Professional Documents
Culture Documents
VOL
JANUARY 2018
WORLD SAFETY
NEWS
Accident
Norwegian B738 ATC Turns Aircraft, TCAS RA
and Turbulence Injures Two Flight Attendants
near Alicante
United B739 Indication of Loss of Thrust from
03 Both Engines 22 American B738 Slat Problem at New York
JACDEC World Safety Ranking 2017
Lion Air ranked 55th in JACDED Airline Safety Ranking 2017. JACDEC
Safety Ranking is the world’s biggest annual survey held to discover 60
biggest rank of safest airlines in the world. JACDEC was specifying the
rank based on safety index. Safety index classified the analysis result of
evaluation achievement of multiple factors such as accidents, serious
incidents, revenue passenger numbers, and safety audit.
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Shalom Mwenes
Contributors
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on The Aviation Herald
www.avherald.com
The aircraft however was unable to continue its schedule, next flight
assigned was HV-5193, and remained on the ground in Amsterdam for
about 21 hours before returning to service.
About 10 minutes later the crew advised it had been just an indication
issue and an issue with engine mode control, they would be able to land
just fine and vacate the runway on own power. The aircraft deviated
around weather and continued for a safe landing on runway 22L about 15
minutes after the emergency call.
The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground about 12 hours after landing.
The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Porto Santo about 4 hours
after landing.
The FAA reported the aircraft sustained damage to wings and tail and
rated the occurrence an incident.
Tower asked the next approach to runway 18C whether they were able
to see the runway, the crew responded in the negative and also per-
formed a missed approach.
The NTSB reported the aircraft was aligned with the runway center line
initially, however, during short final about 1nm before the runway threshold
began to veer left and lined up for the taxiway N parallel to the runway.
The taxiway was occupied. The aircraft went around from about 100 feet
AGL already past the begin of the taxiway. The NTSB reported cloud
tops were at 300 feet AGL. Both crew members reported that they
were right of the runway center line on an ILS approach, the localizer
showed a full deflection indicating they were right of the runway. The
captain reported he called the go around at decision height (200 feet
AGL) because he couldn’t see the runway or airport environment, the
first officer also reported they called for and initiated the go around
before the air traffic controller instructed the go around.
The airline reported they are cooperating with the investigation. The
aircraft was initially right of the center line, the crew corrected but
obviously overcorrected. The first officer was pilot flying and the captain
pilot monitoring.
The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground about 12 hours after landing
back
The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground for about 7 hours, then
returned to service.
The airline reported an object hit the tail of the aircraft, an inspection
found no significant damage to the aircraft. The confusion between ATC
and crew arose because of use acronyms. The aircraft is estimated to
depart again later the day.
The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground about 29 hours after landing
back.
Passengers reported the aircraft hit the runway hard with loud noise.
The airline reported: “The safety of our guests and crew is our number one prior-
ity. VA1507 was not able to safely land at Maroochydore Airport yesterday morn-
ing so the Captain made the decision to divert to Brisbane Airport, where guests
were taken by bus to Maroochydore Airport. We apologise for any inconvenience
caused” in response to our inquiry asking: “Is the narrative by the passengers
correct, that there was a hard touchdown associated with noise? Did this indeed
result in a tail strike? What can you say preliminarily about the damage - would
the damage need to be rated substantial or minor? How many passengers and
crew were on board?”
The ATSB indicated their offices are closed until Jan 2nd 2018, no inquiries would
be answered until then. The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground in
Brisbane about 26 hours after landing in Brisbane before returning to service. No
weather data are available for Maroochydore.
Picture 1. Infrared Satellite Image SEVIRI Oct 18th 2017 13:00Z (Graphics: AVH/Meteosat):
Spain’s CIAIAC reported one flight attendants received a serious leg injury, the other a
minor back injury when the aircraft turned left 90 degrees following an ATC instruction and
descended from the assigned FL190 to FL180 due to a TCAS RA and thus passed through
a zone of turbulence. After being clear of conflict the flight crew was informed about the
injuries of the flight attendants and continued the flight for a landing at destination without
further incident. The CIAIAC opened an investigation into the occurrence.
The airline confirmed the crew requested priority and emergency ser-
vices on stand by due to an unidentified odour in the cabin. The aircraft
landed safely. A maintenance inspection did not identify any defects or
anomalies causing the odour, the aircraft was returned to service.
Poland’s PKBWL rated the occurrence an accident and stated, that the
investigation can still not be considered complete (10 years after the
occurrence). The PKBWL however released their final report annotating
that the investigation could be reopened any time should new evidence
surface and concluding the probable causes of the accident were:
The cause of the accident was failure to execute a missed approach pro-
cedure even if the criteria of a stabilized approach were not met during
an attempt to intercept G/S “from above” at excessive descent rate,
under meteorological conditions below the minimum for the aerodrome.
The PKBWL reported the aircraft was flown by a captain (59, ATPL, about
15,000 hours total, about 5,000 hours on type, certified CATII/CATIII
operations) acting as pilot monitoring, a first officer (37, ATPL, about
5000 hours total, about 2000 hours on type, certified CATII/CATIII
operations) acting as pilot flying and an instructor (54, ATPL, more than
15,000 hours total) acting as pilot in command. The captain was expect-
ed to take controls at decision height and become pilot flying, the first
officer was expected to hand controls to the captain at decision height
and assume the role as pilot monitoring.
The crew discussed for more than 12 seconds that they were flying too
high, the autopilot in LVL CHG mode adopted a vertical rate of descent
of 1720 fpm. The autopilot was briefly selected to V/S which reduced the
rate of descent, the captain urged “go down”, the mode was returned to
level change, the rate of descent increased again.
Passing over KTC NDB the aircraft was at 1274 feet radar altitude, 2200
feet MSL descending at 1848 fpm, the aircraft should have passed KTC at
1790 feet MSL, the first officer stated they had passed KTC about 300
feet above target. 15 seconds the captain stated: “OK, entering in slope”,
9 seconds later the captain announced: “approaching minimum”.
One second later, 02:05:01Z and 17 seconds before first touchdown, the
aircraft crossed the glideslope descending at 1664 fpm at radar altitude
388 feet, the GPWS sounded “SINK RATE”, the autopilot changed from
Level Change to GlideSlope.
8 seconds before touchdown the control column was pulled, the engines
accelerated, the GPWS “PULL UP” warning ceased 6 seconds before first
touchdown.
5 seconds before touchdown the captain spotted the approach lights and
called “I have it”, the first officer confirmed “your controls”. The GPWS
sounded SINK RATE twice, rate of descent 1112 fpm at 50 feet AGL.
The aircraft touched down at 6 degrees nose up and 144 KCAS, the
thrust levers were momentarily placed into the takeoff position, a takeoff
configuration warning occurred. The stick shaker activated, the second
touchdown occurred at +1.799G at 5.8 degrees nose up. The thrust
levers were retarded. Two more bounced occurred, then the thrust
reversers were deployed, autothrottles were disconnected, the autopilot
was disengaged, the aircraft reached the runway, taxied off the runway
and went to the stand.
Five minutes after the first touchdown, during taxiing, the Captain intend-
ed to inform the traffic controller about the occurrence, he said:
2:10:34 hrs - “We should say something to the tower, because we have
lights broken?”
and:
2:10:42 hrs - ... “it must be a lot of lights broken, and other things”
As a result, the crew did not inform air traffic services about the occur-
rence.
The PKBWL analysed that the last RVR information provided by tow-
er “RVR RWY27 500m, 500m and 900m” were below the required
minima, however, this did not prompt the crew to divert to their alternate
with better weather conditions.
The PKBWL analysed the decision by the captain to proceed with the
straight in approach probably was triggered by concerns over an exces-
sivefuel consumption during the flight, however, there was still sufficient
fuel in the tanks to divert to Warsaw.
Both pilots at the controls were aware that they were too high for
straight-in approach (G/S was below the airplane), hence it required a
greater descent rate (1600-2000 ft/min - more than twice the normal
descent rate on G/S) and interception of G/S from above. It caused
that 17 seconds before the first contact with the ground the airplane
crossed G/S and continued the flight below G/S.
The PKBWL emphasized: “Any significant deviation from planned flight path,
airspeed, or descent rate should be announced (by PM). The decision to
execute a go-around is no indication of poor performance.”
Based on the FDR analysis the PKBWL analysed that the approach was
unstabilized contrary to the Flight Crew Training Manual and wrote:
The aircraft intercepted the localizer at RA 3800 feet which was 1700
feet above the glideslope and continued the approach reaching more
than 2000 fpm rate of descent temporarily and wrote: “Boeing com-
pany concluded that AP attempted to capture G/S, but an excessive
descent rate caused fast crossing of G/S and triggered BEAM ANOMA-
LY DETECTION.”
2.4.2. G/S capturing from above with a high descent rate and G/S cross-
ing at a distance of 1.5NM from the runway threshold in the absence of
visual reference to the ground is a HIGHLY DANGEROUS maneuver which
led to the accident.
2.4.6. The crew did not respond to the SINK RATE and PULL UP messages
generated by GPWS over a dozen seconds before the first contact of
the airplane with the ground.
2.4.8. Landing with AP engaged led to G/S crossing and the airplane
passing below G/S, which resulted in its premature contact with the
ground.
The crew’s failure to inform the airport services about the touchdown
short of RWY threshold and damage to the approach lights system had
an adverse impact on safety of subsequent landing aircraft. That failure
was a violation of the rules of conduct in the area of aviation safety, and
was also contrary to the ethics of a professional pilot.
Lion Air B739 was flying a commercial flight from Soekarno-Hatta In-
ternation Airport to Haikou International Airport, Hainan province. During
pre-flight check no significant defect found related to communication
system problem. Aircraft was taking-off normally without any suspicious
event occurred.
During Cruise, flight crew initial contact with Sanya control at waypoint
BUNTA and no information to be report by ATC at certain waypoint. Along
the route from point BUNTA until SYX flight crew still monitor on 130.2
MHz, Sanya control and 121.5 MHz International Air Destress frequency.
When aircraft passed by G221 from BUNTA to SYX control area, ATC con-
troller contacted aircraft. However, ATC did not get any reply from pilot.
Then, controller launched radio failure procedure and contact aircraft via
another frequency.
Approaching point SYX, flight crew replied ATC via 130.2 MHz while Sanya
controller at frequency 122.9 MHz. During this period, no effect impairing
safety was occurred. Then, communication between ATC and the aircraft
was established to continue flight. The aircraft continued to fly normally.
The aircraft landing without any further incident occurred and the pas-
sengers disembarked safely. After landing and discussed with first officer
found that they did not report at compulsory report point at KAGUK.
The aircraft was able to continue for the next sector to Cape Town
(South Africa) on schedule and delivered the helping passenger travelling
home in Cape Town on time.
In the meantime a full scale bomb alert response had been mounted, the
aircraft was directed to a remote area, passengers needed to disembark,
collect their checked luggage and go through security again, the aircraft
was searched without any further explosives found and finally continued
reaching Beijing with a delay of 3.5 hours.
Lion Air B739 was parking at stand B43 Soekarno – Hatta Airport. The
aircraft was planning to fly a commercial flight. The aircraft was going
to perform loading process to the aircraft. Then, BTT Operator drove
luggage cart from break down area terminal alfa to transport baggage to
parking stand B43.
When the luggage cart arrived at B43, BTT operator stopped near the
aircraft to remove luggage cart that is going to be placed in FWD
compartment. However, loading master informed that the luggage cart
containing baggage to placed in AFT compartment. Then, BTT operator
manuvered with 5 km/hour speed. Apparently, the last cart containing
oversize baggage and bumped another cart (no. 013) that is in the
process of unloading at fwd compartment. Then, the cart no. 013
accidentally pushed by the luggage cart and hit the aircraft fuselage.
The ground staff then informed the incident to their supervisor so that
the aircraft can be check further. Then, Engineer came to the aircraft to
check the part of the aircraft that was hit by the cart. The fuselage was
sratch and dent. The engineer stated that the aircraft can not be release
to flight. The aircraft should be grounded for further maintenance.