Groupthink: the Cuban Invasion and Bay of Pigs Fiasco.

Castro took over the Cuban government in 1959. John F. Kennedy was elected in November
1960 and took office on January 20, 1961. The first meeting to discuss the situation in Cuba
took place only two days after JFK’s inauguration, and the invasion was launched on April 17,
1961, less than three months later.
The decision making group consisted of some of the most intelligent, experienced decision
makers in the country. They had just managed to get John Kennedy, a very young, Irish, Roman
Catholic, elected. This success was very unexpected by many.
THE PLAYERS
THE IN-GROUP
Position Prior Position / Notes
Dean Rusk Secretary of State Head of the Rockefeller Foundation
Veteran Policy Maker
Robert McNamara Secretary of Defense President, Ford Motor Company
Renowned for intellectual brilliance and personal
integrity
Doug Dillon Secretary of the Treasury Undersecretary of State for Dwight D. Eisenhower
Robert F. Kennedy Attorney General JFK Campaign Manager
JFK’s brother
Graduate of Harvard, and University of Virginia Law
School
McGeorge Bundy Special Asst for National Dean, college of Arts and sciences, Harvard
Security
Arthur Schlesinger, White House Staff Pulitzer Prize winning historian
Jr.
THE OUT-GROUP
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff
Allen Dulles CIA Director

Richard Bissell CIA Deputy Director of Plans

3 State Department Asst Secretary for Inter-
specialists American Affairs
Chairman: Latin American
Task Force

The decisions were made by the In-Group who either did not seek or did not heed information
from the Military, Intelligence, and State Department specialists.

Assumptions:
1. Nobody will know the US is behind the invasion
 Pierre Salinger in chronicling the events called the plan “the least covert op” ever.
 American newspapers printed articles about the planned invasion prior to its launch.
 Foreign politicians and newspapers knew about the operation in advance of its launch.
2. The Cuban Air Force is ineffectual
 This “ineffectual’ air force shot down half of the B-26’s trying to support the ground
troops
 They sunk two American naval ships (out of 4) carrying supplies for the ground troops
and drove off the others.
3. The 1400 Cuban exiles training in Guatemala are solidly behind this and have high morale
 Morale actually was very low.
4. The Cuban Army is weak, poorly trained, and inadequately armed.
 The Cuban army actually consisted of 20,000 well trained troops armed with state of the
art howitzers, cannons and rockets.
5. The Cuban underground will rise up in support of the invasion and help to overthrow Castro.
 The underground was small and poorly organized, not ready to support an invasion.

Failures:
1. Excluded the experts:
 The Chiefs of Staff from the military could have been asked for more correct information
on the Cuban Army and Air Force
 The State Department specialists could have been asked for more specific information on
the Cuban Underground movement.
 The CIA Director and Deputy Director could have provided more up to date and accurate
information on the state of the training in Guatemala.
2. Disconnected from day to day reality.
 Continued to assume “no one will know we are behind this” even as articles were being
printed about the plan.
3. Illusion of Invulnerability
 The decision making group thought they could do no wrong. They had just managed to
get JFK elected. They were veteran decision makers with long track records of success
 Robert Kennedy is quoted as saying he felt “nothing could stop us.”
 Schlesinger described the situation as one in which “euphoria reigned.”
4. Assumptions of unanimity with self-appointed mindguards
 Schlesinger reported that meetings took place “in a curious atmosphere of assumed
consensus.”
 At a birthday party for one of his children, after an in-group member expressed mild
doubts about the plan, Robert Kennedy took him aside and stated: “you may be right or
wrong, but the President has made up his mind. Don’t push it.”

This is a great historical event to use when explaining Groupthink. It offers examples of all of the
assumptions, judgment errors, causes and consequences involved in Groupthink.
Source: Janis, Irving L. (1972). Groupthink : psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.