Harshita’s Critical Analysis:

One of the issues before the High court was to find if the decision of district court, holding the
nature of lease to be perpetual is right or not. The court held that district court was erroneous in
finding nature of lease to be perpetual as “there cannot be any presumption in favour of perpetual
lease since there should be clear and unambiguous language to infer such a lease.” The court
gave clarity on the fact that Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act would be applicable
on permanent lease and fixed term lease for seeking eviction of the lessee based on the
provisions of the Statute.

Another issue before the court was in relation to the applicability of Section 21 (1)(h) of the
Karnataka Rent Control Act to a subsisting fixed term contractual lease. The court held that if the
fixed period has expired rent control act is sufficient for eviction of a tenant and “it is not
obligatory to found the proceedings on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of
notice in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act”

Another issue the court answered is that to what extent the provisions of Section 21 of the
Karnataka Rent Act shall have an overriding effect over any other law or a contract. The court
stated that intention of the legislature was protection of tenants under section 21 of the Karnataka
Rent Control Act but this protection or non obstante clause can be overridden and the possession
can be recovered by the lessor only under the grounds mentioned in under Clauses (a) to (p) of
Sub-section (1) of Section 21 and the same grounds must be mentioned as forfeiture grounds in
the contract of lease and not otherwise.

Court upheld the decision of Sri Ramakrishna Theatres Ltd. v General Investments and
Commercial Corporation Ltd. & Ors. AIR 1993 as correct law and held that case of Dhanapal
Chettiar has not be interpreted correctly in Sri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.
case.

Thus, to conclude the case clarified that the presence of non obstante clause does not mean that
the central act can be overlooked. If the State Act does not mention S. 107 of the TPA it does not
mean that a lease can take effect without registration because the state act does not mention so.
How this clause must be seen is if there is a contract for a term and determined by way of S. 111
TPA – S. 106 will not apply. If the contract subsists and the lessor wants to evict the tenant it
will happen only on the grounds mentioned in the State Act to evict a tenant, subject to a notice
under S. 106. An exclusive case under the State Act is made out i.e. when the tenant continues to
stay in possession of the property after the contract term is over. Even then, the tenant cannot be
evicted whenever. Lessor has to follow the grounds of the State Act and in this case, no notice
will be required under S. 106. Then the Lessor can directly move to the Court under the State Act
if any one of the grounds stated for eviction is fulfilled.

Eugene Critical Analysis:

In the following case, the issue of whether a proper notice must be provided to the tenant for
eviction or not under the state rent control act came up. The case of dhanpal chettiar where the
case of bona fide requirement of property was allowed, but the eviction was denied due to lack of
notice to quit in accordance with the law was discussed in the present judgement. The High
Court dealing with the matter in revision, held that notice to quit under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act was not necessary for seeking an eviction of a tenant under the
provisions of the Rent Act. The question therefore, as was under consideration before this Court
is mentioned in Para 1 of the judgment itself which is quoted below: - “as to whether in order to
get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act, is it
necessary to give a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.” It has been held
that the purpose of giving a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is only to
terminate the contract of tenancy but it would not be necessary if the tenant incurs the liability of
eviction under the provisions of the Statute. It was also held that the notice under Section 106 of
the Transfer of Property Act would only be a formality and a surplusage and it need not be given
by way of any double protection to the tenant. It has been further observed that even though
tenancy may be terminated by giving a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
yet the landlord will not be in a position to initiate the proceedings for eviction in absence of any
liability incurred by the tenant as provided in the Statute. Therefore, notice under Section 106 of
the Transfer of Property Act loses significance. While the whole point of the state rent control
act and section 106 of the transfer of the property act was to protect the tenants from exorbitant
rents and immediate evacuations, the case of dhanpal chettiar proved to be the exact opposite.
The case went on to show that a prior notice was not important before demanding for an eviction
of the client, which the supreme court in this case of laxmidas bapudas darbar decided to make
bad and pay more importance to other cases.