TORTS AND DAMAGES principal that "where the thing which caused injury, without
TH fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the
CASE DIGESTS – 4 BATCH
Based on Atty. Ranizza D. Datukon’s Syllabus
Jose Maria College – College of Law
D. Presumption of Negligence
1. Res ipsa loquitur
Cases:
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA AND SOLEDAD C. AFRICA,
AND THE HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG V. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC.,
MATEO BOQUIREN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-12986 MARCH 31, 1966
FACTS:
In the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the
Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal
Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed
from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the
opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring
houses, including the personal properties and effects inside
them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued
respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first
as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in
charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them
was attributed as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners
failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised
due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision
of their employees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the
fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply as to
presume negligence on the part of the appellees.
RULING:
Note: Sa explanation ng doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, nag cite
lang ng different case.
Yes. In the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and
Development Co., The court said:
The first point is directed against the sufficiency of plaintiff's
evidence to place appellant on its defense. While it is the rule,
as contended by the appellant, that in case of noncontractual
negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of his injury was
the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized
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defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not occur if he having such control use proper care,
it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the
explanation, that the injury arose from defendant's want of
care."
And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that
he has observed due care and diligence. (San Juan Light &
Transit Co. v. Requena, 244, U.S. 89, 56 L. ed. 680.) This rule is
known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks
for itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the case at bar, where
it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every right to be on the
highway, and the electric wire was under the sole control of
defendant company. In the ordinary course of events, electric
wires do not part suddenly in fair weather and injure people,
unless they are subjected to unusual strain and stress or there
are defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision;
just as barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse
windows to injure passersby, unless some one was negligent.
(Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H & Co. 722; 159 Eng. Reprint 299, the
leading case that established that rule). Consequently, in the
absence of contributory negligence (which is admittedly not
present), the fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a
reasonable presumption of negligence in its installation, care
and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron
Pollock, "if there are any facts inconsistent with negligence, it
is for the defendant to prove."
Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and
sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the other hand,
fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost
invariably from some act of man.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred
therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The
persons who knew or could have known how the fire started
were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the
neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission
on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a
concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping
over it. Defendants’ negligence, therefore, was not only with
respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the
spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended
answer to the second amended complaint that “the fire was
caused through the acts of a stranger who, without authority,
or permission of answering defendant, passed through the
1
TH
gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match in the
premises.” No evidence on this point was adduced, but
assuming the allegation to be true — certainly any unfavorable
inference from the admission may be taken against Boquiren
— it does not extenuate his negligence. A decision of the
Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to those of the
present case, states the rule which we find acceptable here. “It
is the rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or
agent, owe a degree of protection to the public proportionate
to and commensurate with a danger involved … we think it is
the generally accepted rule as applied to torts that ‘if the
effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and
continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact
that the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the
effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is
also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, does not
protect the actor from liability.’ Stated in another way, “The
intention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not
sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of
negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately
cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting
injury.”
DM CONSUNJI VS. CA
GR NO. 137873 , April 20, 2001
FACTS:
Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a
construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from
the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately
rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending
physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival
(DOA) at around 2:15PM.
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo,
performing their work as carpenter at the elevator core of the
14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on
board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the
platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was
merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and
platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso
jumped out of safety.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District
investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990.
Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991
for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision
to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000.
DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUE:
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CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH
W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to prove
negligence on the part of petitioner.
HELD: YES
Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face
of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of
the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the
mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having
charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of
evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law
of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory
that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which
causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has
the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has
no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the
happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The
inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the
fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether
culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant
but inaccessible to the injured person.
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the
14th floor of a building to the basement while he was working
with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death.
The construction site is within the exclusive control and
management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project
superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in
complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances
of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within
the knowledge of the appellant or its employees.
On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know
what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to
the basement while performing work in a construction site
unless someone is negligen, thus, the first requisite for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As
explained earlier, the construction site with all its
paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the
injury is under the exclusive control and management of
2
TH
appellant, thus, the second requisite is also present. No
contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s
deceased husband; thus,the last requisite is also present. All
the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur
are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of
appellant’s negligence arises. x x x.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for
the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the
presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise
since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident
which befell respondent’s husband."
DST MOVERS CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE'S GENERAL
INSURANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 198627, January 13, 2016
(evidence na case ni pero nay application sa negligence)
FACTS:
An accident occurred involving a Honda civic driven by Adeline
Yuboco Dela Cruz, a truck allegedly belonging to DST Movers,
and a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Harrison Tuquero Valdez . It
was alleged that the truck hit the Honda Civic and pushed it
forward, thereby hitting the Mitsubishi Lancer. The driver of
the truck then allegedly escaped.
An investigation report was prepared by PO2 Tomas describing
the involved Honda civic and Mitsubishi Lancer, their drivers,
and damaged sustained but on the trucks description the
driver was stated as unidentified and the damaged was
undetermined.
The Honda Civic was covered by PGIC’s insurance and paid its
owner the entire amount of the insurance. PGIC then filed a
complaint for sum of money against DST movers.
In its answer DST Movers acknowledged that it was the owner
of the truck, however it claimed that the truck did not make
any trips on the day of the alleged accident. They supported
their claims with copies of invoices and receipts and vouchers
relating to repairs and maintenance procedures that were
undertaken on the truck on specific dates which included the
date when the accident occurred.
The MTC Manila ruled in favor of PGIC. On appeal the MTC
manila ruling was affirmed by the RTC Manila in favor of PGIC.
DST Movers then filed before the CA a petition for review
under Rule 42. The CA denied DST Movers’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, DST Movers filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 before the SC. In the petition DST Movers
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insisted that its liability was not established by a
preponderance of evidence. Specifically, it faults the
Metropolitan Trial Court for ruling in favor of PGIC despite how
its version of events was supported by nothing more the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that reliance on this
Report was misplaced as it was supposedly "improperly
identified [and] uncorroborated.”
ISSUE:
Is the Liability of DST movers established by preponderance of
evidence?
RULING:
NO. The Traffic Accident Investigation Report prepared by PO2
Tomas should not have been admitted and accorded weight by
the Metropolitan Trial Court as it was "improperly identified
[and] uncorroborated." Petitioner, in effect, asserts that the
non-presentation in court of PO2 Tomas, the officer who
prepared the report, was fatal to respondent’s cause.
In the first place, this Report should not have been admitted
as evidence for violating the Hearsay Rule. Bereft of
evidentiary basis, the conclusion of the lower courts cannot
stand as it has been reduced to conjecture. Thus, we reverse
this conclusion.
Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides
for the Hearsay Rule. It renders inadmissible as evidence out-
of-court statements made by persons who are not presented
as witnesses but are offered as proof of the matters stated.
SECTION 36. Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
SECTION 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
Respondent, the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial
Court, and the Court of Appeals are all of the position that the
Report prepared by PO2 Tomas satisfies these requisites. Thus,
they maintain that it is admissible as prima facie evidence of
the facts it states. This despite the admitted fact that neither
PO2 Tomas, nor the person who supposedly reported the
events of February 28, 2002 to PO2 Tomas – the person
identified as "G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX" – gave a testimony
in support of the Report.
They are in serious error.
3
TH
The statements made by this court in Standard Insurance are
on point:
[F]or the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible
as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the
following requisites must be present:
. . . (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another
person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made
by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by
such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person
had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third
requisite cited above. As correctly noted by the courts below,
while the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited
as evidence, the investigating officer who prepared the same
was not presented in court to testify that he had sufficient
knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired
them personally or through official information. Neither was
there any explanation as to why such officer was not
presented. We cannot simply assume, in the absence of proof,
that the account of the incident stated in the report was based
on the personal knowledge of the investigating officer who
prepared it.
Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to testify on the
events that transpired during the vehicular collision, his lone
testimony, unsupported by other preponderant evidence, fails
to sufficiently establish petitioner's claim that respondents'
negligence was, indeed, the proximate cause of the damage
sustained by Cham's vehicle.
Respondent presented proof of the occurrence of an accident
that damaged Fidel Yuboco’s Honda Civic sedan, that the sedan
was insured by respondent, and that respondent paid Fidel
Yuboco’s insurance claims. As to the identity, however, of the
vehicle or of the person responsible for the damage sustained
by the sedan, all that respondent relies on is the Report
prepared by PO2 Tomas.
It is plain to see that the matters indicated in the Report are
not matters that were personally known to PO2 Tomas. The
Report is candid in admitting that the matters it states were
merely reported to PO2 Tomas by "G. Simbahon of
PNCC/SLEX." It was this "G. Simbahon," not PO2 Tomas, who
had personal knowledge of the facts stated in the Report. Thus,
even as the Report embodies entries made by a public officer
in the performance of his duties, it fails to satisfy the third
requisite for admissibility for entries in official records as an
exception to the Hearsay Rule.
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To be admitted as evidence, it was thus imperative for the
person who prepared the Report—PO2 Tomas—to have
himself presented as a witness and then testify on his Report.
However, even as the Report would have been admitted as
evidence, PO2 Tomas’ testimony would not have sufficed in
establishing the identity of the motor vehicle and/or the
person responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan. For
this purpose, the testimony of G. Simbahon was necessary.
As the sole evidence relied upon by respondent as to the
identity of the responsible motor vehicle or person has been
rendered unworthy of even the slightest judicial consideration,
there is no basis for holding-as the Metropolitan Trial Court
did-that the motor vehicle responsible for the damage
sustained by the sedan was owned by petitioner. Not only this,
petitioner has even adduced proof that on February 28, 2002,
its Isuzu Elf truck with plate number UAL-295 was undergoing
repairs and maintenance and, thus, could not have been at the
South Luzon Expressway. The weight of evidence is clearly in
petitioner's favor.
NILO B ROSIT vs DAVAO DOCTORS HOSPITAL and DR.
ROLANDO GESTUVO
GR No. 210445, December 7, 2015
FACTS:
Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident where he fractured his
jaw. He was referred to Dr. Gestuvo, a specialist in mandibular
injuries, who operated on Rosit. As the operation required the
smallest screws available, Dr. Gestuvo cut the screws on hand
to make them smaller. Dr. Gestuvo knew that there were
smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not so
inform Rosit supposing that the latter would not be able to
afford the same.
Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and
close his mouth and was in pain. Xrays showed that his jaw was
aligned by the screws used on him touched his molar. Dr.
Gestuvo referred Rosit to Dr. Pangan, a dentist who then
opined that another operation is necessary and that it is to be
performed in Cebu. Rosit went to Cebu and underwent the
operation successfully.
On his return to Davao, Rosit demanded the Dr. Gestuvo
reimburse him for the cost of the operation and the expenses
incurred in Cebu amounting to P140,000. Dr. Gestuvo refused
to pay. Thus, Rosit filed a civil case for damages. RTC adjudged
Dr. Gestuvo negligent holding that res ipsa loquitur principle
applies, thus, expert medical testimony may be dispensed with
because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The
CA refused to acknowledge the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine on the ground that the foregoing elements
are absent.
4
TH

Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA correctly absolved Dr. Gestuvo from
liability.
RULING:
Petition granted.
CA erred in absolving Dr. Gestuvo from liability. A medical
negligence is a type of claim to redress a wrong committed by
a medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the
death of a patient. There are four elements involved in a
medical negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and
proximate causation.
To establish medical negligence, the Court has held that an
expert testimony is generally required to define the standard
of behaviour by which the court may determine whether the
physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward
the patient. But, although generally, expert medical testimony
is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has
done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard
medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony
is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof
of negligence. The exception may be availed of if the following
requisites concur:
1. The accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent
2. The instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution of the person injured
In this case, the essential requisites for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present.
The first element was sufficiently established when Rosit
proved that one of the screws installed by Dr. Gestuvo struck
his molar. An average man of common intelligence would
know that striking a tooth with any foreign object much less a
screw would cause severe pain.
Anent the second element, it is sufficient that the operation
which resulted in the screw hitting Rosit’s molar was, indeed,
performed by Dr. Gestuvo.
Lastly, the third element, it was not shown that Rosit’s lung
disease could have contributed to the pain. What is clear is
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that he suffered because one of the screws that Dr. Gestuvo
installed hit Rosit’s molar.
Clearly then, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine finds application in
the instant case and no expert testimony is required to
establish the negligence of defendant Dr. Gestuvo.
MARCELO MACALINAO vs. EDDIE ONG
G.R. No. 146635 December 14, 2005
FACTS:
Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver,
respectively, at the Genetron International Marketing. On 25
April 1992, Sebastian, their boss, instructed Macalinao, Ong
and two truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of machinerya
reactor/motor for mixing chemicals, to Sebastian's
manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan. While in the process of
complying with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong,
Genetron's Isuzu Elf truck hit and bumped the front portion of
a private jeepney along Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan at
around 11:20 in the morning. Both vehicles incurred severe
damages while the passengers sustained physical injuries as a
consequence of the collision. Macalinao incurred the most
serious injuries among the passengers of the truck.
Macalinao's body was paralyzed and immobilized from the
neck down as a result of the accident and per doctor's advice,
his foot was amputated. He also suffered from bed sores and
infection. His immedicable condition, coupled with the
doctor's recommendation, led his family to bring him home
where he died on November 7, 1992.
Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for
damages against both Ong and Sebastian before the RTC of
Quezon City. After his death, Macalinao was substituted by his
parents in the action. A criminal case for reckless' imprudence
resulting to serious physical injuries had also been instituted
earlier against Ong but for reasons which do not appear in the
records of this case, trial thereon did not ensue.
The RTC ruled that both Ong and Sebastian are jointly liable to
pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil
indemnity for Macalinao's death, holding that the former was
guilty of negligence in driving the truck, and the latter was
negligent in the selection and supervision of Ong.
The CA reversed the RTC’s finding and held that the evidence
presented by petitioners was woefully scant to support a
verdict of negligence against Ong. And since respondents'
liability hinged squarely on proof of Ong's negligence, neither
of them could be held liable for damages to petitioners.
ISSUE:
5
TH
Whether or not the evidence conclusively established fault or
negligence on the part of Ong.
RULING:
YES. Contrary to the conclusion of the appellate court, the
evidence on record coupled with the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur sufficiently establishes Ong's negligence.
The photographs of the accident which the appellate court
cavalierly brushed aside as insignificant deserve substantial
cogitation. In Jose v. Court of Appeals, we upheld the trial
courts reliance on photographs of the accident as opposed to
a party's obviously biased testimony. In so doing, we stated:
In this case, while there is a dearth of testimonial evidence to
enlighten us about what actually happened, photographs
depicting the relative positions of the vehicles immediately
after the accident took place do exist. It is well established that
photographs, when duly verified and shown by extrinsic
evidence to be faithful representations of the subject as of the
time in question, are, in the discretion of the trial court,
admissible in evidence as aids in arriving at an understanding
of the evidence, the situation or condition of objects or
premises or the circumstances of an accident.
According to American courts, photographs are admissible in
evidence in motor vehicle accident cases when they appear to
have been accurately taken and are proved to be a faithful and
clear representation of the subject, which cannot itself be
produced, and are of such nature as to throw light upon a
disputed point. Before a photograph may be admitted in
evidence, however, its accuracy or correctness must be
proved, and it must be authenticated or verified first. In the
case at bar, the photographer testified in open court and
properly identified the pictures as the ones he took at the
scene of the accident.
An examination of said photographs clearly shows that the
road where the mishap occurred is marked by a line at the
center separating the right from the left lane. Based on the
motorists right of way rule, the Isuzu truck which was headed
towards Norzagaray, Bulacan should have been occupying the
left lane while the private jeepney which was traversing the
road to the town proper of Sta. Maria, Bulacan should have
been in the right lane. Exhibits L and L-4 among the
photographs, however, reveal that in the aftermath of the
collision, the Isuzu truck usurped the opposite lane to such an
extent that only its right rear wheel remained in the left lane,
a few inches from the demarcation line. Its two front wheels
and left rear wheel were planted squarely on the private
jeepneys lane and the Isuzu truck had rotated such that its
front no longer pointed towards Norzagaray but partially faced
the town proper of Sta. Maria instead.
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While ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of
fault in automobile collisions, the position of the two vehicles
gives rise to the conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck which hit
the private jeepney rather than the other way around. The
smashed front of the Isuzu truck is pressed against the private
jeepneys left front portion near the drivers side. The private
jeepney is positioned diagonally in the right lane; its front at
the rightmost corner of the road while its rear remained a few
feet from the demarcation line. Based on the angle at which it
stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to the right in
an unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu truck. This would
support the statement of the police investigator that the Isuzu
truck lost control and hit the left front portion of the private
jeepney. It would also explain why the driver of the private
jeepney died immediately after being brought to the hospital,
since in such a scenario, the brunt of the collision logically bore
down on him.
Moreover, the unequal size and weight of the two vehicles
would make it improbable for the relatively lighter private
jeepney to have stricken the heavier truck with such force as
to push the latter to the formers side of the road. Had that
been the case, the two vehicles would have ended up crushed
together at the center of the road or at the Isuzu trucks lane
instead of rolling to a stop at the private jeepneys lane.
Another piece of evidence which supports a finding of
negligence against Ong is the police report of the incident
denoted as Entry No. 04-229 of the Sta. Maria Police Station.
The report states that the Isuzu truck was the one which hit
the left front portion of the private jeepney. This piece of
evidence was disregarded by the Court of Appeals on the
ground that entries in police blotters should not be given
significance or probative value as they do not constitute
conclusive proof of the truth thereof.
While true in most instances, it must still be remembered that
although police blotters are of little probative value, they are
nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of
competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. Entries
in police records made by a police officer in the performance
of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence
of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be
either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.
In this case, the police blotter was identified and formally
offered as evidence and the person who made the entries
thereon was likewise presented in court. On the other hand,
aside from a blanket allegation that the driver of the other
vehicle was the one at fault, respondents did not present any
evidence to back up their charge and show that the conclusion
of the police investigator was false. Given the paucity of details
in the report, the investigators observation could have been
easily refuted and overturned by respondents through the
6
TH
simple expedient of supplying the missing facts and showing to
the satisfaction of the court that the Isuzu truck was blameless
in the incident. Ong was driving the truck while the two other
truck helpers also survived the accident. Any or all of them
could have given their testimony to shed light on what actually
transpired, yet not one of them was presented to substantiate
the claim that Ong was not negligent.
Since respondents failed to refute the contents of the police
blotter, the statement therein that the Isuzu truck hit the
private jeepney and not the other way around is deemed
established. The prima facie nature of the police report
ensures that if it remains unexplained or uncontradicted, it will
be sufficient to establish the facts posited therein.
While not constituting direct proof of Ong's negligence, the
foregoing pieces of evidence justify the application of res ipsa
loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means 'the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.
Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima
facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the
principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It
permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the
accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the
doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence
and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that
there was no negligence on his part.
The doctrine can be invoked only when under the
circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available. This is based in part upon the theory that the
defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the
injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in
general terms and rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which
the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief
evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is
practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the
injured person.
NATIONAL POWER COMPANY v. CA
G.R. NO. 124378, MARCH 8, 2005
FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned and
controlled corporation created under Commonwealth Act No.
120. On 15 November 1973, the Office of the President of the
Philippines issued Memorandum Order No. 398. Said decree
instructed the NPC to build the Agus Regulation Dam at the
mouth of Agus River in Lanao del Sur, at a normal maximum
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
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water level of Lake Lanao at 702 meters elevation. NPC built
and operated the said dam in 1978.
There were several fishpond owners which spent substantial
amounts to construct, maintain, and stock their respective
fishponds. In 1986, all the improvements were washed away
when the water level of the lake escalated and the subject
lakeshore area was flooded. The owners blamed the
inundation on the Agus Regulation Dam built and operated by
the NPC in 1978.
The owners proceeded to NPC and asked if they can assist
them with the damages they suffered but the NPC did not heed
to this demand. Hence, they filed a complaint for damages
before the RTC. They alleged that the negligence and
inexperience of NPC’s employees assigned to operate the Agus
Regulation Dam were the proximate causes of the damage
caused to their properties and livelihood.
On the other hand, NPC denied the private respondents’
allegations, and tossed back the disputations that: (a) the
water level of Lake Lanao never went beyond 702 meters, (b)
NPC employees were never remiss in the performance of their
duties, and (c) the private respondents’ alleged fishponds were
either located below the 702-meter level, or must have been
introduced when the water level was abnormally low and as
such, were within the prohibited area as defined in
Memorandum Order No. 398. In fine, the NPC posited that the
private respondents had no cause of action against it.
The RTC ruled in favor of the owners of the fishponds. The CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
Is NPC liable for the damages suffered by the fishpond owners
considering that they operate and manage the Agus
Regulation Dam?
HELD:
YES. In the absence of any clear explanation on what other
factors could have explained the flooding in the neighboring
properties of the dam, it is fair to reasonably infer that the
incident happened because of want of care on the part of NPC
to maintain the water level of the dam within the benchmarks
at the maximum normal lake elevation of 702 meters. An
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the thing speaks
for itself, comes to fore. Where the thing which causes injury
is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
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affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
CEBU SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS, INC vs.
WILLIAM LINES, INC. and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE and
ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 132607 May 5, 1999
FACTS
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. (CSEW) is a
domestic corporation engaged in the business of dry-docking
and repairing of marine vessels while the private respondent,
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. (Prudential), also a
domestic corporation is in the non-life insurance business.
William Lines, Inc. is in the shipping business. It the owner of
M/V Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel, which
caught fire and sank on February 16, 1991. At the time of the
unfortunate occurrence sued upon, subject vessel was insured
with Prudential for P45,000,000.00 pesos for hull and
machinery.
On February 5, 1991, William Lines, Inc. brought its vessel, M/V
Manila City, to the Cebu Shipyard in Lapulapu City for annual
dry-docking and repair.
While the M/V Manila City was undergoing dry-docking and
repairs within the premises of CSEW, the master, officers and
crew of M/V Manila City stayed in the vessel using their cabins
as living quarters. Other employees hired by William Lines to
do repairs and maintenance work on the vessel were also
present during the dry-docking.
On February 16, 1991, after subject vessel was transferred to
the docking quay, it caught fire and sank, resulting to its
eventual total loss.
William Lines, Inc. filed a complaint for damages against CSEW,
alleging that the fire which broke out in M/V Manila City was
caused by CSEW's negligence and lack of care.
RTC rendered its decision finding CSEW liable, CA affirmed the
RTCs decision. CSEW appealed.
CSEW contends that the finding of negligence by the Court of
Appeals is not supported by the evidence on record, and
contrary to what the Court of Appeals found, CSEW did not
have management and control over M/V Manila City. Although
it was brought to the premises of CSEW for annual repair,
William Lines, Inc. retained control over the vessel as the ship
captain remained in command and the ship's crew were still
present. While it imposed certain rules and regulations on
William Lines, it was in the exercise of due diligence and not an
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indication of CSEW's exclusive control over subject vessel.
Thus, CSEW maintains that it did not have exclusive control
over the M/V Manila City and the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
ISSUE
Is the Doctrine Of Res Ipsa Loquitur applicable in this case?
Making CSEW liable?
RULING:
Yes. The finding by the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
M/V Manila City caught fire and sank by reason of the
negligence of the workers of CSEW, when the said vessel was
under the exclusive custody and control of CSEW is accordingly
upheld.
Under the circumstances of the case, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply
to a given situation, the following conditions must concur :
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; and
(2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence.
The facts and evidence on record reveal the concurrence of
said conditions in the case under scrutiny. First, the fire that
occurred and consumed M/V Manila City would not have
happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care
and diligence had been exercised. In other words, some
negligence must have occurred. Second, the agency charged
with negligence, as found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals and as shown by the records, is the herein petitioner,
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc., which had control
over subject vessel when it was docketed for annual repairs.
So also, as found by the regional trial court, "other responsible
causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff, and third
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence.
What is more, in the present case the trial court found direct
evidence to prove that the workers and/or employees of CSEW
were remiss in their duty of exercising due diligence in the care
of subject vessel.
At around eleven o'clock in the morning of February 16, 1991,
the Chief Mate of M/V Manila City was inspecting the various
works being done by CSEW on the vessel, when he saw that
some workers of CSEW were cropping out steel plates Tank Top
No. 12 using acetylene, oxygen and welding torch. He also
observed that the rubber insulation wire coming out of the air-
conditioning unit was already burning, prompting him to scold
the workers.
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The direct evidence substantiates the conclusion that CSEW of the fire that engulfed the garage, Pascual was nevertheless
was really negligent. Thus, even without applying the doctrine negligent based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It did not,
of res ipsa loquitur, in light of the direct evidence on record, however, categorically rule that the gasoline container
the ineluctable conclusion is that the petitioner, Cebu Shipyard allegedly placed in the rear compartment of the car caused the
and Engineering Works, Inc., was negligent and consequently fire. The trial court instead declared that both petitioners
liable for damages to the respondent, William Lines, Inc. failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they
employed the necessary care and diligence in the upkeep of
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. and BIENVENIDO S. the car. Contrary to the claims of Perla Compania, the trial
PASCUAL v. SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III and PRIMITIVA court also found that it failed to employ the diligence of a good
B. SARANGAYA father of a family, as required by law, in the selection and
G.R. NO. 147746 October 25, 2005 supervision of Pascual.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court again
ruled in favor of Sps. Sarangaya but modified the amount of
FACTS:
damages awarded by the trial court.
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. (Perla Compania), through its
ISSUES:
branch manager Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract
of lease of the first door of the "Super A Building," owned by
(1) Did the Trial Court, as well as the CA, erred in applying the
Spouses Gaudencio and Primitiva Sarangaya, adjoining the
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in the present case?
office of Matsushita Electric Philippine Corporation
(Matsushita). Perla Compania renovated its rented space and
(2) Did the Trial Court, as well as the CA, erred when it found
divided it into two. The left side was converted into an office
Perla Compania negligent in the supervision of Pascual and
while the right was used by Pascual as a garage for the
consequently, vicariously liable for the fire?
company car.
HELD:
Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the
car with him. Three days later, he returned to Santiago and,
(1) NO. The Trial Court, as well as the CA, did not erred in
after checking his appointments the next day, decided to
applying the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in the present case.
"warm up" the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and
switched on the ignition key, the engine made an "odd" sound
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the
and did not start. Thinking it was just the gasoline percolating
thing or the transaction speaks for itself." It relates to the fact
into the engine, he again stepped on the accelerator and
of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or
started the car. This revived the engine but Pascual again heard
establishes the plaintiff's prima facie case. The doctrine rests
an unusual sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of the
on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the
engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and
occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they
started to push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire
furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct
spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole
evidence is lacking.
garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his
face, legs and arms.
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur:
Meanwhile, Sps Sarangaya, whose residence was behind the
second and third doors of the “Super A Building”, were busy
1) The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
watching television when they heard two loud explosions. The
unless someone is negligent;
smell of gasoline permeated the air and, in no time, fire spread
inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture
2) The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the
and appliances.
person in charge and
Sps. Sarangaya filed a civil complaint based on quasi-delict
3) The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
against petitioners for a "sum of money and damages,"
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while Perla
Compania lacked the required diligence in the selection and
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that
supervision of Pascual as its employee.
does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence.
"Ordinary" refers to the usual course of events. Flames
The trial court ruled in favor of Sps. Sarangaya. It declared that,
spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is
although the Sps. Sarangaya failed to prove the precise cause
obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion

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usually occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this case,
without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it,
we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand,
someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the
accident.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in
committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same
situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed
to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its
year-model and condition required) revealed his negligence. A
prudent man should have known that a 14-year-old car,
constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to
damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and
diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary
inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep
of the car.
Pascual attempted to exculpate himself from liability by
insisting that the incident was a caso fortuito. We disagree.
The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed
only when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was independent of the human will; (b) it was
impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso
fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to
perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person
tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in
any course of conduct that aggravated the accident.
In fine, human agency must be entirely excluded as the
proximate cause or contributory cause of the injury or loss. In
a vehicular accident, for example, a mechanical defect will not
release the defendant from liability if it is shown that the
accident could have been prevented had he properly
maintained and taken good care of the vehicle.
The circumstances on record do not support the defense of
Pascual. Clearly, there was no caso fortuito because of his
want of care and prudence in maintaining the car.
Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency
that triggered the occurrence must be one that falls under the
exclusive control of the person in charge thereof. In this case,
the car where the fire originated was under the control of
Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to
maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. No other person,
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not even the Sps. Sarangaya, was charged with that obligation
except him.
Where the circumstances which caused the accident are
shown to have been under the management or control of a
certain person and, in the normal course of events, the
incident would not have happened had that person used
proper care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack of
such care. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to defendant
to establish that he observed all that was necessary to prevent
the accident from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly
failed.
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to
show that Sps. Sarangaya contributed to the incident. They
had no access to the car and had no responsibility regarding its
maintenance even if it was parked in a building they owned.
(2) NO. The Trial Court, as well as the CA, did not erred when
it found Perla Compania negligent in the supervision of Pascual
and consequently, vicariously liable for the fire.
The relationship between the two petitioners was based on
the principle of pater familias according to which the
employer becomes liable to the party aggrieved by its
employee if he fails to prove due diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. The
burden of proof that such diligence was observed devolves on
the employer who formulated the rules and procedures for the
selection and hiring of his employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience
and service records. While the Perla Compania does not
appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position, its
lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable
for the fire.
In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation
and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To
fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence that they complied
with everything that was incumbent on them.
Here, Perla Compania's evidence hardly included any rule or
regulation that Pascual should have observed in performing his
functions. It also did not have any guidelines for the
maintenance and upkeep of company property like the vehicle
that caught fire. Perla Compania did not require periodic
reports on or inventories of its properties either. Based on
these circumstances, Perla Compania clearly did not exert
effort to be apprised of the condition of Pascual's car or its
serviceability.
10
TH
Perla Compania's argument that the liability attached to the hotel guest status extends to all those who avail of its
employers only applies in cases involving the supervision of services — its patrons and invitees.
employees in the transportation business is incorrect. Article
2180 of the Civil Code states that employers shall be liable for ISSUE:
the damage caused by their employees. The liability is imposed
on all those who by their industry, profession or other Whether or not it is respondents PHI and DTPCI and its
enterprise have other persons in their service or employees who are liable to the petitioner for negligence,
supervision. Nowhere does it state that the liability is limited applying the well-established doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
to employers in the transportation business.
RULING:
DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG vs. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC.,
DUSIT THANI PUBLIC CO., LTD. and FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO NO.
INSURANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 180440 December 5, 2012 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident
was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would
not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2)
FACTS:
the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages filed by
the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3)
petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang against herein respondents
the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action
Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI) and Dusit Thani Public Co., Ltd.
or contribution on the part of the person injured.
(DTPCI), as owners of Dusit Thani Hotel Manila (Dusit Hotel);
and co-respondent First Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corporation
In the case at bench, even granting that respondents PHI and
(First Lepanto), as insurer of the aforesaid hotel. On 11 June
DTPCI’s staff negligently turned off the lights and locked the
1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel,
door, the folding wooden counter top would still not fall on
invited her friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a
petitioner’s head had she not lifted the same. Although the
swim at the hotel’s swimming pool facility.
folding wooden counter top is within the exclusive
management or control of respondents PHI and DTPCI, the
The said Complaint was premised on the alleged negligence of
falling of the same and hitting the head of petitioner was not
respondents PHI and DTPCI’s staff, in the untimely putting off
due to the negligence of the former. As found by both lower
all the lights within the hotel’s swimming pool area, as well as
courts, the folding wooden counter top did not fall on
the locking of the main entrance door of the area, prompting
petitioner’s head without any human intervention. Records
petitioner to grope for a way out. While doing so, a folding
showed that petitioner lifted the said folding wooden counter
wooden counter top fell on her head causing her serious brain
top that eventually fell and hit her head.
injury. The negligence was allegedly compounded by
respondents PHI and DTPCI’s failure to render prompt and
In view thereof, this Court cannot acquiesce petitioner’s
adequate medical assistance.
theory that her case is one of res ipsa loquitur as it was
sufficiently established how petitioner obtained that "bukol"
Thereupon, Huang consulted several doctors (7 neuro, 1
or "hematoma."
optha) because she began experiencing ―on and ―off severe
headaches that caused her three sleepless nights. They all said
she had a serious brain injury. In defense, PHI and Dusit denied DR. VICTORIA BATIQUIN, ET. AL VS COURT OF APPEALS,
all the material allegations. According to them, a sufficient ET. AL
notice on the glass door of the hotel leading to the swimming G.R. NO. 118231 JULY 5, 1996
pool area to apprise the people, especially the hotel guests,
that the swimming pool area is open only from 7am to 7pm. FACTS:
Nevertheless, the lights thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m.
for, (1) security reasons; (2) housekeeping personnel to do the Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental
cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings; and (3) people Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City from January 9, 1978 to
doing their exercise routine at the Slimmer‘s World Gym, September 1989. Between 1987 and September, 1989 she was
which was open until 10pm. Huang filed a complaint for also the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics and
damages against respondents. The trial court dismissed the Gynecology at the said Hospital.
Complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, Huang belatedly raises Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the
the defense on breach of contract. She maintains that that an latter's private patient sometime before September 21, 1988.
implied contract existed between them in view of the fact that

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In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with
other physicians and nurses, performed a caesarean operation
on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered the latter’s baby.
After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer
abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also
gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the
latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines.
However, the pains still kept recurring.
She then consulted Dr.Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr
Kho suggested that Mrs.Villegas submit to another surgery.
When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas, she found
whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the
left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind
the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of
the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of
rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This was the
cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of
all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The piece of
rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and Dr. Kho
testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for
examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the
evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber is a Medical
Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anaesthesia Record,
a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's Discharge Summary.
The trial court, however, regarded these documentary
evidence as mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the
person or persons who prepared them are deceased or unable
to testify on the facts therein stated. . . . Except for the Medical
Certificate (Exhibit "F"), all the above documents were
allegedly prepared by persons other than Dr. Kho, and she
merely affixed her signature on some of them to express her
agreement thereto. The trial court also refused to give weight
to Dr. Kho's testimony regarding the subject piece of rubber as
Dr. Kho "may not have had first-hand knowledge" thereof,16 as
could be gleaned from her statement.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the entirety of Dr. Kho's
testimony and, even without admitting the private
respondents' documentary evidence, deemed Dr. Kho's
positive testimony to definitely establish that a piece of rubber
was found near private respondent Villegas's uterus. Thus, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court,
holding the fault or negligence of appellee Dr. Batiquin is
established by preponderance of evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable (YES)
HELD:
Yes. Dr. Batiquin is liable.
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This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the
thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen in those who
have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care." Or as Black's Law
Dictionary puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuctable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which
arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury was
in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one
which ordinary does not happen in absence of negligence. Res
ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of [the]
alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from [the] mere fact that
[the] accident happened provided [the] character of [the]
accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to
belief that in [the] absence of negligence it would not have
occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have
been under [the] management and control of [the] alleged
wrongdoer. . . . Under [this] doctrine
. . . the happening of an injury permits an inference of
negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that
[the] injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under
[the] exclusive control and management of defendant, and
that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the ordinary course
of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
xxx xxx xxx
The doctrine of [r]es ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The
doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of
proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when
applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case,
is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement
of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely
determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence
thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a
breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked
when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available.36
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the
doctrine are present.
First, the entire proceedings of the caesarean section were
under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the
private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the
actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding
its way into private respondent Villegas's body, which,
12
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needless to say, does not occur unless through the intersection
of negligence.
Second, since aside from the caesarean section, private
respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which
could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in
her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been
a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr.
Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for
negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas's abdomen and for all the adverse effects
thereof.
As a final word, this Court reiterates its recognition of the vital
role the medical profession plays in the lives of the people and
the State's compelling interest to enact measures to protect
the public from "the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to
treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma."Indeed, a
physician is bound to serve the interest of his patients "with
the greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best talent
and skill." Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner
endangered the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her
profession's rigid ethical code and in contravention of the legal
standards set forth for professionals, in general, and members
of the medical profession, in particular.
DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE V. SPS. JOHN DAVID Z. GO AND
NORA S. GO
G.R. NO. 160889 APRIL 27, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics and
Gynecology at the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital. She
was the attending physician of respondent Nora S. Go, who
was admitted at the said hospital on April 19, 1992. At 1:30
a.m. of April 20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her fourth child, a
baby boy. However, at around 3:30 a.m., Nora suffered
profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the
placenta which were not completely expelled from her womb
after delivery. She suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a
drop in her blood pressure to "40" over "0." Petitioner and the
assisting resident physician performed various medical
procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Nora’s blood
pressure. While petitioner was massaging Nora’s uterus for it
to contract and stop bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm
Nora and her baby. While in the recovery room, her husband,
respondent John David Z. Go noticed a fresh gaping wound in
the inner portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. He was
informed it was a burn. Petitioner said the blood pressure cuff
caused the injury.
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH
He brought Nora to the NBI for a physical examination, which
was conducted by medico-legal officer. He testified that Nora’s
injury appeared to be a burn and that a droplight when placed
near the skin for about 10 minutes could cause such burn. He
dismissed the likelihood that the wound was caused by a blood
pressure cuff. Nora’s injury was referred to a plastic surgeon at
the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital for skin grafting.
About a year after, scar revision had to be performed at the
same hospital. The surgical operation left a healed linear scar
in Nora’s left arm. Unfortunately, Nora’s arm would never be
the same. Aside from the unsightly mark, the pain in her left
arm remains.
Sps. Go filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, Dr.
Abad, and the hospital. RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Go. CA
affirmed RTC’s Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the injury suffered
by Nora Go.
RULING:
Yes. In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a
presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the
following requisites concur:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make
the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
As to the first requirement, the gaping wound on Nora’s arm is
certainly not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a
baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in
the process of giving birth. Such injury could not have
happened unless negligence had set in somewhere.
Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by
the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are
deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge
under the "captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds
the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence
of his assistants during the time when those assistants are
under the surgeon’s control. In this particular case, it can be
logically inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in
charge during the delivery of Nora’s baby, exercised control
13
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over the assistants assigned to both the use of the droplight
and the taking of Nora’s blood pressure. Hence, the use of the
droplight and the blood pressure cuff is also within petitioner’s
exclusive control.
Third, the gaping wound on Nora’s left arm, by its very nature
and considering her condition, could only be caused by
something external to her and outside her control as she was
unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. Hence, Nora could
not, by any stretch of the imagination, have contributed to her
own injury.
Petitioner’s defense that Nora’s wound was caused not by the
droplight but by the constant taking of her blood pressure,
even if the latter was necessary given her condition, does not
absolve her from liability. As testified to by the medico-legal
officer, Dr. Arizala, Jr., the medical practice is to deflate the
blood pressure cuff immediately after each use. Otherwise,
the inflated band can cause injury to the patient similar to
what could have happened in this case. Thus, if Nora’s wound
was caused by the blood pressure cuff, then the taking of
Nora’s blood pressure must have been done so negligently as
to have inflicted a gaping wound on her arm, for which
petitioner cannot escape liability under the "captain of the
ship" doctrine.
Further, petitioner’s argument that the failed plastic surgery
was not intended as a cosmetic procedure, but rather as a
measure to prevent complication does not help her case. It
does not negate negligence on her part.
Based on the foregoing, the presumption that petitioner was
negligent in the exercise of her profession stands unrebutted.
In this connection, the Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done.…
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
Petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral damages suffered
by the latter as a proximate result of petitioner’s negligence.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. vs. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE
AGANA,
G.R. No. 127590, January 31, 2007
FACTS:
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical
City General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement
and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical
examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil, petitioner in G.R. No. 127590,
diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."
On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of
the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection
surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her
sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the
removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the
consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr.
Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to perform
hysterectomy on her.
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil
took over, completed the operation and closed the incision.
However, the operation appeared to be flawed, because in the
corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, the
attending nurses entered the remarks: "sponge count lacking
2” "announced to surgeon search done but to no avail
continue for closure."
Natividad Agana was discharged on April 24, 1984 and payed
hospital bills amounting to 60,000 Php.
After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating
pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural
consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended
that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes
which were not removed during the operation.
On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband,
went to the United States to seek further treatment. After four
months of consultations and laboratory examinations,
Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was
advised to return to the Philippines.
On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still
suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter
found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being
informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he
managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5
inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon
vanish.
Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains
intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the
Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon
Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in
her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in
width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal
fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced
stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation
14
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was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984,
Natividad underwent another surgery.
On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with
the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for damages
against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the
Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes . They alleged
that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces
of gauze inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for
concealing their acts of negligence.
Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative complaint for
gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the case only with
respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to acquire jurisdiction
over Dr. Ampil who was then in the United States. On February
16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above cases, Natividad
died and was duly substituted by her above-named children.
On March 17, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of
the Aganas.
ISSUE:
W/N Dr. Ampil is liable for negligence and malpractice sans
evidence that he left the two pieces of gauze in Natividad’s
vagina
HELD:
YES, he is liable despite pointing to other probable causes, such
as: (1) it was Dr. Fuentes who used gauzes in performing the
hysterectomy; (2) the attending nurses’ failure to properly
count the gauzes used during surgery; and (3) the medical
intervention of the American doctors who examined Natividad
in the United States of America.
The removal of all sponges used is part of a surgical operation,
and when a physician or surgeon fails to remove a sponge he
has placed in his patient’s body that should be removed as part
of the operation, he thereby leaves his operation uncompleted
and creates a new condition which imposes upon him the legal
duty of calling the new condition to his patient’s attention, and
endeavoring with the means he has at hand to minimize and
avoid untoward results likely to ensue therefrom.
Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two
pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she
was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her
operation. Had he been more candid, Natividad could have
taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to
remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was
initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a
deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient.
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH
This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more
appropriately, medical negligence. To successfully pursue this
kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care
provider either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have
done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove
stone from her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr.
Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos
Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would
find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as
planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra.
Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the administration
of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer
brain damage. The botched operation was witnessed by
Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of
Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the
surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners
showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was
caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable
care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the
anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata
ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was
robust and fit to undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise
due care in intubating the patient, the surgeon was remiss in
his obligation to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and for
arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for the negligence
of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the
surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist
and the DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for
damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the
Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Are the private respondents negligent and thereby caused the
comatose condition of Ramos?
HELD:
15
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YES. private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily
liable for the damages.
Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which
means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a
maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury,
taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a
plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily in a
medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present
expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was
negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the
operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered her person to
the private respondents who had complete and exclusive
control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was
neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she
was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the
thing speaks for itself!
Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove
the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of
Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her
condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell
whether or not the intubation was a success. The Supreme
Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for
the first time on the day of the operation which indicates
unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of negligence
and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to
exercise the proper authority as the “captain of the ship” in
determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper
protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to
confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia
delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in hiring
and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was
negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and
firing of their “consultants”. While these consultants are not
employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the
selection and termination of doctors who work there which is
one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship.
Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.
Damages – temperate damages can and should be awarded on
top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the
injury is chronic and continuing.
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CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH
LEAH ALESNA REYES, ROSE NAHDJA, JOHNNY, and minors
LLOYD and KRISTINE, all surnamed REYES, represented by
their mother, LEAH ALESNA REYES VS. SISTERS OF MERCY
HOSPITAL, SISTER ROSE PALACIO, DR. MARVIE BLANES, and
DR. MARLYN RICO
G.R. No. 130547 October 3, 2000
FACTS:
Leah Alesna Reyes was the wife of the deceased Jorge Reyes
who was diagnosed with Typhoid by Dr. Maryln Rico at the
Mercy Community Clinic. Before seeking professional help,
Jorge had been doing home medication since he was suffering
from a recurring fever. When his condition did not do any
better, he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his
wife, herein petitioner. (Leah Reyes)
Dr. Marlyn Rico conducted a Widal Test since she surmised
that the area had been getting from 15 to 20 cases of typhoid
fever. Jorge was found positive for typhoid. Dr. Rico then
indorsed him to Dr. Marvie Blanes when her shift ended. Dr.
Blanes also had the same diagnosis as Dr. Rico, that Jorge is
suffering from typhoid fever.
Dr. Blanes ordered the administration of chloromycetin (drug
used for typhoid cases); this was administered by nurse
Josephine Pagente.
Jorge’s condition did not improve and continued to worsen.
Eventually, he died. Cause of death was “Ventricular
Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.”
Petitioner Reyes was prompted to file a case against Sisters of
Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. Blanes, Dr. Rico and Nurse
Pagente. The complaint was amended to implead Mercy
Community Clinic and to remove Nurse Pagente.
Petitioner’s Argument:
Jorge did not simply die of typhoid fever but his death was due
to wrongful administration of chloromycetin.
Had respondent doctors exercised due care and diligence, they
would not have recommended and rushed the performance of
the Widal Test; hastily concluded that Jorge had been suffering
from typhoid without checking the compatibility of the drug to
the patient.
The Clinic and its directress, Sister Rose Palacio, was negligent
in failing to provide adequate facilities and in hiring negligent
doctors and nurses.
RTC: Absolved RESPONDENTS from charges of negligence and
dismissing the complaint
16
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CA: Affirmed the ruling of RTC
Petitioners asserted in the Court of Appeals that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applies to the present case because Jorge
Reyes was merely experiencing fever and chills for five days
and was fully conscious, coherent, and ambulant when he
went to the hospital. Yet, he died after only ten hours from the
time of his admission.
ISSUE:
W/n the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when
it ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable
in the instant case.
HELD:
The contention is without merit. We agree with the ruling of
the Court of Appeals. In the Ramos case, the question was
whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist, and a hospital should
be made liable for the comatose condition of a patient
scheduled for cholecystectomy. In that case, the patient was
given anesthesia prior to her operation. Noting that the
patient was neurologically sound at the time of her operation,
the Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as mental
brain damage does not normally occur in a gallblader
operation in the absence of negligence of the anesthesiologist.
Taking judicial notice that anesthesia procedures had become
so common that even an ordinary person could tell if it was
administered properly, we allowed the testimony of a witness
who was not an expert. In this case, while it is true that the
patient died just a few hours after professional medical
assistance was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or
extraordinary about his death. Prior to his admission, the
patient already had recurring fevers and chills for five days
unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given
him by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering from a
serious illness and professional medical help came too late for
him.
Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not
immediately apparent to a layman so as to justify application
of res ipsa loquitur. The question required expert opinion on
the alleged breach by respondents of the standard of care
required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the issue of
the correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of negligence
can be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico.As held in Ramos:
. . . . Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied,
depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally
restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is
able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care were
not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had
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been exercised. A distinction must be made between the
failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something
more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or
treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those
skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit
against a physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a
diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon
is not required at his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific
treatment did not produce the desired result.
Doctrine
Action for Medical Malpractice
Is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure
of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine
that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by
the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like
surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue
such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or
surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent physician or surgeon would have done, or that he or
she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or
surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action
caused injury to the patient.
Elements of Medical Negligence Cases:
1. Duty – duty of the physician or surgeon in taking care of the
patient (patient-physician relationship)
2. Breach – failure to do something which a reasonably
prudent physician or surgeon would have done
3. Injury – damage sustained by the patient due to physician
or surgeon’s failure
4. Proximate Causation – cause of injury is due to the failure
of the physician or surgeon
Res Ipsa Loquitor; when may be dispensed with
General Rule: (The necessity of expert testimony applies only
to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science,
and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of
mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the
facts) Expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice
suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that
he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff, the
need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because
the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. This is
because only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience
are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been
17
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treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and
care.
Court’s Duty: to find a physician negligent upon proper proof
of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony,
where the court from its fund of common knowledge can
determine the proper standard of care. Where common
knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would
not have occurred to the patient if due care had been
exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise
to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only
what occurred but how and why it occurred.
The patient must: prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under
the custody and management of the defendant without need
to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard
of care.
Res ipsa loquitur is generally restricted to situations in
malpractice cases where a layman is able to say that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would
ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. It has
no application in a suit against a physician or a surgeon which
involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril
to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why
any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired
result.
2. Violation of Rules and Statutes
- Traffic Rules (Articles 2184 and 2185)
- Statues and Ordinances/Administrative Rules
- RA 10586, Sec. 13 and IRR
Cases:
U.S. vs. TEODOR JUANILLO
G.R. No. L-7255 OCTOBER 3, 1912
FACTS:
Ponciano Leal was killed on the public highway while going
from the town of Pavia to Santa Barbara, Iloilo at 4:00pm on
April 23, 1911 by a car, of which respondent is a chauffeur.
According to Pedtro Latoja, one of the witnesses presented by
the prosecution, he was walking abreast along the said
highway, and while they he was going along, he heard a noise
from behind. Upon turning around, he saw an automobile
approaching. He immediately called out that an automobile
was coming and jumped to the left, colliding with Labrila,
another witness; that when he turned around to look for Leal
the latter was lying on the ground, having been knocked down
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by the automobile, and that at that place the road was higher
than the adjacent land for a considerable distance each way.
The passengers of the said automobile testified that during the
accident, however these where inconsistent with each other.
According to Becker, the impact of the machine against the
deceased was so hard that he was raised in his seat,
notwithstanding the fact that the brakes had been applied
with great force 300 yards away. According to Dean, the brakes
were applied with force 25 feet away and the machine had
been running under its own momentum for about 150 or 200
yards when the deceased was struck. According to the
defendant, the machine had been running without gasoline for
about 100 yards and the brakes were applied when he was
about 18 feet from the deceased. All agree however, that the
deceased was struck on the left hip by the fender or lamp with
such force that he died within a short time thereafter, and that
the machine did not pass over his body.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juanillo is negligent.
RULING:
YES. The testimony of all the parties in the case at bar as to the
surrounding conditions of this occurrence was to the effect
that the road on which they were traveling was dotted with
simple rural folk. It was Sunday afternoon and the road
connected two rather populous towns that were close
together. In his brief, counsel for the appellant says:
Two native farmers who all their lives have seen nothing that
moves faster than a bull cart, except on the two or three
occasions on which they testify they have visited Iloilo, cannot
be expected to give an intelligent idea of speed of an
automobile, train, or even a fast horse. They testify that they
did not see or observe the deceased after hearing the
automobile until after he was struck. If they had never seen an
automobile save in two or three occasions in their lives, and
looked back and saw one coming in a road not at all wide, with
even fifty or a hundred yards intervening, it would but be
natural for them to rush to the sides of the road. And finding
himself alone on the right hand side, which had been the most
accessible to him at the moment, it would be perfectly natural
for an ignorant farmer at such a, to him, hazardous moment to
decide suddenly to cross and join his companions on the other
side. And it is not surprising if such a man should miscalculate
the time necessary for an automobile, even running at only a
very slow pace, to cover an intervening distance.
Under such conditions appellant being in charge of the
powerful machine, capable of doing great damage if not
skillfully manipulated, was bound to use a high degree of care
to avoid injuring these native farmers, who had a common
18
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right to the highway. A driver of an automobile, under such
circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care than
drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable
of greater destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely under
the power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other
animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an
accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down
automobiles to accommodate persons riding, driving, or
walking.
It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and
let the horse or person get out of the way in the best manner
possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted
and an accident occurs, that the automobile driver will be
called upon to account for his acts. an automobile driver must
at all times use all the care and caution which a careful and
prudent driver would have exercised under the circumstances.
The appellant was aware of and is chargeable with the
knowledge that the deceased and his companions were simple
country people and were lacking in the capacity to appreciate
and to guard against the dangers of an automobile driven at a
high rate of speed, and he was bound to enlarge to a
commensurate extent the degree of vigilance and care
necessary to avoid injuries which the use of his machine made
more imminent.
The negligence of the defendant in the case at bar consisted in
his failure to recognize the great injury that would accrue to
the deceased from the collision. He had no right, it seems to
us, after he saw the deceased and his companions walking in
the road ahead of him to continue at so great a speed, at the
eminent hazard of colliding with the deceased. Great care was
due from him by reason of the deadliness of the machine he
was propelling along the highway. When one comes through
the highways with a machine of such power as an automobile,
it is incumbent upon the driver to use great care not to drive
against or over pedestrians. An automobile is much more
dangerous than a street car or even a railway car. These are
propelled along the fixed rails and all the traveling public has
to do to be safe is to keep off the track. But the automobile can
be turned as easily as an individual, and for this reason is far
more dangerous to the traveling public than either the street
car or the railway train. We do not feel at liberty, under the
evidence, to say that this defendant was free from reckless
negligence. In failing to so check the speed of his machine
when he saw the deceased in front of him to give him sufficient
control to avert the injury or to stop it entirely, when he knew
that if he continued at the same speed at which he was going
he would collide with the deceased, not only shows negligence
but reckless negligence in a marked degree.
CHAPMAN V. UNDERWOOD
G.R. NO. L-9010, MARCH 28, 1914
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FACTS:
Chapman visited his friend Creveling. When he was about to
go home, he wanted to board “San Marcelino” car bound for
Manila. He was told by Creveling that the car was approaching,
he signaled it and the car stopped. The San Marcelino car has
two entrances, one at front and another at rear. Since
Chapman cannot board for the front car because he could not
reach it, he stood beside the car waiting for the rear to get near
him.
The accident happened during this time when Underwood’s
car driven by his chauffeur, a competent driver switched lanes
and when he saw the San Marcelino car in front of him, he
steered to the right which struck Chapman.
Chapman filed for the damages he suffered by the accident.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of Underwood.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the chauffeur was negligent by violating traffic
rules.
2. Whether Underwood is solidary liable with his chauffeur.
HELD:
1. YES. A careful examination of the record leads us to the
conclusion that the defendant's driver was guilty of negligence
in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an
oncoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, in common
out to board the car, was not obliged, for his own protection,
to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his left
hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the
right. He knew that, according to the law of the road, no
automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass
upon his side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars
coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the
law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car.
2. NO. The defendant, however, is not responsible for the
negligence of his driver, under the facts and circumstances of
this case. In the case before us it does not appear from the
record that, from the time the automobile took the wrong side
of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time
intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct the
act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the
interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street
car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to
be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the
driver.
CAEDO et al vs. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
19
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FACTS:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the
morning of March 24, 1958 along E. de los Santos Ave., in the
vicinity of San Lorenzo Village bound for the airport. Several
members of his family were in the car.
Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car of
defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo.
The two cars were traveling at a moderate speed with their
headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela.
Defendant’s driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8)
meters away. Instead of slowing down behind the caretela
defendant’s driver veered to the left with the intention of
passing by the caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught
the ream of the caretela’s left wheel wrenching it off.
Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to the other end and
collided with the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the
collision by veering to the right but the collision occurred just
the same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family.
Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the driver
and owner of the Cadillac car.
ISSUE:
Whether defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was in
the car, was solidarily liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of
the Civil Code.
RULING:
NO. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under
the said provision, if the causative factor was the driver’s
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by
the exercise of due diligence. The basis of the master’s liability
in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the
relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or
damage.
Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be sought in
the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that
is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course
which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also
sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such
negligence may be imputed.
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The car, as has been stated, was not running at an
unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid
of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car
owner to be in any special state of alert. He (Yu Khe Thai) had
reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He
became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car
was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it
earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at
the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass
the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car
was approaching from the opposite direction.
The time element was such that there was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and
warn the driver accordingly.
The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he
sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man
nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that,
wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence
required by law to prevent the misfortune. Under the facts the
owner of the car was not liable.
LINDA CACHO, MINORS SARAH JANE, JACQUELINE, FIRE
RINA AND MARK LOUISE ALL SURNAMED CACHO, ALL
REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM
LINDA CACHO v. GERARDO MANAHAN, DAGUPAN BUS CO.,
INC., AND RENATO DE VERA DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE
NAME R. M. DE VERA CONSTRUCTION
G.R. No. 203081, January 17, 2018
FACTS:
At around 5:00 A.M. on 30 June 1999, Cacho was driving a
Nissan Sentra from Alaminos, Pangasinan to Bani, Pangasinan,
when it collided with a Dagupan Bus, traversing on the
opposite lane. The car had already crossed the Embarcadero
bridge when it collided with the bus which was just about to
enter the bridge. The collision caused heavy damage to the
front of the bus, the total wreckage of the Nissan Sentra,
Cacho's instant death, and multiple injuries to three (3)
passengers inside the car.
The complaint for damages was filed by Cacho’s heirs, which
alleged that Cacho's car was hit by the bus because the latter
swerved to the left lane as it tried to avoid a pile of boulders
placed on the shoulder of the road. These boulders were
negligently placed by De Vera Construction contracted by the
local government to do some work on the Embarcadero
Bridge.
Dagupan Bus, the owner and operator of the bus, and
Manahan, the bus driver, jointly filed their answer with
20
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counterclaim and cross-claims. They claimed that it was Cacho
who drove fast coming from the bridge and bumped into the
bus that was on full stop; and that Cacho had to swerve to the
left because there were boulders of rocks scattered on his
lane.
In their cross-claims, Dagupan Bus and Manahan argued that
the proximate cause of the accident was because of De Vera
Construction's negligence for leaving the boulders of rocks on
both shoulders of the national highway. These rocks
obstructed passage on the highway and posed an imminent
danger to vehicles passing by. At the time of the accident, the
rocks were piled on both shoulders and some rocks rolled
down to both lanes of the highway.
In his answer with counterclaim, De Vera maintained that he
ensured the safety of the road by piling the boulders in a safe
place to make sure they did not encroach upon the road. He
presented the municipality's local civil engineer to testify that
he inspected the road and found that De Vera Construction
had complied with the safety measures. Like his co-
defendants, De Vera blamed Cacho for driving recklessly and
causing the collision with the bus.
The RTC held Dagupan Bus, Manahan, and De Vera jointly and
severally liable to pay the petitioners. The CA reversed the trial
court's ruling.
ISSUE:
Should Dagupan Bus, Manahan, and De Vera be held jointly
and severally liable to pay the petitioners?
HELD:
YES. First, we agree with the trial court that the testimony of
one of the bus’ passengers, Camba, duly established the fact
that Manahan was driving the bus at a high speed before they
entered the bridge. And that, we simply cannot adopt the CA's
position that the bus was on full stop upon entering the bridge
as this is based on speculation and contrary to evidence. Borne
by the record, the impact of the collision resulted in the car
being thrown about ninety (90) degrees counter-clockwise to
the opposite lane before resting perpendicular to the road.
The resulting position of the vehicle after the collision is
incompatible with the conclusion that the bus was at full stop.
Cacho's car would not be thrown off and be turned counter-
clockwise to the opposite direction of its motion if there was
no heavier and greater force that collided with it.
Second, negligence on the part of Manahan was also
established by the photographs showing that he occupied
Cacho's lane.
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From these circumstances, therefore, we find that Manahan
was clearly negligent because the bus he was driving already
occupied a portion of the opposite lane, and he was driving at
a high speed while approaching the bridge.
Moreover, we can also say that Manahan was legally
presumed negligent under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, which
provides: "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was [in violation of] any traffic
regulation." Based on the place and time of the accident,
Manahan was actually violating a traffic rule found in R.A. No.
4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code.
CHAPTER VI
TRAFFIC RULES
ARTICLE I
Speed Limit and Keeping to the Right
Section 35. Restriction as to speed. –
(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive
the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater or less
than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the
traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition
then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor
vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life,
limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than
will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the
assured clear distance ahead.
Considering that the bus was already approaching the
Embarcadero Bridge, Manahan should have already slowed
down a few meters away from the bridge. Actually, he should
have stopped farther away from the bridge because he would
have been able to see that Cacho's car was already crossing the
bridge. An experienced and competent bus driver would be
able to know how to properly react upon seeing another
vehicle ahead that is about to exit a narrow bridge. Obviously,
Manahan failed to do so.
Having established Manahan's negligence, he is liable with
Dagupan Bus to indemnify Cacho's heirs. Article 2180, in
relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code provides that the
employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages
caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part
of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in
the supervision over him after such selection. The
presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on
the part of the employer that it had exercised the care and
21
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diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape solidary liability,
for a quasi-delict committed by its employees, an employer
must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing
proof that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
A closer scrutiny of the evidence presented to overcome this
presumption would show that Dagupan Bus failed in this
regard. It would seem that Manahan applied with Dagupan Bus
sometime in April 1999. And a few days after, or on 21 June
1999, Dagupan Bus gave Manahan clearance to report for duty
as a bus driver.
On this point, we are surprised at how prompt Dagupan Bus
had allowed Manahan to drive one of its buses considering he
had no prior experience driving one. The only time he was
actually able to drive a bus was probably during his driving
examination and a few more times while undergoing
apprenticeship. We cannot simply brush aside and ignore
Dagupan Bus' haste to hire Manahan; to our mind, this is
negligence on its part.
In addition, we noted that Manahan's apprenticeship record
indicate that he is not fit to drive aircon buses nor to drive at
night. That the accident happened early in the morning, when
the visibility conditions are the same as driving at night,
Manahan should not have been driving in the first place. Once
more, Dagupan Bus' negligence is clear.
Finding both Manahan and Dagupan Bus negligent in meeting
their responsibilities, the RTC was correct in awarding
damages in favor of Cacho's heirs
PAULITA "EDITH" SERRA vs. NELFA T. MUMAR
G.R. No. 193861, March 14, 2012
FACTS:
At around 6:30 in the evening, there was a vehicular accident
along the National Highway in Barangay Apopong, General
Santos City, which resulted in the death of Armando Mumar
(Mumar), husband of respondent Nelfa T. Mumar
(respondent).
Based on the evidence presented before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of General Santos City, one Armando Tenerife
(Tenerife) was driving his Toyota Corolla sedan on the National
Highway heading in the direction of Polomolok, South
Cotabato. Tenerife noticed the van owned by petitioner
Paulita "Edith" Serra (petitioner) coming from the opposite
direction, which was trying to overtake a passenger jeep, and
in the process encroached on his lane. The left side of the
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sedan was hit by the van, causing the sedan to swerve to the
left and end up on the other side of the road. The van collided
head on with the motorcycle, which was about 12 meters
behind the sedan on the outer lane, causing injuries to Mumar,
which eventually led to his death.
On the other hand, petitioner denied that her van was
overtaking the jeepney at the time of the incident. She claimed
that the left tire of Tenerife’s sedan burst, causing it to
sideswipe her van. Consequently, the left front tire of the van
also burst and the van’s driver, Marciano de Castro (de Castro),
lost control of the vehicle. The van swerved to the left towards
Mumar’s motorcycle. The impact resulted in the death of
Mumar.
Subsequently, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner
for Damages by Reason of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide and Attachment before the General Santos City RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether Editha Serra is liable for damages for being negligent
in the selection and supervision of the driver of the van
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable
for the damages caused by their employees acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks. Whenever an employee’s
negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly
arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the
due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or
supervision of its employees. The liability of the employer is
direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee.
Moreover, under Article 2184 of the Civil Code, if the causative
factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle
who was present is likewise held liable if he could have
prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
Petitioner failed to show that she exercised the level of
diligence required in supervising her driver in order to prevent
the accident. She admitted that de Castro had only been her
driver for one year and she had no knowledge of his driving
experience or record of previous accidents. She also admitted
that it was de Castro who maintained the vehicle and would
even remind her "to pay the installment of the car."
Petitioner also admitted that, at the time of the accident, she
did not know what was happening and only knew they bumped
into another vehicle when the driver shouted. She then closed
her eyes and a moment later felt something heavy fall on the
roof of the car. When the vehicle stopped, petitioner left the
22
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scene purportedly to ask help from her brother, leaving the
other passengers to come to the aid of her injured driver.
Hence, Editha Serra is liable for damages for being negligent in
the selection and supervision of the driver of the van.
ALFREDO MALLARI, SR. AND ALFREDO MALLARI, JR. V. CA
AND BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORP.
G.R. NO. 128607 JANUARY 31, 2000
FACTS:
On 14 October 1987, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning the
passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. and owned by Mallari
Sr. collided with the delivery van of Bulletin along the National
Highway in Brgy. San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan. Mallari Jr.
testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and
overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the right lane. Before
he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van of Bulletin coming from
the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The
collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while
negotiating a curve in the highway. The impact caused the
jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in
injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who
eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.
Claudia Reyes, the widow of Israel Reyes, filed a complaint for
damages against Mallari Sr. and Mallari Jr., and also against
Bulletin, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands
Insurance Co. The complaint alleged that the collision which
resulted in the death of Israel was caused by the fault and
negligence of both drivers of the passenger jeepney and the
Bulletin Isuzu delivery van.
The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision
was the negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin
delivery van, considering the fact that the left front portion of
the delivery truck driven by Felix Angeles hit and bumped the
left rear portion of the passenger jeepney driven by Alfredo
Mallari Jr.
On appeal the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the
trial court and found no negligence on the part of Angeles and
consequently of his employer, respondent BULLETIN. Instead,
the appellate court ruled that the collision was caused by the
sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted
that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a
curve on the highway, he overtook a Fiera which had stopped
on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by Angeles
before overtaking the Fiera.
ISSUE:
WON Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. are liable for the death of Israel
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HELD: Yes.
The Court of Appeals correctly found, based on the sketch and
spot report of the police authorities which were not disputed
by petitioners, that the collision occurred immediately after
petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while
traversing a curve on the highway. This act of overtaking was
in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as
amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and
Traffic Code.
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. - (a) The driver
of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of
a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding
in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible and
is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to
permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass another
vehicle proceeding in the same direction when approaching
the crest of a grade, nor upon a curve in the highway, where
the drivers view along the highway is obstructed within a
distance of five hundred feet ahead except on a highway
having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one
direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass
another vehicle:
Provided That on a highway, within a business or residential
district, having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in
one direction, the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass
another vehicle on the right.
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for
the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary
situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not
to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.4 When a motor vehicle
is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity
for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does
not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon
having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the
opposite direction comes into view.
In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr.
already saw that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from
the opposite direction and failing to consider the speed
thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning
mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles
in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate
cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a
passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver
of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who
recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where
overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of
the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
23
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presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic
regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed
to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal
presumption.
The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger
jeepney is binding against petitioner Mallari Sr., who
admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged
as a common carrier, considering the fact that in an action
based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier
in order to hold it responsible for the payment of damages
sought by the passenger. Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a
common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the
circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in
case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence.
Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for
the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willful acts of the formers employees. This liability of the
common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its
employees. Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier
jeepney owned by Mallari Sr. assumed the express obligation
to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury or death that might be suffered
by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or
negligence of the carrier.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 20 September 1995 reversing the
decision of the trial court being in accord with law and
evidence is AFFIRMED. Consequently, petitioners are ordered
jointly and severally to pay Claudia G. Reyes P1,006,777.50 for
loss of earning capacity, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
death, and P10,000.00 for attorneys fees. Costs against
petitioners.
R TRANSPORT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS
OWNER/PRESIDENT RIZALINA LAMZON V. EDUARDO PANTE
G.R. NO. 162104 SEPTEMBER 15, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner R Transport Corporation, represented by its owner
and president, Rizalina Lamzon, is a common carrier engaged
in operating a bus line. At about 3:00 a.m. of January 27, 1995,
respondent Eduardo Pante rode petitioner's R. L. Bus Liner in
Cubao, Quezon City bound for Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The bus hit
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a tree and a house due to the fast and reckless driving of the
bus driver, Johnny Merdiquia. Pante sustained physical injuries
as a result of the vehicular accident. He was brought by an
unidentified employee of petitioner to the Baliuag District
Hospital, where he was diagnosed to have sustained a
"laceration frontal area, with fracture of the right humerus,”
or the bone that extends from the shoulder to the elbow of the
right arm. Pante underwent an operation for the fracture of
the right humerus. He was informed that he had to undergo a
second operation after two years of rest. He was unemployed
for almost a year after his first operation because Goldilocks,
where he worked as a production crew, refused to accept him
with his disability as he could not perform his usual job. After
the first operation, he demanded from petitioner the full
payment or reimbursement of his medical and hospitalization
expenses, but petitioner refused payment. Four years later,
respondent underwent a second operation.
Pante filed a Complaint for damages against petitioner for the
injuries he sustained as a result of the vehicular accident. RTC:
plaintiffs are entitled to damages. Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages.
RULING:
Yes. Under the Civil Code, common carriers, like petitioner bus
company, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according
to all the circumstances of each case. They are bound to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of death of
or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
by Articles 1733 and 1755."
Further, Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides that
"[c]ommon carriers are liable for the death or injury to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the
former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders
of the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers
does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employees."
24
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In this case, the testimonial evidence of respondent showed delict (article 2180 of the NCC)
that petitioner, through its bus driver, failed to observe
extraordinary diligence, and was, therefore, negligent in HELD:
transporting the passengers of the bus safely to Gapan, Nueva
Ecija on January 27, 1995, since the bus bumped a tree and a NO. We find no reversible error committed by respondent
house, and caused physical injuries to respondent. Article 1759 court in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint. (art
of the Civil Code explicitly states that the common carrier is 2180 not applicable)
liable for the death or injury to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of its employees, and that such To sustain a claim based on quasi delict, the following
liability does not cease upon proof that the common carrier requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of
selection and supervision of its employees. Hence, even if cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
petitioner was able to prove that it exercised the diligence of a defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
bus driver, it is still liable to respondent for the physical injuries We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove
he sustained due to the vehicular accident. the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence
of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION VS. CA Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It
G.R. No. 118889 March 23, 1998 should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of
Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-
Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was
FACTS:
driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence
was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the
This was a two-car collision at dawn (3am). 2 vehicles, both
damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability.
Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising northward along EDSA
Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein.
Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic accident. The car owned
by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the
Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is
highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, owned by
hardly applicable because none of the circumstances
respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by
mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration.
Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of the
Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business
other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street,
was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such,
the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left
there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and
side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish
employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be
tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver's license.
responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former
not being an employer of the latter.
As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in
view of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the
P25,382.20. By way of subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and
same Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the
respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance
owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was
Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict
in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the motor vehicle,
the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this
The trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to
provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the
substantiate its claim of subrogation.
absence of master-driver relationship between respondent
FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court although
action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict;
based on another ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence of
logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither
Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of respondent
prosper.
FILCAR.4 In other words, petitioner failed to establish its cause
of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict.
Petitioner’s contention that respondents are liable on the
strength of the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v.
ISSUE:
Vda. de Caldo5 that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable
for damages suffered by third persons although the vehicle is
WON FILCAR being the owner of the rent-a-car is also liable for
leased to another.
the negligent act of the lessee Dahl-Jansen based on quasi

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Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is
rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that case,
the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by
petitioner corporation caused injuries to several persons and
damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from liability,
the corporation raised the defense that at the time of the
collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it was
leased to another; and, that the driver was not its employee
but of the lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as it found
that the true nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing
more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve
itself of the burdens and responsibilities of an employer. We
upheld this finding and affirmed the declaration of joint and
several liability of the corporation with its driver.
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., vs UCPB GENERAL
INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 162267 July 4, 2008
FACTS:
A Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by UCPB, insured with UCPB
General Insurance Co., was traversing the Laurel
Highway, Barangay Balintawak, LipaCity. It was driven by
Flaviano Isaac with Conrado Geronimo (Asst. Manager of said
bank), was hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker
Truck, owned by defendants-appellants PCI Leasing & Finance,
Inc. allegedly leased to and operated by defendant-appellant
Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its
employee, defendant appellant Renato Gonzaga. The impact
caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in
an explosion of the rear part of the car. The driver and
passenger suffered physical injuries. However, the driver
defendant-appellant Gonzaga continued on its way to its
destination and did not bother to bring his victims to the
hospital.
As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI
Leasing, repeated demands were made by plaintiff-
appellee for the payment of the aforesaid amounts. However,
no payment was made. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.,
(petitioner) interposed the defense that it could not be held
liable for the collision, since the driver, Gonzaga, was not its
employee, but that of its co-defendant SUGECO. In fact, it was
SUGECO, that was the actual operator of the truck, pursuant
to a Contract of Lease signed by petitioner and
SUGECO. Petitioner, however, admitted that it was the owner
of the truck in question. RTC rendered judgment in favour of
UCPB General Insurance and ordered PCI Leasing and Gonzaga,
to pay jointly and severally the former. CA affirmed with the
lower court’s decision.
ISSUES:
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH
1) Is the petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that
figured in a quasi-delict may be held liable, jointly and
severally, with the driver thereof, for the damages caused to
third parties?
2) Is the petitioner, as a financing company, is absolved from
liability by the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8556, or
the Financing Company Act of 1998.
RULING:
1) YES. The principle of holding the registered owner of a
vehicle liable for quasi-delicts resulting from its use is well-
established in jurisprudence. As explained in the case of
Erezo v. Jepte, thus:
Registration is required not to make said registration the
operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as
in land registration cases, because the administrative
proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation
to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs.
Rafael and Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and
operation of the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5
[a], Act No. 3992, as amended.) The main aim of motor vehicle
registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle
on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on
a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are
numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused
accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without
positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very
scant means of identification. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public,
that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the
interest of the determination of persons responsible for
damages or injuries caused on public highways.
2) NO. The new law, R.A. No. 8556, notwithstanding
developments in foreign jurisdictions, do not supersede or
repeal the law on compulsory motor vehicle registration. No
part of the law expressly repeals Section 5(a) and (e) of R.A.
No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. Thus, the rule remains the
same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter, that is
not registered with the Land Transportation Office, still does
not bind third persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents,
for the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a
motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. A lease
such as the one involved in the instant case is an encumbrance
in contemplation of law, which needs to be registered in order
for it to bind third parties. Under this policy, the evil sought to
be avoided is the exacerbation of the suffering of victims of
tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to identify a guilty
party. A contrary ruling will not serve the ends of justice. The
failure to register a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance,
26
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should not benefit the parties responsible, to the prejudice of
innocent victims.
JONAS AÑONUEVO, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
JEROME VILLAGRACIA
G.R. No. 130003. October 20, 2004
FACTS:
The present petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist
of damages from the driver of the car which had struck him.
The argument is hinged on the cyclist’s failure to install safety
devices on his bicycle. However, the lower courts agreed that
the motorist himself caused the collision with his own
negligence. The facts are deceptively simple, but the
resolution entails thorough consideration of fundamental
precepts on negligence.
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while
Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving a Lancer
car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of
Añonuevo’s brother. Añonuevo was in the course of making a
left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to undergo four
operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against P&G Phils.,
Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal
complaint against Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently
acquitted of the criminal charge. Añonuevo claims that
Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to
register his bicycle or install safety gadgets. He posits that
Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any
traffic regulation.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-
motorized vehicles, making Villagracia presumptively
negligent. (No)
2. W/N Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with
traffic regulations (No)
3. W/N Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence (No)
 of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has
HELD:
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH
1. There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized
and non-motorized vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded
by the limitations in physical exertion. is capable of greater
speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the
same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting
greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or
collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the
motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater
bulk of mass, and greater combustibility due to the use of fuel.
The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the
natures and attached responsibilities of motorized and non-
motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or
ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such
were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded
against, then the framers of the Code would have expanded
the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that
matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need
arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a motorized
vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there
has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed
on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor
vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize
such higher standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to
motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other types of
vehicles.
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should
apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. There is
factual and legal basis that necessitates the distinction under
Art. 2185, and to adopt Añonuevo’s thesis would unwisely
obviate this distinction.
2. The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
time and of the place.30 However, the existence of negligence
in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of
the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which
determines what would be reckless or negligent.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory
duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law,
or negligence per se.32 In Teague vs. Fernandez,33 the Court
cited with approval American authorities elucidating on the
rule:
"The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis
for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause
happened which was intended to be prevented by the
statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be
deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury."
27
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Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter
had transgressed traffic regulations. However, Añonuevo was
speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was
the proximate cause of the accident. Even assuming that
Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was
not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part
would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down
as he proceeded to make the left turn.
3. As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts
adjudged Añonuevo as solely responsible for the accident. The
petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be
reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not
have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped
with safety equipment.
entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the
employer and the costs of the proceedings. The sum paid by
the employer for compensation or the amount of
compensation to which the employee or his dependents are
entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any damage suit
or action.
The petitioner claims that the said law precludes recovery by
the heirs of the deceased because Mamador violated the
employer’s prohibition against laborers riding the haulage
trucks. Petitioner claims such violation was the laborer’s
“notorious negligence” which, under the law, precludes
recovery.
ISSUE:

MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC. vs. WORKMENT’S Whether or not the claim was precluded by the alleged
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and HEIRS OF MAMADOR “notorious negligence” of the deceased.
G.R. No. L-8110 JUNE 30, 1956
RULING:
FACTS:
NO. The Commission has not declared that the prohibition was
known to Mamador. Yet the employer does not point out in
On August 23, 1951 6:00am, the deceased Mamador together
the record evidence to that effect. Supposing Mamador knew
with other laborers of the Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.
the prohibition, said the referee, “can we truthfully say that he
rode a truck driven by its employee Procopio Macunat and on
boarded the fatal truck with full apprehension of the existence
its way to the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to
of the danger, if any at all, that an ordinary prudent man would
overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over
try to avoid? I do not believe so, and even in the presence of
and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of Mamador and
doubt, the same must be resolved in his favor. Unless of
injury to the others.
course, we can attribute to him a desire to end his life.
Nowhere in the records of this case can we find the slightest
Procopio Macunat was convicted and sentenced to indemnify
insinuation of that desire.”
the heirs of the deceased. However, he has paid nothing to the
latter.
There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing
a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be,
Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the
because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. It is
order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner
argued that there was notorious negligence in this particular
confirming the referee’s award of compensation to the heirs
instance because there was the employer’s prohibition. Does
of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death. It maintains that
violation of this order constitute negligence? Many courts hold
this claim is barred by section 6 of the Workmen’s
that violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence
Compensation Law, which reads:
per se. Others consider the circumstances.
Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers
However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that
an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any
violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is
other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with
not negligence per se;it may be evidence of negligence.
such injured employee either to claim compensation from his
employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for
This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn’t be of
damages, in accordance with law; in case compensation is
a greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or board.
claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer
And the referee correctly considered this violation as possible
who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the
evidence of negligence; but it declared that under the
same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of
circumstance, the laborer could not be declared to have acted
recovering from such person what he paid: Provided, That in
with negligence. Correctly, it is believed, since the prohibition
case the employer recovers from such third person damages
had nothing to do with personal safety of the riders.
in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act, such excess
shall be delivered to the injured employee or any other person

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CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH
Such finding is virtually a finding of fact which we may not
overrule in this certiorari proceeding.
Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely
was not “notorious” negligence, which we have interpreted to
mean the same thing as “gross” negligence — implying
“conscious indifference to consequences” “pursuing a course
of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury”
“utter disregard of consequences.” Getting or accepting a free
ride on the company’s haulage truck couldn’t be gross
negligence, because as the referee found, “no danger or risk
was apparent.”
F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. V. CA
G.R. NO. L-52732, AUGUST 29, 1988
FACTS:
The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan
City was situated adjacent to the residence of private
respondents. Sometime in August 1971, private respondent
Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant
manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between
the shop and private respondents' residence. The request was
repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears.
In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in
petitioner's shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the
shop premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts
proved futile. The fire spread to private respondents' house.
Both the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The
cause of the conflagration was never discovered.
Subsequently, private respondents collected P35, 000.00 on
the insurance on their house and the contents thereof.
On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for
damages against petitioner, praying for actual, moral and
exemplary damages. The trial court rendered decision in favor
of private respondents. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner negligent when it refused to build a concrete
firewall in accordance with the city ordinance calling for the
application of res ipsa loquitur?
HELD:
YES. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, whose application to the
instant case petitioner objects to is applicable. The facts of the
case likewise call for the application of the doctrine,
considering that in the normal course of operations of a
furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as
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CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH
wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for
machinery may be found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the
part of petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed.
The Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct
a firewall between its shop and the residence of private
respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the fire could
have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that
gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and
that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop.
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with
city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of
negligence. In the instant case, with more reason should
petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to
construct a firewall between its property and private
respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the
pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an
ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by
the Court as an act of negligence.
ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name
and style COMMUNITY DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU
CASTRO, v. RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR
[G.R. NO. 168512 : March 20, 2007]
FACTS:
Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the
Accounting Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc.
(the Company). As a prerequisite for regular employment, she
underwent a medical examination at the Community
Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia who is a medical technologist,
conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and
CDC issued the test result indicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag:
Reactive." The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as
examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Castro as
pathologist.
When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo,
the Company physician, the latter apprised her that the
findings indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver
disease. Thus, based on the medical report submitted by Sto.
Domingo, the Company terminated Ranida's employment for
failing the physical examination.
When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment,
the latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at the
Bataan Doctors Hospital. During Ramon's confinement, Ranida
underwent another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the
result8 indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed Sto.
Domingo of this development but was told that the test
29
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conducted by CDC was more reliable because it used the
Micro-Elisa Method.
Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this
time, the Anti-HBs test conducted on her indicated a
"Negative" result. Ranida submitted the test results from
Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to the Executive Officer of
the Company who requested her to undergo another similar
test before her re-employment would be considered. Thus,
CDC conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which indicated
a "Negative" result. Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-
in-Charge of CDC, issued a Certification correcting the initial
result and explaining that the examining medical technologist
(Garcia) interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or
reactive.
Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner Garcia and a purportedly unknown pathologist of
CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous interpretation
of the results of Ranida's examination, she lost her job and
suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights,
while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities.
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and
incompetence and reiterated the scientific explanation for the
"false positive" result of the first HBs Ag test in his December
7, 1993 letter to the respondents.
Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and
only when a case was referred to him; that he did not examine
Ranida; and that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp
signature.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lacking proof. However, the
CA rendered its decision finding Garcia liable for damages for
negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result. On the other
hand, it exonerated Castro for lack of participation in the
issuance of the results.
ISSUE:
Is Garcia liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an
incorrect HBsAG test result?
RULING:
YES. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of
the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the
test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care
provider either fail to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or
she did something that a reasonably prudent health care
provider would not have done; and that failure or action
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CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH
caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of
negligence.
Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are:
1) duty,
2) breach,
3) injury, and
4) proximate causation.
All the elements are present in the case at bar.
Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to
comply with statutes, as well as rules and regulations,
purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of
the people by preventing the operation of substandard,
improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical
laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of
clinical laboratory examinations. Their business is impressed
with public interest, as such, high standards of performance
are expected from them.
In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the
law imposes upon a person the duty to do something, his
omission or non-performance will render him liable to
whoever may be injured thereby.
Applicable Laws in this case:
1.Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as
The Clinical Laboratory Law
2.Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and 25(25.1)(1) of the DOH
Administrative Order No. 49-B Series of 1988, otherwise known
as the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the
Registration, Operation and Maintenance of Clinical
Laboratories in the Philippines
3.Section 29(b) of R.A. No. 5527, otherwise known as The
Philippine Medical Technology Act of 1969,
A clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and
supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Secretary
of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods
of laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be
under the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed
physician; and that the results of any examination may be
released only to the requesting physician or his authorized
representative upon the direction of the laboratory
pathologist.
These rules are intended for the protection of the public by
preventing performance of substandard clinical examinations
by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised.
The public demands no less than an effective and efficient
30
TH
performance of clinical laboratory examinations through
compliance with the quality standards set by laws and
regulations.
Garcia failed to comply with these standards.
First, CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a
licensed physician as required by law, but by Ma. Ruby C.
Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist.In the License to
Open and Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the years 1993 and
1996 issued by the Undersecretary for Health Facilities,
Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was
named as the head of CDC. However, in his Answer with
Counterclaim, he stated:
Defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community
Diagnostic Center nor an employee of the same nor the
employer of its employees. Defendant pathologist comes to the
Community Diagnostic Center when and where a problem is
referred to him. Its employees are licensed under the Medical
Technology Law (Republic Act No. 5527) and are certified by,
and registered with, the Professional Regulation Commission
after having passed their Board Examinations. They are
competent within the sphere of their own profession in so far
as conducting laboratory examinations and are allowed to sign
for and in behalf of the clinical laboratory. The defendant
pathologist, and all pathologists in general, are hired by
laboratories for purposes of complying with the rules and
regulations and orders issued by the Department of Health
through the Bureau of Research and Laboratories. Defendant
pathologist does not stay that long period of time at the
Community Diagnostic Center but only periodically or
whenever a case is referred to him by the laboratory.
Defendant pathologist does not appoint or select the
employees of the laboratory nor does he arrange or approve
their schedules of duty.
Castro's infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely
qualifies as an effective administrative supervision and control
over the activities in the laboratory. "Supervision and control"
means the authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of
acts; review, approve, revise or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units.
Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent
Ranida without the supervision of defendant-appellee Castro,
who admitted that:
[He] does not know, and has never known or met, the plaintiff-
patient even up to this time nor has he personally examined
any specimen, blood, urine or any other tissue, from the
plaintiff-patient otherwise his own handwritten signature
would have appeared in the result and not merely stamped as
shown in Annex "B" of the Amended Complaint.
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Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to
respondent Ranida without the authorization of defendant-
appellee Castro.
Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences
which followed after the release of the HBsAG test result.
However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules
promulgated and issued for the protection of public safety and
interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or
omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of
Garcia's failure to comply with the mandate of the laws and
rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for
failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of
the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several more
tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper
safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting the
clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.
ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES v. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and MACLIN ELECTRONICS, INC.
G.R. No. 107968. October 30, 1996
FACTS:
Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, which
is engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles, under the style
Motobilkote.
On April 30, 1991, Maclin Electronics, Inc., through an
employee, brought a 1990 model Kia Pride Peoples car to
Cipriano’s shop for rustproofing. The car had been purchased
the year before from the Integrated Auto Sales, Inc.
The vehicle was received in the shop. According to Cipriano,
the car was brought to his shop at 10 o’clock in the morning of
April 30, 1991 and was ready for release later that afternoon,
as it took only six hours to complete the process of
rustproofing.
In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat
restaurant, which Cipriano also owned, adjoining his
Mobilkote rustproofing shop. The fire destroyed both the shop
and the restaurant, including the Kia Pride. The car had been
kept inside the building, allegedly to protect it from theft.
On May 8 1991, Maclin Electronics sent a letter to Cipriano,
demanding reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. In
reply, Cipriano denied liability on the ground that the fire was
a fortuitous event. This prompted Maclin Electronics to bring
this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages against
31
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Cipriano. Maclin Electronics alleged that its vehicle was lost
due to the negligence and imprudence of the Cipriano, citing
Ciprianos failure to register his business with the Department
of Trade and Industry under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure it as
required in the rules implementing the Decree.
In his Answer, Cipriano invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and
denied liability for the loss which he alleged was due to a
fortuitous event. He later testified that he employed an
electrician who regularly inspected the lighting in his
restaurant and rustproofing shop. In addition, he claimed he
had installed fire-fighting devices and that the fire was an
accident entirely independent of his will and devoid of any
negligence on his part. He further averred that Maclin
Electronicss car was ready for release as early as afternoon
of April 30, 1991, and that it was Maclin Electronicss delay in
claiming it that was the cause of the loss.
Cipriano explained that rustproofing involved spraying
asphalt-like materials underneath motor vehicle so that rust
will not corrode its body and that the materials and chemicals
used for this purpose are not inflammable. Therefore, he could
not be made to assume the risk of loss due to fire. He also
claimed that he was not required to register his business with
the Department of Trade and Industry, because he was not
covered by P.D. No. 1572.
The trial court sustained the Maclin Electronics’ contention
that the "failure of defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is
in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders Cipriano
liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by
fire," even as it ruled that the business of rustproffing is
"definitely covered" by P.D. No. 1572. Since Cipriano did not
register his business and insure it, he must bear the cost of loss
of his customers.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed.
ISSUE:
Is Cipriano required to insure his business and the vehicles
received by him in the course of his business and, if so, was his
failure to do so constitute negligence, rendering him liable for
loss due to the risk required to be insured against?
HELD:
YES. Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. In F.F.
Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held the owner of a
furniture shop liable for the destruction of the plaintiffs house
in a fire which started in his establishment in view of his failure
to comply with an ordinance which required the construction
of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez, we stated that where the
very injury which was intended to be prevented by the
ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
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was not only an act negligence, but also the proximate cause
of the death.
Indeed, the existence of a contract between Cipriano and
Maclin Electronics does not bar a finding of negligence under
the principles of quasi-delict, as we recently held in Fabre v.
Court of Appeals. Cipriano's negligence is the source of his
obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his
contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence
in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is
therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to Maclin
Electronics was due to a fortuitous event, since it was Ciprianos
negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the
proximate cause of the loss.
Thus, P.D. No. 1572, 1 requires service and repair enterprises
for motor vehicles, like that of Ciprianos, to register with the
Department of Trade and Industry. As condition for such
registration or accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32 requires
covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. Rule III of
this Order provides in pertinent parts:
1- REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCREDITATION
1) Enterprises applying for original accreditation shall submit
the following:
xxxxxxxxxx
1.3. Copy of Insurance Policy of the shop covering the property
entrusted by its customer for repair, service or maintenance
together with a copy of the official receipt covering the full
payment of premium;
xxxxxxxxxx
8 - INSURANCE POLICY
The insurance policy for the following risks like theft, pilferage,
fire, flood and loss should cover exclusively the machines,
motor vehicles, heavy equipment, engines, electronics,
electrical, airconditioners, refrigerators, office machines and
data processing equipment, medical and dental
equipment, other consumer mechanical and industrial
equipment stored for repair and/or service in the premises of
the applicant.
There is thus a statutory duty imposed on Cipriano and it is for
his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty of
negligence rendering him liable for damages to Maclin
Electronics. While the fire in this case may be considered a
fortuitous event, this circumstance cannot exempt Cipriano
from liability for loss.
32
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SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 119092, December 10, 1998
FACTS:
This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Bent panel
truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry and a Cimarron
which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of
several others. The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly
employees of the Project Management Consultants, Inc.
(PMCI).
The Cimarron was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of one of
the employees of PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando
Hernandez. It appears that at about 8:00 p.m., as it was
traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way
back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by
petitioner's panel truck, which was traveling in the opposite
direction. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a
jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped
on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused
his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of
the opposite lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with the
Cimarron on the north-bound lane.
Private respondents filed this civil case for damages before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, against
petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty
of contributory negligence and, therefore, its liability should
be mitigated, if not totally extinguished. It claims that the
driver of the Cimarron was guilty or violation of traffic rules
and regulations at the time of the mishap. Hence, in
accordance with Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, he was presumed
to be negligent.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner’s liability should be mitigated on the
ground that that the driver of the Cimarron was also guilty of
contributory negligence
RULING:
No.
First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence
of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the
vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal
connection between the injury received and the violation of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
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the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of
the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law,
like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless
it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says that
"driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning
headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of
accident," that because the Cimarron had only one headlight,
there was "decreased visibility," and that the tact that the
vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded
"decreased [its] maneuverability,". However, mere allegations
such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of
proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the
contributing cause of the injury.
The testimonies of the witnesses point to the fact that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
petitioner's driver. As the trial court noted, the swerving of
petitioner's panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not
only that petitioner's driver was running the vehicle at a very
high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney
ahead of it as well. Hence, the petitioner should be held liable
for such negligence.
ALBERT TISON and CLAUDIO L. JABON
vs. SPS. GREGORIO POMASIN and CONSORCIA PONCE
POMASIN, DIANNE POMASIN PAGUNSAN, CYNTHIA
POMASIN, SONIA PEROL, ANTONIO SESISTA, GINA SESISTA,
and REYNALDO SESISTA
G.R. No. 173180 August 24, 2011
FACTS:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jeepney, figured in a
vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway, Albay. Laarni
Pomasin was driving the jeepney while the tractor-trailer was
driven by Claudio Jabon on the opposite direction. Most of the
passengers (total of 14) in the jeepney including Laarni, died if
not injured. On the other hand, Claudio Jabon and one of the
passengers in the tractor-trailer were also injured.
The opposing parties gave two different versions of the
incident.
Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarni’s father, was on board the
jitney and seated on the passenger’s side. He testified that
while the jitney was passing through a curve going downward,
he saw a tractor-trailer coming from the opposite direction
and encroaching on the jitney’s lane. The jitney was hit by the
tractor-trailer and it was dragged further causing death and
injuries to its passengers.
33
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On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving
the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane
falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began
running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction
of the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the
tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay.
Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-
trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-
trailer was likewise damaged.
Albert Tison, the owner of the truck, extended financial
assistance to respondents by giving them P1,000.00 each
immediately after the accident and P200,000.00 to Cynthia
Pomasin (Gregorio‘s daughter). Cynthia, in turn, executed an
Affidavit of Desistance.
Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
before the RTC of Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and
carelessness of petitioners. Also, Jabon was prohibited from
driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his driver’s
license. Respondents prayed for indemnification for the heirs
of those who perished in the accident, for hospitalization,
medical and burial expenses, moral damages, exemplary
damages, loss of income, attorney‘s fees, litigation expenses,
and cost of suit.
In their Answer, petitioners countered that it was Laarni‘s
negligence which proximately caused the accident. They
further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by Spouses
Pomasin(Gregorio and wife) to enter into an amicable
settlement by executing an Affidavit of Desistance.
Notwithstanding the affidavit, petitioners complained that
respondents filed the instant complaint to harass them and
profit from the recklessness of Laarni. Petitioners
counterclaimed for damages.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing
the complaint for damages. The trial court considered the
testimony of Jabon regarding the incident more convincing
and reliable than that of Gregorio’s, a mere passenger, whose
observation and attention to the road is not as focused as that
of the driver. The trial court concluded that Laarni caused the
collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer. The trial court
likewise upheld the Affidavit of Desistance as having been
executed with the tacit consent of respondents.
The CA disagreed with the RTC and ruled that the reckless
driving of Jabon caused the vehicular collision. The CA relied
heavily on Gregorio‘s testimony that Jabon was driving the
tractor-trailer downward too fast and it encroached the lane
of the jeepney. Based on the gravity of the impact and the
damage caused to the jeepney, the CA inferred that Jabon
must be speeding. Tison was likewise held liable for damages
for his failure to prove due diligence in supervising Jabon after
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he was hired as driver of the truck. Finally, the CA disregarded
the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia because the
latter had no written power of attorney from respondents and
that she was so confused at the time when she signed the
affidavit that she did not read its content.
ISSUES:
1. Who is the negligent party?
2. Whether or not Jabon is presumed negligent considering
that he is prohibited to drive a tractor-trailer
HELD:
1. The negligent party is Laarni (jeepney).
This court agrees with the conclusion of the RTC which found
credible the version of Jabon because his concentration as a
driver is more focused than that of a mere passenger. Aside
from Jabon’s alleged vantage point to clearly observe the
incident, the RTC also took into consideration Gregorio‘s
admission that prior to the accident, the jeepney was running
on the curving and downward portion of the highway. The CA,
however, took into account the other and opposite testimony
of Gregorio that it was their jeepney that was going uphill and
when it was about to reach a curve, he saw the incoming truck
running very fast and encroaching the jeepney‘s lane. The
declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was
straightforward and consistent. The recollection of Gregorio
veered from curving and downward to uphill. On this point,
Jabon and his testimony is more credible. There was no
showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a
preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact
ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-
trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded
jeepney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.
Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In
hindsight, it can be argued that Jabon should have swerved to
the right upon seeing the jeepney zigzagging before it collided
with the tractor-trailer. Accidents, though, happen in an
instant, and, understandably in this case, leaving the driver
without sufficient time and space to maneuver a vehicle the
size of a tractor-trailer uphill and away from collision with the
jeepney oncoming downhill.
2. No, Jabon was not negligent.
Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the
restriction imposed on his driver’s license, i.e., restriction code
2 and 3. As a matter of fact, Jabon even asked the Land
Transportation Office to reinstate his articulated license
containing restriction code 8 which would allow him to drive a
tractor-trailer. The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom that
Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the
collision.
34
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 the court, upon recommendation of the Social Welfare
Generally, driving without a proper license is a violation of Administrator, finally discharged him and quashed the criminal
traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the case. Thereafter, on October 13, 1954, an action was instituted
legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the by Araneta and his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife, and
mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, their son, Dario, to recover material, moral and exemplary
in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held damages.
that a causal connection must exist between the injury
received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be Court of First Instance: Dario Arreglado's father had acted
proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the negligently in allowing his son to have access to the pistol used
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially to injure Benjamin Araneta, and sentenced defendants to pay
contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, P3,943, damages and attorney's fees.
of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. ISSUE:
In the instant case, no causal connection was established
between the drivers violation of traffic regulation and the Whether or not the damages awarded were inadequate.
injury caused. In fact, it was even proved by petitioner that LTO
merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in Jabon’s RULING:
driver’s license.
Yes. We agree with the appellants that the damages awarded
3. Dangerous weapons and substances by the lower court for the injuries suffered by Benjamin
- Article 2188, New Civil Code Araneta are inadequate. In allowing not more than P1,000 as
Cases: compensation for the "permanent deformity and —
MANUEL S. ARANETA, ET AL. V. JUAN ARREGLADO, ET AL. something like an inferiority complex" as well as for the
G.R. NO. L-11394 SEPTEMBER 9, 1958 "pathological condition on the left side of the jaw" caused to
said plaintiff, the court below overlooked the clear evidence
on record that to arrest the degenerative process taking place
FACTS:
in the mandible and restore the injured boy to a nearly normal
condition, surgical intervention was needed, for which the
On March 7, 1951, while plaintiff Benjamin Araneta was talking
doctor's charges would amount to P3,000, exclusive of
with the other students of the Ateneo de Manila while seated
hospitalization fees, expenses and medicines. Furthermore,
atop a low ruined wall bordering the Ateneo grounds, Dario
the operation, according to Dr. Diño, would probably have to
Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by.
be repeated in order to effectuate a complete cure, while
Those on the wall called Dario and conversed with him, and in
removal of the scar on the face obviously demanded plastic
the course of their talk, twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo
surgery.
and enrolling in the De La Salle College. Apparently, Arreglado
resented the banter and suddenly pulling from his pocket a
The indemnity granted by the trial court should be increased
Japanese Lugar pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan
to a total of P18,000.
Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower
jaw, and causing him to drop backward, bleeding profusely.
It is also the hope of the Court that the award in the present
Araneta was taken first to the school infirmary and later to the
case will remind licensed possessors of firearms of their
Singian Hospital, where he lay hovering between life and death
peremptory duty to adequately safeguard such dangerous
for three days. He recovered but the gunshot wound left him
weapons at all times, and to take all requisite measures to
with a degenerative injury to the jawbone (mandible) and a
prevent minors and other unauthorized parties from having
scar in the lower portion of the face, where the bullet had
access thereto. Competent observers have recently called
plowed through. The behavior of Benjamin was likewise
attention to the fact that the growing teenage hooliganism in
affected, he becoming inhibited and morose after leaving the
our society is principally due to parent's complacency in and
hospital.
neglect of their progeny.
Dario Arreglado was indicted for frustrated homicide and
Appellants complain that the court should have allowed more
pleaded guilty; but in view of his youth, Dario being only 14
than P500 to compensate Benjamin's lost school year. We find
years of age, the court suspended the hearings and ordered
this complaint unjustified, since the damages due to the lost
him committed to the care of Mr. Deogracias Lerma, under the
schooling and the resulting reduction in the lad's future
supervision of the Commissioner of Social Welfare,
earning capacity are manifestly speculative, and may not exist
conformably to Republic Act No. 47. Because Arreglado
at all. Moreover, the record does not show facts sufficient to
observed proper conduct and discipline while on probation,
justify a larger award on this account.

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CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH
 HELD:
As to the moral damages for pain, anxiety and suffering
undergone by the father, Manuel Araneta: moral damages in YES. This case for damages arose out of the accidental
case of physical injuries are only recoverable by the party who shooting of petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil
suffered them and not by his next of kin, unless there is Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based
statutory provision to the contrary. on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of
the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for
damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing
SPOUSES PACIS VS. MORALES their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against
GR. NO. 169467, February 25, 2010 Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action
for damages against respondent whom they alleged was
Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages
FACTS:
under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old
**
student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103
Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the
of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that
owner of the gun store.
matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and
direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag
states:
and Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store
while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted
by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside
Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed
a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on
and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting
Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is
the young Alfred in the head.
in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and
ammunition must maintain basic security and safety
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag.
requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate
Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against him
Dealership will be suspended or canceled.
because of the exempting circumstance of “accident” under
Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who
has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the
extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons
criminal case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced
or substances. Such person in possession or control of
and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant
dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
case. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike
petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity
the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no
for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization
risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the
and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory
exercise of a higher degree of care.
damages, MD and AF.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial
knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known
court’s Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability
never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has
petition.
the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from
ISSUE:
ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-
access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the
W/N Morales was negligent
store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they
are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as

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what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent
when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the
drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first
place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault.
Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent
should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any
untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a
firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is
open and he has personally checked that the weapon is
completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not
loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was
not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to
Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to
restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade
firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and

diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the
degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous
weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.

DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN 37
TH
CASE DIGESTS ON TORTS AND DAMAGES LAW – 4 BATCH