Article

Geo-strategic Significance South Asian Survey

25(1&2) 84–101, 2018
of Bay of Bengal and © 2019 The Author
Reprints and permissions:
Andaman Sea: in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/0971523119835045
Leveraging Maritime, journals.sagepub.com/home/sas

Energy and Transport

Connectivity for
Regional Cooperation

Smruti S. Pattanaik1

Abstract
Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea (BoBAS) constitutes a single economically inte-
grated region. Though for the strategic purpose, India looks at Bay of Bengal
(BoB) separated from the Andaman Sea (AS). Since 2000, India has been mak-
ing an effort to integrate its north-eastern region to the vibrant economies in
Southeast Asia. In this context, BoBAS becomes significant to emerge as an eco-
nomically integrated region that has the potential for growth. Most of the coun-
tries, except for Myanmar, have witnessed 6–8 per cent growth for the past 10
years. They face similar maritime security threats, issues of terrorism and drug
trafficking. Over the past few years, the countries of the region have invested on
establishing connectivity network and are ready to cooperate on blue economy
as a part of sustainable development. Several bilateral and multilateral coopera-
tions that exist suggests that the region will emerge as an integrated economic
and security zone in the future.

Keywords
Cooperation, connectivity, maritime, security, subregionalism, Bay of Bengal,
Andaman Sea, Indian Ocean, energy cooperation

1
Institute Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India.

Corresponding author:
Smruti S. Pattanaik, Institute Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Development Enclave (near USI),
Rao Tula Ram Marg, New Delhi 110010, India.
E-mail: smrutispattanaik@gmail.com
Pattanaik 85

Introduction
Regionalism and regional economic cooperation have assumed greater signifi-
cance in recent years as most of the countries see themselves as vehicle of growth
for their developing economies. Economic integration and especially connectiv-
ity, which has emerged as a major driver of cooperation, are no longer examined
through the prism of sovereignty and nationalistic politics. Connectivity and tran-
sit have become new keywords of cooperation. While South Asia Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has received much attention of the policymakers
as a vehicle of regional cooperation, the countries of the region are yet to look
towards sea to explore new avenues of economic cooperation which is compara-
tively cheaper for moving goods and has less environmental impact when com-
pared to vehicular traffic movement. In this context, Bay of Bengal and Andaman
Sea (BoBAS) are relatively new areas of focus for India and other countries of the
region. Exploration of marine resources for development, blue water economy,
cooperation to enhance maritime security, etc. are some of the issues that are now
finding place in the joint statements as major policy objectives among govern-
ments. These spurts in the statements on maritime matters reveal that increasingly
the countries of the region are getting focused on maritime domain for their eco-
nomic development and to address emerging security issues. Organisations like
the Indian Ocean Rim Countries Association (IORA) and Bay of Bengal Initiative
for Multi-Sectoral Technical Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) have focused
on the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal (BoB), respectively. While BoB has
received larger attention, Andaman Sea (AS) did not get the focus it deserved after
India’s independence. As is mostly seen as a connector between the Bay and
Southeast Asian countries with which there was flourishing trade in the past. The
establishment of a tri-service command in Andaman is significant. Indian Navy is
now given the charge of this command.
For India, AS is strategically significant as it is adjacent to the BoB and con-
nects Indian Ocean to what is known as ‘Indo Pacific’ which has now emerged as
an intense region of competition between regional and global rivals, that is, China,
India, Australia and the USA; vying for dominance of this vital geo-strategic
region. The crucial factor is this part of the Indian Ocean is an important sea lanes
of communication (SLOC) vital to the energy security that fuels the growth engine
of many of the countries in the region. Therefore, protection of the SLOC is cru-
cial and none of the countries want it to be choked during conflict which would
impinge on security and survivability of these countries. At one point of time,
keeping this in mind, India had proposed declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of
the peace to keep the region secure from the super power rivalry during the Cold
War period. BoB and AS are the subregions of larger Indian Ocean region,
although these two regions are being treated as a singular subregion taking into
account their economic and strategic potential which means they cannot be treated
as separate entity. The BoB includes countries such as India, Bangladesh,
Myanmar, Thailand and Sri Lanka and the AS includes countries like Indonesia
and Malaysia. In May 2018, India and Indonesia agreed to set up a special task
force to enhance connectivity between the strategic Andaman and Nicobar Islands
86 South Asian Survey 25(1&2)

and provinces in Sumatera Island. Sunil S. Amrith in his seminal work on the
region succinctly describes the importance that the BoBAS had once occupied.
The rich past of the region does not logically progress to a rich future. He writes,

The fragmentation is rapid, because however closely linked the Bay of Bengal’s
coasts—by kinship, by commerce, by cultural circulation—there was never a corre-
sponding political structure to encompass the sea. Not even the British imperial frame
could hold the Bay together. The region was governed. Bay did not emerge as a mean-
ingful unit for the planned economic development and social mobilization that held
such promise for many in mid-twentieth-century Asia. (Amrith, 2013, p. 3)

Research Objectives
This article focuses on why the economic potential of BoBAS region has not
received the attention it deserved from the policymakers? It also looks into BoBAS
as strategic space which even though constitute a part of Indian Ocean, has emerged
as a unique subregion that would require focused study. It analyses the importance
of the region in terms of its strategic significance which would require larger atten-
tion of the states as well as its potential as a harbinger of economic prosperity. This
article focuses on how India looks at this region from economic and strategic point
of view, how important is the region in the context of its Indian Ocean strategy?
It examines the current connectivity projects that provide an insight into the region
potential to emerge as an economic hub and growth corridor, the energy coopera-
tion that exists among these countries, the maritime security synergy that would
provide them with an opportunity to interlock economic and security interests and
analyse how coastal shipping, blue water economy and exploring marine resources
and anti-piracy operation are increasingly binding these countries by creating
regional network that can be termed as security community.
This article argues that this is the region where economic cooperation is
likely to move faster as compared to the other competing regional cooperation
organisation like SAARC or BIMSTEC. Here BoBAS is seen in the context of
subregional cooperation that will contribute to the larger regional cooperation
architecture that already exists and also includes countries that are not part of
these two organisations.

Recentreing of Security Canvas: From Military Security

to Non-traditional Security
Post-Cold War period opened up opportunities for cooperation as economic issues
received closer attention. The traditional security threats arising out of the fear of
military confrontation lessened considerably. Coupled with this, the post-Cold
War period paid much attention to non-traditional security issues, such as terror-
ism, climate change and other environmental issues, that displaced larger number
of people and impacted the politics and economy immensely. Sea pirates have
Pattanaik 87

emerged as a major maritime security challenge. These challenges brought the

countries together since it is no more possible for a single country to deal with
these challenges that would require cooperation in evacuating people affected by
climate related devastating natural calamities or dealing with terrorism that would
require intelligence sharing and joint operation due to their transnational linkages.
India and Sri Lanka were victims of terrorist groups who used the sea for trans-
porting lethal weapons and launching attacks. Most of the countries also discov-
ered oil and gas in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the BoB in early
2000. After the demarcation of maritime boundary, cooperation became a pre-
ferred path. Companies like the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) con-
firmed that it is going to quadruple production of gas in the BoB by 2019 (Rueters,
2018) followed by Bangladesh (Ghosh, 2018).1 These countries are now keen to
initiate joint exploration, collaboration in extracting resources as scientific coop-
eration assumed centre stage. Within the non-traditional security realm, maritime
environment, ocean governance, humanitarian assistance and addressing transna-
tional crime and terrorism that use the sea to operate emerged as important agenda
for cooperation.
The region also provides opportunity for greater regional cooperation in
exploring the energy and marine resources in a sustainable manner. Concept of
blue economy is intertwined with ocean governance that would help the coun-
tries to explore the resources in a sustainable manner. However, the knowledge
and technology to explore blue economy is at a nascent stage. After the resolu-
tion of the maritime boundary disputes between India and Bangladesh and
Bangladesh and Myanmar following international arbitration, this region pro-
vides an opportunity for further cooperation to explore the blue economy poten-
tial of BoB. This is particularly important as was the case in the past Bangladesh
had mobilised its Navy in 2008 against the oil exploration activities of Myanmar.
India and Bangladesh also contested over the ownership of the New Moor
Island, which is now submerged under the water, however the dispute over the
maritime boundary persisted which was settled through arbitration. This contes-
tation was primarily due to the fact that each of the countries bordering BoB had
overlapping claims and counter claims mostly intensified by the presumption
that an exclusive vast EEZ would provide the country with a greater share of oil
and other mineral resources that could be explored (Alam, 2008). The geogra-
phy of the Bay is such that the claims of each of the countries were overlapping.
In 2006, India and Bangladesh had serious misunderstanding over India’s explo-
ration of oil in the BoB.
The BoB is roughly 6 million square kilometres. The India–China rivalry and
competition have brought the BoB to the fore of discussion on maritime security.
Earlier the tendency was to look at it as a subregion that is divided between South
Asia and Southeast Asia rather than seeing it as an integrated economic or strate-
gic space. This ‘mental map’ may have impacted how India looks at the BoBAS
(Brewster, 2014). As the most of the regions are getting integrated economically
and through various road and rail connectivity projects coupled with the interlink-
ing of grid, it is imperative that the security architecture needs to be defined in
terms of the interest of the regional countries that abut the Bay. With the
88 South Asian Survey 25(1&2)

strengthening of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Command, this region has emerged
important from India’s maritime security perspective. Thailand shares maritime
boundary with India in the AS. With China’s announcement of Maritime Silk
Route and its close defence cooperation especially with Thailand, Bangladesh and
Myanmar, BoB has emerged as an area of strategic concerns for India. However,
in recent past, India has been able to develop close ties with Bangladesh and
Myanmar and is engaged in cooperating with these two countries on various non-
traditional security issues. It is also engaged in building the capacity of the armed
forces and engaged in joint exercise that will enhance interoperability among the
navies of this region to meet the emerging security challenges especially in the
sphere of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).

Geo-strategic Significance of the Region and

Its Economic Potential
The BoBAS is significant as it straddles the major SLOC that transports 90 per
cent of world’s energy trade through the Indian Ocean. India considers the BoB as
an important part of its security architecture. In the recent past, China’s expansion
to the Indian Ocean region has added a new dimension to India’s security concern.
Its Naval activities in the Coco Island in Myanmar and the rapid speed with which
it is acquiring ports in South and Southeast Asia signals that China is looking for
greater naval presence in the region. Given the India China war of 1962, New
Delhi perceives BoB as vital to India’s security in the East. This region also wit-
nessed insurgency and secessionist movements in the past. Some of these insur-
gencies were supported by China, the erstwhile East Pakistan and later Bangladesh.
However, India’s cooperation with Bangladesh and Myanmar to a large extent has
addressed these security concerns. This region has witnessed religious militancy
and terrorism and the BoB remains important point of transit for illegal arms. The
Rohingya refugee crisis also indicates the vulnerability of this region to inter-state
conflict. In 2004, Bangladesh police seized 10 truckloads of arms that was meant
for the Indian insurgents in the Northeast. The region is close to illegal arms mar-
kets functioning in the East Asia that has been a major source of weapons for the
insurgents. It was a major region of conduit of arms for the Liberation Tiger of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the past. Drug trafficking is also a matter of concern in
this region as it is adjacent to the golden triangle. India’s strategic concerns to
various developments in this region therefore remain significant. It is important to
mention that most of the countries of this region have nascent democracy.
Therefore, institutional infrastructure and political will that is needed for coopera-
tion remains weak. However, economic imperatives for cooperation have gradu-
ally taken centre stage. Most important within India’s foreign economic policy
pertaining to this region is to connect its north-eastern region to Southeast Asia
which will not only boost the economy of the Northeast region but also connect
the region to the nearest ports. Look East policy earlier and Act East policy
announced recently constitute the core of how India looks at Southeast Asia.
Pattanaik 89

India’s Look East policy cannot be optimised without linking the economies of
the countries surrounding the BoB into a close-knit network of economic and
security connectivity. The maritime dimension of India’s Look East policy cannot
be ignored. Historically, India had flourishing trading relations with the Southeast
Asian countries selling silks and spices. Indian cultural influences are very much
visible in the architecture and culture of the Southeast Asian countries. Sailors
from Odisha, Bengal and other coastal regions often used to sail to these areas
carrying Indian spice, textiles and semiprecious stones. These maritime trades
also transported religion and culture especially Buddhism to that region (Patnaik,
2015). Therefore, not just cultural connectivity, but reviving old trade links is
important for India to showcase the traditional links and explore the economic
potential of trade that once existed. Many of the kingdoms that existed in Southeast
Asia were ‘culturally Indianised’ as David Brewster argues in one of his articles
(Brewster, 2015). Sushma Swaraj, India’s Foreign Minister said, ‘These are
important markers in our engagement with Southeast Asia, in enhancing our stra-
tegic ties with ASEAN across 3Cs. These 3Cs are commerce, connectivity and
culture’ (PTI, 2018).
The BoB remained a largely neglected area as India soon after its independ-
ence married to the idea of land-based defence plan that gave the Army a premium
position in country’s security. Even, after the Royal Navy withdrew from the
Indian Ocean, Indian had no inclination to fill that strategic vacuum but interest-
ingly at the same time New Delhi was concerned about the Cold War conflict
expanding to the region it considered as its strategic backyard (Pattanaik, 2016).
However, the maritime focus developed in the late 1960s and the sailing of USS
Enterprise to the Indian Ocean during the 1971 war made India aware of the stra-
tegic bearing such development can have on its security. In this context, strength-
ening naval presence in the BoB and AS became an imperative. Since then, India
has steadfastly built its Andaman and Nicobar Command to protect its eastern
seaboard. China’s forays into the region and its access to BoB are likely to have
larger strategic implications. The location of the Bay that deeply undercuts India’s
eastern landscape makes it strategic vulnerable. Coupled with this is the Siliguri
corridor that is known as chicken’s neck makes it vulnerable to Chinese threat.
China’s strategic presence in the Coco Island and its larger engagement in
Myanmar where it is building ports, airports and investing in energy sector make
this region significant. China is already building a deep sea Kyauk Pyu port
although at a much lesser scale than it was originally planned (Emont & Myo,
2008). The port in which China has 70 per cent stake is a part of the Belt and Road
Initiative (Emont & Myo, 2008). China is keen to connect its eastern provinces to
the nearest seaport as a part of its peripheral strategy (Swaine, 2013). It has already
invested US$1.5 billion in oil pipeline which is 870 kilometres and a parallel natu-
ral gas pipeline that goes to Kunming in Yunnan Province. However, there is a
larger debate about whether China’s foray into the BoB has altruistic economic
motive or it has strategic implications. There were reports in the past that China
was upgrading communication facilities in the Coco Island. China’s presence as it
has officially projected is to secure the SLOC that constitute crucial lifeline for its
energy supplies. Therefore India’s Look East policy although grounded
90 South Asian Survey 25(1&2)

on economic cooperation and opening up export opportunities for its virtually

landlocked Northeast have strategic content (Samaranayake, 2012, p. 17).
Expanding on economic cooperation the then Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar
Menon said, ‘what we seek as part of our LEP is to make our neighbours, partners
in our development such that we can jointly seek and work on the opportunities
that are coming our way due to the inexorable march of globalization’ (Ministry
of External Affairs [MEA], 2012). The strategic parameter was well laid out by
the then Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, in the ASEAN Business
Advisory Council meet in Kuala Lumpur in 2005. He said,

This was not merely an external economic policy, it was also a strategic shift in India’s
vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global economy. Most of all it was
about reaching out to our civilizational neighbours in Southeast Asia and East Asia.
I have always viewed India’s destiny as being inter-linked with that of Asia and more
so Southeast Asia. (Press Information Bureau [PIB], 2005)

The strategic framework of India’s Look East policy lies in its engagement with
the countries of BoB and AS and further linking them up to Southeast Asia and
Indo-Pacific.
It must be mentioned that the three of the littorals of the BoB, that is, India,
Bangladesh and Myanmar have settled their maritime boundaries. Earlier Sri
Lanka and India had resolved their maritime boundaries. While the settlement of
boundaries provides a common strategic canvas where the countries can coordi-
nate their effort to deal with common security challenges, the BoB littoral coun-
tries are yet to formulate coordinated approach both in terms of exploring the blue
economy to their advantage and coordinate their navies to jointly meet security
challenges. China has emerged as an important player, which has substantial stra-
tegic interest in the BoB. Recent supply of submarines to Bangladesh has raised
certain concerns in New Delhi not so much in terms of actual threat it poses but
the access it is likely to provide to China, who while training the Bangladesh
Navy to operate the submarines will have access to the crucial BoB and can map
the ocean floor for future submarine operation. The international shipping lane
passes through the BoB and AS to connect to the Malacca Strait, which is one of
the busiest. Therefore, China’s interest in this region cannot be ignored. China
already has an access to the BoB through Myanmar.
Scientific exploration in the BoB has revealed that it is a major source of oil and
natural gas. For example, in 2013, Myanmar awarded a total of 13 international
firms to explore 10 shallow water blocks and 10 deep-water blocks (Shin, 2016;
USGS, 2016). In India the Reliance Industry has been awarded the exploration of
Krishna–Godavari basin gas block. The ONGC is exploring KG-DWN-98/2 block
in the BoB where it aims to produce 15 million standard cubic metres a day of gas
and 77,000 barrels a day of oil from the block (Sundaria & Chakravarty, 2018).
Similarly Bangladesh also has the potential gas blocks within its EEZ which is
estimated at 18 blocks (Siddiqui, 2018). BoB’s strategic and economic signifi-
cance is enormous. Five countries, namely India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand
and Indonesia are considered as countries abutting the Bay. The regional political
Pattanaik 91

dynamics and rivalry between India and China who are competing for influence
over these countries determine the dynamics in the BoB region. Four issues will
be significant for this region. First, the energy dependency of the countries of the
region, second, exploring energy sources in the bay, third, cooperating in expand-
ing blue water economy and jointly exploring the marine resources and fourth,
expanding connectivity network that could bind the region together. India’s BoB
strategy is grounded on its relations with the other four countries. The signifi-
cance of BoB is not lost to India. In fact it has been trying to leverage its interest
in this region both bilaterally and multilaterally. India joined enthusiastically
when some of the countries of the BoB region decided to establish BIMSTEC that
has economic underpinning to synergise cooperation among the countries of the
region. Non-traditional security threats have also compelled the countries to col-
laborate. Some of the key issues in which countries of this region are cooperating
are discussed later. These issues have larger economic implications and are likely
to boost a mutually beneficial relationship between India and BoB and AS regions.

Energy Cooperation Among the Countries in the Bay of

Bengal and Andaman Sea Region
Most of the countries of these two regions are energy hungry and are dependent
on Persian Gulf for their energy need. In the recent past, the countries of the
region have joined hand to cooperate on the energy sector and have undertaken
bilateral projects and have been engaged in subregional and regional projects.
Bangladesh has been exploring the oil and natural gas deposits in the Bay to bol-
ster its economy. A total of 27 gas fields have been discovered in Bangladesh
including the latest one in Bhola. Bangladesh is now importing 660 MW of elec-
tricity from India and proposes to import more electricity from Nepal and Bhutan.
It has already committed to invest US$1 million in Bhutan’s hydroelectricity pro-
jects. The government aims to move from gas based power generation to coal
based power generation to fulfil 34,000 MW projected electricity need by the end
of 2030. Power cell of Bangladesh estimates production of 24,000 MW of elec-
tricity by 2021 and by 2041 it expects the production to reach 60,000 MW
(Powercell, 2017). India, Bangladesh and Nepal have signed trilateral power trade
agreement (The Himalayan Times, 2018) and India has agreed to allow its existing
transmission line and grid connectivity to facilitate power trade between these
two countries (Subedi, 2018). In this regard, the National Thermal Power
Corporation of India and Bangladesh Power Development Board have reached an
agreement for uninterrupted supply of energy and a similar agreement was signed
between Nepal and India in 2014. Bangladesh and India have agreed to build a
1,320 MW coal-fired power plant in Ramphal, and the Matarbari project is esti-
mated to contribute 1,200 MW. There are five joint ventures in Moheshkhai with
Singapore, Malaysia, China and Korea to produce to the tune of 6,120 MW of
electricity (Power Cell, 2018). Private companies like Reliance Industries is
building a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) based power plant in Meghnaghat.
Indian company Petronet signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with
92 South Asian Survey 25(1&2)

Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Corporation to set up an LNG regasification

terminal at Kutubdia Island at an estimated cost of US$950 million (LNG World
News, n.d.). Adani Power Limited has also concluded an agreement with
Bangladesh to supply 1,600 MW of power from its plant in Jharkhand to
Bangladesh which is a part of cross-border power trade. India has already agreed
to supply additional 60 MW from the Palatana project in Tripura. The Bheramera
and Berhampur grid connectivity is transmitting 500 MW of electricity to
Bangladesh (Dhaka Tribune, 2018). All these efforts suggest that the BoB coun-
tries have fast tracked their cooperation on energy sector.
Although the much vaunted trilateral gas pipeline among India, Bangladesh
and Myanmar failed to take off in 2005; India has been keenly interested in
exploring natural gas in Myanmar that was under Western sanction for a long time
giving China a monopoly in exploiting gas in Myanmar. ONGC Videsh Limited
and Gas Authority of India Limited are already exploring A1 and A3 blocks and
in 2014, B2 and EP 3 blocks were allocated to India. Petroleum Minister
Dharmendra Pradhan released the Hydrocarbon Vision 2030 for the Northeast
region that provides a glimpse into the potential cross-border energy connectivity.
According to PIB, ‘the focus areas include exploring hydrocarbon linkages and
trade opportunities with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal & Bhutan’ (PIB, 2016).
India with its hydrocarbon resources intends to supply it to the neighbouring
countries after meeting the demand in the Northeast region of the country. Table 1
reflects the demand–supply chain, as it exists in the region.
Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Thailand are developing connectivity net-
works, which will further integrate the countries of the BoB. Between India and
Bangladesh, there are several multimodal connectivity projects that are underway.

Table 1. Unmet Demand Potential in Neighbouring Countries

2014–2015 2019–2020 2024–2025 2029–2030

Demand Potential in Neighbouring Countries
Myanmar 2.00 1.25 1.00 0.75
Bangladesh 4.00 4.00 3.60 5.40
Nepal 1.40 1.70 2.07 2.52
Bhutan 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.18
Sri Lanka 2.00 1.50 2.50 3.50
Total demand potential 9.50 8.37 9.32 12.35
of POL (Petroleum, Oil
and Lubricant) products
Supply Potential in NER
Production capacity (POL) 6.5 7.0 14.3 14.3
Demand from NER 3.20 4.0 5.4 7.3
(Northeastern Region)
Surplus available 3.3 3.0 8.9 7.0
Source: CRISIL Infrastructure Advisory (PIB, 2016, p. 193).
Pattanaik 93

Main objective of the two governments is to restore the connectivity that existed
prior to the partition of the subcontinent and then further expand them to fulfil the
current need. It needs to be mentioned that before partition India’s north-eastern
region and Bangladesh were economically integrated in terms of road, rail net-
work and having access to the nearest sea port. This connectivity continued until
1965 India–Pakistan war. Post partition the states interestingly have been inward
looking. Their external policies are more gearing towards connectivity with coun-
tries outside of South Asia but not towards the previous British India that existed
as a single economically integrated region. Trade and economic integration
between the BoB littorals only got boost after the year 2000 only after the region
witnessed spectacular economic growth and political differences were ironed out
and trust gap was bridged through sustained dialogue.
India and Myanmar are cooperating in developing infrastructure that can facil-
itate trade. Until 1990s, India’s support to democratic struggle within Myanmar
had distanced it from building strong ties with the military regime. However,
Myanmar soon became the lynchpin of India’s ‘Look East policy’ initiated in
1993. Since then the two countries have agreed to Kaladan multimodal project, a
joint venture, which is scheduled to be completed after long delays. Myanmar,
India and Thailand are also jointly building the trilateral highway that would pro-
vide India connectivity to Southeast Asia and the ASEAN region with which it has
historical relations. Nitin Gadkari, Minister of Road Transport and Highways of
India emphasised this aspect when he said, ‘Next year by the end of December,
we will be in a position to get connectivity ... We are giving highest priority to this
(Indian-Myanmar-Trilateral Highway project). This will boost trade and ties
among the nations in the region’ (Rajya Sabha, 2018; The Indian Express, 2018).
India has proposed US$1 billion credit line to the ASEAN countries to build phys-
ical and digital connectivity and has planned to make US$77million development
fund to establish manufacturing hubs in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam
(Balsubramanian, 2015). Interestingly, New Delhi had to convert US$40 million
as grant because this amount remained unutilised for three years after such
announcement was made. Only Vietnam was interested in digital connectivity and
Myanmar argued for better terms and conditions. The proposed credit line is also
mired in lengthy clearance process which is a major challenge to cooperation in
this region (Singh, 2018). This will help the countries of the BoBAS, some of
them are a part of ASEAN regional cooperation organisation.
Between India and Sri Lanka there is a ferry link connecting Dhanushkodi in
Tamil Nadu and Thalaimannar in Sri Lanka and a ferry service between Tuticorin
(in Tamil Nadu) and Colombo started in 2011. The proposed India–Sri Lanka high
voltage direct current (HVDC) grid interconnection project would connect
Madurai with Anuradhapur. In January 2018, the two governments inaugurated
what is called the ‘gigabit connectivity’. There are some proposals that the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) is interested to fund a bridge or an undersea tunnel to
connect Sri Lanka. India and Sri Lanka are developing the Trincomalee upper oil
tank firm along with Japan. Indian Oil Company has a joint venture with the
Lanka Oil and is already managing the lower tanks in Trincomalee. India is
94 South Asian Survey 25(1&2)

building a re-gasified liquefied natural gas-fired 500 MW capacity LNG power

plant and an LNG terminal/floating storage regasification unit in Colombo/
Kerawalapitiya. Both the countries are also discussing regarding 500 MW supply
of electricity using undersea cable. All these connectivity projects suggest that the
countries of the region are slowly getting connected which will facilitate trade that
comes through connectivity network.
India has several hydel projects in Bhutan. India and Bhutan have agreed to
implement four joint venture-model hydro-electric projects, namely Kholongchhu,
Bunakha, Wangchu and Chamkharchu, total 2,120 MW production of electricity
(Royal Bhutanese Embassy, 2016). The countries of the eastern South Asia are
working for grid connectivity that would allow them to sell surplus power to other
countries of the region (Asia Pacific Energy Forum & UNESCAP, 2018).
Interestingly there is a meeting of the minds among the countries of this region,
which is reflected in the current stage of cooperation. Nepal and Bangladesh have
signed MoU to enhance energy cooperation between them. India has completed
17 kilometres stretch of the 69-km Motihari–Amlekhgunj oil pipeline has the
capacity to supply 2 million tons of petroleum to Nepal. India would remain a
major transit country for Nepal and Bhutan for cross-border electricity trade. In
2016, India framed guidelines for cross-border electricity trade (Ministry of Power,
Government of India, 2016).

Maritime Security, Coastal Connectivity in the Bay of

Bengal Region
The BoB can be effectively transformed to a thriving economic community not
just by enabling free trade, cross-border connectivity but cooperating on the secu-
rity dimension and improving port infrastructure for greater trade. There are
several bilateral security cooperation mechanisms that are already in place, for
instance: India and Myanmar have held seventh India–Myanmar Coordinated
Patrol (CORPAT), India and Bangladesh conducted first joint naval patrol, namely
the CORPAT in the BoB on 27 June 2018, India and Bangladesh joint drill of the
Coastal Security Guard, India and Sri Lanka naval exercises (SLINEX), etc.
Taking into consideration, China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean and its
outreach to the BoB through Myanmar, India is planning undersea network of
seabed-based sensors to monitor activities under sea. Other countries like
Myanmar have proposed SEZs near Sittwe closer to the Rakhine state and Dawei
bordering the BoB. There are chances that given the political turbulence in
Rakhine these two SEZs (Special Economic Zones) are vulnerable to terrorism
and other maritime crimes. Similarly, Bangladesh’s expanding global trade and its
concerns regarding drugs and arms trafficking has compelled it to strengthen its
maritime forces. It has already ordered two offshore patrol vehicles to deal with
the threats posed by traffickers. This is likely to increase Bangladesh’s maritime
surveillance and response capacity. In 2004, 10 truckloads of arms were unloaded
Pattanaik 95

in a jetty in Chittagong illustrating the vulnerability of Bangladesh. India and

Thailand have instituted counter terror cooperation. The navies of India and
Thailand conduct CORPATing across International Maritime Boundary Line
(IMBL) twice a year. India and Indonesia have similar exercises. India initially
had the Milan exercises consisting of the BoB littorals which have now expanded
to become a larger multilateral exercise. The eastern seaboard remains vital to
India’s security. To this end,

The Navy will effectively engage friendly maritime forces in the Indian Ocean Region
and beyond, through port visits, bilateral interactions, training initiatives, operational
exercises and technical support arrangements, in order to establish a cooperative frame-
work that promotes mutual understanding and enhances security and stability in the
region. (Indian Navy, 2015)

While the EEZ are covered under the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on
Laws of Sea), high sea does not have any governance structure making it suscep-
tible to criminal activities. Larger collaboration with other countries is necessary
to contain such activities that may impinge on maritime security.
There are serious issues of arms peddling, drug and human trafficking including
the activities of sea pirates in this region. Some of the countries are already coop-
erating bilaterally to address these issues. Maritime search and rescue, addressing
the issue of maritime pollution, anti-piracy operations, hydrographic surveys, etc.
have received the attention of the coastal countries. Several bilateral agreements
are in place to combat the issue of terrorism and drug trafficking bilaterally. India
has an annual security dialogue with Nepal, close collaboration with Bhutan and
home minister level talks with Bangladesh, cooperation in addressing the issue of
insurgency with Myanmar and annual defence dialogue with Sri Lanka. It must be
noted that the countries of the BoB share porous border and have ethnic linkages
across the border. Often terrorists and insurgents cross the border to take shelter
with the help of the ethnic brethren across the border. This has created a scenario
where countries are compelled to cooperate. Moreover, the drive for economic
well-being of the people is closely inter-linked with security issues. Both in
SAARC and BIMSTEC, the convention on terrorism provides multilateral frame-
work for the countries to address the issue jointly. India and Sri Lanka collaborated
closely to meet the challenge posed by the LTTE which used Indian Ocean to
transfer arms, ammunition to fight the Sri Lankan army. India has also provided off
shore patrol vehicles (OPVs) to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh navies. For the first
time, to coordinate the security of the BIMSTEC countries, the organisation has
dialogue at the level of national security advisors. Also, for the first time the
BIMSTEC countries, except for Nepal and Thailand, participated in a joint exer-
cise held in India. It must be noted that the countries of the region have had difficult
bilateral relationship in the past that was a major hurdle for cooperation. However,
they are able to overcome those hurdles and are able to see the security concerns
are indivisible. This is due to the transnational linkages of terrorists and arms deal-
ers operating in this region which makes it difficult for a single country to confront
on its own.
96 South Asian Survey 25(1&2)

Maritime Domain Awareness

Maritime domain awareness remains a significant component of maritime
cooperation among the BoBAS countries. This entails scientific exchanges of
data that enhance understanding of the ocean and activities related to it, sharing
of intelligence to combat threats posed by transnational terrorist networks,
establishing coastal radar surveillance centre. It also includes governance of
the sea and capacity building of naval forces to meet the challenges. In this
context, institutionalising cooperative mechanisms like white shipping agree-
ments and setting up of information fusion centres that would provide hydro-
graphical data for better understanding of the maritime domain are important.
Already the countries of the region have conducted bilateral and multilateral
naval exercises to enhance interoperability among the navies so as to help them
to collaborate in meeting future contingencies. CORPATs of maritime bound-
ary and joint surveillance are some of the issues that the countries are working
together. To enhance India’s coastal security and maritime domain awareness,
the National Command Control Communication and Intelligence Network
(NC3) was inaugurated to ‘collate data about all ships, dhows, fishing boats
and all other vessels operating near our coast, from multiple technical sources
including the AIS and radar chain’ (Indian Navy). India is willing to share
among the friendly countries who want India to establish a fusion centre where
such data can be shared.
India is also a pioneer in HADR field and has operated off shore HADR
activities helping in Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, and providing flood relief
in Sri Lanka. It effectively intervened in dealing with ‘fresh water crisis’ at Male
in 2017.

Enhancing Security, Furthering Trade: Regional Security

Organisations in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea
The BoBAS region has several regional cooperation mechanisms. For any growth
zones to be successful such regional and subregional mechanisms become signifi-
cant. There is already a quadrilateral cooperation among Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India and Nepal known as BBIN subregional cooperation which is modelled on
growth zone. Among the existing regional organisations, first such cooperative
mechanism is BIMSTEC which is known as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral Technical Economic Cooperation. Most of the countries of BIMSTEC
have a coastline with the BoB. The BIMSTEC region constitutes 1.5 billion peo-
ple—21 per cent of the world population, and a combined GDP of over US$ 2.5
trillion (MEA, 2014). This holds a great promise for regional cooperation.
According to a study, ‘if appropriate road and rail links existed, the difference in
cost between seaborne trade and rail-based trade would on average be more than
2.5 times, and for road-based trade be more than 6 times’ (D. Wignall & Wignall,
2014, p. 5)
Pattanaik 97

In the fourth BIMSTEC summit held in Kathmandu, the member states

agreed for cross-country energy grid interconnection. This is significant as
already at bilateral level grid connectivity is now a reality (Pattanaik, 2018).
Regional grid connectivity would further bind these countries as at the subre-
gional level of BBIN the countries have agreed to such a proposal. BIMSTEC
also emphasises on blue economy. However, the countries need to shape their
policies that would make them capable to ensure sustainable use of marine
resources and prevent marine pollution that is largely chocking the marine lives.
There is an increasing trend of IUU fishing. Increase in population in the coastal
area also puts pressure on blue economy. Drafting rules and regulations for
operating maritime forces, sustained multilateral dialogue, sharing of research
and development activities would contribute to the making of a BoBAS eco-
nomic and security community. Blue economy is also seen as an alternative
sustainable development. Common regional policy, integrated exploration of
marine resource, marine security, pollution, protection of marine lives should
inform the policymaking in this region. Strategic culture of marine cooperation
needs to be evolved. Synchronised and simplified transit is essential for coop-
eration among the BIMSTEC countries. The countries have agreed on a conven-
tion on terrorism, which aims to help them to overcome threat to security
through robust real time intelligence sharing. BIMSTEC as a regional coopera-
tion mechanism is negotiating free trade among the member countries and
would only be able to attains greater synergy where seamless trade would be
possible. Outside of BIMSTEC framework, the regional countries are also sig-
natories of Asian highway and railway network. In 2009, ADB conducted a
study on BIMSTEC Transport Infrastructure and Logistic Study (BTILS) that
argued how connectivity is achievable, if there is a political will. It conducts
regular meeting of national security advisers to facilitate dialogue among the
countries that are fighting common security challenges which are often cross-
border in nature.
The other regional forums that bind some of the BoBAS countries are
SAARC and ASEAN. While ASEAN is seen as a successful model of regional
cooperation forum, SAARC mechanism has lagged behind and is victim of non-
cooperation between India and Pakistan. However, SAARC has pioneered the
concept of free trade and trade in service. It continues to hold promises for
greater regional integration. India is a dialogue partner of the ASEAN and has
bilateral cooperation with other members of ASEAN, such as Indonesia,
Malaysia, Myanmar and Thailand, which are part of the BoBAS littorals. While
Myanmar and Thailand are part of BIMSTEC; Indonesia and Malaysia are a
part of ASEAN. BBIN has emerged as an effective mechanism of regional coop-
eration that holds promises. Although Bhutan is yet to ratify the BBIN subre-
gional cooperation, Nepal, Bangladesh and India have made substantial
advancement in connecting their national grids and are a part of bilateral and
subregional trade and transit mechanism.
Two other significant regional forums that bind the littoral countries of the
Indian Ocean region and especially the BoBAS subregion are ‘Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium’ (IONS) which brings in 36 littoral countries to discuss maritime
98 South Asian Survey 25(1&2)

matters and IORA which underlines enhancing coordination and supporting

harmonised international maritime safety and security (MSS) collaboration as one
of its agenda (IORA, n.d.). IORA holds Indian Ocean dialogue regularly. It also
deals with disaster risk management as ‘around 50% of natural disasters occurring
in this region are climatogenic and seismogenic in nature’ (IORA, n.d.) that makes
cooperation a compulsion rather than a choice.

Conclusion
The BoBAS region provides opportunities for economic and security cooperation
as has been underlined in this article. The region is prone to external power inter-
vention as it is closer to the strategic choke point of Malacca Strait. The region is
strategically significant. Yet, there exist broadly good relationship among the coun-
tries of the region facilitating economic activities and security interlinkages. As
discussed, the countries are looking for robust connectivity structure and have
adopted bilateralism, subregionalism and regionalism to enhance their economic
and security interests. Energy security remains one of the prime concerns since the
countries of the region are dependent on import of oil. Blue economy has featured
in joint statements and governmental narratives as the countries are increasingly
becoming conscious of carbon sequestration, and coastal resilience and the need
for sustainable development as sea resources are not limitless. However, there are
major challenges that need to be addressed. As discussed in this article some of the
connectivity projects that have lagged behind for example: the India, Myanmar and
Thailand trilateral highway. Similarly, India’s effort for digital and physical con-
nective has faced structural problem because the Export–Import Bank does not
have any specialist dealing with digital aspect of the connectivity. Capacity of each
country in maritime domain is also not the same. However, there is a meeting of the
minds in terms of the political realisation that cooperation is the need of the hour.
Although the regional institutional mechanism that will convert the economy of
the BoBAS countries into growth zones that would emerge as integrated market is
weak, the bilateral mechanism is robust. Perhaps the regional institutional mecha-
nisms need to build from the progress made by the bilateral institutional mecha-
nisms that are in place. Cooperation continued to be piloted by governments and
there is a need to bring in non-government organisations into policy formulation
and its implementation. Blue economy remains unexplored and there is a need for
cooperation on scientific collaboration.
Growth zones are fundamental to integration. For a very long time India is
focusing on its Northeast and believes that integrating Northeast to nearest sea-
ports in the neighbouring countries is essential for the long-term growth of the
region. India is a major power of the BoBAS region. Over the period of time, it
has enhanced collaboration with the littoral states to meet common ecological and
security challenges. While it has been diligently pursuing a model of economic
development that seeks closer integration through connectivity and market, it has
been able to bring the regional countries together to meet the common challenge
of terrorism and transnational crime. Although there is a possibility that the
Pattanaik 99

BoBAS region will increasingly attract attention of external powers having an

interest in Indian Ocean, it is likely that India would jealously guard the region
that would directly impinge on its security through mutually beneficial relation-
ship that would integrate their economic and security interest. Over the period of
time, there appears to have been a synergy in their security outlook. The countries
of the region believe in a common economic destiny as their economies gets inter-
linked. Therefore, it is imperative that this interlinking of economy will determine
their approach to security than the other way round.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship
and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of
this article.

Note
1. According to Ghosh, ‘South Korean conglomerate Daewoo has made a natural gas
discovery in Block D-12 in the Bay of Bengal in Bangladesh, adjacent to Myanmar’s
Block AD 7, in a basin that is shared between Bangladesh and Myanmar’.

References
Alam, K. (2008, August 2). Maritime boundary dispute and oil and gas exploration in
the Bay of the Bengal. Daily Star. Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/news-
detail-48489
Amrith, S. S. (2013). Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The furies of nature and the fortunes of
migrants. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Asia Pacific Energy Forum & UNESCAP. (2018). Integrating South Asia’s power grid
for a sustainable and low carbon future, cross-border electricity cooperation in
South Asia. Retrieved from https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Integrating%20
South%20Asia%E2%80%99s%20Power%20Grid%20for%20a%20Sustainable%20
and%20Low%20Carbon%20Future_WEB.pdf
Balsubramanian, J. (2015, November 21). PM Modi proposes $1 billion line of credit
for connectivity with ASEAN. Live Mint. Retrieved from https://www.livemint.com/
Politics/riD4W4GN503dmSAGwBtZQN/PM-Modi-proposes-1-billion-line-of-credit-
for-connectivity.html
Brewster, D. (2014). Dividing lines: Evolving mental maps of the Bay of Bengal. Asian
Security, 10(2), 151–167. Retrieved from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/156624784.pdf
———. (2015). The rise of the Bengal tigers: The growing strategic importance of the Bay
of Bengal. Journal of Defence Studies, 9(2), 81–104.
Dhaka Tribune. (2018, September 10). India begins 500MW additional power supply
to Bangladesh. Retrieved from https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/power-
energy/2018/09/10/india-begins-500mw-additional-power-supply-to-bangladesh
Emont, J., & Myo, M. (2008, August 15). Chinese-funded port gives Myanmar a sinking
feeling. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-
funded-port-gives-myanmar-a-sinking-feeling-1534325404
100 South Asian Survey 25(1&2)

Ghosh, S. (2018, August 30). After India, Bangladesh discovers natural gas in the Bay of
Bengal. Indo Asian Commodity. Retrieved from https://www.indoasiancommodities.
com/2018/08/30/india-bangladesh-discovers-gas-bay-bengal/
Indian Navy. Initiatives to strengthen coastal security. Retrieved from https://indiannavy.
nic.in/content/initiatives-strengthen-coastal-security
———. (2015). Ensuring secure seas: India’s maritime security strategy 2015 (p. iv). New
Delhi: Integrated Head Quarter of Ministry of Defence.
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) (n.d.). Maritime Safety & Security. Retrieved from
http://www.iora.int/en/priorities-focus-areas/maritime-safety-and-security
———. (n.d.) Disaster risk management. Retrieved from http://www.iora.int/en/priorities-
focus-areas/disaster-risk-management
LNG World News. (n.d.). Petronet to build $950 mln LNG terminal in Bangladesh.
Retrieved from https://www.lngworldnews.com/petronet-to-build-950-mln-lng-
terminal-in-bangladesh/
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). (2014). Brief on BIMSTEC. Retrieved from https://
www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/BIMSTEC_Brief_February_2014.pdf
———. (2018, February 18). Speech by Foreign secretary on India’s look East
policy at the 10th meeting of the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar)
Cooperation Forum. Retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.
htm?dtl/18855/
Ministry of Power, Government of India. (2016, December). Guidelines of cross border
trade in electricity. Retrieved from https://powermin.nic.in/sites/default/files/webform/
notices/Guidelines%20for%20Cross%20Boarder%20Trade.pdf
Patnaik, S. K. (2015, November). Odisha and South-East Asia a study of ancient relations
and maritime heritage. Odisha Review, pp. 30–35. Retrieved from http://magazines.
odisha.gov.in/Orissareview/2015/Nov/engpdf/26-37.pdf
Pattanaik, S. S. (2016). Indian Ocean in the emerging geo-strategic context: Examining
India’s relations with its maritime South Asian neighbors. Journal of Indian Ocean
Region, 12(2), 127–128.
———. (2018). Transforming Eastern South Asia: Relevance of BIMSTEC. Strategic
Analysis, 42(4), 422–429.
Power Cell (2018). Coal fired big projects. Retrieved from http://www.powercell.
gov.bd/site/page/e35bd93a-c1ba-45b3-b7c2-21a0e035df30/%E0%A6%95%E0
%A7%9F%E0%A6%B2%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%AD%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6
%A4%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%95-%E0%A6%A-
C%E0%A7%83%E0%A6%B9%E0%A7%8E-%E0%A6%AA%E0%A7%8D%E0%
A6%B0%E0%A6%95%E0%A6%B2%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AA
———. (2017, March 29). utpadan parikolpana (Power Generation). Retrieved from
http://www.powercell.gov.bd/site/page/4577f2b0-761b-4abe-8f00-37f129b50849/

Press Information Bureau (PIB). (2005, December 12). Keynote address at special leaders
dialogue of ASEAN Business Advisory Council. Retrieved from http://pib.nic.in/
newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=14102
———. (2016, February 9). Petroleum Minister releases Hydrocarbon Vision 2030 for
North-East. Retrieved from http://pib.nic.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=136255
PTI. (2018, January 6). Swaraj’s 3-C formula for ties with ASEAN: Culture, commerce,
connectivity. Business Standard. Retrieved from https://www.business-standard.com/
article/current-affairs/swaraj-s-3-c-formula-for-ties-with-asean-culture-commerce-
connectivity-118010600452_1.html
Rajya Sabha. (2018, March 15). Question no 2252 on Trilateral Highway. Retrieved from
https://mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/29652/question+no2252+trilateral+highway
Pattanaik 101

Reuters. (2018, May 25). India’s ONGC to quadruple output from Bay of Bengal gas field
that cost $1 bln. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/ongc-gas/indias-ongc-
to-quadruple-output-from-bay-of-bengal-gas-field-that-cost-1-bln-idUSL3N1SV5AB
Royal Bhutanese Embassy. (2016). New Delhi: Bhutan–India Hydropower Relations.
Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.bt/rbedelhi/?page_id=28
Samaranayake, N. (2012). The long littoral project—Bay of Bengal: A maritime perspective
on Indo-Pacific security (p. 17). CNA. Retrieved from https://www.cna.org/cna_files/
pdf/irp-2012-u-002319-final.pdf
Shin, A. (2016, February 15). Second gas column discovered in the Bay of Bengal.
Myanmar Times. Retrieved from https://www.mmtimes.com/business/18976-second-
gas-column-discovered-in-the-bay-of-bengal.html
Siddiqui, S. (2018, August 18). Prospects of huge gas reserves in deep sea. The Independent.
Retrieved from http://m.theindependentbd.com/post/161330
Singh, S. (2018, April 4). Three years, no takers for India’s $1-billion credit line for
ASEAN digital links. The Indian Express. Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/
article/india/three-years-no-takers-for-indias-1-billion-credit-line-for-asean-digital-
links-narerndra-modi-5122440/
Subedi, B. (2018, December 23). India relaxes cross-border power trading guidelines. The
Kathmandu Post. Retrieved from http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-12-
23/india-relaxes-cross-border-power-trading-guidelines.html
Sundaria, S., & Chakravarty, D. (2018, February 5). ONGC’s biggest oil, gas project in
Krishna-Godavari basin expected to be delayed. Livemint. Retrieved from https://
www.livemint.com/Industry/R8kLK0myZxL1cE7yGbjftJ/ONGCs-biggest-oil-gas-
project-in-KrishnaGodavari-basin-ex.html
Swaine, M. D. (2013). Chinese views and commentary on periphery diplomacy. Stanford,
CA: Hoover Institute. Retrieved from https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/
research/docs/clm44ms.pdf
The Himalayan Times. (2018, August 11). Nepal and Bangladesh ink MoU on energy
cooperation. The Himalayan Times. Retrieved from https://thehimalayantimes.com/
business/nepal-bangladesh-ink-mou-on-energy-cooperation/
The Indian Express. (2018, January 23). India–Myanmar–Thailand trilateral highway by
2019: Nitin Gadkari. The Indian Express. Retrieved from https://www.livemint.com/
Politics/hdV9E00I5CwSrKmSheAu6M/IndiaMyanmarThailand-Trilateral-Highway-
by-2019-Nitin-Gad.html
USGS. (2016, July 25). Large deposits of potentially producible gas hydrate found in
Indian Ocean. Retrieved from https://www.usgs.gov/news/large-deposits-potentially-
producible-gas-hydrate-found-indian-ocean
Wignall, D., & Wignal, M. (2014). Seaborne trade between South Asia and South East Asia
(ADB Study Working Paper No. 508). Tokyo: ADB.