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152-160 all notes

the requirement of voluntariness
Martin v. state
RULE:
An accusation of drunkenness in a designated public place cannot be established by
proof that the accused, while in an intoxicated condition, was involuntarily and forcibly
carried to that place by the arresting officer. 
It sound that an accusation of drunkenness in a designated public place cannot be
established by proof that the accused, while in an intoixicated condition, was involuntarily
and forcibly carried to that place by the arresting officer.
FACTS:
Defendant was arrested at his home and taken into a public place by police where he
allegedly manifested a drunken condition by using loud and profane language.
Defendant was convicted of public drunkenness and he appealed. 
ISSUE:
Was the Defendant’s conviction proper?
ANSWER:
No.
CONCLUSION:
The pertinent provisions of the subject statute are: "Any person who, while
intoxicated or drunk, appears in any public place where one or more persons are present, *
* * and manifests a drunken condition by boisterous or indecent conduct, or loud and
profane discourse, shall, on conviction, be fined" Under the plain terms of this statute, a
voluntary appearance is presupposed. The court reversed defendant's conviction and
concluded that an accusation of drunkenness in a designated public place could not be
established by proof that the accused, while in an intoxicated condition, was involuntarily
and forcibly carried to that place by an arresting officer.

People v. grant
RULE:
A reviewing court cannot disturb a jury's finding of sanity unless it is so manifestly
against the weight of the evidence as to indicate that the verdict was based on passion or
prejudice.
The interests of justice require reversal of the defendant’s convictions because the
jury instructions are substantially defective in that they do not contain an instruction on the
defense of involuntary conduct.
 The defendant had a right to a jury instruction on the defense of involuntary action
due to automatism.
Facts:
Grant (defendant) had been drinking alcohol at a tavern when the police were
summoned to arrest another patron.

Grant, who had a history of violent behavior, broke through a crowd that was
watching police officers take the other patron to their car and struck one of the officers.
Grant was subdued by another officer with the use of great force, placed in the
police car, and taken to the county jail.
While in his cell, Grant suffered what appeared to be a grand mal seizure.
At his trial for aggravated battery and obstructing a police officer, Grant offered
testimony by a doctor that at the time of the attack Grant was suffering from a psychomotor
seizure, brought on by a form of epilepsy that had also caused the grand mal seizure.
The doctor gave his opinion that in this state Grant’s conscious mind could not
control his behavior. The trial judge instructed the jury on the issue of insanity but not on
the defense of involuntary conduct. Grant appealed his conviction on both charges.

FACTS:

A third party was involved in an altercation with tavern owner.

While the third party was being arrested, defendant broke through the crowd and
struck one police officer in the face.
Defendant suffered a seizure in jail and was taken to the hospital.
Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery and obstructing a police officer.
Defendant claimed he suffered from an epileptic seizure at the time of the alleged
offenses. On appeal, the judgment convicting defendant of battery and obstructing a police
officer reversed because the jury instructions were substantially defective in that they did
not include an instruction for the defense of involuntary conduct, and defendant could not
be convicted for separate offenses that arose from the same course of conduct.

ISSUE:
Does a trial court err in giving the usual insanity instruction when the claim was that
defendant suffered an epileptic seizure at the time of the offenses?
ANSWER:
 Yes.
CONCLUSION:
The court held that the jury's finding of sanity was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence because there was testimony that defendant was alert and in possession of his
complete faculties at the time he was arrested.
The jury instructions were substantially defective because they did not contain an
instruction on the defense of involuntary conduct.
The obstructing a police officer conviction was reversed because defendant could not
be convicted for separate offenses that arose from the same course of conduct.

The prohibition of status crime

Robinson v. California
RULE:
A state law that imprisons as a criminal a person afflicted with a narcotic addiction,
even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the state or been guilty of any
irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
FACTS:
A California statute made it a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for any
person to "be addicted to the use of narcotics." 
A jury found defendant guilty under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11721 for being
addicted to the use of narcotics and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.
Defendant sought further review from the United States Supreme Court because at
the time of his arrest, defendant was not engaged in any illegal conduct, and there was no
proof that he had actually used narcotics within California.
The record included a police officer's testimony that defendant had scar tissue and
discoloration on the inside of his arm, as well as needle marks and a scab below the crook of
the elbow, which the officer believed was the result of injections by hypodermic needles.
The officer also testified that defendant admitted to the occasional use of narcotics.
But at the time of arrest, the defendant was not using or in possession of any
narcotics.
ISSUE:
Is the California statute unconstitutional for inflicting cruel and unusual punishment? 
ANSWER:
Yes
 Narcotic addiction is an illness, which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily.
We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though
he has never touched any narcotic drug within the state or been guilty of any irregular
behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 14 th amendment.
Concurring: since addiction alone cannot reasonably be thought to amount to more
than a compelling propensity to use narcotics, the effect of this instruction was to authorize
criminal punishment for a bare desire to commit a criminal act.
CONCLUSION:
The Court concluded that § 11721 made the status of being addicted to the use of
narcotics a criminal offense, whether or not he ever used or possessed narcotics within
California or had been guilty of any antisocial behavior there. The Court found § 11721 to be
unconstitutional and in violation of U.S. Const. amend. XIV for inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment.
A state statute which makes it a criminal offense, punishable by imprisonment for
not less than 90 days nor more than one year, to be addicted to the use of narcotics, even
though the accused has never touched any narcotic drug within the state or been guilty of
any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight
and Fourteenth Amendments.

163-165 note 5
powell v. texas
dissent view
unless robinson case is to be abandoned, the use of narcotics by an addict must be
beyond the reach of the criminal law. Similarly, the chronic alcoholic with an irresistible urge
to consume alcohol should not be punishable for drinking or for being drunk. His conviction
in this case be invalided only if there is a constitutional basis for saying that he may not be
punished for being in public while drunk.

181-185
specificity
Chicago v. Morales
CASE SYNOPSIS
On a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois, petitioner city contended that
its Gang Congregation Ordinance was constitutional and did not fail for vagueness due to a
lack of notice of proscribed conduct and for failing to govern law enforcement.
 Facts:
In 1992, the Chicago City Council enacted the Gang Congregation Ordinance which
prohibited “criminal street gang members” from “loitering” with one another in any public
place.
The ordinance was violated if (1) a police officer reasonably believed that at least one
of the two or more persons present in a “public place” was a “criminal street gang member,”
(2) the persons were “loitering,” defined as “remaining in any one place with no apparent
purpose,” (3) the officer ordered “all” of the person to disperse from the area, and (4) any
person disobeyed the officer’s order.
Morales (defendant) and others were accused of violating the law, but the charges
were dismissed by the trial court that held the law to be unconstitutionally vague.
In a consolidated appeal from several of those holdings, the Illinois Supreme Court
agreed with the trial courts and affirmed.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the state’s supreme
court correctly held the ordinance violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

DISCUSSION

Upon review, the court agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court and held that the
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. 
The ordinance did not meet the fair notice requirement because it did not provide
adequate notice of what constituted prohibited conduct. 
The vagueness that dooms this ordinance is not the product of uncertainty about the
normal meaning of loitering but rather about what loitering is covered by the ordinance and
what is not
Reasoning: the loitering is the conduct that the ordinance is designed to prohibit. If
the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified
impairment of liberty.
The officer may issue an order only after prohibited conduct has already occurred, it
cannot provide the kind of advance notice that will protect the putative loiterer from
being ordered to disperse.
Because no standard of conduct was specified, at all, by the ordinance, the entire
ordinance failed to give the ordinary citizen adequate notice of what was forbidden and
what was permitted. 
The ordinance also violated the requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement. 
 Because the ordinance provided absolute discretion to police officers to determine
what activities constituted loitering, the ordinance failed to meet constitutional standards
for definitiveness and clarity. (due process?) 
Thus, the ordinance was unconstitutional for vagueness.

CONCLUSION
The Court affirmed the judgment that the Gang Congregation Ordinance violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and held that it was unconstitutionally vague
because it did not provide adequate notice of the proscribed conduct and did not set
minimal guidelines for law enforcement.

195-197
snapshot review

Mens Rea
The criminal law should punish proscribed conduct only when that conduct is
accompanied by bad thoughts.
199-210 notes 2,3,5,7
the requirement of a guilty mind
people v. Dillard
RULE:
A mere belief, unsupported by a showing of due care and bona fide, reasonable
effort to ascertain the facts, is insufficient to constitute a mistake of fact defense.
FACTS:
The generally accepted common law principle (codified in §20 of the California Penal
Code) with respect to statutory prosecutions in effect at the time of this case was that, in the
absence of criminal negligence, all criminal offenses require both a criminal act and
accompanying wrongful intent.
In 1967, the California Legislature enacted § 12031, which made it a misdemeanor to
carry a loaded firearm in public.
The statute did not expressly require knowledge that the firearm was loaded as an
element of the crime.

Dillard (defendant) was riding his bicycle on the street when he was stopped by a
local police officer, Torres, who saw what he suspected was a rifle case on Dillard’s person.
Officer Torres searched the rifle case and discovered a rifle containing one round of
ammunition in the chamber.
 Dillard was charged with the misdemeanor offense of carrying a loaded firearm in a
public place.
At trial, he admitted that the rifle was his, and further testified that he had retrieved
it from his stepfather’s home several hours earlier.
The trial court excluded evidence offered in support of Dillard’s claim that he did not
know the rifle was loaded at the time, and that, based on previous similar instances, he had
reason to believe it was in fact not loaded.
The trial court instructed the jury that knowledge of the fact that the firearm was
loaded at the time of the offense was not an element of the crime. Dillard appealed his
conviction to the California Court of Appeal.
ISSUE:
Did appellant sufficiently establish his defense of reasonable mistake of fact?
Whether it was the legislative intent to exclude knowledge that the weapon is loaded
as an element of the offense of carrying a loaded weapon in a public place.
Acts that are so destructive of the social order, or where the ability of the state to
establish the element of criminal intent would be so extremely difficult if no impossible of
proof, that in the interest of justice the legislature has provided that the doing of the act
constitute a crime, regardless of knowledge or criminal intent on the part of defendant
ANSWER:
No.
CONCLUSION:
Appellant's contention that to dispense with the requirement of knowledge violates
his due process right to present a defense is meritless.  Since knowledge that the weapon is
loaded is not an element of the offense of violation of section 12031, subdivision (a), lack of
such knowledge is not a defense. Hence, no right of appellant's was infringed.
Whether a good faith and reasonable mistake of fact would be a defense (see § 26,
subd. Three) is not an issue presently before us. Appellant's offer of proof was deficient in
that it showed only lack of knowledge, i.e., that he was unaware that the rifle was loaded
and that, based on past experience with his stepfather, he believed it to be unloaded. 
Rule:
A mere belief, unsupported by a showing of due care and bona fide, reasonable
effort to ascertain the facts, is insufficient to constitute a mistake of fact defense.  
Note5: when the state imposes even impure strict liability, the criminal offense may
be punished only as a violation.
Violation v. crime: offense punishable only by a fine, or fine and forfeiture, or other
civil penalty that shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on
conviction of a criminal offense.
Note 7
 Inferring culpability
Defendant knew that what he took and sold were air force bomb casings. His defense
was that he honestly believe that they had been abandoned by the air force and that he was
therefore violating no one’s right by taking them.
Intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory
affirmation.

210-211 notes 6 (p219)

united states v. wulff
Brief Fact Summary.
Wulff (Defendant) was indicted for selling migratory bird parts in violation of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute
violated his due process rights because it did not require the government prove criminal
intent.
Synopsis of Rule of Law.
A felony offense that does not require the government to prove some level of
criminal intent violates a defendant’s due process rights.
Facts.
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act made it a felony to sell any migratory bird.
Defendant sold a federal agent a necklace made of a red-tailed hawk and great-
horned owl talons.
Both birds were protected under the Act and Defendant was indicted.
Defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the basis that the Act violated his due
process rights because it imposes a felony conviction without requiring criminal knowledge
or intent.
707b(2): sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.
The federal district court granted the motion and the Government appealed.
Issue.
Must a felony offense require the government to prove criminal intent? The issue is
whether the absence of a requirement that the government prove some degree of scienter
violates the defendant’s right to due process.

Whether the absence of a requirement that the government prove some degree of
scienter violates the defendant’s right to due process.
 The elimination of the element of criminal intent does not violate the due process
clause where 1. The penalty is relative small and 2. Where conviction does not gravely
besmirch, 3. The statutory crime Is not taken over from the common law, and 4.
Congressional purpose is supporting.
Rule: congress must require the prosecution to prove the defendant acted with some
degree of scienter. Otherwise, a person acting with a completely innocent state of mind
could be subjected to a severe penalty and grave damage to his reputation.
Held.
(Milburn, J.) Yes. A felony offense that does not require the government to prove
some level of criminal intent violates a defendant’s due process rights.
Offenses may eliminate an element of criminal intent without violating the due
process clause only when the 1.penalty is relatively small and a conviction would not
irreparably damage the 2. defendant’s reputation. Here, the maximum penalty is two years
in prison or two thousand dollar fine, or both. This is not a small penalty. Also, a felony
conviction irreparably damages one’s reputation and costs him civil rights. Affirmed.

Discussion.
The court in Wulff notes that the Constitution does not allow a person acting with a
completely innocent state of mind to be subjected to severe penalty and suffer serious
damage to his reputation. For these repercussions, Congress must require the government
to prove the defendant acted with some degree of scienter.
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