Plotinus' Account of Participation in Ennead VI.

4-5
Steven K. Strange

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 30, Number 4, October 1992,

pp. 479-496 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1992.0068

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/226185/summary

[ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ]
 Plotinus' Account of
Participation in Ennead VI.4- 5
STEVEN K. S T R A N G E

1. THE PROJECT OF ENNEAD VI. 4-5

IN THE INTRODUCTION TO the third book o f his c o m m e n t a r y on Plato's

Parmenides (p. 784 Cousin), Proclus lists f o u r p r o b l e m s c o n c e r n i n g the T h e o r y
o f I d e a s which it was a p p a r e n t l y traditional to discuss in c o m m e n t i n g on the
first p a r t o f t h a t dialogue. T h e s e are: (1) w h e t h e r Ideas exist, (2) which things
have Ideas c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e m a n d which do not, (3) w h a t is the n a t u r e o f
the Ideas, a n d (4) in w h a t way sensible things participate in Ideas. l T h e f o u r t h
p r o b l e m on Proclus' list, like the second, is c o n n e c t e d with a specific puzzle
f r o m the first p a r t o f the Parmenides. T h i s is the difficulty that P a r m e n i d e s
raises at P a r m . 13 l a 4 - 6 , namely, w h e t h e r what participates in an I d e a does so
by participating in the whole o f it, in a p a r t o f it, or in s o m e o t h e r way. T h i s
puzzle is o f t e n r e f e r r e d to as the 'sailcloth d i l e m m a ' , f r o m the e x a m p l e that
P a r m e n i d e s uses to illustrate it at ~3 ~b 7 - 9 . I will r e f e r to the associated p r o b -
lem, for the sake o f c o n v e n i e n c e , as "the p r o b l e m o f participation." My p u r -
pose in what follows will be to try to clarify Plotinus' position with respect to
this p r o b l e m . I t h i n k that s o m e i m p o r t a n t details o f his position h a v e not b e e n
fully g r a s p e d by c o m m e n t a t o r s . I also think that a m o r e a d e q u a t e g r a s p o f his
position m a y h e l p us b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d Plotinus' general view o f the m e t a p h y s -
ics o f the sensible world.
No p h i l o s o p h e r o f the i m p e r i a l p e r i o d would have c o u n t e d as a Platonist
who did not a f f i r m the existence o f the I d e a s , ' but it is e v i d e n t f r o m Proclus'

A similar list is given by Syrianus, In Meta. io8.31 ft. Syrianus adds the question whether
anything else besides sensible items participate in Ideas. On this issue in Plotinus, cf. below, p.486
a n d n. *3-
"Cf. Atticus apud Eusebius PE 15.13.4 fir. 9.29 ft. des Places), who equates abandoning the
Ideas with abandoning Platonism. Proclus (In Parm. IV. init., p. 837 Cousin) mentions certain
people who thought, as do some modern commentators, that Parmenides is presented in the
Parmenides as attacking the Theory of Ideas. However, even these thinkers, if they were Platonists

[479]
480 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3o:4 OCTOBER 1992

commentary as well as from earlier sources, such as the Middle Platonic hand-
book the Didaskalikos, that there was a considerable a m o u n t of controversy
among ancient Platonists concerning the other three questions on Proclus' list,
as indeed there still is among interpreters of Plato today. No doubt these
controversies had already arisen at the very earliest period o f systematic com-
mentary on Plato: they are for instance reflected in the traditional subtitle of
the Parmenides, On the Ideas. Indeed the first part o f the Parmenides itself,
together with what we know o f Aristotle's own treatise On the Ideas, provides
clear evidence that these controversies date to the Academy of Plato's time,
and their persistence suggests that they are not merely difficulties of exegesis,
but that they reach to the core o f the Theory of Ideas as a philosophical
position, and hence touch the essence of Platonism itself.
Plotinus in the Enneads addresses all four of the traditional problems about
the Ideas that are mentioned by Proclus. The question o f what sorts of things
have Ideas corresponding to them is briefly discussed in the early scholastic
treatise on intellect and the Ideas, V. 9 [5] 9 -x2, and Plotinus returns to the
specific controversy over whether there are Ideas of individuals (cf. V. 9.12) in
another treatise o f the first period, V. 7 [I8]. He does not devote much space
to arguments for the existence of Ideas. This is perhaps due to the fact that he
is writing for an audience o f committed Platonists who would have already
been convinced by such arguments, but it may also be because he is more
interested in the deeper and for him more important issue about the nature of
the Ideas and their relation to the intellect, on which we know his views were
considered unusual and controversial,s and where he evidently thought that
Plato's real view had been misunderstood. Indeed, the attempt to develop,
clarify, and justify Plotinus' intuitions about the nature and mode of existence
of the Ideas as the contents of intelligible reality is one of the principal themes
of the Enneads.
It is clear that Plotinus also thought that the problem of the nature of
participation, because of its great difficulty, had not been properly under-
stood either. Here too he expends a great deal of effort on trying to get clear
about what the right view on the question is, in the course of which he presents
an original and very interesting solution to the problem, to be discussed in
what follows. His main treatments of the problem of participation are re-
stricted to a few treatises of his early and middle periods. These include the
treatises concerned with sensible matter, i.e., II. 4 [12] along with II. 5 [25] 4 - 5

(or even Academics), probably did not wish to reject the theory themselves or to see Plato as
having done so, but thought that in the first part of the Parmenides Plato was merely cataloging
objections that had been raised against the theory.
s Porphyry, Life ofPlotinus ~ o . 8 6 - i o 4, eL also Life 18.8-19 and Enn. V . 5 . 1 - , .
 P L O T I N U S ' A C C O U N T OF P A R T I C I P A T I O N 481

on potentiality and matter and III.6 [~,6] ft. on its impassibility, but his most
important discussion of the topic is the long treatise VI.4- 5 [22-~3], which
bears the traditional title That Being Is Simultaneously Present as One and the Same
Thing Everywhere (I'le0~ ~o~ ~6 6v g'v xcx~,~cx~6 6v ~lxcx~avxcxXo~ E~VCtL6~,ov),
which has the problem o f participation as its main subject.
The treatise V I . 4 - 5 is rightly held to be among the most difficult and
obscure texts of the Enneads.4 It is particularly hard to follow the track of
Plotinus' argument in it, or to grasp the principles of its organization. Part of the
difficulty is due to Plotinus' practice o f writing commentary on commentaries--
Porphyry tells us that Plotinus characteristically wrote about issues that came up
in his seminar, which was organized a r o u n d discussions of standard commentar-
ies on Plato and Aristotle.5 Plotinus is clearly concerned in the treatise to coun-
ter various alternative accounts of the participation relation that had been given
by earlier commentators. But as usual he spends little time in expounding his
adversaries' views, apparently taking for granted that they will be familiar to his
audience--they come, after all, from the standard contemporary a u t h o r s - -
and devotes himself instead to the task of refuting them. Hence it is hard for us
to appreciate his tactics when we do not know precisely what these views were,
and cannot be sure of how they were presented, though it is a plausible assump-
tion that Plotinus knew them from preexisting commentary or commentaries
on Plato's Parmenides. 61 do think, however, that the argument o f the treatise can
be seen to follow some sort of plan, though certainly not a tightly organized one.
It may be useful if before taking up Plotinus' main thesis about participation in
VI.4-5 1 indicate briefly what I take the basic strategy of his argument in the
treatise to be.~

4 Von Kleist (below, n. 7), for instance, speaks of "die ausserordendiche Schwierigkeit dieser
Abhandlungen" (]ahresberichte, 2).
sCf L/re 14.10--16 with 4' no-a a and 5 . 6 o - 6 s . From the last of these passages it appears that
the kepha/a/a or summaries, now lost, that accompanied Porphyry's original edition o f the Enneads
may have been concerned in part to identify the original targets of Plotinus' arguments where this
would have been obscure to the reader.
6Unfortunately, Proclus in his Parmenides commentary does not name his sources for the
positions that he discusses, as he does in his commentary on the Timaeus, but it is highly likely that
many of them were Middle Platonic or even earlier. (Some useful suggestions along these lines
have been made by J o h n Dillon in the introductions to individual books of his and Glenn Mor-
row's translation of Proclus' commentary [Princeton, ~986].) Note that the commentators to
whom PIotinus is responding in V I . 4 - 5 all seem to treat the sailcloth dilemma as an aporia to be
solved, rather than as a destructive attack on the Theory of Ideas.
7A useful if not wholly successful attempt to provide a map of the argument o f the treatise
was made over a century ago by Hugo yon Kleist in two papers: '*Der Gedankengang in Plotins
erster Abhandlung tiber die Allgegenwart der intelligibeln in der wahrnehmbaren Welt: Enn.
VI.4," Jahresbericht der k6nigliches Gymnasium und Realschule I. Ordnung zu Flensburg, nr. ~35 (L88a):
1--28, and "Zu Plotins zweite~- Abhandlung tiber die Allgegenwart der intelligibeln in der
wahrnehmharen Welt: Enn. VI.5," Philologus 4 u (1884): 54-7 L For a summary of von Kleist's
account o f the general strategy o f the treatise, see pp. 54-55 of the latter paper.
482 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 0 " 4 OCTOBER 1 9 9 2
T h e treatise o p e n s , not with the p r o b l e m o f the m o d e o f participation o f
scnsibles in Ideas, b u t with a related p r o b l e m , namely, h o w soul is p r e s e n t to
sensible bodies in space, s T h i s h a d a l r e a d y b e e n the subject o f a n earlier
treatise, IV.2 [4], O n the Essence o f Soul.9 T h e p r o b l e m , briefly put, is t h a t soul
is i n c o r p o r e a l , a n d t h e r e f o r e , on Plotinus' view, without extension, yet accord-
ing to the Timaeus (36d) the W o r l d Soul e x t e n d s t h r o u g h o u t the sensible
universe, a n d o t h e r souls are also e x t e n d e d t h r o u g h o u t the bodies t h a t they
inhabit. H o w can soul, which is w i t h o u t m a g n i t u d e , c o m e to be p r e s e n t every-
w h e r e in an e x t e n d e d body, a n d is it b o d y o r soul itself that is the cause o f this
b e i n g so? T h i s is a serious difficulty f o r Plotinus, since in earlier treatises he
h a d said things that suggest a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y views on this point. I n
IV.2.1, 7 1 - 7 6 he h a d a r g u e d that the "divisibility" o f soul is d u e to body, a n d
is t h e r e f o r e accidental to it, while IV. 1, 9 statev~ that soul is by n a t u r e divisi-
ble, so that its divisibility c a n n o t be accidental to it. Plotinus also holds that the
p h e n o m e n a o f the n a t u r e o f sense p e r c e p t i o n r e q u i r e that the soul be p r e s e n t
as n u m e r i c a l l y the s a m e whole at e v e r y p o i n t o f its b o d y , " a n d that this is the
m e a n i n g o f Plato's s t a t e m e n t in the Timaeus (35 a) t h a t soul is c o m p o u n d e d o u t
o f indivisible ous/a a n d the sort o f ous/a that " b e c o m e s divisible a b o u t bodies."
B u t it is difficult to see how this can be, if soul is by its n a t u r e s o m e t h i n g
u n e x t e n d e d , as on Plotinus' view an i n c o r p o r e a l m u s t be.
T h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y c h a p t e r o f VI. 4 e n d s by a n n o u n c i n g an investigation
into the m o d e o f p r e s e n c e o f soul in body, with a view to resolving these
difficulties. T h i s is not, however, w h a t we get in the i m m e d i a t e l y following
passage. Plotinus instead t u r n s in VI.4.2 to the seemingly d i f f e r e n t question o f
h o w intelligible b e i n g can be p r e s e n t to the sensible world: the solution o f the
p r o b l e m a b o u t the p r e s e n c e o f soul is t h e r e f o r e a p p a r e n t l y to be d e v e l o p e d as
a corollary to the solution o f the m o r e g e n e r a l p r o b l e m o f participation o f
sensibles in space in Being. 12 Plotinus begins the second c h a p t e r o f VI. 4 with
an observation a b o u t the i n d e p e n d e n t existence o f the intelligible universe

SThis problem is mentioned by Galen, On the Characters of Soul 776.1o-a I Ktthn.

9See the discussions of this treatise by Eyjtlfur Kjalar Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception
(Cambridge, 1988), Io1--106, and "Reflections on Plotinus' Ennead IV.~," in Sven-Tage Teodors-
son, ed., Greek and Latin Studies in Memory of Caius Fabricius (G6teborg, 199o), 2o6-19.
'~ relative dating of IV. l is uncertain, even apart from doubts about the chronological
order of the treatises of Plotinus' early period, since it originally seems to have formed part of
III.9, Various Considerations, a collection of notes that, despite what Porphyry implies (LOee4.47),
were obviously written at different times (cf. P. Henry, Les itats du texte de Plotin [Paris, 196x], 36).
We perhaps cannot even take for granted that IVA does not predate IV.2.
"IV.a.~; cf. already IV. 7 Ill 5, 36-38 and 7.~6-28. This amounts to the claim that the
individual soul present at any point of a particular body cannot be distinguished numerically from
that present at any other point of the same body.
" I t is in fact reasonable to see the treatise as a whole as an extended commentary on both the
sailcloth passage of the Pa~aenides and on Timaeus 35a.
 P L O T I N U S ' ACCOUNT OF P A R T I C I P A T I O N 483
a n d the d e p e n d e n c e u p o n it o f its i m a g e , t h e sensible universe, a n o b s e r v a t i o n
that will g r o u n d w h a t we will see is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l m o v e in Plotinus' treat-
m e n t o f t h e p r o b l e m o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Plotinus observes t h a t t h e intelligible
universe, as t h e t r u e W h o l e (~6 r ~ z v , 2.1) o f P a r m e n i d e a n B e i n g ,
m u s t be sufficient u n t o itself f o r its o w n existence, a n d t h a t it c a n n o t in a n y
way be t r u e o f it t h a t it is a p a r t f r o m itself n o r in a n y t h i n g else (for this w o u l d
r e q u i r e t h e r e to be s o m e t h i n g o u t s i d e it), w h e r e a s a n y t h i n g else that exists
m u s t s o m e h o w be "in" a n d p a r t i c i p a t e in this t r u e Whole.~3 P l o t i n u s i m m e d i -
ately infers f r o m this w h a t will be t h e p r i n c i p a l thesis o f the treatise ( 2 . 1 7 - 2 5 ) :
(1) that w h a t participates in intelligible reality m u s t participate in the w h o l e o f
it, n o t a part, since that w o u l d i n v o l v e its b e i n g divided, a n d d o so n o t by v i r t u e
o f the intelligible W h o l e c o m i n g to be p r e s e n t to the p a r t i c i p a n t , w h i c h w o u l d
involve its g o i n g o u t s i d e itself, b u t c o n v e r s e l y by the p a r t i c i p a n t c o m i n g to be
p r e s e n t to it, a n d (2) t h a t f o r this r e a s o n the intelligible c a n be said to be
" e v e r y w h e r e " (xctvtctgo~), n o t in a n y spatial sense, b u t b e c a u s e it is "in itself"
as the t r u e W h o l e in w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g else participates, i.e., b e c a u s e e v e r y -
t h i n g else is p r e s e n t to it, r a t h e r t h a n v/ce versa.
T h e m a i n thesis o f t h e treatise has t h u s a l r e a d y b e e n i n d i c a t e d by t h e
m i d d l e o f the s e c o n d c h a p t e r , a l o n g with Plotinus' f u n d a m e n t a l g r o u n d f o r
e n d o r s i n g it. T h e rest o f t h e treatise, a p a r t f r o m a few digressions, is o c c u p i e d
with clarifying a n d a r t i c u l a t i n g this claim, w h i c h is certainly as yet u n c l e a r ,
rejecting alternatives to it ( f o r these, cf. VI.4.:5, x - 1 9 ; V I . 4 . 9 - i o), r e s p o n d i n g
to possible objections t h a t m i g h t be raised against it, a t t e m p t i n g to d e m o n -
strate it directly f r o m c o m m o n c o n c e p t i o n s a n d p r o p e r first principles,,4 a n d
a b o v e all t r y i n g to m a k e t h e thesis s e e m plausible o r at least n o t implausible,
f o r Plotinus is quite a w a r e t h a t it has c e r t a i n e x t r e m e l y p a r a d o x i c a l f e a t u r e s

,s On this passage, cf. Dominic J. O'Meara, "Being in Numenius and Plotinus: Some Points of
Comparison," Phronesis 2t 0976): 121 and n. 4. O'Meara speaks in this connection of Plotinus'
conception of "the integrity of Being." He rightly notes that Plotinus is here employing material
from Hypothesis II of the Parmendies (145 a - 146c), where Parmenides is made to argue that his
One Being cannot be "in another" ( ~ dO~.~). Von Kleist (]ahresberichte, 6-7 [see above, n. 7]
thinks that IV.4.2 is intended as an argument that participation must be immediate, that there can
be no middle term between participant and Being or the Ideas. Certainly Plotinus holds such a
view (see below, P.49o and n. 34), but it might be better to say that it is a consequence of his
argument here. Later on in the treatise he does argue against all alternatives that posit a mediated
form of participation.
'~ I do not think that von Kleist in his Philologus article, init: (above, n. 7) is correct in seeing
Plotinus' positive argument for the main thesis as coming in the first book VI.4, which is con-
cerned rather (with the exception of VI.4.~, which introduces the main thesis) with plausibility
arguments in favor of the thesis and dialectical arguments directed against alternatives to it. The
positive proof comes rather in VI.5.3- 7, and is appropriately introduced by the methodological
discussions in VI.5. t of the common conception of the omnipresence of god and in VI.5.2 of the
proper principles from which demonstrations of features of the nature of intelligible reality must
proceed.
484 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 o : 4 OCTOBER 1 9 9 2
a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s . H e r e t u r n s a n u m b e r o f times in the c o u r s e o f the treatise
to the initial p r o b l e m a b o u t the soul, in o r d e r to relate the m o r e g e n e r a l
discussion to it. First, t h e r e is his r e m a r k at VI.4.3, 1 9 - 2 3 t h a t the m o r e
g e n e r a l discussion shows that soul can i n d e e d be said to c o m e to be e x t e n d e d
accidentally, p r o v i d e d t h a t this is p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d (cf. 1 . 1 3 - a 7).'0 T h e r e
are two f u r t h e r discussions o f the o r i g i n a l difficulty a b o u t soul in VI.4: at w
1 6 - w a n d at w 1 6 7 (w167 is a digression o n eschatological is-
sues:6). Finally, in the two closing c h a p t e r s o f the treatise ( V I . 5 . 1 1 - 1 2 ) ,
Plotinus r e c u r s to the g e n e r a l c o n c e p t u a l p r o b l e m raised by VI. 4. t, i.e., h o w
s o m e t h i n g u n e x t e n d e d can also b e t h o u g h t o f as e x t e n d e d o v e r the whole o f
space, a n d tries o n c e m o r e to state clearly h o w this can b e so.

2. PLOTINUS ON THE NATURE OF PARTICIPATION

It m i g h t be objected t h a t t h e r e is really no distinction to be d r a w n b e t w e e n t h e
question o f h o w soul is p r e s e n t to body, the question with which V I . 4 opens, a n d
the p r o b l e m o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n - - a distinction that I have so f a r b e e n a s s u m i n g to
e x i s t - - f o r the r e a s o n that sensible things participate in I d e a s f o r Plotinus en-
tirely t h r o u g h t h e a g e n c y o f souls.~7 T h i s latter claim is certainly true. Plotinus
s t a n d a r d l y distinguishes b e t w e e n the logos o f soul, t h e a n a l o g u e in his system o f
the Stoic s p e r m a t i c logos, t h r o u g h which the soul acts on the m a t t e r o f its b o d y ,
a n d the I d e a in Nous o f which this soul-logos is an i m a g e (e.g., VI.7. 4, 5 - 9 with
5 . 6 - 1 3 ; VI.3-15), while such passages as I I.6. a, 4 o - 4 2 reveal his belief t h a t all
c o r p o r e a l p r o p e r t i e s a r e s u p p o s e d to arise t h r o u g h the action o f such soul-
logoi.'s It has o f t e n b e e n n o t e d that V I . 4 - 5 is r e m a r k a b l e in its failure to d r a w
this distinction b e t w e e n the I d e a a n d the soul-logos. But the r e a s o n f o r this m u s t
be that Plotinus d o e s n o t see the distinction as b e i n g r e l e v a n t to his p u r p o s e s
here. T h e activity o f t h e soul t h r o u g h its logos in s h a p i n g m a t t e r is w h a t we
m i g h t call its " d e m i u r g i c " activity, having to d o with the production o f sensible

~sThe view that the soul is accidentally present to body is attributed by Nemesius (On the
Nature of Man w 69-72 Matthei, 17.16--17 and 18.15-22 Morani [-- Numenius fr. 4b des Places])
to Numenius and to Plotinus' teacher Ammonius Saccas. (I owe this observation to Eyj61fur K.
Emilsson.) It is therefore quite interesting that Plotinus is concerned to vindicate this view.
,s The final two lines of VI.4. t6, 47-48 explicitly mark the end of this digression. The phrase
zSv ~j~xQx~g%6yov there means the discussion of the main thesis about participation: cf. z6
~ctQx~g VI.5. 3, t 9, which is also a reference to the thesis.
,7 Something like this claim seems to be involved in the view of participation proposed by
Jonathan Scott Lee, "The Doctrine of Reception according to the Capacity of the Recipient in
Ennead VI.4-5," Dionysius 3 0979): 79-97. See also Lee's dissertation, The Omnipresenceof Being: A
Study in Plotinian Metaphysics (University of Connecticut, 1978) and his "Omnipresence, Participa-
tion, and Eidetic Causation in Plotinus," in R. B. Harris, ed., The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic
Approach (Albany, 1982), 9o-lo3 .
,s VI. 1.9, 4 -8 (cf. ~8) shows that Plotinus thinks of logoi as the causes of participation in Form
(eidos).
 PLOTINUS' ACCOUNT OF PARTICIPATION 485
properties: this w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d to s o m e t h i n g like Aristotclian efficient cau-
sality. Participation, h o w e v e r , which is w h a t Plotinus is c o n c e r n e d with in o u r
treatise, c o r r e s p o n d s r a t h e r to formal causality, that is, not to the e x p l a n a t i o n o f
how s o m e t h i n g comes to have a certain p r o p e r t y , but r a t h e r to the e x p l a n a t i o n o f
what it is f o r it to h a v e that p r o p e r t y : h e r e the p r o d u c t i v e o r d e m i u r g i c activity o f
the soul does not e n t e r into the e x p l a n a t i o n . ' 9 G r a n t e d , as we shall see, Plotinus
tends to describe participation in o u r treatise in r a t h e r " d y n a m i c " terms, b u t I
think that this m u s t be i n t e r p r e t e d in s o m e o t h e r way t h a n in t e r m s o f the
b r i n g i n g a b o u t o f the p r o p e r t y in question.
Plotinus in fact carefully distinguishes in V I . 4 - 5 b e t w e e n the p r o b l e m o f
participation a n d that o f the p r e s e n c e o f soul to body. Nevertheless the two
p r o b l e m s a r e t r e a t e d as parallel a n d are clearly s u p p o s e d to have similar
solutions, so that the latter p r o b l e m a l m o s t s e e m s a special case o f the f o r m e r .
T h i s is because soul, like the I d e a , is a n i n c o r p o r e a l substance, a n d h e n c e they
are p r e s e n t to sensibles, i.e., bodies, in a n a l o g o u s ways. But the two cases
differ in that soul a p p e a r s as extended in b o d y , p r e s e n t whole in the s a m e way
at each point o f it, w h e r e a s we n e e d not t h i n k o f an I d e a as being equally
participated by each p a r t o f a participant. F o r instance, I participate wholly in
the I d e a o f H u m a n i t y , as does e v e r y o t h e r h u m a n being, b u t no p r o p e r p a r t
o f m e is a h u m a n . E v e n in the case o f those I d e a s that a r e participated by p a r t s
o f their participants, e.g., color, we m i g h t n o t want to say that the parts m u s t
participate in the s a m e way: two d i f f e r e n t p a r t s o f the s a m e white thing a r e
ipsofacto a c c o r d i n g to Plotinus n u m e r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t white things (VI. 4.1, ~ 3 -
24, r e p e a t i n g the d o c t r i n e o f IV.2.1, 4 7 - 5 o ) , ~~ whereas it is numerically the
same soul that is p r e s e n t at each p o i n t o f its body. Plotinus m i g h t also r e f u s e to
call the p r e s e n c e o f soul in b o d y a case o f participation because t h e r e is n o
single p r o p e r t y which is possessed by a b o d y in virtue o f its soul: r a t h e r , the
soul is what c o n f e r s u p o n the b o d y the capability o f h a v i n g all o f its o t h e r
properties. ~'

,9 Note that demiurgic production and participation are treated separately in Timaeus, the
former under the works of Intellect, the latter under the works of Necessity. Participation is also
connected in Plato with the "second-best" causes of the Phaedo, which are not to be conceived as
efficient causes. Plotinus does not distinguish in our treatise between efficient and formal causal-
ity, and operates with an undifferentiated notion of cause as that which produces its effect and
without which the effect cannot exist (VI.4. l o, 6-15)- Nevertheless, the very claim he makes in
this passage--that it is the mode of arrangement of the paint, not the painter, that "produces" or
causes the image in a painting--shows the need to distinguish between something like formal and
efficient causality. Elsewhere, however, he does draw precisely this distinction between the
demiurgic activity of soul and formal causality (V.9.2, 16-18).
'~Note that Plotinus' view involves a peculiar interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of
nonsubstantial individuals of Categories w
"Except, perhaps, the property of being alive, which the soul may be responsible for directly.
486 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3o:4 OCTOBER 1992

As a matter o f technical usage, Plotinus is prepared to speak of participa-

tion (~tezdkvl~tg, ~t~0e~tg) whenever an item possesses a property in virtue o f
something different from itself or its own essence (cf. 1.6 [x] x, 12--14, V. 9 [5]
2, 15 and VI. 9 [9] 2.~3-24 with VI.4.13, 6-8). He calls the converse o f this
relation "presence" (~ra~ovo~a,,, cf. VI.6 [34] 14, 27-4a). All three terms are
taken from Plato's dialogues. He sometimes allows himself to speak not only o f
sensibles but also of intelligible items and souls as possessing properties by
participation in Ideas (e.g., V.5. 5, 12; 111.8.5, 12), and in so doing he may be
taking sides in an important controversy about the structure of the T h e o r y of
Ideas. We know that Plotinus' students Amelius and Porphyry differed over
whether anything other than sensibles should be said to participate in Ideas:
Plotinus' practice on this point agrees with Amelius' view.,3 But since the
problem of participation as presented in Plato's Parmenides concerns only the
participation of sensible things in Ideas, I will restrict myself in what follows to
consideration o f participation in this sense (cf. V.9.5, 3 6 - 3 8 and 1.6.1, 12-14,
which concern the participation of sensibles in Ideas). VI.3. 9, 27-3o, which
asserts that a particular man, e.g., Socrates, is man by participation in the Idea
of Man, shows that sensible particulars are supposed to have even what we
would think of as their essential attributes by participation.
Plotinus therefore sees participation as an explanatory or causal relation,
and Ideas as the causes of the properties of sensible things. This is wholly
faithful to Plato's formulations o f the Theory of Ideas. T h e Ideas or Forms
for Plato are defined by two characteristics: they are the objects of ideal
knowledge or understanding, and they are causes of the properties of particu-
lars. When we first encounter the notion of Forms in Plato, at Euthyphro 5-6,
they are not yet conceived as separate from sensibles, yet even there they are
what the expert, say, on piety, knows in virtue of his knowledge, and they are
also what makes pious things pious and so forth. T h e picture of Forms in the
Euthyphro presupposes a very simple account of how they perform this latter
causal or explanatory funtion: Ideas themselves possess the property of which
they are the cause, they are present in the participant--it is this aspect of the
Euthyphro picture that Plato abandons when he later separates the I d e a s - - a n d
they cause the participant to have the relevant property in the same way that
fire was supposed by Presocratic physicists to make things hot, by communicat-
ing its own innate heat to that in which it was present (cf. 1.2.~, 31 ft.). T h e

,2 For the Old A c a d e m i c use o f this t e r m , see Phaedo aood a n d Eudemian Ethics 1218b 9.
,s Cf. Syrianus In Meta. lO 9.1 ff. for this controversy (see n. 1 above). According to Syrianus,
Amelius could also appeal to the authority o f Numenius and C r o n i u s on this point. T h e contro-
versy is connected with i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the the " c o m m u n i o n o f Forms" o f the Sophist, a n d with
the challenge that Socrates raises to Zeno at Parmenides 1 2 9 b l - 3 a n d 129e2-13oa2 (cf. Proclus'
c o m m e n t a r y o n these passage).
 PLOTINUS' ACCOUNT OF PARTICIPATION 487
Forms, then, on Plato's earliest view, a r e like masses o r stuffs that essentially
possess p r o p e r t i e s a n d that c o m m u n i c a t e these p r o p e r t i e s to participants by
virtue o f b e i n g p r e s e n t in a n d literally parcelled out a m o n g their participants.
T h e g r e a t a d v a n t a g e o f this early view o f F o r m s o r I d e a s is that it provides
an easy way o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g the participation relation.,4 H o w e v e r , Plato h a d
come to reject this view o f the I d e a s by the time he wrote the Phaedo, p r o b a b l y
for a n u m b e r o f reasons: it did n o t allow f o r an account o f the characteristi-
cally i m p e r f e c t participation o f sensibles in Ideas, s o m e t h i n g that by t h e n h a d
m a d e a d e e p i m p r e s s i o n o n him; it also m a d e I d e a s look to be c o r p o r e a l a n d ,
as e x t e n d e d masses, to possess an insufficient d e g r e e o f unity. C o n s i d e r a t i o n s
such as these led Plato to s e p a r a t e the I d e a s f r o m sensibles in the Phaedo, to
place t h e m in a r e a l m o f t r u e B e i n g subject to P a r m e n i d e a n strictures, a p a r t
f r o m the sensible r e a l m o f O p i n i o n . B u t in so d o i n g he left h i m s e l f at a loss to
explain the m o d e o f participation o f sensibles in the Ideas. Phaedo l o o d shows
him still using the l a n g u a g e o f " p r e s e n c e " a n d "sharing" a p p r o p r i a t e to the
Euthyphro m o d e l , b u t d o u b t f u l o f it o r o f w h a t to say a b o u t the precise n a t u r e
o f the relation.'5
It is clear f r o m the puzzles o f the first p a r t o f the Parmenides a n d f r o m
o t h e r sources '6 that the n a t u r e o f participation was a m a t t e r o f c o n t r o v e r s y in
the A c a d e m y . T h e difficulties c o n c e r n i n g it can be s u m m a r i z e d in t e r m s o f
the sailcloth d i l e m m a o f Parm. 13oe--131C. In this passage, P a r m e n i d e s first
gets Socrates to a g r e e that sensible things are n a m e d a f t e r I d e a s in virtue o f
participating or, literally, h a v i n g a s h a r e in t h e m ( 1 3 o e 5 - 1 3 1 a~). I f so, t h e n
the participant m u s t either possess the whole o f the I d e a o r a p a r t o f i t - - a t
least Socrates has n o third a l t e r n a t i v e to suggest. P a r m e n i d e s goes on to a r g u e
that both h o r n s o f this d i l e m m a lead to impossibilities. First, if each partici-
pant possesses the whole o f the I d e a , then the I d e a will be " a p a r t f r o m itself"
(crb~oO Xe00Cg, 13 lb2) a n d h e n c e can no l o n g e r be o n e thing. It is r e p e a t e d that
this is impossible at Pa~n. a 4 4 c 8 - d 2 , a n d the point is m a d e again at Philebus
15b3-8: if an ideal m o n a d c o m e s to be p r e s e n t in items o f Becoming, it m u s t

04This is surely one of the main reasons that a version of this view was revived in Plato's
Academy by Eudoxus: cf. R. M. Dancy, Two Sttuiies in the Early Academy(Albany, 1991), Study I:
"Predication and Immanence: Anaxagoras, Plato, Eudoxus, and Aristotle."
'3The Phaedo in fact seems to display two different models of participation: at ~o2b-d,
sensibles get their "names" or predicates from possessing what seem to be literally shares of the
Idea (the "tall in us" and so forth), while at 75a sensible things are said to strive to be like the Equal
Itself, and to come to be called equal insofar as they imperfectly succeed in achieving this. This
latter model is also important for Plotinus' theory, as we will see below (P.492).
'eCf. Philebus 15b and T/maeus51a7-b~ and 5oc5-6, where the way in which the Receptacle
participates in Ideas by receiving images of them is said to be extremely dificult to understand;
compare Metaphysics 987b13-14. Plotinus refers to the Timaeus passages at VI.5.8, 8-9 and
IlI.6.1 l, 5-8.
488 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 o : 4 OCTOBER 1992

either have become m a n y or be a whole that is apart f r o m itself ( a ~ o ~ or6"co~

X0~Q~g), which is as impossible as a n y t h i n g can possibly be.,7
Socrates responds to P a r m e n i d e s here by suggesting that the Idea may be
like a day, which is one a n d the same everywhere without being apart from itself
( 13 1b 3 - 6 ), for it is one a n d the same day now in Athens and in Alexandria. T h e
similarity o f this to some o f the language that Plotinus uses to discuss participa-
tion has led m a n y c o m m e n t a t o r s to take this to be Plotinus' own p r e f e r r e d
solution to the problem. 's T h e r e is some truth in this, since he clearly does want
to claim that the Idea is in a sense simultaneously everywhere, but the situation
is considerably m o r e complex, as we shall see. In any case, Parmenides manages
to refute Socrates' suggestion in Plato's dialogue by substituting for the analogy
with the day a d i f f e r e n t example (1 3 1b7-c3), which evidently is supposed to be
more clear, a n d which Socrates appears to accept. Suppose, Parmenides says, a
sailcloth or awning (~r were stretched over a n u m b e r o f men: there would
then be one a n d the same thing over them all, yet each o f t h e m would only have
a part of the cloth over him. T h e implication is apparently that Socrates' anal-
ogy with the day is unclear, a n d that it is only loosely that we can speak o f one
and the same day as being everywhere: strictly speaking, a single location pos-
sesses only part o f the whole day,.considered as a spatially e x t e n d e d thing, j u s t
as each of the m e n in the sailcloth example is u n d e r only one part o f the
sailcloth.
Since the first h o r n o f the d i l e m m a has now been rejected, it follows that
participants can at best share in parts of the Idea. Parmenides refutes this
alternative with two distinct arguments. First, if this is so t h e n the Idea will no
longer be one, but many. Second, he notes cases in which parts o f an Idea will
not be of the same n a t u r e as the Idea itself: e.g., parts o f the Large Itself
would no longer be absolutely large and parts of the Equal Itself no longer
absolutely equal. Plotinus uses similar arguments in rejecting the same h o r n o f
the dilemma (VI.4. 3, 3 ~ ft.). I f an intelligible is not present as a whole, part o f
it will be here and part there, so that it will be divisible and thus bodily (for
Plotinus assumes that incorporeal things are with'out parts). Moreover, if the
whole of it is, e.g., Life, t h e n a part o f it will not be Life, i.e., will not be
identical with Life itself, what it is to be alive.29

'7 Aristotle makes a similar point at Metaphysics Zl6, 1o4ob25-26.

9sCf. Br6hier's introduction to the treatise; also J o h n Fielder, "Plotinus' Reply to the Argu-
ments of Parmenides 13oa - 13 l d," Apeiron 12 (1978): l - 5, and "Plotinus' Response to Two Prob-
lems o f Immateriality," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 52 (x 978): 9 6 -
loa; as well as F. M. Schroeder, "The Platonic Parmenides and Imitation in Plotinus," Dionysius
(1978): 5x-73 9
99 In VI.4.9, Plotinus deals with an attempt or attempts to grasp this horn o f the dilemma
while avoiding these untoward consequences, either by making the participated parts of the Idea
exactly like the Idea itself, i.e., by making the Idea homoiomerous, or by identifying the so-called
 PLOTINUS' ACCOUNT OF P A R T I C I P A T I O N 489
T h o u g h Socrates had initially been unable to come up with a third alterna-
tive account o f participation besides participation in the whole or in the part of
the Idea, a little later on he does suggest another mode of participation that
seems to offer a way of avoiding the horns of the sailcloth dilemma, and
indeed this was the way that most Platonists, and perhaps even Plato himself,
dealt with the problem.so Perhaps, Socrates says at Parm. 132c-d, Ideas are like
paradigms o f which the participants are likenesses, so that participation will
consist in being made like the Idea. This will allow us to avoid the sailcloth
dilemma because the participant will no longer need to share directly in the
Idea itself, but will only possess a likeness of it.
Parmenides tries to block this alternative account of participation by using
the well-known Third Man Argument: if participation in Ideas consists in
being made like them, i.e., in sharing a property with them, then a further
Idea will be needed to account for this likeness, and a vicious regress will
result. Plotinus has a reply to this elsewhere in the Enneads: namely, that the
likeness of an image to its original is nonreciprocal, so that the original is not
like the image in that respect in which.it is an image of it (e.g., the image o f a
man is not a man), hence the regress cannot not arise (I.2.2, 3-1o).3' Plotinus
is willing to concede that the participant is in some sense like the Idea. Never-
theless, he clearly does not think that the notion of imaging by itself provides
an adequate account of participation, or that it allows us to avoid the sailcloth
dilemma.s,
For one thing, he does not think that the analogy with imaging, or the
analogy of illumination of matter by the Idea that he tends not to distinguish
from imaging, makes it sufficiently clear that participants are ontologically
dependent on the associated Idea as the cause of their existence (cf. VI. 4. lo,
1-22). He says, however, that it is possible to remedy this deficiency in the
analogy if we exclude cases of artificially produced images, such as paintings,
and restrict ourselves to naturally produced images such as reflections and

"parts" (Parm. 13 lc) with capacities or powers of the Idea. He argues that these suggestions must
lead to one of three consequences: (t) they will end up by making the Idea divisible, which is
impossible, or (2) they will fall prey to the objections to making participation take place t h r o u g h
proceeding powers of the Idea (see below on VI.4. 3, init.). (3) Otherwise, they really a m o u n t to
grasping the other h o r n of the dilemma, that is, they collapse into to his own thesis.
so It is the account suggested by Phaed0 75 b and Timaeus 50-52.
s, T h a t this is Plotinus' reply to the second version of the T h i r d Man Argument in the
Parmenides was pointed out by B r t h i e r in his introduction to Enn. 1.2. For Plotinus' reply to the
first version of the T h i r d Man, cf. my remarks in "Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic
Interpretation o f the Categories," Aufstieg und Niedergang der r'tmischen Welt II.36.2, p. 972 n. 54-
s, For this reason I think that the imaging analogy is taken too seriously as part of Plotinus'
official account of participation, for example by Schroeder, " T h e Platonic Parmenides." Plotinus
discusses it in such detail not because he accepts it but because it was the account of participation
given by other commentators.
49 ~ JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 0 : 4 OCTOBER 1 9 9 2
shadows, w h e r e the image is directly p r o d u c e d by its original a n d h e n c e can-
not exist without the original b e i n g actually present to it. B u t t h e r e are still
misleading f e a t u r e s o f the analogy that lead Plotinus to want to reject it o r at
least to s u p p l e m e n t it by a m o r e a d e q u a t e account. For o n e thing, he does not
wish to say that the likeness in the participant is actually produced by the I d e a - -
this is r a t h e r the role o f the soul a n d its logos. T h e point o f focussing o n cases
where the original p r o d u c e s its image is to b r i n g out the fact that the image
c a n n o t exist without the a r c h e t y p e , not that it is directly p r o d u c e d by it.33 Also,
in the case o f physical imaging, the image a n d original will share some p r o p e r -
tics, even if they d o not share the p r o p e r t y according to which the image is an
image and not a n o t h e r m e m b e r o f the same class as the original. B u t Plotinus
thinks that intelligibles a n d sensibles c a n n o t share any p r o p e r t i e s at all (VI. 1. l,
15-3o).
But the main r e a s o n that Plotinus does not find acceptable the account o f
participation in terms o f imaging o r illumination is that it p r e s u p p o s e s that the
participant a n d the I d e a are apart, so that the participant c a n n o t participate
directly in the Idea:s4 e i t h e r we will have to say that s o m e t h i n g p r o c e e d s f r o m
the Idea to the participant, which Plotinus argues is impossible, o r we will
leave it entirely unclear how the participation comes about. ( H e r e 'apart' and
'together' m u s t be conceived metaphysically o r causally, not spatially: we
might call this the denial o f action at a metaphysical distance.) F r o m VI.4. 3, it
is a p p a r e n t that some previous i n t e r p r e t e r s had s o u g h t to avoid the sailcloth
dilemma by positing certain 5vvdl~eLg o r powers s u p p o s e d to p r o c e e d f r o m
the Ideas to participants.3~ Plotinus rejects this o n the g r o u n d that a p o w e r
cannot exist a p a r t f r o m o r cut o f f f r o m its source: h e n c e if participants partici-
pate in Ideas by possessing powers o f them, they can only d o so if the Idea
itself is also directly p r e s e n t to t h e m , and we fall back into the sailcloth di-
lemma. A similar a r g u m e n t is directed by Plotinus against too-literal talk o f
participation o c c u r r i n g by way o f illumination o f participants by the Idea, an
interpretative gambit that seems clearly m e a n t to call to m i n d the analogy o f
the Day f r o m the Parmenides:36 cf. VI.4.4. 7, 2 3 - 8 , 8. T h e illumination in this
case must n o t be conceived, Plotinus argues, in t e r m s o f light proceeding from

3sCf. what is said about the analogy of illumination at VI.5.8, 1~-15, where Plotinus identifies
itwith the analogy of reflection.
This is the point of the remarks on previous interpretations of the Receptacle passage of the
Timaeus in the first part of VI.5.8.
s5On possible connections of the views discussed in VI.4.3, cf. Dominic J. O'Meara, Structures
hil,rarchiquesdans la pens~ede Plotin (Paris, 1975), a4 n. at. One of the positions Plotinus criticizes in
VI.4.9 involves making a similar move in attempting to grasp the "part" horn of the dilemma: see
above, n. ~9.
stThis was noted by Schroeder, "The Platonic Parmenides."For a similar analogy, cf. Marcus
Aurelius 8.57 and 12.3o.
 PLOTINUS' ACCOUNT OF PARTICIPATION 491
a source to an illuminated object. R a t h e r we must think instead o f the light itself
as what is participated in,s7 i.e., we m u s t identify the power with the source o f
the power, so that on this analogy we will again make the participant to
participate directly in the Idea.

3" THE SENSIBLE W O R L D AS A P P E A R A N C E

We can now see that Plotinus insists u p o n c o n f r o n t i n g the sailcloth dilemma
directly, rather than trying to avoid it by appealing to the notion of partici-
pants as being or as having images o f the Idea rather than the Idea itself. We
can also see that he wishes to grasp the h o r n of the d i l e m m a that has the
participant participating in the whole o f the Idea. It has often been noted that
this means that he wishes to maintain some version of Socrates' analogy o f the
Day.sS But we must be careful here. C o m m e n t a t o r s often speak as if Plotinus'
claim was that the Idea o f Being was present as one and the" same thing
everywhere in the sensible universe, as if participants actually came to have the
Idea in which they participate.s0 B u t this is to miss the crucial feature o f
Plotinus' account o f participation. For Plotinus clearly asserts that the Idea
cannot be in the sensible,to since i n d e e d it cannot be in a n y t h i n g besides itself,
and that the Idea cannot u n d e r g o a n y sort o f procession towards the sensible,
since to do so it would have to d e p a r t from itself and therefore u n d e r g o a
change or affection (VI.4.3; cf. VI.5. 3, the definitive and most explicit state-
m e n t o f Plotinus' view o f participation).4' He concedes that in some sense the
Idea must be 'everywhere', but he does not think that this need imply that it is
actually in anything else (VI.4.u, 25-~7). He argues that if the Idea's being
everywhere means that it is in everything, it would then be "by itself yet not by
itself" (~dp' ~cx~o~ 6v ~t~I a6 ~r ~ctvTo~ e~vctt, VI.5. 3, 12), which is a contradic-
tion in terms.4" T h e Idea is in a sense present to its p a r t i c i p a n t s - - t h o u g h , as

s7 This seems to be the point of "thinking away" or abstracting from the source of illumination
in the example Plotinus discusses at 7.32-33 .
ss See n. 28 above.
sgThis is true for example of Lee (see n. a 7 above) and Fielder and Schroeder (n. 28 above).
See also n. 42 below on the view of Michael Wagner.
40 For instance, VI.4. 7, 3 ft. T h e same view is found in Proclus, Elements ofTheolog3 w (cf. A.
C. Lloyd, "Procession and Division in Proclus," in H.J. Blumenthai and A. C. Lloyd, eds., Sou/and
the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism [Liverpool, 1983], 26o), who may well have taken it from
Plotinus. O n Proclus' agreement with Plotinus here, cf. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Ox-
ford, 199o), 69.
41T h e same doctrine seems already to be stated at IV.2 [4] ~, 2o-23- T h e notion that participa-
tion cannot involve any sort of affection of the Idea is taken from Symposium 21 lb.
4, T h a t this is the conclusion of a reductio ad absurdum has usually been missed by commenta-
tors (cf. n. 89 above). In fact, to my knowledge this step in Plotinus' argument has only been
properly grasped by Dominic O'Meara, " T h e Problem of Omnipresence in Plotinus, Ennead
VI.4-5: A Reply," Dionysius 4 (198~ 68, in reply to criticisms made by J. S. Lee (in his " T h e
492 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3o:4 OCTOBER ~992
we will s h o r t l y see, e v e n this claim n e e d s to be m o d i f i e d - - b u t n o t p r e s e n t in
them.
H e n c e , P l o t i n u s claims, r a t h e r t h a n t h e I d e a a p p r o a c h i n g its p a r t i c i p a n t s ,
we i n s t e a d h a v e t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s a p p r o a c h i n g the I d e a in o r d e r to p a r t i c i p a t e
in it (cf. V I . 4 . 3 , 1 8 - 2 t ; V I . 4 . 1 6 , 7 - 1 3 ) , so t h a t w h a t we s h o u l d really say is t h a t
t h e y a r e p r e s e n t to it r a t h e r t h a n it t o t h e m (cf. V I . 5 . 3, 1 3 - i 4 ) . I take this t o
m e a n at least t w o t h i n g s . First, t h a t it is t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s t h a t a r e c h a n g e d o r
a f f e c t e d in c o m i n g to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e I d e a , n o t the idea itself.43 T h e y m o v e
t o w a r d it, n o t it t o w a r d t h e m . S e c o n d , it is clear t h a t P l o t i n u s has h e r e b e e n
i n f l u e n c e d b y Plato's talk o f sensible e q u a l t h i n g s striving (6Q~ye~cxt) to be like
the E q u a l itself at Phaedo 75 b. (Plotinus s p e a k s r a t h e r o f t h e ~t~eoLg o f sensibles
f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n , V I . 4 . 8 , 44-45).44 A g a i n , I d o n o t t h i n k t h a t this implies t h a t
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s play a r o l e in actively b r i n g i n g a b o u t t h e i r o w n p a r t i c i p a t i o n
in a g i v e n I d e a . R a t h e r , t h e n o t i o n o f striving is a m e t a p h o r i c a l w a y o f r e f e r -
r i n g to the capacities o f t h e v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s to p a r t i c i p a t e in I d e a s : t h e s e
capacities, a c c o r d i n g t o Plotinus, a r e always realized as f a r as possible,4s a n d in
this w a y t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m a y be t h o u g h t o f as 'striving' a f t e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n , in
that, so to s p e a k , t h e y ' d o all t h e y c a n ' to a c h i e v e it. T h a t sensibles p a r t i c i p a t e
in t h e p a r t i c u l a r I d e a s t h a t t h e y d o at a given time is b r o u g h t a b o u t b y s o u l
a n d its logos, b u t t h a t sensibles, o r r a t h e r sensible m a t t e r , always p a r t i c i p a t e s in
some I d e a o r o t h e r o f a c e r t a i n r a n g e o f I d e a s is d u e to t h e n a t u r e o f t h e
p a r t i c i p a n t . I t is t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t to receive c e r t a i n f o r m s t h a t is
the key f a c t o r in a c c o u n t i n g f o r this fact.46

Doctrine of Reception according to the Capacity of the Recipient in Ennead VI.4-5," cL n. 17

above) of O'Meara's account of participation in his book Structures hie'rarchiques dans la pens~e de
Plain (cf. n. 35 above). Earlier, in his paper "Being and Numenius and Piotinus" (above, n. 13),
O'Meara too had failed to grasp this point, noting that the argument of VI.4.2 is meant to deny
that Being can be "in another" (n. 4), yet going on to say that "... Plotinus sees Being, paradoxi-
c.ally, as present in others" (l ~ l), and that "Plotinus... holds to both the integrity of Being and its
presence in others" 022). Michael Wagner's claim, directed against O'Meara's later essay
("Plotinus' Idealism and the Problem of Matter in Enneads VI.4 & 5," D/onys/us 1o [ 1986l: 67), that
Plotinus' argument is not meant to imply that the hypostases cannot enter the sensible world
simply misses the main point of Plotinus' argument here.
4~See above, n. 4 l, on Symposium ~ x lb.
Both [r and 6O~,eo0ctLoccur at Physics 1.9, 19eal6-eo, where Aristotle is discussing
the Platonist conception of matter: Piotinus clearly has this passage in mind in this connection. See
Nicomachean Ethics I. l init. for a similar apparently Platonist usage of the verb ~Ceo0ctLin Aristode.
4s For this 'doctrine of reception according to the capacity of the recipient' in Plotinus, cf. A.
9H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe m the Philosophy of Plotinus (Cambridge,
194o), 6o.
OCf. VI.5.al , 35-38 with II.4.8, 4-7 on relative or hylomorphic vs. absolute or 'prime'
matter of sensibles. It might be thought that Plodnus is faced here with a version of the weU-
known problem about which came first, the chicken or the egg, since participants must already
exist and thus already have some actual properties before they can enter into participation
relations, yet the existence of actual properties was supposed to be accounted for by appeal to
 PLOTINUS' ACCOUNT OF PARTICIPATION 493
So e v e r y I d e a is wholly p r e s e n t to t h e sensible world w i t h o u t e n t e r i n g into
it, that is, w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g a p a r t o r c o n s t i t u e n t o f it. Precisely those sensible
things t h a t h a v e the a p p r o p r i a t e capacity to participate in a given I d e a d o so,
by s o m e h o w c o m i n g to be directly p r e s e n t to that Idea. T h e a g e n t or p r o d u c -
tive factor in this process is soul a n d its logos: a c c o r d i n g to Ennead I I I . 8 . 3 - 4, it
results f r o m a sort o f c o n t e m p l a t i o n by the soul o f the I d e a (c.f. also II. 3.18, 8 -
14). Is t h e r e t h e n a n y t h i n g that the p a r t i c i p a n t receives as a result o f this
process? It is a c o n s e q u e n c e o f Plotinus' a r g u m e n t s so f a r n o t e d that t h e r e
c a n n o t be a n y t h i n g that p r o c e e d s f r o m the I d e a to the participant, a n d p r e -
s u m a b l y the s a m e will h o l d f o r the logos o f soul, which is n o t distinguished in
this treatise f r o m the I d e a : n o t h i n g can p r o c e e d to the participant f r o m it
either, f o r similar reasons. But Plotinus in several places does speak a b o u t
what he calls the f o r m in m a t t e r , a n d distinguishes it f r o m the I d e a (VI.5.6, 8;
11, 31-34), so he m u s t think that t h e r e is something t h a t the p a r t i c i p a n t re-
ceives as a result o f participation. ( N o t e that the e n m a t t e r e d triangle is said to
be "in m a n y , " VI. 5.11, 3 e, which is precisely w h a t Plotinus denies o f the Idea.)
T h e s e f o r m s - i n - m a t t e r are to be identified with the p.t~fflp.otx~tor "imitations"
that pass into a n d o u t o f the Receptacle (which Plotinus identifies with p r i m e
matter), a c c o r d i n g to Timaeus 5o-51.47 N o w in several places in V I . 4 - 5 ,
Plotinus speaks o f i m m a n e n t f o r m s a n d images o f I d e a s as appearing in sensi-
bles,4S a n d in the slightly later treatise 111.6 [~6] he a r g u e s at g r e a t length that
p r i m e m a t t e r m u s t not be conceived as actually possessing a n y o f the p r o p e r -
ties that it a p p e a r s to have, i.e., t h a t the a p p e a r a n c e s o f f o r m s in it are false
appearances.49 P r e s u m a b l y this m e a n s that w h e n we perceive sensible p r o p e r -
ties we are not really perceiving a p r o p e r t y that is really t h e r e in the object,
n o r a n y t h i n g caused to a p p e a r to us by any sensible p r o p e r t y that is objectively

participation. (This is a key point in the controversy between Lee and O'Meara [cf. n. 4z above]
over how to avoid attributing to Plotinus a "causal dualism.") This however does not seem to be a
problem if the sort of participation under discussion is supposed only to account for sensible
properties, since Plotinus thinks that prime matter, which is not a sensible thing, together with its
(nonsensible) capacities for participation in size or extension (cf. 11.4.8-lo; 111.6.16-18), is pro-
duced by soul prior to its producing anything of the sensible world (111.4.1), and that what is
produced by prime matter thus participating are the extended masses of the physical elements,
which then serve as hylomorphic matter for, i.e., participants in, successively higher levels of
form. The actual properties of the participant at each stage of this hylomorphic layering are
presumably what determines its capacity for further participation, e.g., color can only be partici-
pated by a surface. The problem remains, however, to account for why at the initial stage of
information different parts of prime matter or the Receptacle are informed by different ones of
the four physical elements. (cf. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism [above, n. 40], lo3-1o4). But
Plato had already treated this as a brute, unexplained fact (Timaeus 52d).
47Cf. A. C. Lloyd, "Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic I," Phronesis 1 (1955-56): 59.
4sCf. for instance the description of the block of stone at VI.5.1 l, 8-11.
49On this point, seeJ. Igal, trans. Polfirio: Vida de Plotino; Plotino:En~adasI-H (Madrid, 198~),
lntroducci6n general, 68.
494 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 0 : 4 OCTOBER 1992

present in the t h i n g we perceive. N e v e r t h e l e s s it seems clear t h a t Plotinus d o e s

not want to d e n y all objectivity to the sensible world o r to declare it entirely
illusory. T h e r e m u s t t h e r e f o r e be s o m e objective f o u n d a t i o n f o r sensible p r o p -
erties. T h i s t h o u g h t m i g h t p r o m p t us to m a k e the following speculative sugges-
tion: p e r h a p s f o r Plotinus w h a t we are a w a r e o f t h r o u g h p e r c e p t i o n , t h o u g h
in a c o n f u s e d a n d m i s l e a d i n g fashion, a r e relations of participation b e t w e e n
sensible m a t t e r a n d various Ideas.5o Being relations, they a r e not objective
sizes, qualities, etc.: they h a v e n o n o n r e l a t i o n a l properties. (This would m a k e
the m e t a p h o r o f reflection in a m i r r o r for the participation o f m a t t e r in f o r m ,
which Plotinus d e v o t e s a g o o d deal o f a t t e n t i o n to in I I I . 6 , a particularly
a p p r o p r i a t e one.) T h e fact that the sensible item does not really acquire a n y
(nonrelational) p r o p e r t y t h r o u g h its participation in I d e a s m a y h e l p a c c o u n t
for Plotinus' insistence in V I . 4 - 5 that while in o n e sense the p a r t i c i p a n t is in
contact with the I d e a , in a n o t h e r it is not (e.g., VI.5.8, 18). T h e p a r t i c i p a n t can
be said to be "in contact" with the I d e a , in that it stands in an ( i m m e d i a t e )
reladon o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n to the I d e a it participates in; it is "not in contact" with
the Idea, in t h a t it acquires n o o t h e r (first-order) p r o p e r t y in virtue o f d o i n g
so. Matter is by its n a t u r e always in contact with a n d participating in the lowest
level o f Ideas, i.e., sizes (cf. II.4), a n d the bodies that result f r o m this basic
level o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n serve as h y l o m o r p h i c m a t t e r for o t h e r participation-
relations. Matter, b o t h p r i m e o r absolute m a t t e r a n d h y l o m o r p h i c o r relative
matter, is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by its possession o f certain definite receptivities o r
capacities f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in given r a n g e s o f Ideas.5, Soul by its logos brings
these capacities successively to act o v e r time, as in the case o f a g r o w i n g seed o f
a particular sort o f plant.
F r o m the u l t i m a t e m e t a p h y s i c a l p o i n t o f view, however, all sensible p r o p e r -
ties are m e r e a p p e a r a n c e s : w h a t t h e r e is at the metaphysical level is m a t t e r a n d
its receptivities, Ideas, the c o m p l e x relations o f participation that obtain be-
tween t h e m , a n d the soul a n d its logos that b r i n g t h e m into actuality. Because

50Presumably the fact that we are only confusedly aware of such relations has something to do
with the fact that we are unable to have a clear perception of the existence of matter: cf. If.4. lo,
interpreting Timaeus 52b. Our speculative suggestion could not be correct if, as D. J. O'Brien has
recently claimed, Plotinus holds that prime matter does not participate in the Ideas at all
CPlodnus and the Gnostics on the Generation of Matter," in H.J. Blumenthal and R. A. Markus,
eds., Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays in Honour of A. H. Armstrong [London. 1981],
1o8-23). I cannot discuss here the interpretation of IV.8.6, 18-~ 3 on which O'Brien bases this
claim (see Igars note in his translation ad/oc.), but it seems clearly refuted by VI.5.8, which
discusses in detail the mode of participation of prime matter in form--note the example of
participation in the Idea of Fire, VI.5.8, 22 ff.; prime matter is of course, as in Aristode, the
proximate matter of the sensible elements. Cf. also III.6. I l, 5 and 12.2, which concern participa-
tion by the Receptacle, which Plotinus identifies with prime matter.
~' This is the doctrine of the passages cited in n. 46 above.
 P L O T I N U S ' A C C O U N T OF P A R T I C I P A T I O N 495

of this objective basis, however, there is a level of discourse available, the level
of ordinary discourse about physical objects, in which we can discuss the
sensible world as it appears, in terms of immanent form, which Piotinus him-
self certainly often does: see for instance the description of the block of stone
at VI.5.11, 8 - x l, or the discussion of sensible substance in the early chapters
of Vl.B.5.s' Immanent form is Form seen as--falsely seen as--belonging to the
participant (cf. VI.4. 3, 17-19): on our above speculative suggestion, it is a
misperception of the presence of a particular participation-relation. There is
of course a great deal more that needs to be said about Plotinus' conception of
immanent form: how it is individual, how it is universal, and so forth. But this
lies outside the scope of the present paper.
To summarize, then: Plotinus thinks that the difficulty of Parmenides 131
arises from wrongly conceiving the Idea, on the model of participation as
sharing, as in some sense in or present to its participants, rather than vice versa,
the participants being (nonreciprocally) present to it. His response to the
puzzle is most fully stated in VI.5. 3. If we consider the situation in the way that
he suggests, there is no difficulty in opting for the alternative that participa-
tion is of the whole of the I d e a - - t h e alternative that Plotinus perhaps thinks
Plato has ironically underlined as preferable in stressing its apparent impossi-
bility in both the Parmenides and the Philebus. The participant is to be thought
of as somehow active in participation: it "approaches" the Idea in "striving" to
be like it (cf. Phaedo 75b; Physics 1.9), while the Idea remains unmoved and
impassive (cf. Symposium 21 lb4-5). This, however, is only a metaphorical way
of indicating the doctrine of 'reception according to the capacity of the recipi-
ent': what Idea is participated by which matter is entirely due to the capacity of
the matter, and not to the fact that it is this Idea rather than another that is
present. It is better here to speak of ~ctQovo~ct or 'presence' than participating
or 'sharing', provided we realize that this relation of presence is a nonrecipro-
cal o n e - - h e n c e the absolute separation or independence of the Idea from
participants can be maintained.
It is my claim that something like this is what Plotinus ultimately wants to
say about the properties of sensibles in general. The sensible world is less reai
than the intelligible because it is strictly speaking unreal: it is a world of appear-
ances. This view is clearly not intended to rule out the possibility of a level of
discourse which is adequate for talking about these appearances and in that
sense 'true' of them, i.e., ordinary talk about sensible things, though it cannot
be discussed here how the possibility of this level of discourse might be made

s* It is worth noting that the context in Vl.3 is a discussion o f Aristotle's theory of categories,
and that Plotinus assumes, as does his student Porphyry, that the theory of the Categories concerns
the signification o f the terms of ordinary language. On this, see my paper cited in n. 3x above.
49 6 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3o:4 OCTOBER 199 2

Out. T h e r e is also n o s p a c e to d i s c u s s o t h e r i m p o r t a n t p r o b l e m s c o n n e c t e d
with this o n e , f o r e x a m p l e h o w P l o t i n u s ' view o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n is r e l a t e d to his
view c o n c e r n i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f I d e a s o f i n d i v i d u a l s e n s i b l e things.53 N e v e r -
theless it is m y h o p e t h a t t h e o u t l i n e s o f P l o t i n u s ' view o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n h a v e
n o w b e c o m e m o r e clear. I t is s t r i k i n g h o w P l o t i n u s r e a c h e s t h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s
by r i g o r o u s l y f o l l o w i n g o u t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e p u z z l e o f Parmenides 131 b-c
a b o u t participation.54

Ernory University

5sFor instance, VI.5.8 has been taken to exclude the possibility of Ideas of individuals (e.g., by
H. J. Blumenthal, Plotinus'Psychology[The Hague, 1971], ch. 9)- I do not believe that it does so:
for example, what is said about participation in Fire Itself is not relevant to this issue, since
sensible fire is not the sort of thing that divides into Aristotelian or Plodnian individuals. Nor do I
think that VI.5.6, 7-1 i need imply rejection of Ideas of individuals, despite appearances (cf.
Blumenthal's discussion, Plotinus' Psychology, l~ 3 ff.). But this question deserves a much more
extensive discussion than I can give it here.
Versions of this paper were read to a session of the International Society for Neoplatonic
Studies, to the Texas Workshop in Ancient Philosophy at Rice University, at Emory University,
and at the New School for Social Research. I am grateful for helpful comments and questions to
the editor of thisJournal, to Donald Rutherford, and especially to Eyj61fur K. Emilsson.