Week 6.

1 – Introduction
The point of this introductory lecture is that theories of politics and policy change
come and go and are often just repackaged versions of previous accounts of the policy
process. What is common to most accounts is attention to both stability and change –
policy does not just change overnight and neither does it never change. Therefore,
inevitable debate revolves around the extent or type of change and the significance of
policy change within a wider picture. Most accounts also present ways to break down
a large and complex political system into more manageable and discrete stages or
processes. Dissatisfaction with these artificial divisions (e.g. the distinction between
policy formulation and implementation) often results in a rejection of the terms used
in the past in favour of something new (e.g. the current use of the term “governance”)
without really solving the problems of the past. This is not a problem as such – the
point is that (as in life) it is worth remembering the morals from the Emperor’s New
Clothes before accepting uncritically the idea that a new body of literature with a new
approach is superior to the last. What we are seeking is a satisfactory way to describe
and explain periods of stability and change in politics.

Contemporary discussions of policy change and decision-making can be situated

within the classic debate on rationality and incrementalism. This lecture outlines
what a rational process of decision making entails, the factors which serve to
constrain such a process, and the ‘solutions’ suggested in the literature – including
bounded rationality, incrementalism and mixed scanning. It is relevant to any
discussion of: how are, can and should decisions be made? It is also relevant to
contemporary analysis of government policy. For example in the UK we see a degree
of commitment to rationality or “zero-based budgeting” in the Treasury’s
Comprehensive Spending Reviews, although the process only seeks justification for
marginal funding increases for Whitehall departments. Perhaps an appearance of
rationality is also given when major inquiries or reviews of policy are commissioned?

It is not easy (and indeed not necessary or even desirable) to separate issues of
rationality from the other issues discussed in this lecture block. Theories of agenda
setting are particularly important to this topic, while other links between lectures are
discussed below.

Rationality and Incrementalism

“The fundamental premise underlying organizational studies in political science is
that the behaviour of organizations mimics the bounded rationality of the actors that
inhabit them” (Jones, 1999: 302).

What do we mean by rationality or comprehensive rationality? We refer to a

description or a prescription of decision making behaviour in which:

• Policy aims or ends are identified in terms of the values of the policy maker
• All means to achieve those ends are identified
• The best means are selected
• Analysis of the decision-making context is comprehensive – i.e. all relevant
factors/ possibilities have been considered (see Jordan and Richardson, 1987:
9-14).
John (1999: 33): “Put simply, the rational actor model conceives policy to be a
logical, reasoned and neutral way organizations assess problems, propose solutions,
then choose and carry out courses of action. The model has several assumptions …
there are clear cut stages to decision-making. Organizations can make decisions when
they are faced with choices. They rank the decisions and one emerges as a clear
winner. When organizations make their choices, the preference rankings between
them are consistent. Every participant in the policy process gets what they want,
subject to the constraint of resources”.

It is similar (although the usage of the term ‘rational varies) to the discussion of
rational choice (which you will encounter later in the course) in that some models are
ideal types (perfect information, perfect capacity to consider information, perfect
control over resources, etc). (It is also “ideal” in the sense that it secures the “best”
decisions – see Hill, 2005: 145 onwards). Since it is often viewed as an ideal type,
then other models are devised following discussion of its limitations. This process is
most associated with Simon’s bounded rationality or “satisficing”, and Lindblom’s
incrementalism. We should follow John’s (1999: 33) advice that exaggerating the
differences between these approaches is counterproductive, but the main difference
between them may be that Simon’s approach is presented as an attempt to get as close
to the rational ideal as possible (hence his focus on improving methods of analysis
and training), while Lindblom often argued that incrementalism is not only necessary
but also in some sense desirable. You can see that at the time this may have been
viewed with some scepticism, since Lindblom’s model seemed to praise the group-
government process over representative democracy, or a rational process which linked
decision-makers to their electorate. Or, we could say that this approach is based on an
attempt to address a more realistic proposition – that there is not one central decision
maker and power or decision-making is dispersed.

Bounded rationality
Simon’s approach is based on limitations to comprehensive analysis. In terms of the
policy maker it is limited by:
• Incomplete knowledge and information of the existing situation and the
consequences of policy “solutions”
• A cognitive inability of decision makers to consider every possible solution,
not only in terms of time and intelligence, but also in terms of values or
predisposition (or a willingness to consider only a limited number/ type of
policy solutions).
• The distinction between individual and organisational rationality.
• The difficulty (impossibility?) of separating facts and values (see Lindblom)

Further, these problems are compounded if we look at how policies are carried out
within an organisation (an issue picked up more in the implementations literature).
Simon’s approach is to accept these limitations as a description, but to try and
improve these abilities as a prescription – to satisfice (or seek a solution which is
“good enough” using shortcuts or rules of thumb) rather than to maximise. The
argument here is that the problems inherent in comprehensive rationality are the very
reasons to focus on decision-making and make it better.

Jones (1999: 302-3) provides a similar description of the limitations to “objective

rationality”:
 1) Searches for knowledge are incomplete
2) Organisations do not have the capacity or inclination to seek every available
solution
3) The means or solutions to achieve ends do not just exist – they have to be
produced
4) Policy problems are subject to definition
5) Solutions often exist before problems
6) A choice may be consistent with goal A but not goal B

As factors 3-5 in particular show, the limitations to rationality in decision-making are

interlinked with the literature on agenda-setting, in which problem definition or
framing and the ranking of the importance of policy problems are subject to
competition between policy actors. There is an obvious connection to issues of power
(week 8 lectures) and our subsequent discussion of policy monopolies.

Incrementalism
Lindblom provides a similar critique of rationality. Its failures are based on
limitations in:
• Cognitive/ problem-solving ability
• Available information – especially of future consequences and future
conditions
• The cost of research
• The ability to distinguish between facts and values (a factor we can discuss in
the agenda-setting lecture)
• The dynamics of the policy process and the way in which issues arise (i.e.
decision-makers may need to react to events much more than devoting time to
policy planning)

The solution, then, is a focus on “successive limited comparisons” (later developed as

“disjointed incrementalism) based on:
• A recognition that values and empirical analysis are intertwined – even for an
individual. In “The Science of Muddling Through” Lindblom demonstrates
this well in discussions of the context of inflation and even in cases what to do
when an initial decision has been made (see discussion of the relocation of
tenants).
• There is no widespread agreement on the cause and hence the solution of the
problem. Even if there was, there would be no agreement over the way to
achieve the solution.
• A rejection of the distinction between means and ends in favour of agreement/
negotiation between various policy analysts and decision-makers
• A very limited analysis of policies not already in place
• Success measured in terms of the level of agreement of those involved in the
decision-making process
• Policy directed at solving problems with existing policy

The benefits of incrementalism?:

It is worth trying to make a distinction between the benefits of incrementalism as a
more realistic description of the policy process than comprehensive rationality (which
is obvious given the strawman nature of the latter) and prescriptions based on the
benefits of incrementalism as a policy style. When we discuss the former, the wider
point about incrementalism and policy change is that when decisions are made it is
crucial to recognise that the starting point is not a blank sheet of paper. Any policy
change must take into account (a) the extent of existing commitments and (b) the
effort invested by decision-makers and powerful groups into achieving previous
agreements on policy. Further, as Jones (1999: 35) points out, incrementalism also
undermines the idea that the policy process is linear and easily divided into stages.
This is expressed similarly in related accounts of the policy process. For example:

• Inheritance before choice in public policy – most policy decisions are based on
legislation which already exists, while most day-to-day delivery of policy
takes place without significant ministerial (or presidential) involvement. The
significant investment of political resources into policy change in one area
means ignoring or acceding to policy stability in 99 others.
• Policy succession – the size and scope of the state is such that any “new”
policy is likely to be a revision of an old one. Indeed new policies are often
pursued merely to address the problems caused by the old (this is a feature of
the prescriptive element of incrementalism).
• The lack of policy termination – few policies are terminated and even fewer
are not replaced. Complete termination often has immediate costs (financial,
political), may smack of failure without replacement, may be opposed by
groups and interests associated with the policy, and may be undermined by
organisations operating in relative anonymity or seeking new ways to justify
their existence.
• Path dependence – when commitment to a policy has been established and
resources devoted to it, over time it becomes increasingly or relatively costly
to choose a different policy.

Criticisms of incrementalism often tend to be couched in terms of accepting the

description, but striving towards some investment in decision-making systems to
avoid many of the problems with rationality (particularly with regard to
“fundamental” decisions – but how do we identify these?). But what are the potential
benefits to incrementalism as a policy style:

• More focussed on the problem at hand – by using existing policy as a

starting point
• Based on trials and error/ past decisions – to some extent existing
policy is based on small adjustments to errors made in the past
• Less costly – not only in terms of the money needed to invest in
research and organisational change, but also unintended consequences
of new policy. “Muddling through” avoids relatively serious and
costly mistakes.
• Less disruptive? I.e. each actor will be more likely to accept decisions.
Existing policy is based on previous attempts to negotiate and
compromise. Small adjustments rather than wholesale change suggests
that the same process does not have to be repeated.
However, some also tie in with wider considerations of the adequacy of an
incremental system in terms of the adequacy of existing arrangements (i.e. it only
works when previous decisions have been good decisions; or it is OK in times of
stability but what about when society is predisposed towards significant change?).

However, the debate also extends to theories of power and pluralism in particular. In
part, Lindblom’s analysis relies on some sense of dispersal of power for his ideas
about:

• a “watchdog” - if one policy decision affects another then the latter has means
to readdress and act on the situation
• mutual adjustment – policy decisions are arrived at through negotiation or
mutual adjustment.

In other words, we could argue that Lindblom’s arguments rely on a defence of

pluralism. Put simply, if resources within society were dispersed (significantly)
unequally, then it would be less legitimate to talk of “mutual” adjustment instead of
coercion or dominance. See Ham and Hill for the argument that Lindblom’s views
have changed in recognition of this point.

Criticisms of incrementalism as a description have prompted alternatives such as:

1. Dror and meta-policy (deciding how to make policy). Dror suggests that
incrementalism is accurate description, but suggests that incrementalism is
appropriate only in some areas. In other areas more bold steps may be
required.
2. Etzioni and mixed scanning – makes the distinction between incremental and
“fundamental” decisions such as declaring war. Etzioni suggests that this
approach is also a good description of the process, although as Hill (2005:
151) points out, some fundamental decisions have also developed
incrementally (e.g. nuclear power, the Vietnam War).

Another question may be the relation of this debate to the UK – is e.g. Lindblom’s
discussion more relevant to the US system? A good way to think about this may be to
consider the actions of a UK minister in this context:

• What organisational/ policy structure has she inherited?

• What policy is she committed to?
• How much time does she have to devote to each issue?
• Where does she get her information?
• What information-gathering resources does the department have?
• What information-gathering resources are available from external sources?
• Which types of solutions are “off limits” because of public, media,
parliamentary, party reactions?
• How much money is there to devote to a solution?
• To what extent can she plan for the future?

Another exercise is to break down a policy problem/ solution into its constituent parts.
Lindblom’s discussion of inflation is a good start.
Punctuated Equilibrium
Jones (2003) suggests that incrementalism does not deal well with examples of
profound policy change when decision-makers shift their attention. Long periods of
stability are interrupted by short but intense periods of rapid change. For example,
this is demonstrated by “too many large changes in budget processes” which cannot
be explained by routine adjustments to existing commitments (1999: 303). While
incrementalism may best explain long periods of policy stability, it does not deal
adequately with policy shifts caused by shifts of attention by policy makers following
new or successful attempts to reframe policy issues. Interestingly this discussion
results from a similar conclusion on the limits to ‘rationality’. Baumgartner and Jones
(1993) suggest that since decision makers have limited resources (time, knowledge,
attention, etc) they cannot deal with the full range of ideas or policy problems
available to them. So they ignore most and promote relatively few to the top of their
agenda (see lecture 3).

Concluding Remarks
Part of the problem in applying criticism to incrementalism is that there may not be a
common understanding of what incrementalism means. “Strawman” accounts of
incrementalism may now be as likely as those concerning rationality. There is
particular room for doubt over the size of incremental steps and the extent to which
policy can change radically through a series of small steps. A feature of the debate
over rationality and incrementalism is that both Simon and Lindblom refined or
revised their positions over the course of their careers (the discussion above is a
conflation of those ideas). For example, in Lindloms’ later discussions he
distinguishes between of incremental politics (i.e. the process of negotiation) and the
adequacy of incrementalism in relation to strategic analysis of policy problems (see
Ham and Hill, 1993: 95 which suggests the outcome is even less of a distinction
between Lindblom and Simon).

As John (1999: 36) points out, this suggests that policy styles vary over time and
across policy areas. The process can be characterised as (to a greater extent) rational
at some points and incremental in others (most?). The key is to explain why there is
such stability and change with detailed analysis of policy.

Examples of links to other lectures:

• Policy learning – a key critique of the policy transfer literature highlights the
assumption of a rational process of change without enough attention to the
wider political process. Policy learning or transfer is also used as a tool by
competitors to an existing policy monopoly.
• Agenda setting and policy monopolies: Jones’ (1999; 2003) argument – most
associated with the term “punctuated equilibrium” - is based on a study of
agenda-setting work to explain profound changes to policy monopolies.
• Multi-level Governance – we may wonder about the extent to which a process
can be rational/ comprehensive if it is difficult to identify the core of decision-
making. Implicit within many accounts of rational decision-making is the idea
of one or a central decision-maker.
 • Smoking – we can see many of these issues arise in the tobacco policy case
study. For example, the dangers of passive smoking may now seem obvious,
with a clear need for a policy solution. However, the establishment of the
policy problem and its significance on the political agenda was by no means
straightforward. In the UK we may see the significance of devolved
government arrangements as a focus for change across the UK as a whole,
with the advertising of international experience of tobacco restrictions a key
part of the strategy to challenge existing policy monopolies.
• In Scotland in particular we will see in a discussion of the decision-making
process that policy formulation is indistinguishable from agenda-setting, the
significance of multi-level government arrangements, challenges to existing
policy monopolies on tobacco and that policy transfer is by no means
straightforward even if it seems so in retrospect.

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From your reading of the subject you should have an idea of how to answer these
questions:
• What is “rational” decision making?
• Is rationality “ideal”?
• What are the factors which undermine rationality?
• Consider the argument that incrementalism provides the answer to the
questions of how policy is made - and how it should be made
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Handy links to articles on related subjects

• Policy succession -
http://www.springerlink.com/media/nntr48yrmkcxrjjtxxww/contributions/k/6/
7/4/k674815q7805530g.pdf
• Avoiding policy termination -
http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/pgwf2qyrmj5wnm6ugxuq/contri
butions/n/d/l/x/ndlxnjf84rlvlang_html/print.htm
• Path dependence - http://www.jstor.org/view/00030554/di011609/01p0796a/0
• Inheritance in public policy: change without choice in Britain /Richard Rose
and Phillip L. Davies. 351.41 Ros
See also
Baumgartner, F. and Jones, B. (1993) Agendas and Instability in American Politics*
John, Peter (1999) Analysing Public Policy (London: Continuum) 320.6 Joh
Jones, B. (1999) ‘Bounded Rationality’, Annual Review of Political Science
Vol. 2: 297-321
Jones, B. (2003) ‘Bounded Rationality and Political Science: Lessons from Public
Administration and Public Policy’ Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, 13, 4, 395-412
There is also a set of photocopied articles and chapters in heavy demand
including (Go to course reading then select Cairney as Lecturer):
Dempster – On change …
Ham – rationality and decision making …
Lindblom, C.E. (1959). The Science of Muddling Through.
Public Administration Review, 19, 79-88*
Lindblom, C. E., (1979), “Still Muddling, Not Yet Through”, Public Administration
Review, 39, pp. 517-525*
Jordan, A.G. (1987) ‘Rationality’*
Smith – the artificial debate …