Heterosexism, Misrecognition, and Capitalism: A Response to Judith Butler

Author(s): Nancy Fraser

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Social Text, No. 52/53, Queer Transexions of Race, Nation, and Gender (Autumn -
Winter, 1997), pp. 279-289
Published by: Duke University Press
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 Heterosexism, and Capitalism
Misrecognition,
A RESPONSE TO JUDITH BUTLER

JudithButler'sessay is welcomeon severalcounts.It returnsus to deep Nancy Fraser

and importantquestionsin social theorythathave gone undiscussedfor
some time.And itlinksa reflection on such questionsto a diagnosisof the
troubledstateoftheLeftin thecurrentpoliticalconjuncture. Most impor-
tant,however,is Butler'scommitmentin this essay to identifying, and
retrieving,the genuinelyvaluable aspects of Marxism and the socialist
feminismof the 1970s, which currentintellectualand politicalfashions
conspireto repress.Also exemplaryis her interestin integrating the best
insightsof thoseparadigmswithdefensiblestrandsof more recentpara-
digms,includingdiscourseanalysis,culturalstudies,and poststructural-
ism,in orderto understandcontemporary capitalism.These are commit-
mentsI wholeheartedly share.
Nevertheless,Butlerand I disagree.Our most importantdisagree-
ments-and the most fruitful for discussion-turn on how preciselyto
realizethissharedprojectof reclamationand integration. We hold diver-
gent views of what preciselyconstitutes the enduringlegacyof Marxism
and thestillrelevantinsightsof socialistfeminism.We also divergein our
respectiveassessmentsof the meritsof variouspoststructuralist currents
and in our respectiveviewsof how thesecan bestinformsocial theorizing
thatretainsa materialist dimension.Finally,we disagreeabout thenature
of contemporary capitalism.
In orderto clear the way fora fruitful discussionof these issues, I
wantto begin by disposingquicklyof whatI taketo be the red herrings.
Butlerconjoinsherdiscussionofmybook,JusticeInterruptus, to a critique
of a group of unnamed interlocutors whom she calls "neoconservative
Marxists."Whateverthemeritsof hercritiqueof thisgroup-a questionI
shallreturnto later-her strategy ofusingitto framea discussionof me is
unfortunate. Despite her disclaimers to the contrary,readerscould draw
I
the erroneousconclusionthat sharethe "neoconservative Marxist"dis-
missalof the oppressionof gaysand lesbiansas "merelycultural,"hence
as secondary,derivative, or eventrivial.They mightassumethatI see sex-
ual oppressionas less fundamental, material,and real than class oppres-
sion and that I wish to subordinatestrugglesagainst heterosexismto
strugglesagainstworkers'exploitation.Findingme thuslumpedtogether
with"sexuallyconservative orthdodox"Marxists,readerscould evencon-

Social Text52/53,Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Fall/Winter1997. Copyright? 1997 by Duke

UniversityPress.

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 clude thatI viewgay and lesbianmovementsas unjustified particularisms
thathave splittheLeftand on whomI wishforcibly to imposeLeftunity.
I, of course,believenothingof the sort. On the contrary, in Justice
Interruptus I have analyzedthe currentdecouplingof so-called identity
politicsfromclass politics,the culturalLeft fromthe social Left, as a
constitutive featureof the"postsocialist"condition.'Seekingto overcome
thesesplitsand to articulatethebasis fora unitedfrontof theLeft,I have
proposed a theoreticalframeworkthat eschews orthodox distinctions
between "base" and "superstructure,""primary" and "secondary"
oppressions,and that challengesthe primacyof the economic. In the
process, I have theorizedthe conceptual irreducibility of heterosexist
oppressionand themorallegitimacyof gay and lesbianclaims.
Centralto myframework is a normativedistinction betweeninjustices
of distributionand injusticesof recognition.Far fromderogating thelatter
as "merelycultural,"the pointis to conceptualizetwo equally primary,
serious,and real kindsof harmthatany morallydefensiblesocial order
must eradicate.To be misrecognized,in my view,is not simplyto be
thoughtill of,looked down on, or devaluedin others'consciousattitudes
or mentalbeliefs.It is ratherto be denied the statusof a fullpartnerin
social interactionand preventedfromparticipating as a peerin sociallife-
not as a consequenceof a distributive inequity(such as failingto receive
one's fairshareof resourcesor "primarygoods"), but ratheras a conse-
quence of institutionalizedpatternsof interpretation and evaluationthat
constituteone as comparativelyunworthyof respector esteem. When
such patternsof disrespectand disesteemare institutionalized, forexam-
in
ple, law, social welfare,medicine,and/orpopularculture,theyimpede
parityof participation,just as surelyas do distributive inequities.The
resultingharmis in eithercase all too real.
In my conception,therefore,misrecognitionis an institutionalized
social relation,not a psychologicalstate.In essence a statusinjury,it is
analyticallydistinctfrom,and conceptuallyirreducibleto,theinjusticeof
maldistribution, althoughit maybe accompaniedby the latter.Whether
misrecognition converts intomaldistribution, and vice versa,dependson
the natureof the social formationin question.In precapitalist, pre-state
societies,forexample,wherestatussimplyis theoverarching principleof
distribution and wherethe statusorderand the class hierarchy are there-
fore fused, misrecognitionsimplyentailsmaldistribution. In capitalist
societies,in contrast,where the institutionalization of specialized eco-
nomic relationspermitsthe relativeuncouplingof economicdistribution
fromstructuresof prestige,and where status and class can therefore
diverge,misrecognition and maldistribution are not fullymutuallycon-
vertible.Whetherand to whatextenttheycoincidetodayis a questionI
shallconsiderbelow.

280 Nancy Fraser

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 Normatively, however,thekeypointis this:misrecognition constitutes Frommy
a fundamentalinjustice,whetheraccompaniedby maldistribution or not.
And thepointhas politicalconsequences.It is notnecessaryto showthat perspective,
a giveninstanceof misrecognition bringswithit maldistribution in order
to certifythe claimto redressit as a genuineclaimforsocial justice.The itmakesno sense
point holds for heterosexistmisrecognition, which involvesthe institu-
tionalizationof sexual normsand interpretations thatdenyparticipatory to saythat
parityto gaysand lesbians.Opponentsof heterosexism need notlabor to
heterosexist
translateclaimsof sexual statusinjuryinto claimsof class deprivationin
orderto vindicatethe former.Nor need theyshow thattheirstruggles is
misrecognition
threatencapitalismin orderto provetheyare just.
In myaccount,then,injusticesof misrecognition are fullyas serious cultural."
"merely
as distributive injustices.And theycannotbe reducedto thelatter.Thus,
far fromclaimingthat culturalharms are superstructural reflectionsof Thatlocution
I
economic harms, have proposed an analysisin whichthe two sortsof
harms are cofundamentaland conceptuallyirreducible.From my per- presupposes
spective,therefore, it makesno sense to say thatheterosexist misrecogni-
tionis "merelycultural."That locutionpresupposestheverysortofbase- theverysort
superstructuremodel, the very sort of economisticmonism,that my
aims to displace.
of base-
framework
Butler,in sum,has mistakenwhatis actuallya quasi-Weberiandual-
ism of statusand class for an orthodoxMarxian economisticmonism.
superstructure
Erroneouslyassumingthatto distinguishredistribution fromrecognition model,the
is necessarilyto devalue recognition,she treatsmynormativedistinction
as a "tactic" aimed at derogatinggay and lesbianstrugglesand imposing verysortof
a new "orthodoxy."ContraButler,I mean to defendthedistinction, while
disclaiming the tactic. To get at the real issues between us, therefore, economistic
requiresdecouplingtwoquestionsthatare too closelyidentified in herdis-
cussion. The firstis a politicalquestion concerningthe depth and seri- monism,that
ousness of heterosexist oppression;on this,I have argued,we do not dis-
agree. The second is a theoreticalquestion concerningthe conceptual myframework
statusof whatButlermisleadingly calls "the material/cultural
distinction"
aimsto displace.
as it relatesto the analysisof heterosexismand the natureof capitalist
society;herelie our real disagreements.2
Let me begin unpackingthese real disagreementsby schematically
recappingButler'scritique.As I read it, she offersthreeprincipaltheo-
reticalargumentsagainstmyredistribution/recognition framework. First,
she contendsthatbecause gays and lesbians suffermaterial,economic
harms,theiroppressionis not properlycategorizedas misrecognition.
Second, invokingthe important1970s socialist-feminist insightthatthe
familyis part of the mode of production,she contendsthatthe hetero-
normativeregulationof sexualityis "centralto the functioningof the
politicaleconomy"and thatcontemporary strugglesagainstthatregula-

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 tion"threatentheworkability" of thecapitalistsystem.Third,afterrevis-
itinganthropological accounts of precapitalistexchange,she contends
thatthe distinction betweenthematerialand the culturalis "unstable,"a
"theoreticalanachronism"to be eschewedin social theory.None ofthese
argumentsis persuasive,in myview,largelybecause none affordsan ade-
quatelydifferentiated and historically situatedview of moderncapitalist
society.Let me considerthethreeargumentsin turn.
Butler'sfirstargumentappeals to some indisputablefactsabout the
harms currently sufferedby gays and lesbians.Far frombeing "merely
symbolic," these harms include serious economic disadvantageswith
undeniablematerialeffects.In theUnitedStatestoday,forexample,gays
and lesbianscan be summarilydismissedfromcivilianemploymentand
militaryservice,are denied a broad range of family-basedsocial welfare
benefits,are disproportionately burdenedwithmedicalcosts,and are dis-
advantaged in tax and inheritance law. Equally materialare the effectsof
the factthathomosexualslack the fullrangeof constitutional rightsand
protectionsenjoyedby heterosexuals.In manyjurisdictions, theycan be
prosecutedforconsensualsex; and in manymore,theycan be assaulted
withimpunity.It follows,claimsButler,fromthe economicand material
characterof theseliabilities,thatthe "misrecognition" analysisof hetero-
sexismis mistaken.
Butler'spremiseis true,of course,butherconclusiondoes notfollow.
She assumes that injusticesof misrecognition must be immaterialand
noneconomic.Leaving aside forthemomenther conflationof themater-
ial withthe economic,her assumptionis on both countsmistaken.Con-
sider firstthe issue of materiality. In my conception,injusticesof mis-
are
recognition just as material as injusticesof maldistribution. To be
sure, the firstare rootedin social patternsof interpretation, evaluation,
and communication,hence, if you like,in the symbolicorder.But this
does not mean theyare "merely"symbolic.On the contrary, the norms,
significations, and constructions of personhood that impede women,
racializedpeoples,and/orgaysand lesbiansfromparityof participation in
social lifeare materially instantiated-ininstitutionsand social practices,
in social actionand embodiedhabitus,and yes,in ideologicalstateappa-
ratuses.Far fromoccupyingsome wispy,etherealrealm,theyare material
in theirexistenceand effects.
From my perspective,therefore, the materialharmscitedby Butler
constituteparadigmaticcases of misrecognition. They reflecttheinstitu-
tionalizationof heterosexist meanings,norms,and constructions of per-
sonhood in such arenas as constitutional law,medicine,immigration and
naturalizationpolicy, federal and state tax codes, social welfareand
employmentpolicy,equal opportunitylegislation,and the like. What is
institutionalized,moreover,as Butlerherselfnotes,are culturalconstruc-
tions of entitlement and personhoodthatproduce homosexualsubjects

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as abjects.This, to repeat,is the essence of misrecognition: the material
construction throughtheinstitutionalization of culturalnormsof a class of
devaluedpersonswho are impededfromparticipatory parity.
If misrecognitionharms can thus be material,can they also be
economic?It is true,as Butlernotes,and as I myselfexpresslynoted in
JusticeInterruptus, that some formsof heterosexisminflicteconomic
harmson gays and lesbians.The questionis how to interpret them.One
possibility is to see these economic harms as direct expressionsof the
economic structureof society-much like Marxistssee the exploitation
of workers.In thisinterpretation, whichButlerappears to endorse,the
economicliabilitiesofhomosexualswouldbe hardwiredin therelationsof
production.To remedythemwould requiretransforming thoserelations.
Anotherpossibility, favoredby me, is to see the economicharmsof het-
erosexismas indirect(mal)distributive consequencesof the morefunda-
mentalinjusticeof misrecognition. In this interpretation, which I pro-
posed in JusticeInterruptus, therootsof economicheterosexism wouldbe
the"relationsofrecognition":an institutionalized of
pattern interpretation
and valuationthatconstructsheterosexuality as normativeand homosex-
ualityas deviant,therebydenyingparticipatoryparityto gays and les-
bians. Change therelationsof recognitionand the maldistribution would
disappear.
This conflictof interpretations raisesdeep and difficult questions.Is it
necessaryto transform the economicstructureof contemporary capital-
ism in order to redressthe economic liabilitiesof homosexuals?What
preciselyis meantby the "economic structure"?Should one conceivethe
heteronormative regulationof sexualityas belongingdirectlyto the capi-
talisteconomy?Or is it betterseen as belongingto a statusorderthatis
differentiated from,and complexlyrelatedto, the economic structure?
More generally,do the relationsof recognitionin late-capitalistsociety
coincidewitheconomicrelations?Or do the institutional differentiations
of moderncapitalismintroducegaps betweenstatusand class?
To pursuethesequestions,let us examineButler'ssecond argument.
Here she invokesthe 1970s socialist-feminist insightthat the familyis
part of the mode of to
production support the thesisthatthe heteronor-
mativeregulationof sexualityis "centralto thefunctioning ofthepolitical
economy."It follows,claimsButler,thatcontemporary strugglesagainst
thatregulation"threatentheworkability" of the capitalistsystem.
Actually,two different variantsof the argumentare discerniblehere,
one definitional, the otherfunctionalist. Accordingto the firstvariant,
(hetero)sexualregulationbelongsby definition to the economicstructure.
The economicstructuresimplyis theentireset of social mechanismsand
institutions that(re)producepersonsand goods. By definition, then,the
is
family part of this structure,beingthe primary sitefor the reproduction
of persons.So, by extension,is the genderorder,whichstandardizesthe
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 family's"products"to conformto one of two-and onlytwo-mutually
exclusive,seeminglynaturalkindsof persons:men and women.The gen-
der order,in turn,is held to presupposea mode of sexual regulationthat
producesand naturalizesheterosexuality, whilesimultaneously producing
as
homosexuality abject. The conclusiondrawn by Butleris thatthehet-
eronormative of is
regulation sexuality part of the economic structure
by
definition,despitethefact thatit structuresneitherthesocial division of labor
nor themode ofexploitationof labor power in capitalistsociety.
This definitional argumenthas an air of olympianindifference to his-
tory. As a result,it risks accomplishing too much. that
Stipulating the
mode of sexual regulationbelongs to the economic structureby defini-
tion-even in the absence of any discernibleimpact on the divisionof
labor or the mode of exploitation-threatens to dehistoricizethe idea of
theeconomicstructureand drainit of conceptualforce.Whatgetslostis
thespecificity of capitalistsocietyas a distinctiveand highlypeculiarform
of social organization.This organizationcreatesan orderof specialized
economicrelationsthatare relatively decoupled fromrelationsof kinship
and politicalauthority.Thus, in capitalistsociety,the linkbetweenthe
mode of sexual regulation,on the one hand, and an orderof specialized
economic relationswhose raison d'etre is the accumulationof surplus
value,on theother,is attenuated.It is farmoreattenuated,certainly, than
in precapitalist,pre-statesocieties,whereeconomic relationsare largely
adumbratedthroughthe mechanismsof kinshipand directlyimbricated
withsexuality.In thelate capitalistsocietyofthetwentieth century, more-
over, the linksbetweensexualityand surplus-valueaccumulationhave
been stillfurtherattenuatedby the rise of what Eli Zaretskyhas called
"personallife":a space of intimaterelations,includingsexuality,friend-
ship,and love,thatcan no longerbe identified withthefamilyand thatis
lived as disconnectedfromthe imperativesof productionand reproduc-
tion.4In general,then,contemporary capitalistsocietycontains"gaps":
betweenthe economic orderand the kinshiporder;betweenthe family
and personallife;and betweenthestatusorderand theclass hierarchy. In
thissortof highlydifferentiated society,it does not make sense to me to
conceivethe mode of sexual regulationas simplya partof the economic
structure.Nor to conceivequeer demandsforthe recognitionof differ-
ence as misplaceddemandsforredistribution.
In anothersense, moreover,the definitional argumentaccomplishes
verylittle.Butlerwantsto concludethatstrugglesoversexualityare eco-
nomic,butthatconclusionhas been renderedtautologous.If sexualstrug-
gles are economicby definition, thentheyare not economicin the same
sense as are strugglesover the rate of exploitation.Simplycallingboth
sorts of struggles"economic" riskscollapsingthe differences, creating
the misleadingimpressionthat they will synergizeautomaticallyand
bluntingour capacityto pose, and answer,hard but pressingpolitical
284 Nancy Fraser

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questions as to how they can be made to synergizewhen in fact they Ifsexual
divergeor conflict.5
This bringsme to the functionalist variantof Butler'ssecond argu- are
struggles
ment.Here theclaimis thattheheteronormative regulationof sexualityis
economic-not by definition, butbecause it is functionalto theexpansion economicby
of surplusvalue. Capitalism,in otherwords,"needs" or benefitsfrom
then
definition,
compulsoryheterosexuality. It follows,accordingto Butler,thatgay and
lesbian strugglesagainstheterosexismthreatenthe "workability"of the
theyare not
capitalistsystem.
Like all functionalistarguments,this one stands or falls with the economicinthe
empiricalrelationsof cause and effect.Empirically, however,it is highly
implausiblethatgay and lesbian strugglesthreatencapitalismin its actu- same sense as
allyexistinghistoricalform.That mightbe the case ifhomosexualswere
constructedas an inferiorbut useful class of menial laborers whose are struggles
exploitationwas centralto the workingsof the economy,as African
Americans,for example, have been. Then one could say that capital's overthe
interestsare servedby keepingthem "in theirplace." In fact,however,
homosexualsare moreoftenconstructedas a groupwhose veryexistence rateof
is an abomination,much likethe Nazi constructionofJews;theyshould
have no "place" in societyat all. No wonder,then,that the principal exploitation.
opponentsof gay and lesbianrightstodayare not multinational corpora-
tions,but religiousand culturalconservatives, whose obsessionis status,
not profits.In fact, some multinationals-notablyAmerican Airlines,
Apple Computer,and Disney-have elicitedthewrathof such conserva-
tives by institutinggay-friendly policies, such as domesticpartnership
benefits.They apparentlysee advantagesin accommodatinggays, pro-
vided theyare not subjectto boycottsor else are big enoughto withstand
themiftheyare.
Empirically,therefore,contemporary capitalismseemsnot to require
heterosexism.Withits gaps betweenthe economicorderand thekinship
order,and betweenthe familyand personal life,capitalistsocietynow
permitssignificant numbersof individualsto livethroughwage laborout-
side of heterosexualfamilies.It could permitmanymore to do so-pro-
videdtherelationsof recognition werechanged.Thus we can now answer
one of the questionsposed earlier:the economicdisabilitiesof homosex-
uals are betterunderstoodas effectsof heterosexismin the relationsof
recognitionthan as hardwiredin the structureof capitalism.The good
news is thatwe do not need to overthrowcapitalismin orderto remedy
those disabilities-althoughwe may well need to overthrowit forother
reasons. The bad news is thatwe need to transform the existingstatus
orderand restructure therelationsof recognition.
With her functionalist argument,Butlerhas resurrectedwhat is in
my view one of the worstaspects of 1970s Marxismand socialistfemi-
nism:theovertotalizedviewof capitalistsocietyas a monolithic"system"
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 of interlockingstructuresof oppression that seamlesslyreinforceone
another.This view missesthe "gaps." It has been resoundingly and per-
suasivelycritiquedfrommanydirections,includingthe poststructuralist
paradigmthat Butler endorses and the Weberianone adapted by me.
Functionalistsystemstheoryis one strandof 1970s thoughtthatis better
forgotten.
The questionof whatshouldreplacefunctionalism bears on Butler's
thirdargumentagainst my redistribution/recognition framework.This
argumentis deconstructive. Far frominsistingthattherootsofheterosex-
ism are economicas opposed to "merelycultural,"its pointis to decon-
structthe"material/cultural distinction."
That distinction, claimsButler,is
"unstable." Importantcurrentsof neo-Marxianthought,rangingfrom
RaymondWilliamsto Althusser,have irretrievably thrownit into"crisis."
The knockdownargumentcomes fromthe anthropologists,however,
notablyMauss and Levi-Strauss.Their respectiveaccountsof "the gift"
and "the exchange of women" reveal that "primitive"processes of
exchange cannot be assigned to one side or the otherof the material/
culturaldivide.Being bothat once, such processes"destabilize"thevery
distinction. Thus, in invokingthematerial/cultural distinction today,But-
ler contends,I have lapsed intoa "theoreticalanachronism."
This argumentis unconvincingforseveralreasons,thefirstof which
is thatit conflates"theeconomic"with"thematerial."Butlerassumesthat
mynormativedistinction betweenredistribution and recognitionrestson
an ontologicaldistinction betweenthematerialand thecultural.She there-
foreassumesthatto deconstruct thelatterdistinctionis to pulltherugout
fromunderthe former.In fact,however,thisassumptiondoes not hold.
As I notedearlier,injusticesof misrecognition are, frommyperspective,
just as materialas injusticesof maldistribution. Thus, mynormativedis-
tinctionrestson no groundof ontologicaldifference. What it doescorre-
latewith,in capitalistsocieties,is a distinctionbetweentheeconomicand
the cultural.This, however,is not an ontologicaldistinction but a social-
theoretical distinction. The economic/cultural distinction, notthematerial/
culturaldistinction, is therealbone of contentionbetweenButlerand me,
the distinction whose statusis at issue.
What,then,is theconceptualstatusof theeconomic/cultural distinc-
tion?The anthropologicalargumentsdo shed lighton thismatter,in my
view,but not in a way thatsupportsButler'sposition.As I read them,
bothMauss and Levi-Straussanalyzedprocessesof exchangein pre-state,
precapitalist societies,wherethemasteridiomof social relationswas kin-
ship. In their accounts,kinshiporganizednot onlymarriageand sexual
relations, but also thelaborprocessand thedistribution ofgoods; relations
of authority, reciprocity, and obligation;and symbolichierarchies of status
and prestige.Neitherdistinctively economic relationsnor distinctively

286 Nancy Fraser

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culturalrelationsexisted; hence, the economic/cultural distinctionwas Frommy
presumably not available to the members of those societies.It does not
follow,however, that the distinction is senseless or useless. On the con- perspective,
trary,it can be meaningfully and usefullyapplied to capitalistsocieties,
whichunlikeso-called"primitive"societiesdo containthesocial-structural historicization
differentiationsin question.6Moreover,it can also be applied by us to
a
represents
societiesthatlack thesedifferentiations in orderto indicatehow theydif-
ferfromours. One can say,forexample,as I just did, thatin such soci- betterapproach
eties a singleorderof social relationshandlesboth economicintegration
and culturalintegration, mattersthatare relatively decoupled in capitalist to social
is
society.This, moreover, precisely the spirit which I understand
in
Mauss and Levi-Strauss.Whatevertheirintentionsregarding"the eco- theorythan
nomic" and "the cultural,"we gain less fromreadingthem as having
"destabilized"the distinctionthan fromreadingthemas havinghistori- or
destabilization
cizedit. The point,in otherwords,is to historicizea distinction centralto
modern capitalism-and with it modern capitalismitself-by situating deconstruction.
bothin thelargeranthropologicalcontextand therebyrevealingtheirhis-
toricalspecificity.
Thus, Butler's"destabilization"argumentgoes astrayat two crucial
points.First,it illegitimately generalizesto capitalistsocietiesa feature
societies:namely,theabsenceof a social-structural
specificto precapitalist
economic/cultural differentiation. Second, it erroneouslyassumes thatto
historicizea distinctionis to renderit nugatoryand useless in social the-
ory.In fact,historicization does thecontrary. Far fromrenderingdistinc-
tionsunstable,it renderstheirusage moreprecise.
From my perspective, then, historicizationrepresents a better
approach to social theorythan destabilizationor deconstruction.7It
allows us to appreciatethe social-structurally differentiatedand histori-
callyspecificcharacterof contemporary capitalistsociety.In so doing,it
also enablesus to locate the antifunctionalist momentand possibilitiesof
countersystemic "agency" and social change. These appear not in an
abstracttranshistorical propertyof language,such as "resignification" or
"performativity," but ratherin the actual contradictory characterof spe-
cificsocial relations.With a historicallyspecific,differentiated view of
contemporarycapitalistsociety, we can locate the gaps, the nonisomor-
phismsof statusand class, the multiplecontradictory interpellationsof
social subjects,and the multiplecomplexmoralimperatives thatmotivate
strugglesforsocial justice.
Seen fromthis sort of perspective,moreover,the currentpolitical
conjunctureis not adequately grasped by a diagnosis centeredon the
putativeresurgenceof orthodoxMarxism.It is bettergrasped,rather,by
one thatforthrightly acknowledges,and seeks to overcome,splitsin the
Leftbetweensocialist/social-democratic currentsorientedto thepoliticsof

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 redistribution, on the one hand, and multiculturalistcurrentsorientedto
the politicsof recognition, on the other.The indispensablestartingpoint
forsuch an analysismustbe a principledacknowledgment thatbothsides
havelegitimate claims,whichmustsomehowbe harmonizedprogrammat-
ically and made to synergizepolitically.Social justice today,in sum,
requiresbothredistribution and recognition;neitheralone willsuffice.
On thislastpoint,I feelcertain,Butlerand I agree.Despite herreluc-
tance to invokethelanguageof social justice,and despiteour theoretical
disagreements, both of us are committedto reclaimingthebest elements
of socialistpoliticsand to integrating themwiththe best elementsof the
politicsof the "new social movements." Likewise,we are bothcommitted
to retrievingthegenuinelyvaluablestrandsoftheneo-Marxiancritiqueof
capitalismand to integrating them withthe most insightfulstrandsof
post-Marxian criticaltheorizing.It is the meritof Butler'sessay and, I
would hope, of my own book as well, to have put this project on the
agenda once again.

Notes

forhelpful
I amgrateful fromLauraKipnis,LindaNicholson,
comments andEli
Zaretsky.

1. See especially
theintroduction
and chapter1, "FromRedistribution
to
Recognition? ina 'Postsocialist'
DilemmasofJustice Age,"inNancyFraser,
Jus-
tice Interruptus: Critical Reflectionson the 'Postsocialist' Condition (New York:
Routledge,1997).
2. In whatfollowsI shallleave aside a problemwithButler'srenditionofthe
argumentof JusticeInterruptus. She presentsme as arguingcategoricallythat
heterosexismis a pure injusticeof misrecognition, unalloyedby maldistribution.
In fact,I discussedtheissue hypothetically in themode of a thoughtexperiment.
Aimingto disclose the distinctive logics of redistribution
claimsand recognition
claims respectively,I invited readers to imagine a conceptual spectrum of
oppressed collectivities,rangingfromideal-typicalvictimsof pure maldistribu-
tion at one end to ideal-typicalvictimsof pure misrecognition at the otherend,
with hybridor "bivalent" cases in the middle. In this hypotheticalspirit,I
sketcheda conceptionof a "despised sexuality"as a concreteapproximationof
the ideal typeat the misrecognition end of the spectrum,whileexplicitlynoting
that this conceptionof sexualitywas controversialand while leavingopen the
question of whetherand how closely it correspondedto the actuallyexisting
homosexualcollectivities strugglingforjusticein thereal world.Thus, my "mis-
recognition"analysisof heterosexismin JusticeInterruptus is farmore qualified
thanButlerletson. Recently,moreover,I have arguedthatforpracticalpurposes
virtuallyall real-worldoppressedcollectivitiesare "bivalent."Virtuallyall, thatis,
have both an economic and a statuscomponent;virtuallyall, therefore,suffer
both maldistribution and misrecognition in formswhereneitherof theseinjusticesis

288 Nancy Fraser

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a mereindirect oftheother,butwhereeach has someindependent
effect weight.Nev-
ertheless,not all are bivalentin the same way,norto the same degree.Some axes
of oppressiontiltmoreheavilytowardthe distribution end of the spectrum,oth-
ers inclinemoreto therecognitionend, whilestillothersclustercloserto thecen-
ter. On this account, heterosexism,while consistingin part in maldistribution,
consistsprimarily in injusticesofmisrecognition and is rootedpredominantly in a
statusorderthatconstructshomosexualityas devalued and thatinstitutesit as a
despised sexuality.For the originalargument,see JusticeInterruptus, chapter1.
For the subsequentrefinement, see Nancy Fraser,"Social Justicein the Age of
IdentityPolitics:Redistribution, Recognition,and Participation,"in The Tanner
Lectureson Human Values,vol. 18 (Salt Lake City: Universityof Utah Press,
forthcoming).
3. In general,one shoulddistinguishseveralquestionshere: (1) thenatureof
the injusticesin question,(2) theirultimatecauses, (3) the contemporary causal
mechanismsthatreproducethem,and (4) theirremedies.I am gratefulto Erik
Olin Wrightforthispoint (privatecommunication,1997).
4. Eli Zaretsky,Capitalism,theFamily,and PersonalLife(New York:Harper
and Row, 1976).
5. Thus, the definitional argumentmerelypushes the need fordinstinctions
to anotherlevel.One mightof course saythata politicalclaimcan be economicin
eitherof two ways: first,by contestingthe productionand distributionof eco-
nomic value, includingsurplusvalue; and second, by contestingthe production
and reproductionof norms, significations,and constructionsof personhood,
includingthose concerningsexuality.But I failto see how thisimproveson my
simplerstrategyof restricting thetermeconomic to its capitalistmeaningand dis-
tinguishingclaimsforrecognitionfromclaimsforredistribution.
6. In thisbriefessay I cannottakeup the importantbut difficult questionof
how the economic/cultural distinctionis best applied to the criticaltheoryof
contemporary capitalistsociety.In "Social Justicein theAge of IdentityPolitics,"
however,I discussthisquestionat length.Rejectingtheviewof economyand cul-
ture as separate spheres,I propose a criticalapproach thatrevealsthe hidden
connectionsbetweenthem.The point,in otherwords,is to use the distinction
againstthe grain,makingvisible,and criticizable,both the culturalsubtextsof
apparentlyeconomicprocessesand theeconomicsubtextsof apparentlycultural
processes. Such a "perspectivaldualism" is only possible, of course, once we
have the economic/cultural distinction.
7. At anotherlevel,however,I mean to endorsedeconstruction. It represents
an approach to the politicsof recognitionthat is oftensuperiorin my view to
standardidentitypolitics.A deconstructive politicsof recognitionis transforma-
tive, not affirmative, of existinggroup identitiesand differentiations. In this
respect,it has affinitieswithsocialism,whichI understandas a transformative, as
opposed to affirmative, approach to the politicsof redistribution. (For an elabo-
rationof this argument,see JusticeInterruptus, chapter 1.) Nevertheless,I do
not find deconstructionuseful at the level on which Butler invokes it here:
namely,thelevel of social theory.

& Capitalism
Heterosexism,Misrecognition, 289

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