SAFE PRACTICES IN HOSTILE

BLASTING/ROCK CONDITIONS
BY

Peter Bellairs
Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific
PMB 17, Singleton, NSW, 2330, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 6574 6665 FAX: +61 2 6574 6849

and

Gour Sen
University of Wollongong
Northfields Avenue, Wollongong, NSW, 2522, Australia

ABSTRACT

Blasting conducted in rock temperatures greater than or equal to 55°C (13 1 “F) and / or in rock
containing sulphide minerals and their oxidation products can result in unplanned detonations. Blasting
practices involving the identification of the affected areas together with the use of speciality explosive
products and rigorous attention to quality control are required to safely blast in these types of
environments.

Sulphide dust explosions occur in some underground mines where the primary blast results in a
secondary explosion of the sulphide rock dust which propagates some distance from the primary blast
area. This phenomena results in considerable damage and the generation of significant volumes of toxic
gasses delaying re-entry to the affected area of the mine thereby increasing both costs and safety
concerns.

The exothermic reaction between ammonium nitrate based explosives and rock types containing
partially oxidised sulphides have resulted in numerous high risk blasting incidents. These reactions can
occur at ambient temperatures and often result in premature detonations / deflagrations causing a great
deal of consternation at the affected minesite resulting in lost production and considerable expenditure to
solve the problem.

Rock masses at elevated temperatures can also result in unplanned detonations unless appropriate
precautions are taken.

This paper discusses each of these hazards, cites some case studies and details appropriate generic safe
and efficient blasting techniques for each of the above applications using appropriately formulated
explosive products.

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INTRODUCTION

The initial process used to extract the vast majority of minerals, metals, aggregates or to construct
tunnels and foundations in hard rock is drill and blast as it is currently the most efficient and cost
effective means of fragmenting an insitu rockmass. The process commences with the marking out of
hole positions, drilling these, leaving them for a variable period of time and then filling the holes with
initiation system, bulk or packaged explosives followed by inert stemming material. The surface
initiation system is then laid out according to a plan to enable the holes to detonate in a predetermined
sequence to maximise their fragmenting effect.

Even though the drill and blast process is inherently high risk, strict adherence to appropriate rules and
procedures dramatically reduces this to a point where it is considered by many personnel to be a routine
function. In certain circumstances, however, well controlled and organised blasting practices can
produce unplanned premature detonations / deflagrations or secondary explosions. The occurrence of
either of these high risk events can result in death, injury, equipment destruction / damage and
considerable disruption to the mining operation.

This paper identifies and discusses the possible causes of these accidental events and suggests some
preventive measures, which may, if followed, eliminate or at least reduce their occurrence.

EXPLOSIVE GROUND REACTIVITY

Rocks are composed of various minerals with different characteristics. These minerals are chemicals,
and depending on the types and percentage of particular minerals present, the rock can be relatively
unstable and ready to react when other chemicals, such as explosives, are introduced. Many of the
sulphide minerals when partially oxidised will react with ammonium nitrate based explosives. Pyrite is
the most common of these sulphides due to its relative abundance in a large number of rock types. In
many mines in Australia, sulphide containing rocks react exothermically with commercial explosives
leading to combustion associated with explosive spillages or premature detonation, Rumba11 (1991).
This reactive scenario is further increased by the drilling process which supplies the rock mass with
additional atmospheric oxygen, thereby creating ideal conditions for spontaneous combustion. If the
drilled rock mass is composed of a rock type that is liable to react, then the insertion of an explosive,
which is composed of very strong oxidisers, greatly increases the potential for this reaction to occur.
The three stages of reaction are shown in figure one, Bellairs and Ash (1995) which indicated that at
point C the temperature rapidly increases. Exothermic reactions associated with explosive ground
reactivity can cause the rock temperature to reach 700°C (1300”F), which far exceeds that required to
initiate a premature detonation. It should be noted that the time taken for the explosive ground reactivity
is variable from hours to months and cannot be predicted with any accuracy.

CASE STUDIES

Explosive rock reactions are not isolated events, as is evidenced by a number of incidents in iron ore,
gold, base metal and coal mines in Australia.

Rumba11 (1991) details an incident at the Mt Whaleback Iron Ore Mine located in Western Australia in
December 1983, where two blast holes loaded with ANFO that were primed with a booster and

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detonating cord prematurely detonated. The first hole to detonate had a 10m (32.8 feet) stemming of
drill chips. The explosion resulted a heap of rock 10 m in diameter and 2m (6.6 feet) high. The second
hole to detonate was not stemmed. The bulk of the explosive force resulting in rifling, with fragments
up to 1 OOmm (4 inch) in diameter being thrown a distance of 50m (164feet). The two detonated holes
were not tied into the remainder of the pattern. Although there was no injury or property damage, the
impact of this explosion on the mining operation was pronounced, with the east pit, the main high grade
ore source, being closed for 23 days. This length of time was required to tie in the surface initiation
system to the remainder of the charged blast holes in the pattern, using remote control machinery.
Investigations into this occurrence revealed that a section of the overburden rock known as black pyritic
shale can react with ammonium nitrate based explosives, resulting in spontaneous combustion and
premature detonation.

The Collinsville Coal Mine, figure two, suffered an explosive ground reactivity problem when three
loaded blast holes deflagrated. The majority of the holes were loaded with 1.3 g/cc Heavy ANFO. All
holes had been de-watered prior to charging and during this process sulphur dioxide gas was detected
but no heating was observed. Sulphur dioxide gas is evolved when sulphides partially oxidise and
therefore the presence of this gas is an indicator of explosive ground reactivity. However, this was not
known by the minesite personnel at the time of the incident. All holes were primed with 400g (one
pound) cast booster with a 3.6 g/m (18grain/foot) detonating cord downline. It was during the process
of tying in the shot that an unfamiliar sound was heard. This prompted the shotfirer to stop work and he
observed a stemmed blast hole emitting smoke and fumes. The blast was immediately vacated,
management were notified and the area was made safe by blocking off all access. Two more
deflagrations were observed. Subsequent investigations revealed that the rocks in that area were acidic,
spontaneously oxidising and therefore susceptible to explosive ground reactivity.

This was confirmed by collecting appropriate samples and subjecting these to a laboratory based
technique called DTA (Differential Thermal Analysis). Each sample was pulverised and a small (less
than 1 g or 0.0402) sub sample mixed with the explosive being used. The composit sample was placed
in a special holder inside the instrument and was heated up at 2°C (3.6”F) per minute. The differential
temperature between the heating block and the inside of the sample holder was monitored and graphed,
figure three. It is the exothermic reactions that are of interest as these can lead to premature detonations.
The degree of reactivity is assessed by the temperature at which the reactions occur with low
temperatures such as 22°C (71°F) indicating on extremely reactive rock type.

DETONATION DUE TO HIGH AMBIENT ROCK TEMPERATURE

Sometimes the inherent rock temperature is such that standard explosives cannot be safely used. The
reason for this high ambient temperature can be due to any one or a combination of the following:
l Geothermal gradient

0 Volcanism
l Spontaneously combusting rock type
l Reactive rock.

In the case of geothermal gradient it is simply the depth to which mining has progressed that causes the
elevated temperatures (eg South African gold mines). With volcanism it is the volcanic activity in the
surrounding region that is responsible for elevated temperature, a high profile example being the Lihir

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Gold Mine in Papua New Guinea. In many cases spontaneously cornbusting rock types are either coal
seams or carbonaceous shales with pyrite. If a blast hole is drilled into rocks above the spontaneous
cornbusting strata high temperatures (above 200°C or 392°F) can occur (eg Rhondda Collieries,
Bayswater and Drayton coal mines in Australia and KPC Coal Mine in Kalimantan, Indonesia) which
can cause ammonium nitrate based explosives to detonate.

In a significant number of cases the elevated temperature will also result in the rocks becoming subject
to the exothermic reactions associated with explosive ground reactivity. In this situation the elevated
temperature turns a non reactive rock at ambient temperatures into one that will react exothermically
when explosives are placed in contact with the rock type.

CASE STUDIES - HOT GROUND

As previously discussed, volcanism can result in high temperature rock types being required to be
excavated. Sen (1989) described one such case where in an underground gold mine in Kagoshima,
Japan, exploratory holes showed that the rock temperature rises to 90°C (194°F) at 1 OOm (109yards)
below sea level. This region is influenced by the active Sakurajima volcano and consequently the mine
must use a heat resistant emulsion explosive called Sunvex instead of ANFO in the working areas where
rock temperature is more than 55°C (13 1 “F), otherwise premature detonations may occur.

The ambient rock temperature in certain sections of Mt Isa mines in Australia approaches 100°C (2 12°F)
where normal ANFO cannot be used safely. The 500 Orebody at Mt Isa had to be sealed off due to the
spontaneous combustion of much of the ore at this location. This spontaneous combustion led to the
surrounding rock mass being heated up in excess of 100°C (212°F). This problem occurred in the
1960’s with the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation being called to
investigate. The studies led to various additives being used with ANFO to provide thermal stability
(urea) and to combat explosive ground reactivity (borates), Luckaszewski (1968). The use of this doped
ANFO together with temperature logging and load and shoot enabled a portion of the 500 Orebody to be
safely mined. Unfortunately continued severe spontaneous combustion forced the closure and sealing of
this orebody, and there are currently no plans to reopen it.

Bellairs et al (1994) describes how a loaded and stemmed blast hole prematurely detonated in an open-
cut coal mine in Queensland, Australia. The blast hole was 15m (4.6 foot) deep and contained 168Kg
(370 pounds) of ANFO, one HDP 400 booster and a 3.6g/m (lSgrains/foot) detonating cord downline.
An RKC thermocouple was used to measure the rock temperature in the blast area and it was found to
vary between 42°C (108°F) and 52°C or 126°F (subsequently it was established that the thermocouple
was not capable of measuring blast hole wall temperature accurately as it was only taking a spot reading
at the base of the hole). The blast hole was 150mm (6inch) in diameter and angled 15” away from the
limit. The explosion took place two hours after the commencement of charging. Fortunately there were
no injuries or damage sustained to any personnel or equipment. Subsequently, samples collected
showed that the overburden immediately above the coal seam consisted of layers of black shale with
traces of pyrite. The pyrite in the slightly weathered black shales had been partially oxidised making the
rock highly susceptible to oxidation by the explosive. As pyrite is known to react with ammonium
nitrate based explosives leading to the potential for an explosive ground reaction, this may have been the
cause of the premature detonation. However, DTA investigations indicated the lack of explosive ground
reactivity. The spontaneously cornbusting coal seam beneath the overburden had caused portion of the

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blast hole to heat up above ammonium nitrates disassociation temperature, see Table 1 below, causing
the explosive to detonate.

Table 1: Sensitivity of commonly used blasting agents, explosives and pyrotechnic compounds to
impact and temperature in the absence of contaminants (Rumball 1991).

Impact Deflagration
Explosive Ingredient Sensitivity Decomposition /
(N m) Ignition Temp. (oC/OF)
ANFO 186/367 (decomposes)
PETN 3 202/396 (deflagrates)
TNT 15 300572 (deflagrates)
HMX (Cyclotol) 7.4 287/549 (deflagrates)
Lead Azide 3.5 320/579 (deflagrates)
RDX (Cyclotol) 7.5 2601500 (deflagrates)
Barium chloride (delay compound used in detonators) NTS
Boron (delay compound used in detonators) 450/842 (ignites)
Barium chromate (delay compound used in detonators) NTS
Potassium perchlorate (delay compound used in detonators) 400/752 (ignites)
Zircon-nickel allov (delav comnound used in detonators) NTS

The Toyoha mine is an underground base metal mine in Hokkaido Island in Japan producing mainly
lead, silver and zinc. The working faces are more than 600m (1970feet) below surface where the virgin
rock temperature is above 120°C (248°F); in some areas it is even 160°C (320°F) or more. Under these
extreme conditions, the working face temperatures are lowered by mechanical ventilation, cooling by
water, drainage of hot ground water (which is utilised on the surface for baths, etc) and by blocking off
worked out areas. In this mine, three types of heat resistant packaged explosives are used depending on
the prevailing rock temperature at the working faces. The composition and features of these explosives
are given in Table 2.

Table 2 - Composition and Features of Explosives Used at the Toyoha Mine

For Rock Temperature 20°C t o 70°C 1 70°C t o 160°C 160°C to 165OC

Ammonium Nitrate 75 - 85% 70 - 75% 70 -75%
Combustible Material 3-7% 3-7% 3-7%
Water, Micro Balloon 18-22% 10 - 14% 10 - 14%
Heat Resistant Agent 7-13% 9- 15%
Specific Gravity 1.05 - 1.15 1.25 - 1.35 1.25 - 1.35
Sand Gap Test 2 - four times 0 - 1 time O-l time
Ballistic Pendulum I
8mm 61- 65 mm 58-63 mm
Heat Resistant 1 85°C for 24 hrs ) 160°C for 24 hrs 1 165°C for 24 hrs (

Note 1: 20°C = 68”F, 70°C = 158”F, 85°C = 185”F, 160°C(158”F) = 320°F 165°C = 329°F

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 2: 8mm = 0.341inch, 61mm = 2.40inch, 65mm = 2.56inch, 58mm = 2.28inch, 63mm = 2.48inch.

When rock temperatures in working faces are higher than 70°C (158”F), specially prepared heat proof
electric detonators are used that have tin plated copper lead wires covered with a heat resistant resin, and
a silicon rubber plug.

SULPHIDE OUST EXPLOSIONS

Currently the exact operating mechanisms of sulphide dust explosions (SDE’s) are not fully understood,
Anon (1996), although the sulphur content of the ore, its mineralogy and the grain size are significant
factors. It has also been postulated that the post blast detonation gasses also play a part in making the
atmospheric environment more explosive.

The SDE’s are dependent on a number of variables in the characteristics of dust such as chemical
composition, particle size distribution, surface area, density, concentration and moisture content. Any
ore which contains an appreciable amount of pyrite and / or pyrrhotite is considered to be particularly
hazardous. But all sulphide dusts can be explodable. Generally, any ore which has a 20 per cent or
more sulphur content should be regarded as potentially explosive but SDE’s have occurred in orebodies
with a sulphur content as low as eleven per cent. Enright (1988) considers that dust explosions generally
have a particle size less than 400 micron.

A number of underground mines in Australia have experienced sulphide dust explosions such as
Benambra, Hellyer, Thalanga, Scuddles and Elura to name a few. The problems associated with SDE’s
revolve around damage to mine infrastructure such as ventilation, power, water, air etc and in extreme
cases equipment can be damaged. Large quantities of noxious gasses such as sulphur dioxide are also
produced which can contaminate other areas of the mine causing personnel in these locations to be
affected. In mines with a severe SDE problem the entire mine is evacuated with personnel only
returning once the gas concentrations are below certain acceptable limits. This results in a significant
loss of production. In addition to this the noxious gasses vented to the atmosphere often cause a
significant surface environmental problem associated with air quality and acid build up in the surface
material surrounding the exhaust vents.

Considerable effort has therefore been placed on solving this problem with an AMIRA (Australian
Mineral Industry Research Association) Project 3 16 A and B being funded by both government and
industry sources. Various techniques have been used and were trialed and evaluated during this study:
Use of pulverised limestone
Use of short delay blasting
Limiting all blasts to a maximum of 120 milliseconds
Using permitted explosives
Clearing the mine of all personnel before any blasting or, alternatively, providing fresh air bases and
oxygen self- rescuers
Use of water to wet down the blast area and the associated drives
Use of water sprays
Use of Nonel@ (shock tube)and elimination of detonating cord.

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None1 (shock tube) will not cause dust explosions whereas a detonating cord of 3.6g/m (18grain/foot)
strength or above can cause an explosion. It is also reasonably established that gel stemming of at least
600mm (2feet) in length in standard development rounds will prevent SDE’s in conjunction with the use
of wetting down the blast area and associated drives, water sprays and the use of None1 (shock tube).
Care must be taken to ensure absolute quality control of the process otherwise an SDE will occur. In
addition any rockmass weakness such as a fault or a joint that lets the explosive flame access the
sulphide dust cloud can also lead to an SDE.

The gel powder is supplied in small polythene sachets with the stemming mixture being prepared in a
large drum, in the ratio of one gel sachet to 201itres (6 gallons) of water. With the water stirring at 80 -
100 RPM in the drum, the gel is added at the rate of 50g/sec (O.lpound/sec). After stirring for a further
two minutes the mixture is allowed to set for a minimum period of two hours before it is ready for use.
The mixture keeps for three to four days between mixing and use.

In one underground mine in Western Australia, 64 shots were fired in locations where, based on
experience at the mine, SDE’s were highly likely. In 32 of these full precautions were taken, while in
the other half no precautions were taken. In the former case, there was not a single dust explosion, while
in the latter case 3 1 of the 32 faces reported SDE. The key precautions taken in these tests included:
1. Stemming the blast holes
2. Preventing any explosives (including “bunch blocks” from coming into contact with ore dust
3. Washing down the walls a good distance (ideally 10 m) from the face
4. Setting up misting sprays in the drive
5. Having an effective monitoring device for detecting SDE before miners returned underground.

The use of limestone dust has been trialed elsewhere to make combustible sulphide dust inert but the
quantities of dust required are prohibitively large and it is impractical to effectively disperse the dust to
cover all exposed rock surfaces the method is not recommended to be used to prevent or inhibit SDE.

Another effective technique that is far easier, less manpower intensive and not subject to the strict
attention to detail required by the other successful multi-task method, involves the use of a suitable
inhibited emulsion explosive. A product called Iregel RU has been extensively used in North America
in mines suffering SDE’s. Since the introduction of the inhibited emulsion, no SDE’s have occurred
even though the other preventive measures mentioned above have not been taken, apart from replacing
detonating cord with None1 (shock tube). Trialing as part of the AMIRA project utilising alternate holes
loaded with Titan@ 6000 (which is based on Iregel RU) and ANFO fired as single tests indicated a 100
per cent success rate with Titan 6000 whilst a large proportion of the ANFO holes caused an SDE.

SDE’s occur more frequently in development blasting than stope blasting. One hypothesis advanced to
account for this is that higher concentrations of atmospheric dust are created during development
blasting due to the confined space. The logic being that if the same or at least similar percentages of
dust are left on all surfaces of a mine and the blast produces about the same volume of dust per unit
weight of rock in each blast type then this combined with the shock wave stirring up the dust on the
walls, floors etc will result in higher concentrations of dust in a development heading than a stope.
These higher concentrations are required to produce an SDE.

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Another hypothesis involves the utilisation of after blast gasses combined with the dust to produce an
explosive mixture. Both hypothesis explain the occurrence of significantly more SDE’s in development
compared to stoping but as previously discussed no definitive mechanism for SDE generation has been
proved.

PROACTIVE APPROACHES FOR EXPLOSIVE GROUND REACTIVITY

A number of indicators occur that can be used to predict if a particular minesite has a high probability of
experiencing explosive ground reactivity. The most proactive approach is to recognise the presence of
these indicators and approach the explosive supplier to assess the problem via both an extensive site visit
incorporating a sampling program followed by a suitable laboratory based assessment such as the
previously discussed DTA technique.

The indicators are listed below with respect to ease of identification and how relevant they are to
predicting explosive ground reactivity. It should be noted that reacting explosive spillages and
unplanned detonations are rated lowly (ten and eleven) as the concept is to prevent these high risk events
occurring:

1. Spontaneous combustion
2. Acidic conditions
3. White, yellow, yellow-green salts
4. Acrid smell
5. Spontaneously combusting samples
6. Black sulphide sediments
7. Presence of sulphides
8. Presence of mixed sulphides
9. Sulphide grain size
10. Reacting explosive spillages
11. Unplanned detonations
12. High ambient temperatures

If indicators one, ten or eleven occur, immediately contact the explosives supplier for appropriate
testwork / assistance to resolve the situation. Any two of indicators two, three, four or live or any two of
indicators seven to nine inclusive and twelve combined with any other indicator should also result in a
call to the explosive supplier for assistance.

If the assessment indicates the presence of explosive ground reactivity then appropriate drill and blast
procedures based on:

1. Identification of reactive areas

2. Notification of reactive patterns to all relevant personnel prior to drilling
3. Accurate temperature logging
4. Use of inhibited explosive product
5. Significantly restricted sleep times.

can be implemented to dramatically reduce risk of unplanned detonations.

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PROACTIVE APPROACHES FOR HOT GROUND

As previously indicated hot ground conditions can also lead to unplanned detonations / deflagrations so
a proactive approach must be undertaken to reduce these high risk events using procedures based on:
l Accurate temperature logging

l Loading from coolest to hottest holes

l Loading from the front of the shot to the back of the shot
l Drastically reduced sleep times
l Specially formulated or modified explosives and initiation systems
l Smaller more frequent shots
l Simplified initiation designs

PROACTIVE APPROACHES FOR SDE’S

Mines experiencing SDE’s should minimise risk by:

l Documenting each SDE occurrence on a data base
l Analyse the SDE occurrence data to produce a predictive model
l Wide notification of all blasts with a potential to generate an SDE
l Implementation of appropriate blast procedures to minimise SDE’s either based on
l Utilisation of an appropriately inhibited explosive together with use of Nonel@ (shock tube)
initiation system, or
l Combination of previously discussed techniques utilising gel stemming, misting sprays, None1
(shock tube) initiation, washing down etc
l Having well trained personnel versed in the procedures
l Monitoring air quality prior to allowing re-entry

CONCLUSION

Blasting operations are liable to cause unplanned detonations or post-detonation explosions in the
following hostile environments:
l When the natural rock temperature is high
l When the rock type being blasted reacts with normal explosives to produce exothermic heat
l When the rock type being blasted produces Sulphide Dust Explosions.

However, if appropriate precautions and preventive measures are taken then these hazards can be
avoided and safe blasting methods can be efficiently and effectively established to produce well
fragmented rock required for efficient mining and tunnelling etc operations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to record their gratitude for the assistance received in preparing this paper to the
following persons: Associate Professor Gento Mogi (Tokyo University), Mr Kenichi Nakamura
(Sumitomo Metal Mining Co Ltd), Mr Graham Terrey (NSW Department of Mineral Resources), and
Mr Takashi Yoshie (Toyoha Mining Co Ltd).

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1. Anon. (1996). Guidelines for Safe Mining (Chapter 12), NSW Department of Mineral
Resources, 188 - 190.
2. Bellairs, P. and Ash, M. (1995). Further Improvement to a Safe and Efficient Procedures to
Blast, Excavate and Dispose of a Reactive Rock Type, Explo ‘95, the AUSIMM, Brisbane, 63 -
66.
3. Bellairs, P., Mathews, J. and Slaughter, S. (1994). The Development of a Safe and Efficient
Blasting Procedure in Warm Ground, Proceedings of Open Pit Blasting Workshop ‘94, Perth, 43
- 50.
4. Enright, R. J. (1988). Theoretical Evaluation of Sulphide Dust Explosions in Open Stopes,
Fourth International Mine Ventilation Congress, the AUSIMM, Brisbane, 49 1 - 498.
5. Luckaszewski, G. M. (1968). The Reactivity of ANFO Explosives with Mineral Sulphides, the
AUSIMM Proceedings, 228,61 - 70.
6. Rumball, J. A. (199 1). The Interaction of Partially Weathered Sulphides in the Mt McRae Shale
Formation with Ammonium Nitrate, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Murdoch University, Western
Australia.
7. Sen, G. C. (1989). Hishikari - The Richest and Most Modern Gold Mine in Japan, LUMA, The
University of Leeds (UK), 111 - 117.

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