TC-122 Petitioners Compendium

[Type here]
TC-122
COMPENDIUM
FOR PETITIONERS
SCC Online Web Edition, Copyright © 2020
Page 7 Wednesday, June 24, 2020
Printed For: Anushka Mathur, National Law University
SCC Online Web Edition: http://www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: Supreme Court Cases
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Page 16 Thursday, June 25, 2020
Printed For: Harsha Menon, National Law University
TruePrint™ source: The Law Weekly
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
TruePrint™ source: The Law Weekly
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
tranquillity and are in theory offences against public order, the difference between
them being only a difference of degree, yet for the purpose of grading the punishment
to be inflicted in respect of them they may be classified into different minor categories
as has been done by the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, the Constitution, in formulating
the varying criteria for permissible legislation imposing restrictions on the fundamental
rights enumerated in Article 19(1), has placed in a distinct category those offences
against public order which aim at undermining the security of the State or
overthrowing it, and made their prevention the sole justification for legislative
abridgement of freedom of speech and expression, that is to say, nothing less than
endangering the foundations of the State or threatening its overthrow could justify
curtailment of the rights to freedom of speech and expression, while the right of
peaceable assembly “sub-clause (b)” and the right of association “sub-clause (c)” may
be restricted under clauses (3) and (4) of Article 19 in the interests of “public order”,
which in those clauses includes the security of the State. The differentiation is also
noticeable in Entry 3 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule, which refers
to the “security of a State” and “maintenance of public order” as distinct subjects of
legislation. The Constitution thus requires a line to be drawn in the field of public order
or tranquillity marking off, may be, roughly, the boundary between those serious and
aggravated forms of public disorder which are calculated to endanger the security of
the State and the relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely local significance,
treating for this purpose differences in degree as if they were differences in kind.
9. It is also worthy of note that the word “sedition” which occurred in Article 13(2)
of the Draft Constitution prepared by the Drafting Committee was deleted before the
article was finally passed as Article 19(2). In this connection it may be recalled that
the Federal Court had, in defining sedition in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. King-
Emperor8 held that “the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or
must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency”,
but the Privy Council overruled that decision and emphatically reaffirmed the view
expressed in Tilak case9 to the effect that “the offence consisted in exciting or
attempting to excite in others certain bad feelings towards the Government and not in
exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance,
great or small” — King-Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao10. Deletion of the word
“sedition” from the draft Article 13(2), therefore, shows that criticism of Government
exciting disaffection or bad feelings towards it is not to be regarded as a justifying
ground for restricting the freedom of expression and of the press, unless it is such as
to undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the State. It is also significant that
the corresponding Irish formula of “undermining the public order or the authority of
the State” [Article 40(6)(i)) of the Constitution of Eire, (1937)] did not apparently find
favour with the framers of the Indian Constitution. Thus, very narrow and stringent
limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgement of the right of free speech
and expression, and this was doubtless due to the realisation that freedom of speech
and of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic organisations, for without free
political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the
processes of popular Government, is possible. A freedom of such amplitude might
involve risks of abuse. But the framers of the Constitution may well have reflected,
with Madison who was “the leading spirit in the preparation of the First Amendment of
the Federal Constitution”, that “it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to
their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those
yielding the proper fruits”. (Quoted in Near v. Minnesotta11 ).
10. We are therefore of opinion that unless a law restricting freedom of speech and
expression is directed solely against the undermining of the security of the State or
the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under clause (2) of
Article 19, although the restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been conceived
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
order. It will be noticed that the language employed in the amended clause is ‘in
the interests of’ and not ‘for the maintenance of’. As one of us pointed out in Debi
Saran v. State of Bihar, the expression ‘in the interests of’ makes the ambit of the
protection very wide. A law may not have been designed to directly maintain public
order and yet it may have been enacted in the interests of public order.”
Though the observations quoted above do not directly bear upon the present
controversy, they throw a good deal of light upon the ambit of the power of the
legislature to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right
of freedom of speech and expression.
24. In this case, we are directly concerned with the question how far the offence, as
defined in Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code, is consistent with the fundamental
right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which is in these terms:
“19. (1) All citizens shall have the right—
(a) to freedom of speech and expression….”
This guaranteed right is subject to the right of the legislature to impose reasonable
restrictions, the ambit of which is indicated by clause (2), which, in its amended form,
reads as follows;
“(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any
existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, insofar as such law imposes
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause
in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States,
public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence.”
It has not been questioned before us that the fundamental right guaranteed by Article
19(1)(a) of the freedom of speech and expression is not an absolute right. It is
common ground that the right is subject to such reasonable restrictions as would
come within the purview of clause (2), which comprises (a) security of the State, (b)
friendly relations with foreign States, (c) public order, (d) decency or morality, etc.
etc. With reference to the constitutionality of Section 124-A or Section 505 of the
Indian Penal Code, as to how far they are consistent with the requirements of clause
(2) of Article 19 with particular reference to security of the State and public order, the
section, it must be noted, penalises any spoken or written words or signs or visible
representations, etc. which have the effect of bringing, or which attempt to bring into
hatred or contempt or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the
Government established by law. Now, the expression “the Government established by
law” has to be distinguished from the persons for the time being engaged in carrying
on the administration. “Government established by law” is the visible symbol of the
State. The very existence of the State will be in jeopardy if the Government
established by law is subverted. Hence, the continued existence of the Government
established by law is an essential condition of the stability of the State. That is why
“sedition”, as the offence in Section 124-A has been characterised, comes, under
Chapter VI relating to offences against the State. Hence, any acts within the meaning
of Section 124-A which have the effect of subverting the Government by bringing that
Government into contempt or hatred, or creating disaffection against it, would be
within the penal statute because the feeling of disloyalty to the Government
established by law or enmity to it imports the idea of tendency to public disorder by
the use of actual violence or incitement to violence. In other words, any written or
spoken words, etc. which have implicit in them the idea of subverting Government by
violent means, which are compendiously included in the term “revolution”, have been
made penal by the section in question. But the section has taken care to indicate
clearly that strong words used to express disapprobation of the measures of
Government with a view to their improvement or alteration by lawful means would not
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
interpretation of the words in question. In that case, the Court had to choose between
a definition of the expression “Prize Competitions” as limited to those competitions
which were of a gambling character and those which were not. The Court chose the
former interpretation which made the rest of the provisions of the Act, Prize
Competitions Act (42 of 1955), with particular reference to Sections 4 and 5 of the Act
and Rules 11 and 12 framed thereunder, valid. The Court held that the penalty
attached only to those competitions which involved the element of gambling and those
competitions in which success depended to a substantial degree on skill were held to
be out of the purview of the Act. The ratio decidendi in that case, in our opinion,
applied to the case in hand insofar as we propose to limit its operation only to such
activities as come within the ambit of the observations of the Federal Court, that is to
say, activities involving incitement to violence or intention or tendency to create public
disorder or cause disturbance of public peace.
28. We do not think it necessary to discuss or to refer in detail to the authorities
cited and discussed in the reported case (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India18
at pp. 940-52. We may add that the provisions of the impugned sections, impose
restrictions on the fundamental freedom of speech and expression, but those
restrictions cannot but be said to be in the interest of public order and within the
ambit of permissible legislative interference with that fundamental right.
29. It is only necessary to add a few observations with respect to the
constitutionality of Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code. With reference to each of the
three clauses of the section, it will be found that the gravamen of the offence is
making, publishing or circulating any statement, rumour or report (a) with intent to
cause or which is likely to cause any member of the Army, Navy or Air Force to mutiny
or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty as such; or (b) to cause fear or alarm to the
public or a section of the public which may induce the commission of an offence
against the State or against public tranquillity; or (c) to incite or which is likely to
incite one class or community of persons to commit an offence against any other class
or community. It is manifest that each one of the constituent elements of the offence
under Section 505 has reference to, and a direct effect on, the security of the State or
public order. Hence, these provisions would not exceed the bounds of reasonable
restrictions on the right of freedom of speech and expression. It is clear, therefore,
that clause (2) of Article 19 clearly saves the section from the vice of
unconstitutionality.
30. It has not been contended before us on behalf of the appellant in Cr. A. No. 169
of 1957 or on behalf of the respondents in the other Appeals (Nos. 124-26 of 1958)
that the words used by them did not come within the purview of the definition of
sedition as interpreted by us. No arguments were advanced before us to show that
even on the interpretation given by us their cases did not come within the mischief of
the one or the other section, as the case may be. It follows, therefore, that the
Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1957 has to be dismissed. Criminal Appeals Nos. 124-26 of
1958 will be remanded to the High Court to pass such order as it thinks fit and proper
in the light of the interpretation given by us.
———
* Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 9th April, 1956, of the Patna High Court in Cr. A.
No. 445 of 1955.

** Appeals from the Judgment and Order dated 16-5-1958, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos.
76 and 1081 of 1955 and Cr. Misc. Writ No. 2371 of 1955
1
(1958) ILR 2 ALL 84
2 (1942) FCR 38
3 (1892) ILR 19 Cal 35
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
b)———
c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of
persons to commit any offence against any other class or community, shall be
punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or
with both.”
9. I am not able to understand how these sections could be utilised assuming what
is stated in Ext. P1 is true. Criticising the present judicial set up or functioning of the
Parliament or Legislative Assemblies cannot be considered as bringing into hatred or
contempt or exciting or attempting to excite disaffection towards the Government
established by law. Nor are the slogans alleged to have been shouted by the
petitioners capable of inciting any class or community of persons to commit any
offence. I might add that seldom a day has passed in the State for the last three
decades when such or similar slogans have not been shouted in one or other part of
the State.
10. The scope of S. 124-A of the IPC. has been restricted by the Supreme Court to
cases in which the speech, writing or other activity of the accused was prejudicial to
public order or public security as it is only in such cases that it could he said that the
attack was directed against the Government established by law. The approach to the
question whether any action brings into hatred or contempt or excites disaffection
towards the government should be in the following way. First, the true meaning of the
words, the innuendo they convey and the covert meaning, if any, they have, have to
be gathered. Secondly, their probable or natural effect has to be seen. In other words,
whether they are calculated to produce the result, in hatred, contempt or disaffection
towards the Government. Thirdly, if they do, the intention of the author of the words
to produce that result has to be ascertained. As the Supreme Court has observed in
Kader Nath's case (AIR. 1962 SC 955) the provisions of S. 124A should be limited in
its application to acts involving an intention or tendency to create disorder or
disturbance of law and order or incitment to violence. The ventilation of grievances
against officers by means of articles, pamphlets or by demonstrations would not fall
within the mischief of S. 505(c). Shouting slogans for a classless society or against the
privileged or for establishment of socialism will not come within the mischief of the
provision. I therefore quash the proceedings in Crime No. 55/81 of the Mannantody
Police Station pending before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Mannantody.
S.M.
11. Allowed.
———
Disclaimer: While every effort is made to avoid any mistake or omission, this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/ regulation/ circular/
notification is being circulated on the condition and understanding that the publisher would not be liable in any manner by reason of any mistake
or omission or for an y action taken or omitted to be taken or advice rendered or accepted on the basis of this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/
rule/ regulation/ circular/ notification. All disputes will be subject exclusively to jurisdiction of courts, tribun als and forums at Lucknow only. The
authenticity of this text must be verified from the original source.
© EBC Publishing Pvt.Ltd., Lucknow.

Printed For: Harsha Menon, National Law University
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Printed For: rashi jeph, National Law University
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Printed For: Anurag Singh, National Law University
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Printed For: Anurag Singh, National Law University
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
citizens to go wherever they like in the Indian territory without any kind of restriction
whatsoever. They can move not merely from one State to another but from one place
to another within the same State and what the Constitution lays stress upon is that
the entire Indian territory is one unit so far as the citizens are concerned. Clause (c) of
Section 4(1) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, authorises the Provincial
Government or the District Magistrate to direct any person to remove himself from any
area and prohibit him from entering the same. On the face of it such provision
represents an interference with the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d)
of the Constitution. The controversy, therefore, narrows down to this, whether the
impugned legislation is saved by reason of its being within the permissible limits
prescribed by clause (5) of Article 19.
23. With regard to clause (5), the learned Attorney-General points out at the outset
that the word “reasonable” occurring in the clause qualifies “restrictions” and not
“law”. It is argued that in applying the clause, all that we have to see is whether the
restrictions that are imposed upon the exercise of the right by law are reasonable or
not and we have not to enquire into the reasonableness or otherwise of the law itself.
The reasonableness of the restrictions can be judged, according to the learned
Attorney-General, from the nature of the restrictions themselves and not from the
manner in which or the authorities by which they are imposed. The question whether
the operation of the law produces hardship in individual cases is also a matter which is
quite irrelevant to our enquiry.
24. I do agree that in clause (5) the adjective “reasonable” is predicated of the
restrictions that are imposed by law and not of the law itself; but that does not mean
that in deciding the reasonableness or otherwise of the restrictions, we have to confine
ourselves to an examination of the restrictions in the abstract with reference merely to
their duration or territorial extent, and that it is beyond our province to look up to the
circumstances under which or the manner in which the restrictions have been
imposed. It is not possible to formulate an effective test which would enable us to
pronounce any particular restriction to be reasonable or unreasonable per se. All the
attendant circumstances must be taken into consideration and one cannot dissociate
the actual contents of the restrictions from the manner of their imposition or the mode
of putting them into practice. The question of reasonableness of the restrictions
imposed by a law may arise as much from the substantive part of the law as from its
procedural portion. Thus, although I agree with the learned Attorney-General that the
word “reasonable” in clause (5) of Article 19 goes with “restrictions” and not with
“law”, I cannot accept his suggestion as regards the proper way of determining the
reasonableness of the restrictions which a legislation might impose upon the exercise
of the right of free movement.
25. Coming now to the provisions of the impugned Act, Mr Banerjee's main
contention is that Section 4(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, which provides
for passing of orders removing a person from a particular area, on the satisfaction of
the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate, cannot be a reasonable piece of
legislation inasmuch as the only pre-requisite for imposition of the restrictions is the
personal satisfaction of certain individuals or authorities, the propriety or
reasonableness of which cannot be tested by the application of any external rule or
standard. It is said that any law which places the liberty of a subject at the mercy of
an executive officer, however high placed he might be and whose action cannot be
reviewed by a judicial tribunal, is an arbitrary and not a reasonable exercise of
legislative powers. The contention requires careful examination.
26. It is not disputed that under clause (5) of Article 19, the reasonableness of a
challenged legislation has to be determined by a court and the court decides such
matters by applying some objective standard which is said to be the standard of an
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Police removed the defect, if any. As has been stated already, on 30th July, 1951, the
petitioner himself by a letter written to the Commissioner of Police sought his
permission to stay at Kalyan which is within the State of Bombay. His request was
acceded to and the Police actually took him to Kalyan on the evening of 30th. We think
that, in these circumstances, the order made on 23rd July, 1951, might be construed
to be an order of externment from Greater Bombay and though there was a mistake
regarding the place where the externee was to remove himself to, the mistake was
rectified by the petitioner choosing Kalyan as the place of residence and that choice
being accepted and given effect to by the Police Department. We do not think that in
these circumstances there is really any substance in the first point raised by Mr
Umrigar.
7. The second point urged by the learned counsel raises the question as to whether
Section 27(1) of the City of Bombay Police Act has imposed restrictions upon the
fundamental right of a citizen which is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the
Constitution and being in conflict with this fundamental right is void and inoperative
under Article 13(1) of the Constitution. There can be no doubt that the provision of
Section 27(1) of the Bombay Act was made in the interest of the general public and to
protect them against dangerous and bad characters whose presence in a particular
locality may jeopardize the peace and safety of the citizens. The question, therefore, is
whether the restrictions that this law imposes upon the rights of free movement of a
citizen, come within the purview of clause (5) of Article 19 of the Constitution; or in
other words whether the restrictions are reasonable? It is perfectly true that the
determination of the question as to whether the restrictions imposed by a legislative
enactment upon the fundamental rights of a citizen enunciated in Article 19(1)(d) of
the Constitution are reasonable or not within the meaning of clause (5) of the article
would depend as much upon the procedural part of the law as upon its substantive
part; and the court has got to look in each case to the circumstances under which and
the manner in which the restrictions have been imposed. The maximum duration of
the externment order made under Section 27(1) of the Bombay Act is a period of two
years and the Commissioner of Police can always permit the externee to enter the
prohibited area even before the expiration of that period. Having regard to the class of
cases to which this sub-section applies and the menace which an externment order
passed under it is intended to avert, it is difficult to say that this provision is
unreasonable. The Commissioner of Police can in a proper case cancel the externment
order any moment he likes, if, in his opinion, the return of the externee to the area
from which he was removed ceases to be attended with any danger to the community.
As regards the procedure to be followed in such cases, Section 27(4) of the Act lays
down that before an order of externment is passed against any person; the
Commissioner of Police or any officer authorized by him shall inform such person, in
writing, of the general nature of the material allegations against him and give him a
reasonable opportunity of explaining these allegations. He is permitted to appear
through an advocate, or an Attorney and can file a written statement and examine
witnesses for the purpose of clearing his character. The only point which Mr Umrigar
attempts to make in regard to the reasonableness of this procedure is that the
suspected person is not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses who deposed against
him and on whose evidence the proceedings were started. In our opinion this by itself
would not make the procedure unreasonable having regard to the avowed intention of
the legislature in making the enactment. The law is certainly an extraordinary one and
has been made only to meet those exceptional cases where no witnesses for fear of
violence to their person or property are willing to depose publicly against certain bad
characters whose presence in certain areas constitute a menace to the safety of the
public residing therein. This object would be wholly defeated if a right to confront or
cross-examine these witnesses was given to the suspect. The power to initiate
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
W.P.(C).TEMP NO.84 , 129,
132,148 & 163 OF 2020
11
“C.R.”
====================
WP(C).TMP.Nos. 84, 129, 132, 148 & 163 of 2020
====================
ORDER
Dated this the 24th day of April, 2020
Devan Ramachandran, J.
These writ petitions, filed by the petitioners ad vindictam
publicam, calls into focus, inter alia along with other issues, certain
confidentiality concerns quad hoc a contract (hereinafter “the
contract” or “impugned contract” for short) entered into by the
Government of Kerala with a Company by name Sprinklr Inc.
(hereinafter called Sprinklr for convenience) – which is stated to be
a “modern digital communication infrastructure” provider – to make
available an online digital software/platform to process and analyse
data with regard to patients and those vulnerable and susceptible to

W.P.(C).TEMP NO.84 , 129,
132,148 & 163 OF 2020
19
search of entities outside India when there are several Companies in
India equally or more competent; and that had they approached the
Government of India, they would have been able to give the same or
better support to them, as are now been stated to be offered by
Sprinklr, through the National Informatics Centre (NIC).
16. The learned Assistant Solicitor General then appraised us
that the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY)
is firm in their resolve that sensitive personal data of Indian citizens
should always be in the control of the State and should necessarily
be stored in the State Data Centres or in the National Data Centres.
He then said that the Government of Kerala has to ensure that the
data is collected only for the purposes for which it is required; that
they should anonymise all such before it is shared with any third
party service providers for a due cause; and that such personal data
should be confirmed to have been purged after completion of the
purposes for which it has been collected.
17. We must record at this juncture that after we heard the
learned Assistant Solicitor General of India on the afore lines, the
learned Additional Advocate General conceded that there is no

W.P.(C).TEMP NO.84 , 129,
132,148 & 163 OF 2020
22
also so as to enable this Court to obtain an overall control over the
conduct of the parties in terms of the contract with respect to data
confidentiality.
23. We are also guided to do so, impelled by the singular
intent to ensure that there is no “data epidemic” after the COVID-19
epidemic is controlled.
24. Resultantly:
(a) We hereby direct the Government of Kerala and its
concerned Departments to anonymise all the data that have been
collected and collated from the citizens of the State with respect to
the COVID-19 epidemic, as also with respect to all data to be
collected in the future and to allow Sprinklr to have further access to
any such data only after the process of anonymisation is completed.
(b) The Government of Kerala is directed to inform every
citizen, from whom data is to be taken in future, that such data is
likely to be accessed by Sprinklr or other third party service
providers and their specific consent to such effect shall be obtained
in the necessary forms or formats.

TC-122 Petitioners Compendium

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

TC-122 Petitioners Compendium

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

[Type here]

No. 445 of 1955.

© EBC Publishing Pvt.Ltd., Lucknow.

Dated this the 24th day of April, 2020

These writ petitions, filed by the petitioners ad vindictam

confidentiality concerns quad hoc a contract (hereinafter “the

contract” or “impugned contract” for short) entered into by the

Government of Kerala with a Company by name Sprinklr Inc.

(hereinafter called Sprinklr for convenience) – which is stated to be

a “modern digital communication infrastructure” provider – to make

available an online digital software/platform to process and analyse

data with regard to patients and those vulnerable and susceptible to

search of entities outside India when there are several Companies in

better support to them, as are now been stated to be offered by

Sprinklr, through the National Informatics Centre (NIC).

16. The learned Assistant Solicitor General then appraised us

that the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY)

is firm in their resolve that sensitive personal data of Indian citizens

should always be in the control of the State and should necessarily

be stored in the State Data Centres or in the National Data Centres.

should be confirmed to have been purged after completion of the

purposes for which it has been collected.

17. We must record at this juncture that after we heard the

learned Assistant Solicitor General of India on the afore lines, the

learned Additional Advocate General conceded that there is no

also so as to enable this Court to obtain an overall control over the

conduct of the parties in terms of the contract with respect to data

23. We are also guided to do so, impelled by the singular

intent to ensure that there is no “data epidemic” after the COVID-19

(a) We hereby direct the Government of Kerala and its

concerned Departments to anonymise all the data that have been

the COVID-19 epidemic, as also with respect to all data to be

collected in the future and to allow Sprinklr to have further access to

any such data only after the process of anonymisation is completed.

(b) The Government of Kerala is directed to inform every

citizen, from whom data is to be taken in future, that such data is

likely to be accessed by Sprinklr or other third party service

providers and their specific consent to such effect shall be obtained

in the necessary forms or formats.

You might also like