Republic of the Philippines and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period;
SUPREME COURT and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081             July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,  that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and
DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral
Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit
the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent,
against the election of said petitioner as member of the National
Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by
the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for
the position of member of the National Assembly for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the
National Assembly for the said district, for having received the
most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of
office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in
session assembled, passed the following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE
AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA
PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los
Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de
la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente,
son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro
Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of
Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-
things, that said respondent be declared elected member of
the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that
the election of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que
no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed
before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the
Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the
Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during
which protests against the election of its members should be
presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object,
prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro
Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging
presentation of a protest against the election of a member of
the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion
of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral
Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936,
denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the
issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon
the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the
power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests,
which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department
of the Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in
pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction
relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies
submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their
internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate
its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed
of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is,
therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance
appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of
the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of
the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be
sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental
question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of
the Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an
answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing
the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its
resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day
for the presentation of protests against the election of any
member of the National Assembly, it acted within its
jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied
powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and
regulations essential to carry out the power and functions
conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in
adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government,
and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control
of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December
3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been
filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission
1
 of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed
within the time that might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with
quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an
"inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within
the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer
in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his
special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the
Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no
existing law fixing the period within which protests against the
election of members of the National Assembly should be filed;
that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election of members of the National
Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power
impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of
its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest
before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the
last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral
Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired
jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over
the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the
said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of
prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its
members, and that such confirmation does not operate to
limit the period within which protests should be filed as to
deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest
filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity
created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial
functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
(  f  ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional
creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code
of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of
sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the
Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance
appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the
Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law
(No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no
application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was
submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral
Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the
merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the
following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon
the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the
protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the
merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having
been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a
case  primæ impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of
duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it
undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and
vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of
jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under
our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this
assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to
the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the
refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-
fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has
also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he
chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check
on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and
the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their
jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The
Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And
the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts
void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and
in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing
of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the
other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function
as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by
which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,
for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in
any living constitution. In the United States where no express
2
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a
period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as
the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited
to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity
of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is
in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power
provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered
that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the
chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors
of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever
ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority
of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the
success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in
the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and
court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of
December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the
said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day
for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as
contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly
has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to
entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935,
then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is
mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the
respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating
its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the
resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission
fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should
be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a
conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly
on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the
very nature of the republican government established in our country in
the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The
Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to
determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within
the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting
claims of authority under the fundamental law between department
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by
the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English
type and other European types of constitutional government, the
framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the
written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial
department. In some countries which have declined to follow the
American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions
prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the
fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would
be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to
assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of
Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to
examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power.
This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in
Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter
of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-
123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of
ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows
the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we
to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the
conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined,
would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may
be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask
these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we
avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason
and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts
of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to
pass upon the second proposition and determine whether the Electoral
Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting
its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance
of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National
Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has
pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article
VI of the Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three
by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and
history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of
3
its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly
appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall
be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the
Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1)
modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows:
"That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be
the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive
the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has
had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate
and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete"
(Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil.,
886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the
purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken by
the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-
committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the
creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear
legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose
election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate
impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial
officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was
to be composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and
six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest
corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and
three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless
the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside.
The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934,
with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative
representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated
one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two
representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in
the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the
executive department in the persons of two representatives to be
designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its
report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934
subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of
either house and all cases contesting the election of any of
their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission,
constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by
the members of the party having the largest number of votes
therein, three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one
Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with
comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish
plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon
abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative
Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific
and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The
Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on
Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral
Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project
of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as
finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as
follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members
of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election
of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members elected by the
party having the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having
the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates
Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole
subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the
following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the
said draft:
xxx     xxx     xxx
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the
scope of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page
11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and
all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be
judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask
from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose elections is not contested
shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the
members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word
"judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no
question about the election of a member, there is nothing to
be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is
nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the
Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those
whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the
gentleman knows, the action of the House of Representatives
confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the
rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not
necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been
elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as
we have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the
matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because
he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the
municipal president who is elected? What happens with
regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody
confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it
makes a canvass and proclaims — in this case the municipal
council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there,
unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need
on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a
contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected
in place of another who was declared elected. From example,
in a case when the residence of the man who has been
elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man
who has been elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the
commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first
meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The
purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers
exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns
and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest,
there is nothing to be judged.
4
 Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that
propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose
a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the
delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft
cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first
part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and
qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the
cases of contested elections are already included in the phrase
"the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and
contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of
clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral
Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the
elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe
that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the
assembly on its own motion does not have the right to
contest the election and qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If
this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly
believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by
law, they cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be
retained by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of
the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the
assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its
members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he
must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question
before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide
whether the election is contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the
Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon
the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly
even though that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because
they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in
response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura,
Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference
between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas
speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:
xxx     xxx     xxx
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente
en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto
de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de
determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha
sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la
enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft,
de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the
election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se
limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta
contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate
Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also
took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros
a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte
Suprema, ¿no cree Su Señoria que esto equivale
practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal
Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la
Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los
miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre
la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es
suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese,
podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la
minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el
triunfo.
xxx     xxx     xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others
seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the
National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to
amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority party
and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members
each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The
Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76)
against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the
commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly shall
be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three
members elected by the party having the largest number of
votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members
of the party having the second largest number of votes, and
three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said
justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as
follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of
three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the
largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in
the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns,
and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8,
1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the
original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All
contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the
elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the
legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal,
is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
5
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition,
chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously
notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of
contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are
partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14,
1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right
to be the exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two
modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of
controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the
standing committees appointed at the commencement of
each session, was denominated the committee of privileges
and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all
questions of this description which might be referred to them,
and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon,
to the house, from time to time. When an election petition
was referred to this committee they heard the parties and
their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all
the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the
form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or
disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was
by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court
was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house,
in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The
committee of privileges and elections although a select
committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee was usually what is called an
open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee,
a quorum of the members named was required to be present,
but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the
committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament
questions relating to the right of membership gradually
assumed a political character; so that for many years previous
to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and
determined by the house of commons, as mere party
questions, upon which the strength of contending factions
might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert
Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government,
resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon
the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of
election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every
principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly
prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were
insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same
licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions
of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George
Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons,
undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of
March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to
bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections,
or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech
to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville
alluded to the existing practice in the following terms:
"Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes,
the principal dependence of both parties is their private
interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious that we
are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite
sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act
by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of
our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every
contested election, many members of this house, who are
ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the
competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the contention,
and take upon themselves the partial management of the very
business, upon which they should determine with the strictest
impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that
Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation
of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of
April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the
name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that
it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of
commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever
devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the
magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy,
may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to
the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in
by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not
been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill
was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief
justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had
been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on
the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a
total abrogation of one of the most important rights and
jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem
of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of
its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's
Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance
with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the
practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary
Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary
Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;,
s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of
England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada,
election contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the
House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally
determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In
Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election
of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the
Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6).
The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the
Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the
authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly
in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests,
the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the
Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19)
and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all
provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited
both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in
the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a
dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two
opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision
for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877
(United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating
a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by
the Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and
five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the
four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be
binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although
there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of
America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field,
who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court
(Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate
Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless Partisanship
of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least
abiding historical interest.
6
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and
political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore,
they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a
constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of
passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only
in the light of their own experience but also having in view the
experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of
the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which
the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the
vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation,
the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of
98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the
constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression
of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln,
First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that
the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections
of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional
precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people,
acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this
body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a
composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are
equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was
created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the
necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and
specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a
power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any
other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral
Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that
it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36
S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of
the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay
down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of
power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral
Commission in such case would be invested with the power to
determine contested cases involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all
times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would
the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this
authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority
would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from
time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases
referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that
authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has
chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by
the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the
ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the
Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of
the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be
permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned
counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of
respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a
coordinate department of the government and of according validity to
its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited
power of the commission in the admission of protests against members
of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the
creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of
construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner,
the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by
admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of
the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National
Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the
concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of
abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is
political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary
processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are
not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that
the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much
confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified
cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the
proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the
government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific
purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own
particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be
animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great
ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the
actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be
desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human
institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate
power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or
unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which
the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present
case, there are considerations of equitable character that should not be
overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy.
The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15,
1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions
mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new
National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the
resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was
approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the
7
Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and
approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of
election protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its
resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not
yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official
records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached
to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three
justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National Assembly
constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only
on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the National
Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the
presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly
— on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of
regulation in such cases — had already barred the presentation of
protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself
and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter
entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was
not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming the election of members against whom no protests had been
filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election
contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at
the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in
the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be
construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority
incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election
protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its
members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all
legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission
in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua,
confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the
Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers
is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly
and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules
of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and
in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither necessary in
order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the
proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting
such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time
that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332;
vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is
in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is
adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision
or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the
House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such
certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon
the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the
return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into
execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32
Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or
decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient,
without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing,
Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each
house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against
the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly
authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole
judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as
by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the
election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the
time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each
house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such
members against whose election no protests had been filed within the
prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further
protests against the election of those members not theretofore
contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature,
Record — First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu],
Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640;
Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature,
Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate],
Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp.
892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law.
Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly
abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all
contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe
regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix,
as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing
of contests against the election of its members. And what the National
Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through
the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution
follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into
the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the
overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the
delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments
and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review
in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source
of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to
execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to
the legislative than to any of the other two departments of
the governments.
(f  ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present
Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature
was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the
Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and
carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner
of filing protests.
8
 (  j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral
Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ
pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of
partisan influence or consideration, which object would be
frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power
to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of
conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not
only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the
Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members,
but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house
to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing
contests against the election of its members, the time and
manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to
be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of
contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect
may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of any member against whom no protest had been
filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive
the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe
the time within which protests against the election of any
member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against
the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any
manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the
Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope
and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy,
we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission
is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview
of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is
hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

9
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3820             July 18, 1950
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,  consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February 5, 1948, the Rural
vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons,respondents.
J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong,
Lorenzo Tañada, and Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus  to relieve the petitioner
from his confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been
committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15,
1950, which reads as follows:
Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer
other pertinent questions related to the said amount; Now,
therefore, be it.
Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person
to whom he gave the P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be committed
to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the
New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by
further order of the Senate or by the special committee
created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such discharge to be
ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing
to the Senate or to the said special committee the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer
other pertinent questions in connection therewith.
The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as
pertinent here, may be briefly stated as follows:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through
the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as
Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000,
respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a
nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the
Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged
interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of
P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other
attorney-in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt in
the Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios
Hospital. The Philippine Government held a 25-year lease contract on
said estate, with an option to purchase it for P3,000,000 within the same
period of 25 years counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation
Republic of the Philippines purported to exercise that option by
tendering to the owner the sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection,
by depositing it in court on June 21, 1944, together with the accrued
rentals amounting to P3224,000. Since 1939 the Government has
remained in possession of the estate.
On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista
Estate for P5,000,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who made a down payment of
P10,000 only and agreed to pay P5000,000 within one year and the
remainder in annual installments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation
that failure on his part to make any of said payments would cause the
forfeiture of his down payment of P10,000 and would entitle the
Hospital to rescind to sale to him. Aside from the down payment of
P10,000, Burt has made no other payment on account of the purchase
price of said estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust
Company. On May 14, 1946, the Philippine Trust Company sold estate
for the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and
promise to pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of
P1,100,000 in ten successive installments of P110,000 each. The nine-
month period within which to pay the first installment of P90,000
expired on February 14, 1947, without Burt's having paid the said or any
other amount then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947, the Philippine
Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to
the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale in
Progress Administration made, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a
notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his
contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his
failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period of nine
months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the
cancellation of Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in
the name of the Rural Progress Administration, from which order he
appealed to the Supreme Court.1
It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding
paragraphs that the Philippine Government, through the Secretary of
Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress
Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed,
accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of
October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which
reads as follows:
RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG
ESTATES DEAL.
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government,
through the Rural Progress Administration, has bought the
Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates for the aggregate sum
of five million pesos;
WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the
Supreme Court dated October 31, 1949, the Buenavista Estate
could have been bought for three million pesos by virtue of a
contract entered into between the San Juan de Dios Hospital
and Philippine Government in 1939;
WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government
did not have to purchase the Buenavista Estate because the
occupation government had made tender of payment in the
amount of three million pesos, Japanese currency, which fact
is believed sufficient to vest title of Ownership in the Republic
of the Philippines pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court
sustaining the validity of payments made in Japanese military
notes during the occupation;
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did
not have to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as
it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale
from the Philippine Trust Company dated September 3, 194,
for seven hundred and fifty thousand pesos, and by virtue of
the recission of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had
an interest in the estate; Now, therefore, be it.
RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is,
created, composed of five members to be appointed by the
President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of the said
Committee to determine whether the said purchase was
honest, valid, and proper and whether the price involved in
the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor,
and any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the
premises. Said Committee shall have the power to conduct
public hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to
compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of
documents before it; and may require any official or
employee of any bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality of the Government to assist or otherwise
cooperate with the Special Committee in the performance of
its functions and duties. Said Committee shall submit its
10
 report of findings and recommendations within two weeks
from the adoption of this Resolution.
The special committee created by the above resolution called and
examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was
the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the
committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent
unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the
total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the
two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before
October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense
of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000
were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the
same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with
the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks
aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he draw on said
account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the
account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National
Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself
cashed. It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate
recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case.
At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:
Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for
questions involving the disposition of funds, I take the
position that the transactions were legal, that no laws were
being violated, and that all requisites had been complied with.
Here also I acted in a purely functional capacity of
representative. I beg to be excused from making answer
which might later be used against me. I have been assured
that it is my constitutional right to refuse to incriminate
myself, and I am certain that the Honorable Members of this
Committee, who, I understand, are lawyers, will see the
justness of my position.
At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera,
a member of the committee, interrogated him as follows:
Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your
own typewritten statement, were legal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved,
according to your own statement, did not violate any law?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such
a manner that no laws were violated, how is it that when you
were asked by the Committee to tell what steps you took to
have this money delivered to Burt, you refused to answer the
questions, saying that it would incriminate you?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to
privacy in his dealings with other people.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was
disposed of because you would be incriminated, or you would
be incriminating somebody?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege
to dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a result
of a legal transaction without having to account for any use of
it.
But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator
Sumulong, interrogated the petitioner, the latter testified as follows:
The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also
made on October 29, 1949, is payable to cash; and upon
cashing this P440,000 on October 29, 1949, what did you do
with that amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you
delivered these P440,000 which you cashed on October 29,
1949?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a
representative of Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you
delivered the P440,000 was a Filipino?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that
representative of Burt to whom you delivered this big amount
of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to
whom you delivered the big amount on October 29, 1949,
gave you a receipt for the amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.
The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person,
representative of Burt, this big amount of P440,000 which
forms part of the P1-½ million paid to Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.
The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. By cable?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that
instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction
from Burt to deliver these P440,000 to a certain person whose
name you do not like to reveal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of
the person.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you
by Burt was verbal?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by
Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal
instruction; when Burt was still here in the Philippines?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he
would receive the money?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he
was here in the Philippines gave you the verbal instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.
The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for
Burt to merit receiving these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the
verbal instruction why that certain person should receive
these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.
The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big
amount to that certain person without receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would
represent him and where could I meet him.
The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as
early as 1946?
Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.
11
 The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention
in the prosecution of the two cases involving the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates?
Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high
government official?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that
certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot
remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000
on October 29, 1949, you knew already that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times.
The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a
Filipino name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a
Spanish name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.
The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which
according to your recollection is Spanish; can you remember
the first letter with which that family name begins?
Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.
The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family
name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you
have delivered this P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Several times?
Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.
The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that
person two or three times, you never were able to find out
what was his name?
Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr.
Peralta knows my name; of course, we have not done
business. Lots of people in Manila know me, but they don't
know my name, and I don't know them. They sa{ I am
"chiflado" because I don't know their names.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.
The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?
Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of
that certain person? What is his complexion: light, dark or
light brown?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to
Senator Cabili), but smaller. He walks very straight, with
military bearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain
person to whom you gave the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met
that certain person, you never came to know his residence?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office.
The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6.
On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate,
which approved and read to him the following resolution:
Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session
assembled:
That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be
arraigned for contempt consisting of contumacious acts
committed by him during the investigation conducted by the
Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 to
probe the Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal of October
21, 1949, and that the President of the Senate propounded to
him the following interrogatories:
1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal
the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 on
October 29, 1949, a person whose name it is impossible for
you not to remember not only because of the big amount of
money you gave to him without receipt, but also by your own
statements you knew him as early as 1946 when General
Ernest H. Burt was still in the Philippines, you made two other
deliveries of money to him without receipt, and the last time
you saw him was in December 1949?
Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a
written answer alleging that the questions were incriminatory in nature
and begging leave to be allowed to stand on his constitutional right not
to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Not satisfied with that
written answer Senator Sumulong, over the objection of counsel for the
petitioner, propounded to the latter the following question:
Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the
Committee asked you for the name of that person to whom
you gave the P440,000, you said that you can [could] not
remember his name. That was the reason then for refusing to
reveal the name of the person. Now, in the answer that you
have just cited, you are refusing to reveal the name of that
person to whom you gave the P440,000 on the ground that
your answer will be self-incriminating. Now, do I understand
from you that you are abandoning your former claim that you
cannot remember the name of that person, and that your
reason now for your refusal to reveal the name of that person
is that your answer might be self-incriminating? In other
words, the question is this: What is your real reason for
refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave
the P440,000: that you do not remember his name or that
your answer would be self-incriminating?
xxx     xxx     xxx
Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of
procedure that the accused should not be required to testify
unless he so desires.
The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the
question. The question is very clear. It does not incriminate
him.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made
before the Senate Committee on the first, second, and third
hearings to which I was made in my letter to this Senate of
May 2, 1950, in which I gave all the reasons that were in my
powers to give, as requested. I cannot change anything in
those statements that I made because they represent the best
that I can do , to the best of my ability.
The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The
answer has nothing to do with the question.
Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault,
that the reason that you gave during the investigation for not
revealing the name of the person to whom you gave the
P440,000 is not the same reason that you are now alleging
because during the investigation you told us: "I do not
remember his name." But, now, you are now saying: "My
answer might incriminate me." What is your real position?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements
that I made at the first, second, and third hearings. I said that I
wanted to be excused from answering the question. I beg to
be excused from making any answer that might be
incriminating in nature. However, in this answer, if the detail
12
 of not remembering the name of the person has not been
included, it is an oversight.
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple
question: Do you remember or not the name of the person to
whom you gave the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember .
Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of
that person, how can you say that your answer might be
incriminating? If you do not remember his name, you cannot
answer the question; so how could your answer be self-
incriminating? What do you say to that?
Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain.
Please, I do not see how to answer those questions. That is
why I asked for a lawyer, so he can help me. I have no means
of knowing what the situation is about. I have been in jail 13
days without communication with the outside. How could I
answer the question? I have no knowledge of legal procedure
or rule, of which I am completely ignorant.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be
answered.
The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the
question. It is very clear. It does not incriminate the witness.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my
constitutional rights. I beg to be excused from making further
answer, please.
Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent
addressed to the President of the Senate, dated May 2, 1950,
you stated there that you cannot reveal the name of the
person to whom you gave the P440,000 because if he is a
public official you might render yourself liable for prosecution
for bribery, and that if he is a private individual you might
render yourself liable for prosecution for slander. Why did you
make those statements when you cannot even tell us whether
that person to whom you gave the P440,000 is a public official
or a private individual ? We are giving you this chance to
convince the Senate that all these allegations of yours that
your answers might incriminate you are given by you honestly
or you are just trying to make a pretext for not revealing the
information desired by the Senate.
The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The
question is restated and explained.)
Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer
for me and signed it. That is all I can say how I stand about this
letter. I have no knowledge myself enough to write such a
letter, so I had to secure the help of a lawyer to help me in my
period of distress.
In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was
called to show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt
of the Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to the petitioner
questions tending to elicit information from him as to the identity of the
person to whom he delivered the P440,000; but the petitioner refused
to reveal it by saying that he did not remember. The President of the
Senate then propounded to him various questions concerning his past
activities dating as far back as when witness was seven years of age and
ending as recently as the post liberation period, all of which questions
the witness answered satisfactorily. In view thereof, the President of the
Senate also made an attempt to illicit the desired information from the
witness, as follows:
The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good
memory. Answer: Did you deliver the P440,000 as a gift, or of
any consideration?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it
to that person, that is all.
The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.
The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least
remembrance of the name of that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.
The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events
that happened a short time ago and, on the other hand, you
remember events that occurred during your childhood?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain.
The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15
hereinabove quoted whereby the petitioner was committed to the
custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until "he shall have
purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid
Special Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) ,
to wit:
That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No.
8 be empowered and directed to continue its investigation of
the Tambobong and Buenavista Estates deal of October 21,
1949, more particularly to continue the examination of Jean L.
Arnault regarding the name of the person to whom he gave
the P440,000 and other matters related therewith.
The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on
May 18, 1950.
The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and
prolonged consideration because it is the first of its kind to arise since
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was adopted. For the
first time this Court is called upon to define the power of either House of
Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt; and we are
fully conscious that our pronouncements here will set an important
precedent for the future guidance of all concerned.
Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it
necessary to lay down the general principles of law which form the
background of those issues.
Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers
of the Government in three independent but coordinate Departments —
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The legislative power is vested in the
Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) Each house may determine the
rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a
Member. (Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.
(Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the Constitution of the United States, ours
does not contain an express provision empowering either of the two
Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers for contempt. It may also be
noted that whereas in the United States the legislative power is shared
by and between the Congress of the United States, on the one hand, and
the respective legislatures of the different States, on the other — the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor
prohibited by it to States being reserved to the States, respectively, or to
the people — in the Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the
Congress of the Philippines alone. It may therefore be said that the
Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the
Congress of the United States or any State Legislature. Our form of
Government being patterned after the American system — the framers
of our Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and
practices — we can, in this case, properly draw also from American
precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as
we have done in other cases in the past. Although there is no provision
in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
13
the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information — which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to
others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
(McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The
fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary
implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.
(Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242.) But no person can
be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his
testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction
to inquire. (Kilbourn vs.Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.).
Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider
range of legislative field than either the Congress of the United States or
a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say that the field of inquiry
into which it may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any
limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It is not
necessary to do so in this case. Suffice it to say that it must be
coextensive with the range of the legislative power.
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special
Committee created by it, to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and we entertain no
doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of
Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted. The transaction involved a
questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no
less than P5,000,000 of public funds, of which Congress is the
constitutional guardian. It also involved government agencies created by
Congress to regulate or even abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted
investigation, the investigating committee has recommended and the
Senate approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any
other department head from discharging functions and exercising
powers other than those attached to his own office, without ]previous
congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting brothers and near relatives
of any President of the Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly
and in whatever capacity in transactions in which the Government is a
party, more particularly where the decision lies in the hands of executive
or administrative officers who are appointees of the President; and (3)
providing that purchases of the Rural Progress Administration of big
landed estates at a price of P100,000 or more, shall not become
effective without previous congressional confirmation.2
We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by
the petitioner in support of his contention that his commitment is
unlawful.
First  He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he
gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will
not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to
answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the
legislative process. It is argued that since the investigating committee
has already rendered its report and has made all its recommendations as
to what legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its findings,
there is no necessity to force the petitioner to give the information
desired other than that mentioned in its report, to wit: "In justice to
Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of
suspicion that now pervades the public mind must be dissipated, and it
can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the Senate to compel
Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000 and answer the questions which
will definitely establish the identity of that person . . ." Senator
Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who appeared and argued the
case for the respondents, denied that that was the only purpose of the
Senate in seeking the information from the witness. He said that the
investigation had not been completed, because, due to the contumacy
of the witness, his committee had not yet determined the parties
responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution No.
8; that, by Resolution No. 16, his committee was empowered and
directed to continue its investigation, more particularly to continue its
examination of the witness regarding the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith; that the bills
recommended by his committee had not been approved by the House
and might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation;
and that those bills were not necessarily all the measures that Congress
might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation is finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of
a legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the
power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power
in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a
Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to
coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject
of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to
answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the
inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may be
propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible
legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action
and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the
sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a
single question.
In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that
the power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative
body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation; that once
that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of
that jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the ruling of the Senate on the
materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not subject to
review by this Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We
have to qualify this proposition. As was said by the Court of Appeals of
New York: "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative
body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed,
and we have no right to assume that the contrary was intended."
(People ex rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2
N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the said case of McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary
deduction from the decision in Re Chapman, 41 L. ed., 1154, that where
the questions are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry  a witness
rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that where the
alleged immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body
from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the court is in
duty bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative
body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not
preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the
exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to
the resolution of the issue under consideration, we find that the
question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact,
this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity
of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special
Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible
for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that
the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000
involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the
very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the
question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no
relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already
indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that
every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or
14
possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the
matter under inquiry.
It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills
recommended by the Committee as a result of the uncompleted
investigation and that there is no need for it to know the name of the
person to whom the witness gave the P440,000. But aside from the fact
that those bills have not yet been approved by the lower house and by
the President and that they may be withdrawn or modified if after the
inquiry is completed they should be found unnecessary or inadequate,
there is nothing to prevent the Congress from approving other measures
it may deem necessary after completing the investigation. We are not
called upon, nor is it within our province, to determine or imagine what
those measures may be. And our inability to do so is no reason for
overruling the question propounded by the Senate to the witness.
The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here.
The inquiry there in question was conducted under a resolution of the
Senate and related to charges, published in the press, that senators
were yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then before
the Senate and were speculating in stocks the value of which would be
affected by pending amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member of a
firm of stock brokers dealing in the stock of the American Sugar Refining
Company, appeared before the committee in response to a subpoena
and asked, among others, the following questions:
Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or
sold any stock or securities, known as sugar stocks, for or in
the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate
senator?
Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the
benefit of, or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any
United Senate senator?
He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act of
Congress for contempt of the Senate. Upon being convicted and sent to
jail he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ
of habeas corpus. One of the questions decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States in that case was whether the committee had the right
to compel the witness to answer said questions, and the Court held that
the committee did have such right, saying:
The questions were undoubtedly  pertinent to the subject-
matter of the inquiry. The resolution directed the committee
to inquire whether any senator has been, or is, speculating in
what are known as sugar stocks during the consideration of
the tariff bill now before the Senate." What the Senate might
or might not do upon the facts when ascertained, we cannot
say, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures
might be defensible, as contended in argument, but is plain
that negative answers would have cleared that body of what
the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while
affirmative answers might have led to further action on the
part of the Senate within its constitutional powers. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible
for the deal is incumbent upon the judicial rather than upon the
legislative branch. But we think there is no basis in fact or in law for such
assumption. The petitioner has not challenged the validity of Senate
Resolution No. 8, and that resolution expressly requires the committee
to determine the parties responsible for the deal. We are bound to
presume that the Senate has acted in the due performance of its
constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if the act is capable of
being so construed. On the other hand, there is no suggestion that the
judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine the parties responsible
for the deal. Under the circumstances of the case, it appearing that the
questioned transaction was affected by the head of the Department of
Justice himself, it is not reasonable to expect that the Fiscal or the Court
of First Instance of Manila will take the initiative to investigate and
prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and unless the
Senate shall determined those parties are and shall taken such measures
as may be within its competence to take the redress the wrong that may
have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction.
As we have said, the transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 of
public funds. That certainly is a matter of a public concern which it is the
duty of the constitutional guardian of the treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range
of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the
witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be
enforced by the committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va.,
49; 79 S.E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied
upon by the petitioner, is not applicable here. In that case the inquiry
instituted by the House of Representatives of the United States related
to a private real-estate pool or partnership in the District of Columbia.
Jay Cook and Company had had an interest in the pool but become
bankrupts, and their estate was in course of administration in a federal
bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. The United States was one of their
creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a
settlement of the bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course his
action was subject to examination and approval or disapproval by the
bankruptcy court. Some of the creditors, including the United States,
were dissatisfied with the settlement. The resolution of the House
directed the Committee "to inquire into the nature and history of said
real-estate pool and the character of said settlement, with the amount
of property involve, in which Jay Cooke and Co. were interested, and the
amount paid or to be paid in said settlement, with power to send for
persons and papers, and report to this House." The Supreme Court of
the United States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the
resolution contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the
matter was one in respect of which no valid legislation could be had;
that the bankrupts' estate and the trustee's settlement were still
pending in the bankruptcy court; and that the United States and other
creditors were free to press their claims in that proceeding. And on
these grounds the court held that in undertaking the investigation "the
House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own
authority, but assumed a power which could only be properly exercised
by another branch of the government, because the power was in its
nature clearly judicial." The principles announced and applied in that
case are: that neither House of Congress possesses a "general power of
making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen"; that the power
actually possessed is limited to inquires relating to matters of which the
particular House has jurisdiction, and in respect of which it rightfully may
take other action; that if the inquiry relates to a matter wherein relief or
redress could be had only by judicial proceeding, it is not within the
range of this power , but must be left to the court, conformably to the
constitutional separation of government powers.
That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1)
There the court found that the subject of the inquiry, which related to a
private real-estate pool or partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of
either House of Congress; while here if it is not disputed that the subject
of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a questionable
expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within
the jurisdiction of the Senate, (2) There the claim of the Government as
a creditor of Jay Cooke and Company, which had had an interest in the
pool, was pending adjudication by the court; while here the
interposition of the judicial power on the subject of the inquiry cannot
be expected, as we have pointed out above, until after the Senate shall
have determined who the parties responsible are and shall have taken
such measures as may be within its competence to take to redress the
wrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of
the transaction.
It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of
Killbourn vs. Thompson has evoked strong criticisms from legal scholars.
(See Potts,  Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt [1926], 74
U. Pa. L. Rev., 692-699; James L. Land is, Constitutional Limitations on
the Congressional Power of Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153,
154, 214-220.) We quoted the following from Professor Land is'
criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw the case purely as an attempt by the
15
House to secure to the Government certain priority rights as creditor of
the bankrupt concern. To him it assumed the character of a lawsuit
between the Government and Jay Cooke and Co., with the Government,
acting through the House, attempting to override the orderliness of
established procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not before the
courts but before Congress. That bankruptcy proceedings had already
been instituted against Jay Cooke and Co., in a federal court gave added
impetus to such a conception. The House was seeking to oust a court of
prior acquired jurisdiction by an extraordinary and unwarranted
assumption of "judicial power"! The broader aspect of the investigation
had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay Cooke and Co.'s
indebtedness and the particular funds in question were only part of the
great administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of
public monies, that the particular failure was of consequence mainly in
relation to the security demanded for all government deposits, that the
facts connected with one such default revealed the possibility of other
and greater maladministration, such considerations had not been put
before the Court. Nor had it been acquainted with the every-day nature
of the particular investigation and the powers there exerted by the
House, powers whose exercise was customary and familiar in legislative
practice. Instead of assuming the character of an extraordinary judicial
proceeding, the inquiry, place in its proper background, should have
been regarded as a normal and customary part of the legislative process.
Detailed definiteness of legislative purpose was thus made the demand
of the court in Killbourn vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell
the results that may be achieved. The power of Congress to exercise
control over a real-estate pool is not a matter for abstract speculation
but one to be determined only after an exhaustive examination of the
problem. Relationship, and not their possibilities, determine the extent
of congressional power. Constitutionality depends upon such
disclosures. Their presence, whether determinative of legislative or
judicial power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor
the Court can predict, prior to the event, the result of the investigation."
The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall  vs. Gordon, 243
U.S., 521; 61. ed., 881. The question there was whether the House of
Representatives exceeded its power in punishing, as for contempt of its
authority, the District Attorney of the Southern District of New York,
who had written, published, and sent to the chairman of one of its
committees an ill-tempered and irritating letter respecting the action
and purposes of the committee in interfering with the investigation by
the grand jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of the House of
Representatives. Power to make inquires and obtain evidence by
compulsory process was not involved. The court recognized distinctly
that the House of Representatives had implied power to punish a person
not a member for contempt, but held that its action in this instance was
without constitutional justification. The decision was put on the ground
that the letter, while offensive and vexatious, was not calculated or likely
to affect the House in any of its proceedings or in the exercise of any of
its functions. This brief statement of the facts and the issues decided in
that case is sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof to the present
case. There the contempt involved consisted in the district attorney's
writing to the chairman of the committee an offensive and vexatious
letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal of the
witness to answer questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which
the Senate has the power and jurisdiction to make . But in that case, it
was recognized that the House of Representatives has implied power to
punish a person not a member of contempt. In that respect the case is
applicable here in favor of the Senate's (and not of the Petitioner's )
contention.
Second.  It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks
authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. This contention is
based on the opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices
Street and Villa-Real, in the case of  Lopez vs. De los Reyes  (1930), 55
Phil., 170. In that case it appears that on October 23, 1929, Candido
Lopez assaulted a member of the House of Representatives while the
latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend the
session which was then about to begin, as a result of which assault said
representative was unable to attend the sessions on that day and those
of the two days next following by reason of the threats which Candido
Lopez made against him. By the resolution of the House adopted
November 6, 1929, Lopez was declared guilty of contempt of the House
of Representatives and ordered punished by confinement in Bilibid
Prison for a period of twenty-four hours. That resolution was not
complied with because the session of the House of Representatives
adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, and was reiterated at the
next session on September 16, 1930. Lopez was subsequently arrested,
whereupon he applied for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court, six justices voted to grant the writ: Justice Malcolm,
Street, and Villa-real, on the ground that the term of imprisonment
meted out to the petitioner could not legally be extended beyond the
session of the body in which the contempt occurred; and Justices Johns,
Villamor, and Ostrand, on the ground that the Philippine Legislature had
no power to punish for contempt because it was a creature merely of an
Act of the Congress of the United States and not of a Constitution
adopted by the people. Chief Justice Avanceña, Justice Johnson, and
Justice Romualdez wrote separate opinions, concurring with Justice
Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, that the Legislature had inherent power
to punish for contempt but dissenting from the opinion that the order of
commitment could only be executed during the particular session in
which the act of contempt was committed.
Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally
divided and no decisive pronouncement was made. The opinion of Mr.
Justice Malcolm is based mainly on the following passage in the case of
Anderson vs.Dunn, supra:
And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the
legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of its
adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows that
imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment.
as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the
cogency and application of the two limitations which were
expressly pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is,
that the power even when applied to subjects which justified
its exercise is limited to imprisonment and such imprisonment
may not be extended beyond the session of the body in which
the contempt occurred.
Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avanceña held:
From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the
imposition of the penalty is limited to the existence of the
legislative body, which ceases to function upon its final
periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its existence and
not to any particular session thereof. This must be so,
inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such penalty is
the right which the Legislature has to self-preservation, and
which right is enforceable during the existence of the
legislative body. Many causes might be conceived to
constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue
to be a menace to its preservation during the existence of the
legislative body against which contempt was committed.
If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for
contempt exists while the legislative body exercising it is in
session, then that power and the exercise thereof must
perforce continue until the final adjournment and the election
of its successor.
Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations
from Cooley's Constitutional Limitationsand from Jefferson's Manual, is
to the same effect. Mr. Justice Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where as
in the case before us, the members composing the legislative body
against which the contempt was committed have not yet completed
their three-year term, the House may take action against the petitioner
herein."
16
We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and
Marshall vs. Gordon relied upon by Justice Malcolm areobiter dicta.
Anderson vs. Dunn was an action of trespass against the Sergeant-at-
Arms of the House of Representatives of the United States for assault
and battery and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had been arrested for
contempt of the House, brought before the bar of the House, and
reprimanded by the Speaker, and then discharged from custody. The
question as to the duration of the penalty was not involved in that case.
The question there was "whether the House of Representatives can take
cognizance of contempt committed against themselves, under any
circumstances." The court there held that the House of Representatives
had the power to punish for contempt, and affirmed the judgment of
the lower court in favor of the defendant. In Marshall vs.Gordon, the
question presented was whether the House had the power under the
Constitution to deal with the conduct of the district attorney in writing a
vexatious letter as a contempt of its authority, and to inflict punishment
upon the writer for such contempt as a matter of legislative power. The
court held that the House had no such power because the writing of the
letter did not obstruct the performance of legislative duty and did not
endanger the preservation of the power of the House to carry out its
legislative authority. Upon that ground alone, and not because the
House had adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of the petitioner
from custody.
The case where the question was squarely decided is
McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra. There it appears that the Senate had
adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a select committee of five
senators to investigate various charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance
in the Department of Justice after Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty
became its supervising head. In the course of the investigation the
committee caused to be served on Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry
M. Daugherty and president of the Midland National Bank of
Washington Court House, Ohio, a subpoena commanding him to appear
before it for the purpose of giving testimony relating to the subject
under consideration. The witness failed to appear without offering any
excuse for his failure. The committee reported the matter to the Senate
and the latter adopted a resolution, "That the President of the Senate
pro tempore issue his warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or his
deputy to take into custody the body of the said M.S. Daugherty
wherever found, and to bring the said M.S. Daugherty before the bar of
the Senate, then and there to answer such questions pertinent to the
matter under inquiry as the Senate may order the President of the
Senate pro tempore to propound; and to keep the said M.S. Daugherty
in custody to await the further order of the Senate." Upon being
arrested, the witness petitioned the federal court in Cincinnati for a writ
of habeas corpus. The federal court granted the writ and discharged the
witness on the ground that the Senate, in directing the investigation and
in ordering the arrest, exceeded its power under the Constitution. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the
contentions of the witness was that the case ha become moot because
the investigation was ordered and the committee was appointed during
the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on March 4, 1926. In overruling
the contention, the court said:
. . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited
the committee's authority to the period of the Sixty-eighth
Congress; but this apparently was changed by a later and
amendatory resolution authorizing the committee to sit at
such times and places as it might deem advisable or
necessary. It is said in Jefferson's Manual: "Neither House can
continue any portion of itself in any parliamentary function
beyond the end of the session without the consent of the
other two branches. When done, it is by a bill constituting
them commissioners for the particular purpose." But the
context shows that the reference is to the two houses of
Parliament when adjourned by prorogation or dissolution by
the King. The rule may be the same with the House of
Representatives whose members are all elected for the period
of a single Congress: but it cannot well be the same with the
Senate, which is a continuing body whose members are
elected for a term of six years and so divided into classes that
the seats of one third only become vacant at the end of each
Congress, two thirds always continuing into the next
Congress, save as vacancies may occur through death or
resignation.
Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as
a continuing body, may continue its committees through the
recess following the expiration of a Congress;" and, after
quoting the above statement from Jefferson's Manual, he
says: "The Senate, however being a continuing body, gives
authority to its committees during the recess after the
expiration of a Congress." So far as we are advised the select
committee having this investigation in charge has neither
made a final report nor been discharged; nor has been
continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its activities
have been suspended pending the decision of this case. But,
be this as it may, it is certain that the committee may be
continued or revived now by motion to that effect, and if,
continued or revived, will have all its original powers. This
being so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the case
cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary sense.
The situation is measurably like that in Southern P. Terminal
Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S., 498, 514-
516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it
was held that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission did not become moot
through the expiration of the order where it was capable of
repetition by the Commission and was a matter of public
interest. Our judgment may yet be carried into effect and the
investigation proceeded with from the point at which it
apparently was interrupted by reason of the habeas
corpus proceedings. In these circumstances we think a
judgment should be rendered as was done in the case cited.
What has been said requires that the final order in the District
Court discharging the witness from custody be reversed.
Like the Senate of the United States , the Senate of the Philippines is a
continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and
so divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every two
years, two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as
vacancies may occur thru death or resignation. Members of the House
of Representatives are all elected for a term of four years; so that the
term of every Congress is four years. The Second Congress of the
Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949, and will expire on
December 30, 1953. The resolution of the Senate committing the
Petitioner was adopted during the first session of the Second Congress,
which began on the fourth Monday of January and ended in May 18,
1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of
Representatives, we think it could be enforced until the final
adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find
no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for
contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative
body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed
during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any
proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry
with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which
that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that
the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the
Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon
the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
17
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to
punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the
soundness of this proposition. The Senate has ordered an investigation
of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we have found it
is within its competence to make. That investigation has not been
completed because of the refusal of the petitioner as a witness to
answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The
Senate has empowered the committee to continue the investigation
during the recess. By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has
obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and
the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the
witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall
have answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is
a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative
function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt
only during the session in which investigation was begun, would be to
recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same
time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its
performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to
punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session,
the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and
succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the
witness until the investigation is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and
vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that
the power may be abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate
which might keep the witness in prison for life. But we must assume that
the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper
bounds. And if, contrary to this assumption, proper limitations are
disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open to those whose
rights might thus be transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-
incrimination. He contends that he would incriminate himself if he
should reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 if
that person be a public official be (witness) might be accused of bribery,
and if that person be a private individual the latter might accuse him of
oral defamation.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm,
and slippery to afford him safety. At first he told the Committee that the
transactions were legal, that no laws were violated, and that all
requisites had been replied with; but at the time he begged to be
excused from making answers "which might later be used against me." A
little later he explained that although the transactions were legal he
refused to answer questions concerning them "because it violates the
right of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people . . . I simply
stand on my privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me
as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for the use of
it." But after being apparently convinced by the Committee that his
position was untenable, the witness testified that, without securing any
receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to a certain person, a
representative of Burt, in compliance with Burt's verbal instruction made
in 1946; that as far as he know, that certain person had nothing to do
with the negotiations for the settlement of the Buenavista and
Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times before he
gave him the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, and that since then he had
seen him again two or three times, the last time being in December,
1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age,
between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in height. Butt the witness
would not reveal the name of that person on these pretexts: " I don't
remember the name; he was a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I
don't remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important
question, what is the name of that person to whom you gave the
P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the
Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself,
necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable
that he gave the P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal
to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to
testify would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur., sec. 15, Contempt, pp.
399-400.) In the case of Mason vs. U.S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that
Mason was called to testify before a grand jury engaged in investigating
a charge of gambling against six other men. After stating that he was
sitting at a table with said men when they were arrested, he refused to
answer two questions, claiming so to do might tend to incriminate him:
(1) "Was there a game of cards being played on this particular evening at
the table at which you are sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards being
played at another table at this time?" The foreman of the grand jury
reported the matter to the judge, who ruled "that each and all of said
questions are proper and that the answers thereto would not tend to
incriminate the witness." Mason was again called and refused to answer
the first question propounded to him, but, half yielding to frustration, he
said in response to the second question: "I don't know." In affirming the
conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court of the United States among
other things said:
In the present case, the witness certainly were not relieved
from answering merely because they declared that so to do
might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in this regard
is well illustrated by the enforced answer, "I don't know ,"
given by Mason to the second question, after he had refused
to reply under a claim of constitutional privilege.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and
that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with
the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his
claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for
the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for
the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him. as he
is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-
incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court,
from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well
as from his general conception of the relations of the witness.
Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court
to determine whether a direct answer to a question may
criminate or not. . . . The fact that the testimony of a witness
may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient
to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same
time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation.
The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some
fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or
to secure immunity to a third person. ( 3 Wharton's Criminal
Evidence, 11th ed., secs. 1135,1136.)
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the
facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is
justified in refusing to answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23 N.E. [2d],
210 [Ill. App., 1939].) A witness is not relieved from answering
merely on his own declaration that an answer might
incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide
that question. (Mason vs. U.S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193,
1200.)
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional
right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful
testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact
fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right
under the Constitution. The witness in this case has been vociferous and
militant in claiming constitutional rights and privileges but patently
recreant to his duties and obligations to the Government which protects
those rights under the law. When a specific right and a specific
obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain
while the other is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the
18
latter. The right to life is one of the most sacred that the citizen may
claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his
corresponding obligation to respect the life of others. As Mr. Justice
Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the gallows
may repine at the fate which awaits him, and yet it is not certain that
the laws under which he suffers were made for the security."
Paraphrasing and applying that pronouncement here, the petitioner may
not relish the restraint of his liberty pending the fulfillment by him of his
duty, but it is no less certain that the laws under which his liberty is
restrained were made for his welfare.
From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it
is so ordered, with costs.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

19
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13862            April 15, 1918
In re R. McCULLOCH DICK.
Kincaid & Perkins, W. H. Lawrence and D. R. Williams for petitioner.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for the Government.
CARSON, J.:
The Solicitor-General moves the court to revoke its orders providing for
a stay of execution of its judgment pending proceedings looking to a
review of the judgment by the supreme Court of the United States and
not exceed three months; and, further, to remand the petitioner to the
custody of the chief of police of the city of Manila, so that the order of
deportation may be executed forthwith.
Since the enactment by Congress of the Amendments to the Judicial
Code which require litigants in this court, seeking review of our
judgment by the supreme court of the United States, to institute
proceedings to that end by filing an application for a writ of certiorari  in
the clerk's office of the Supreme Court of the United States, we have
adopted the practice of temporarily staying or suspending the execution
of our judgments, when timely application is made therefor, in any case
wherein it is made to appear that the applicant desires to make
application for such writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States; that he will diligently prosecute the prescribed remedy and
intends to take necessary steps to submit his application without
unnecessary delay; that his application for suspension of execution of
our judgment is made in good faith and not merely for the purpose of
securing delay, nor based on frivolous grounds; and that the execution
of the judgment would subject him to irreparable loss, damage, or injury
in the event of its subsequent reversal by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
In the absence of the statutory rules governing the procedure in such
case, our practice has been to direct the clerk of the court, in case heard
on appeal, to retain the record of the cause in his hands without
certifying our judgment to the court below, and in cases heard in the
exercise of our original jurisdiction, to retain control over the record
without certifying our judgment to the inferior tribunal corporation
board or person charged with its execution or with obedience to its
mandate until, a day fixed in the order, or until the further order of the
court.
Suspensions or stays of execution under this practice have usually been
limited to a period of from two to three months, which experience has
shown to be sufficient, under ordinary circumstances, to give the
application an opportunity to file his petition for the writ of certiorari in
the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the instance case timely application was made for suspension of the
execution of our judgment remanding the petitioner to the custody of
the chief of police for compliance with the deportation order; and it was
shown to the satisfaction of the court that the application was made in
good faith, and that the application would suffer irreparable injury by
the execution of the deportation order, if reverse our judgment and
accept the views of the four members of this court who dissented
therefrom and were of opinion that the deportation order was "without
warrant of law."
No objection having been made to the motion for a stay of execution of
our judgment remanding the petitioner, an order was entered in
accordance with the established practice above set out.
At the same time, the petitioner (who, by virtue of the suspending order
remained in the custody of the court) was released from the technical
custody of our sheriff, and set at liberty upon his filing an approved bond
in the sum of P2,000 which under the exceptional circumstances of the
case, was conditioned not merely upon his remaining within the
jurisdiction of the court and subject to its order at all times pending the
proceedings looking to the review of our judgment, but also upon his
keeping the peace and not being guilty of any offense against the public
order and tranquility, nor inciting others to like conduct throughout that
period.
The Solicitor-General prays for an order vacating these orders providing
for a stay or suspension of the execution of our judgment and setting the
petitioner at liberty on bail, on the ground that we have no jurisdiction
to issue such orders; and on the further ground that, granting, for the
sake of argument, that we have jurisdiction in the premises, the facts
disclosed by the record do not justify us in maintaining these orders in
force under existing conditions in the Philippine Islands.
The Solicitor-General contends that this court having declared, upon full
consideration of law and the facts, that the Governor- General is vested
with power to deport the petitioner, we have no power, under our own
rulings, to interfere with or to control his action in the premises.
But is equally true that by entering upon the inquiry as to whether the
Governor-General was lawfully clothed with power to deport the
petitioner, we recognized the power and duty of the court to adjudicate
the question raised by the petitioner as to the power of the Governor-
General in the premises; and asserted our authority, under the law, to
have the body of the petitioner brought before us in habeas
corpus proceedings, and placed at our disposal pending the final
disposition of the question thus submitted for adjudication.
In the very nature of things the right of the Chief Executive to exercise
his lawful powers without the interference of the court must give way,
so far that may be necessary to secure a full, fair, and final adjudication
by the courts of a question as to the legality and existence of powers
which he assumes to exercise, when that question is raised inhabeas
corpus  proceedings by a petitioner alleging that he has been unlawfully
deprived of his liberty.
The petitioner in the instant case is now under the custody of this court,
pending the final adjudication of the question raised by him as to the
existence and legality of the power raised by the Governor-General in
ordering his deportion; and although this court has solemnly declared
that the Governor-General is lawfully vested with such power, there can
be no question as to the right of the petitioner to apply to the Supreme
Court of the United States for a review of our judgment.
We are satisfied that under the law and the settled practice of this court,
we have jurisdiction to suspend the execution of our judgment, and to
withhold the order remanding the petitioner for deportation for a period
of time sufficient to give him a suitable opportunity to apply for a writ
of certiorari  form the Supreme Court of the United States. (U. S. vs. Lim,
36 Phil. Rep., 682; Campagnie de Commerce et de Navigation D'Extreme
Orient vs.Hamburg Amerika Packetfacht Actien Gesellschaft, 36 Phil.
Rep., 590; E. Viegelmann & Co. vs. Collector of Customs, 37 Phil. Rep.,
10; R. G. No. 11899, Ynchausti & Co. Board of Public Utility
Commissioner.1)
As a corollary to our ruling that we have jurisdiction temporarily  to stay
or suspend execution of our judgment remanding petitioner to the
custody of the officer who delivered him to the custody of the court in
compliance with the writ of habeas corpus, it flows that it is our duty
and that we have the power to adopt such measures as may be
appropriate and necessary for his safe-keeping while in our custody, and
to secure of the chief of police for deportation if and when the order
staying or suspending execution of that judgment is vacated.
But while we entertain no doubt as to our jurisdiction to provide for a
temporary stay or suspension of execution of our judgment remanding
the petitioner, and pending such stay, to provide, his retention in our
custody, either in the ands of our sheriff or at liberty under bail; we are
forcibly impressed with the representations of the Solicitor-General as
to the impropriety of maintaining the order letting him to bail, over the
objection of the chief Executive, who is primarily charged with
maintenance of the peace, good order, and safety of these Island.
As the Solicitor-General well says, the logical and necessary conclusion
to be derived from the record of these proceedings, read together with
the opinion of the court, is that the petitioner is an undesirable alien,
who presence in the Philippine islands is a menace to the peace and
safety of the community. The Governor-General in the lawful exercise of
the authority conferred upon him under section 69 of the Administrative
20
Code, has so declared, after prior investigation f the course of which the
petitioner had full opportunity to be head in his own behalf; and this
court has expressly held that we are not at liberty in the course of these
proceedings to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the
evidence on which he based his conclusions.
Indeed, it was the knowledge of these findings by the Governor-General
as disclosed by the record, which caused us to condition the letting of
the petitioner to bail upon the execution of a bond in a substantial sum,
conditioned not merely upon his holding himself subject to the orders of
the court pending the stay of execution of our judgment, but also upon
his keeping the peace throughout that period.
At that time no objection had been filed by the Solicitor-General to the
motion of petitioner to suspend our judgment pending proceedings
looking to its review by the supreme court of the United States; and, in
the absence of objection, we conceived that the convenience of the
petitioner might properly be consulted by setting him at liberty under a
substantial bond conditioned as we have just indicated.
But it now becomes our duty to consider whether the order letting the
petitioner to bail should be maintained in force over objection
interposed by Solicitor-General on behalf of the Chief Executive; and
notwithstanding his representations that as an undesirable alien who
presence in the Philippine Islands is a menace to the peace and safety of
the community the petitioner should be deported forthwith, and
certainly should not be at large to continue his pernicious activities at
will, during the more or less prolonged period of the suspension of
execution of our judgment remanding him to the custody of the chief of
police.
In this connection, our attention has been called to the fact that the
petitioner is the proprietor and editor of a weekly newspaper of
considerable circulation and as such has it within his power, if at large to
place more or less serious obstacles in the way of measures
contemplated by the executive legislative authorities for the recruiting
and organization of native troops destined to the serve of the United
States in the present war. Indeed, the Solicitor-General asserts that the
first issued of that newspaper following the promulgation of the decision
of this court, contains matter well calculated to create and foment racial
prejudices and differences, highly detrimental to the general welfare
and good order of the Island, and especially to be deprecated at this
time and when the utmost peace and harmony should prevail in the face
of a common enemy.
But without stopping to consider whether there is anything in this issue
of the Free Press which supports the contentions that there is a manifest
inconsistency between the rulings upon which our judgment was based,
and the maintenance in force of our order stetting the petitioner at large
on bail, over the objection of the Solicitor-Genral representing the Chief
Executive.
Having held that he Governor-General was lawfully authorized to
institute and maintain deportation proceedings against the petitioner
under the provisions of section 69 of the Administrative code; and
having declared that we have no jurisdiction in these habeas
corpus proceedings to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of the
evidence on which he based his ruling in the course of these
proceedings; and the Governor-General having declared, as a result of
an investigation lawfully held under his direction, that the petitioner is
an undesirable alien, whose presence in the Philippine Islands is a
menace tot he peace and safety of the community; it would seem to be
a flagrant abuse of our discretion to turn him loose upon the community
at such ta time as this, in the face of the insistent objection of the Chief
Executive who is primarily charge with the maintenance of the safety,
peace, and good order of these Islands.
The most that the petitioner is entitled to demand, as of right, is that
under the transcendent authority of its writ ofhabeas corpus, this court
should stay the course of the deportation proceedings, and if necessary
take him into the custody of the court itself, long enough to secure a full
and final adjudication of the legality of the deportation order. He cannot
demand that he be released from custody until that question is
determined in his favor; though, as we have said, the court may, in its
discretion, let him to bail pending the proceedings.
But this discretion is a sound judicial discretion to be exercised in the
light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances. After having held
that a petitioner in habeas corpus proceedings had been lawfully
adjudged a dangerous lunatic or a desperate criminal no court would be
justified, except under the most extraordinary circumstances, a letting
him to bail merely for the purpose of securing a review of the
proceedings by a superior court. So this court, after upholding the
legality of the order deporting the petitioner and of the proceedings
wherein he was adjudged an undesirable alien whose presence in the
Philippine Island is a menace to the pace and safety of the community
cannot consistently turn him loose upon the community under bail, for
the more or less prolonged period necessary to secure a review of the
proceedings by the Supreme Court of the United States, when objection
to that course is interposed by the executive officer more especially
charged with the maintenance of the peace and safety of the
community.
What has been said in some of the federal courts of the United Sates as
to the propriety of exercising the discretionary power to grant bail in
favor of Chinese person, pending deportation proceedings against them,
in ordinary cases wherein it was not asserted that he presence of such
person was a menace to the peace, safety, good order o health of the
community, or a dangerous anarchist, or a person afflicted with a
loathsome and communicable disease, or the like.
We have conclude, therefore, that while we should and must deny the
motion of the Solicitor-General to vacate our order staying the execution
of our judgment and to turn the petitioner over to the chief of police for
deportation forthwith, we would not be justified in maintaining in force
the order letting the petitioner to bail, over the well-founded objection
of the Chief Executive who is primarily charged with the conservation of
the peace, safety and good order of the Islands. Accordingly, we will
entertain a new or an amended motion by the Solicitor-general to take
the petitioner into the immediate custody of the court, to cancel the
bond upon which he is now at large, and thereafter to turn him over to
the custody of the chief of police of the city of Manila or such other
officer as may be designated by the chief Executive, for detention
pending the stay of execution of our judgment in these habeas
corpus proceedings.
The motion of the Solicitor-General, in the form in which it has been
submitted, should be and is hereby denied.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Avanceña, J., reserves his vote.
21
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,  the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,  Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall
vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO
SALAPANTAN, petitioners,  prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE
NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary
injunction relates to the power of the incumbent President of the
Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the
absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on
October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve,
among other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of
his present powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued
another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the
previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and
canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly,
Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree
No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote
below. 2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued
Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The
Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued
opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their
desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you
approve the following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose
of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a
plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the
Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim
Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which
shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall
include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives
elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be
less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and
those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the
Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the
regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors
shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each
region or sector and the, manner of their election shall be prescribed
and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its
members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights,
privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and
shall not exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the
Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from
the election and selection of the members, convene the interim
have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be
the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even
after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge
its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and
and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under
this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the
powers and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the regular
President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to
such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe.
The President (Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy
Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem
necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers
until martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there
exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever
the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or
is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his
judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the
exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions,
which shall form part of the law of the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently
constituted but their functions, powers, and composition may be altered
by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of
the Commission on Elections may be called at any time the government
deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any
important matter whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these
amendments shall continue in full force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President
shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by I majority of the
votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision
and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD,
father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding
and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar
as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential
Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is
no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power
to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for
respondent Commission on Elections, The Solicitor General principally
maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state
of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority
22
to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step
towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by VICENTE M.
GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting
that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the
Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the
interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the
Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed
on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and
ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers
under Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent
assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-
plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the
submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time
for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the
President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing
15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
I the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640
(Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to
challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a
stature Presidential Decrees are of such nature-may be contested by one
who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public
funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five
Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. 5
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million
Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed
petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of
public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate
the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as
regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to
exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority upon which
the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure
political one, lying outside the domain of judicial review. We disagree.
The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a
judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of
the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power
to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim
National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory
provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its
active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto
the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of
Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed.
Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a
constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal
of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought
to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport
to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the
issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the
new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by
the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least
ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in the
Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that
the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether
that power has been discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality
of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the
legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the
wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments
to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act
or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the
amending process confers on the President that power to propose
amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the
contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be
a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended,
the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.  10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his
theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's authority
to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted
for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the
judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that
the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority
and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision
has been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the
people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by
the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a
power which includes the competence to determine whether the
constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And,
this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the
submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional
cases underline the preference of the Court's majority to treat such
issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political
impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor
General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73
"submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification
or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s
therefore "is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously
considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the
Ratification Cases 12 involving the issue of whether or not the validity of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. announcing the Ratification by the
Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the
affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled
that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion,
expressing the majority view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned
plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that
the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to
be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the
proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of
judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political nature,
and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With
Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the
1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our authority to determine the
23
constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on
August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in
Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it adhered
to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused
to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified,
in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question theory
adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker
and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was
decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued:
"The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the
same as those given in support on the political question theory
advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were
carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound
and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the
aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect
of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The
National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of
all its Members, call a constitutional convention or,
by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the
question of calling such a convention to the
electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly
instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending
power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life
of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times
of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of
the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-
thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling
of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an
election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the
National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed
by a majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the
incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to
when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking
for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the
determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace
and order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a
member of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory
Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the
incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could
convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the
sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be
convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected.
The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National
Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the
plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of
the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the
Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to
withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the
referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the
interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated,
because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of
the I interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that
referendum of January, 1973, the people had already resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes
the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the
usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the
amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed
upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power
is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular
National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the
National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating
body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment
amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political
science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an
organic character and that of a legislative character'. The distinction,
however, is one of policy, not of law. 17 Such being the case, approval of
the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The
prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to
the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the
Philippines is a crisis government today are more or less concentrated in
the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of
government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a
corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the
separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded
as imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out
among three mutually independent branches executive, legislature, and
judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one
branch should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a
total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the
Federalist, No. 47, 'the very definition of tyranny.' In normal times the
separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary
governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form
an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action in behalf of
the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the life
of any government when all powers must work together in unanimity of
purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of
executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The
more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional system, the
more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion in time of
crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of the
cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the former the all-
important harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in
the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a
result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than
presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only
be concentrated and expanded; it must also be freed from the normal
system of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other
hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable
24
even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special
exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The
rationale behind such broad emergency powers of the Executive is the
release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional
restrains" so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is
now a conceded valid at. That sun clear authority of the President is
saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus:  23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly and
shall preside over its sessions until the interim
Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue
to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the
nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and
the powers vested in the President and the Prime
Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon
the interim National Assembly to elect the interim
President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall
then exercise their respective powers vested by this
Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and
acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the
land, and shall remain valid, binding, and effective
even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of
this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
incumbent President, or unless expressly and
explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional
Convention delegate, "that the Constitutional Convention, while giving
to the President the discretion when to call the interim National
Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon,
would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise,
with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be
paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing
Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any constitutional
dictatorship which extends over a period of time. The separation of
executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinct
obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in
executive power is not too much a cause for as the steady increase in
the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been
called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve
rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and economic
crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional
constitutional law just confines the President's power as Commander-in-
Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the
facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly
shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be attributed
to tile President to take emergency measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally
consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period.
However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully
addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the
exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of
that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in
the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by
the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the
dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the
interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the
Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent
power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's
legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been
legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the
function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution,
which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power.
This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office
into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the
legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened
and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges
of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court
possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional
infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline
to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental
machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a
destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis
government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these
parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms
the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are
mere agents of the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the
referendums of January 1973 and February 1975, the people had
already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The
Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the
Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang
Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the
same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in
1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had
informed the President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for
the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned
the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The
national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to
settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement,
the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by
the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on
October 16 . 28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under
Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet
members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng mga
Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the people in a
plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments
to the Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the
"barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the
submission of the proposed amendments to the people on October 16.
All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of
amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of
Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the
questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the National
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
V
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state
is easily seen. In the Philippines, a republican and unitary state,
sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat
people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in which,
according to the Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the
concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional
legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people
may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject
they choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This
is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life
is all experiment." 34"The necessities of orderly government," wrote
25
Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be permitted
to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based,
therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when they adopt
it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the
people to exercise their sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The
proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the
thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the
sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who
can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein, the
submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial
law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people
themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed,
it may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act,
although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be
followed reside somehow in a particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question -
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued? - is a referendum question,
wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by the
desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that
their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in pursuing his
program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the proposed
amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This
is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the
new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes
of those 18 years old and above which will have valid bearing on the
results. The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to
answer the referendum question and the plebiscite question does not
infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in
consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and
submitting to them for ratification of proposed constitutional
amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year
olds above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for
every barangay center, one containing the ballots of voters fifteen years
of age and under eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters
eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for
voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of
the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in another
ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be
separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each
of the two boxes. 38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a
"plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely consultative in character. It is
simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues
submitted to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which is
derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the
President. 39 It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen,
regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex-
convicts . 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent
act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election Literacy,
property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is
generally associated with the amending process of the Constitution,
more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of
martial law stultifies in main the freedom to dissent. That speaks of a
bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of Justice
Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded no State
imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the
individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that
liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16
recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The
President himself had announced that he would not countenance any
suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in
winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the
people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters soon found their
way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views
on the proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the
1973 Constitution, which is already a settled matter. 43 Even government
employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to
participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the
referendum-plebiscite issues. 44
VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is
not too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-
plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the
day. The people have been living with them since the proclamation of
martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried
the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief
period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites
for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum
Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the
publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the
women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled
plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional
amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-
Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act
492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the
bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President,
and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication
in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No.
517). And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment
affecting the economy as well as the independence of the Republic was
publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days
prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)."  45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no
provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but
simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the
United States Supreme court held that this matter of submission
involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political,
social and economic," which "are essentially political and not
justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President,
may fix the time within which the people may act. This is because
proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as
succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that
they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only when
there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be
proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed, they
are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third, ratification is
but the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be
done contemporaneously. 47 In the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of
the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the
felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment
may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and
not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper
body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos.
991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the
environmental circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess
power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the
26
required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of
his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within
the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices
Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia
Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of
the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices
Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view
that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in
the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma
voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his
concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183),
specifically dissents from the proposition that there is concentration of
powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious
doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo,
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there
is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for
ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar
expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be extended.
Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that
the question is political and therefore beyond the competence and
cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs.
COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ
Palma hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to
exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as
above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient
information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the
standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra,
and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions
at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate
Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and
Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are
hereby dismissed. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, J, in the result.

27
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,  shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, respondent.
 
CRUZ, J.:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of
Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the
Commission on Appointments among the several political parties
represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-
Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with
Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was
among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal
Party. 1
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was
reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally
resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its
number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only
17 members. 2
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised
its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing
the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed
LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner
and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP. 3
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his
removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of
his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition
and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary
restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the
respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.  4
Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be
removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election
thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v.
Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in
the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because
the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained
political stability.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the
petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the
real party respondent being the House of Representatives which
changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and
removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the
Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be
entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments.
In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was
submitted by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae in compliance with
an order from the Court.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and
twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties
or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the
respondent's assertion, the Court has the competence to act on the
matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary
act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us
because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not
the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from
the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question
because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6
... the term "political question" connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it
refers "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners
therein to annul the election of two members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not been validly
nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23 members from the
Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens
Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only himself as the
minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected
Senators Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks,
to complete the nine-man composition of the Tribunal as provided for in
the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this Court, contending
that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative
members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate, "three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of
the party having the second largest number of votes therein." As the
majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could nominate only
three members and could not also fill the other two seats pertaining to
the minority.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended
inter alia that the subject of the petition was an internal matter that only
the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that
what was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the
respondents but the legality of the choice in light of the requirement of
the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the manner of filling
the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court held
that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for
determination in the present case. Here, we are
called upon to decide whether the election of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon
nomination by Senator Primicias-member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number
of votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee on
Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that
said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall
be chosen "upon nomination ... of the party having
the second largest number of votes" in the Senate
and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not
clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the
choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be
28
 mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the
legitimate province of the judicial department to
pass upon the validity of the proceeding in
connection therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has been in
accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,
where the legislative department has by statute
prescribed election procedure in a given situation,
the judiciary may determine whether a particular
election has been in conformity with such statute,
and particularly, whether such statute has been
applied in a way to deny or transgress on
constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S., 439;
emphasis supplied)
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only
jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties
herein."
Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in
Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or legality of the
organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or
discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that
the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not
be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is
even less persuasive. While he may be technically correct in arguing that
it is not he who caused the petitioner's removal, we feel that this
objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this
controversy. We may, for one thing, treat this proceeding as a petition
for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the
respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on
Appointments. For another, we have held as early as in the Emergency
Powers Cases 7 that where serious constitutional questions are involved,
"the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure." The same policy has since then been
consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 8where we held through Chief Justice Fernando:
In the course of the deliberations, a serious
procedural objection was raised by five members of
the Court. It is their view that respondent
Commission on Elections not being sought to be
restrained from performing any specific act, this
suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere
request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from
the remedial law standpoint, has much to
recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would
affirm the original stand that under the
circumstances, it could still rightfully be treated as a
petition for prohibition.
The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All
await the decision of this Court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed
and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons
of public policy demand that [its]
constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may
likewise be added that the exceptional character of
the situation that confronts us, the paramount
public interest, and the undeniable necessity for
ruling, the national elections being barely six
months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear
undeniable, therefore, that before us is an
appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to
prevent the enforcement of an alleged
unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice
then; we must act on the matter.
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the
petitioner and the respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan
to support their respective positions. It is best, therefore, to make a
quick review of that case for a proper disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats
were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an
independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the
Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the
Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25
members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the
House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and
formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and
reorganize the chamber. Included in this reorganization was the House
representation in the Commission on appointments where three of the
Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen were displaced by three of
their party colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority.
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy
Administrator of the Reforestration Administration was rejected by the
Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and respondent Jorge
Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to
this Court, contending that the rejection of his appointment was null and
void because the Commission itself was invalidly constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely
temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not
disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political
group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The
reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because
it was not based on the proportional representation of the political
parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution.
The Court held:
... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time,
even if du to arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature, like the one that has led to the
formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does
not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the
membership of the Commission for said House.
Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may
have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from
one side to another in the House. The framers of
our Constitution could not have intended to thus
place a constitutional organ, like the Commission
on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of
Congress.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent
political party contemplated in the Constitution because it has not been
registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to the
other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party
has not yet achieved stability and suggests it might be no different from
several other political groups that have died "a-bornin'," like the LINA, or
have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint.
According to him, that case expressly allows reorganization at any time
to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, provided only
29
that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting
the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal
congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That change
fully justified his designation to the Commission on Appointments after
the reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision
to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators
and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House,
respectively, on the basis of proportional
REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES
THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of
each House of Congress to see to it that this
requirement is duly complied with. As a
consequence, it may take appropriate measures,
not only upon the initial organization of the
Commission, but also, subsequently thereto. If by
reason of successful election protests against
members of a House, or of their expulsion from the
political party to which they belonged and/or of
their affiliation with another political party, the
ratio in the representation of the political parties in
the House is materially changed, the House is
clothed with authority to declare vacant the
necessary number of seats in the Commission on
Appointments held by members of said House
belonging to the political party adversely affected
by the change and then fill said vacancies in
conformity with the Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the
petitioner and the respondent (who was supported by the Solicitor
General) an important development has supervened to considerably
simplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his
argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims
has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the
questioned reorganization. As he insists:
(c) Assuming that the so-called
new coalesced majority is
actually the LDP itself, then the
proposed reorganization is
likewise illegal and ineffectual,
because the LDP, not being a
duly registered political party,
is not entitled to the "rights
and privileges granted by law
to political parties' (See. 160,
BP No. 881), and therefore
cannot legally claim the right
to be considered in
determining the required
proportional representation of
political parties in the House of
Representatives. 9
xxx xxx xxx
... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18,
Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the
right of representation in the Commission on
Appointment only to political parties who are duly
registered with the Comelec. 10
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against
the petitioner. On that date, the Commission on Elections in an en banc
resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated August 28,
1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political
party. 11 This has taken the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to
speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still
pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under
this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the
House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to
representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was
organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself
would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945
by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support
Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the
election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The Liberal Party won. At that time it
was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be
represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral
Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of
the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has
157 members in the House of Representatives and 6 members in the
Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines
and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently
from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there
still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these are
to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic
in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of
socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals.
But it surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such
discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of
the LDP in the House of Representatives would have to be denied
representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that
matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which
the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The
independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no
political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of
its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of
Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six
legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was
alloted two of the seats in the Commission on Appointments, it did not
express any objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to
the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been
cut by more than half.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the
party must survive in a general congressional election, the LDP has
doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be said
that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of
Representatives, the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. At
any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations,
that the issue presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as it
does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the
manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the
Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still
come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the alleged
technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the
existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed aside, conformably
to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised
may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority
of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that
may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is
understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include
the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of
political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of
allegiance from one political party to another.
30
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving
it to be settled by the House of Representatives or the Commission on
Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has
been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate
had to be resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to
act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon
the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely
discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the
Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray
our oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order
dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent
has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to
Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

31

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118295.  May 2, 1997]
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members
of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO
ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of
Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and
HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM
ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION,
INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT,
DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS,
INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation
of various taxpayers and as non-governmental
organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO
ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ,
AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES,
ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA,
SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO,
FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective
capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who
concurred in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer;
RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade
and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as
Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary,respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade
Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast majority of
countries has revolutionized international business and economic
relations amongst states.  It has irreversibly propelled the world towards
trade liberalization and economic globalization.  Liberalization,
globalization, deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz
words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping
away as mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of
promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export
subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions,  tax exemptions and
currency controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in
specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global
scenario are replacing age-old “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that
unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods
and services.  In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known
management guru, “Increased participation in the world economy has
become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity.”
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by
the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three multilateral
institutions -- inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations --
were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods.  The first was
the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries;
the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal
with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade
Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in world
trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite
challenge, even retaliation, from other states.  However, for a variety of
reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO,
unlike the IMF and WB, never took off.  What remained was only GATT --
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  GATT was a collection of
treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no
institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable
system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations,
principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay
Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body -- the
World Trade Organization -- with the signing of the “Final Act” in
Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its
members.[1]
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO
as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V.
Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving “Philippine
access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through
the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and
industrial products.”  The President  also saw in the WTO the opening of
“new opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the reduction of) costs
and uncertainty associated with exporting x x x, and (the attraction of)
more investments into the country.”  Although the Chief Executive did
not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines - - and this is of
special interest to the legal profession - - will benefit from the WTO
system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the
independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement
Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal.  Heretofore, trade disputes were
settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived at
frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where
naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO  requires the Philippines “to
place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing
as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits
and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the
Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO
Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
“develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos
(and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods.”
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine
participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic
globalization?  Does it prescribe Philippine integration into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?  These are the
main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the
nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation
and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the
assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of
government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various
executive offices concerned therewith.  This concurrence is embodied in
Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of
the  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry (Secretary Navarro, for
brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for
brevity).
By signing the Final Act,[2] Secretary Navarro on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
“(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the
consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to
32
seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures;
and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.”
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate
received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President of the
Philippines,[3]stating among others that “the Uruguay Round Final Act is
hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section
21, Article VII of the Constitution.”
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate
received another letter from the President of the Philippines [4] likewise
dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that “the Uruguay
Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21,
Article VII of the Constitution.”
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified
the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution
entitled “Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization.”[5]
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution
No. 97 which “Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur,
as  it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of  the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.”[6] The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages
137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated
legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3
thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements,
for brevity) as follows:
“ANNEX 1
Annex 1A:     Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and
Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the    General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article
VII of the General on Tariffs and
Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing
Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating
Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B:     General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
Annex 1C:     Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights
ANNEX  2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX  3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism”
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines
signed[7] the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:
“NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and considered the
aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
and the agreements and associated legal instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are
integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994,
do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause
thereof.”
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of
the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and “the
associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and
three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof.”
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro
embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes
aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions
and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.  In his
Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,[8]  the Solicitor General describes
these two latter documents as follows:
“The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations
and decisions on a wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of
least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on
technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on,
among other things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of
commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access,
national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of financial
services, commercial presence and new financial service.”
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed.  After
careful deliberation on respondents’ comment and petitioners’ reply
thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to
the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective
memoranda.  The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista,
the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva,
Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as “Bautista
Paper,”[9] for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2)
summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court
directed:
“(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the
matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in
the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of
Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO
Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies
of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned
in the Final Act, as soon as possible.”
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would
consider the case submitted for resolution.  In a Compliance dated
September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of
the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in
another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various
“bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving
derogation of Philippine sovereignty.”  Petitioners, on the other hand,
submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30,
1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners
summarized the issues as follows:
“A.  Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise
not justiciable.
B.  Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who
participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the
concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or of
the validity of the concurrence.
C.   Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec.
33
 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
D.  Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair
Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power
which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution
is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines’;
E.   Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial
power.
F.   Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the
ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization.
G.  Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
and not with the Presidential submission which included the
Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.”
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for
respondents “synthesized the several issues raised by petitioners into
the following”:[10]
“1.  Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal
Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the
letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2.  Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit,
restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.
3.  Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the
exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the
rules of evidence.
4.  Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by
the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final
Act.”
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven
presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively ignored
three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is
otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate
(Wigberto E. Tañada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from
joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate
acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in
the ratification of the WTO Agreement.  The foregoing notwithstanding,
this Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1)  The “political question” issue -- being very fundamental and vital,
and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to
hear and decide this case -- was deliberated upon by the Court and will
thus be ruled upon as the first issue;
(2)  The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is
waivable and the respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing
it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in
respondents’ favor, will not cause the petition’s dismissal as there are
petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the
defense of estoppel; and
(3)  The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent senators will be taken up as an integral part of the
disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the
respondents did not question the locus standi  of petitioners.  Hence,
they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue.  They
probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public
funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved
here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the
substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather
than skirted or deflected by procedural matters.[11]
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY?  OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE
PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER
WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS
THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II,
AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3)  DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS
ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE
WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS
COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR
VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE
FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND
DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON
COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue:  Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy.  Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.  “The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political.  The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld.”[12] Once a “controversy as to the application or interpretation of
a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide.”[13]
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters [14] raised in
the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, [15] as follows:
“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.”
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department’s duty and
power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government including Congress.  It is an
innovation in our political law.[16] As explained by former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion,[17] “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.  This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment
on matters of this nature.”
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases,
[18] 
it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority
to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any
officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given
due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.  Indeed, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative
and executive officials.  On this, we have no equivocation.
34
 We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this 1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national
petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT
President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under
upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance
international body.  Neither will it rule on the propriety of the with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which
government’s economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, require:
subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade (a)  the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of
barriers.  Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty “to domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether
determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the Senate in volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion
ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes. of volume or value of its local production; or
Second Issue:  The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism (b)  that an enterprise’s purchases or use of imported
This is the lis mota,  the main issue, raised by the petition. products be limited to an amount related to the
Petitioners vigorously argue that the “letter, spirit and intent” of volume or value of local products that it exports.
the Constitution mandating “economic nationalism” are violated by the 2.  TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general
so-called “parity provisions” and “national treatment” clauses scattered elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in
in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which
in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or under
on Commitments in Financial Services. administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary
Specifically, the “flagship” constitutional provisions referred to are to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, (a)  the importation by an enterprise of products used in or
which are worded as follows: related to the local production that it exports;
“Article II (b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES related to its local production by restricting its access to
xx                                                                         xx                                       foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise;
                                           xx         xx or
Sec. 19.  The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national (c)  the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. particular products, in terms of volume or value of
xx                                                                         xx                                       products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or
                                           xx         xx value of its local production.”  (Annex to the Agreement
Article XII on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27,
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p.22125, emphasis
xx                                                                         xx                                       supplied).
                                           xx         xx The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as
Sec. 10.  x x x.  The Congress shall enact measures that will follows:
encourage  the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
wholly owned by Filipinos. territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
Filipinos. sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.  the
xx                                                                         xx                                       provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of
                                           xx         xx differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively
Sec. 12.  The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures nationality of the product.”  (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the
that help make them competitive.” Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948,
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement
desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in their on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments
memorandum:[19] p.177, emphasis supplied).
“a)  In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods “b)  In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIMS, for brevity): (TRIPS, for brevity):
“Article 2 Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions. treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property...  (par.
GATT 1994.  no Member shall apply any TRIM that is 1, Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property
inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article  XI rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.25432 (emphasis
of GATT 1994. supplied)
2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the “(c)  In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
obligations of general elimination of quantitative National Treatment
restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of 1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any
GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this conditions and qualifications set out therein, each
Agreement.”  (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of
Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting
p.22121, emphasis supplied). the supply of services, treatment no less favourable
The Annex referred to reads as follows: than it accords to its own like services and service
“ANNEX suppliers.
Illustrative List 2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by
according to services and service suppliers of any other
35
 Member, either formally identical treatment or formally
different treatment to that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be
considered to be less favourable if it modifies the
conditions of completion in favour of services or service
suppliers of the Member compared to like services or
service suppliers of any other Member.  (Article XVII,
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28,
Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p.22610 emphasis
supplied).”
It is petitioners’ position that the foregoing “national treatment”
and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products,”  in contravention of the “Filipino First”  policy of the
Constitution.  They allegedly render meaningless the phrase “effectively
controlled by Filipinos.”  The constitutional conflict becomes more
manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the
Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed agreements. [20] Petitioners further argue that
these provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the role
exports play in national development and negate the preferential
treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General
counter (1) that such Charter  provisions are not self-executing and
merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of
the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation
but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly
Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do
not conflict with the Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement
contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the
Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of
principles and state policies.”  The counterpart of this article in the 1935
Constitution[21] is called the “basic political creed of the nation”  by Dean
Vicente Sinco.[22] These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. [23] They
are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power
of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.  As
held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,[24]the
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections
of Article XII are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which
can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.  They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor[25]  that broad
constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement
them, thus:
“On petitioners’ allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal
Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social
Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely
statements of principles and policies.  As such, they are basically not
self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly
define and effectuate such principles.
‘In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.  They
were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the
legislature.  If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the
directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but
political.  The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure
of the executive and the legislature through the language of the
ballot.  (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).”
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic
considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade
“into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making.”  Mr.
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs.
Factoran, Jr.,[26] explained these reasons as follows:
“My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court,
show a more specific legal right -- a right cast in language of a
significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution -- that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to
act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial
court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed
for.  To my mind, the court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of
law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution
and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial
court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather
than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons.  One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated
or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants
may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation
of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can
be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in
the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
which reads:
‘Section 1.          x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.’ (Emphases
supplied)
When substantive standards as general as ‘the right to a balanced and
healthy ecology’ and ‘the right to health’ are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as ‘a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction,’ the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making.  At least in respect of the vast area of
environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to
special technical competence and experience and professional
qualification.  Where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making departments -- the legislative and
executive departments -- must be given a real and effective opportunity
to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to
implement them before the courts should intervene.”
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional
Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from
merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy
and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other
sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
“Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase
in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to
raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on
sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries
that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets.  However,
36
the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions
of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop.  x x x
x x x                                                                      x x
x                                                                             x x x
Sec. 13.  The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity.”
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic
goals of national economic development, as follows:
1.  A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth;
2.  A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
provided by the nation for the benefit of the people; and
3.   An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of
life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the
ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of
qualified Filipinos “in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony” [27] and in the use of
“Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods”; (2) by
mandating the State to “adopt measures that help make them
competitive;[28] and (3) by requiring the State to “develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.”[29] In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the
realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of “a trade policy
that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements
of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity”; [30] and speaks of
industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets”
as well as of the protection of “Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices.”
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs.
Government Service Insurance System, et al.,[31] this Court held that “Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.   From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.  It isper se judicially enforceable.”  However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to
“the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony” and not to every aspect of trade and
commerce.  It refers to exceptions rather than the rule.  The issue here is
not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or
not.  Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing
provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of
Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair.[32] In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy.  It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy.  While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,
services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself
has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing
economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members.  Unlike in
the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in
the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of
sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of
any other.  There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.
“WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of
the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by the
majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the
Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which would require
three fourths vote.  Amendments would require two thirds vote in
general.  Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments
provision will require assent of all members.  Any member may
withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of six months from
the date of notice of withdrawals.” [33]
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more
effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with
developed countries.  Within the WTO, developing countries can form
powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than
outside the Organization.  This is not merely a matter of practical
alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law.  Thus, the basic
principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of
developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in
international tradecommensurate with the needs of their economic
development.”  These basic principles are found in the preamble [34] of
the WTO Agreement as follows:
“The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing
volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the
optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to
ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed
among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade
relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable
multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all
of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives
underlying this multilateral trading system,  x x x.”  (underscoring
supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and
consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the WTO Agreement
grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their
domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign
competition.  Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential
treatment is given to developing countries in terms of the amount of
tariff reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be
spread out.  Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate
of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6)
years while developing countries -- including the Philippines --
are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten
(10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed
countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural products by 20%
over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to
be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT
requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary outlays for
export subsidyby 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy
37
by 21% within a period of six (6) years.  For developing countries,
however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for
developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within which
to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair
foreign competition and trade practices including anti-dumping
measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import
surges.  Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign
competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures.  There is hardly
therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO, local
industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be
deprived of control of the economy.  Quite the contrary, the weaker
situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been taken
into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the
WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion.  True, they
have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet
uncharted sea of economic liberalization.  But such decision cannot be
set aside on the ground of  grave abuse of discretion, simply because we
disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic
policies.   As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case
will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade
liberalization as an economic policy.  It will only perform its
constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave
abuse of discretion.
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and
independent national economy”[35] does not necessarily rule out the
entry of foreign investments, goods and services.  It contemplates
neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.”  As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
“Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country
that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even
its most basic needs.    It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion;
rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international
community.  Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries
as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.” [36]
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,”
and “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that
apply to all WTO members.  Aside from envisioning a trade policy based
on “equality and reciprocity,” [37] the fundamental law encourages
industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,”
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust
industries that can compete with the best in the foreign
markets.  Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally.  And given a free
trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong
have  demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against
the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in
favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific
pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a
total
proscription  of   foreign  competition.  On  the  other  hand, respondent
s  claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer
the best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the
most reasonable prices.  Consequently, the question boils down to
whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the
general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos’ general
welfare because it will -- as promised by its promoters -- expand the
country’s exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and
quality products at the most reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve “judgment calls” by our
policy makers, for which they are answerable to our people during
appropriate electoral exercises.  Such questions and the answers thereto
are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of
discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the
Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987.  That does not mean
however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its
framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of
business.  By the same token,  the United Nations was not yet in
existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective.  Did that
necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have
contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the
Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part
of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN
organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question.  Constitutions are
designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events.  They
should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances.  It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can
withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend
with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding
events.  As one eminent political law writer and respected
jurist[38] explains:
“The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the
root and not the blossom, the base and framework only of the edifice
that is yet to rise.  It is but the core of the dream that must take shape,
not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly ‘in the
crucible of Filipino minds and hearts,’ where it will in time develop its
sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its
substance.  In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise
full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it
conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia.  It must grow with the society it
seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race,
drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that
will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law
attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.”
Third Issue:  The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The WTO Agreement provides that “(e)ach Member shall ensure
the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures
with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements.”[39] Petitioners maintain that this undertaking “unduly
limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the
legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines.  It is an assault
on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that
Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national
interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the
WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods x x x but
also to the flow of investments and money x x x as well as to a whole
slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters x x x.” [40]
More specifically, petitioners claim that said
WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the
Congress.[41] And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the
President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to
“specified limits and x x x such limitations and restrictions” as Congress
may provide,[42] as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by
which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue.  However,
while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions
38
and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.  Unquestionably, the
Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from
the rest of the world.  In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all
nations."[43] By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered
to be automatically part of our own laws.[44] One of the oldest and most
fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda  --
international agreements must be performed in good faith.  “A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties x x x.  A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken.”[45]
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty.  By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.  After all,
states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit
the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.  Thus, treaties have been
used to record agreements between States concerning such widely
diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or
cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of
hostilities, the formation of alliances,the regulation of commercial
relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing
conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations.
[46]
 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be
considered absolute.  Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1)
limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of
nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.  As aptly put
by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny alone.  The
age of self-sufficient nationalism is over.  The age of interdependence is
here.”[47]
UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its
51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights under
the “concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.” 47-A Under Article 2 of the
UN Charter, “(a)ll members shall give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter,
and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the
United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.”  Such
assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in
administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping
operations of the organization.  In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961,
the International Court of Justice held that money used by the United
Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were
“expenses of the United Nations” under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
UN Charter.  Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding share
in such expenses.  In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in
its power to appropriate.  It is compelled to appropriate funds whether
it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not.  So too, under Article
105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of
sovereignty of members within their own territory.  Another example:
although “sovereign equality” and “domestic jurisdiction” of all
members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter,
such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security under Chapter VII of the Charter.  A final example: under Article
103, “(i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation
under the present charter shall prevail,” thus unquestionably denying
the Philippines -- as a member -- the sovereign power to make a choice
as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many
other international pacts  --  both bilateral and multilateral -- that
involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty.  These are enumerated by
the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as
follows:
“(a)  Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes
on income, where the Philippines agreed, among others, to
exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by,
among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United
States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the United
States.  Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries and
similar remunerations paid by the United States to its
citizens for labor and personal services performed by them
as employees or officials of the United States are exempt
from income tax by the Philippines.
(b)  Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others,
for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes
on income.
(c)  Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the
avoidance of double taxation.
(d)  Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the
avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the
Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs duties,
inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South
Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies
arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the
Philippines agreed to exempt from customs duties, excise
taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or
charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment,
stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
(g)  Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the
Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the same privileges as
those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under
separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor
visas where the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from
the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a
sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days.
(I)  Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals
from the requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for
a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.
(j)  Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the
Philippines agreed that premises of Special Missions in the
Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said
premises without consent of the Head of Mission
concerned.  Special Missions are also exempted from
customs duties, taxes and related charges.
(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties.  In this
convention, the Philippines agreed to be governed by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l)  Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice.  The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in
all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty,
any question of international law, the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of
international obligation.”
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to
limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain
and police power.  The underlying consideration in this partial surrender
of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting
states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines,
39
its officials and its citizens.  The same reciprocity characterizes the
Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
“International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human
rights, the environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic
political sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations.  But
unless anarchy in international relations is preferred as an alternative, in
most cases we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations
involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political
sovereignty.  (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to
durable, well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute
resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries exploiting raw
economic power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power
relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries
typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade liberalization.  This
is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger
set of potential new trading relationship than in case of the larger
country gaining enhanced success to the smaller country’s market.” [48]
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on
the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of x x x cooperation and amity with all nations.”
Fourth Issue:  The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General
Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) [49] intrudes on the power
of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedures.[50]
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, [51] it
will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:
“Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the
infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph
1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for
obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the
authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to
obtain an identical product is different from the patented
process.  Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one of the
following circumstances, that any identical product when
produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been
obtained by the patented process:
(a)  if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b)  if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the process and the owner of
the patent has been unable through reasonable
efforts to determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof
indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if
the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if
the condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate
interests of defendants in protecting their manufacturing and
business secrets shall be taken into account.”
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of
disputable (note the words “in the absence of proof to the contrary”)
presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with
the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by
the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product
obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is
“substantial likelihood” that the identical product was made with the
use of the said patented process but the owner of the patent could not
determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product.  Hence, the “burden of proof” contemplated by Article 34
should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer
to overthrow such presumption.   Such burden, properly understood,
actually refers to the “burden of evidence”  (burden of going forward)
placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that
his product was produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the
“burden of proof” since, regardless of the presumption provided under
paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of
the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is
“identical” to the genuine one produced by the patented process and
the fact of “newness” of the genuine product or the fact of “substantial
likelihood” that the identical product was made by the patented
process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the
rules of evidence as the present law on the subject, Republic Act No.
165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar
presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or utility
model, thus:
“SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design patent or of a patent
for utility model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the patented
design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article
or product and in the making, using or selling of the article or product
copying the patented design or utility model. Identity or substantial
identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute
evidence of copying.” (underscoring supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to
provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product
obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial
likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the
process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to
determine the process used.  Where either of these two provisos does
not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method
of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal
systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our
disposition of the third issue -- derogation of legislative power - will
apply to this fourth issue also.  Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause
more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists.  Besides, Article
34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due
process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in
our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international
conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in
legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial. [52]
Fifth Issue:  Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other
Documents Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO
Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the other documents referred to
in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and
the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services -- is defective
and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion.  They submit
that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it
is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document
signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon
authority of the President.  They contend that the second letter of the
President to the Senate[53] which enumerated what constitutes the Final
Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
“A final act, sometimes called protocol de clôture, is an
instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a
diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts
of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon
and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference.” [54] It is
not the treaty itself.  It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a
protracted conference which may have taken place over several
years.  The text of the “Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations” is contained in just one
page[55] in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as
representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
40
 "(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the
consideration of their respective competent authorities with
a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance
with their procedures; and
(b)  to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in
exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely,
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted
without need for ratification.  They were approved by the ministers by
virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of
the members can meet “to give effect to those provisions of this
Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to
facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this
Agreement.”[56]
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also
approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines.  It applies only
to those 27 Members which “have indicated in their respective
schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly,
expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary
entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and
national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems
and refinancing available in the normal course of business.” [57]
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what
multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral parts, [58] as
follows:
“Article II
  Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for
the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters to
the agreements  and associated legal instruments included in the
Annexes to this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in
Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred to as “Multilateral
Agreements”) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all
Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in
Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as “Plurilateral Trade
Agreements”) are also part of this Agreement for those Members
that have accepted them, and are binding on those
Members.  The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either
obligation or rights for Members that have not accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified
in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as “GATT 1994”) is legally
distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated
30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the
conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as
subsequently rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter
referred to as “GATT 1947”).
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was
concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25,
1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994,
[59]
 the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was
concurring in, as follows: [60]
“THE CHAIRMAN:  Yes.  Now, the question of the validity of the
submission came up in the first day hearing of this Committee
yesterday.  Was the observation made by Senator Tañada that what was
submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on establishing the
World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which is
not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization?  And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of
order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that
his suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was
acceptable.  That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the
Committee as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the
question of the submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new...
is he making a new submission which improves on the clarity of the first
submission?
MR. ROMULO:  Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there
should be no misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters
by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN:  Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Tañada and later on Senator
Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this question yesterday?
Senator Tañada, please.
SEN. TAÑADA:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear
that what is being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final
Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World
Trade Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions,
and the Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President
Ramos.
SEN. TAÑADA.   . . .  of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN.  Thank you, Senator Tañada.  Can we hear from Senator
Tolentino?  And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission
actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it
now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final
Act itself.  The Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act.   It
requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted.   The
Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the
governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
‘By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree:   (a)  to
submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of the
respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures.’
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to
the governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever their
constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade
Organization Agreement.   And if that is the one that is being submitted
now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN.  Thank you, Senator Tolentino,  May I call on Senator
Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES.  Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a
matter of record.  And they had been adequately reflected in the journal
of yesterday’s session and I don’t see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante
cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN.  Thank you, Senator Gonzales.  Senator Lina, do you
want to make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA.  Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by
Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of question.   Then the new
submission is,  I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no
further comment to make.”
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the
WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Court’s constitutionally
imposed duty “to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of
the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No.
97.  Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of
discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
[61]
 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.  It must be grave  abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
41
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in new millennium.  Let the people, through their duly authorized elected
contemplation of law.[62] Failure on the part of the petitioner to show officers, make their free choice.
grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. [63] WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the SO ORDERED.
Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of
Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions.  It is itself a
constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are
presumed regular and done in good faith.  Unless convincing proof and
persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions,
this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor.  Using the foregoing well-
accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of
regularity in the Senate’s processes, this Court cannot find any cogent
reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate’s exercise of its
power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of
Article VII of the Constitution.[64]
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional
principles require the State to develop an independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer
Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced
goods.  But it is equally true that such principles -- while serving as
judicial and legislative guides -- are not in themselves sources of causes
of action.  Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional
principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a
“trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and
the promotion of industries “which are competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty.   So
too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative
and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation  and
amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making
it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power.  We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or
despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such
exercise.  It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some
of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more
advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution
No. 97.  But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision.  To do so would
constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and
duty.  Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its
authority.  As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review.  That is a matter
between the elected policy makers and the people.  As to whether the
nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in
electing their policy makers.  After all, the WTO Agreement allows
withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best
seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance[65] where “the East will
become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and
culturally in the next century.”  He refers to the “free market” espoused
by WTO as the “catalyst” in this coming Asian ascendancy.  There are at
present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia
negotiating for membership in the WTO.  Notwithstanding objections
against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as
the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum
for the development of international trade law.  The alternative to WTO
is isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction.   Duly
enriched  with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and
disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed
with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads
42