JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.

ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON

GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION,
INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG AND ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,
respondents.

FACTS:

For resolution are petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710 -15 and Omnibus Motion
in G.R. No. 146738 of the Court's Decision of March 2, 2001. On the line in the cases at bar is the office
of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President.

In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected President of the Philippines, while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
elected Vice-President. The President was accused with corruption, culminating in Ilocos Sur Governor
Chavit Singson’s accusations that the President received millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

On 20 January 2001, the President negotiated with representatives of the Vice-President. News broke
out that Chief Justice Hilario Davide would administer the Oath of Presidency to the Vice-President at
EDSA Shrine. Estrada issued two statements: one stating reservations on the constitutionality of
Arroyo’s presidency, and another stating that he is incapable of dispensing his responsibilities as
president, thus allowing Arroyo to be the acting president.

The Arroyo administration was met with acceptance by the different branches of government, by
majority of the public, and by the international community. The impeachment trial was closed, despite
sentiments.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER:

1. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the
issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence;
2. It is argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on him;
3. Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara Diary against him violated the rule on res inter
alios acta.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Angara Diary is inadmissible for being violative of the following Rules on Evidence:
Hearsay, Best Evidence, Authentication, Admissions, and Res Inter Alios Acta.

HELD:

No. (1) To begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the
pleadings in the cases at bar. It is argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence,
non-binding on him.

Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered
by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on
the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce
it. Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. As
aforediscussed, the Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind
and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara
from which we can reasonably deduce petitioner's intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not
covered by the rule on hearsay.

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a
party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement
that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he
would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and "Pagod na pagod na
ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I
don't want any more of this — it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I
just want to clear my name, then I will go."

(2) The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a party's
reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction as
an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.

(3) Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of
them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. Secretary Angara acted for and in
behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara. Under our rules of
evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). "What is
done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument.”
 SENATOR RAMON "BONG" REVILLA, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, through its
SPECIAL PANEL OF INVESTIGATORS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, and
FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of
public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Sen. Revilla for the years
2006 to 2010, in the total amount of P517,000,000.00. It contains allegations on Sen. Revilla, as Senator
of the Republic of the Philippines, for authorizing the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of
his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of fraudulent Non-Governmental Organizations created
and controlled by Napoles's JLN Corporation in relation to "ghost" PDAF-funded projects, and for
receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds as his "commission" or "kickback.”

The Ombudsman found that the diversion and/or misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF was coursed through a
complex scheme involving various participants from Sen. Revilla's Office, the DBM, the IAs, and the JLN-
controlled NGOs. Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe,
Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time
material to the charges; (b) with the help of his co-accused, who are public officers and private
individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth through their intricate
modus operandi as described above; and (c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least
P224,512,500.00, way more than the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of
Plunder.

Aggrieved, all the petitioners separately moved for the reconsideration of the March 28, 2014 Joint
Resolution.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:

Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and
further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider
the whistleblowers' testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant
to the res inter alios acta rule.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the findings of probable cause against Sen. Revilla should be upheld.

HELD:

Yes. The testimonies of the whistleblowers are, in fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla,
since they provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was
directly involved. Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge
of the conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation — the epicenter of the entire PDAF
operation — and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by Napoles to prepare the
pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the
DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts.
Sen. Revilla opposes the admission of the whistleblowers' testimonies based on the res inter alios acta
rule. However, in Reyes, citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, this Court had unanimously ruled that the
testimonies of the same whistleblowers against Jo Christine and John Christopher Napoles, children of
Janet Napoles who were also charged with the embezzlement of the PDAF, are admissible in evidence,
considering that technical rules of evidence are not binding on the fiscal during preliminary
investigation. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence,
which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary
investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply during preliminary
investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on
independently relevant statements. Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are
independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co-accused in the present
controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam. Therefore, the
statements made by whistleblowers who were employees of JLN Corporation and privy to the financial
transactions of Napoles concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla's PDAF, should be given consideration as
they are directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand.

In any case, this Court has resolved that "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as
long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." The substantial basis for crediting the
whistleblowers' testimonies, even if so regarded as hearsay, rests on their key functions in JLN
Corporation as above- mentioned, as well as the collective evidence gathered by the prosecution
tending to support the same conclusion that Sen. Revilla and his alleged co-conspirators acted in concert
to pillage his PDAF funds.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALVIN PAGAPULAAN * a.k.a. ALVIE PAGAPULAAN y
DAGANG, JOSE BATULAN y MACAJILOS, RENATO FUENTES y BANATE and JUNJUN FUENTES y BANATE,
accused,

FACTS:

This appeal assails the Decision dated November 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals. By Information dated
June 24, 2003, appellant Jose Batulan and his co-accused Alvin Pagapulaan, Renato Fuentes, and Junjun
Fuentes were charged with murder for the death of Ruben Pacho. On arraignment, all four (4) accused
pleaded not guilty.

Pagapulaan, being a minor when the felony was committed, was released on recognizance. He
subsequently entered into a plea bargaining agreement and pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide.

The trial court rendered a verdict of conviction. It gave full credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. It found that the four (4) accused acted in concert and took advantage of their
superior strength. More, treachery attended the killing for the attack on Ruben was surreptitious and
left him in no position to defend himself.

By Decision dated November 11, 2014, the Court of Appeals affirmed in the main. It did not appreciate
treachery as an attendant circumstance. It, nonetheless, ruled that appellant and his co-accused still
committed murder by taking advantage of their superior strength when they surrounded and attacked
the victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellant's conviction for murder.

HELD:

No. Despite Letecia's failure to positively identify Batulan in open court, the Court of Appeals correctly
found that that appellant's guilt was sufficiently established by other credible and competent evidence.
Appellant's co-accused Renato Fuentes and Junjun Fuentes testified that appellant stabbed the victim in
the neck, using a Batangas knife,

Renato and Junjun, too, positively identified appellant as one of Ruben's assailants. They vividly narrated
how appellant attacked and stabbed Ruben in the neck using a Batangas knife. Appellant cannot
discredit their testimonies by merely invoking the principle of res inter alios acta. The principle of res
inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. This rule, however, applies to extrajudicial declarations or admissions. It does not
apply to testimonies given on the witness stand where the party adversely affected had the opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant.

Here, the statements of Renato and Junjun identifying appellant as one of the victim's assailants were
made in open court on direct examination. Further, when cross-examined, Renato and Junjun did not
waver.
Also, the acts of appellant and his co-accused were coordinated. They were synchronized in their attacks
and were motivated by a single criminal impulse — to kill Ruben. Their spontaneous agreement to
commit the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility. Conspiracy being present, appellant
is thus equally liable as his co-accused regardless of who delivered the killing blow. For where there is
conspiracy, all conspirators are liable as co-principals. The act of one is the act of all.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANECITO ESTIBAL y CALUNGSAG, accused-
appellant.

FACTS:

For automatic review is the Decision dated March 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals which upheld the
Decision of the RTC convicting Anecito Estibal y Calungsag of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A (2),
in relation to Article 266-B (5) (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353
and in further relation to Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 8369.

The accused-appellant, 43 years old, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on March 9, 2009. But during
the pre-trial, BBB, wife of the accused-appellant and mother of AAA, the minor victim, disclaimed any
further interest to pursue the case. Her reasons were that she pitied the accused-appellant and,
according to her, AAA had already forgiven her father. But having entered the accused-appellant's plea,
the trial court refused to entertain their desistance.

At the trial, four witnesses came forward to testify for the prosecution. The prosecution's last witness,
Police Officer 3 Fretzie S. Cobardo, was the officer assigned at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Women and Children Protection Center of Taguig City. It was she who investigated the above incident
and took down the sworn statement of AAA late in the evening of February 5, 2009.

On clarificatory questioning by the court, PO3 Cobardo narrated that during her investigation of AAA
and BBB, they were both crying; that without being asked leading questions and without being coached
by her mother, AAA, 13 years old and a first-year high school student, revealed in detail how the
accused-appellant abused her for several years and how he raped her that morning of February 5, 2009;
that AAA told that the first time she was raped by her father was when she was in Grade III, but this was
the first time she was telling anyone about the rapes; that BBB told PO3 Cobardo that she could not
imagine how her husband could commit such an outrage against their own daughter; that from her own
observations of AAA's demeanor, PO3 Cobardo was convinced that she was telling the truth.

Relying on PO3 Cobardo's testimony of what AAA narrated to her, the RTC considered the spontaneity of
the declarations made by AAA as confirmed by PO3 Cobardo as part of the res gestae, and convicted the
accused-appellant.

The appellate court agreed with the RTC that the testimonies of the three prosecution witnesses, PO3
Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas, form part of the res gestae, although none of them was a
participant, victim or spectator to the crime. According to the CA, "they heard what [AAA] said when she
reported the sexual abuse committed against her by accused-appellant Estibal."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellant's conviction.

HELD:
Yes. AAA's statements to the barangay tanod and the police do not qualify as part of res gestae in view
of the missing element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable time between the rape and the
declarations which afforded her sufficient opportunity for reflection.

In People v. Manhuyod, Jr., the Court stressed that in appreciating res gestae, the element of
spontaneity is critical. It is of particular signicance to note that in her sworn statement to the police, AAA
admitted that she first revealed her ordeal of sexual abuse to her cousin DDD in the afternoon of
February 5, 2009, although her mother BBB had returned from her overnight guard duty that morning.
Shocked by what AAA told him, DDD relayed it to BBB.

AAA's revelation to DDD and BBB set off an inexorable chain of events that led to the arrest of the
accused-appellant. There is no doubt, however, that there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or
instinctive about the declarations which AAA made to the barangay tanod and later that night to the
police. Her statements were in fact a re-telling of what she had already confessed to her mother earlier
that afternoon; this time however, her story to the tanods and the police was in clear, conscious pursuit
of a newly formed resolve, exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally exposed and put behind
bars. There was then nothing spontaneous about her so-called res gestae narrations.

Res gestae speaks of a quick continuum of related happenings, starting with the occurrence of a startling
event which triggered it and including any spontaneous declaration made by a witness, participant or
spectator relative to the said occurrence. In other words, the declarant is spontaneously moved merely
to express his instinctive reaction concerning the startling occurrence, and not to pursue a purpose or
design already formed in his mind.

It is obvious that AAA had by then undergone a serious deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose
own outrage as the betrayed wife and grieving mother so emboldened AAA that she finally resolved to
emerge from her fear of her father. Here then lies the crux of the matter: AAA had clearly ceased to act
unthinkingly under the immediate influence of her shocking rape by her father, and was now led by
another powerful compulsion, a new-found resolve to punish her father.

Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the original declarant was not
placed under oath or affirmation, nor subjected to cross-examination by the defense, except in a few
instances as where the statement is considered part of the res gestae.

This Court has a situation where the incriminatory statements allegedly made by AAA were conveyed to
the trial court not by AAA herself but by PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas. But unless the
prosecution succeeded in invoking res gestae, their testimonies must be dismissed as hearsay, since
AAA's statements were not subjected to cross-examination consistent with the constitutional right of
the accused-appellant to confront the evidence against him.

Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of
justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it
is hearsay just the same.
 GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P. VILLANUEVA,
MARINA P. VILLANUEVA, VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P. VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE P. VILLANUEVA,
SAMUEL P. VILLANUEVA, LOURDES P. VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P. VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA ,
petitioners-appellants, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents- appellees.

FACTS:

The three haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the
Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental, were originally owned by the Compañia General de Tabacos de
Filipinas. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners,
negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not have sufficient
funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to
one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Allegedly because TABACALERA did
not agree to the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas, without a guaranty private respondent
Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. The guarantee was embodied in
a document denominated as "Escritura de Traspaso de Cuenta."

Private respondent Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount of
P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the purchase price. However, as only the amount of
P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the latter amount was debited
from private respondent's account. The difference was supposedly paid by private respondent to
Villanueva, but as no receipt evidencing such payment was presented in court, this fact was disputed by
petitioners.

On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in
favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter
registered in the name of Villanueva under TCT No. T- 4780 of the Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental.
The fields were likewise mortgaged by Villanueva to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), later
transferred to the Philippine National Bank on December 16, 1955, for a total indebtedness of
P334,400.00. Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente after the
1949-1950 milling season in January and February, 1950.

On October 7, 1954, the day before the intestate proceedings were ordered closed and the estate of the
late Praxedes Villanueva delivered to his heirs, private respondent Vicente instituted an action for
recovery of property and damages before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental against
petitioner Goñi in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Praxedes Villanueva. In his
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 2990, private respondent Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of
the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell
executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on October 24, 1949.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent Gaspar Vicente may testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of
Praxedes T. Villanueva, which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate, in violation of Rule 123,
Sec. 26, Par. (c), now Rule 130, Sec. 20, Par. (a).

HELD:
We find that neither the trial nor appellate court erred in ruling for the admissibility in evidence of
private respondent Vicente's testimony. Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente
would be disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130,
commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute.

The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to
the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit
upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of
the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the
surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased

The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter
had been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the
defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded
to the decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed
in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the
defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might
have been interested to establish, if living.

Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private
respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the
estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring
during deceased's lifetime." It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim
against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity
as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting
and surrender of Fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said
action not having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased
person.

Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or
communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such
person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the
adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the
agent. The contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-
fact of Praxedes Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such
contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente
with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule
130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of
the other because death has permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at
bar, for the reason that petitioner Goñi could and did not negate the binding effect of the
contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said contract/promise to sell,
petitioner Goñi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal contract of lease over
fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICK JOHN MERCADO y ANTICLA, accused-
appellant.

FACTS:

An Information was filed against Mercado for the murders of his aunt Alicia Mercado-Lusuriaga and her
live-in partner, Evelyn Santos .

The victims, Evelyn Santos and Alicia Mercado, are partners who lived together in a house located at
Block 6 Lot 2, Belmont Parc Subdivision, Purok 4, Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Appellant was the
nephew of Alicia. He was enrolled at the nearby STI College in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and used to live in
the same house.

It appears that around 11:00 PM of October 14, 2007, appellant was already inside the house, having
come home from school. Records show that around 2:00 AM of October 15, 2007, the house of Evelyn
and Alicia was reported to be on fire. While the house was burning, Evelyn and appellant were observed
on the terrace supposedly trying to find a way to escape the blaze.

Witnesses declared that as soon as Evelyn was carried out to safety, she promptly accused and pointed
to appellant as the person responsible for attacking her and Alicia as well as for setting the house on fire.
Specifically, Evelyn claimed that appellant hit her and Alicia with a baseball bat then set them on fire.
One witness heard Evelyn say: "ilayo ninyo sa akin yang si Patrick dahil siya ang pumalo sa aking ulo at
nagsunog ng bahay." Another witness stated hearing the following utterances from Evelyn: "Kuya, wag
mo akong iwan papatayin ako ng pamangkin ko," referring to appellant, and "ilayo nyo sa akin si Patrick
dahil yan ang papatay sa amin." Still, another witness claimed to have heard Evelyn say: "Ilayo nyo sa
akin yan bata na yan. Yan ang papatay sa akin. Yan ang sumunog sa amin. Yan ang pumalo sa ulo
namin."

While on board the ambulance on the way to the hospital, Evelyn repeated the name of appellant as the
culprit who caused their injuries and burned the house. Thus, she uttered: " Te, si Patrick ang may
gawa," "Si Patrick sinunog kami," and "Si Patrick ang pumalo sa akin. Si Patrick ang sumunog sa amin,
pati sa bahay."

Despite medical attention, Evelyn succumbed to her injuries and died on November 2, 2007 at the UST
Hospital. Based on the declarations of Evelyn, appellant was charged for the killing of Evelyn and Alicia.

After trial on the merits, in its Decision dated February 24, 2012, the RTC convicted Mercado of the
crime of Double Murder. In the assailed Decision dated June 20, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding
that Mercado was the perpetrator of the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in convicting Mercado despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
The appeal is unmeritorious. The Court, however, modifies the penalty imposed on Mercado to a single
penalty of reclusion perpetua only.

Accused-appellant desperately tried to anchor his defense on denial but failed to prove the same. His
testimony failed to overcome the credibility and probative value of the dying declarations and/or part of
the res gestae of Evelyn Santos which were recounted by several witnesses. A denial, like other
defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is independently assessed.

In this connection, both the RTC and CA correctly held that the evidence of the prosecution — as
independently assessed — sufficiently established the guilt of Mercado.

As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence because it is "evidence
of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death
would make a careless and false accusation."

The first and fourth requisites are undoubtedly present in this case. With regard to the third requisite,
since there was no evidence presented to show that Evelyn could not have been competent to be a
witness had she survived, the presumption that she would have been competent would be sustained in
accordance with the foregoing rule discussed in Umapas. The Court holds, therefore, that the third
requisite is sufficiently met.

With regard to the second requisite, the Court in Umapas considered the severity of the declarant's
wounds to reasonably presume that she uttered her words under the belief that her own death was
already imminent.

In the present case, Evelyn made the declarations just as she was pulled out of the fire, with blood
coming out of her forehead, when she was having difficulty breathing, and with second and third degree
burns affecting 74% of the total surface area of her body. Considering the foregoing facts — along with
the principle enunciated in Umapas that the declarant's belief in the imminence of her death can be
shown by the nature and severity of the declarant's wounds — then the Court is convinced that the
second requisite for a dying declaration is sufficiently met.

Without doubt, therefore, the dying declarations of Evelyn to numerous witnesses that it was Mercado
who had attacked her and her partner and eventually set their house on fire are admissible in evidence.
In any event, even if the statements of Evelyn would not qualify as dying declarations, they are
nevertheless admissible in evidence because they are part of the res gestae.

Applying the foregoing to the present case, the statements of Evelyn were clearly part of the res gestae.
The fire — which caused severe injuries on her body, destroyed her house, and killed her live-in partner
— was undeniably a startling occurrence. Evelyn's statements were made immediately after she was
rescued, and when she was clearly suffering from the pain caused by her injuries, thereby negating any
possibility of her contriving or manufacturing a lie. The statements were also undoubtedly about the
startling occurrence as Evelyn repeatedly claimed that Mercado was the one who attacked her and
Alicia, and thereafter set the house on fire. The statements were thus certainly part of the res gestae.