Technical Safety: Norsok Standard

NORSOK STANDARD
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
TECHNICAL SAFETY
S-DP-001
Rev. 1, December 1994
Technical Safety S-DP-001
CONTENTS
1. FOREWORD 3
2. SCOPE 3
3. NORMATIVE REFERENCES 3
4. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVATIONS 4
4.1 Definitions 4
4.2 Abbrevations 4
5. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 4
5.1 General 4
5.2 Safety Management 5
5.3 Analyses and Optimisation 5
5.4 Risk Reduction Principles 5
6. EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 7
7. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT 8
7.1 General Requirements 8
7.2 Escape Routes 9
7.3 Safe Area 10
7.4 Living Quarters 10
7.5 Helicopter Deck 10
7.6 Utility Area 11
7.7 Emergency Service Areas 11
7.8 Process Area 11
7.9 Riser Area 11
7.10 Flare boom, flare tower, cold vent 12
7.11 Drilling and Wellhead Area 12
8. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO STRUCTURAL DESIGN 13
8.2 Accidental Design Load Protection 13
9. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO PROCESS AND AUXILIARY FACILITIES 14
9.2 Safety Systems 15
9.3 Process Safety 15
9.4 Depressurisation 15
9.5 Relief and Venting 16
9.6 Flaring 17
9.7 Cold Vent 18
9.8 Drainage Systems 18
10. REQUIREMENTS TO SAFETY AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 19
10.2 Fire and Gas Detection 19
10.3 Ignition Source Control 30
10.4 PA/Alarm System 30
10.5 Emergency Power 30
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NORSOK Standard 1 of 53
11. REQUIREMENTS TO EXPLOSION AND FIRE PROTECTION 32

11.2 Fire Protection Philosophy 32
11.3 Protection of Pressure Vessels and Process Piping 33
11.4 Passive Fire Protection 36
11.5 Active Fire Protection 37
11.6 Explosion Protection Philosophy 37
12. SAFETY ASPECTS RELATED TO FLOATING INSTALLATIONS 37
12.1 General 37
12.2 Marine industry standard 37
12.3 Crude Storage 38
12.4 Layout 38
12.5 Turret 38
12.6 Drainage 39
12.7 Emergency re-positioning 39
12.8 Topside/floater interface 39
12.9 Escape and evacuation 40
13. NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS 40
13.1 General 40
13.2 Common requirements 40
13.3 Supporting structure 41
13.4 Welhead system 41
13.5 Life-saving appliances 42
13.6 Emergency shut-down 42
ANNEX A Fire Protection Data Sheet (Informative) 43

ANNEX B1 Type A of Normally not Manned Installations (Informative) 45
ANNEX B2 Type B of Normally not Manned Installations (Informative) 49
ANNEX C Informative References (Informative) 52
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1. FOREWORD
This standard is developed by the NORSOK Standardisation Work Group.
All annexes are informative.
2. SCOPE
This standard applies to design, construction and modifications on installations for
offshore drilling, production and transportation of petroleum.
The objective of this document is to achieve implementation of technology which

establishes and maintains an adequate level of safety for personnel, environment and
material assets.
This standard defines Safety Design Principles for installations, arrangements and
systems.
3. NORMATIVE REFERENCES
API RP 521Guide for pressure-reliving and depressing system.
ISO 13 702 Requirements and Guidelines for the prevention, control and mitigation
of fires and explosions. The standard is in current development.
ISO 10418 Analysis, Design, Installations and Testing of Basic Surface Safety
Systems for Offshore Production Platforms (Replaces API RP14C).
prEN 50145 Electric apparatus for potentially explosive gas atmosphere -

Classification of hazardous areas.
IEC 79-10 International Electrotechnical Commission Publication. Area

Classification.
IEC 79-13 International Electrotechnical Commission Construction and use of

rooms or buildings protected by pressurization.
API 500 B Guide for Area Classification.
S-DP-003 Environmental Care.
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4. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVATIONS
4.1 Definitions
All terms and phrases within the scope of this standard shall be regarded as defined in the
regulations and international codes and standards referred to in this document.
4.2 Abbrevations
APS Abandon Platform Shutdown

CCR Central Control Room
ESD Emergency Shut Down
ESDV Emergency Shut Down Valve
F&G Fire and Gas
LEL Lower Explosion Limit
LQ Living Quarter
PA Public Address
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
HC Hydrocarbons
PSD Prosess Shutdown
NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
IR Infra Red
UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply
DHSV Downhole Safety Valve
UV Ultra Violet
5. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
5.1 General
Governing documents, in the form of Acts, Regulations, Standards and Recognised

Practices shall be identified and applied in the design process.
Use of international standards and codes shall be preferred to non-standard solutions unless
it is documented that the alternative solution altogether will be optimal from a safety and
cost point of view.
Any implications of Safety objectives established by project with respect to the design
shall be identified and expressed in the form of design objectives and requirements.
The technical safety requirements shall comply with the established risk acceptance
criteria.
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The main goal is to develop cost optimum concepts which shall give sufficient protection
for personnel, environment and material assets.
Risk analyses are acknowledged as vital tools which provide input to the decision
processes in both the design and during the operation of the installations. Analyses of
scenarios that have been adequately covered by relevant previous analyses or of recognised
standard designs, should be avoided.
5.2 Safety Management
This standard presumes that each project establishes a Safety Program that includes or
addresses :
• Scope and purpose of the program

• System for identification and asessment of risk
• Risk Acceptance Criteria
• Organisation and responsibilities in terms of safety
• System for keeping track of assumptions,decisions and corrective actions related to
safety
• Procedures for Handling of deviations and nonconformances
• Work program specifying all planned safety activities for each phase, including risk
analysis and safety verification plan.
5.3 Analyses and Optimisation
The design principles presented in clause 6 to 13 reflect a normally adequate standard for
safe design, whereas the Project Risk Acceptance Criteria are reflecting the maximum risk
level, not necessarily achieved through a standard design. This is because the safety level
depends on several factors, partly outside the range of standardisation, e.g. operational
aspects, environmental conditions, new applications or new technology.
In this connection risk analysis shall be applied in order to evaluate alternatives and
provide necessary information for decision making.
5.4 Risk Reduction Principles
5.4.1 Overall Principles

Cost/benefit evaluation shall be applied to study different design alternatives.
This principle shall be considered in connection with items below.
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5.4.2 Inherent safety

The design shall aim at a sufficant level of inherent safety, e.g. through:
• Eliminating or replacing hazardous materials

• Reducing the quantities of hazardous materials
• Selecting a process with a lower risk potentia
• Reducing numbers of leak sources (flanges, valves, instrument connections etc.) and
ignition sources.
• Sufficant material corrosion properties and toughness factors.
5.4.3 Failure mechanisms

A systematic and documented identification of relevant failure mechanisms shall be
performed. Relevant subject disciplines shall be involved.
In particular this applies to:
• Failure mechanisms which can cause leaks and releases of hazardous substances,
including all types of corrosion, erosion, cavitation, material fatigue and ageing
• Failure mechanisms which can cause ignition, e.g. ageing of electrical materials or
components, self heating of rotating machinery, current leakage due to water, static
electricity, earthing faults potential
• Failure mechanisms reducing the reliability and survivability of barriers and safety
systems
5.4.4 Escalation Prevention

Possible escalating events shall be identified and relevant measures taken to reduce this
risk.
The need for establishing safety barriers to avoid escalations shall be considered as part of
the design.
5.4.5 Simplicity, Comprehensibility and Recognisability

System and equipment complexity which may lead to human error shall be avoided by:
• Limiting the amount of equipment

• Avoiding unnecessary functional dependency, especially in or between control
systems, safety systems and barriers
• Selecting simple and logical solutions
• Standardisation of codes, controls, colours, work methods and components
• Designing with due attention to the 'human factor'
Vital systems shall be properly marked and easily recognisable and understandable.
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6. EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
The installation shall have satisfactory access and evacuation facilities and be adequately
equipped with rescue equipment.
The emergency prepardeness of any activity shall be established on the basis of defined
situations of hazard and accident.
An emergency prepardness analysis shall be carried out to design the emergency
prepardness so as to meet the specific requirements for the activity in question.
The emergency preparedness required in any activity shall form the basis for design and
modification of the installation and the selection of equipment.
In the establishment of emergency preparedness measures which prevent a hazardous

situation from developing into an accident situation shall be given priority over measures
which reduce the consequences of an accident situation.
An Emergency Preparedness Plan covering the operational phase shall be developed at an

early stage of the Conceptual Phase. The plan shall be in accordance with chapter 10 in
ISO/WD 13 702.
The plan shall take into account the following evacuation principles:
• The muster area and the access to the evacuation station shall be arranged and
protected in order to evacuate the actual number of personnel in an organised and
efficient way. Area allocation: 0.4 m2 per lifeboat seat.
Main evacuation area.
• Gravity/free fall life boats with minimum life boat capacity of 100 % of personnel on
board the installation.
Other evacuation areas.
• One additional lifeboat in the far end of the installation shall be considered if escape
to the main evacuation area is impossible
• For scenarios where the possibility for gas/smoke on the helideck is within
acceptable limits, helicopter may be considered as the primary means of evacuation
• For bridge connected installations and flotels the primary means of evacuation shall
be the bridge. One additonal lifeboat in the oposite end of the installation shall be
considered if escape to bridge is impossible in credible accident scenarios.
• Evacuation chutes with rafts shall be used as a secondary means of evacuation, with
one located in the main evacuation area.
• The Emergency Preparedness Assessment shall be applied to identify any need for
additional evacuation means and the optimum location of these.
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7. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT
7.1 General Requirements
The installation shall be divided into main areas which shall be designed and located so as
to minimize the risk to people, environment and material assets. The division of areas shall
be made based on the risk they represent in the operations.
Living quarters, control centre and equipment of major importance to safety shall be
located in non-hazardous areas.
Gas release points, e.g. flare/cold vent, shall be located and designed so that release of gas
does not entail increased level of risk in the operations.
Risers shall be located and designed so that fracturing will have acceptable consequences.
Reference is given to chapter 5 and 10 in ISO/WD 13 702 for layout, orientation and
location of equipment and functions.
7.1.1 Area Classification

Installations shall be classified in terms of explosion risk, and divided into zones according
to degree of risks.
The definition of zones shall be in accordance with IEC 79.10. The extent of zones should
be in accordanse with API 500B for small and open concepts.
References are also given to draft EN Standard pr EN 50145.
The classification of hazardous areas shall be based on events and situations associated
with normal platform operations, e.g. continuous or periodic venting, evaporation from
open handling systems, small leaks from flanges and gaskets, escape of flammable
substances during maintenance and work-over operations.
"Catastrophic" events such as pipe rupture or vessel burst, which may be a result of
material weakness, design error, falling loads, collision or sabotage, shall not be regarded
as giving rise to a higher classification. This shall be reflected in the risk analyses, and may
impose stricter requirements to arrangements and equipment than defined by the area
classification alone.
The area classification is an important part of the basis for layout, as it gives requirements
to:
• Location of ventilation air inlets and outlets

• Ventilation system requirements
• Location of combustion air inlets and exhaust outlets for internal combustion engines
and fired units
• Location and use of ignition sources
• Location of emergency equipment
• Location and design of doors and other connections between areas
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• Operational- and maintenance procedures in hazardous areas.

• Selection of equipment.
For design principles related to pressurisation of rooms, alarms and disconnection upon
loss of pressurisation, ref. is made to IEC 79-13.
7.2 Escape Routes
The total time needed for escape to safe area , including time for safe termination of
critical tasks, rescue operations, etc., shall be estimated and efforts shall be made to
minimise this time.
For large manned installations the escape route system and the safe area shall be available
for at least 1 hour.
The dimension of escape routes shall be minimum 1 m width (0,9 m for doors) and 2,1 m
height. Escape routes intended use by more than 50 persons shall be extended to 1.5 m (1.2
m for doors) width and 2.2 m height.
Other general principles are listed below:
• There shall be at least two exits to escape routes from every regularly manned area
outside quarters and offices, leading in different escape directions
• The escape route network shall lead to safe areas and facilities as follows:
- Living Quarters
- Shelter Areas
- Life Boats and Life Rafts-stations
- Boat Landings
- Helideck
- Flotel or other installations linked by bridge/walk way
• Escape routes shall preferably be part of the daily used transport- and passageways.
Where appropriate, main escape routes shall be provided on the outside along the
periphery of the installation.
• Doors shall normally open in the escape direction, but not block the outside escape
route. Opening of doors should not require electric, hydraulic or pneumatic power. If
such power is required the power supply shall be local.
• Any dining room, recreation room in L.Q. etc., where more than 15 persons may be
assembled shall have at least 2 exit doors. Internal room arrangement shall be
evaluated for possible blocking of exits following an accident as well as external
blockings. For all areas where there is a risk of congestion and panic, the doors shall
be provided with panic bars.
• Escape routes leading to a higher or lower level shall be provided by stairways. The
number of these stairways shall be assessed based on the platform size, configuration
of areas and equipment layout. Vertical ladders can be used in areas where the work
is of such a nature that only a few persons (max. 3) are in the area on short time
basis.
• It shall be possible to escape from a drilling area without running through a wellhead
area.
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• A dead end corridor of more than 5 metres length is not acceptable. Stairways
included in escape routes shall be designed to allow for transport of injured
personnel on stretcher.
• Lifts shall not be considered as a part of escape ways. However, it shall be possible
to escape from the lift and the hoist way with the lift at any elevation. Escape from
legs/shafts/coloumns of an installation shall be considered separately. If use of lift is
necessary to
• ensure adequate and effective escape, the lift system shall satisfy special
requirements, e.g. concerning transport of injured personnel on stretchers, protection,
ventilation, power supply.
• Escape routes and emergency stations shall be illuminated. Escape routes shall be
provided with adequate emergency lighting. Emergency station should have
minimum 15 Lux, Escape routes minimum 4 Lux.
• Escape routes in all areas outside the living quarter shall be marked by yellow
painting.
• The escape routes within the living quarter shall be provided with low level
directional lighting, showing correct escape direction. Other enclosed and regularly
manned utility and process areas shall be considered separately.
• Escape routes shall be arranged from the drillfloor to adjacent modules and also
down the substructure. Protection of these escape routes from radiation heat shall be
considered.
7.3 Safe Area
The Safe Areas shall be in accordance with ISO WD 13702 14.
7.4 Living Quarters
The living quarters shall be designed, equipped and located so that acceptable safety for all
accomodated personell is achieved.
Special emphasis shall be given to separation of the areas with drilling, production and
auxiliary systems from areas for living quarters.
Living quarters shall be designed and protected so as to ensure that the functions they are
designed for can be maintained during a dimensioning accidental event.
The living quarters shall be equipped with a reliable smokedetection and alarm system.
The ventilation system shall be designed to vent out smoke in a fire scenario.
7.5 Helicopter Deck
The helicopter deck shall be subject to approval by the National Civil Aviation
Administration.
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7.6 Utility Area
The utility area should serve as a barrier between hazardous areas and LQ/Emergency
Service Areas.
Routing of hydrocarbon piping to, or through, the utility area shall be minimised.
7.7 Emergency Service Areas
An emergency service area is defined as an area containing equipment and systems

required during emergency conditions. This includes firewater systems, emergency
generators and emergency power distribution systems, main control and communication
equipment, emergency ventilation equipment, ballast system and position keeping system.
The location and protection of these systems as well as system design shall secure
operations during and after an emergency condition. The equipment necessary during
evacuation is of particular importance.
Routing of hydrocarbon piping within Emergency Service Areas shall be limited to diesel
fuel supply lines for the emergency services themselves.
The emergency stations shall be provided and located in accordance with ISO/WD 13 702
Clause 10.
7.8 Process Area
The separation philosophy for different parts of the process systems shall be that
equipment items of relatively high integrity but containing large volumes of liquids and
low pressure hydrocarbons (separator vessels) shall be separated from equipment with high
pressure which are the most likely sources of leakage (gas compression plant).
Process equipment containing larger volumes of high pressure hydrocarbons should be

located above main loadbearing structures to minimise the potential fire and explosion
loads on such structures.
Process piping, pig launchers and receivers and equipment shall be protected from external
impact, e.g. from dropped objects or missiles due to disintegration of rotating machinery
or as found required through analysis.
ESD-valves shall be located and arranged in such a way that the exposure to fires and
explosions are minimised. Electric cables, pneumatic tubings and hydraulic systems shall
be protected from fire and explosion loads until they have completed shut down sequence
time.
7.9 Riser Area
For risers which may release larger amounts of hydrocarbons, protection from external
impact due to ships and drifting objects shall be evaluated by locating the risers behind
main support structures or by dedicated protection structures able to resist the
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dimensioning impact energy. Impaced energy of 14MJ may be assumed until a detailed
collision risk study is available.
The following means of protection to be considered:
• For two or more gas risers, or one gas riser together with several oil risers: passive
fire protection
• Pig launchers and receivers: location in open, naturally ventilated areas, at the
periphery of the platform, and with hatches directed away from equipment and
structures.
• ESDV's: location in open naturally ventilated areas as close to the sea as practical.
7.10 Flare boom, flare tower, cold vent
Flare booms and flare towers shall be located and dimensioned with due attention to all
relevant flaring rates and wind situations to ensure that the heat radiation level (Ref.
Clause 9.6 Flaring) will be within acceptance limits at all relevant locations on the
platform, with regard to the operators, the structures such as cranes and towers and the
electrical and mechanical equipment and pipes.
The flare flame or hot gases shall not represent a hazard due to increased surface
temperature to crane operators, crane structures and drill tower structures. Cold vents shall
be designed in such a way that ignition of the gases will not represent unacceptable risk.
A flare/vent study is required, showing the potential effects on all exposed areas.
7.11 Drilling and Wellhead Area
The drilling and wellhead areas shall be located with maximum distance to the safe areas
and be separated from processing areas in order to minimisce the concequences from a
blow out.
The areas shal be arranged such that where practically possible it allows for external fire
fighting assistance from two different directions in order to fight a burning blow out.
Alternatively, the area shall be provided with a fire fighting system upgraded to provide a
substitute for external fire fighting.
The activities in this area will also be of a critical nature in case of emergencies, and it is of
vital importance that escape routes are available to the personnel in the area.
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Furthermore the wellhead area shall be located so as to:
• Avoid storage of combustible fluids

• Facilitate access and emergency work in the wellhead area in the event of a blowout
• Minimise hydrocarbon piping not connected to the well
• Ensure that the wellhead area is separated or protected from sources of ignition
• The wellheads shall be located as high as practical and above the main frame in order
to minimise exposure of the main frame from a wellhead fire, and to facilitate control
of a blow out on the platform
Consideration should be given to the protection of well and BOP equipment, such as
control panels and hydraulic systems and their related signal paths.
When simultaneous drilling, work over and/or production is planned for, operational
procedures shall ensure an acceptable safety level of the installation.
8. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO STRUCTURAL DESIGN
Installations, equipment, systems and components shall be designed, equipped and located
so that they can be operated safely and withstand anticipated loads.
Structures, systems and operations shall be planned, designed and implemented in such
ways that no single failure during design, fabrication or operation may lead to hazard or
accident. This applies both to operational failure as well as to faults/deficiencies related to
structures and equipment used directly in operations, or to equipment with auxiliary
functions.
8.2 Accidental Design Load Protection
Accidental loads shall be identified and taken into account in the structural design. The
probability, magnitude and potential consequences of identified loads shall be assessed and
analysed.
Main principles concerning structural protection and hazards that may have a critical effect
on the structure are listed below.
The requirements below are only subject to deviations if documented by risk and cost
benefit analyses.
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Relevant loads are:
• Impact loads caused by explosion, dropped object, ship collision or others.
- Explosion:
Ref. is given to ISO/WD 13702.
- Dropped objects:
Protection of structure to be dimensioned for falling container, pipes etc.
based on estimated weight, probability drop height, vulnerability and
criticality of the exposed areas.
- Ship collision:
The possibility of collisions caused by merchant vessels and the need for
adequate Sea Traffic Surveilance System should be evaluated. For supply
vessels operating beside the installation, a collision load of 14 MJ shall be
assumed.
• Heat loads caused by jet fires or pool fires on the platform or adjacent platform, from
risers or from the sea surface in case of large oil releases to the sea or in case of
subsea gas releases.
- Fire:
Fixed installations shall be able to withstand a dimensioning blowout/fire on
sea for a time period sufficient for safe evacuation of the installation. The
endurance shall not be less than 1 hour. Fixed installations shall be
protected
against fire on sea, as identified by risk analyses. For blowout/fire on sea
concerning floating installations, see clause 12.2.6
• Loads caused by extreme weather, earthquake, damage to structural elements

(damaged condition) or extreme temperature tension.
9. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO PROCESS AND AUXILIARY

FACILITIES
Process and auxiliary systems shall be designed, manufactured, equipped and installed in
such a way that the installations can be operated safely.
Process and auxiliary facilities shall be designed such that no single failure during
operations can lead to unacceptable hazardous situations. This principle shall apply to
operational errors as well as equipment failure.
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9.2 Safety Systems
A Safety Shutdown System shall be independent of and in addition to other systems and
equipment used for normal operation, control and monitoring, and shall act as a safety
barrier in case of malfunction or maloperation of these systems and equipment.
The Safety Shutdown System is logically divided into three main levels of shutdown:
• Process Shutdown (PSD)

• Emergency Shutdown (ESD)
• Abandon Platform Shutdown (APS)
Basic system philosophy is that a shutdown on a certain level shall never initiate
shutdowns on higher levels, but shall always include shutdowns on lower levels.
For more details reference is given to Clause 10.3 Emergency Shutdown.
9.3 Process Safety
Abnormal operating conditions leading to potential hydrocarbons release shall be

controlled by two levels of protection according to ISO 10418 (API RP 14C):
• Primary level of protection

• Secondary level of protection
As far as possible, the two levels of protection shall operate on functionally different basis.
Duplication of identical safety devices given different set points shall not be regarded to
satisfy the requirement of two levels of protection.
The PSD system shall automatically detect abnormal operation conditions within systems
or equipment and initiate actions so that uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons is prevented.
The systems shall be designed to avoid cascading effects due to partial shutdown within
PSD, i.e. shutdown signals should trip all affected systems so that a new abnormality is not
developed as a result of the initial trip action.
The system philosophy also implies that the fail safe principle shall apply. I.e. components
shall move to, or stay in the predetermined safest position upon loss of signal or power.
The degree and extent of a PSD situation will depend on type of abnormality, and may
vary from equipment shutdown with minimum effect on the production rate, to a total
process shutdown.
9.4 Depressurisation
Fast depressurisation shall be the primary mean of avoiding rupture of pressure

vessels/piping which may cause escalation. Active and passive protection are secondary
means.
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All pressure vessels and piping segments, which during shut down contains more than 1.0
ton of produced hydrocarbons or unprocessed crude, shall be equipped with a depressuring
system.
Depressurisation systems are required in addition to pressure relief facilities because of the
loss of material strength during a fire.
Depressurisation systems may also be required for systems which are unable to contain
flammable or toxic materials by passive means alone. Loss of the active method of
containment will require depressurisation to prevent escape of the material concerned (e.g.
centrifugal compressor's dependence on seal oil systems).
The material properties at actual temperatures and pressures during depressurisation, steel
thickness, active or passive protective measures shall together ensure that a pressure
vessel/piping segment does not rupture at a stage where this may escalate the fire scenario
beyond the control of the protective systems and arrangement. This may call for a detailed
study of each ESD segment in particular.
The design procedure outlined in clause 11.3.
The depressuring, manually or automatic, shall be applied the following way:
• Manual field depressurisation sequence is considered initiated after 3 minutes from

detection of initial fire
• Automatic depressurisation sequence is considered initiated immediately after
detection of initial fire.
API RP 521 may be used as a guidance in the design of depressurisation systems.
9.5 Relief and Venting
The release of hydrocarbons from relief and depressurisation systems shall be routed
through a closed system terminating at a liquid's disengagement vessel and with the liquid
free gas being safely flared. Vents which are not suitable for routing to flare (e.g. due to
back-pressure) shall be terminated outside the platform perimeter in such a way that
accumulation of gases due to "dead pockets" etc. is avoided.
Local venting of hazardous gases shall not be permitted unless it can be done without
hazard to the personnel or the platform, e.g. for small and normally not manned
installations local venting may be found acceptable.
Flare K.O. drums shall be sized for two criteria:
• Disengagement of entrained liquid droplets

• Containment of liquid carry over
The criteria for droplet removal will depend on the flare concept. The objective is to avoid
condensate dropping from flare. The particle size shall be less than 400 microns. In case of
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vertical flare tower using subsonic flare burner the droplet size shall be less than 300
microns.
The K.O. Drum liquid containment capacity shall be based on the largest foreseeable liquid
condensation rate for a period of at least 20 minutes. This period shall provide realistic
time to identify a problem and allow for operator intervention. Longer periods may be
required, e.g. for subsea flowlines and interfield pipelines. This shall be evaluated for each
case. In addition the knock-out drum shall provide capacity for 90 seconds of liquid carry
over from the largest source (assuming overfilled vessel).
Progressive release of inventories from process piping and pressure vessels that can cause
significant escalation of a fire, shall be avoided. As a minimum, the piping system and the
pressure vessels shall maintain their integrity during depressurisation. The depressuring
system itself (blowdown valves, branch piping and headers and K.O. Drums) is of
particular importance. The ability to maintain integrity when exposed to the fire loads
depends on selection of material, wall thickness, pressure rating and applied fire
protection.
9.6 Flaring
The need for flaring should be minimised from an environment point of view. Ref. Design
Principles Environmental Care, NORSOK S-DP-003.
Calculations shall be performed to determine the levels of radiation on all areas of the
platform for critical flare conditions.
Flare radiation calculations shall account for variations in flaring quantities and wind
conditions.
Maximum heat loads from flares on open areas where personnel may be present and on
locations where structures and equipment are exposed shall be as follows:
• Permissible radiation levels to personnel shall follow radiation levels as given in API
RP 521.
• The heat loads from planned continuos flaring conditions on areas where personnel
are supposed to perform work tasks lasting for two hours or more the working
environment requirements for exposed areas shall be considered and ample
protection provided as required.
• For long periods of flaring (continuos flaring) , consideration shall also be given to
the radiation level on the helideck., i.e. the radiation/temperatures on the helideck
shall not become intolerable to personnel or limit the necessary helicopter
operations. Unless otherwise accepted by the responsible for helicopter operations,
max. 1.9 KW/m2 is allowed on helideck.
• Max heat loads from flare on structures and equipment not designed for high heat
loads shall be limited to meet the requirements below. Higher exposure for short
times, e.g. during emergency flaring conditions, that will not harm the structure or
equipment can be accepted. Such deviations shall be documented.
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Protection of exposed areas may be necessary to meet these requirements.
- Heat loads on steel- or aluminium structures shall not give temperatures that
results in loss of structural integrity.
- Heat loads on wires in drill tower and cranes shall be limited depending on
type of lubrication and inspection- /replacement frequency.
- Heat loads on areas classified as zone 2 shall be kept below 200oC.
- Heat loads on Ex-rated electrical equipment and instrumentation shall not give
temperatures exceeding 40C°.
Based on a case to case evaluation of protective clothing, provision of local radiation

shields, etc., the limits for acceptable heat loads can be adjusted as applicable. Such
deviations shall be documented.
9.7 Cold Vent
The design of cold vents shall be based on dispersion calculations to prove that the
foreseen gas rates can be released without creating explosive air/gas mixtures on the
installation or in its vicinity.
Further, the possibility of an unintended ignition shall be taken into account in the design
and dimensioning of the cold vent, i.e. ignition of foreseen gas rates shall not give
unacceptable heat loads or other consequences on the installation.
The need for extinguishing ignited cold vent shall be considered.
9.8 Drainage Systems
The platform shall be equipped with the following drainage systems:
• One closed drainage system

• One open drainage system from non-hazardous areas
• One open drainage system from hazardous areas
• Where applicable, a separate mud drainage system shall be provided covering the
drill floor and mud treatment areas
Open drainage systems from areas where there is no pollution, e.g. rain water drain from
roofs and helideck shall be routed directly to the sea.
Reference to ISO/WD 13 702 Clause 8.
________________________________________________________________________________
10. REQUIREMENTS TO SAFETY AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
The general requirements to safety and communication systems are to be in accordance

with ISO/WD 13 702 Clause 10.
Safety and communication systems shall be designed and protected so as to retain their
operational capability for the required period of time during an accidental event.
Safety systems shall be designed to operate independently of other systems or with a safety
equivalent to an independent system.
10.2 Fire and Gas Detection
10.2.1 General
All F&G detection system display- and information facilities shall be centralised, and
located in a continuously manned area, normally the Central Control Room.
With the installation divided into "fire areas" the design of F&G System shall presume that
each fire area shall be covered by a sufficient number of detectors.
The alarm presentation in CCR should in addition to screens (VDU's) be given on a simple
fire and gas mimic. Only essential information shall be shown on the mimic, i.e. with fire
area status, unless for areas or equipment where a more detailed alarm identification is
appropriate, e.g.:
• Around helifuel package.

• In or at ventilation inlets.
• Inside critical equipment enclosures.
Local F&G display - and status facilities shall be provided in the drilling area
incorporating F&G control of the drilling facilities.
10.2.2 Gas detector layout and alarm initiation

The following principles shall apply concerning detector layout and alarm initiation:
• Location, type and number of gas detectors shall take into account:
- leakage sources within the area

- borders between non-hazardous and hazardous areas
- gas density relative to air
- detection principles and voting logic
- ventilation air flow patterns
________________________________________________________________________________
- wind-direction and velocity

- critical reaction time/detector response time
- size of the area
- criticality of the area with regard to safety
• HVAC intakes
Gas detectors in HVAC supply shall be located at the air intake, alternatively in the
duct as close to duct opening as possible. Detectors in a duct shall be positioned as
near as practicable to the centre of the duct where the air velocity is greatest and
where the response time to gas ingress is consequently most rapid. At big intakes, the
flow patterns around the opening shall be determined to achieve an optimum position
of the detectors with regard to response.
HVAC intakes or ducts shall be monitored by minimum two gas detectors.
• "Confirmed Gas"
Is activation of two detectors arranged in one voting area, one at "high" and the other
at "low" LEL set point. . Each project shall define the high and low set points,
considering the distance between individual detectors working in a voting area,
ventilation conditions, etc. However, the "high" level shall be set not above 60%
LEL.
Where single detector logic is employed, single detector at "high" gives "Confirmed Gas".
.
Areas covered by two detectors should be arranged in a voting logic with detectors in
adjacent hazardous area.
• Alarm on Gas detection
Alarms shall be automatically initiated according to table 10.1
________________________________________________________________________________
Table 10.1
Automatic alarm in area

CCR Living Non-haz. Process Drilling Drill control
Quarter utility area area area cabin/office
Confirmed gas
detected at :
HVAC intake LQ X X X X X X
Non-hazardous X X X X X X
utility area
HVAC/air intakes
Process area incl. X X X
HVAC outlets
Drilling area incl. X X X
HVAC
Any single dete X X (detector in
ctor "low" LEL drilling area)
• Beam Gas Detectors
Beam detectors are preferred where the layout enables good coverage by such
detectors. Beam detectors should be used in combination with point detectors in a
voting. This can be a way of limiting the number of detectors.
10.2.3 Fire detector layout and alarm initiation

• Fire detector type
The selection of fire detectors shall be based upon an evaluation of the nature of the
fire that is to be detected and the operational conditions that may exist.
Early smoke detection systems, sensitive to small concentration of combustion
products shall be considered in all rooms without automatic fire fighting, such as:
- Central Control Room

- Instrument Room
- Switch Board and Electrical Rooms
IR or dual IR/UV fire detectors shall be used in process areas
• Manual detection
Manual fire alarm buttons shall be provided at strategic locations, e.g. exits from
process areas, escape routes, fire stations.
________________________________________________________________________________
• "Confirmed Fire"
Is activation of two fire detectors working on a voting principle in a fire area.

"Confirmed Fire" is activation of one single fire detector when no voting is
employed.
• Alarm on Fire detection
Alarms described in table 10.2 shall be automatically initiated. Alarms in other areas
to be manually initiated for CCR.
Automatic alarm in area

CCR Living Non-haz. Process Drilling Drill
Quarter utility area area control
area cabin/office
Confirmed fire
detected at :
LQ X X
Non-hazardous X X X X
utility area
Process single X X X
wellhead
Conf. process X X X X X X
Conf./Drilling X X X
Any single X X
detector Detector in
drilling area
Table 10.2 Automatic alarms upon fire detection.
Table 10.3 below presents normative examples of fire- and gas detection in the various
areas on installations. Alarms are described in the text above, and is not repeated in the
table. The solutions presented in the table can be deviated upon an evaluation of the
specific risks in an area.
Reference is also made to Figure 10.1 regarding the Emergency Shutdown Philosophy, and
clause 11.5 regarding Active Fire Fighting.
________________________________________________________________________________
Area/room Automatic Shut- Automatic Shut- Comments

Fire detection down Gas down
Action detection Action
Wellhead Area Flame or Heat ESD II Area ESD II * Not normally
(fusible plugs*) manned
installations
Manifold Area Flame ESD II Area ESD II
Nat. vent./ Flame ESD II Area, leak ESD II
outdoor H.C. detection
Process Area
Mech. vent. Flame ESD II Area + ESD II
Process Area HVAC extr.
(separation/gas duct
compression)
Water Flame or ESD II HVAC ESD I* Area assumed
Injection smoke * intake* non-hazardous
Treatment None ** *Mech.
Area ventilated area
**
Nat.vent/outdo
or area
Gas Compres- Flame ESD II Area ESD II
sion Area
Drill Floor None Manual Area Manual* *See 10.3.5
Drillers Cabin Smoke Manual HVAC Manual* *See 10.3.5
intake
Degasser Flame Manual HVAC Manual* *See 10.3.5
Room Drillers extract Drillers
cabin cabin
Shale Shaker Flame Manual Area, H2S* Manual * If sour
Room Drillers Drillers service
Cabin cabin** **See 10.3.5
Active Mud Flame Manual Area + Manual* *See 10.3.5
Tank Room Drillers HVAC Drillers
cabin extract cabin
Sack/Bulk Heat None HVAC ESD II
Storage Room intake
Mud Lab Smoke None HVAC ESD II Assumes no
intake piped
connection to
mud system
Cementing Flame None HVAC Manual
Unit Room intake Drillers
Cabin
Table 10.3: Fire and gas detection/Shut down actions 1 of 3

Area/room Automatic Shut- Gas Shut- Comments
________________________________________________________________________________
Fire detection down detection down

Action Action
Central Smoke in Manual HVAC ESD I * Fire detection
Control Room cabinets * and/ intake Early warning
(CCR) or at roof level system
Instrument Smoke * Manual HVAC ESD I * Fire detection
room adjacent intake Early warning
to CCR system
Central Tele Smoke * Manual HVAC ESD I * Fire detection
Eq. Room intake Early warning
system
Local Smoke Manual HVAC ESD II* *Shut down of
Equipment intake internal
Room (LER) equipment to be
evaluated
Turbine hall Flame * Manual HVAC ESD I * Fuel system
Smoke ** intake **Electric
equipm.
Turbine hood Flame and heat* Unit Area Unit ** * Supplier to
shutd. (hood) shutd.upon confirm.
upon area gas ** Continue
area fire detect ventilation.
detect Block and bleed
fuel gas system
Turbine Combust. ESD I
air intake
Switch board Smoke * El. ** HVAC ESD 1 * Fire detection
and electrical power intake Early warning
room switch system
off ** Manual or
automatic with
timer to be
decided
Battery room Smoke HVAC ESD
(lead acid) intake Shutd.
H2 gas boost
detector at charge
extract
Fire pump Flame Manual HVAC ESD I, * Running fire
room with intake Close fire- pump will be
diesel engine damper * shut down only
on overspeed
Air compres. Smoke or heat Manual Air intake ESD I* *Incl. unit shut
down
Table 10.3: Fire and gas detection/Shut down actions 2 of 3
________________________________________________________________________________
Area/room Automatic Shut- Gas Shut- Comments

Fire down detection down
detection Action Action
Mechanical Smoke or heat Manual HVAC ESD I Separate

workshop intake welding HVAC
extract
Instrument Smoke or heat Manual HVAC ESD I
Workshop intake
Paint Storage Heat or flame HVAC ESD I
intake
HVAC intake Smoke at HVAC Air intake ESD I
common for intake and in shut
LQ. HVAC room down
LQ, Smoke Manual * *Covered by
cabins/rooms/ gas detector in
areas HVAC intake
(see above line)
Vent extract Heat Manual
from galley
General galley Heat Manual
area
Crane engine Heat Manual Combustion ESD * Unit * Depend on
room air intake * s.d. timer crane location
delay 30sec
Helideck None None
Hangar Smoke and None
flame
Chain locker None None
Turret Area Flame ESD II Area ESD II
Pump room in Smoke, heat HVAC ESD I
column intake
Table 10.3 Fire and gas detection/shut down actions. 3 of 3
________________________________________________________________________________
10.3 Emergency Shutdown
10.3.1 General
References are given to ISO/WD 13 702 Clause 6.
The installation shall be analysed to identify all hazardous conditions and their
consequences. The critical operating parameters shall then be selected and an emergency
shutdown logic developed. Due consideration shall be given to the event sequence in
relation to the overall installation safety. In the detail assessments of ESD philosophy,
actions associated with time delays in the achievement of a state of no escalation potential
shall be identified and the implications on ESD philosophy determined.
The ESD principle hierarchy presented in figure 10.1 shall be applied for complex instal-
lations and used as guidance for simpler installations.
For drilling operations see clause 10.3.5.
________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 10.1 Emergency Shutdown Principle Hierarchy
________________________________________________________________________________
10.3.2 Abandon Platform Shutdown (APS)

The APS shall be provided for manual operation in case of total evacuation from an
installation. The intent of an APS is to ensure that an abandoned platform is:
• Depressurised
• Electrically dead
Firepumps if running shall be allowed to run empty the diesel daytank.
Emergency Support Systems with self-contained, built-in power supply shall be left
operational. Such systems may be:
• Navigational aids
• Helideck perimeter lights
• Emergency lights
Shutdown of other emergency systems shall be via 'timer' to ensure that systems are
operational as long as required, for ensuring a safe shutdown, evacuation and abandonment
(see fig. 10.1).
10.3.3 ESD
With a few exceptions as further described below, initiation of ESD I shall only leave the
Emergency Systems active.
Typical Emergency Systems are:
• F&G Detection
• Fire Fighting
• ESD
• Radio/External Communication
• UPS
• PA
• Blowdown and Flare
• Bilge/Ballast Water
• Emergency Generation & Distribution
• Emergency Lighting
• Evacuation
• Vital Equipment required in an Emergency Situation
Personnel lifts and hydraulic work platforms must be kept operable to ensure that
personnel can escape safely from such equipment after a shutdown. Shutdown of utility
systems and activation of emergency systems are shown in fig. 10.1.
Initiation of ESD II shall shut down the process; close riser/flowline valves and wellhead
valves and switch over turbine generators from fuel gas to diesel. Welding sockets and
________________________________________________________________________________
other sockets which serves areas where hot work permit are required shall be disconnected
in all areas upon ESD II as well as upon gas detection (single detector).
Depressurisation upon fire in the process or wellhead area shall be manual or automatic
subject to the evaluations outlined in Clause 9
10.3.4 Manual APS/ESD stations

Manual APS stations shall in principle be distributed at strategic positions such as
• Muster/escape areas, e.g. lifeboat stations, helideck, bridge connections

• CCR
Manual ESD stations shall in principle be distributed in essential areas such as:
• Exits from areas with hydrocarbon piping and equipment, e.g. wellheads, drilling,
process etc.
• Along major escape routes, muster areas, eg. life boat stations, helideck
• Control points, e.g. central control room, drillers cabin, local manned control room,
emergency operation centre, radio room etc.
10.3.5 Shutdown of Drilling and Work-over Operations

Automatic initiated shutdowns of drilling and work-over operations shall only be activated
from the F&G detection system at confirmed fire or gas detected in rooms critical for the
drilling and work-over operations.
The adverse effects of automatic shutdowns shall be thoroughly evaluated for each case of
automatic action that are accepted.
Loss of overpressure in these rooms shall not give an automatic shutdown, but give alarm
to the responsible drilling personnel.
By any other ESD, the drilling and work-over operations shall not be automatically
affected, except for burning on the burner boom, which shall be stopped automatically.
Supply of emergency power to drilling plant in case of main power generation shutdown
shall be subject to evaluation by the project.
An ESD push button for initiation of ESD I shall be provided at Drillers Cabin and Drilling
Supervisor's Office.
Responsible drilling personnel shall in addition have a Manual Drilling Shutdown switch
available to stop drilling and work-over operations. The BOP system, the draw work
brakes and cementing unit are not affected by this switch.
________________________________________________________________________________
10.4 Ignition Source Control
Equipment left live in the APS situation shall be certified for operation in zone I areas.
Excepted is only equipment required for the safety operations, see figure 10.1., that are
located in rooms continuously manned or monitored in emergency situations. Such
equipment shall be easily shut down manually from the manned area/room.
Equipment left live in the ESD I situation shall be certified for operation in zone 1 areas.
Excepted is emergency equipment in LQ and other areas subject to special considerations.
Examples of equipment that can be accepted without certification for zone 1 areas are:
• Emergency generator
• Emergency switch gear
• Central equipment for internal/external communication
Upon ESD II, all equipment operated under "hot work permits" shall be disconnected.
10.5 PA/Alarm System
The objective of a PA/ Emergency Alarm System is to warn and guide personnel as
quickly as possible in the event of a hazardous or emergency situation and to promote
quick response.
Location, number, type and effect of alarm systems/equipment/signal shall be so that the
alarm condition is easily recognised in any area where distribution of the alarm is required.
The Emergency Alarm System shall be designed in accordance with table 10.4.
Alarm Type Signal Indicates

Muster Alarm Continuous audible signal. Prepare to abandon installation
Yellow flashing lamp
General Alarm Intermittent audible signal. Fire, or fire related situations,
(1sec. on, 1 sec. off) Yellow gas leak or other serious
flashing lamp situations
Toxic Gas Alarm Intermittent audible signal Toxic gas
(0.1 sec. on, 0.1 sec off).
Yellow flashing lamp
Alert Two level audible tone on Important announcement to
P.A. system. Yellow flashing follow on PA system
lamp
Table 10.4 Alarm Signals
The system shall be designed to give appropriate access priorities.

10.6 Emergency Power
The Emergency Systems listed in Clause 10.3.3. shall be supplied with emergency power.
________________________________________________________________________________
The emergency power shall be supplied from a diesel engine driven emergency generator
located in an unclassified area. The consumers shall be supplied with emergency power for
at least 18 hours.
An uninterrupted power supply for emergency equipment and systems shall be installed.
Emergency batteries shall have a capacity to supply emergency power for a minimum
period of 30 minutes.
The emergency generator shall be exclusively dedicated for supply of emergency power.
The emergency generator system shall be selfcontained. Arrangements for black start shall
be provided.
Start and monitoring of the emergency power system shall be possible from the CCR
where a matrix panel shall display the status of the generator.
The time required for the emergency generator to accept electrical loading after initiation
of start signal shall be evaluated.
In addition to automatic starting provisions a manual starting and testing device shall be
provided.
The emergency power distribution system shall be sufficiently protected against fire and
explosion to operate during an emergency situation until safe evacuation has been
performed.
In special cases, fire pumps can be fed by emergency power. Such solutions are to be
subject to special considerations, e.g. of the size and complexity of the emergency
generator system, the need for load shedding, start-up time etc.
For operational reasons, the following systems should also be supplied with emergency
power :
• Process control and data acquisition system

• PSD system
________________________________________________________________________________
11. REQUIREMENTS TO EXPLOSION AND FIRE PROTECTION
The general requirements to explosion and fire protection are given in ISO/WD 13 702
11.2 Fire Protection Philosophy
The requirement for protection against fire on a installation is directly related to the actual
fire potential in the area. Active and passive fire protection shall be arranged in such a way
that a fire is prevented from spreading to other areas within a certain time specified and to
protect load carrying structure against critical heat loads.
The fire protection philosophy shall be established and shall as a minimum reflect the
aspects listed below:
• Accidental loads
• Relevant fire scenario
• Fire water capacity
• Manning
• Availability of fire protection equipment during emergencies
• Requirements for automatic detection
• Mutual aid
• Compatibility of equipment
• System availability during maintenance
• For utility areas, including el. - and instrument. rooms, choice of fire retarding
materials, for sectioning of switch boards, etc.
The fire load shall be established based on fire load analyses where due attention is given
to:
• Leak and ignition probabilities

• Leak source parameters, leak rate vs duration, gas/oil ratio
• Fire characteristics, pool fire, flash fire, jet- or diffuse fire
• Air/ventilation conditions/limitations
• Distances, separation or shielding
• The effects of ESD and depressurization
• Active fire protection, availability and efficiency
In addition to requirements given in ISO Standard, the fire protection design shall be
documented by Fire Protection Data Sheets, Annex A.
Credit for fire water can be taken in the protection of equipment piping and (secondary)
structures, subject to considerations outlined in 11.3. such credit shall not affect design of
primary firepartitions segregating areas or design of load carrying structures. It is a
________________________________________________________________________________
condition that escallation within an area due to failure of the fire water systems does not
affect the main fire partitions and load carrying structures.
11.3 Protection of Pressure Vessels and Process Piping
The procedure described below shall be followed unless more detailed evaluations are
performed.
The design procedure includes the following principal steps. Figure 11.1 gives an overview
of the procedure.
Step 1. Identification of fire types.
The initial step is to decide which type of fire the pressure vessel/piping can be exposed to.
Fuel supply and ventilation conditions shall be determined:
Types of fire:
• Pool fires in open or enclosed areas, fuel controlled
• Pool fires in enclosed areas, ventilation controlled
• Jet fires
Step 2. Effect of fire water
Water applied for controlling the fire and cooling of pressure vessels and piping is very
effective when evenly distributed over the exposed areas. Credit for fire water can be taken
when the design provides :
• Spray of deluge water from nozzles from below, from both sides and from above
• Spray nozzle location ensuring that water spray projection covers all surfaces of the
protected equipment/piping
• Supply of deluge water to a module is arranged so that accidents can not damage the
supply
• Coverage of fire detectors that ensures immediate detections of small fires in all parts
of the fire area
• Operation procedures shall ensure high availability of these systems
Alternatively, heat loads shall be based on detail evaluation of the credible fire scenarios.
Application of predicting tools for calculation of heat loads may be an integral part of the
evaluation.
Step 3. Heat flux values for the next step are then selected from the following table:
________________________________________________________________________________
Type of fire Initial heat flux Initial heat flux Reduced Average
density density initial heat load
max. point loads average load due to fire water
credit
Pool fire (crude)
open or enclosed area 150 kW/m2 100 kW/m2 80 kW/m2
fuel controlled
Pool fire enclosed area 100 kW/m2
ventilation controlled 200 kW/m2 130 kW/m2
Jet fire 250 kW/m2 200 kW/m2
Table 11.1 Heat flux values.
The reduced average initial heat loads shall only be applied if the conditions outlined in
step 2 is fulfilled.
Step 4. Depressuring / rupture calculations
Perform depressuring calculations for each major pressure vessel and piping segment,
establishing internal pressure fluctuation, wall material temperature and residual strength,
as a function of time. Determine whether rupture will occur during depressuring, and
identify time to rupture if this will occur.
The effect of manual versus automatic initiation is specified in clause 9.4.
Step 5. Evaluation of failure mode
In areas where the pressure vessels and piping segments withstand the fire, without
rupture, for or the time required to depressure all pressure vessels and piping systems to 50
% of initial pressure or 4.5 barg whichever is the lowest, the protection is considered
acceptable.
If a rupture occurs before this state of depressurisation has been reached, an acceptance of
the situation will have to be judged based on the risk analyses. Residual quantities,
escalation potentials both within the area and towards adjacent areas shall be evaluated.
Where rupture can not be accepted, i.e. the risk acceptance criteria are not met, the
provision of additional protective systems and arrangements shall be implemented. This
can be:
• Upgrading of active fire water system so that credit from fire water can be taken
• Application of passive protection that will reduce the heat loads to the exposed
pressure vessels/piping
• Modifications to pressure vessel /piping design (material , wall thickness etc.)
• Modifications to the general arrangements that have an impact on the time to rupture
• Change from manual to automatic depressuring
________________________________________________________________________________
The procedure will then have to repeated from step 1, 2 or 3 as applicable.
________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 11.1 Flowdiagram for deciding of use of passive fire protection on pressure
vessels and piping.
11.4 Passive Fire Protection
Living quarters shall be designed and protected so as to ensure that the functions they are
designed for can be maintained during a dimensioning accidental event.
If fire technical calculations indicate that the outer surfaces of living quarters in the event
of a dimensioning fire may be subjected to at heat fluc exceeding 100 kW/m2, they shall
be fitted with fire divisions of minimum class H-60.
The choice of materials and interior design of living quarters shall be decided in relation to
the fire risk, and shall prevent fire from spreading.
________________________________________________________________________________
The choice of materials and interior design of living quarters shall be decided in relation to
the fire risk, and shall prevent fire from spreading.
Windows should not be installed in H-rated fire divisions.
11.5 Active Fire Protection
• For large integrated installations shall be based on 2 independent pump systems.

Each pump system should have the capacity to supply 100% of the largest fire water
demand. It is recommended that each pump system consists of 2x50% pump units,
unless other solutions are found to comply with the over all Fire Protection
Philosophy based on thorough evaluation, including pump standard, favourable
effects, compensating measures, alternative fire water supply. Ref. clause 11.2
• Fire pumps with a capacity above 2500 m3/h (each) shall not be selected without
special reason.
11.6 Explosion Protection Philosophy
Reference is given to ISO/WD 13702 Standard Clause 13.
12. SAFETY ASPECTS RELATED TO FLOATING INSTALLATIONS
12.1 General
This clause contains additional safety design principles related to Floating production/
drilling/storage installations. Installations intended for short term drilling and general
service are not covered by this standard.
12.2 Marine industry standard
This standard assumes that structure, marine systems and marine equipment on floating
installations do comply with relevant requirements in the marine industry, i.e.
international codes and conventions, authority requirements and class society rules.
________________________________________________________________________________
12.3 Crude Storage
Crude storage tanks, and in particular large tanks, shall be subject to special safety
considerations in light of their fire- and explosion potential. Main principles for such tanks
are described below:
• Large crude storage tanks shall be provided with an adequate and safe vent system,
and gases shall be routed to either cold vent, flare or re-cycling system.
• Pumping units shall be of the 'deep well' type.
12.4 Layout
The following additional requirements shall apply concerning the layout of floating
installations:
• Vital control functions, e.g. maritime control/bridge, process control and special
emergency preparedness functions, should be arranged in one common control centre
for the entire installation.
• Turret location/arrangement shall be based on evaluations including leak frequencies
and potential leak quantities.
• Hydrocarbon pressure vessels and heary duty equipment shall not be located within
main hull structure unless it is verified that:
- the explosion venting is sufficient to prevent unacceptable overpressure.
- the fire loads do not cause structural collapse.
Process decks and relevant parts of the floater deck shall be arranged with the
aim of minimising the risk of large pool fires on decks and tank tops.
• Process areas, turret areas and piping shall be designed to minimise the risk of jet
fires towards tank tops.
12.5 Turret
The following design principles applies to turret design:
1. The turret arrangement design shall aim at achieving open naturally ventilated areas
and minimising explosion pressure. Enclosed mechanically ventilated areas shall be
restricted to containers or small rooms with control- and special equipment that
requires special protection or cannot be located in outdoor environment. Such
enclosed premises shall have overpressure ventilation, with air taken from a non-
hazardous area. Location of the premises themselves as well as their ventilation
intakes shall take into account the prevailing wind directions.
Equipment that can be ignition sources, e.g. electric equipment shall not be arranged in
moon pool area.
2. Anchor handling winches should be located in open areas. If located in hazardous

area, suitability for operation in hazardous area shall be ensured. Sea water spraying
(deluge) for spark suppression may be applied for equipment that are exposed to sea
________________________________________________________________________________
water under normal operations. For spraying of other equipment, fresh water shall be
applied. Where winches are arranged on the deck below Riser Termination and ESD
valves, the deck separating the areas shall be solid and gas tight.
3. The use of flexible hose connections for well stream transfer, within the turret and
between turret and ship, should be minimised. Turrets based on swivels are preferred
in stead of drag chain turrets.
4. Fire protection of turret can be arranged by fixed or oscillating fire monitors located
on the ship, e.g. on gantry structure. Portable equipment and fixed systems for
enclosed rooms shall be arranged according to Clause 11.
5. Production or export/ gas injection risers shall be protected against fires in the turret
by passive means. Routing of risers within conductors is one acceptable design
principle. At riser termination end, the riser connector and first ESD valve shall be
protected by passive means. For protection of other parts of the structure, please refer
to other relevant parts of this standard.
6. Risers shall be protected against damage from wires and chains used for mooring.
Arrangements that provides both protection against such loads as well as fire
protection are preferred.
7. Decks above moon pool where hydrocarbons leaks may occur shall have an adequate
drain routed to a collection tank.
12.6 Drainage
Drainage systems on floating installations shall be designed to operate satisfactorily for all
sea states in which the installation is intended to be operable. Drainage systems for the
process systems shall be designed to operate satisfactory for all sea states in which the
process system is intended to be operable.
12.7 Emergency re-positioning
The need for quick re-positioning of the floater in case of specific emergency situations
shall be evaluated. Important factors in this evaluation are number and types of risers, riser
pressures, subsea ESDV and mooring arrangement.
Anchor moored or dynamically positioned installations located above well(s) shall be able
to move 150 m from the normal position in 10 minutes, or as specified through adequate
risk analyses.
12.8 Topside/floater interface
All interfaces between the typical maritime 'floater technology' and offshore 'petroleum
technology' shall be clarified at an early stage of the design process, and be monitored
during the project to ensure compatibility and consistency in the total design.
________________________________________________________________________________
12.9 Escape and evacuation
For floating installations it shall be verified that effective escape and/or evacuation can be
performed at dimensioning heel angles and motions
13. NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS
13.1 General
This section outline the design principles to the design of process, safety and auxiliary
systems for production installation which are normally not manned.
The design principles only apply to installations which are designed as remote-controlled
units with no requirement for permanent manning. The personnel will usually only be
present during daytime.
It is recognised that a large variety of designs can be developed. Specific design.

requirements will have to reflect the special conditions.
Examples of design is given in ANNEX B.
13.2 Common requirements
13.2.1 Risk evaluations

Risk evaluations shall take into consideration drilling and process data weather conditions,
ship traffic or the environmental acceptance criteria.
13.2.2 Design principles

Simple, reliable and sturdy concepts for the purpose of minimizing maintenance activities
on the installation shall be emphasised.
The following special activities related to manned operations onboard shall be evaluated
during design:
• weather conditions for boarding and departing of the installation

• allowable weather and sea state conditions and weather monitored while the
installation is manned
• arrangement for boarding and departing of the installation
• activities that may take place during production or need a shut-down of the
installation
________________________________________________________________________________
13.2.3 Supporting structure

The minimum requirements to the design concerning resistance to impact from collisions
with ships, shall be based on an individual evaluation of each concept. This evaluation
shall take into consideration the types of vessel expected to be in the vicinity of the
installation, boarding procedures (boarding zone, weather restrictions, loading
requirements, call frequency, anchoring philosophy etc.) and the layout and arrangement of
the installation.
13.3 Welhead system
13.3.1 Welhead system

The wellhead system includes the wells, the X-mas trees and the flowlines up-stream to
and including choke valves.
The wellhead system shall be designed to withstand the highest load combination of
pressure and temperature occurring during operation, shut-down and maintenance of the
wells.
In addition to local operation, wing control valves may be controlled from the remote
control center, allowing remote shut-down and restart of the production. Blocking of
remote start-up of production shall be possible while the installation is manned.
13.3.2 Piping systems and pressure vessels

While allowing for safe operation, piping systems and pressure vessels shall be designed to
minimize the instrumentation and control equipment.
Piping systems designed to withstand the highest load combination of pressure and
temperature to which the systems are expected to be exposed, need not be provided with
full flow pressure relief valves.
If the total inventory cubic content of process pipes and pressure vessels between X-mas
tree and the riser emergency shut-down valve does not exceed 6 m3 , automatic
depressurization is not required. In that case, personnel safety shall be ensured by proper
evacuation procedures in case of fire.
The need for thermal relief of piping systems and pressure vessels as well as the need for
an automatic depressurisation system for systems with an inventory of more than 6 m3
shall be considered in the individual design.
13.3.3 Drain and vent systems

Drain for liquid hydrocarbons either to supply boat or to a drain tank shall be installed.
Manual depressurisation of all pressurised systems shall be possible.
________________________________________________________________________________
Vent pipes from systems containing hydrocarbons shall be terminated at a minimum of 3 m

above or outside decks. The location of vent pipe termination shall take into account
helicopter operations.
Vents on atmospheric vessels which are not dimensioned to withstand a full inside
explosion pressure shall be provided with adequate flame arrestors.
13.3.4 Risers
Production and lift gas risers shall normally be equipped with a riser emergency shut-down
valve.
On risers for stable fluids which may be depressurised from the main installation, omission
of riser emergency shut-down valves may be considered.
13.4 Auxiliary systems
Engines shall be certified for operation in hazadous areas.

13.5 Escape routes
Muster areas and the primary escape routes shall have radiation shielding from fire in the
wellhead and process areas in order to allow evacuation of the installation.
13.6 Life-saving appliances
When the installation is manned, life-saving appliances with a capacity of 2 x 100% of the
crew on board shall be available. Life-saving appliances may be lifeboat(s), liferaft(s) to be
lowered into the water or motor-driven rubber dinghies operated from standby vessel.
13.7 Emergency shut-down
Provisions shall be made for emergency shut-down and operational shut-down of the
installation to be made both locally at the installation and at the remote control centre.
The emergency shut-down signal from the remote control centre shall be by a fail-safe
signal (e.g. by means of a radio link) which on disconnection shuts down the normally not
manned installation. A possible time delay in shut-down due to a link failure shall not
exceed 5 min.
Emergency shut-down of the remote control centre or plant shall result in operational shut-
down of the not normally manned installation.
It shall not be possible to inhibit a local emergency shut-down system from the remote
control centre.
The emergency shut-down system shall be in operation when the installation is unmanned.
________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX A
FIRE PROTECTION DATA SHEET
(Informative)
________________________________________________________________________________
“Insert excel datasheet here”.
________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX B
TYPE A OF NORMALLY
NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS
(Informative)
________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX B1 TYPE A OF NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS
General
This paragraph defines the design principles to safety systems on type A installations.
Example of Type A installation
Type A, which includes installations that are manned only during daylight and under
weather conditions that allow safe access and escape by boat. The requirements to this
type of installations are based on the assumption that the installation will be manned only
occasionally.
A type A installation will typically be arranged with means for access, an access deck for
the X-mas trees and a helicopter winch deck, primarly intended for materials handling.
The process equipment will typically include X-mas trees, production manifold and a
removable spool for pigging.
The safety equipment will typically include an inflateable liferaft, fire detectors, portable
gas detectors as well as portable fire extinguishers.
The main power source may be a battery pack with recharging and by a small
dieselgenerator or by a power cable from the service installation.
A hoist may be installed.
When manned, shut-down of the installation shall be made on the installation.
The installation will be manned in connection with scheduled maintenance jobs, well
monitoring and start up of production following an emergency shut-down.
Access to the installation will typically be by boat.
Fire and Gas Detection
Fire detection shall take place by means of fusible plugs or similar simple systems and
shall results in automatic shut-down.
Gas detectors with alarm functions shall be in operation when the installation is manned.
If portable detectors with built-in alarm functions are used, these shall be placed in fixtures
on approved locations by the crew when ascending the installation.
________________________________________________________________________________
Alarm systems
Upon gas detection an audible alarm shall be activated. This alarm may be provided by
portable gas detectors themselves.
When the installation is manned, an APS signal shall be operable, which can be perceived
by all on board.
Communication equipment
An emergency shut-down link between the remote control center and the not normally
manned installation shall be established.
Voice communication between the installation and the remote control center and directly
between the installation and standby vessel shall be possible when the installation is
manned.
If voice communication is based on protable radios, a minimum of two radios shall be

available on the satellite installation.
Active and passive fire protection
Primary protection of personell in case of fire, shall be effective evacuation.
As a minimum, the fire fighting equipment shall consist of portable carbon dioxide and
powder extinguishers.
Escape routes
A primary escape route to the boat landing via stairs shall be established. However, ladders
can be accepted, if warranted by special circumstances.
A secondary escape route to the boat landing shall be established if it can be provided at a
distance form the primary escape route that effectively make a contribution to the
evacuation options in an emergency situation.
Life-saving appliances
The installation shall be provided with at least one inflatable liferaft to be lowered into the
sea and which hold the maximum crew of the installation.
During manning of the installation a motor-driven rubber dinghy shall be available for
evacuation of the installation crew. The dinghy shall be in the immediate vicinity of the
installation in order that mobilisation of the dinghy will not increase the total time of
evacuation. The rubber dinghy shall be able to hold the entire crew on board the
installation at any time.
________________________________________________________________________________
Shelter
The installation shall have a place at which the crew can take shelter from the rain.
A lavatory shall be available.
Helicopter hoisting deck
A deck allowing emergency evacuation of personnel to hovering helicopter shall be

arranged.
Standby vessel
A standby vessel shall be available near the installations when it is manned.
The vessel shall be equipped with two motor-driven rubber dinghies and with a firewater
monitor with a minimum capacity of 2500 m3/h with throw length of approximately 50
meter.
________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX B2
TYPE B OF NORMALLY NOT
MANNED INSTALLATIONS
(Informative)
________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX B2 TYPE B OF NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS
General
This section defines the safety system requirements to type B installations.
Example Type B
Helicopter deck.
The helicopter deck shall as a minimum be equiped with a dual agent extinguizing system
based on 250 kg dry powder and 250 l premixed foram.
Type B, which includes installations with helideck and which will be manned only under
weather conditions that allow safe access to the installations by helicopter and evacuation
of the installations by lifeboats.
Type B installation will typically be designed with a wellhead area and manifolds in the
wellhead side of the installation and a utility/shealter area to the opposite side. This area
will normally function as a barriere and protect the lifeboat area.
The installation will typically be equiped with X-mas trees, a production manifold, a test
manifold, a test separator and a pig launcher. The installation will also have sheltered area
with resting facilities.
The control system may consist of a hydraulic wellhead control package and an integrated
system with emergency shut-down functions, fire and gas detection as a well as control and
monitoring of the process.
The main power source may be diesel generators.
The auxiliary systems may further consist of a methanol system, a closed drain system, a
utility drain system and a seawater pump. Communication may be by a telemetry, via a
line of sight system ( a radio link) and/or by stationary radios.
The safety equipment may include a lifeboat, a liferaft, dry powder fire extinguishing
appliances, portable fire extinguishers and gas and fire detection.
The installasion will be manned in conection with scheduled maintenance jobs, well
monitoring, switching wells on test, as well as start-up following emergency shut-down.
Access to the installation will normally be by helicopter.
________________________________________________________________________________
Fire and gas detection
Fire detection shall take place by means of fusible plugs or similare in the wellhead and
process manifold areas and by means of a automatic fire detection system for rooms with
flammable equipment or materials and resting rooms. Gas detection system shall also be
provided.
Alarm systems
Fire alarm shall be automatically when the installation manned. A manually activated
audible APS alarm shall be provided.
Emergency shutdown stations
Push buttons to activate the emergency shut-down shall be placed at lifeboat station,
helideck, top of access ways to boat landing in resting area and in the welhead area.
Emergency Power
A emergency power supply shall be provided with a capasity of minimum four hours.
Helicopter Deck
The helicopter deck shall as a minimum be equipped with a dual agent extinguisher system
based on 250 kg dry powder and 250 l premixed foam.
________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX C
INFORMATIVE REFERENCES
(Informative)
________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX C INFORMATIVE REFERENCES
Norwegian Regulations
• Regulations relating to implementation and use of risk analyses in the petroleum

activities. Stipulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and the Ministry of the
Environment.
• Regulations relating to process and auxiliary facilities in the petroleum activities.

Stipulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
• Regulations relating to safety and communication systems on installations in the

petroleum activities. Stipulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
• Regulations relating to drilling and well activities and geological data collection in
the petroleum activities. Stipulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
• Regulations relating to helicopterdecks on drilling platforms.

(Bestemmelser for sivil luftfard GSL D5-1.)
• Regulations relating to emergency preparedness in the petroleum activities.

Stipulated by the Directorate of Health, the Ministry of the Environment and the
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
• Regulations for fixed means of access, stains, ladders and railings on production
installations stipulated by Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
• Regulations concerning explosion and fire protection of installations in the

petroleum activities. Stipulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
• Regulations concerning loadbearing structures in petroleum activities by Norwegian

Petroleum Directorate.
• Regulation issued by Norwegian Maritime Directorate.
This NORSOK standard is considered to be in accordance with Norwegian regulations

with the following exeptions:
• Clause 11.3 Credit for deluge

• Clause 11 Sprinkler in LQ
• Clause 13 Not normally manned installations.
________________________________________________________________________________

Technical Safety: Norsok Standard

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NORSOK STANDARD

11. REQUIREMENTS TO EXPLOSION AND FIRE PROTECTION 32

ANNEX A Fire Protection Data Sheet (Informative) 43

The objective of this document is to achieve implementation of technology which

prEN 50145 Electric apparatus for potentially explosive gas atmosphere -

IEC 79-10 International Electrotechnical Commission Publication. Area

IEC 79-13 International Electrotechnical Commission Construction and use of

API 500 B Guide for Area Classification.

S-DP-003 Environmental Care.

4. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVATIONS

APS Abandon Platform Shutdown

Governing documents, in the form of Acts, Regulations, Standards and Recognised

5.2 Safety Management

• Scope and purpose of the program

5.3 Analyses and Optimisation

5.4 Risk Reduction Principles

5.4.1 Overall Principles

5.4.2 Inherent safety

• Eliminating or replacing hazardous materials

5.4.3 Failure mechanisms

5.4.4 Escalation Prevention

5.4.5 Simplicity, Comprehensibility and Recognisability

• Limiting the amount of equipment

6. EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

In the establishment of emergency preparedness measures which prevent a hazardous

An Emergency Preparedness Plan covering the operational phase shall be developed at an

Main evacuation area.

Other evacuation areas.

7. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT

7.1 General Requirements

7.1.1 Area Classification

• Location of ventilation air inlets and outlets

• Operational- and maintenance procedures in hazardous areas.

7.2 Escape Routes

Other general principles are listed below:

7.3 Safe Area

The Safe Areas shall be in accordance with ISO WD 13702 14.

7.4 Living Quarters

7.5 Helicopter Deck

7.6 Utility Area

7.7 Emergency Service Areas

An emergency service area is defined as an area containing equipment and systems

7.8 Process Area

Process equipment containing larger volumes of high pressure hydrocarbons should be

The following means of protection to be considered:

7.10 Flare boom, flare tower, cold vent

7.11 Drilling and Wellhead Area

Furthermore the wellhead area shall be located so as to:

• Avoid storage of combustible fluids

8. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO STRUCTURAL DESIGN

8.1 General Requirements

8.2 Accidental Design Load Protection

Relevant loads are:

• Impact loads caused by explosion, dropped object, ship collision or others.

• Loads caused by extreme weather, earthquake, damage to structural elements

9. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO PROCESS AND AUXILIARY

9.1 General Requirements

9.2 Safety Systems

• Process Shutdown (PSD)

9.3 Process Safety

Abnormal operating conditions leading to potential hydrocarbons release shall be

• Primary level of protection

Fast depressurisation shall be the primary mean of avoiding rupture of pressure