The Relevance of Philosophy to Law Falcis III v.

Civil Registrar-General

Plato’s Republic History

Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle The petition was filed by Atty. Jesus Falcis in 2015.

Natural Divine Law by St. Thomas Aquinas Oral arguments

Tractatus Logico Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein On March 2018, the Supreme Court of the Philippines approved the scheduling of a
same-sex marriage petition that seeks to invalidate Articles 1 and 2 of the Family
Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein Code.

The Command Theory of Law During the second week of June 2018, the Supreme Court announced that they will
hear arguments in a case seeking the invalidation of the Family Code's provisions
Legal Positivism – Theory of Correspondence; Theory of Falsification; Theory of prohibiting same-sex marriage.[2] The news of the historic oral arguments was also
Verification reported by the international media. Duterte also expressed his support for same-sex
marriage to be legalized in the Philippines.[3]
Utilitarianism by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
On June 19, 2018, oral arguments commenced with the following arguments made:
The Categorical Imperative by Immanuel Kant
whether or not the petition is properly the subject of the exercise of the Supreme
Falcis III v. Civil Registrar-General Court's power of judicial review, whether or not the right to marry and the right to
choose whom to marry are cognates of the right to life and liberty, whether or not the
Imbong v. Ochoa limitation of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples is a valid exercise of police power,
whether or not limiting civil marriages to opposite-sex couples violates the Equal
Obergefell vs Hodges Protection Clause, whether or not denying same-sex couples the right to marry
amounts to a denial of their right to life and/or liberty without due process of law,
People v Echegaray whether or not sex-based conceptions of marriage violate religious freedom, whether
or not a determination that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are unconstitutional
Roe v. Wade
must necessarily carry with it the conclusion that Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health Code (i.e.: homosexuality and lesbianism as grounds for annulment and legal
separation) are also unconstitutional, and whether or not the parties are entitled to the
Bolos v. Bolos reliefs prayed for. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) under Jose Calida argued
against the case.[4] The second session of arguments took place on June 26, 2018.[5]
Aglipay v. Ruiz
Supreme Court justices queried Falcis on what injury was inflicted on him due to the
Edwards v. Aguillard implementation of the Family Code but it was learned during the oral arguments that
Falcis was a single man did not apply for a marriage for himself which meant he was
Baze v. Rees never denied one. Falcis was told that his concern should have been raised in a lower
court, particularly a regional trial court first.[6]
Roper vs. Simmons
Decision
Atkins v. Virginia
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on September 3, 2019 for "lack of standing"
Ford v. Wainwright
and for "failing to raise an actual, justiciable controversy." and stated that it could only
Victoria Segovia, et al. Vs. The Climate Change Commission base a decision on actual Facts and "real adversarial presentations"[7] noting that
Falcis cannot claim injury since he is not seeking marriage for himself or has
presented an actual case.[8] The high court however added that the 1987 Constitution
in "plain text" imposes no restriction on same-sex marriage.[6] The Supreme Court
suggested in its ruling that congress should address the issue.

The petitioners were also cited for indirect contempt with the high court reasoning that
"[t]o forget [the bare rudiments of court procedure and decorum] – or worse, to purport
to know them, but really, only to exploit them by way of propaganda – and then, to
jump headlong into the taxing endeavor of constitutional litigation is a contemptuous
betrayal of the high standards of the legal profession."
Falcis described the decision as a "temporary setback" and has already considered
the fact that oral arguments were HELD regarding his case as a victory "for the
opportunity to educate the public" about the ISSUE of same sex marriage in the
country.[6]
Imbong v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819)
Facts:The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the
executive and the legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate.
Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of
modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the
peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an
enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception,
women’s health and population control.
Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the
constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect. The court then issued a status Quo Ante Order
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.
Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one
title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due
process by concealing its true intent – to act as a population control measure. On the
other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health”
are both interrelated as they are inseparable.
ISSUE: Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the
Constitution
RULING: NO. Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the
Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is
geared towards the reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to save lives
and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range
of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the
number of births in the country. The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’
contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-one
subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its opeRATIOn. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to
cripple or impede legislation.”
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to
the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose
and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be
“so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced
in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the
act.”
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable
human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.
The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to certain provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status
Quo Ante Order ISSUEd by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of
R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
Obergefell vs Hodges
The landmark case of Obergefell vs Hodges upHELD the rights of same-sex couples
to marry. The US Supreme Court HELD that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a
State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex based on the
following principles and premises:
(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs.
(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is
fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.
(a) The first premise of this Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.
(b) A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance
to the committed individuals. The intimate association protected by this right was
central to Griswold v. connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of
married couples to use contraception.
(c) A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and
families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and
education.
(d) Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a
keystone of the Nation’s social order. States have contributed to the fundamental
character of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social
order. There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to
this principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the
States have linked to marriage and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex
couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a
central institution of the Nation’s society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent
purposes of marriage.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and
just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is
now manifest.
(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights
secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always
coextensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.
The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry.
(5) While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for
change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting
a fundamental right.
People v Echegaray G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997
Facts: The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having
been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-
appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for reconsideration which focused on the
sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged
false accusation of rape against the accused. This was dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R.
Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free
Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.
A supplemental Motion for reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of
accused-appellant.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for reconsideration raises three (3) main ISSUES:
(1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2)
alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal
question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death
penalty.
RATIO: One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society
against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government
enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its
own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and
sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question
of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte
Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.
Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as
that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for
its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the
law regardless of their private opinions,"
Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The
provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it
and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while
rather awkward, is still plain enough
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the
death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact
legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step
process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death
penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing
the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention,
the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in
the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty
was not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended
the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is
concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory
penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily
penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation
of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence
involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with
the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is
not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal
Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the
trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which
are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House
of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors
to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the
death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what
crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion
and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the
foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the
nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative
Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-
impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power
to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes".
This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is
subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails
(1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that
Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or
designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case,
death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court
that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death
penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must
be squarely applied.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are
inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject
crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the
human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and
consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context
of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must
be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty.
Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be
valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be
perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty.
Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an
"alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be
the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest
of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to RATIOnalize and harmonize
the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death
penalty for said crimes."
Roe v. Wade
Citation. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 1973 U.S.
LEXIS 159 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973)
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain
an abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort to prevent the
enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions except those performed to
save the life of the mother.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when
medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when
medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe
sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face
and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing
the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she
was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was
not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford
to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of
herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
ISSUE. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to
terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and
sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights
reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?
HELD. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage,
deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century.
At common law abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable
movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that
abortion was ever a firmly established common law crime even when it destroyed a
quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion
laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to
discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by
neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is
hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However,
modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively
safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in
protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician,
and may not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may
regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the
State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe
abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon
the State’s interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.
Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and
the right to privacy is thus not inherently involved in this case.
Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions except in
the case of a life saving procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional based
upon the right to privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription of
abortion when the statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state interest,
such as the health of the mother or the viable fetus. The court declined to address the
question of when life begins.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
Citation. 497 U.S. 261, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 1990 U.S.
Brief Fact Summary. Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident, which left her in a
“persistent vegetative state.” After it became clear that Cruzan would not improve, her
parents requested that the hospital terminate the life-support procedures the hospital
was providing. The hospital and subsequently the State court refused to comply.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A State may condition the exercise of a patient’s right to
terminate life-sustaining treatment on a showing of clear and convincing evidence of
the desire of the patient to exercise such a right.
Facts. Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident, which left her in a “persistent
vegetative state.” in order to feed her and to facilitate her recovery, surgeons
implanted into her a gastronomy feeding and hydration tube. after it become apparent
that cruzan had virtually no chance for recovery, petitioners, cruzan’s parents, asked
hospital employees to terminate the life support procedures. the state hospital
employees refused to honor this request without court approval. after trial, on appeal,
the missouri supreme court refused to order termination of the life-support, because
clear and convincing evidence was not produced to show that Cruzan herself would
have chosen to refuse treatment.
ISSUE(s).
Did Cruzan have a right under the United States Constitution that would require the
hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment?
Did Missouri’s procedural requirement for clear and convincing evidence of an
incompetent person’s desire to terminate life support before it is terminated violate the
Constitution?
HELD. No and No. The Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed.
Prior decisions support the principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing medical treatment under the Due Process Clause.
But incompetent persons do not enjoy the same rights, because they cannot make
voluntary and informed decisions.
The right to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an incompetent, if it is to be
exercised, must be done for such incompetent by a surrogate. Missouri’s interest in
the preservation of life is unquestionably a valid State interest. The Due Process
Clause protects an interest in life as well as a right to refuse life-saving treatment.
Missouri may legitimately safeguard these personal decisions by imposing heightened
evidentiary requirements. Moreover, even when available, family members will not
always act in the best interests of a patient. The State is entitled to safeguard against
such abuses.
Dissent. Justice Brennan: Missouri may constitutionally impose only those
requirements necessary to ascertain Cruzan’s wishes. The “safeguard” employed by
the Missouri courts imposes a markedly asymmetrical evidentiary burden. No proof is
required to show an incompetent person would wish to continue treatment.
Concurrence. Justice O’Connor: Would emphasize that the Supreme Court of the
United States does not decide the ISSUE whether a State must give effect to the
decisions of a surrogate. In Justice O’Connor’s view, such a duty may well be
constitutionally required to protect one’s liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.
Justice Scalia: Would have preferred that The Court announced clearly that the
federal courts have no business in this field. The United States Constitution says
nothing on this topic. The nine justices of this Supreme Court are not better at making
this decision than nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone
directory.
Discussion. This case is labeled a “right to life case.” Most of the attention, however, is
focused on burden of proof standards for showing a person’s intent with regard to a
life-threatening matter. This type of case, where a person requests that her life be left
to natural processes, must be distinguished from cases that involve assisted suicide,
whereby a doctor will take an affirmative step to induce a person’s death.
BOLOS V. BOLOS 634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]
DOCTRINE: declaration of nullity of marriage; the rule on declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages as contained in a.m. no.
02-11-10-sc, which the court promulgated on 15 march 2003, extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the family code which took effect on 3
august 1988.
FACTS: Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaRATIOn of nullity
of her marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family
Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of
said decision was received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the
Notice of Appeal.
the rtc denied due course to the appeal for danilo’s failure to file the required motion
for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of section 20 of the rule on declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages. thereafter, the
rtc issued the order declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final
and executory and granting the motion for entry of judgment filed by cynthia. not in
conformity, danilo filed with the ca a petition forcertiorari under rule 65 seeking to
annul the orders of the rtc as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared
psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who
should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court
stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideRATIOn as a prerequisite to
appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family
Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the
phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions”
rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of the
Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was solemnized
before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not
applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980,
years before its effectivity.
ISSUE: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on DeclaRATIOn of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is
applicable to the case at bench.
HELD: No, it does not.
RATIO: The Rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment
of voidable marriages as contained in a.m. no. 02-11-10-sc which the court
promulgated on march 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. section 1 of the rule, in fact,
reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaRATIOn of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code
of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the
phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions”
rather than to the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which
denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
AGLIPAY V. RUIZ
Constitutional Law | Freedom of Religion | Separation of Church and State
64 Phil. 201 G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
“Any benefit indirectly enjoyed by a religious institution, as long as such benefit was
only incidental to a legitimate secular objective, would not violate the prohibition.”
FACTS:
The government had authorized a special stamp ISSUE on the occasion of the
observance in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress under the
sponsorship of the Catholic Church. The petitioner, as head of the Philippine
Independent Church, assailed the measure, contending that it violated the
Constitution because it benefited a particular religion; thus he sought to prohibit the
issuance and selling of the stamps commemorative of the event.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authorized stamp issue be declared invalid for violating the
principle of separation of Church and State.
RULING:No. The Supreme Court, on examining the background Facts, discovered
that although the original design of the stamp featured a Catholic chalice, this was
later rejected in favor a map of the Philippines under which appeared the caption,
“”Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937.” What was
emphasized, therefore, is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, as the seat of
that congress. The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not inspired by
any sectarian denomination. The only purpose was “to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourist to this country.” The stamps were not ISSUE and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. The officials concerned merely took advantage of an
event considered of international importance “to give publicity to the Philippines and
its people”.
While it is obvious that the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to
be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda,
if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply
because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in
view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The
main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not
contemplated.
Therefore, the stamp ISSUE was HELD to be not invalid.
Edwards v. Aguillard
Citation. 482 U.S. 578,107 S. Ct. 2573,96 L. Ed. 2d 510,1987 U.S.
Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) HELD
that Louisiana’s Creationism Act (the Act) that required evolution be taught if “creation
science” was taught and vice versa violated the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution (Constitution).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While the Court is normally deferential to the state’s
articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be
sincere and not without a sham. It is clear that requiring schools to teach creation
science with evolution does not advance academic freedom.
Facts. The Act forbids the teaching of evolution in public schools unless accompanied
by instruction in “creation science.” No school is required to teach evolution or creation
science. If either is taught however, the other must be taught. The Appellees, Aguillard
and other parents of children attending Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers,
and religious leaders (Appellees) challenged the constitutionality of the Act. The
District Court HELD that the Act violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution
either because it prohibited the teaching of evolution or because it required the
teaching of creation science with the purpose of advancing a particular religious
doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE. Whether the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution?
HELD. Yes. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Lemon’s first prong focuses
on the purpose of that animated adoption of the Act. In this case, the Appellants,
Edwards and others (Appellants), have identified no clear secular purpose for the Act.
The goal of providing a more comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered by
either outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the teaching of creationism.
While the Supreme Court is normally deferential to the state’s articulation of a secular
purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not without a
sham. It is clear that requiring schools to teach creation science with evolution does
not advance academic freedom. The Act does not grant teachers the flexibility that
they did not already possess to supplant the present science curriculum with a
presentation of theories besides evolution, about the origin of life. Here, the purpose
of the Act was to restructure the science curriculum to conform with a particular
religious viewpoint. Therefore, the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution.
Dissent. There is ample evidence that the majority is wrong in holding that the Act is
without secular purpose.
Concurrence. Nothing in this Supreme Court’s decision diminishes the traditionally
broad discretion accorded state and local school officials in the selection of the public
school curriclum.
Discussion. Since this case took place in the context of a public school, the Supreme
Court was less tolerant of governmental sponsorship of religious symbolism.
Baze v. Rees
Facts : Two Kentucky inmates challenged the state's four-drug lethal injection
protocol. The lethal injection method calls for the administRATIOn of four drugs:
Valium, which relaxes the convict, Sodium Pentathol, which knocks the convict
unconscious, Pavulon, which stops his breathing, and potassium chloride, which
essentially puts the convict into cardiac arrest and ultimately causes death. The
Kentucky Supreme Court HELD that the death penalty system did not amount to
unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.
Question
Is the use of a four-drug lethal injection process to carry out death sentences a
violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment?
In a 7-2 decision with four concurrences and a dissent, the Court HELD that
Kentucky's lethal injection scheme did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Noting that
the inmates had conceded the "humane nature" of the procedure when performed
correctly, the divided Court inmates had failed to prove that incorrect administRATIOn
of the drugs would amount to cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Court also
suggested that a state may violate the ban on cruel and unusual punishment if it
continues to use a method without sufficient justification in the face of superior
alternative procedures. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. announced the judgment
and ISSUEd an opinion joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion supporting the
judgment but for the first time stated his opposition to the death penalty. Justice
Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a separate concurring
opinion in support of the judgment. Justice Alito also ISSUEd a separate concurring
opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice David Souter, dissented.
Atkins v. Virginia Citation. 536 U.S 304 (2002)
Brief Fact Summary. Atkins contention was that the execution of a mentally retarded
criminal is a cruel and unusual punishment which contravenes the Eighth Amendment.
He made this contention when he was sentenced to death for committing murder.
Atkins (D) had an IQ 0f 59 at the time of his conviction.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Under the Eighth Amendment, the capital punishment of a
mentally retarded convict is cruel and unusual.
Facts. Atkins Daryl (D) was sentenced to death for shooting a patron of an automated
teller machine and for robbery, after he was found guilty of abduction, capital murder
and armed robbery. A verdict of “mildly mentally retarded” pertaining to the health of
Atkins (D), was given by a forensic psychologist. This verdict of the psychologist was
based on the interview he had with Atkins (D) and with others who knew him, review
of school and court records of other crimes and a standard intelligence test which
showed that Atkins (D) had a full scale IQ of 59. Atkins (D) however appealed against
the RULING of the trial court on the ground that sentencing a mentally retarded
criminal to death was a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
ISSUE. Under the Eighth Amendment, is the capital punishment of a mentally
retarded convict cruel and unusual?
HELD. (Stevens, J.) Yes. Under the Eighth Amendment, the capital punishment of a
mentally retarded convict is cruel and unusual. Mentally retarded persons should be
tried and punished when they commit crimes once they meet the law’s requirement.
Mentally retarded persons do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct because of their disabilities in
the areas of reasoning, control of impulses and judgment. Hence, the enactment of
the federal government which exempts the mentally retarded from execution has
provided a strong evidence in which the society view the mentally retarded offenders
as less culpable than the average criminal. The mentally retarded person’s disposition
often portrays that they lack remorse for their crimes and they are also poor witnesses
because they are not capable of assisting their counsel. Reversed and remanded.
Dissent. (Scalia, J) the decision taken in this case as no ground in the Eighth
Amendment’s text or history, no ground in contemporary attitudes towards the death
penalty, relies on nothing more than the personal preferences of the members of
today’s majority and the Court’s death-is-different jurisprudence is taken to the
extreme. So, not making use of the death penalty belongs to the legislatures and
abolishing it one small increment at a time should not be sought by this Court.
Discussion. the Supreme Court in Atkins observed that the execution of mentally
retarded criminals in the states that permitted it was not common and also noted that
the practice of such executions “has become truly unusual” and developing a “national
consensus” against it was fair.
Roper v. Simmons
Citation. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1, 2005
U.S. LEXIS 2200, 73 U.S.L.W. 4153, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 131 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2005)
Brief Fact Summary. Respondent committed murder when he was age 17. He was
tried and sentenced to death after he turned 18.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. “The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition
of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes
were committed.”
Facts. Respondent Simmons conspired to burglarize and murder a person with two
friends. Only one fully participated. They entered the victim’s home, kidnapped her,
bound her with duct tape and electrical cord, and threw her into a river. Respondent
was 17 at the time. He subsequently bragged out the killing. He was taken into
custody and confessed. He was put on trial as an adult, convicted, and sentenced to
death.
Issue. “[W]hether it is permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States to execute a juvenile offender who was older
than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime.”
Held. No. The Supreme Court of the United States first established the applicability of
the Eight Amendment, as well a precedent of the application of the death penalty to
minors. Traditionally, minors did not face capital punishment. It noted that a
“consensus” of the country is against the application of the death penalty to juveniles.
The Supreme Court noted the gravity of capital punishment and its application.
“Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow
category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the
most deserving of execution.'” The Supreme Court further noted that juveniles are
different, in that: they lack maturity and understanding of responsibility; are “more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure”; and that “that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
adult.” Having recognized the fact that a juvenile is not “the worst” offender, “the
penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to
adults.”
Dissent.
Justice O’Connor’s dissent did not see how a consensus existed.
Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, took issue with the
notion that the Constitution had “changed” in such a way to permit the decision.
Concurrence. The concurring justices applauded the Supreme Court’s application of
“[t]he evolving standards of decency that have driven our construction of this critically
important part of the Bill of Rights foreclose any such reading of the Amendment.”
Discussion. “The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and
well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite
insufficient culpability.
Ford v. Wainwright:
Petitioner Ford was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
Following his sentence, Ford began to act in manner consistent with a serious mental
disorder.
Ford then went through Florida’s procedure on determining the competency of a
condemned prisoner, whereby three psychiatrists interviewed the prisoner and gave
the Governor their ultimate decision.
Following the procedure, the psychiatrists deemed Ford competent, and the Governor
signed his death warrant.
Ford’s appeals in state court were denied, so he filed a habeas petition in federal
court.
The District Court and Court of Appeals denied relief.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed. It HELD that executing the insane
violates the Eighth Amendment, and that Florida’s competency proceeding did not
comport with due process principles.
Ford v. Wainwright Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:
Petitioner Ford was convicted of murder in Florida state court and sentenced to death.
There was no indication that Ford had any mental incapacity at the time of the crime,
his trial, or his sentencing. However, following his sentencing, Ford began to display
symptoms of a serious mental disorder. One psychiatrist ultimately concluded that
Ford was not competent to suffer execution. Ford’s counsel invoked Florida’s
procedure to determine a condemned prisoner’s competency.
In accordance with the Florida procedure, three psychiatrists interviewed Ford for 30
minutes in total. All three found that Ford suffered some mental disorder but was
sane for purposes of execution. The Governor then, without explanation, signed
Ford’s death warrant. Ford’s counsel’s attempt to have a hearing in state court was
denied. Ford’s counsel then filed a habeas petition in federal court.
Procedural History:
The District Court dismissed Ford’s petition.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the dismissal.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
ISSUES and Holdings:
Does executing the insane violate the Eighth Amendment?
Did Florida’s procedure for determining a condemned prisoner’s competency provide
adequate due process?
Judgment:
The decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and remanded.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
Executing the insane is a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
A competency determination for a condemned prisoner requires basic due process
protections.
Reasoning:
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Marshall evaluated writings from English
law and those that existed at the time the Eighth Amendment. Those writings
revealed that execution of the insane has been considered cruel and unusual for
centuries. In addition, no State in the United States allows the execution of the
insane. Therefore, it is rather easy to conclude that execution of the insane violates
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Marshall concluded that the Florida
procedure to determine competency does not comport with due process. A full
hearing to evaluate Ford, including allowing Ford a right to be heard with evidence of
insanity as well as a right to challenge evidence against his claim, is necessary. The
reason for that conclusion is because Florida’s procedure (i) failed to include Ford in
the truth-seeking process; (ii) failed to allow Ford to challenge or impeach the
psychiatrists’ opinions; and (iii) improperly placed the ultimate decision in the State’s
executive branch even though the Governor is not neutral after having overseen all
stages of Ford’s prosecution.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions:
Concurring Opinion (Powell):
While Justice Marshall is correct that executing the insane violates the Eighth
Amendment and that Florida’s competency proceeding was inadequate, his
requirement for a “sanity hearing” is not mandatory. Due process is a flexible concept.
The State should have some leeway in the way it conducts the competency
evaluation.
Concurring in part, Dissenting in part (O’Connor):
The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of the insane. However, since
Florida’s law prohibits the practice, the Court must look at Florida’s competency
procedure, and that procedure does not even provide the most minimal due process
protections. The State of Florida, rather than the federal government, should come up
with a process to determine competency that comports with due process.
Dissenting Opinion (Rehnquist):
The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of the insane, and Florida’s
procedure is fully consistent with the common law heritage of allowing the executive to
determine sanity of the condemned.
Significance:
Ford v. Wainwright is significant because it dealt with an issue that the Court had yet
to consider since the Eighth Amendment was incorporated to the States. That is the
issue of whether executing the insane violates the Eighth Amendment. This case
stands for the proposition that it does.
Victoria Segovia, et al. Vs. The Climate Change Commission, represented by its
Chairman, His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino, et al.G.R. No. 211010March 7, 2017
Facts: Former President Gloria Macapagal-arroyo issued AO 171 which created the
PresidentialTask Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. In 2009,
AO 254 wasISSUEd, mandating the to formulate a national Environmentally
Sustainable Transport Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. Later that same year,
Congress passed the ClimateChange Act. It created the Climate Change Commission
which absorbed the functions ofthe PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body
of the government relating toclimate change.Petitioners wrote respondents regarding
their pleas for implementation of the RoadSharing Principle, demanding the reform of
the road and transportation system in thewhole country. The Petitioners are Carless
People of the Philippines, parents,representing their children, who in tum represent
"Children of the Future, and Car-ownerswho would rather not have cars if good public
transportation were safe, convenient,accessible, available, and reliable". They claim
that they are entitled to the issuance ofthe extraordinary writs due to the alleged
failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by environmental laws,
and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos. Petitioners
contend that respondents' failure to implement the laws and executive issuances
resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in
violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and
may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and
air" by the government without due process of law.issues1. Whether or not the
petitioners have standing to file the petition;2. Whether or not the petition should be
dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; and3. Whether or
not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.
RULING:The petition is DISMISSED due to procedural grounds. The RPEC did
liberalize the requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the
enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws. This has been
confined by this court's rulings in arigo v. swift, and International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-BioTech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia.
However, it bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance
of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the
inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ; and a petition
for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who
is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission. The petitioners failed to
establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for. For a writ of kalikasan
to issue, the following requisites must concur: there is an actual orthreatened violation
of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; theactual or threatened
violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public officialor employee, or
private individual or entity; and the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead
to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The writ of
continuingmandamus cannot issue.The petition shall fail. First, the petitioners failed to
prove direct or personal injury arisingfrom acts attributable to the respondents to be
entitled to the writ. While the requirementsof standing had been liberalized in
environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for
continuing mandamus.Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is
denominated a principle. It cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach
upon the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this
principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel
the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are
discretionary, and the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act
one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to
the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the
performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official
can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.In this
case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to
perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the
executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the
bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the
respondents were able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects
and programs that seek to improve air quality.