Case Title: MELISSA NIKOLAI ANSALDO DELESTE VS.

LAND BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No.: 169913 June 8, 2011

FACTS:
On February 16, 1954, Hilaria (wife of Gregorio) and Virgilio (son of Gregorio) sold a
parcel of agricultural land to Deleste for PhP 16,000. The deed of sale was notarized on
February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Deleste paid the taxes on the property
from then on. After the death of Hilaria, on April 30, 1963, Edilberto Noel, as the
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed before the CFI an action
against Deleste for reversion of title which escalated to the CA up to the SC which ruled that
the subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and
that Hilaria could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a
result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-
owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.
Notably, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued and the subject property was
placed under the said program. However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the
DAR as the landowners therefore notices and processes relative to the coverage were sent
to these heirs only. In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the
“Zoning Regulation of Iligan City,” reclassifying the subject property as
commercial/residential. Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land
Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were tenants of the subject property.
The CLTs were registered on July 15, 1986. In 1991, the subject property was surveyed and
was approved on January 8, 1999 then submitted to LBP. Thereafter, EPs and OCTs were
issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, in favor of private respondents
over their respective portions of Lot No. 1407.
On November 22, 1999, the City of Iligan filed a complaint with the RTC for the
expropriation of a portion of the subject lot. The RTC issued a Decision granting the
expropriation. Considering that the real owner of the expropriated portion could not be
determined, as the subject property had not yet been partitioned and distributed to any of
the heirs of Gregorio and Deleste, the just compensation for the expropriated portion of the
subject property in the amount of PhP 27,343,000 was deposited with the DBP in Iligan City,
in trust for the RTC in Iligan City. On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste filed with the
DARAB a petition seeking to nullify private respondents’ EPs. The PARAD rendered a
Decision declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of
ownership, the subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a
residential/commercial land, and the violation of petitioners’ constitutional right to due
process of law. DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners’ land is covered by agrarian reform given that the city of Iligan passed
City Ordinance No. 1313 reclassifying the area into a strictly residential area in 1975.
2. Whether the land that has been previously and partially expropriated by a city government
may still be subjected to agrarian reform.
3. Whether DAR violated the rights of petitioners to procedural due process.
4. Whether the certificates of title are valid given that they were directly issued to the farmer-
beneficiaries in gross violation of section 16(e) of R.A. 6657
RULINGS:
No. On the coverage of the subject property by the agrarian reform program we agree
with petitioners that the subject property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform
program in view of the enactment by the City of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance, City
Ordinance No. 1313. It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify
agricultural into non-agricultural lands. The Court held that pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local Government Code, municipal and/or city councils are
empowered to “adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with
the National Planning Commission.” It was also emphasized therein that “the power of the
local government to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands
prior to the passage of RA 6657 is not subject to the approval of the DAR].
The validity of said local zoning ordinance is, therefore, beyond question. Since the
subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the enactment
of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an “agricultural land”
within the ambit of RA 6657. Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside
the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses
prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR.
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to
divest tenant-farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27,
which have been vested prior to 15 June 1988. As emphasized, the reclassification of lands
to non-agricultural cannot be applied to defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers under
Presidential Decree No. 27. An ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or
light industrial should be given prospective application only, and should not change the
nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such
land.
This simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as we must, the ordinance should
be given prospective operation only. The further implication is that it should not change the
nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such
lands. This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have actually accrued in the
instant case. In this respect, under PD 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn lands were
“deemed owners” of the land they till as of October 21, 1972. Prior to compliance with the
prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have, at most, an inchoate right over the land they
were tilling. In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents and
purposes, it was only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-beneficiaries, were
recognized to have an inchoate right over the subject property prior to compliance with the
prescribed requirements. Considering that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975,
and subsequently approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still had no vested
rights to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private respondents were
issued the CLTs and were “deemed owners.”
The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since reclassification
had taken place twenty-six (26) years prior to their issuance. Undeniably, no vested rights
accrued prior to reclassification and its approval. Consequently, the subject property,
particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
On the violation of petitioners’ right to due process of law Petitioners contend that
DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the
agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated. The
importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program
cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential
requirements of administrative due process of law. Firstly, the taking of subject property was
done in violation of constitutional due process. A violation of due process in the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law happened when the petitioner
was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR
before acquisition of the property was to be undertaken. Neither was there proof that
petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those
portions to be acquired. Both in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential
Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property,
the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially
those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore
be observed.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CA’s
October 28, 2004 and September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The
Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Title covering the subject property,
particularly Lot No. 1407, issued in favor of private respondents are hereby declared NULL
and VOID. The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents and
Original Certificates of Title erroneously issued in favor of private respondents. No
pronouncement as to costs.
 Case Title: Barangay Sindalan v. CA
G.R. No.: 150640, 22 March 2007

FACTS:
Barangay Sindalan, pursuant to its resolution, filed a complaint for eminent domain
against the Sindayan spouses who were the registered owners of the parcel of land subject
for expropriation. The barangay sought to convert a portion of spouses Sindayan’s land into
Barangay Sindalan’s feeder road. The spouses argued that the expropriation of their
property was improper because it was sought for a private use. They alleged that the
expropriation of their property, which was adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision, would benefit
only the homeowners of said subdivision. The RTC ruled that the barangay had the lawful
right to take the property of the Sindayan spouses. The Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for
a public purpose.
HELD:
No, the contemplated road to be constructed by the barangay would benefit only the
residents of a subdivision.
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private
property must be for a public purpose. In this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as
"whatever is beneficially employed for the community." The intended feeder road sought to
serve the residents of the subdivision only. It has not been shown that the other residents of
Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, will be benefited by the contemplated road to
be constructed. While the number of people who use or can use the property is not
determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use or purpose, the factual milieu of the
case reveals that the intended use of respondents’ lot is confined solely to the Davsan II
Subdivision residents and is not exercisable in common. Considering that the residents who
need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II
Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them. To deprive respondents of their
property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under
the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently illegal. Without doubt,
expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose.
 Case Title: HIPE vs COMELEC
G.R. No.: 181528, 02 October 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Hector Hipe and Private respondent Vicencio were candidates for the
mayoralty post in Catubig, Northern Samar. Vicencio petitioned for the exclusion of 7
election returns of Precinct to Municipal Board of Canvassers of Catubig, Northern Samar
(MBOC). He alleged that they were prepared under duress, threats, intimidation/ coercion,
and that the election was marred by massive vote buying. The MBOC ruled in favour of
Vicencio.
Petitioner filed an appeal with COMELEC alleging that the written petition was filed
out of time and the grounds used was not proper for pre-proclamation controversy.
COMELEC dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time. Hipe filed a motion for
reconsideration. Subsequently respondent Vicencio was proclaimed as the mayor, COMELEC
held that the ruling of MBOC had attained finality that the filing of verified appeal was 5 days
late. COMELEC has no jurisdiction since the case no longer be considered as a pre-
proclamation controversy, but should rather be ventilated in an election protest.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC should have not dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner
on the ground of belated filing.
HELD:
Yes. When a plaintiff’s case depends upon the establishment of a negative fact, and
the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof
is upon the party averring the negative fact.
Hipe asserted a negative fact that no copy of written ruling of the MBOC was sent to
him or his counsel. He was able to prove it in the case. Hence, respondent has the burden to
prove otherwise. Other than Madronios statement in his Certification that hard or printed
copies of the ruling of the MBOC were furnished to Atty. Desales on May 19, 2007, no other
evidence was adduced by respondent to support her claim.
Moreover, the COMELEC has the discretion to construe its rules liberally and, at the
same time, suspend the rules or any of their portions in the interest of justice. It is well settled
that election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their purpose to
effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the choice of their representatives.