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Annual Reviews
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10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100213
values
■ Abstract Skepticism toward sociology has grown over recent years. The atten-
tion granted to rational choice theory (RCT) is, to a large extent, a reaction against
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this situation. Without doubt, RCT is a productive instrument, but it fails signally in
explaining positive nontrivial beliefs as well as normative nonconsequential beliefs.
RCT’s failures are due to its move to use too narrow a definition of rationality. A
model can be developed that combines the advantages of the RCT (mainly providing
self-sufficient explanations), without falling victim to its shortcomings. This model is
implicitly used in classical and modern sociological works that are considered to be
illuminating and valid.
2 BOUDON
and expressive directions as well as its cognitive approach. While some sociological
works aim at explaining social phenomena, others produce data for the benefit of
public policy, critical analyses of society for the benefit of social movements, or
emotional descriptions of society in the spirit of realistic novels or movies for the
benefit of the general public.
Another source of this particularity is that the notion of theory has a much more
uncertain meaning in sociology than it does in the other sciences. Thus, labeling
theory, a theory often referred to over recent decades, does nothing more than label
familiar phenomena. Much is written about social capital theory today. But social
capital is just a word for well-known mechanisms. As Alejandro Portes (1998)
writes, “Current enthusiasm for the concept of social capital. . .is not likely to
abate soon (. . .) However, . . .the set of processes encompassed by the concept are
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not new and have been studied under other labels in the past. Calling them social
capital is, to a large extent, just a means of presenting them in a more appealing
conceptual garb.”
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So, explanation is not always the main aim that sociologists seem to pursue,
and they sometimes give the impression of taking the idea of explanation down a
particular path that has nothing to do with the meaning of the word in other, more
solidly established sciences.
I see the attention currently granted to rational choice theory (RCT) as being,
to a large extent, a reaction against this state of affairs.
questions they raise have little chance of ever being answered. Thus, once we have
explained that most Romans in the early Roman Empire believed in the traditional
Roman polytheistic religion because they had been socialized to it, we are con-
fronted with the question as to why Roman civil servants and centurions, although
they too had been socialized to the old polytheistic religion, tended rather to be
attracted by monotheistic religions such as the Mithra cult and then Christianity
[Weber 1988 (1922)]. Moreover, the notion of socialization generates a black box
that seems hard to open: Nobody has yet been able to discover the mechanisms
behind socialization in the way, say, that the mechanisms behind digestion have
been explored and disentangled. I am not saying that socialization is a worthless
notion, nor that there are no such things as socialization effects, but merely that the
notion is descriptive rather than explanatory. It identifies and christens the various
correlations that can be observed between the way people have been raised and
educated and their beliefs and behavior; it does not explain them.
RCT can be described by a set of postulates. I will present them in a general way
in order to transcend the variants of the theory. The first postulate, P1, states that
any social phenomenon is the effect of individual decisions, actions, attitudes,
etc., (individualism). A second postulate, P2, states that, in principle at least, an
action can be understood (understanding). As some actions can be understood
without being rational, a third postulate, P3, states that any action is caused by
reasons in the mind of individuals (rationality). A fourth postulate, P4, assumes
that these reasons derive from consideration by the actor of the consequences of
his or her actions as he or she sees them (consequentialism, instrumentalism). A
fifth postulate, P5, states that actors are concerned mainly with the consequences
to themselves of their own action (egoism). A sixth postulate, P6, maintains that
actors are able to distinguish the costs and benefits of alternative lines of action and
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4 BOUDON
that they choose the line of action with the most favorable balance (maximization,
optimization).
involved in an arms race shortly after the end of World War II. Now, an arms
race presents a “prisoner’s dilemma” (PD) structure: If I (the U.S. government)
do not increase my military potential while the other party (the government of the
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U.S.S.R.) does, I run a deadly risk. Thus, I have to increase military spending, even
though, as a government, I would prefer to spend less money on weapons and more
on, say, schools, hospitals, or welfare because these would be more appreciated
by the voters. In this situation, increasing one’s arsenal is a dominant strategy, al-
though its outcome is not optimal. The United States and the Soviet Union played
this game for decades and accumulated so many nuclear weapons that each could
destroy the planet several times over. This “foolish” outcome was the product
of “rational” strategies. The two superactors, the two governments, played their
dominant strategy and could not do any better than marginally reducing their ar-
senals through negotiations. The game stopped when the PD structure that had
characterized the decades-long interaction between the two powers was suddenly
destroyed. It was destroyed by the threat developed by then U.S. President Reagan
of reaching a new threshold in the arms race by developing the SDI project, the so-
called Star Wars. The initiative contained a certain measure of bluff. Technically,
the project was nowhere near ripe. Even today, the objective of devising defensive
missiles to intercept any missile launched against territories protected by the SDI
appears problematic at best. Economically, the project was so expensive that the
Soviet government saw that there was no way to follow without generating serious
internal economic problems. Hence, it did not follow and by not so doing, lost its
status of superpower, which had been uniquely grounded in its military strength.
Of course, there are other causes underlying the collapse of the Soviet Union, but
a fundamental one is that the PD game that had hitherto characterized relations
between the two superpowers was suddenly disrupted by Reagan’s move. Here,
an RCT approach helps identify one of the main causes of a major macroscopic
historical phenomenon. It provides an explanation as to why Gorbachev moved
in a new direction that would be fatal to the U.S.S.R., and why the U.S.S.R. col-
lapsed at precisely that point in time. In this case, we get an explanation without
black boxes as to why the “stupid” arms race was conducted, and why it sud-
denly stopped at a given point in time, leaving one of the protagonists in defeat.
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6 BOUDON
scribed by the Greek letters) on the reasons why farmers, landlords, etc., behaved
the way they did are evident, not in the logical but in the psychological sense.
It would be easy to list many modern works that owe their scientific value to
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the fact that they use this RCT model. The works of economists and sociologists
such as Olson (1965), Oberschall (1973, 1994), Coleman (1990), Kuran (1995),
Hardin (1995), among others, come to mind, as well as historians such as Root
(1994) or political scientists such as Rothstein (2001). Without question, RCT has
indeed produced a substantial number of genuinely scientific contributions in the
past or more recently.
the risk of losing my reputation (Overbye 1995). Sometimes, RCT is made more
flexible by the notion of “cognitive frames.” Thus, Quattrone & Tversky (1987)
propose considering that voters vote because they see their motivation to vote as a
sign that their party is going to win, in the same way that the Calvinists, according
to Weber, are success-oriented because they think this attitude is a sign that they
are among the elected. Such a “frame” appears, however, not only as ad hoc, but
as introducing a black box. Schuessler (2000) starts from the idea that the voter
has an expressive rather than an instrumental interest in voting.
None of these “solutions” has been widely accepted. Some, like Ferejohn’s and
Fiorina’s, display a high intellectual virtuosity. However, they have not eliminated
the “paradox.”
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Other Paradoxes
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8 BOUDON
woman; he or she does not see or feel its effects. He or she nevertheless con-
siders corruption to be unacceptable. Plagiarism is, in most instances, without
consequences. Indeed, in some circumstances it may even serve the interests of
the person being plagiarized since it attracts public attention. It is looked on with
approbrium, however. On some issues like the death penalty, I can have strong
opinions even though the likelihood that I might be personally affected is zero. In
other words, in many circumstances, people are guided by considerations that have
nothing to do with their own interests, nor with the consequences of their actions or
reactions.
On the whole, psychologists, sociologists, and economists have produced a
huge number of observations which cannot easily be explained within the RCT
frame. This situation raises two questions. Why does the RCT fail so often? Is
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there a model that would satisfy the scientific ambition underlying RCT, namely
trying to provide explanations without black boxes, and at the same time get rid
of its defects?
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constant direction returns to his starting point if we accept the theory that the earth
is flat. But what does it get us to replace the word difficult with the word costly?
Defending a given theory is more costly precisely because it is more difficult. We
must then explain why this is so; and from instrumental rationality we come back
to cognitive rationality.
RCT is powerless before a second category of phenomena: those characterized
by the fact that actors are following nonconsequentialist prescriptive beliefs. RCT
is comfortable with prescriptive beliefs as long as they are consequentialist. RCT
has no trouble explaining, for example, why most people believe that traffic lights
are a good thing: Despite the inconvenience they represent to me, I accept them
because they have consequences that I judge beneficial. Here, RCT effectively
accounts for both the belief and the attitudes and behavior inspired by that be-
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lief. But RCT is mute when it comes to normative beliefs that cannot readily be
explained in consequentialist terms (Boudon 2001a). The subject in the classical
socio-psychological experiment “ultimatum game” acts against his or her own in-
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terest. The voter votes, even though that vote will have virtually no effect on the
election result. The citizen vehemently disapproves of corruption even though not
affected personally. The plagiarist gives rise to a feeling of disdain, even when
no one is hurt and the plagiarized writer’s renown is actually enhanced. We point
an accusing finger at imposters, though their machinations create problems for no
one but themselves.
RCT is powerless before a third category of phenomena, that involving behavior
by individuals whom we cannot in any sensible way assume to be dictated by
self-interest. Regardless of whether Sophocles’ Antigone is being acted in Paris,
Beijing, or Algiers, the viewer of the tragedy unhesitatingly condemns Creon
and supports Antigone. The reason RCT cannot explain this universal reaction is
simple: The spectators’ interests are in no way affected by the matter before them.
We therefore cannot explain that reaction by any possible consequences on them
personally; nor by any consequences at all because there are no such consequences.
The spectator is not directly involved in the fate of Thebes; that fate belongs in the
past, and no one has any control over it anymore. Thus the consequentialism and
self-interest postulates are disqualified ipso facto.
Sociologists often find themselves confronted with this kind of phenomenon,
inasmuch as the social actors are regularly called upon to evaluate situations in
which they are not personally implicated at all. Most people are not personally
implicated in the death penalty; it “touches” neither them, their families, or friends.
This hardly means they cannot have a strong opinion on the issue. How can a set
of postulates that assumes them to be self-interested account for their reactions in
situations where their interests are not at stake and there is no chance that they
ever will be? These remarks lead to a crucial conclusion for the social sciences as
a whole; namely, RCT has little if anything to tell us about opinion phenomena,
which are a major social force and hence a crucial subject for sociologists.
In sum, RCT is disarmed when it comes to (a) phenomena involving non-
commonplace beliefs, (b) phenomena involving nonconsequentialist prescriptive
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beliefs, and (c) phenomena that bring into play reactions that do not, by the very
nature of things, spring from any consideration based on self-interest.
These considerations suggest that axioms P4, P5, and P6 are welcome in some cases
but not in all. Reciprocally, the set of axioms P1, P2, and P3 appear to be more
general than the set P1 to P6. Now, P1 defines what is usually called methodologi-
cal individualism (MI), whereas the set of postulates made up of P1 and P2 defines
interpretive sociology (in Weber’s sense). As to the set P1 to P3, it defines a version
of interpretive sociology where actions are supposed to be rational in the sense that
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they are grounded on reasons in the actor’s mind. I identify the paradigm defined by
postulates P1 to P3 as the cognitivist theory of action (CTA). It assumes that any col-
lective phenomenon is the effect of individual human actions (individualism); that,
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in principle, provided the observer has sufficient information, the action of an ob-
served actor is always understandable (understanding); that the causes of the actor’s
action are the reasons for him or her to undertake it (rationality) (Boudon 1996).
RCT’s failures are due to its move to reduce all rationality to the instrumental
variety and neglect cognitive rationality as it applies not only to descriptive but
also to prescriptive problems (axiological rationality). Conversely, it is essential for
sociology as a discipline to be aware that many classical and modern sociological
studies owe their explanatory efficacy to the use of a cognitive version of MI, as
opposed to the instrumental one, primarily represented by RCT.
of the “impartial spectator,” it invites us to pay attention to the fact that on many
issues people may be unconcerned about their own interests, but can nevertheless
have strong opinions on these very same issues. Individual opinions can also be
inspired by impersonal reasons.
Theorists have recognized that instrumental rationality is only one form of
rationality. Moreover, many classical and modern compelling sociological analyses
implicitly (as with Tocqueville) or explicitly (as with Weber) use the generalized
conception of rationality that characterizes the CTA model. A few examples will
illustrate this point.
COGNITIVE RATIONALITY
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sons for actors’ beliefs and behavior are currently “cognitive.” He wondered why
French intellectuals on the eve of the Revolution firmly believed in the idea of
Reason with a capital R, and why that notion had spread like wildfire among the
public. It was an enigmatic phenomenon, not to be seen at the time in Britain,
the United States, or the German states. And one with enormous macroscopic
consequences.
Tocqueville’s explanation consists in showing that Frenchmen at the end of
the eighteenth century had strong reasons to believe in Reason. In France at that
time, many traditional institutions seemed illegitimate. One was the idea that the
nobility was superior to the third estate. Nobles did not participate either in local
political affairs or economic life; rather they spent their time at Versailles. Those
who remained in the country held on all the more tightly to their privileges the
poorer they were. This explains why they were given the name of an unsightly little
bird of prey, the hobereau, a metaphor that spread quickly because it was perceived
to be so fitting. The following equation was established in many individual minds:
Tradition = Dysfunction = Illegitimacy; and, by opposition, Reason = Progress =
Legitimacy. It was because this line of argument was latent in people’s minds that
the call by the philosophes to construct a society founded on Reason enjoyed such
immediate success.
The English, on the other hand, had good reasons not to believe in those ideas.
In England, the nobles played a crucial role: They ran local social, political, and
economic life. The superiority attributed to them in customary thinking and by
English institutions was perceived as functional and therefore legitimate. In
general, traditional English institutions were not perceived as dysfunctional.
12 BOUDON
Pareto has said, with reason, that the history of science is the graveyard of all the
false ideas that once were endorsed under the authority of scientists. In other words,
science produces false ideas beside true ones. Now, nobody would accept the notion
that these false ideas are endorsed by scientists under the effect of irrational causes,
because their brains would have to have been wired in an inadequate fashion, or
because their minds would have to have been obscured by inadequate “cognitive
biases,” “frames,” “habitus,” by class interests or by affective causes—in other
words, by the “biological,” “psychological,” or “cultural forces” evoked by Becker
(1996). Scientists believe in statements that often turn out to be false because they
have strong reasons for believing in them, given the cognitive context.
The believers in phlogiston, in ether, or in the many other entities and mecha-
nisms that now appear purely imaginary to us had in their day, given the cognitive
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That this drop of water appears regularly escaped immediate attention, nor was it
clearly perceived that this result contradicts phlogiston theory.
Why should the false beliefs produced by ordinary knowledge not be explained
in the same fashion as false scientific statements, namely based in the minds of
the social subjects on reasons that they perceive to be strong, given the cognitive
context in which they move?
I am not saying that false beliefs should always be explained in this fashion.
Even scientists can hold false beliefs through passion or other irrational causes.
What I am saying is that belief in false ideas can be caused by reasons in the mind
of the actors, and that they are often caused by reasons in situations of interest to
sociologists. Even though these reasons appear false to us, they may be perceived
to be right and strong by the actors themselves. To explain that what they perceive
as right is wrong, we do not have to assume that their minds are obscured by
some hypothetical mechanisms of the kind Marx (“false consciousness”), Freud
(“the unconscious”), Lévy-Bruhl (the mentalité primitive), and their many heirs
imagined, nor by the more prosaic “frames” evoked by RCT. In most cases, expla-
nations are more acceptable if we make the assumption that, given the cognitive
context in which they move, actors have strong reasons for believing in false
ideas.
I have produced elsewhere several examples showing that the rational explana-
tion of beliefs that we consider normal in the case of false scientific beliefs can also
be applied to ordinary knowledge. I have explored intensively instances of belief in
magic (Boudon 1998–2000) and false beliefs observed by cognitive psychologists
(Boudon 1996).
Here I limit myself to one example (inspired from Kahneman & Tversky, 1973)
from the second category. When psychiatrists are asked whether depression is a
cause of attempted suicide, they agree. When asked why, they answer that they have
frequently observed patients with both features: Many of their patients appeared
to be depressed and they have attempted suicide. Of course, the answer indicates
that the psychiatrists are using one piece of information in the contingency table
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TABLE 1 A causal presumption can be derived from the single piece of information a if a is
much larger than exg/i
Suicide attempted Suicide not attempted Total
above (Table 1): Their argument runs, “a is high, hence depression is a cause of
attempted suicide.”
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Now, any freshman in statistics would know that such an argument is wrong:
To conclude that there is a correlation between depression and suicide attempts,
one has to consider not one, but four pieces of information, not only a, but the
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difference a/e−c/f.
The psychiatrists’ answer shows that statistical intuition seems to follow rules
that have nothing to do with the valid rules of statistical inference. But it does not
prove that we should assume, in a Lévy-bruhlian fashion, that the physicians’ brains
are ill-wired. The physicians may very well have strong reasons for believing what
they do. Their answers may even suggest that statistical intuition is less deficient
than it seems. Suppose, for instance, that e in the table below equals 20%, in other
words that 20% of the patients of the physicians have depression symptoms, and
that g also equals 20% (20% of the patients have attempted suicide). Admittedly,
higher figures would be unrealistic. With these assumptions, in the case where the
percentage a of people presenting the two characters is greater than 4, the two
variables would be correlated, and thus causality could plausibly be presumed. A
physician who has seen, say, 10 people out of 100 presenting with the two characters
would have good reason to believe in the existence of a causal relationship between
the two features.
In this example, the belief of the physicians is not really false. In other instances,
the beliefs produced by cognitive psychology appear to be unambiguously false.
In most cases, however, I found that these beliefs could be explained as being
grounded in reasons perceived by the subjects as strong, which the observer can
easily understand.
Obviously, these reasons are not of the “benefit minus cost” type. They are rather
of the cognitive type. The aim pursued by the actor is not to maximize utility, but
rather credibility, to determine whether something is likely, true, etc. In addition
to its instrumental dimension, therefore, rationality has a cognitive dimension.
14 BOUDON
Axiological Rationality
Weber’s “axiological rationality” is often understood as synonymous with “value
conformity.” I would propose rather that the expression identifies the case where
prescriptive beliefs are grounded in the mind of social actors on systems of rea-
sons perceived by them as strong, in exactly the same way as descriptive beliefs
(Boudon 2001a). This important intuition contained in Weber’s notion (though
implicitly rather than explicitly) was apparently already present in Adam Smith’s
mind.
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the risks involved in the realization of the contribution, etc. (d ) The investment time
is comparable in the case of the miner and of the soldier. It takes about as much time
and effort to train a soldier as to produce a miner. The two jobs are characterized by
similar risks. Both include the risk of death. (e) Nonetheless, there are important
differences between the two types of jobs. ( f ) The soldier serves a central function
in society. This function preserves the identity and the very existence of the nation.
The miner fulfills an economic activity among others. He is not more central to
the society than, say, the textile worker. (g) Consequently, the death of the two
men has a different social meaning. The death of the miner will be identified as
an accident, the death of the soldier on the battlefield as a sacrifice. (h) Because
of this difference in the social meaning of their respective activities, the soldier
will be entitled to symbolic rewards, prestige, symbolic distinctions, including
funeral honors in case of death on the battlefield. (i) The miner is not entitled to
the same symbolic rewards. ( j) As the contribution of the two categories in terms
notably of risk and investment is the same, the equilibrium between contribution
and retribution can only be restored by making the salary of the mineworkers
higher. (k) This system of reasons is responsible for our feeling that the miner
should be paid a higher wage than the soldier.
First, Smith’s analysis does not use RCT. People do not believe what they
believe because this would maximize some difference between benefits and costs.
They have strong reasons for believing what they believe, but these reasons are not
of the cost-benefit type. They are not even of the consequential type. At no point
in the argument are the consequences that would eventually result from the miners
not being paid more than the soldiers evoked. Smith’s argument takes rather the
form of a deduction from principles. People have the feeling that it is fair to pay
higher salaries to miners than soldiers because the feeling is grounded on strong
reasons derived from strong principles, claims Smith. He does not say that these
reasons are explicitly present in everyone’s head, but clearly assumes that they are
in an intuitive fashion responsible for their beliefs. If miners were not paid more
than soldiers this would perhaps generate consequences (a strike by miners, say);
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but these eventual consequences are not the reason why most people think the
miners should be paid more; people do not believe in this statement out of fear of
these eventual consequences.
Weber probably had such cases in mind when he introduced his distinction
between “instrumental” and “axiological” rationality.
A contemporary theorist of ethics proposes analyses of some of our moral
sentiments that are similar to Smith’s (Walzer 1983). Why, for instance, do we
consider conscription to be a legitimate recruitment method for soldiers but not
for miners, he asks? The answer again is that the function of the former is vital
whereas that of the latter is not. If conscription were to be applied to miners, it could
be applied to any and eventually to all kinds of occupations, hence it would lead
to a regime incompatible with the principles of democracy. In the same fashion,
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are grounded on solid reasons, but not on reasons of the type considered in RCT.
I am not saying of course that a notion such as fairness cannot be affected by
contextual parameters. Thus, it has been shown that in the ultimatum game the
50/50 proposal is more frequent in societies where cooperation with one’s neigh-
bors is essential to current economic activity than in societies where competition
between neighbors prevails (Henrich et al. 2001). Such findings are not incompat-
ible with a rational interpretation of moral beliefs. They rather show that a system
of reasons is more easily evoked in one context than in another. In summary,
whereas contextual variation in moral beliefs is generally interpreted as validating
a cultural-irrational view of axiological feelings, the contextual-rational paradigm
illustrated by the previous examples appears to be more satisfactory: offering self-
sufficient explanations, i.e., explanations without black boxes.
of truth or rationality, then the next question would be: On which principles do
you ground the criteria, and so on ad infinitum.
To sum up, a system of reasons can be stronger or weaker than another and we
can explain why; but it cannot be said to be strong or weak in an absolute sense. Like
all evaluative notions, truth and rationality are comparative, not absolute notions.
A theory is never true or false, but truer or falser than another, if I may say so. We
consider it true from the moment when we find it hard to imagine a better theory.
The criteria used to decide that one system of reasons is stronger than another are
drawn from a huge reservoir and vary from one question to another.
Borrowing examples from the history of science has the advantage of clarifying
the discussion about the criteria of rationality. But the conclusion to be drawn from
the above example (that there are no general criteria of rationality) applies not only
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to scientific, but to ordinary beliefs as well. And they apply not only to descriptive,
but also to prescriptive beliefs.
This latter point often meets some resistance because of a wrong interpretation
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CONCLUSION
I have tried to make some crucial points: that social action generally depends on
beliefs; that as far as possible, beliefs, actions, and attitudes should be treated as
rational, or more precisely, as the effect of reasons perceived by social actors as
strong; and that reasons dealing with costs and benefits should not be given more
attention than they deserve. Rationality is one thing, expected utility another.
Why should we introduce this rationality postulate? Because social actors try
to act in congruence with strong reasons. This explains why their own behavior
is normally meaningful to them. In some cases, the context demands that these
reasons are of the “cost-benefit” type. In other cases, they are not: Even if we
accept that the notions of cost and benefit are interpreted in the most extensive
fashion, what are the costs and benefits to me of miners being better paid than
soldiers if I have no chance of ever becoming either a soldier or a miner?
On the whole, to get a satisfactory theory of rationality, one has to accept the
idea that rationality is not exclusively instrumental. In other words, the reasons
motivating an actor do not necessarily belong to the instrumental type. In the cases
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18 BOUDON
generates further questions of the type “where does the program come from? Why
do some actors endorse it while others do not?” Because the CTA model has an
answer to such questions, it is capable of generating self-sufficient explanations.
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are incompatible with systems of reasons that most people think of as strong.
The same is true of the other paradoxes, to which it is unnecessary to come back
in detail: People make their decisions because of a more or less conscious set
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of arguments that they feel strong reason to believe in. Thus, in the “ultimatum
game,” they pick the 50/50 solution because they wonder which solution is fair, and
they do their best to define fairness in this case. They do not ask what is good for
themselves. People reject corruption though its effect on them is neutral because
they endorse a theory from which they conclude that it is unacceptable. In all these
cases, they display teleological behavior: They want to reach a goal. But only in
particular cases is the goal to maximize one’s interests or the satisfaction of one’s
preferences; the goal may also be finding the true or fair answer to a question.
Given these various goals, they are rational in the sense that they look for the best
or at least for a satisfactory system of reasons capable of grounding their answer.
The reader may be puzzled by the fact that I have used many examples from
classical sociology in this paper. By so doing I wanted to suggest a thesis that I
can formulate but not demonstrate in a short space: that from the beginning of our
discipline, the most solid sociological explanations implicitly use the CTA model
or, when adequate, its restricted version: RCT.
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CONTENTS
Frontispiece—Raymond Boudon xii
PREFATORY CHAPTERS
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v
P1: FRK
June 11, 2003 19:56 Annual Reviews AR190-FM
vi CONTENTS
The African American “Great Migration” and Beyond, Stewart E. Tolnay 209
The Potential Relevances of Biology to Social Inquiry, Jeremy Freese,
Jui-Chung Allen Li, and Lisa D. Wade 233
by Open University on 05/20/13. For personal use only.
INDEXES
Subject Index 611
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 20–29 635
Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 20–29 638
ERRATA
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Sociology
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