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Journal of Chinese Governance: A Balance Act: Minimizing Economic Loss While Controlling Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia
Journal of Chinese Governance: A Balance Act: Minimizing Economic Loss While Controlling Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia
To cite this article: Binlei Gong, Shurui Zhang, Lingran Yuan & Kevin Z. Chen (2020): A balance
act: minimizing economic loss while controlling novel coronavirus pneumonia, Journal of Chinese
Governance, DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2020.1741940
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2020.1741940
RESEARCH ARTICLE
1. Introduction
Epidemics are a major cause of poor health in developing countries, hindering human
1
capital accumulation and economic growth. According to a study by the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences, global annual direct economic loss due to epidemics exceeds
2
$60 billion. Influenza pandemics are the main type of epidemic. Due to its rapid
mutation rate and strong transmission capacity, the prevention and control of influ-enza
pandemic is rather difficult. As a result, influenza pandemic has a significant impact on
societal operations and is an important challenge to human health and glo-bal
development. The outbreak of Spanish influenza in 1918 infected 500 million peo-ple
worldwide and caused 50–100 million deaths from the period 1918 to 1920, resulting in
economic losses of more than $3 trillion and accounting for approximately 4.8% of global
3
GDP at that time. After the Second World War, along with the global enhancement of
medical conditions, epidemic monitoring and scientific research
CONTACT Kevin Z. Chen kzchen@zju.edu.cn China Academy for Rural Development, Zhejiang
University, Room 1322, Qizhen Building, 866 Yuhangtang Road, Hangzhou 310058, China
2020 Zhejiang University
2 B. GONG ET AL.
sector—and macro-level economic impact as well. If individuals and firms fail to take
effective self-protection measures, more public funds will be invested to control the
epidemic. Compared with the direct economic impact, such as for hospitalization
and medication, the indirect could be much greater, including absenteeism and
reduced productivity, the cost of nonpharmaceutical intervention to reduce disease
8
spread. Taking the Spanish influenza pandemic as an example, among the
estimated eco-nomic losses of $3 trillion, 60% were indirect economic losses
9
caused by prevention and control measures. This section summarizes and
evaluates the economic impact of epidemics on the individuals and firms.
11
authenticity of the information she or he receives. Fast et al. indicates that the pub-lic
response to epidemics is mainly influenced by three factors: the perceived risk of the
12
disease, the transmissibility of the virus, and media transmission. Dickmann finds that
the more the public knows about virus-related information, the more helpful it is to
reduce the panic induced by the virus. On the one hand, when the media make
exaggerated or conflicting reports on the virus, it will lead to public panic, thus affect-ing
normal social and economic operations. On the other hand, if the media underesti-mate
the virus, it will lead to a lack of public awareness and lower virus protection, resulting in
13
more infection and damage caused by the epidemics. Fenichel et al. used 1.7 million
points of flight travel data, showing that the outbreak of 2009 H1N1 significantly changed
individual travel behavior and caused economic losses of about $50 million. Compared
to official institutions such as WHO, the media tends to over-estimate the severity of the
14
epidemic. However, as the main source to learn about epidemic information, media
15
like Google leads to excessive interventions at the indi-vidual level. Garnaut and Song
argued that the lack of transparency and accuracy of information was the main reason
why the government failed in the early prevention and control of the SARS outbreak in
Beijing, Guangdong and other regions, which led to the spread of the epidemic. The
outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan is another example. Since the government didn’t paid
enough attention in the early stage, many parties and activities were still conducted in
January 2020, which may be one of the reasons that dramatically improve the number of
infected people since then.
the early stages of the H1N1 outbreak, and 20% of the consumers thought they
could catch the virus from eating pork. Although the WHO changed the name from
“swine flu” to “2009H1N1” in May 2009, the continued use of “Swine Flu” in the
media had a negative impact on pork futures prices for about four months, resulting
in an approxi-mate $200 million revenue loss in the pork market from April to
September 2009 in the United States. According to the United States Trade
19
Representative (USTR), the U.S. pork industry experienced losses of about $270
million in the second quarter of 2009 alone.
Third, the impact of epidemics on the international trade of agricultural products is
derived from the relevant trade restrictions by trade partners for the prevention and
control of the epidemic. As a result, the demand for agricultural products imported
from the affected areas declines in the international market. For example, due to the
2009 H1N1 outbreak, pork imports to Russia and China fell 28% and 56%,
respectively, as compared to those of 2008. Another example is Libya during the
2014 Ebola out-break, where exports of natural rubber, a major agricultural product,
20
decreased by 40% compared with that of the previous year.
economic recovery after the end of the outbreak. For example, workers could put in
overtime to make up for their earlier absence, and consumers may delay their con-
sumption until after the outbreak. Such behaviors can drive the overall recovery of
the industry from both the supply and demand sides.
8.0%). The total loss of GDP in the three west African countries was about $359
36
million (in 2014 prices). Although the outbreak was nearly under control a year
after it began, the negative impact on the three economies continued. The
estimated GDP loss for the three in 2015 was $2.2 billion ($240 million for Liberia,
37
$535 million for Guinea and $1.4 billion for Sierra Leone).
treatment of infected people, while non-drug control is based on public prevention and
control measures, including personal and community protection, isolation and
42 43
quarantine, as well as travel and trade restrictions. Ferguson et al. thought that
influenza pandemic control should contain the elimination of social gathering activities to
reduce human contact, the implementation of quarantine policies to reduce the infectivity
of infected people, and the development of vaccines and antiviral drugs to reduce the
possibility of infection for uninfected people. Although some studies have proved that
antiviral drugs and vaccines can effectively prevent and control epidemics, it is difficult
for medical enterprises and scientific research institutions to provide those in the short
44
term, due to the strong concealment and fast mutation rate of the virus. For example,
during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, the United States began vaccine devel-opment on the
sixth day after the first H1N1 virus was detected in April 2009, and the official public
45
order was accepted in December 2009.
46
According to WHO guidelines, countries affected by epidemics are advised to
implement measures such as school closures, family quarantines, adjustment of work
patterns, reduction of travel and public transportation, and restrictions on gatherings in
47
accordance with national plans and the severity of the epidemic. These measures are
regarded as key non-drug interventions and are often used as the main prevention and
48
control measures to deal with an early influenza pandemic. In the case of 2009 H1N1,
for example, the U.S. CDC initially recommended that schools with confirmed cases
should be closed for seven days to reduce the potential risk of infection based on the
H1NI outbreak in Mexico. However, as estimates of the severity of the virus decreased,
so did the recommendations. The early identification and isolation of sick students and
staff became a major way to reduce the spread of influenza in schools. In terms of
restricting international travel, due to the severe epidemic in Mexico, many airlines
reduced their frequency of flights to Mexico City or suspended flights for at least one
49
month, which resulted in the reduction of international traffic by about 40% in May.
During the 2003 SARS outbreak, the Chinese government took measures including
integrate medical resources and establishing the personnel tracking mechan-ism to
effectively control the epidemic. For the infected, fever clinics were set up to identify the
patients, and the patients were collected and treated in designated hospi-tals to prevent
cross-infection. For the potentially infected and non-infected, transpor-tation inspections
strengthened among civil aviation, railway, ship and coach to monitor the movement
path of personnel based on the large population mobility of China’s existing realities.
Susceptible, I for Infective, and R for Removed after being cured. Further studies
incor-porated the incubation period and virus infectivity into SIR model, which was
50
closer to the real scenario of infectious disease transmission. This method uses
the infection rate of the virus to evaluate the effectiveness of prevention and control
measures, but pays less attention to the economic and social costs. The existing
assessments of the actual epidemic prevention and control measures can be
divided into two groups, the evaluations of overall impact from all measures and the
evaluations of the impact from a single measure. In terms of the overall measure
51
effect evaluation, Ferguson et al. used data from the United States and the United
Kingdom to simulate the effectiveness of different public control measures in the
early stages of an outbreak. The results showed that immigration restrictions and
flight bans had a limited effect, while school closures had a significant effect at the
peak of the epidemic, but their impact throughout the whole epidemic period was
non-significant. More studies were conducted to evaluate the single measure effect.
52
Riley et al. found that the decrease in human contact represented by isolation and
the timely detection and treatment of infected people were the major reasons for the
decline in SARS transmission rate. As for the outbreak control effect of school
closures, many studies have concluded that school closures are beneficial to
outbreak control, mainly reflected in the decline of infection rates among school-age
people, and that this positive effect is not offset by the contact between students
53
and non-relatives during the school closure period. To demonstrate the necessity
54
of coordinating those prevention and control measures, Epstein et al. constructed
a global influenza pandemic model to simulate the effect of flight control on
epidemics. The results showed that if flight control policies were not combined with
other policies, the infection rate of influenza would increase, as the delayed travel
caused by flight restrictions might lead to a concentration of outbreaks.
The second evaluation method for prevention and control measures is the min-imum
cost accounting. When the government introduces public prevention and con-trol
measures, the prevention and control of viral transmission is not the only target, but also
the economic cost under different policies. A large number of cross-disciplin-ary studies
combine viral transmission models and macroeconomic models to calculate the cost
under different control combinations by taking economic loss into account when
evaluating the actual effect, including the implementation cost and the decline in
productivity caused by non-drug control, such as isolation, as well as the cost of death,
55
disability and treatment caused by infection. Such assessment methods could
calculate the cost per case and the number of infections avoided under prevention and
56
control. Bartsch et al. used the Monte Carlo simulation model to estimate the cost of
Ebola cases in the three most affected countries from a provider and social perspective.
The four specific cases include: 1) survivors receiving supportive care; 2) patients who
died after receiving supportive care; 3) survivors receiving extensive sup-portive care;
and 4) patients who died after receiving extensive supportive care. The results showed
that the total social cost for fully recovered Ebola cases ranged from $480 to $912 per
capita, while non-surviving Ebola cases ranged from $5,929 to $18,929 per capita,
varying by age and country. The main reason for the cost per case is mortality and the
resulting loss of productivity. This model also estimated that
12 B. GONG ET AL.
Liberia alone spent between $143–155 million on the outbreak, more than three times
57
the country’s total annual health budget ($49 million from 2011 to 2012). Adda et al.
used high-frequency data of a long time period, combined econometric exogenous
shocks with viral transmission models and selected public transport strikes and school
closures as natural experiments to measure the impact of different control policies on
viral transmission as well as the economic losses caused by control measures using
58
simulation methods. The parameter estimation of viral transmission in Adda et al. did
not rely on prior assumptions, and could therefore better evaluate the effect of single
measure on viral transmission. However, there are also disadvantages of that research.
On the one hand, the utilization of long-term data means that it is more focused on
general flu, rather than infectious diseases like SARS and Ebola. On the other hand, the
actual prevention and control is usually multi-channel, while the single measure effect
ignores the spillover effects between prevention and control measures.
The third evaluation method for prevention and control measures is to consider
the individual’s response strategy based on the minimum cost accounting. In the
59
review article published in Nature, Ferguson pointed out that most prediction
models for viral transmission ignored the human response to the virus, which would
60
lead to serious prediction bias in this connected society. Jonas showed that
individual response strategies to a virus affected the cost and benefit of pre-vention
and control measures in two aspects. One aspect is that an individual’s response to
the virus would affect how quickly it spreads. The other aspect is that individual
61
behaviors might carry higher costs. Yoo et al. found that after the 2009 H1N1
outbreak, public adaptive behavior was conducive to reducing viral transmission,
62
especially in the early stage of the outbreak. Fast et al. thought that the public’s
adaptive behavior would bring pressure on medical security, eco-nomic loss and
even increased violence. The mix of prevention and control meas-ures would
change significantly when the costs of public adaptive behavior were taken into
63
account. Thomas et al. calculated the economic losses of the Ebola epidemic in
the three west African countries, where the economic losses caused by the
preventive actions of the public and international investors reached $1.6 billion.
Therefore, considering the effectiveness of prevention and control measures, it is
necessary to explore the individual response strategies of epidemics.
In conclusion, the first evaluation method merely considers the prevention effects of
control measures, but ignores the huge economic losses. The second method con-siders
the potential economic costs, but ignores the economic impact of individual responses to
the epidemic. On the one hand, the lack of individual self-protection might lead to the
increased cost of public prevention and control measures. On the other hand, excessive
epidemic prevention would bring additional economic losses. For example, during the 2003
SARS outbreak, there was hoarding of epidemic-related goods at home, such as masks and
disinfectants, resulting in the misallocation and waste of public resources. Moreover, overly
strict home quarantine measures for non-infected people would have an even greater
negative impact on the affected service industry, such as restaurants, hotels and tourism.
Therefore, when evaluating the cost and benefit of the measure combination, it is
recommended to define different levels of prevention and control intensity. On this basis,
the cost and benefit of different
JOURNAL OF CHINESE GOVERNANCE 13
confirmed case and the isolation of COVID-19 was shortened to less than a
65
month. Since effective prevention and control of epidemic is not the only target,
the eco-nomic cost needs to be considered. The combination of epidemiological
models and economic models by scholars in different fields can be beneficial to
realize the dual goals of containment of viral transmission and minimization of
economic losses. Meanwhile, cross-disciplinary epidemic studies mainly rely on
timely data disclosure, which is conducive to cross-border cooperation and
complementary advantages, thus improving epidemic information processing.
In addition to viral characterization analysis and economic impact assessment,
epi-demic information processing also requires the establishment of prevention and
con-trol policies of local governments with limited epidemic information. The general
goal of local governments is to achieve economic growth and maintain social
stability. At the early stage of the epidemic, with limited information, local
governments usually choose conservative prevention and control policies. After the
outbreak of an epi-demic, with the request of the superior government and publics,
the short-term goal of a local government is to reduce the number of local people
infected. As a result, excessive policies are likely to be adopted, which could bring
extensive disruptions to local economic operation. How to deal with public health
shocks is an important part of national governance modernization, which needs to
be improved from target man-agement and plan formulation. First, in terms of target
management, a zero occur-rence of public health events should be taken as one of
the assessment goals to encourage these local governments to pay enough
attention in the early stage. Second, it is crucial for the cooperation between local
governments and other func-tional departments, such as the National Health
Commission. Existing plans usually start from the perspective of one functional
department, lacking the comprehensive coordination of multiple departments. Due
to the difficulty in political coordination and unclear functional orientation, it is
challenging to combine local governance with professional capacity for prevention
and control. The government should clarify the functions of different departments
and reduce organizational costs in multi-depart-ment cooperation.
Thirdly, a rapid and authoritative dissemination of authentic epidemic infor-mation
is an assurance. The timely dissemination of authentic information about epi-demics
is an important component of effective prevention and control. On the one hand, in
the early stage of an epidemic, the lack of authentic information might make the
public ignore the epidemic, thus accelerating the large-scale outbreak and increas-
ing the subsequent costs. On the other hand, with the development of mass media,
when the government cannot provide effective and authentic information, a large
amount of false information can be generated and induce panic among the public,
causing economic losses even more severe than the damage from the virus itself.
The key to information dissemination lies in who can disclose the authentic infor-
mation and how to motivate relevant departments to report the authentic situation in a
timely manner. From virus emergence to virus strain isolation and virus characteris-tics
identification, the cost of prevention and control is relatively low in the early stages.
However, due to the lack of clear power and responsibility relationships, as well as a
performance target assessment mechanism for local governments and
JOURNAL OF CHINESE GOVERNANCE 15
relevant departments, the final actions may deviate from the maximization of social
welfare, thus missing the best control time and greatly increasing the pressure for sub-
sequent prevention and control and thus economic costs. From the perspective of a
vertical system, the central government is the core of the emergency work, while local
governments have less autonomy in managing epidemic information. From the per-
spective of a horizontal system, the power and responsibility relationships between
institutions at the same level are not clear. When facing with emergent epidemics, from
the perspective of the timely transmission of authentic epidemic information, it is
necessary to further clarify the power and responsibility relationships between gov-
ernments at all levels and relevant functional departments to establish a scientific
emergency management system for public health events and realize the transform-ation
from institutional advantage to governance capabilities.
Notes
1. Lopez et al., “Global and Regional Burden of Disease,” 1747–1757.
2. Sands et al., “The Neglected Dimension of Global Security,” 1281–1287.
3. Johnson and Mueller, “Updating the Accounts,” 105–115; Jonas, Pandemic Risk.
4. Bloom et al., “Emerging Infectious Diseases,” 4055–4059.
5. Burns et al., Evaluating the Economic Consequences of Avian Influenza.
6. Fan et al., The Inclusive Cost of Pandemic Influenza.
7. Jonas, Pandemic Risk; See note 5 above.
8. Jonas, Pandemic Risk; See note 5 above.
9. See note 5 above.
10. See note 6 above.
11. Fast et al., “Cost-effective Control of Infectious Disease,” e0136059.
12. Dickmann, Plague–Pandemic–Panic.
13. Fenichel et al., “Skip the Trip,” e58249.
14. Towers et al., “Mass Media and the Contagion of Fear,” e58249.
15. Garnaut and Song, China: New Engine of World Growth.
16. Audibert et al., “Social and Health Determinants of the Efficiency,” 1705–1717.
17. Thomas et al., The Economic Impact of Ebola on Sub-Saharan Africa.
18. USMEF’s Survey Shows Reaction of Chinese Consumers to H1N1.2009: https://www.foodmarket.
com/News/A/702517/3O37B8UF13J7tdmR8hwG5TfwOg5Bm8Mxasz0NlsC9tN2AW5EYphg==/
USMEFs-Survey-Shows-Reaction-of-Chinese-Consumers-to-H1N1-
19. USTR: https://ustr.gov/index.php/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/
2009/june
20. See note 17 above.
21. Chen et al., “The Positive and Negative Impacts of the SARS Outbreak,” 281–293.
22. Siu and Wong, “Economic Impact of SARS,” 62–83.
23. Beutels et al., “The Economic Impact of SARS in Beijing,” 85–91.
24. See note 21 above.
25. Khan et al., “Spread of a Novel Influenza A (H1N1) Virus,” 212–214.
26. Rassy and Smith, “The Economic Impact of H1N1,” 824–834.
27. See note 19 above.
28. Du et al., “The Social Burden of SARS,” 274–276.
29. APEC, “Commentaries & Analyses,” 261–267.
30. Potter, “A History of Influenza,” 572–579.
31. Voigtl€ander and Voth, “The Three Horsemen of Riches,” 774–811.
32. Ambrus et al., “Loss in the Time of Cholera,” 475–525.
33. Douglas, “Is the 1918 Influenza Pandemic Over?” 672–712.
16 B. GONG ET AL.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This article is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [71903172], the
Research Program for Humanities and Social Science Granted by Chinese Ministry of
Education [18YJC790034], Soft Science Research Program of Zhejiang Province
[2020C25020], and Academy of Social Governance, Zhejiang University.
JOURNAL OF CHINESE GOVERNANCE 17
Notes on Contributors
Binlei Gong is a tenured associate professor at China Academy for Rural Development and
the School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University.
Shurui Zhang is a PhD candidate at China Academy for Rural Development and the School
of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University.
Lingran Yuan is a PhD candidate at China Academy for Rural Development and the School
of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University.
Kevin Z. Chen is a chair professor at China Academy for Rural Development and the School
of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, and Senior Research Fellow at International Food
Policy Research Institute. Kevin Z. Chen is the corresponding author (kzchen@zju.edu.cn).
ORCID
Binlei Gong http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0615-9341
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