Of Sophists Tyrants and Polyphemos The N PDF

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OF SOPHISTS, TYRANTS AND POLYPHEMOS:

THE NATURE OF THE BEAST IN
EURIPIDES’ CYCLOPS
Patrick O’Sullivan
Since it was first suggested in 1896 by W. Schmid (1896, 57) an orthodoxy

has emerged that Polyphemos’ characterization in the Cyclops reflects the
supposed views of the Sophists – or at least some prominent Sophists – of
the fifth century bc. Central, of course, to this view is the interpretation
of Polyphemos’ speech in response to Odysseus’ pleas to spare him and his
crew and respect the laws of ξενία (‘hospitality’ [316–46]). Among those
to have endorsed the view that Polyphemos resembles a Sophist are such
influential figures as Albin Lesky (1966, 401), who wrote of Polyphemos:
‘This giant spurns the law on principle, he only sacrifices to himself or his
stomach, without bothering about law or custom. He is thus made into
an extremist adherent of natural justice, offering, according to the poet’s
purpose, an effective illustration of the doctrines which at the time were
being championed by the most radical of the sophists.’ Wilamowitz in his
introduction to the Cyclops in the third part of his three-volume transla-
tion of Greek tragedies, had made much the same claim. Wilamowitz
saw Polyphemos’ supposed ‘atheism’ not only as a source of humour for
the audience, but also as a parody of the intellectual rationalism of the
fifth century supported by what he calls ‘jene anti-religiösen und anti-
moralischen “Sophisten” ’.1 Neither Wilamowitz nor Lesky specified any
Sophists by name, but Duchemin in her commentary on the Cyclops restates
the point, and sees the supposed link as consisting in a shared atheism,
as did Wilamowitz. She goes further and mentions Thrasymachus and
Callicles – the latter being the angry young man of Plato’s Gorgias – as the
‘Sophists’ most likely to hold views similar to those of Polyphemos.2
With few dissenting voices, the supposed Polyphemos–Sophist nexus
has found many proponents in recent times. Again, the alleged views of
Callicles and Thrasymachus are most often invoked to support what has
become a standard view in treatments of the Euripidean Polyphemos. David
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Konstan, while rightly seeing Polyphemos as a despotic figure threatening to

the Attic demos in his excessive αὐτάρκεια (‘self-sufficiency’),3 treats him as
a typically ‘sophistic’ figure, citing Callicles and Thrasymachus as parallels.
Here he echoes the views of Paganelli, who sees Polyphemos as parodying
the views on religion espoused by Protagoras, Prodicus and others, as well
as using Gorgianic rhetorical tropes.4 Kovacs, in the introduction to his
Loeb translation writes: ‘Like certain of the Sophists, represented most fully
in the Callicles of Plato’s Gorgias, the Cyclops has “seen through” tradi-
tional morality, and he regards law as an invention of man that needlessly
complicates life.’ 5 This view is similar to that of Seaford who also invokes
Callicles as a parallel for Polyphemos on the basis that each shows contempt
for conventional morality, laws and communal values. Seaford (1984, 52)
writes: ‘It has been generally recognized that this passage parodies certain
contemporary intellectual developments. We are reminded in particular of
Kallikles in Plato’s Gorgias, who argues that strong individuals have a duty,
based on φύσις (‘nature’), to satisfy their desires at the expense of νόμοι
(‘laws’), which are to be despised as the creation of the weak majority.’ Such
scholars, are, I think, right to see connections between Plato’s Callicles and
Euripides’ Polyphemos, and certainly features of the latter’s ‘sophistication’,
so Seaford puts it (1984, 53) entail developments on the Homeric Cyclops.
But whether this makes the Euripidean monster a parody of a Sophist is
less clear, and Seaford rightly refrains from calling Callicles a sophist. Even
the Homeric Polyphemos is not without some cunning, and attempts to
trick Odysseus into divulging the whereabouts of his ship (Od. 9.279–80).
This ploy is not lost on the great trickster himself, and, giving as good as
he gets, he answers characteristically (Od. 9.281–2):
Ὣς φάτο πειράζων, ἐμὲ δ’ οὐ λάθεν εἰδότα πολλά,
ἀλλά μιν ἄψορρον προσέφην δολίοις ἐπέεσσιν.
So he spoke, trying me on, but he did not trick me, since I knew much,
and I answered him back with deceptive words.
As Odysseus implies, a man with less knowledge might have been taken in
by the question. The point here, then, is that any elements of cunning in
the Euripidean Cyclops need not be seen entirely as a result of fifth-century
sophism, but appear on some level in the monster’s earliest treatment.
Since Aristophanes, of course, critics have readily detected sophistic
elements in Euripides’ dramas, and many may find it natural to see
Polyphemos as extensively embodying sophistic traits that are so prevalent
elsewhere in the Euripidean corpus. But the supposedly sophistic aspect
of Polyphemos in the Cyclops is not as far-reaching as has been claimed,
and the Euripidean Polyphemos is better understood as embodying traits
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Of Sophists, tyrants and Polyphemos: The nature of the beast in … Cyclops
attributed to the tyrant, as construed and demonised in fifth- and fourth-

century Greek, invariably Attic, literature.6 This is evident in parallels from
other dramas such as the Prometheus Bound, Phoenissae and Supplices, and
passages from Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle, where the issue
of tyranny is broached.7 It is also worth noting parallels with other tyran-
nical types in Greek drama, including Pentheus in the Bacchae and the
Aeschylean Lycurgus; both these rulers opposed Dionysos and his worship
at their own cost, and aspects of their stories have some bearing on the
figure of Polyphemos. The correspondences that emerge, then, between the
stereotypical tyrant’s behaviour and that of Polyphemos more fully explain
his role in the Cyclops than any sophistic parallels. They make him a far
more appropriate villain for a drama at the City Dionysia, the festival of its
first performance, and a major vehicle for the dissemination and scrutiny
of Attic democratic values.8
I. Problems in the Polyphemos–Sophist nexus

Some have rightly doubted that Polyphemos is largely a sophistic figure
in the Cyclops, but the case for this needs to be put more forcefully and
with greater precision.9 In dealing with atheism as a supposed connection
between Polyphemos and the Sophists, it should be said that Polyphemos
is no atheist, and that atheism was not a tenet of sophistic thinking. As
Sutton (1980, 121, 124) pointed out, Polyphemos acknowledges the
gods throughout the play, and boasts in fact that he is a ‘god, descended
from a god’ (Cyc. 231). While Sutton is correct in his claim, he wrongly
implies that Sophists were typically atheistic, so his reasons for dismissing
the purported link are problematic, especially the allusion to ‘cynical and
atheistic sophism’. The idea of the divine takes a number of forms in
sophistic thought that preclude a blanket formula of atheism.10 Elsewhere,
Sutton’s treatment of the Polyphemos-as-Sophist idea (1980, 121) is marred
by his claim that Polyphemos does not deride νόμοι (‘laws’) per se, but rather
addresses the specific νόμος (‘law’) of helping suppliants to which Odysseus
appeals. But Polyphemos denounces those who devise laws – νόμους – for
human life in general (338). The implication of Sutton’s approach here is
that Polyphemos would be a sophistic figure if in fact he did attack νόμος
generally, and he does refer to the supposed Machtpolitik of Callicles (whom
he labels a sophist) and Thrasymachus in this context. But it can be shown
that Callicles should not be considered a sophist, and that Thrasymachus
does not endorse the Machtpolitik which Sutton and many others ascribe to
him. Nor, moreover, is the denunciation of laws in the service of espousing
the rampant hedonism of Polyphemos typical of sophistic teaching. So,
while Sutton is correct in saying that Polyphemos should not be too readily
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equated with the Sophists, there are more compelling reasons for this than
have been adduced. These reasons, moreover, afford further insights into
the monster’s characterization in the Cyclops.
In dealing with the supposed Callicles–Sophist nexus first, one should
note that Callicles in Plato’s dialogue is neither a teacher of any sort, paid
or unpaid, of higher education, nor a professional speech-writer. One of
these professions must be included in any satisfactory definition of the
term ‘Sophist’, as then understood, otherwise the term simply becomes too
loose to be of value, and could be extended indefinitely to include Pericles,
Euripides, Thucydides, Alcibiades, to name just a few. Plato continually
makes teaching an essential element of being a Sophist (Prot. 317b; Gorg.
519c–e). In earlier times, the term σοφιστής (‘sophist’) was applied to
poets or sages, and denoted their role not only as founts of wisdom, but as
educators of lore and morals, as Guthrie points out.11 Certainly Callicles
does not see himself as one of the products of sophistic thinking; nor, it
would appear, does Plato. For well before Callicles’ impassioned outburst,
Plato has made clear that students are not necessarily reflecting the views
of their teachers. He allows Gorgias a reasonable defence of his profession,
in which he claims that rhetoric should be used ἐπὶ δικαίᾳ χρείᾳ (‘for a just
purpose’) and that, if a student abuses newly-acquired rhetorical skills, this
is the fault of the student, who deserves censure, not the teacher (Gorg.
456d–457c).12 It was also pointed out long ago by Grote in his justly
famous defence of the Sophists that Callicles contemptuously dissociates
himself from the teachers of ἀρετή (‘excellence’) – most famous among
whom was Protagoras – describing them as ‘worthless creatures’ when
asking Socrates: ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων; (‘but what
would you say about worthless men?’ Gorg. 520a).13 Callicles mentions
Pindar (fr. 169a) – poet laureate to the aristocracy – as the source for his
belief, and interprets the poet as saying it was just for Heracles to steal the
cattle of Geryon. For Callicles, Heracles’ actions follow the law of nature,
and νόμος is βασιλεύς (‘king’) of all mortal and immortal things (Gorg.
484b).14 Callicles thus attempts to give his view some credibility, not by
stressing it as a development of current intellectual trends, but by seeing it
as something practised by the great heroes of old.
Nor is there any thing typically sophistic in his (in)famous view that
natural justice consists of the right of the strong to have the advantage over
the many and weak, as well as for the strong to be able to glut all their
desires in defiance of restraint and moderation (Gorg. esp. 482c–484d;
491e–492c). These views involve an iconoclastic treatment of νόμος and
φύσις whereby Callicles claims to be talking about what is just by nature
as opposed to what is just by convention or law (esp. 483a–e). These laws
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(νόμοι), says Callicles, are framed by the weak and many (ἀσθενεῖς and
πολλοί) who frighten the stronger (τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους) by saying that
to overeach (πλεονεκτεῖν) others is shameful (αἰσχρόν) and unjust (ἄδικον).
These lawmakers, being inferior (φαυλότεροι), are content with equality
(τὸ ἴσον), for which reason seeking to have more is unjust and shameful
by convention (νόμῳ), but is in full accord with φύσις, whose ordinances
Callicles proceeds to outline (483d–e). This attack on conventional morality
is essentially anti-democratic, since equality was one of the great hallmarks
of democracy, proclaimed at Athens.15 The political implications of this
view lead Callicles eventually to praise those of a tyrannical disposition.
In speaking of the need for those suitably endowed by nature to cultivate
and sate their desires to the greatest extent possible, Callicles sees this as the
right lifestyle by φύσις for monarchs and tyrants (Gorg. 491e–492c):
This, what I am saying to you now in all frankness, is what is fine and just
according to nature (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον): that one who is to live
his life properly (ὀρθῶς) must let his desires (ἐπιθυμίας) become as great as
possible and not restrain them; and he must be capable of serving these once
they are as large as possible, through his courage and intelligence (δι’ ἀνδρείαν
καὶ φρόνησιν), and to satisfy them with the things he might have a desire for
at any time … Since for those whose lot it is from the beginning to be the
sons of kings, or who are able by their nature (φύσις) to assume some power,
or tyranny (τυραννίδα), or dynasty, what in truth could be more shameful
or worse than moderation (σωφροσύνης) and justice (δικαιοσύνης) for these
men …? But in truth, Socrates, – which you claim to be pursuing – this is how
things are. Luxury and intemperance and license (ἐλευθερία), if it has enough
support, this is excellence and happiness (ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία); all the rest,
the ornaments, the agreements made by men contrary to nature (παρὰ φύσιν),
these are rubbish and worth nothing (φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια).
Such an opinion is tentatively foreshadowed in the Gorgias by an earlier
interlocutor in that dialogue, Polus, who cites the examples of Archelaus,
tyrant of Macedon as a paradigm of happiness for escaping punishment
despite evil-doing (Gorg. 471a–d). Polus’ claim is that many people commit
injustices yet remain εὐδαίμων (‘happy’, 470d), and Archelaus – whom
Polus admits is ἄδικος (‘unjust’, 471a) – is the most telling example. As
Irwin notes, there is no endorsement of wrongdoing in Polus’ claim, more
an observation that Socrates admits is commonplace (472a–b).16 The
essence of Polus’ view is conventional in that he agrees that doing wrong
is more shameful (αἴσχιον) than suffering it, but that suffering it is worse
(κάκιον) than doing it (474c). This admission of Polus sets him apart from
Callicles who enters after Socrates’ response, and provocatively endorses
the right of the strong to fulfill their desires at the expense of the weak.
Indeed, his inversion of values along the νόμος–φύσις divide carries a clear
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normative, not just descriptive, element for him. By the time of Callicles’
appearance, then, the spectres of tyranny and despotism have already made
their presence felt and inform his ideas more profoundly than usually recog-
nized – a fact which can thus shed considerable light on the connections
between him and Polyphemos.
The mere invocation of νόμος and/or φύσις – readily found in the
tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides, and, as Callicles himself notes, the
poetry of Pindar – need not make one a Sophist.17 Moreover, the Sophists
never comprised a single body of thought on the great νόμος–φύσις
controversy, nor does any extant sophistic view equate with Callicles’
hedonism.18 A quick overview of some relevant sophistic ideas will demon-
strate this, beginning with Protagoras, who appears to have upheld the
importance of communal, democratic values – in other words the very kind
of νόμοι spurned by Callicles (and a fortiori, we may infer, the Euripidean
Polyphemos). Protagoras not only drafted the democratic constitution of
the Athenian colony of Thurii (A 1 D-K), but in the eponymous dialogue
the Sophist famously tells his myth of the origins of communal life in the
polis (Prot. 322d–324d), with its focus on the need for αἰδώς (‘respect’)
and δίκη (‘justice’) as essential to political excellence (ἀρετή). Essential also
to the Protagorean ἀρετή of running a city are σωφροσύνη (‘moderation’)
and justice (323a), two concepts singled out by Callicles as most inimical
to his tyrannical ‘strong man’ whom he considers entitled to live by sating
his desires (Gorg. 492b). Elsewhere, νόμος is promoted by certain Sophists
with the firm idea of a communal good in mind, for instance, in the work
of the Anonymus Iamblichi, who invokes νόμος and φύσις to make this
point.19 Law (νόμος) is alluded to as if a king (βασιλεύς) and is ingrained
in our very nature along with justice (6.1):
τόν τε νόμον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐμβασιλεύειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ οὐδαμῇ μεταστῆναι
ἂν αὐτὰ· φύσει γὰρ ἰσχυρὰ ἐνδεδέσθαι ταῦτα.
The law and justice are king among mortals and would in no way be displaced;
for the strength of these things is ingrained in (our) nature.
The appearances of νόμος and φύσις in the Anonymus Iamblichi, remind
us of their presence in Callicles’ speeches, but the political and ethical ends
towards which these concepts are put could hardly be any more different.
Even those Sophists who evidently upheld φύσις over νόμος, as did
Hippias and Antiphon, are saying things quite different from Callicles’
views, and by corollary, those of Polyphemos. Hippias saw νόμος as
oppressive, even calling it a τύραννος, because it forces many things on
us against our nature (Plato, Prot. 337d–338b). When intervening in the
dispute between Socrates and the great Sophist, he makes the point that
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those present at the discussion are akin (συγγενεῖς) by φύσις, even though
not by νόμος. Rather than allow selfish hedonism, Hippias’ point is to
assert a greater unity amongst people than νόμος usually allows for. How
far beyond this select gathering Hippias would take this idea is unclear, but
some striking papyrus fragments of Antiphon’s On Truth (B 44 D-K20) do
stipulate more fully the essential unity of all humanity along the νόμος–
φύσις divide.21 Antiphon acknowledges that justice (δικαιοσύνη) involves
not transgressing laws (νόμιμα) – in contrast to Callicles’ view of natural
justice and Polyphemos’ rejection of νόμοι. He also sees the ordinances of
nature as transcending convention or agreement; thus, a man would suffer
harm, if he disobeys them even in private (fr. B 44 A, col. 2.10–20). More
generally Antiphon states, anticipating the Platonic Callicles: τὰ πολλὰ τῶν
κατὰ νόμον δικαίων πολεμίως τῇ φύσει κεῖται (‘many things that are just
according to nomos are inimical to nature’, fr. B 44 A col. 2.26–30). But
the examples Antiphon gives to explain his view suggest he is talking of
an ‘enlightened self-interest’, as Guthrie called it, rather than the ‘greed is
good’ idea of Callicles.22 This is a long way from the faith in νόμος expressed
by the Anonymus Iamblichi or Lycophron (fr. 3 D-K), but Antiphon has
not created a moral vacuum in which a supposed strongman is entitled to
lord it over the weak.23 Another sophistic invocation of νόμος and φύσις for
ethical and political ends different from those upheld by Callicles can be
found in Alcidamas’ condemnation of slavery as against Nature and God
(Schol. on Arist. Rhet. 1373b6): ‘God has set all people free; Nature has
made no-one a slave’, a view which extends to slaves the unity Antiphon
posits between Greeks and foreigners.24
Thrasymachus’ view in Republic 1 (338c) on justice as ‘nothing other
than the interests of the stronger’ – τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ
κρείττονος ξυμφέρον – suggests, on closer inspection something other
than the views of Callicles and Polyphemos. By the ‘stronger’ Thrasyma-
chus means the established government, and justice ‘in all cities’ is ‘the
advantage enjoyed by the established power’: τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς
ξυμφέρον (339a). Thus, a democracy frames democratic laws, a tyranny
tyrannical laws, and so on (Rep. 338e). The inclusion here of democracy as
amongst the ‘stronger’, contrasts with Callicles’ contempt for this form of
government whose laws, he says, are framed by the many and weak (Gorg.
483b). Adam noted that Thrasymachus does not use his view as a basis for
ethical conduct for an individual – as Callicles did – but rather to describe
current political theory and practice.25 The two, then, are speaking on
different issues, and are not, as is often claimed, speaking with one
voice.26 In any event, Thrasymachus’ stated position is far from uniquely
his own, but mentioned elsewhere in the Platonic corpus as something of
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a commonplace (Laws 714c–e; Glaucon’s view, Rep. 358e–359b). When

Socrates attempts to counter this by saying that the true ruler looks to
the advantage of the ruled (342d–e), Thrasymachus responds that justice
is ‘another man’s good’ (ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν), in that it means obeying laws
set by another, and coming off worse in any transaction (343c). Injustice
is related to πλεονεξία (‘greed’), whose ultimate manifestation is tyranny
itself, which he calls τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν (‘the ultimate injustice’,
344a). Thrasymachus cites the tyrant as the embodiment of injustice who
enjoys worldly success (344c). Elsewhere, Thrasymachus goes on to say
that injustice is more advantageous than justice and a form of εὐβουλία
(‘sensible planning’, 348c–349d).
Unlike Callicles, however, he does not promote the right of the strong
to act against conventional justice. For, according to Thrasymachus, the
advantages enjoyed by the tyrant are all examples of injustice. But, for
Callicles, they are all examples of natural justice, and a rule of conduct for
his superior man. The closest the Platonic Thrasymachus gets to this view
is to call unjust men ‘intelligent’ and ‘good’ ( φρόνιμοί … ἀγαθοί, 348d),27
and to link injustice to excellence (ἀρετή) and wisdom (σοφία), calling it
a fine (καλόν) and strong (ἰσχυρόν) thing – at least he seems initially to
agree with this Socratic interpretation of his views (348e–349a).28 Yet this
apparent agreement is undercut almost immediately. When Socrates wishes
to confirm that Thrasymachus is not talking sarcastically, the latter retorts:
τί δέ σοι … τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μή, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχεις;
‘What difference does it make to you if I believe it or not? Why don’t you
test the argument? ’, 349a 9–10). From this, it is apparent that he is not
committed to endorsing the state of affairs he has just outlined. In fact,
as Socrates picks apart his argument, Thrasymachus claims that Socrates
will not let him speak his mind; from here on, he will simply answer to
facilitate Socrates’ argumentation (350d–e, 351d, 352b).29 Many aspects
of this exchange, then, suggest that Thrasymachus should not therefore be
equated with Callicles in advocating a ‘might is right’ ideology.
Two external pieces of evidence confirm this impression. In the first,
Thrasymachus says (B 8 D-K):
οἱ θεοὶ οὐχ ὁρῶσι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις
ἀγαθῶν παρεῖδον τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ταύτῃ μὴ
χρωμένους.
The gods do not look to human affairs. For they would not have neglected
the greatest of goods amongst humans, justice; for we see people making no
use of it.
Here justice is described as the greatest good for mortals, rather than as
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a weapon for the strong, and of theological significance, since its neglect
on earth indicates divine indifference to humanity. Disregard of justice, in
other words, points to the alienation of humans from the divine. A frag-
ment of Thrasymachus’ Politeia (B 1), a political speech delivered before
the Athenian assembly, is also worth noting here, and not just because
it is the one piece of his writing to survive of any significant length.30 It
contains much of interest, not least being the fact that quite a different
view from that which Plato gives him is being espoused here.31 The speech
is set during the Peloponnesian War and the speaker presents himself as
a young man, no longer able to keep quiet in the face of the civic turmoil
he sees around him. He laments the absence of civic concord (ὁμονοία) –
a concept of some importance in other Sophists’ writings 32– now replaced
by enmity and turmoil. A key point made along the way is the critique of
those rhetoricians and others, fighting amongst themselves, described as
seeking to win without thinking who fail to see how the arguments of their
opponents are embodied in their own policies. The piece ends with a plea
for unity and recourse to the ancestral constitution. Here Thrasymachus
is invoking the insights afforded by sophistic training to make a telling
political point, urging restraint and conciliation. Seen against these other
writings of his, Thrasymachus’ views in Plato’s Republic can be plausibly
understood as focusing on what is hypocritically termed justice in an age
of power politics and internecine strife that gripped the Greek world in
the late fifth century bc. He may well be making a point about specious
terminology and about the abuse of language to conceal ugly realities, as
did Thucydides in his incisive account of the stasis in Corcyra (3.82.4–5).
There the combatants are described as manipulating language so that the
customary meaning of words in regard to actions was changed. So, in his
view on justice in Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus is perhaps better under-
stood as a disillusioned moralist, exposing what is passed off as justice in
terms of Realpolitik, rather than endorsing such a situation.33 There is much
that separates him from Callicles, and removes him yet further from the
figure of Euripides’ Polyphemos.
To sum up: there are good reasons for rejecting many of the purported
links between Polyphemos and Sophists. Firstly, the main linch-pin in this
connection, Callicles, was no Sophist nor does he entertain views attested
by any known Sophist. Secondly, the Sophists themselves entertained
widely divergent views on morality, νόμος and φύσις, none of which are
recalled by Polyphemos’ words or actions in the Cyclops even on a parodic
level. Finally, Thrasymachus’ views in Republic 1 on justice and power are
descriptive, not normative, and his own ideas on justice and political theory
elsewhere place him at quite a distance from Callicles’ pronouncements.
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Concepts of tyranny are far more central to Callicles’ ethical impera-

tive, and are worthy of fuller discussion now, since they can be shown to
have far-reaching implications for the characterization of the Euripidean
Polyphemos.
II. The tyrannical Polyphemos

A reign of terror by a Sicilian bully
From his first appearance Polyphemos embodies in its most basic terms the
idea of rule by force in barking out his orders and threatening the satyrs
(Cyc. 203–5, 210–11):
ἄνεχε πάρεχε· τί τάδε; τίς ἡ ῥᾳθυμία;
τί βακχιάζετ’; οὐχὶ Διόνυσος τάδε,
οὐ κρόταλα χαλκοῦ τυμπάνων τ’ ἀράγματα.
…
τί φάτε, τί λέγετε; τάχα τις ὑμῶν τῷ ξύλῳ
δάκρυα μεθήσει. βλέπετ’, ἄνω καὶ μὴ κάτω.
Cyclops Get out of the way! Make way! What’s this? What’s this idleness?
Why are you performing Bacchic rights? There’s no Dionysos here, no castanet
of bronze, no rattle of the drums … What have you got to say for yourselves?
What do you say? One of you will soon start weeping tears courtesy of my
club. Look up, not down!
The first sight of Polyphemos is perfectly consistent with what we have
learnt about him from Silenos and the chorus. He is a δεσπότης (34, 90,
163, et passim),34 and a particularly violent one at that, while they are his
slaves (24, 78, 79, 442).35 In fact, it appears that the Euripidean monster
has a retinue of his own beyond the satyrs, in contrast to the Homeric
monster who is a loner (cf. Od. 9.112–15).36 In any event, a clear feature
distinguishing Euripides’ Cyclops from the Homeric model is that the
satyric monster has a tyrannical dominion over others. The term δεσπότης
is coupled by Plato with τύραννος (Laws 859a), and Herodotus, who
endows the demented Cambyses with the ὕβρις of a tyrant, elsewhere calls
him δεσπότης (3.80.2–3; cf. 3.89.3). Aristotle in the Rhetoric (1393b5–22)
sees the desire to enslave others as another typical feature of the tyrant. The
Aristotelian reference need not be seen purely as an invented idea of his
own day, since he mentions a fable told by Stesichorus warning the people
of Akragas that Phalaris’ accession to the tyranny is likely to lead to their
own enslavement (Arist. Rhet. 1393b5–22). The Cyclops’ sheer brute force
– or at least his menacing presence – becomes yet more emphatic in the
threats he makes to the satyrs with his club,37 and in his command that
they look up, rather than down. Here, then, is a (literal) overlord, whose
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physical size is alluded to verbally, and probably depicted visually onstage,

underpinning the nature of the power he has over the satyrs.
As one might expect of satyric drama, size matters here, and this seems
confirmed in the satyrs’ response (212–13):
ἰδού· πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν Δί’ ἀνακεκύφαμεν
καὶ τἄστρα καὶ τὸν ᾨρίωνα δέρκομαι.
Ch. See? My head is bent upwards towards Zeus and the stars, and I can
see Orion.
Rather than see this as a literal time-shift,38 we may see it as comic over-
reaction of the satyrs to the fearsome prospect of their towering master,
a hunter, like Orion, albeit one who has returned home empty-handed.
The Orion reference is apt for the Euripidean Polyphemos for other
reasons, too. Both are club-wielding giants (cf. Od. 11.572–5); both sons
of Poseidon (cf. Hesiod, fr. 148a); both violent and lecherous, since Orion’s
assaults on Merope (Hes., fr. 148a) and Artemis find their eventual parallel
in Polyphemos’ grotesque rape of Silenos (Cyc. 576–89).39 Both meet
with the same punishment. Hesiod (fr. 148a) and Servius (Aen. 10.763)
mention Orion’s blinding by Merope’s father, Oinopion, a son of Dionysos.
Seaford plausibly suggests that this episode may have been dealt with in
Sophocles’ satyric Kedalion (frs. 328–33); and it is known that two frag-
mentary Pindaric dithyrambs mention the blinding of Orion (Pindar, fr.
72–4; cf. P. Berol. 9571), which may have included the presence of satyrs.40
These resonances between Orion and Polyphemos, not only focus on the
monstrous nature of each figure, but carry tyrannical overtones at least for
the Cyclops, since rape is a crime strongly associated with tyrants.41
Polyphemos’ contempt for Dionysos and his rites, so blatant from
the outset, brings out his hostility to divinity – not atheism – and such
hostility is evident again in his rhesis to Odysseus (316–46) and in his
cannibalism.42 Such violent antipathy to the patron god of the festival
where the Cyclops was first performed must have done much to establish
his villainy for the contemporary audience and invite comparison with
other figures who similarly wished to have nothing to do with Dionysos.
Notable amongst these are Lycurgus, king of the Edonians and Pentheus,
king of Thebes. In opposing the rites of Dionysos, Polyphemos invites ruin
on himself, much like the two kings, both of whose stories had appeared
on the Greek stage before Euripides’ Cyclops and his Bacchae.43 Seaford
outlines a number of connections between Polyphemos and Pentheus,
chiefly on the basis that each is an initiand into the Dionysian mysteries.44
The parallels he adduces are convincing, but we may also see tyrannical
overtones in the correspondences between the two figures. In fact, Seaford
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rightly noted elsewhere that much in Pentheus’ characterization resembles

Polyphemos not only as another opponent of the Dionysiac thiasos, but
in the monstrosity and anti-democratic ideology of each.45 Regarding
Polyphemos, this latter feature manifests itself more precisely in his
contempt for νόμοι (338–40), which, as we have seen, are championed
by democratic Sophists such as Protagoras and the Anonymus Iamblichi,
the latter a vehement opponent of tyranny (7.12–16). Dionysos in the
Bacchae (43) mentions that Cadmus gave Pentheus the τυραννίς (tyranny)
over Thebes; and the term τύραννος appears with particular force when the
chorus tell the king (775–7):
ταρβῶ μὲν εἰπεῖν τοὺς λόγους ἐλευθέρους
πρὸς τὸν τύραννον, ἀλλ’ ὅμως εἰρήσεται·
Διόνυσος ἥσσων οὐδενὸς θεῶν ἔφυ.
I am afraid to speak free words to the tyrant, but all the same it will be said.
Dionysos is inferior to none of the gods.
The terror induced by Pentheus is typical of tyrants, and consistent with
Polyphemos’ brutally despotic presence from his first appearance in the
Cyclops. As for Lycurgus, Homer relates that this foe of Dionysos was
blinded for his outrages (Il. 6.130–40), as, of course, were Polyphemos and
Orion. Dramatic treatments of Lycurgus might have afforded particularly
apt parallels with Polyphemos, had more of Aeschylus’ tetralogy about him
survived, but there is very little evidence to go on. It is known, however,
that Lycurgus (TGF III 124–6) was the title of an Aeschylean satyr-play
that accompanied his tragedies Edonians, Bassarids and Neaniskoi, and
Apollodorus (3.5.1) writes that Lycurgus enslaved Dionysos’ maenads and
satyrs. It seems very likely, then, that this satyr-play involved the enslave-
ment at least of these male followers of the god, thus anticipating the
Cyclops. Indeed, in the play’s prologue an implicit reference to Lycurgus
has been plausibly detected.46 Silenos’ reference to the madness inflicted on
Dionysos by Hera (Cyc. 3–4), as one of his own πόνοι, would remind the
audience of Dionysos’ wanderings which resulted from this and brought
him into conflict with Lycurgus.47 The brevity of the allusion, one of three
references to Dionysos’ adventures in the prologue, implies that the tale
is well known, and that the following drama will involve an ogre similar
to Lycurgus.48
In the following encounter in which Polyphemos discovers Odysseus
and his men carrying off his lambs and cheeses, the monster acts as judge,
jury and (eventually) executioner in his decision to eat them without
delay (Cyc. 222–84). Much in Polyphemos’ behaviour can be shown to be
consistent with Greek notions of tyranny as a form of rule characterized
130
by lawlessness, headed by a capricious ruler, who is incapable of friendship,

but willing to associate with slanderers. He assumes the worst of the visitors
from the outset, suspecting that they are pirates (222–3):
ἔα· τίν’ ὄχλον τόνδ’ ὁρῶ πρὸς αὐλίοις;
λῃσταί τινες κατέσχον ἢ κλῶπες χθόνα;
Hey! What’s this mob I see in front of my house? Are they robbers or thieves
who have put into shore here?
These may be conventional questions, as has been suggested,49 but the
fact that Polyphemos does not address the visitors directly indicates he has
already reached his conclusions about their intentions even before noticing
his sheep have been bound up and his cheese buckets overturned. His initial
ἔα (‘Hey!’) and his contemptuous reference to the strangers as an ὄvχλος
(mob) show emphatically his hostile reaction on first seeing them.50 His
propensity to jump to wrong conclusions is clear in inferring that Silenos,
ruddy-faced from swigging the wine Odysseus has given him, has been
beaten up, a mistake which Silenos shamelessly exploits to get himself off the
hook and to avoid admitting to selling off the Cyclops’ property (226–7).51
From this point he plays toady to the Cyclops – eventually paying a harsh
price for his sycophancy (576–89) – but in the meantime we find him
egging the monster on in his cruelty and cannibalism. Silenos’ outlandish
lie (232–40) that the strangers carried off Polyphemos’ goods against his
will and were intending to torture the Cyclops and sell him into slavery
is immediately accepted as fact by the monster, who proceeds to describe
how he will cook and eat the travellers as punishment (241–9). Odysseus,
perhaps uncharacteristically, offers a truthful and succinct account of what
happened, supported by the chorus (253–60, 270–2). This is countered in
an oath by Silenos, as ludicrous and obsequious as it is false, in which he
not only addresses the Cyclops as ὦ κάλλιστον ὦ Κυκλώπιον | ὦ δεσποτίσκε
(‘o most beautiful, o little Cyclops, o dear little master’, 266–7) but also
glibly puts his own sons’ lives at stake (262–9). The chorus’s support for
Odysseus is given short shrift by the monster (273–4):
Ψεύδεσθ’· ἔγωγε τῷδε τοῦ Ῥαδαμάνθυος
μᾶλλον πέποιθα καὶ δικαιότερον λέγω.
You’re lying. As far as I’m concerned, I trust this man more than I would
Rhadamanthys and I say he is more just, too.
Some kind of ἀγών (debate) might be expected here, as in other Euripi-
dean dramas, such as the Hecuba 1129–1237 or Troades 905–1059, where
conflicting views are given voice, in good keeping with Protagorean rhetoric
and epistemology (frs. 5, 6, 6a D-K). But here, the Cyclops is simply
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incapable of anything so sophistic as to consider more than one side of

the story. Instead, he chooses to believe the old satyr, praising him, of all
creatures, as a model of justice. Ussher finds Polyphemos’ trust in Silenos
moving, but its sheer incongruity has comic qualities.52 Silenos’ greed,
cowardice, self-deception and self-aggrandisement are evident throughout
the play, as in other satyric dramas such as Sophocles’ Ichneutae 145–68,
205–9.
The monster’s preference for Silenos here and unwillingness to grant
Odysseus a hearing would rankle with Athenian democratic νόμοι which
allowed speeches for defence and prosecution. Moreover, Polyphemos’
choice of ‘friend’ here would also endow him with certain qualities deemed
typical of the tyrant. In Herodotus’ famous account of the Persian debate
over the constitutions (3.80–2), Otanes, among other criticisms of the
tyrant, mentions as a characteristic feature (3.80.4–5):
χαίρει (sc. τύραννος) δὲ τοῖσι κακίστοισι τῶν ἀστῶν, διαβολὰς δὲ ἄριστος
ἐνδέκεσθαι.
He delights in the worst of his citizens, and he is very good at listening to

slander.53
Also comparable to the bizarre alliance of Polyphemos and Silenos is
Plato’s depiction of the tyrant as associating with the dregs of society,
κηφῆνας … ξενικούς … παντοδαπούς (‘vagabonds’, ‘aliens’, ‘motley mobs’),
since the ἐπιεικεῖς (‘decent folk’) will despise him (Rep. 567d–568a). Plato,
using the analogy of political constitutions for the delineation of the soul,
also sees how tyrants are propped up by people acting as sycophants and
false witnesses (συκοφαντοῦσιν … ψευδομαρτυροῦσι), among others (Rep.
575b). The situation is easily recognizable in Silenos’ obsequiousness before
his brutish master. As if the culmination of the tyrant’s transgressions,
Otanes mentions the tyrannical habit of putting men to death without
trial (ἀκρίτους, Hdt. 3.80.6). This latter feature also characterizes the brutal
autocracy of Creon, whose persona in Sophocles’ Antigone has long been
recognized as tyrannical, not least in his desire to put to death instantly
anyone who defies his edict concerning Polyneices (Ant. 305–314; cf. 486–
95).54 Polyphemos’ favouring Silenos over the others, and his immediate
resolve to kill his visitors can thus be seen to carry clear tyrannical overtones
for the contemporary audience in the light of these parallels.
Polyphemos’ dwelling place in Sicily, not specified by Homer, links him
geographically at least with a number of sixth- and fifth-century tyrants,
Hiero, Gelon, Theron, and especially, as we shall see, Phalaris.55 The Sicilian
location is mentioned no fewer than thirteen times in a play of just over
700 lines – often by reference to Aetna – and does indeed seem to have
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thematic significance as well as functioning as an appropriately distant

(from Athens) locale for a satyr play.56 We may not agree with Paganelli’s
attempt to see Polyphemos’ rhetoric as somehow reflecting the style of the
Sicilian Gorgias, but that commentator was right to see significance in the
locale of Sicily for Poyphemos’ character with its connotations of Hellenism
mixed with barbarism as well as despotism.57 Indeed the Sicilian-ness of
these tyrannical nuances in Polyphemos’ persona become more marked in
the repeatedly stated manner in which he intends to kill his victims: carving
them up and boiling them (243–6).
… ὡς σφαγέντες αὐτίκα
πλήσουσι νηδὺν τὴν ἐμὴν ἀπ’ ἄνθρακος
θερμὴν διδόντες δαῖτα τῷ κρεανόμῳ,
τὰ δ’ ἐκ λέβητος ἑφθὰ καὶ τετηκότα.
Once they’re slaughtered they’ll soon fill my belly, giving me as I preside over
it a feast from the hot coals, and the rest will be boiled and cooked from the
cauldron.
References are made to his cleavers and knives (241–2), his handiwork
with such instruments (403) and bronze cauldron (246, 343, 392, 399,
403; cf. 357, 374) in which he cooks his victims as a form of sacrifice,
presumably to himself or his belly (334–5). For Seaford, such features give
Polyphemos a certain culinary and ritual sophistication, albeit directed
to the horror of cannibalism, over his Homeric counterpart, who eats
his victims raw (Od. 9.287–93). The Euripidean monster ironically calls
himself κρεανόμος (‘a dispenser of meat’) as he relishes the prospect of his
hideous meal (245).58 Indeed, his culinary habits and the references to
his fire and cauldron, combined with his Sicilian home, imply a link to
Phalaris, the tyrant of Akragas (570–554 bc). By the time of Pindar’s First
Pythian (c. 470 bc) Phalaris already had the universal reputation of roasting
his victims alive in his infamous bronze bull (95–8):
τὸν δὲ ταύρῳ χαλκέῳ καυτῆρα νηλέα νόον
ἐχθρὰ Φάλαριν κατέχει παντᾷ φάτις,
οὐδέ νιν φόρμιγγες ὑπωρόφιαι κοινανίαν
μαλθακὰν παίδων ὀάροισι δέκονται.
A hateful reputation utterly engulfs Phalaris, the man of pitiless mind who
burnt people in his bronze bull, and no lyres in banquet halls receive him in
gentle communion with boys’ voices.
Euripides’ repeated emphasis on Polyphemos’ fire and bronze cauldron may
thus plausibly be seen to evoke the infamous torture of roasting victims
alive in the bronze bull, ascribed to the ruler.59 Admittedly, Phalaris was
133
no cannibal, even in the ancient traditions about him. But in Euripides’

treatment on the one hand and in the Greek tradition on the other, Phalaris
and Polyphemos emerge as a couple of Sicilian ogres who share the habit of
enslaving those around them (Stesichorus, apud Arist. Pol. 1393b5–22), as
well as committing atrocities against humans by burning or cooking them
in bronze vessels.
Polyphemos’ speech: greed, godlessness and desire

Much has been written on the apparently specious or inept nature of
some of Odysseus’ claims in his speech to Polyphemos (Cyc. 285–312)
in which he pleads for himself and his men to be spared. Among these
are the preservation of the temples of the monster’s father, Poseidon, in
Greece and attempting to portray the Trojans as a threat to Sicily – not the
last time that tendentious claims about threats posed by a distant enemy
would be invoked as a premise for war.60 Odysseus’ reputation for smooth
talking precedes him, exacerbated by his known descent from Sisyphus,
which even he does not deny (Cyc. 103–5; cf. 313–15). Such a reputation
is certainly consistent with his depictions in tragedy, especially Sophocles’
Philoctetes and Euripides’ Hecuba. However, for Odysseus here, it could
be argued that such claims are born of desperation and addressed to
a creature who he knows will only ever act out of the most crass form of
self-interest and who has already determined to kill him. Odysseus’ words
and actions can hardly be considered to be seriously called into question,
given the perfidy of Silenos, the constant (if, at times, ineffectual) support
the hero receives from the chorus, and the god-hating monster he faces.
Polyphemos’ tyrannical nature seems alluded to on certain levels even
in the supplication speech. In addressing him as ὦναξ (‘o lord’, 290),
Odysseus suggests that Polyphemos is a ruler of sorts – a γῆς ἄναξ (‘lord of
earth’) – as Ussher points out, to match Odysseus’ description of himself
as γῆς Κεφαλλήνων ἄναξ (‘lord of the land of the Kephallenians’, 103).61
The sort of despot the monster is has already been made clear, so Odysseus’
address, ostensibly flattering to Polyphemos, is likely to suggest that he
is a type of debauched ruler. Ussher also rightly pointed to the connec-
tion between Odysseus’ admonitory words ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ, Κύκλωψ (‘but
obey me, Cyclops’, Cyc. 309) and those of Teiresias to Pentheus: ἀλλ’ ἐμοί,
Πενθεῦ, πιθοῦ· (‘but obey me, Pentheus’, Ba. 309), but he could have gone
further.62 The significance of this can now be better appreciated in that
in both situations not only is there a plea for correct religious observance
(Cyc. 309–11; cf. Ba. 309–13) but in each case tyrannical figures are
addressed.63
Whatever is alluded to as tyrannical in Odysseus’ speech finds much
134
fuller expression in Polyphemos’ response (316–46, esp. 316–17).

ὁ πλοῦτος, ἀνθρωπίσκε, τοῖς σοφοῖς θεός,
τὰ δ’ ἄλλα κόμποι καὶ λόγων εὐμορφία.
Little man, it is wealth that is god for those who are clever; the rest is all
pompous and fine-seeming words.
Konstan noted that Polyphemos uses wealth for ‘pure consumptive
hoarding’ and that such αὐτάρκεια (‘self-sufficiency’) contrasts with
communal notions of φιλία (‘friendship’) along possibly oligarchic lines
for the contemporary audience.64 Tyrannical implications in Polyphemos’
attitude may be detected here as well. The monster’s veneration of wealth
indicates a certain sophistication in redefining divinity. It also suggests
a greed that tallies with notions of tyrants in the fifth and fourth centuries,
while also contrasting with the thought of the sophistic Anonymus
Iamblichi on the pitfalls of obsession with money (4.1–6). Aristotle makes
greed and a desire for money one of the main distinguishing features
between the τύραννος and βασιλεύς (Pol. 1311a1–11). For Aristotle, matters
concerning kingship (τὰ βασιλικά) aim at honour (τιμή), while a tyrant’s
affairs (τὰ τυραννικά) grasp after money (χρήματα). Tyranny (τύραννις)
shares the ultimate aim (τὸ τέλος) of oligarchy, namely wealth (πλοῦτος),
specified, as we have seen, as Polyphemos’ patron deity. Aristotle’s comment
that such wealth is necessary for the tyrant’s bodyguard and luxury (τρυφή)
is worth noting in the light of Callicles’ view (Gorg. 492d) that for his
ideal tyrannical figure τρυφή is one of the great ἀρεταί (‘excellences’). What
Aristotle has censured as typical of the tyrant is not only praised by Callicles
for the same reason, but is stipulated at the outset of the monster’s speech
as one of his main priorities.
The link between tyranny and an obsession with wealth is found in
fifth-century texts. In Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, Aegisthus immediately
shows some of the traits of being a tyrant in his threats of violence to the
aged chorus (Ag. 1619–24, 1628–32), which lead to the immediate choral
retort of calling him τύραννος (1633). Such an impression is confirmed
in Aegisthus’ announcement of his plans to rule Argos with Agamemnon’s
χρήματα (1638–9). Elsewhere, Kurke (1999, 80–9) has shown that, for
Herodotus, a preoccupation with money is a defining feature of a rapacious
monarch, most notably in his portrait of Darius, whom he calls κάπηλος
(‘petty dealer’, 3.38.1–3, 3.85–6, 3.89.3; cf.1.187). The link between greed
and tyranny is developed at some length in Euripides’ Phoenissae especially
in the bitter ἀγών between Polyneices and Eteocles.65 In fact Eteocles deifies
tyranny: τὴν θεῶν μεγίστην … Τυραννίδα (‘the greatest of deities …T yranny’,
Pho. 506). He goes on to see it as his duty to retain his power, and
135
– anticipating the remarks of Callicles – sees relinquishing the greater and

taking the lesser share as a sign of cowardice: ἀνανδρία (Pho. 509–10; cf.
Gorg. 492b). He says it is finest to commit wrong (ἀδικεῖν: 523–4) for the
sake of tyranny, which is inseparable from his own πλεονεξία. Polyneices
claims motivations of justice in his speech (Pho. 469–96); yet states bluntly,
in language akin to Cyc. 316, his real motivation is money, like a typical
Aristotelian tyrant (Pho. 439–40):66
τὰ χρήματ’ ἀνθρώποισι τιμιώτατα
δύναμίν τε πλείστην τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔχει.
Amongst men money is most honoured and has the greatest power in human
affairs.
In effect both brothers are aiming at tyranny, and Jocasta’s arbitration
speech (Pho. 531–58) defends ‘equality’ which recalls Theseus’ praise of
democracy in the Supplices (429–62). Specifically, Jocasta sees Eteocles’
desire for tyranny as consisting particularly in his greed and a lust for
money (Pho. 549–58). For Jocasta, pursuing wealth for its own sake
(554–5, 558) is clearly a symptom of tyrannical ambitions. Her view that
enough suffices ‘for the moderate’ (τοῖς ... σώφροσιν) and that wealth (ὄλβος)
is only transient is antithetical to the greed of the two warring brothers,
a greed which is consistent with the monster’s praise of wealth (316). This
further indicates the tyrannical overtones of Polyphemos’ views, given
the tyrannical aspirations of the brothers. Another parallel with Callicles
is found in the Cyclops’ opening statement in the ἀγών. In dismissing
Odysseus’ supplication as κόμποι καὶ λόγων εὐμορφία (‘boasting and fine-
seeming words’), Polyphemos again seems to be on Callicles’ wavelength,
who dismisses conventional νόμοι in similar terms: τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ
παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα ἀνθρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια (‘the embel-
lishments that are the unnatural agreements among men, nonsense and
worth nothing’, Gorg. 492d).67
The monster’s indifference to the temples of his father (318–19) becomes
more openly impious and arrogant in his dismissal of the power of Zeus
and his thunderbolt (320–1):
Ζηνὸς δ’ ἐγὼ κεραυνὸν οὐ φρίσσω, ξένε,
οὐδ’ οἶδ’ ὅτι Ζεύς ἐστ’ ἐμοῦ κρείσσων θεός.
I don’t tremble before the thunderbolt of Zeus, stranger, nor am I convinced

that Zeus is a mightier god than I.
Such contempt reiterates the kind of transgressive figure Polyphemos is;
throughout the play he is unholy, or ἀνόσιος (e.g. 26, 348, 378, 438; cf.
31, 693). In rejecting the authority of Zeus’ thunderbolt, Polyphemos
136
resembles the Argive warrior Capaneus, who is also a giant (Septem

423–4; cf. Pho. 1128–33).68 Both monster and warrior share the chthonic
Giants’ impiety as well as their punishment at the hands of the Olympians
(Apollod. 1.6.1; E. Pho. 1180–6).69 Polyphemos’ disdain of Olympian
authority is the corollary of his hostility to Dionysos, a feature he shares
with other tyrannical figures on the tragic stage, such as Pentheus and
Lycurgus. Polyphemos’ boast here is thus more akin to the kind of ὕβρις
normally seen as typical of tyrants rather than fashionable intellectuals of
the late fifth century.70
The theme of αὐτάρκεια (‘self-sufficiency’) emerges again in Polyphemos’
speech in which he outlines the details of his lifestyle and world-view. He
emerges as a figure of a self-proclaimed hedonism (gluttonous and auto-
erotic) and lawlessness which make him a caricature of accepted ideas of
the tyrant in Greek literature of the age. Whenever Zeus sends rain or snow,
Polyphemos tells Odysseus, he stays cosy in his cave (323–4), wrapped in
the furs of animals, with a roaring fire to keep him warm (329–31); the
earth naturally brings forth grass to fatten his livestock (332–3). One image
in particular seems to sum up this satyric villain as monstrous, primitive
and comically grotesque all at once. Domestic bliss for him includes the
following (325–8):
ἢ μόσχον ὀπτὸν ἤ τι θήρειον δάκος
δαινύμενος, εὖ τέγγων τε γαστέρ’ ὑπτίαν,
ἐπεκπιὼν γάλακτος ἀμφορέα, πέπλον
κρούω, Διὸς βρονταῖσιν εἰς ἔριν κτυπῶν.
… dining on a cooked calf or some wild beast, I lie on my back and give my
belly a good soaking by drinking dry a storage jar of milk, I bang my clothes
making enough noise to rival Zeus with all his thunderings.71
This seems to be a kind of parodic one-man symposium. His primitiveness
is emphasized here in his drinking milk (327), when one would expect
wine to be the order of the day for anyone bragging about the good life.
His mentioning of a θήρειον δάκος (‘wild beast’, 325) as a typical meal also
indicates his monstrosity (cf. 247–9); and his self-sufficiency regarding his
after-dinner amusement descends to the more sordid level of masturba-
tion. Such a practice was often associated with slaves and satyrs them-
selves (e.g. Soph. Ich. 366–8),72 and adds a comically grotesque element
to Polyphemos’ violent and menacing persona. At the same time it also
underscores his habit of evidently giving into every base physical impulse.
His gluttony, in a comic twist, even becomes of theological significance for
Polyphemos who announces he sacrifices to no god except himself καὶ τῇ
μεγίστῃ, γαστρὶ τῇδε, δαιμόνων (‘and my belly here, the greatest of divini-
137
ties’, 335). The Euripidean Eteocles, as we saw, glossed tyranny in almost

identical terms (Pho. 506), and it seems the playwright has broached the
same idea making Polyphemos’ belly and its urges a physical manifestation
of his own tyrannical persona.73 He continues: to gorge (φαγεῖν) and drink
to the full (ἐμπιεῖν) and cause yourself no pain (λυπεῖν δὲ μηδὲν) everyday
are ‘Zeus’ for those who are σώφρων (‘sensible’, 336–8). This is, of course,
the opposite of what σωφροσύνη normally connoted in Greek usage.74
Moreover, some of the more abstracted notions of Zeus found in tragedy
and philosophy are reduced by Polyphemos here to the most basic and
rapacious levels of self-gratification.75
Polyphemos, in speaking of what it means to be σώφρων in this fashion
(Cyc. 336–8), has nothing remotely sophistic in his attitude here. His
inversion of the usual meaning of σώφρων seems to be a sardonic take on
the current abuses of language going on at the time, such as Thucydides
mentions in his account of the civil war in Corcyra (3.82.4–5). In any
event, the monster could hardly be further from the civic ideals of respect
and bonds of communal friendship, espoused in Protagoras’ political theory
(Prot. 322c) or the restraint urged by the Anonymus Iamblichi (4.1, 6.1
et passim). The monster’s idea of σωφροσύνη is in effect a grotesque mani-
festation of Callicles’ ideal lifestyle for those suitably endowed by nature.
The views of Protagoras and the Anonymus Iamblichi would make them
opposed politically and ethically not only to Callicles, but would readily
put them amongst those οἳ δὲ τοὺς νόμους | ἔθεντο ποικίλλοντες ἀνθρώπων
βίον (‘those who have framed laws, complicating human life’, Cyc. 338–9),
so despised by Polyphemos. Polyphemos’ hedonism, like that of Callicles,
brings him on a collision course with νόμοι which he spurns for the sake
of sating his desire to eat his hapless visitors (338–41):
… οἳ δὲ τοὺς νόμους
ἔθεντο ποικίλλοντες ἀνθρώπων βίον,
κλαίειν ἄνωγα· τὴν <δ’> ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἐγὼ
οὐ παύσομαι δρῶν εὖ, κατεσθίων γε σέ.
Those who have established laws and complicated human life, can all go hang.
As for me, I won’t stop short of gratifying my desire by eating you.76
Polyphemos’ consumption of wine exacerbates these overall habits, so that
he not only becomes drunk – drinking it as he does milk (e.g., 417–18,
577) – but commits an act of sexual violence as an alternative to his
usual post-prandial diversion. He drags Silenos into the cave to rape him,
imagining himself to be Zeus and the aged satyr Ganymede (576–89).
Polyphemos’ lawlessness and sexual violence find their counterparts in
the worst crimes which Otanes attributes to the tyrant (Hdt. 3.80.6):
138
τὰ δὲ δὴ μέγιστα ἔρχομαι ἐρέων· νόμαιά τε κινέει πάτρια καὶ βιᾶται γυναῖκας

κτείνει τε ἀκρίτους.
But now I come to speak of his (sc. the tyrant’s) greatest transgressions; he
discards ancestral laws and rapes women and kills people without trial.
These attributes are echoed by Theseus in Euripides’ Supplices (429–62)
when outlining the evils of the tyrant in response to the Theban herald
who has just been singing the praises of this kind of ruler and attacking
democracy. Theseus replies (Suppl. 429–32):
οὐδὲν τυράννου δυσμενεστέρον πόλει,
ὅπου τὸ μὲν πρώτιστον οὐκ εἰσὶν νόμοι
κοινοί, κρατεῖ δ’ εἷς τὸν νόμον κεκτημένος
αὐτὸς παρ’ αὑτῷ·
Nothing is more hateful to a polis than a tyrant, when firstly no laws are
common and he rules as one himself taking the law for himself.
Excessive αὐτάρκεια, in the form of sole power, verging on egomania, and
hostility to law characterize the tyrant elsewhere, in Euripides’ Antigone
(fr. 172 N). Polyphemos not only renounces laws but similarly in effect
imagines he is a law unto himself in seeing himself as a god with no regard
for Zeus, since he has everything he could want. Again Herodotus provides
instructive tyrannical parallels. In Otanes’ speech, the tyrant is seen, much
like Polyphemos sees himself, as having πάντα τὰ ἀγαθά (‘all good things’,
Hdt. 3.80.4). Both monster and tyrant, it would seem, would enjoy
αὐτάρκεια yet each remains full of envy and loathing concerning those
around him. Polyphemos is instantly hostile on first seeing the visitors
(Cyc. 222–3) and the habit of both tyrant and Cyclops to associate with
the worst types and the desire to put innocent people to death are other
features they have in common. Theseus continues his reproach of tyrants
in the Supplices (450–5):
κτᾶσθαι δὲ πλοῦτον καὶ βίον τί δεῖ τέκνοις
ὡς τῷ τυράννῳ πλείον’ ἐκμοχθῇ βίον;
ἢ παρθενεύειν παῖδας ἐν δόμοις καλῶς,
τερπνὰς τυράννοις ἡδονὰς ὅταν θέλῃ,
δάκρυα δ’ ἑτοιμάζουσι; μὴ ζῴην ἔτι
εἰ τἀμὰ τέκνα πρὸς βίαν νυμφεύσεται.
Why should a man acquire wealth and a livelihood for his children, if it
means producing a greater livelihood for a tyrant? Or why keep his daughters
virtuously at home, to be the sweet delights for tyrants whenever it pleases
them, and to bring tears to those who furnish them? May I die if my children
are married by force.
139
Tyrants are associated with greed in taking the πλοῦτος – so dear to

Polyphemos – and livelihood of others. Lechery, as another manifestation
of greed, is a further tyrannical trait whereby young women are mere objects
of pleasure, so that tyrants not only enjoy the sexual act but also wielding
the power that forces women to yield to them. This leads to the imputation
of rape as a typically tyrannical act, just as is found in Herodotus’ account
of tyranny (3.80.6), and in other tragic dramas.
In the Prometheus Bound, for instance, lechery and violence – sexual
and otherwise – are prominent in the portrayal of Zeus, who is repeat-
edly called a tyrant and his regime a tyranny (PV 10, 222, 224–5, 305,
357, 736–7, 941–2, 996).77 This profoundly tyrannical god thus provides
another parallel to Polyphemos. Admittedly, Prometheus is a source for
many of these charges against Zeus, but similar sentiments are expressed
by Hephaestus and Oceanus, figures with less reason for rancour, who both
describe him as τραχύς (PV 35, 324), confirming the impression that Zeus
is a despot. Moreover, the brutality of his regime receives visual form in
the presence of his aptly named henchmen, Kratos and Bia, as well as in
the horrific punishment meted out to Prometheus in view of the audience
(or described in great detail). Zeus’ lechery and lawlessness confirm
his tyrannical persona, especially since the chorus and Io (PV 561–88)
attribute these features to him. More than once the chorus mention that
Zeus sets accepted law aside to rule by his νεοχμοῖς … νόμοις (‘drastically
new laws’) without proper sanction (ἀθέτως: 149–50), and at 401–5 he
rules ἰδίοις νόμοις (‘by his own personal laws’) over the old gods.78 Griffith
rightly saw a parallel between the description of Zeus by Prometheus (PV
186–7) and Theseus’ condemnation of the tyrant in Euripides’ Supplices
(429–34) where this figure takes the law for himself.79 The rejection of
conventional νόμοι (‘laws’) by Zeus tallies with Polyphemos’ contempt for
νόμοι and his arrogant faith in his own αὐτάρκεια. Lechery becomes another
manifestation of Zeus’ tyrannical nature, and the presence of Io confronts
the audience with a visual condemnation of his ἔρως and βία (‘lust’ and
‘sexual violence’).80 Io’s story prompts Prometheus to describe Zeus as
τύραννος … βίαιος (‘a violent tyrant’, 736–7), and the girl sees herself as
a victim of the god’s πόθος (‘desire’, 654).
The violence and lechery of the Euripidean Polyphemos not only
recalls that of the Zeus in the PV, but may be seen as a manifestation of
his overall impulse to act on his desires at every opportunity. In this the
monster parallels Platonic notions of the typical tyrant. The tyrannical
man praised by Callicles (Gorg. 491e–492c), as noted earlier, is enjoined
to let his desires grow to the greatest extent possible so that he can attain
greatest satisfaction. Polyphemos’ stated intentions manifest this attitude
140
in a characteristically grotesque manner with dire consequences for at least

two of Odysseus’ men (Cyc. 340–1):
τὴν <δ’> ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἐγὼ
οὐ παύσομαι δρῶν εὖ, κατεσθίων γε σέ.
As for me at any rate, I won’t stop short of gratifying my desire by eating

you.81
Constant self-indulgence is seen as a salient feature of the tyrant as
discussed by Plato in Book 9 of his Republic. While there is much in Plato’s
discussion of the tyrant that Euripides clearly had not made explicit in his
depiction of Polyphemos, significant overlaps can be detected between the
satyric ogre and the Platonic monster. This sort of figure constantly feels
the need, like Polyphemos, to glut himself at every opportunity, to kill
anyone around him if he so wishes, and consume anything he wants. But,
as in Callimachus’ tale of the insatiable Erysichthon,82 the Platonic tyrant
becomes a victim of his desires, (Rep. 9.574e–575a):
τυραννευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ Ἔρωτος, οἷος ὀλιγάκις ἐγίγνετο ὄναρ, ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος ἀεὶ
γενόμενος, οὔτε τινὸς φόνου δεινοῦ ἀφέξεται οὔτε βρώματος οὔτ’ ἔργου, ἀλλὰ
τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἔρως ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ ζῶν, ἅτε αὐτὸς ὢν
μόναρχος, τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ πόλιν ἄξει ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τόλμαν.
When under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is always in his waking
hours such as he rarely became in his sleep. He will refrain from no murder,
however terrible, nor from any food nor atrocity. But the desire that lives in
him as a tyrant in total anarchy and lawlessness, since it is a sole ruler itself,
will drive the one who possesses it (i.e. this desire) to every act of daring, as
a tyrant would drive a city to the same.
This depiction of Eros itself as a kind of tyrant is of interest, since
a debauched and violent form of Eros is so consistently a perceived trait
of the tyrant in classical literature, not only here, but in passages already
discussed from Herodotus, Euripides and the Prometheus Bound.83 Such
an Eros not only most obviously manifests itself in Polyphemos’ rape of
Silenos, but is evident in his gluttony and greed which are so much are part
of his characterization, just as they are for the Platonic tyrant. Neither will
restrain himself when it comes to satisfying his urges. Polyphemos states:
τὴν <δ’> ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἐγω | οὐ παύσομαι (Cyc. 340–1), and Plato’s tyrant
does not hold back from any outrage: οὔτε τινὸς φόνου δεινοῦ ἀφέξεται
οὔτε βρώματος οὔτε’ ἔργου (Rep. 574e–575a). Plato makes no mention
of cannibalism per se, but Polyphemos’ cannibalism is, of course, the
most obvious link here to the transgressive consumptions of the Platonic
tyrant. Such transgressions in the Cyclops take on a more debauched form
appropriate to a satyric ogre.84
141
By living according to these desires, Polyphemos parallels at least in

a general sense Plato’s idea of the tyrant as an essentially self-destructive
character, who is the most miserable of all people (Rep. 9.576c). What Plato
sees as resulting in misery and injustice in the soul, for Polyphemos neces-
sitates his punishment. Indeed, it is Polyphemos’ sheer uncontrolled greed
to drink as much wine as possible that causes him to become hopelessly
drunk and enables Odysseus to blind him and escape with his men and
the satyrs. Odysseus’ advice to the monster to drink everything is hardly
necessary (Cyc. 571–2, 573–5; cf. 503–6), and it is no coincidence that
Polyphemos’ excessive drinking leads immediately to the rape of Silenos.
The tyrannical tropes of greed, ὕβρις (‘violent arrogance’) and lechery thus
become combined in Polyphemos’ exclamations (576–89, esp. 576–84):
ἰοὺ ἰού·
ὡς ἐξένευσα μόγις· ἄκρατος ἡ χάρις.
ὁ δ’ οὐρανός μοι συμμεμειγμένος δοκεῖ
τῇ γῇ φέρεσθαι, τοῦ Διός τε τὸν θρόνον
λεύσσω τὸ πᾶν τε δαιμόνοων ἁγνὸν σέβας.
οὐκ ἂν φιλήσαιμ’ ; αἱ Χάριτες πειρῶσί με.
ἅλις· Γανυμήδη τόνδ’ ἔχων ἀναπαύσομαι
κάλλιον ἢ τὰς Χάριτας. ἥδομαι δέ πως
τοῖς παιδικοῖσι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς θήλεσιν.
Ah! Ah! I only just managed to swim out of that one! This is pure delight!
I think I see heaven borne along mingled with the earth. I’m gazing upon the
throne of Zeus and the whole august majesty of the gods. Won’t I kiss them?
The Graces are tempting me. Enough! I shall retire to bed in finer style with
Ganymede here in my arms, than I would with the Graces. And I have more
fun with boys than women anyway.
As Dover has shown, homosexuality, particularly in a sympotic context, has
aristocratic overtones, yet both the manner of Polyphemos’ drinking and
his violence show him to be grossly uncivilized.85 Even, or perhaps espe-
cially, by the chorus’s standards, Polyphemos – a stranger to the Dionysiac
thiasos – is ἀπαίδευτος (‘uneducated’ Cyc. 492–3), a word Plato also uses of
tyrannical figures (Gorg. 510b). As elsewhere in the play, Polyphemos thus
appears as at once bestial and quasi-sophisticated as well as having delusions
about his own supposed divinity that can only invite ruin.
The friendlessness of tyranny

A further important element shared between Polyphemos and stere-
otypical tyrannical figures is a perceived lack, namely of φιλία (‘friend-
ship’). Konstan has made many useful points on the transgressive nature
of Polyphemos’ αὐτάρκεια which precludes a concept of communal φιλία.86
142
But while Konstan tended to see an emerging dichotomy between the

φιλία of Odysseus, the chorus and Dionysos on one hand, and the hyper-
individualistic, oligarchic sophism of Polyphemos on the other, a much
stronger case can be put to posit a dichotomy between φιλία and tyranny
within the play. For Odysseus and the satyrs, φιλία functions on many
important levels. The chorus’s φιλία with Dionysos, and with Odysseus,
is mentioned a number of times (81, 176, 378, 435–6, 437, 466, 620–3;
cf. 496–8).87 Elsewhere, to make up for the chorus’s predictable avoidance
in helping blind Polyphemos, Odysseus calls for support from them, so
that he and his men – whom he calls friends (φίλων) – will gain courage
from their commands (649–53). Odysseus again speaks of his own men
as οἰκείοι φίλοι (‘close friends’, 650), and, as if to emphasize the horror
of Polyphemos’ crimes, Odysseus refers to the men who are eaten as his
ἑταίροι (‘companions’, 398, 409), which echoes the chorus’s horrified
question (377–8):
… μῶν τεθοίναται σέθεν
φίλους ἑταίρους ἀνοσιώτατος Κύκλωψ;
Has that most godless Cyclops really feasted on your dear companions?
Thus, Polyphemos’ indifference to φιλία not only illustrates his impious
behaviour, but becomes a motive for revenge and furthers the play’s
narrative and general fidelity to the myth.88 For it is his men’s status as φίλοι
again which prompts Odysseus’ resolve to avenge Polyphemos’ crimes,
rather than himself become the sole survivor, having temporarily left the
cave to speak to the chorus (478–9).89
… ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄνδρας ἀπολιπὼν φίλους
τοὺς ἔνδον ὄντας οὐ μόνος σωθήσομαι.
I shall not save myself alone and abandon the men who are my friends
inside.
Such φιλία, however, is as alien to stereotypical tyrants as it is to the
Euripidean Polyphemos. This monster’s world-view spurns communal
values altogether, and this, it seems, is typical of Cyclopes generally in the
play.90 The only time he shows any sociable inclinations is when drunk,
under the influence of the god of the thiasos, whom he has opposed or, at
best, reduced to a liquid form of over-indulgence for himself (529–33).
This is hardly evidence of a social conscience, as Ussher suggests.91 Rather, it
may be taken as a sign of the effect the wine is having on him, and evidence
that even this self-centred monster is not entirely immune to the communal
urgings of the thiasos. But beyond this drunken state, Polyphemos enter-
tains no notions of φιλία. Odysseus’ plea to him not to eat φίλους (‘friends’,
143
288) falls on deaf ears (340–1). And the monster’s comically misplaced trust
in Silenos (Cyc. 273–4, 539) hardly qualifies as genuine friendship; their
‘relationship’ – if one can talk of such a thing – is based on fear, deceit and
obsequiousness on the part of the aged satyr. Similarly, the Herodotean
tyrant is incapable of φιλία not only in his φθόνος (‘envy’, ‘spite’) directed
at the best men, but in his inconsistent reactions to others around him, as
Otanes points out (Hdt. 3.80.5):
ἤν τε γὰρ αὐτὸν μετρίως θωμάζῃς, ἄχθεται ὅτι οὐ κάρτα θεραπεύεται, ἤν τε
θεραπεύῃ τις κάρτα, ἄχθεται ἅτε θωπί.
For if someone praises him in moderation, he becomes angry because he is not

fawned on excessively, if somebody does fawn on him excessively, he becomes
angry with him for being a flatterer.
Plato develops this idea (Gorg. 510b–511b) and claims that, given
his fear of better men and his contempt for his inferiors, the only friend
a tyrant will have will be one who imitates him. Plato’s delineation of the
tyrannical man, of course, makes it clear that such a φίλος (‘friend’) is no
better than the liars and sycophants who in the Republic associate with
tyrants. Plato’s First Letter to the tyrant of Sicily, Dionysius II, stipulates the
solitude of tyrants (309b), and echoes the point by seeing the friendless-
ness of the tyrant as a motif from tragedy, where a doomed tyrant exclaims
(309d–310a):92
φίλων ἔρημος, ὦ τάλας, ἀπόλλυμαι.
O, wretch that I am, bereft of friends, I am ruined.

Passages in other tragedies confirm this as a standard feature of the tyrant,
thus underscoring links with the Euripidean Polyphemos. The autocratic
usurpation of the laws that is so much a feature of the tyrant in Theseus’
denunciation of tyranny (Euripides, Suppl. 429–32) is certainly consistent
with the idea of a friendless ruler.93 So too, is the attack on the tyrant
who wishes foolishly κρατεῖν μόνος (‘to rule alone’, Euripides, Antigone
fr. 172). When complaining of the ingratitude and cruelty of Zeus in the
PV, Prometheus sees the god’s attitude as one of the typical by-products of
tyranny where there is no trust among friends (PV 224–5):
ἔνεστι γάρ πως τοῦτο τῇ τυραννίδι
νόσημα, τοῖς φίλοισι μὴ πεποιθέναι.
For somehow this disease abides in tyranny, not to trust friends.

Euripides’ Peliades takes the idea further to see the murder of friends as
another feature of tyranny, where a sense of paranoia seems to hold sway
144
(fr. 605 N):

τὸ δ’ ἔσχατον δὴ τοῦτο θαυμαστὸν βροτοῖς
τυραννίς, οὐχ εὕροις ἂν ἀθλιώτερον.
φίλους τε πορθεῖν καὶ κατακτανεῖν χρεών,
πλεῖστος φόβος πρόσεστι μὴ δράσωσι τι.
Tyranny is utterly the most unbelievable thing for mortals, and you would
not find anything more miserable. It becomes necessary to ruin friends and
kill them, and there is the greatest fear constantly that they might be acting
against you.
Here, the bonds of φιλία and the nature of tyranny are mutually exclusive.
In the Cyclops, then, the bonds of φιλία linking the satyrs with their god,
and Odysseus with his men, as well as Odysseus with the chorus form
a significant contrast to the depiction of Polyphemos’ social situation. His
excessive individualism and hostility to human and divine φιλία give his
characterization yet more tyrannical overtones. His fondness for the roguish
Silenos simply corresponds to the habits of tyrants who associate with the
worst people around them.
The blind beast

In the build-up to the blinding of Polyphemos and its aftermath we may
detect further parallels with what befalls tyrannical figures and rulers in
Greek tragedy. Seaford, as mentioned earlier, suggests certain parallels
as initiands of Dionysos between Polyphemos and Pentheus, whom he
rightly calls the τύραννος (‘tyrant’) of the Bacchae. Taking up suggestions
by Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, Seaford also sees some connection to the
protagonist of Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus whose self-discovery leads to
his annihilation and expulsion as a pharmakos figure, just as Pentheus’
annihilation results from his initiation into Dionysian mysteries.94 When
Polyphemos gets drunk for the first time, tended first by Silenos then
Odysseus, we may see a satyric version mutatis mutandis of a similar
initiation, only that this time the result is not sparagmos (‘ritual tearing
apart’), but blindness.95 But apart from these connections based on ritual,
it is clear that the fate of Polyphemos is assimilated to that of Pentheus in
the choral anticipation of what he is to suffer. At Ba. 977–1022, imme-
diately after Pentheus’ departure, the chorus invoke the hounds of Lyssa
to attack the impious king, and go on to rehearse his destruction, twice
calling on ‘sword-wielding’ justice to pierce him in the throat (Ba. 992–6
= 1012–16):
ἴτω δίκα φανερός, ἴτω
ξιφηφόρος φονεύου-
145
σα λαιμῶν διαμπὰξ
τὸν ἄθεον ἄνομον ἄδικον Ἐχίονος
γόνον γηγενῆ.
Let sword-wielding justice come for all to see! Let it come, wielding a sword,
slaying him clean through his throat – the godless, lawless, unjust, earth-born
seed of Echion.
Likewise, the chorus of satyrs look forward to the demise of Polyphemos,
who, throughout the play has shown himself to be equally irreverant and
lawless.96 In the choral reference to him as παῖς γῆς (‘child of the earth’, 648)
we see a change from the more usual references to him as a son of Poseidon
(cf. Cyc. 21, 262, 286). Polyphemos thus not only becomes assimilated
to the hubristic earth-born giants who attempted to overthrow the gods,
but also to Pentheus, whose earth-born nature is also made explicit by the
Bacchic chorus (Ba. 995–6, 1015–16). Just as the bacchants pray that their
opponent will metaphorically be pierced through the throat, so the satyrs
hope Polyphemos will ‘get it in the neck’.97 This is indeed appropriate, since
the monster’s throat has been the symbol of his greed and cannibalism as
the chorus sang (Cyc. 356–60; cf. 410) and now is a fitting symbolic focus
for the punishment Odysseus will mete out to him (Cyc. 608–11):
λήψεται τὸν τράχηλον
ἐντόνως ὁ καρκίνος
τοῦ ξενοδαιτυμόνος· πυρὶ γὰρ τάχα
φωσφόρους ὀλεῖ κόρας.
The tongs will fiercely throttle the neck of the guest-eater. For through the
fire he will soon lose his eyes that bring him light.
This need not be seen as cruel or wanton on the part of the satyrs; nor
should, pace Ussher, the choral injunctions to Odysseus and his men to
burn and smoke out the eye of the monster, twisting and heaving the
firebrand (658–61), be seen in similar terms.98 Ussher correctly noted
that the chorus’s present imperatives and asyndeton, especially Cyc. 661,
give a sense of ‘keep on twisting, keep on pulling’ (τόρνευ’ ἕλκε), but his
view that this makes them sadistic is misguided. The abhorrent actions
of Polyphemos throughout the play in their tyrannical and impious
overtones would be enough to warrant the punishment he suffers in the
minds of many of the fifth-century audience. Moreover, his demise fits
neatly with one of satyric drama’s standard motifs: the overthrow of an
ogre by a wandering hero who liberates the satyrs from their bondage.99
The parallels from the Bacchae in the choral anticipations of what godless,
lawless figures like Pentheus suffer suggest Polyphemos’ fate is similarly
part of a divine justice. Indeed, to exult in an enemy’s demise was certainly
146
comprehensible to the contemporary audience as part of the traditional

ethic of helping friends and harming enemies.100 As Goins points out,101
this ethic is particularly suited to other satyric dramas such as Euripides’
Sciron (fr. 678 N):
ἔστι τοι καλὸν κακοὺς κολάζειν.
I tell you it is a fine thing to punish wicked people.

and Syleus (fr. 692 N):
τοῖς μὲν δικαίοις ἔνδικος, τοῖς δ’ αὖ κακοῖς
πάντων μέγιστος πολέμιος κατὰ χθόνα.
fair to the just, but to the evil in turn, the greatest enemy of all upon the
earth.
Both of these plays feature Heracles as the righter of wrongs who, like
Odysseus, triumphs over a brutal molestor of wayfarers – the kind of ogre
typified by Polyphemos in the Cyclops.
In being blinded during the course of the play and reappearing onstage,
Polyphemos resembles not just Oedipus in the OT (cf. Cyc. 663–709 cf.
OT 1297–1530). More specifically, however, closer parallels with the
blinding of the barbarian king Polymestor in the Hecuba (1056–1295)
have been noted (e.g Cyc. 663–8, cf. Hec. 1034–40; Cyc. 693, 701, cf. Hec.
1052–3).102 Both Polymestor and Polyphemos are violators of νόμος and
ξενία motivated by greed and wealth (Cyc. 316, cf. Hec. 25–7; 1206–7);
both are blinded for their outrages, and re-emerge in an attempt to wreak
vengeance (Cyc. 663–709, cf. Hec.1056–82).103 The blinded king’s bitter
prophecies to his tormentor at the end of the Hecuba (1259–73) that she
will finish her days literally as a bitch form another interesting connection
between him and Polyphemos, who mentions the long wanderings ahead
of Odysseus (Cyc. 696–700):
αἰαῖ· παλαιὸς χρησμὸς ἐκπεραίνεται·
τυφλὴν γὰρ ὄψιν ἐκ σέθεν σχήσειν μ’ ἔφη
Τροίας ἀφορμηθέντος. ἀλλὰ καὶ σέ τοι
δίκας ὑφέξειν ἀντὶ τῶνδ’ ἐθέσπισεν,
πολὺν θαλάσσῃ χρόνον ἐναιωρούμενον.
Ah! Ah! An ancient prophecy is being brought to pass. For it said that I would
have my sight made blind by you as you were sailing from Troy. But it also
foretold that you would pay the penalty for these actions, wandering over the
sea for a great length of time.
Such lines confirm that Polyphemos is no atheist, and, in the light of his
brutal initiation into the mysteries of Dionysos, it is tempting to see yet
147
another link to Polymestor. For the blinded king says that the source of
his new, but equally hard-earned, prophetic powers is none other than
Dionysos himself (Hec. 1267):
ὁ Θρῃξὶ μάντις εἶπε Διόνυσος τάδε.
Dionysos, prophet to the Thracians, spoke these things.

Such parallels in the final moments of the Cyclops and Hecuba underscore
the barbaric nature of Polyphemos, who is thus again aligned to a corrupt
and vicious ruler. Polymestor in the Hecuba in his greed, murderous
tendencies and defiance of νόμοι (laws) and ξενία (hospitality) shares much
with tyrannical figures of Greek literature. The beginning of Odysseus’ final
retort to Polyphemos draws attention to the monster’s tyrannical nature in
his contempt for νόμοι (Cyc. 701)
κλαίειν σ’ ἄνωγα· καὶ δέδραχ’ ὅπερ λέγω.
Go hang for all I care! I have done what I say.

Polyphemos directed the same expression – κλαίειν ἄνωγα (‘go hang’) – at
those who complicated human life by framing νόμοι (‘laws’ 338–41), and
in speaking of law-makers with such contempt, he showed he had one
of the key symptoms of the tyrannical disposition. Now his words come
back to haunt him, as if to remind him and the audience of the price to be
paid for such tyrannical hostility to human and divine law. The final brief
utterance by the chorus, unconvinced by threats of further violence from
Polyphemos (704–7), again alludes to issues of friendship and servitude
involving reunion with the longed-for Dionysos (Cyc. 708–9):
ἡμεῖς δὲ συνναῦταί γε τοῦδ’ Ὀδυσσέως
ὄντες τὸ λοιπὸν Βακχίῳ δουλεύσομεν.
But we’re going to be sailors with Odysseus here and from now on we’ll be
slaves of Dionysos.
The ironic use of δουλεύσομεν (‘we’ll be slaves’) does not only underscore
the essentially benign relationship the satyrs enjoy with their god, even as
‘slaves’. It also shows that such servitude is a happy contrast to what they
have suffered under Polyphemos.
Conclusions
This overview, positing links between the satyric Polyphemos and (largely)
Athenian notions of tyranny, has attempted to draw attention to important,
but too often neglected aspects of the monster’s nature. Much of this
is characterized by notions of gluttony, greed for money, propensity to
148
violence – sexual and otherwise – enslavement of others and consequent

disregard of φιλία, law and conventional religion. These are repeatedly
the salient features of tyrants in drama, philosophy and contemporary
histories. In challenging the extent to which Polyphemos may be consid-
ered a Sophist of sorts, my aim has not been to divest Euripides’ plays of
reference to contemporary political and social developments. For tyranny,
mostly fear of it, was still a major issue in the Athenian political conscious-
ness in the late fifth century even before the regime of the Thirty.
Thucydides makes clear that the Athenians did not shy away from the
fact that their own empire, while democratic at home, was a tyranny over
their subjects, as Pericles’ second speech (2.63.2–3) and Cleon’s contribu-
tion to the Mytilenean debate (3.37–40) make brutally clear to them.
Indeed, Callicles is rather like Cleon in the latter’s speech during the
Mytilenean debate where the demagogue not only shows open contempt
for democracy (Thuc. 3.37.1), but also for public debate and the influence
of the Sophists (3.38.3–7).104 Cleon, of course, like Callicles, is no Sophist
himself, yet certainly appears to owe them, perhaps indirectly, something
at least for his powers of oratory – or at least the words Thucydides gives
him. Not on this level alone does Cleon share something with Callicles.
For in his speech the idea of tyranny is invoked to explain to the Athenians
the real nature of their empire, which he uses to support his argument for
the collective punishment of the Mytileneans οὐ σκοποῦντες ὅτι τυραννίδα
ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν (‘you don’t see that you hold your empire as a tyranny’,
3.37.2).105 Elsewhere, Thucydides says that Alcibiades – ostensibly a radical
democrat or demagogue – inspired fears in his fellow citizens that he was
aiming at a tyranny (6.15.4).106 This was largely due to the alleged excesses
of his personal life, which, like those of Polyphemos, seem to defy νόμος.
Thucydides mentions Alicibiades’ indulgence of his ἐπιθυμίαι (‘desires’)
beyond his means, and the greatness of his παρανομία (‘lawlessness’) in
relation to his own lifestyle and habits. These, he says, cause Alcibiades’
enemies: ὡς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι καθέστασαν (‘to set him down
as one desirous of attaining tyranny’).
In the speech Against Alcibiades, by Ps.-Andocides, most probably
a document of the fourth century bc,107 the same charge is made against
the demogogue, as well as claims about his violence and contempt for
laws (10, 14, 19, 23, 39), extravagance, greed and over-indulgence (13,
31–2). The link between these alleged habits and tyranny is made explicit
in the speech (24), so that Alcibiades is seen to be both demagogue and
tyrant: τοὺς μὲν λόγους δημαγωγοῦ τὰ δ’ ἔργα τυράννου παρέχων (‘he uses
the words of a demagogue and the deeds of a tyrant’, 27). For the speaker
here, the message is clear enough: to create a figure people will love to hate,
149
give him, as Euripides does Polyphemos, the tropes of a tyrant. Indeed, the
same idea appeared on a different level in a drama of the late fifth or early
fourth century bc, if an interesting anecdote about Philoxenus of Cythera
(frs. 816, 819 PMG) can be believed. Athenaeus (1.6e–7a) and the Scholia
on Aristophanes’ Wealth (290d) tell us that the dithyrambic poet and
playwright Philoxenus, on being thrown into the quarries for attempting
to seduce or rape Galatea, mistress of Dionysius of Syracuse, escaped and
wrote a play about the Cyclops’ love for the nymph Galatea – a theme
later made famous by Theocritus (Id. 6 and 11). Philoxenus, we are told,
presented himself as Odysseus and the tyrant as Polyphemos, while Galatea
was, in effect, herself. The veracity of the story is hardly necessary for my
overall argument, but the sources at least provide ancient witnesses to the
idea that a monster like Polyphemos and tyrants are ready reference points
for each other. Aristophanes’ Wasps of 422 provides further evidence of the
widespread fear and suspicion of tyranny in late-fifth-century Attica (esp.
464–507). Responding to clearly ungrounded charges that he is aiming at
a tyranny, Bdelycleon says he has not heard mention of the word in the past
fifty years. Yet, he says the charge is on everyone’s lips as soon as anyone
voices a criticism on any issue (Wasps 488–99), or is a perceived glutton,
or gourmand or, as his slave butts in, wants unusual sexual favours (cf.
Wasps 500–2). Here, given a customary Aristophanic touch, is a parody of
an evidently widespread paranoia of the day.
The Euripidean Polyphemos can be understood as very much a creation
of the fifth century, in playing up to such popular concerns about tyranny.
Euripides’ Cyclops thus addresses a widespread concern, which is given
appropriate satyric treatment through the characterization of the villain
of the piece. As many astute ancient observers pointed out, the spectre
of tyranny may be not so far removed from the excesses of demagogy, or
a corrupt form of democracy, which Euripides must have observed around
him.108 Euripides’ Polyphemos does not, then, represent an immoralist
philosophy supposedly maintained by certain Sophists of the poet’s own
day. His own rhesis and awareness of Odysseus’ rhetorical tropes make him
much more like the tyrannically-inclined demagogue Callicles than like
a Sophist. This latter term has been applied too easily to Polyphemos, to the
detriment of our understanding of the play and many of its central concerns,
to say nothing of the Sophists themselves. Polyphemos, of course, is given
some bizarre and comic twists we might expect of satyric drama, which
would suitably intensify his villainy for the audience at such a democratic
institution as the City Dionysia. The monster’s tyrannical nature therefore
enhances the audience’s exultation in his downfall as well as the general
sense of celebration and release appropriate to the ending of this, or any,
‘playful tragedy’.
150
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to audiences in Sydney and Cincinnati and to Richard Seaford, David
Konstan and G.W. M. Harrison for valuable comments on earlier versions of this
paper.
Notes
1
Wilamowitz 1926, 21. Wilamowitz also sees Odysseus’ speech as riddled with
unsound sophisms, too, as have more recent recent commentators; see n. 000
below.
2
Duchemin 1945, 118; others who similarly make the same point in passing
include: Steffen 1971, 206, 211; G. Arnott 1972, 23 n. 10.
3
Konstan 1990, esp. 216–17; 224 n. 39 on the despotic aspects of Polyphemos,
but cf. also 215, 218, 220 n. 28 for claims about his alleged sophism.
4
Paganelli 1979, 24–7, 35–60, 121–2.
5
Kovacs 1994, 56. The view is implicitly endorsed more recently by Worman
2002, 103; cf. 111, who speaks of Polyphemos’ ‘sophistic’ tactics and response and
refers to the Cyclops as ‘the monstrous sophist’ (119, 121). She notes that others
have primarily based connections between Polyphemos and the Sophists on the
Platonic Callicles (119).
6
I do not wish to deny altogether any sophistic elements in the characterization
of Polyphemos. Seaford 1984 ad 316, plausibly posits some connections between
Polyphemos’ redefinition of divinity and some remarks by Prodicus on the nature
of the gods (B5 D-K). Polyphemos deifies money and his belly, claiming the latter
as the greatest god (Cyc. 335; cf. 316). Yet this might also be read as a parody of the
tendencies to allegorize the gods as evidently practised by Metrodorus of Lampsakos
(fr. 4 D-K) and others in their readings of Homer – a practice traceable to Theagenes
of Rhegium in the sixth century (fr. 2 D-K).
7
This is not to assume that tyranny and all figures labelled τύραννος (tyrant)
were thereby condemned in Greek thought; cf. Pindar Pyth. 3.84–6; cf. Ol. 1.23,
Pyth. 1.60, 3.70; Isocrates Evag. (esp. 40); Nicocles 11–26; Xenophon Hieron 8–11;
Aristotle Pol. 1285a14–1285b33.
8
For some time now commentators have stressed, with varying degrees of
cogency, the politicized nature of the Dionysia as a vehicle for communal ideology.
See Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1990, 7, 23–8; Winkler and Zeitlin 1990, the
introduction (esp. 5) and essays by Longo 1990, 12–19; Winkler 1990, 20–62;
Goldhill 1990, 97–129; Ober and Strauss 1990, 237–70. The political-historicist
approach has elicited a response by J. Griffin 1998, 39–61, who emphasizes the
emotional impact of tragedy on its audience. Some of Griffin’s objections to the
more speculative and doctrinaire approach of, for instance, Longo, are apposite, but
elsewhere his reaction is too reductive in implying, for instance, that the historicist
view sees tragedy as ‘quasi-fascist hymns to the state’ (41). Moreover, there is no
reason why a large cultural event cannot be both heavily political (which is not
to say it necessarily hammers home a simple, jingoistic message) and capable of
generating powerful emotions. The two approaches need not be mutually exclusive,
151
and indeed the latter effect may often depend on the former. For other views on
the importance of the social and political context of Greek tragedy see P. Cartledge
1997, 3–35 and Goldhill 1997, 54–68, who writes of the Greek theatre as a place
‘where to be in an audience is above all to play the role of democratic citizen’ (54:
emphasis his); cf. also Hall 1997, 93–126.
9
For instance, Ussher 1978 ad 316–40, 187–8, who does not elaborate;
elsewhere, however, Ussher ad 332–5 calls Polyphemos an atheist.
10
See: Protagoras (B 4), which, as Cicero correctly noted (N.D. 1.1.2) is agnostic,
not atheistic; elsewhere Protagoras mentions ἀσέβεια (‘impiety’) as inimical to
political ἀρετή (‘excellence’, Plato, Prot. 323e); cf. also Antiphon (A 9); Thrasyma-
chus (B 8); Alcidamas (ap. Schol on Arist. Rhet. 1373b6); Gorgias, Hel. 6, 19. For
overviews, see Guthrie 1971, 226–49; Kerferd 1981, 163–72.
11
Guthrie 1971, 27–34, esp. 29–32. As the references cited by E.R. Dodds
1959, ad 519e7 show, Plato often glosses sophists as teachers of ἀρετή (‘excellence’).
The definition of Sophists as professional teachers has rightly been emphasized
in modern scholarly treatments of them: e.g. Kerferd 1981, 24–5; Rankin 1983,
13–14; Taylor, ‘Sophists’, OCD 3, 1422. It is true that fifth- and fourth-century
uses of the term ‘sophist’ could denote a person of cunning and deceit as either
an inventor or trickster (PV 62, 944), or mean a master of devious rhetoric, as
used by, for instance, Aeschines (1.125, 175, 3.16, 202), Demosthenes (18.276,
19.246, 250) and Isocrates (13.1). The term could also denote a purveyor of false
learning; see: Plato (Soph. 231d–e), Xenophon (Mem. 1.6.13; Cyn. 13.8 [but cf.
Xen. Cyrop. 3.1.14, 3.1.38] ) and Aristotle (Soph. Elench. 1.165a21). But nothing
in the characterization of Polyphemos in the Cyclops betrays any such qualities or
parodies thereof.
12
See Dodds 1959 ad 457c1 for a defence of δικαίᾳ. Alternative mss readings of
δικαίου (‘of a just man’) do not affect the point being made.
13
Grote, 1846, ch. 67, 344–50, esp. 347; see also Dodds 1959, 13, and ad loc.;
Guthrie 1971, 102; Irwin 1995, 568–9.
14
Callicles’ interpretation contrasts with Herodotus’ reference (3.38.4) to
Pindar’s expression that νόμος is βασιλεύς, which he uses to explain differing
customs and cultural attitudes. For an overview of Callicles’ view, see Dodds 1959
ad 484b1–c3.
15
e.g., Hdt. 3.80.6; Thuc. 2.37.1; Eur. Suppl. esp. 429–37; cf. Pho. 535–48.
16
See Irwin 1979 ad 468e; also Dodds 1959 ad 472a5–b3. Polus, as a teacher of
rhetoric (Gorg. 462b11; cf. Phdr. 267b–c), can legitimately be considered a Sophist;
see also Radermacher 1951, 12–14. Plato stresses that Polus is reflecting the views
of the majority (Gorg. 473e; cf. 474b6–7), rather than proffering a radical attack
on conventional morality as Callicles does.
17
e.g. Sophocles’ Antigone, esp. 450–70; cf. also the so-called ‘Ode to Man’ Ant.
332–75; PV 442–506; Soph. Philoctetes, 971–2. For Euripides on the νόμος–φύσις
issue see, for instance, fr. 920 N; Ion 642–3; Bacchae 890–6.
18
For detailed discussions see Grote 1846, Chapter 67 passim; Heinimann
1945, passim, esp. 110–62; Guthrie 1971, passim, esp. 55–134; Kerferd 1981, esp.
111–30; Rankin 1983, esp. 79–91.
152
19
Esp. 1–2.1, 3.1, 6.1, 7.1–13; note the praise of εὐνομία (lawfulness) and
condemnation of ἀνομία (lawlessness). Apart from Protagorean elements, parallels
with Democritus (B 250, 255 D-K) and Lycophron (fr. 3 D-K) justify the descrip-
tion of the treatise as sophistic, as does the fact that the document was written in
prose, like Thrasymachus’ Politeia. For fuller discussions, see Cole 1961, 127–63;
Guthrie 1971, 71–4, 314–15.
20
= P.Oxy. XI no. 1364 ed. Hunt.
21
For fuller discussion, see Guthrie 1971, 107–13; Kerferd 1981, 115–17; and
more recently, Pendrick 2002, 32–8, 53–67, 315–77.
22
Guthrie 1971, 107. Pendrick 2002, 60–3, rightly notices major differences
between the two, and sees Callicles passionately advocating ‘limitless πλεονεξία’
(‘greed’) for his strongman in contrast to Antiphon’s detached treatment of how
people aim at a relative advantage for themselves wherever possible.
23
Cf., for instance, his praise of σωφροσύνη (‘moderation’, B 58) and condemna-
tion of ἀναρχία (‘anarchy’, B 61).
24
Alcidamas’ hostility to νόμοι is apparent in his description of philosophy as
a ‘bulwark against the laws’ (Arist. Rhet. 1406b11–12). For his high opinion of
philosophy, see his On the Sophists 2.
25
Adam 1902 [1963] vol. I, ad 337a–339b. For fuller treatments of the Thra-
symachus scene in Republic 1, see also Grote 1846, 350–2; Guthrie 1971, 88–97;
Kerferd 1981, 120–3; Rankin 1983, 58–63.
26
Duchemin 1945 ad 316–46; Adkins 1960, 239–40, calls them both ‘immor-
alists’. For Sir Karl Popper 1966, 116, they are ‘ethical nihilists’; cf. also Pendrick
2002, 63.
27
On Thrasymachus’ use of ἀγαθός here to denote a concept like ‘successful’
rather than ‘morally good’, see Adkins 1960, 34–7, 156–63, 235–6; cf. also LSJ
s.v. ἀγαθός I 3, II 1–2.
28
The tone of Thrasymachus’ second reply – Ἀληθέστατα … μαντεύῃ (‘you are
prophesying most truly’, 349a) – may well be sardonic.
29
A point well made by Guthrie 1971, 90–1.
30
It receives considerable praise from Havelock 1957, 231–9.
31
As a non-Athenian, Thrasymachus would not have delivered it before the
assembly himself, but may have written it for a client, or used it as a rhetorical
display piece for his students. At the very least, it is reasonable to infer that its
contents are not radically opposed to Thrasymachus’ own views. It is preserved by
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Demosthenes 3) primarily on the basis of its stylistic
interest.
32
For instance, Gorgias (B 8a D-K); Antiphon (B 44a D-K); Democritus (B 250,
255 D-K); cf. also Protagoras (Prot. 322c); Plato Rep. (351d).
33
Adam 1902 [1963] ad loc. aptly compares Thrasymachus’ description of
justice in the Republic 348c as γενναία εὐήθεια (‘noble simplicity’) with Thucydides’
statement that such a characteristic came to be scorned: τὸ εὔηθες, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον
πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη (‘simplicity, of which a noble disposition
takes most part, was made to seem ridiculous’, 3.83.1).
34
Cf. Silenos’ comically incongruous address to him as δεσποτίσκε (‘o dear little
153
master’, 267).
35
Violence as a typical behaviour of the tyrannical ruler is noted by Plato (Plt.
276e; cf. 291e). The satyrs happily anticipate the prospect of being the slaves of
Dionysos in the last word of the play: δουλεύσομεν (‘we shall be slaves’, 709),
underscoring the difference between their natural master and brutal despotism
of the Cyclops. As Odysseus knows, the relationship between Dionysos and the
satyrs is characterized by φιλία (‘friendship’, 434–6), and the god is described, in
somewhat understated fashion as: οὐ Κύκλωπι προσφερή (‘not like the Cyclops’,
436). At Cyc. 78–9 they contrast their usual state as the πρόπολος (‘attendant’) of
Dionysos to their current position of being δοῦλος (‘slave’) to Polyphemos. For
extensive treatment of the slavish elements of satyrs in the Cyclops and elsewhere,
see Griffith 2002, esp. 195–227.
36
Polyphemos’ orders at 241–3 to prepare the fire and knives for his meal seem
more likely to be addressed to a servant, rather than, as Ussher suggests (1978) ad
loc., to Silenos, who continues to remain onstage.
37
Ussher 1978 ad 210–13 sees a reference to stocks here, but it seems far more
natural to see ξύλον as a club, the monster’s weapon in Homer with which he is
blinded (cf. Od. 9.319); s.v. ξύλον LSJ II 2. The club is the monster’s weapon in
many images on Greek pottery from the sixth century on; e.g. LIMC VIII 2 s.v.
Polyphemos I 40–3, 46.
38
This seems to be compounded by Polyphemos’ inquiry about his ἄριστόν (Cyc.
214), usually the morning meal. For discussion, see Duchemin 1945 ad 213, 214;
Ussher 1978 ad 214–15; Seaford 1984 ad 213–14.
39
As Seaford 1984 ad 213–14 notes, Orion fathers fifty sons from as many
nymphs (Corinna fr. 655 PMG), while Polyphemos, appropriately enough for
a satyric ogre, brags about his masturbatory prowess (Cyc. 327–8).
40
Seaford 1984 ad 213–14 sees the inclusion of satyrs in the episode by Servius
ad Aen. 10.763 as likely deriving from Sophocles. For discussion of Kedalion, see,
more recently, KPS 344–8, esp. 344 n. 3 for other sources for this episode.
41
See below pp. 000–000.
42
See, for instance, Cyc. 26, 316–21, 336–8, 348, 378, 438; cf. 30–1, 693.
43
Polyphrasmon’s Lykourgeia tetralogy appeared in 467 bc (fr. 1; cf. T 3 Snell);
in addition to his own Lykourgeia, Aeschylus produced a Semele or Hydrophoroi,
Pentheus and Bacchae, but whether these three comprised part of a tetralogy is
uncertain. Iophon produced a Pentheus or Bacchae (T 1a, fr. 2 Snell) and Xenocles
a Bacchae of 415 (fr. 1 Snell). The story of each of these opponents of Dionysos is
popular also in archaic and classical vase painting: LIMC VI 1, pp. 309–19; VI 2,
s.v. Lykourgos I 12–14, 17, 19, 20, 26, 27; LIMC VII 2 s.v. Pentheus 24, 39, 40,
41, 43–5, and elsewhere.
44
Seaford 1981, 252–75 and 1984, 57–9; Sutton 1980, 128, aptly notes that
both gradually come under the influence of their foe before meeting their demise;
Dionysos entrances Pentheus (Ba. 811–46) while Odysseus continues to ply the
Cyclops with drink (Cyc. 519–89).
45
See Seaford 1996, 47; and ibid, n. 91; cf. Ba. 537–44. As Seaford notes, the
enemy of the thiasos is the enemy of the πόλις (‘city-state’). Berve 1967 vol. I, 200,
154
rightly saw Polyphemos as a ‘burlesk’ tyrant, but did not develop the point at all.
46
By, for instance, Ussher 1978 ad 3–4; Seaford 1984 ad 3–4. As Ussher notes, we
need not see here a reference to a particular play involving this episode. Sophocles’
Antigone (955–65) similarly assumes the story is well known.
47
The conflict between Lycurgus and Dionysos is dealt with more fully by Apol-
lodorus (3.5.1) and Nonnus (32.38–152).
48
Note also references to the Gigantomachy (Cyc. 5–8) – popular in Greek art
from the Siphnian treasury at Delphi (LIMC IV 2, 2) to numerous black-figure
and red-figure vases, (e.g., LIMC IV 2, pp. 118–51); see also Duchemin 1945. It
also comprised one of the series of metopes on the Parthenon (LIMC IV 2, 18),
a building visible to the audience of the Cyclops as they entered and left the theatre
of Dionysos. Silenos also mentions the kidnapping of Dionysos (Cyc. 11–12), told
famously in the seventh Homeric Hymn.
49
Seaford 1984 ad 223–4 with references.
50
LSJ, s.v. ἔα. For the overtones of ὄχλος, ibid. s.v. 2.
51
The objection of Ussher 1978 ad 224–30 that Silenos has not been drinking
long enough to have a ruddy complexion misses the point. Silenos is no ordinary
imbiber, and we may fully expect the effects of his sudden re-acquaintance with his
beloved drink to be comically exaggerated, as is typical of satyric drama.
52
Ussher 1978, 187, and ad 273–6.
53
Elsewhere, Herodotus reports the views of a Corinthian on the horrors of
tyranny where mass killings, persecution of the best citizens and theft of money
are cited as the salient features of this sort of government (5.92). Fuller discussions
of Herodotus on tyranny can be found in How and Wells 1912, vol. 2, 338–47;
Ferrill 1978, 385–98, argues strongly for a consistently hostile attitude to tyrants in
Herodotus’ Histories; so too Hartog 1988, esp. 324–5; cf. also Kurke 1999, 65–171,
esp. 67–8; 80–9; 131–42.
54
By, for instance, Jebb 1891, xxiv–xxv; Podlecki 1966, 359–71; Berve 1967 vol.
I, 194; Griffith 1999, esp. ad 162–210; Seaford 2003, 104–6.
55
The Sicilian setting for Polyphemos’ story may have been invented by Epic-
harmus (frs. 70–2 K-A). As Kurke 1999, 131–2, notes, the Sicilian tyrants were
perceived as differing from their mainland counterparts in more often claiming the
throne through divine ancestry (cf. Cyc. 231), rather than as the champions of the
δῆμος (‘people’).
56
Cyc. 20, 60, 95, 114, 130, 298, 366, 395, 599 (references to Aetna); 95, 106,
114, 703 (references to Sicily). Ussher 1978, 194 suggests the repeated mentions
of Aetna may have been designed to compensate for an absence of a painted back-
ground scenery. But would the audience have needed so much prompting to be
reminded of nothing other than the play’s locale?
57
Paganelli 1979, 121–2; cf. the scepticism of Seaford 1984, 55.
58
Seaford 1984, 53, 56; ad 244–6; cf. Ussher 1978 ad 243–6, who takes
κρεανόμος to be, in effect, a knife.
59
Cf. Heraclides Ponticus, FHG 2.223.37; see also Andrewes 1956, 129; Berve
1967 vol. I, 129–32, and the chapter on Sicilian tyrants generally, 128–54.
60
For an overview of Odysseus in drama, see Stanford 1954, 102–17, although
155
he says precious little about the Cyclops. Arrowsmith 1956, 2–8 offers a harsh
critique of Odysseus in the play; and Worman 2002, esp. 113–23, sees much that
is cynical and duplicitious in the hero’s rhetoric; cf. also Ussher 1978 ad 285–312;
187–8; Seaford 1984, 55–6; ad 285–312. Sutton 1980, 121–2 attempts to rehabili-
tate Odysseus in the Cyclops; and the case for this put by Goins 1991, 187–94, is
a valuable corrective to the excessively condemnatory view propounded by others.
61
Ussher 1978 ad 290–1.
62
Ibid. ad 309–12.
63
Ussher 1978 ad 313–15 also suggests that Silenos’ gleefully malicious injunc-
tion to Polyphemos to eat Odysseus’ flesh entire, especially his tongue, so he can
become κομψός (‘refined’) and λαλίστατος (‘a great chatterer’, 313–15), implies that
Odysseus is like a tragic herald addressing royalty; cf. the herald described elsewhere
in Euripides (Suppl. 426, 462) in cognate terms. We may also add Creon’s insult to
the guard: οἴμ’ ὡς λάλημα δῆλον ἐκπεφυκὸς εἶ (‘it is clear you are born babbler, as
I realize’, Ant. 320). Such parallels indicate the analogous position of Polyphemos
as a ruling figure in typically despotic form. Underlying Silenos’ suggestion is the
assumption that Polyphemos, unlike Odysseus, is no accomplished – some might
say ‘sophistic’ – speaker in the first place.
64
A point well made by Konstan 1990, 215, 216–17, but his claim that
Polyphemos ‘argues in the manner of the sophists’ does not follow. Tyranny
and oligarchy are not mutually exclusive concepts as Aristotle (Pol. 1311a1–11)
shows.
65
For discussion see Berve 1967 vol. I, 200–1; Seaford 2003, 110–11. The link
between tyranny and greed is implied in the earliest attestation of the word τυραννίς
(‘tyranny’) in Archilochus (fr. 19 West), whose eschewal of the gold of Gyges goes
hand in hand with his eschewal of tyranny; cf. also Theognidea (51–2 West).
66
For an able defence of these lines, deleted in Diggle, see Mastronarde 1994 ad
438–42.
67
Thrasymachus at Rep. 336c in dismissing Socrates’ views as φλυαρία (‘nonsense’),
shares something with Callicles in the similarly aggressive persona Plato gives him,
but not in the nature of his ideas.
68
Cf. also Sophocles Antigone 131–7. For fuller discussion, see Hutchinson 1985
ad 422–56.
69
Mastronarde 1994, pp. 451–82 offers a detailed defence of the bulk of the
messenger’s speech at Pho. 1090–1199, including lines 1182–6. The fate of
Enceladus is already mentioned in the prologue (Cyc. 5–9), and may be a proleptic
device to hint at the nature and eventual downfall of Polyphemos; for the popularity
of the Gigantomachy in archaic and classical Greek art, see above, n. 48.
70
On the link between ὕβρις (‘arrogance’, ‘outrage’) and tyranny, see Hdt
3.80.1–4; 3.81.1; Sophocles, OT 872–81.
71
Ussher 1978 ad 326–8, and Seaford 1984 suggest plausibly that the reference
here is to masturbation rather than farting. See also Henderson 1991, 27, 171 for
parallels in Aristophanes which support this reading.
72
See Dover 1989, 97; Lissarague 1990a, 57, 61; figs. 2.4, 2.5, 2.6; Stewart
1997, 187–91.
156
73
Some scholarly consensus is emerging that the play is datable to 408, the
year after the Phoenissae, which might increase the likelihood of self-parody in the
Cyclops. See below n. 102.
74
s.v. LSJ 2. See also North 1966 passim; Dover 1974, 66–9.
75
Cf., by way of contrast, Aesch. Ag. 160–6; Soph, Tr. 1278; Heraclitus B 32
D-K.
76
The monster’s remarks at 342–6 are a grim joke at the expense of the mentioning
of ξενία, as well as underlining the sacrificial nature of the imminent slaughter, on
which see Seaford 1984 ad 345–6.
77
For useful discussion of the nature of Zeus’ tyranny in the PV, see Griffith 1983,
7; see also ad. 10, 150–1, 736–7; Seaford 2003, 99–101.
78
For νεοχμός as connoting a drastic innovation, s.v. LSJ νεοχμός II. LSJ also
equate ἀθέτως with ἀθέσμως to mean ‘lawlessly, despotically’; s.v. ἀθέτος II.
79
Griffith 1983 ad loc.
80
Her plight features in Sophocles’ satyric Inachus fr. 269a. In Aeschylus’ satyric
Dictyulci (fr. 47a 783–4), Danaë, as another victim of Zeus’ passions, berates the
god.
81
For ψυχή (‘soul’) as the seat of desires and emotions, s.v. LSJ IV. It is surely
a measure of his bestiality that the concept here carries no overtones of anything
other than physical desire for Polyphemos.
82
Another god-defying figure who is punished by an all-consuming hunger, as
told in Callimachus’ Hymn 6. Erysichthon seems to have tyrannical tropes in ruling
his minions with a δεσποτικὴ χεῖρ (‘despotic hand’ 62), and in being a βαρὺς ἄναξ
(‘harsh lord’ 62)
83
Plato was not the first to call Ἔρως (‘desire’, ‘passion’) a tyrant; cf. Euripides
Hipp. 538; cf. fr. 269; fr. 430.3.
84
In this Platonic passage we again see the connection between tyranny and
lawlessness, which parallels the thoughts of the Anonymus Iamblichi (cf. Antiphon
B 61), and gives a further tyrannical underpinning to Polyphemos’ stated contempt
for νόμοι (Cyc. 338–40).
85
Dover 1989, 149–51 for aristocratic connotations of homosexuality; see also
Seaford 1984 ad 583–4. Polyphemos’ barbaric nature is also evident in the fact
that he has to be educated into the niceties of behaviour at the symposium (Cyc.
542–75). The centaurs who gate-crashing the wedding of Perithous provide the
strongest parallel to Polyphemos as similarly drunken transgressors on first acquaint-
ance with the drink of Dionysos. The excesses of satyrs in sympotic contexts, by
contrast, are mostly comic in that their attempts on maenads frequently fail, and
their antics with wine-sacks and drinking vessels are more acts of buffoonery than
genuinely endangering others around them. For discussion, see Lissarague 1990a
and 1990b; Stewart 1997, 187–91; Osborne 1998, 17–19, 97, 133–4, 149–51,
164–5; cf. LIMC VIII 2 ‘Mainades’ 36, 62, 120.
86
See esp. Konstan 1990.
87
Although the choral address to Dionysos at Cyc. 73 as ὦ φίλος ὦ φίλε Βακχεῖε
(‘O friend, O Bacchic friend’) has been deemed problematic by some, e.g. Seaford
1984 ad 73–4, who nevertheless suggests that it may be acceptable as an ibycean,
157
the sense of φιλία is clear here, as well.

88
At Od. 9.421, Odysseus’ concern for his ἑταίροι is a strong motivating factor
in his revenge on Polyphemos.
89
Diggle, Seaford 1984 and Kovacs 1994 delete Cyc. 480–2 in which Odysseus
reiterates his resolve to avenge his φίλοι. The case for deletion rests in part on subjec-
tive criteria of style and the ‘lameness’ of the sentiments, which themselves do not
preclude Euripidean authorship; cf. also Eur. IT 1067–8, 1467–9.
90
Silenos describes them as μονάδες (‘loners’ Cyc. 120), an emendation plausibly
argued for by Schmidt 1975, 291–2, of the ms νομάδες (‘members of roaming
tribes’). Even if νόμαδες is retained, however, Silenos’ explanation of what he says
at 120: ἀκούει δ’ οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδενός (‘nobody takes any notice of anyone at all’)
makes clear the completely autonomous lifestyle of each of the Cyclopes.
91
Ussher 1978 ad 530–3.
92
Cf. Ep. VII 331e–332a, 332c, where the absence of friends for Dionysius II is
seen as one of his major setbacks.
93
It is noteworthy also that the autocratic tendencies of Creon’s rule in Sophocles’
Antigone involve a radical redefinition of φιλία (‘friendship’), as Griffith 1999 ad
162–210 discusses.
94
See Seaford 1981 and 1984, 57–9, for ritualistic parallels between Pentheus
and Polyphemos; cf. also Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1990, 110.
95
He shares this punishment with the Edonian king Lycurgus, at least in
Homer’s account (Il. 6.119–40), whose opposition to Dionysos was dealt with
in the Lykourgeia tetralogies by Polyphrasmon and Aeschylus. According to some
accounts, e.g. Sophocles’ Antigone 955–65, he was imprisoned in a cave, and Apol-
lodorus (3.5.1) says he torn apart by horses, after being driven mad and killing his
own son, Dryas.
96
Cf. also the chorus’s description of Pentheus coming to conquer them with
ἀδίκῳ γνώμᾳ παρανόμῳ τ’ ὀργᾷ (‘with unjust intent and lawless anger’, Ba. 997).
97
As Ussher 1978 ad 608–11, put it, in rightly rejecting a literal interpretation
in favour of a metaphorical one here.
98
Ib. ad 659–62.
99
On this feature of satyric drama, see Sutton 1980, 145–8; Seaford 1984,
33–6.
100
A standard of behaviour going back to the archaic age: Archilochus, fr. 126
(West); Theognidea, 337–40; see also Dover 1974, 180–4 for a range of evidence
from classical drama, historiography, oratory and philosophy that endorses or at
least addresses this sentiment. Consequently, attempts to see some compassion on
the part of the poet for Polyphemos at Cyc. 669–70, by, for instance, Ussher 1978
are unconvincing.
101
Goins 1991, 193. He assumes that Heracles is speaking of himself in fr. 692,
but it could easily be said of him by another figure.
102
See, for instance, Kaibel 1895, 71–88; Tanner 1915, 173–206; Ussher 1978,
196–7; Sutton 1980, esp. 114–20. The similarities between the two scenes have
been collected by Ussher (1978, 196–7), who correctly states that such parallels
do not constitute reliable dating criteria for the Cyclops, as either before or after
158
the Hecuba. Kaibel’s attempt (1895, esp. 84–5) to establish an earlier date for the
Cyclops than the Hecuba, which he claims borrows from it, is no more provable than
the opposite inference. Verbal and other similarities exist between the Cyclops and
other Euripidean dramas from different periods, and these might be cited with equal
(im)plausibility as dating criteria. On the basis of verbal and thematic parallels, such
as the prominence of the concepts of ξενία and νόμος within each drama, Sutton
(1980, 108–20) attempted to see the Cyclops as the satyr play accompanying the
trilogy of which Hecuba was a part. In effect, he dated the satyr play to c. 424 bc.
Independently, Arrowsmith (1956, 2 n. 1) found the link to the Hecuba a ‘most
tempting suggestion’. While the extent of such parallels is noteworthy, Sutton’s
inference of the date of the Cyclops on this evidence is unconvincing, since the
points of overlap may simply result from dramatically similar situations in each
drama; cf. Seaford’s cogent critique (1982) of Sutton’s method. Paganelli 1979,
135–9 suggested 414/3 on the basis of supposed historical allusions such as the
Sicilian expedition; but even if such allusions can be established, 414/3 may just
as plausibly function as a terminus post quem. The fullest case for c. 408 is put by
Seaford 1982, 163–72 and 1984, 48–51.
103
The murder of Polymestor’s innocent sons adds gratuitous savagery to Hecuba’s
revenge, as if a foreshadowing of her bestial destiny, prophesied by Polymestor
(Hec. 1259–73). The satyrs’ taunting Polyphemos (Cyc. 669–88) contrasts with the,
albeit brief, sympathy the chorus of the Hecuba show for Polymestor, who hasten
to remind him of his own crimes (Hec. 1085–6).
104
Note especially his barb directed to the assembly: ἁπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῃ
ἡσσώμενοι (sc. ὑμεῖς) καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως
βουλευομένοις (‘quite simply you succumb to the pleasure of listening and are more
like spectators of sophists, sitting there, than counsellors concerning the city’,
3.38.7). Callicles’ contempt for Sophists (Gorg. 520a) has already been noted.
105
Cf. also note the attitude of the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue (Thuc.
5.84–114).
106
Thucydides’ interest in the issue of tyranny and its implications for the events
of 415 is attested elsewhere (6.60.1), as well as in his excursus on the Peisistratids
(6.53–9).
107
See the overview of the issues of authorship and date by Edwards (1995,
133–6).
108
In addition to Thucydides and Ps.-Andocides, see also Plato (Gorg. 467a,
478e–479a, Rep. 565a–566a) and Aristotle (Pol. 1310b14–16).
159

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8

OF SOPHISTS, TYRANTS AND POLYPHEMOS:

Since it was first suggested in 1896 by W. Schmid (1896, 57) an orthodoxy

Konstan, while rightly seeing Polyphemos as a despotic figure threatening to

attributed to the tyrant, as construed and demonised in fifth- and fourth-

I. Problems in the Polyphemos–Sophist nexus

a commonplace (Laws 714c–e; Glaucon’s view, Rep. 358e–359b). When

Concepts of tyranny are far more central to Callicles’ ethical impera-

II. The tyrannical Polyphemos

physical size is alluded to verbally, and probably depicted visually onstage,

rightly noted elsewhere that much in Pentheus’ characterization resembles

by lawlessness, headed by a capricious ruler, who is incapable of friendship,

incapable of anything so sophistic as to consider more than one side of

He delights in the worst of his citizens, and he is very good at listening to

thematic significance as well as functioning as an appropriately distant

no cannibal, even in the ancient traditions about him. But in Euripides’

Polyphemos’ speech: greed, godlessness and desire

fuller expression in Polyphemos’ response (316–46, esp. 316–17).

– anticipating the remarks of Callicles – sees relinquishing the greater and

I don’t tremble before the thunderbolt of Zeus, stranger, nor am I convinced

resembles the Argive warrior Capaneus, who is also a giant (Septem

ties’, 335). The Euripidean Eteocles, as we saw, glossed tyranny in almost

τὰ δὲ δὴ μέγιστα ἔρχομαι ἐρέων· νόμαιά τε κινέει πάτρια καὶ βιᾶται γυναῖκας

Tyrants are associated with greed in taking the πλοῦτος – so dear to

in a characteristically grotesque manner with dire consequences for at least

As for me at any rate, I won’t stop short of gratifying my desire by eating

By living according to these desires, Polyphemos parallels at least in

The friendlessness of tyranny

But while Konstan tended to see an emerging dichotomy between the

For if someone praises him in moderation, he becomes angry because he is not

O, wretch that I am, bereft of friends, I am ruined.

For somehow this disease abides in tyranny, not to trust friends.

(fr. 605 N):

The blind beast

comprehensible to the contemporary audience as part of the traditional

I tell you it is a fine thing to punish wicked people.

Dionysos, prophet to the Thracians, spoke these things.

Go hang for all I care! I have done what I say.

violence – sexual and otherwise – enslavement of others and consequent

the sense of φιλία is clear here, as well.

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