Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cases - Ownership
Cases - Ownership
We do not agree with the contention of the Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – The
petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive
action of the petitioners in the RTC was original jurisdiction:
an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule
that the action of the petitioners was …
an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of
possession of the real property subject matter (2) In all civil actions, which involve the title
thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit to, or possession of, real property, or any
which has for its object the recovery of interest therein, where the assessed value of
possession over the real property as owner. It the property involved exceeds Twenty
involves recovery of ownership and possession Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for civil
based on the said ownership. On the other actions in Metro Manila, where such value
hand, an accion publiciana is one for the exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00)
recovery of possession of the right to possess. except actions for forcible entry into and
It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
after the expiration of one year after the original jurisdiction over which is conferred
occurrence of the cause of action or from the
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PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal value. It is the amount in the tax declaration
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial that should be consulted and no other kind of
Courts. value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is
₱5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the
The jurisdiction of the court over an action exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
involving title to or possession of land is now Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction
determined by the assessed value of the said over the territory where the property is
property and not the market value thereof. The located, and not the court a quo.24
assessed value of real property is the fair
market value of the real property multiplied by It is elementary that the tax declaration
the assessment level. It is synonymous to indicating the assessed value of the property
taxable value.20 The fair market value is the enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has
price at which a property may be sold by a been issued by the proper government
seller, who is not compelled to sell, and agency.25
bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to
buy. Unavailing also is the petitioners’
argumentation that since the complaint,
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will likewise, seeks the recovery of damages
show that it does not contain an allegation exceeding ₱20,000.00, then the RTC had
stating the assessed value of the property original jurisdiction over their actions. Section
subject of the complaint.21 The court cannot 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted
take judicial notice of the assessed or market earlier, explicitly excludes from the
value of lands.22 Absent any allegation in the determination of the jurisdictional amount the
complaint of the assessed value of the demand for "interest, damages of whatever
property, it cannot thus be determined kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
whether the RTC or the MTC had original and costs." This Court issued Administrative
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’ Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in
action. the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and
paragraph 2 thereof states that –
We note that during the trial, the petitioners
adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 2. The exclusion of the term "damages of
8590-A, showing that the assessed value of whatever kind" in determining the
the property in 1991 was ₱5,950.00. The jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and
petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
in evidence the tax declaration containing the R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the
assessed value of the property when they filed damages are merely incidental to or a
their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that consequence of the main cause of action.
the assessed value of the property in 1991 However, in cases where the claim for
was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and damages is the main cause of action, or one of
not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the causes of action, the amount of such
the petitioners since the case involved title to claim shall be considered in determining the
or possession of real property with an jurisdiction of the court.
assessed value of less than ₱20,000.00.23
Neither may the petitioners find comfort and
We quote with approval, in this connection, solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
the CA’s disquisition: amended, which states:
The determining jurisdictional element for SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional
the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
discloses, the assessed value of the property jurisdiction:
in question. For properties in the provinces,
the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value …
exceeds ₱20,000, and the MTC, if the value is
₱20,000 or below. An assessed value can have (8) In all other cases in which the demand,
reference only to the tax rolls in the exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
municipality where the property is located, kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
and is contained in the tax declaration. In the costs or the value of the property in
case at bench, the most recent tax declaration controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand
secured and presented by the plaintiffs- Pesos (₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases in
appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of
by them that the property was worth 3.5 the above-mentioned items exceeds Two
million pesos, not to mention that there is Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00).
absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in
the light of the fact that there is an assessed
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PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
The said provision is applicable only to "all From the pleadings and memoranda
other cases" other than an action involving respectively filed by the parties, the Court
title to, or possession of real property in which gathers the following factual antecedents:
the assessed value is the controlling factor in
determining the court’s jurisdiction. The said On July 8, 1992, in the MCTC of Bayugan and
damages are merely incidental to, or a Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, the siblings Crispulo
consequence of, the main cause of action for Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed
recovery of possession of real property. 26 complaint for forcible entry against Cesar
Sampayan for allegedly having entered and
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No.
action of the petitioners, all the proceedings 1959, PLS-225, and built a house thereon
therein, including the decision of the RTC, are without their knowledge, consent or authority,
null and void. The complaint should perforce the entry having been supposedly effected
be dismissed.27 through strategy and stealth.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The In their complaint, the plaintiffs (now private
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court respondents), substantially alleged that their
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are mother Cristita Quita was the owner and
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners. actual possessor of Lot No. 1959; that after
their mother’s death on January 11, 1984,
SO ORDERED. they became co-owners pro-indiviso and
lawful possessors of the same lot; that on
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, June 1, 1992, while they were temporarily
and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. absent from the lot in question, defendant
Cesar Sampayan, through strategy and
stealth, entered the lot and built a house
thereon, to their exclusion; and that, despite
2 THIRD DIVISION their repeated demands for Sampayan to
vacate the lot and surrender the possession
thereof to them, the latter failed and refused
G.R. No. 156360 January 14, 2005
to do so.
CESAR SAMPAYAN, petitioner,
In his answer, defendant Sampayan denied
vs.
the material allegations of the complaint and
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
averred that neither the plaintiffs nor their
CRISPULO VASQUEZ and FLORENCIA
mother have ever been in possession of Lot
VASQUEZ GILSANO,respondents.
No. 1959 and that he does not even know
plaintiffs’ identities or their places of
DECISION
residence. He claimed that he did not enter
the subject lot by stealth or strategy because
GARCIA, J.: he asked and was given permission therefor
by Maria Ybañez, the overseer of the lot’s true
In this verified petition for review owners, Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado who
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of were then temporarily residing in Cebu City
Court, petitioner Cesar Sampayan seeks the for business purposes. In the same answer,
annulment and setting aside of the following Sampayan alleged that the plaintiffs’ claim
issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. has long prescribed for the reason that the lot
SP No. 43557, to wit: in dispute had been possessed and declared
for taxation purposes by the spouses
1. Decision dated May 16, 2002, denying his Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol in
petition for review and affirming an earlier 1960, and that in 1978, the Oriol spouses sold
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Agusan one-half (1/2) of the lot to the spouses Mr.
del Sur, Branch VII, which in turn reversed on and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado, while the other
appeal a favorable judgment of the Municipal half, to the couple Manolito Occida and
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bayugan and Juliana Sambale-Occida in 1979. Both
Sibagat, Agusan del Sur in a forcible entry vendees, so Sampayan averred, have actually
case thereat commenced against him by possessed the respective portions purchased
herein private respondents, the brother-and- by them up to the present. He thus prayed for
sister Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia the dismissal of the complaint.
Vasquez-Gilsano; and
In the ensuing proceedings following the
2. Resolution dated November 7, joinder of issues, the plaintiffs, to prove that
2002, which denied his motion for they have been in actual possession of Lot No.
reconsideration. 1959 when defendant Sampayan effected his
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PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
entry thereto, submitted in evidence the one-half (1/2) portion and introduced
following documents: improvements thereon, such as coconut
and caimito trees;
1. Tax Declaration No. 3180 in the
name of Cristita Quita; 4. Deed of Relinquishment of Rights of
Portion of Land, executed by the
2. Certificate of Death showing the date spouses Oriol in favor of the same
of death of Cristita Quita on January couple Manolito Occida and Juliana
11, 1984; Sambale-Occida, to further strengthen
the transfer of possession and whatever
3. Certificate issued by Fermina R. possessory rights the Oriols had in the
Labonete, Land Management Officer-III lot in question;
of CENRO X-3-E, DENR-X-3-9,
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur showing that 5. Deed of Absolute Sale of Land
Lot 1959, PLS-225 is covered by a executed by Concordia Balida-Oriol
Miscellaneous Sales Application of with the conformity of Teodosio
Cristita Quita; Mosquito (another claimant), to prove
that the other half of Lot No. 1959 was
4. Affidavit of one Emiliano G. Gatillo to sold in 1978 to Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio
the effect that he was the one who gave Terrado whose overseer allowed
the lot in question to Cristita Quita Sampayan to enter and occupy the
sometime in 1957 and that since then premises;
the latter had been occupying the lot;
6. Protest filed with the CENRO,
Plaintiffs also filed a Supplemental Agusan del Sur by the vendee Juliana
Position Paper dated July 13, 1994 for Sambale-Occida against the
the purpose of showing that Cristita Miscellaneous Sales Application of
Quita is one of the oppositors in Cristita Quita;
Cadastral Case No. 149. Together with
said position paper, they submitted a 7. Affidavit of Dionesia Noynay attesting
copy of the Answer/Opposition earlier to the fact that she is residing in Lot
filed in Cadastral Case No. 149. In said No. 1957, a lot adjacent to the lot in
cadastral case, Cristita Quita was question, since 1960 up to the present.
claiming Lot 1959, thus her name In the same affidavit, Dionisia claimed
appeared in the list of oppositors that neither Cristita Quita, much less
therein. the plaintiffs, had ever possessed Lot
No. 1959. She claimed that it was the
5. The decision in the said Cadastral Occida couple who possessed said lot
Case No. 149 showing that the then and introduced improvements thereon;
Court of First Instance of Agusan del and
Sur declared Lot No. 1959 as one of the
lots subject of the same cadastral case. 8. Affidavit of Juliana Occida and Maria
Ybañez to show the impossibility of
For his part, defendant Sampayan, to prove plaintiffs’ possession of the same lot.
the allegations in his answer, offered in
evidence the following: Meanwhile, on March 21, 1996, while the case
was pending with the MCTC, the presiding
1. Tax Declaration No. A-11698 in the judge thereof personally conducted an ocular
name of Felicisimo Oriol, which cancels inspection of the contested lot in the presence
Tax Declaration 8103; of the parties and/or their counsels. Among
those found in the area during the inspection
2. Tax Declaration No. GRB-01-930 in are: the house of defendant Sampayan; the
the name of Felicisimo Oriol which dilapidated house of a certain Peter Siscon;
cancels Tax Declaration No. A-11698; and a portion of the house of Macario Noynay,
husband of Dionisia Noynay, one of
3. Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Sampayan’s witnesses.
Land, dated April 30, 1979, executed by
Jesus Oriol for and in behalf of the Based on his ocular findings, the judge
spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia concluded that the improvements he saw in
Balida-Oriol, conveying the one-half the premises could never have been
(1/2) portion of Lot No. 1959 to the introduced by the plaintiffs nor by their
couple Manolito Occida and Juliana mother Cristita Quita but by the vendees of
Sambale-Occida who possessed the the same lot. Reproduced by petitioner Jose
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PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
Sampayan in the instant petition as well as in private respondents, who was in actual prior
the Memorandum he subsequently filed with physical possession of Lot No. 1959.
this Court, the MCTC judge’s findings and
observations during the ocular inspection, Unable to accept the RTC judgment,
about which the herein private respondents Sampayan went to the Court of Appeals on a
took no exception whatsoever, are hereunder petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-
quoted, as follows: G.R. SP No. 43557.
"Noted inside the land are the house of the As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of
defendant, Cesar Sampayan, of Peter Siscon, Appeals, in the herein assailed Decision
which appears to be dilapidated, and part of dated May 16, 2002,2denied Sampayan’s
the house of Macario Noynay which petition. His motion for reconsideration having
encroached to the land in question. Planted on been similarly denied by that court in
the land are five (5) coconut trees, fruit its Resolution of November 7,
bearing, three (3) not fruit bearing coconut 2002,3 Sampayan is now with us via the
trees, and three (3) star apple or caimito trees. present recourse, it being his submissions -
Defendant Sampayan admitted that he started
occupying the land since 1992. It is admitted "I.
by the parties during the ocular inspection
that one-half (1/2) portion of the land was THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
bought by a certain Occida from certain Mr. RULING THAT THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
and Mrs. Felicisimo Oriol. TRIAL COURT OF BAYUGAN, AGUSAN DEL
SUR, HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
The findings in the ocular inspection have CONSIDERING THAT DURING THE HEARING
confirmed the allegation of the defendant THEREOF IT WAS FOUND OUT BY THE SAID
that his predecessors-in-interest have MUNICIPAL COURT THAT ACCION
introduced improvements by planting PUBLICIANA OR PLENARIA DE POSESION,
caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on AND NOT FORCIBLE ENTRY, IS THE PROPER
the land in question. ACTION;
We note that in the herein assailed decision, Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that
the Court of Appeals attached much in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he
significance to the fact that private informed respondents that the building
respondents’ mother Cristita Quita was an occupies a portion of his land. However, he
oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. We rule allowed them to continue using the building.
and so hold that the mother’s being an But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of
oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents
itself, establish prior physical possession demolish and remove the part of the building
because not all oppositors in cadastral cases encroaching his property and turn over to him
are actual possessors of the lots or lands their possession. But they refused. Instead,
subject thereof. they continued occupying the contested
portion and even made improvements on the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby building. The dispute was then referred to
GRANTED and the Decision and Resolution, the barangay lupon, but the parties failed to
respectively dated May 16, 2002 and reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on
November 7, 2002, of the Court of Appeals March 27, 1996, a certification to file action
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. was issued.
1. To vacate Lot 1227 of the Cadastral The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due
Survey of Jordan, Guimaras; respect and deference, committed a reversible
error in the interpretation/application of the
2. To pay Two Hundred Pesos (₱200.00) law in the instant case and in the appreciation
per month from October, 1996 as of the facts and evidence presented. The Court
compensation for the use of the of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when
property until the same is vacated; and it denied and dismissed the petition filed by
the petitioners.16
3. To pay Two Thousand Pesos
(₱2,000.00) as attorney’s fees and After considering the parties’ submissions, we
litigation expenses. find three basic issues: (1) Did the MCTC err
in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the
SO ORDERED.13 cases? (2) Did the RTC err in sustaining the
MCTC’s judgment? (3) Did the CA err in
Petitioners appealed to the RTC, Branch 65, at denying the petition for review filed by the 19
Jordan, Guimaras, which decided as follows: petitioners ordered to be ejected?
Petitioners’ contention that private respondent Besides, petitioners did not question initially
should have filed an action to the MCTC’s Order dated February 19, 1999,
recover possession de jure with the RTC is not when they moved for an extension of time to
supported by law or jurisprudence. The file their position papers and affidavits. They
distinction between a summary action of wanted another 30 days on top of the 30 days
ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of set by the MCTC, which strictly should have
possession and/or ownership of the land is been 10 days only. In this regard, petitioners
settled in our jurisprudence. could not claim that they were denied
sufficient time to file their position papers and
What really distinguishes an action for affidavits before the trial court. Further, they
unlawful detainer from a possessory action cannot validly invoke our ruling25 in Bayubay,
(accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory for in that case there was no order at all
action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first terminating the preliminary conference and
is limited to the question of possession de requiring the parties to submit position papers
facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion and affidavits.
P a g e | 15
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
We note with dismay petitioners’ insistence ejectment suits is to prevent breaches of the
that we order the MCTC "to conduct the peace and criminal disorder, and to compel
requisite preliminary conference." The the party out of possession to respect and
summary character of ejectment suits will be resort to the law alone to obtain what she
disregarded if we allow petitioners to further claims is hers. The party deprived of
delay this case by allowing a second possession must not take the law into his or
preliminary conference. Ejectment by way of her own hands.28For their part, herein
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are petitioners could not be barred from defending
summary proceedings, designed to provide an themselves before the court adequately, as a
expeditious means of protecting actual matter of law and right.
possession or the right to possession over the
property involved. It is a timely procedure However, petitioners in their defense should
designed to remedy the delay in the resolution show that they are entitled to possess Lot
of such cases.26 1227. If they had any evidence to prove their
defenses, they should have presented it to the
Lastly, petitioners aver that private MCTC with their position papers and
respondent failed to prove her allegation of affidavits. But they ignored the court’s order
ownership of Lot 1227 as it is only based on a and missed the given opportunity to have their
tax declaration which is not an evidence of defenses heard, the very essence of due
ownership. They also claim that their process.29 Their allegations were not only
possession of the lot was not and could not be unsubstantiated but were also disproved by
by mere tolerance. However, this is a factual the plaintiff’s evidence.
matter best left to the trial courts.
In sum, we find no reversible error much less
What we have now is sufficient evidence any grave abuse of discretion committed by
showing that private respondent has a better the Court of Appeals. A person who occupies
right to possess Lot 1227. The commissioners’ the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
report and sketch plan show that the 19 permission, without any contract between
petitioners occupy the lot, which corroborate them, is necessarily bound by an implied
private respondent’s allegation and disprove promise that he will vacate upon demand,
petitioners’ defense that Lot 1227 is a failing which a summary action for ejectment
shoreline; or that Lot 1227 is a social forest is the proper remedy against him.30 His status
area. While not a conclusive evidence of is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant
ownership, private respondent’s tax whose term of lease has expired but whose
declaration constitutes proof that she has a occupancy continued by tolerance of the
claim of title over the lot. It has been held owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful
that: deprivation or withholding of possession is to
be counted from the date of the demand to
Although tax declarations or realty tax vacate.31
payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED
good indicia of possession in the concept of for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
owner for no one in his right mind would be Appeals dated March 30, 2001 and its
paying taxes for a property that is not in his Resolution dated October 18, 2001 are
actual or at least constructive possession. AFFIRMED.
They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The Costs against petitioners.
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one’s SO ORDERED.
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-
against the State and all other interested Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an 5 FIRST DIVISION
act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.27 [G.R. NO. 165177 : August 25, 2005]
The lower courts did not err in adjudicating LILIA V. PERALTA-
the issue of possession. Mere absence of title LABRADOR, Petitioners, v. SILVERIO
over the lot is not a ground for the courts to BUGARIN, substituted by his widow,
withhold relief from the parties in an CONSOLACION BUGARIN,1 Respondent.
ejectment case. Plainly stated, the trial court
has validly exercised its jurisdiction over the
DECISION
ejectment cases below. The policy behind
P a g e | 16
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: prior physical possession and ownership
thereof. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
Challenged in this Petition for Review
on Certiorari is the March 12, 2004 WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises
decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. considered and for failure on the part of the
SP No. 57475, which affirmed with plaintiff to establish the preponderance of
modification the January 26, 2000 evidence of prior actual physical possession
judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of and present title over the lot in her favor, let
Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. the instant case be ordered DISMISSED, and
RTC-1590-I, which in turn affirmed the the defendant be awarded the rightful
decision4 dated May 16, 1999 of the Municipal possession and ownership of the same and the
Trial Court (MTC) of San Felipe, Zambales, in plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay FIFTEEN
Civil Case No. 328, and its September 6, 2004 THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS as
resolution5 denying reconsideration thereof. reasonable Attorney's fee and FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as
On January 18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V. appearance fee plus costs.
Peralta-Labrador filed a case for "Recovery of
Possession and Ownership," docketed as Civil SO ORDERED.10
Case No. 328, with the MTC of San Felipe,
Zambales. She alleged that she is the owner of The RTC affirmed the assailed
Cadastral Lot No. 2650, with an area of 400 decision,11 hence petitioner filed a Petition for
sq. m. located at Sitio Caarosipan, Barangay Review before the Court of Appeals which was
Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales, having however denied for insufficiency of evidence to
purchased the same in 1976 from spouses prove ownership or prior actual physical
Artemio and Angela Pronto. In 1977, she was possession. The appellate court deleted the
issued Tax Declaration No. 10462 and paid monetary awards in favor of respondent as
the taxes due thereon.6 well as the declaration of the MTC that
respondent is the owner of the questioned lot
In 1990, the Department of Public Works and on the ground that the OCT No. P-13011,
Highways constructed a road which traversed relied upon by said court was not formally
Cadastral Lot No. 2650 thereby separating offered in evidence, hence, cannot be
108 sq. m. from the rest of petitioner's lot, for considered by the court. The decretal portion
which she was issued Tax Declaration No. 02- thereof, states:
2460R in 1991.7
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio discussion, the instant petition is hereby
Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision
sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the same dated January 26, 2000, in Civil Case No. RTC
despite the pleas of petitioner. Hence, on 1590 I of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
January 18, 1996, she instituted a complaint Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, and Decision dated
for recovery of possession and ownership May 16, 1999, in Civil Case No. 328 of the
against respondent. Municipal Trial Court of San Felipe, Zambales
are MODIFIED by deleting the declaration of
In his Answer with ownership as to the disputed 108 square
Counterclaims,8 respondent contended that meters and the monetary award in favor of
the area claimed by petitioner is included in respondent Silverio Bugarin. However, the
the 4,473 square meter lot, covered by the dismissal of the complaint is AFFIRMED.
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13011;
and that he has been in continuous SO ORDERED.12
possession and occupation thereof since 1955.
In his Amended Answer with The motion for reconsideration filed by
Counterclaim,9 however, respondent failed to petitioner was denied. Hence the instant
allege that the questioned lot is covered by the petition.
OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that
he planted fruit bearing trees in the property. Pertinent portion of Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Respondent further pleaded the defenses of Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
lack of cause of action and prescription.
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings,
On May 16, 1999, the court a quo ruled in and when. - - a person deprived of the
favor of respondent declaring him as the possession of any land or building by force,
owner of the controverted lot on the basis of intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, - may
the OCT No. P-13011. The complaint was at any time within one (1) year after such
dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove unlawful deprivation or withholding of
P a g e | 17
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
possession, bring an action in the proper 4. That in or before 1990 the land was
Municipal Trial Court against the person or traversed by a new National Highway and the
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of land was segregated from a bigger portion of
possession, or any person or persons claiming the land, the western portion is now the land
under them, for the restitution of such in question and since the new provincial road
possession, together with the damages and which traversed the whole land of the plaintiff,
costs. (Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ the old highway which is west of Lot 2650
shall belong to the plaintiff in compensation of
In Lopez v. David Jr.,13 it was held that an the portion of her lot traversed by the new
action for forcible entry is a quieting process highway, said old highway is also taken by
and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in defendant unlawfully;16
pursuance of the summary nature of the
action. Thus, we have nullified proceedings in It is clear that petitioner's averment make out
the MTCs when it improperly assumed a case for forcible entry because she alleged
jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful prior physical possession of the subject lot
deprivation or withholding of possession had way back in 1976, and the forcible entry
exceeded one year. After the lapse of the one thereon by respondent. Considering her
year period, the suit must be commenced in allegation that the unlawful possession of
the RTC via an accion publiciana, a suit for respondent occurred two years17 prior to the
recovery of the right to possess. It is an filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996,
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the the cause of action for forcible entry has
better right of possession of realty prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to
independently of title. It also refers to an entertain the case. Petitioner's complaint
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one therefore should have been filed with the
year from the accrual of the cause of action or proper RTC.
from the unlawful withholding of possession of
the realty independently of title. Likewise, the It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject
case may be instituted before the same court matter cannot be waived by the parties or
as an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action cured by their silence, acquiescence or even
to recover ownership as well as possession.14 express consent.18 Hence, the failure of
respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of
Corrollarily, jurisdiction of a court is cause of action and prescription stated in his
determined by the allegations of the Amended Answer with Counterclaim will not
complaint. Thus, in ascertaining whether or vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the case.
not the action falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the On this point, the Court held in Bongato v.
averments of the complaint and the character Malvar19 that:
of the relief sought are to be examined.15
It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is
In the instant case, petitioner's complaint a quieting process, and that the restrictive
alleges that: time bar is prescribed to complement the
summary nature of such process. Indeed, the
2. That plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of one-year period within which to bring an
land denominated as Cadastral lot No. 2650, action for forcible entry is generally counted
San Felipe Cadastre, situated at sitio from the date of actual entry to the land.
Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San However, when entry is made through stealth,
Felipe, Zambales which she bought in 1976 then the one-year period is counted from the
from Spouses Artemio Pronto and Angela time the plaintiff learned about it. After the
Merano when she was still a widow, with the lapse of the one-year period, the party
following boundaries: North, Alipio Abad, dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either
East, Antonio Cueva, South, Juan Borja, and an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action
West, Old Provincial Road, containing an area to recover the right of possession; or an accion
of 108 square meters, declared under Tax reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
Declaration No. 002-1860R and assessed at ownership as well as possession.
P1,120.00;
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear
3. That plaintiff has been in open, that the cause of action for forcible entry filed
continuous, exclusive and adverse as well by respondents had already prescribed when
as notorious possession of the said lot and they filed the Complaint for ejectment on July
in the concept of an owner since she 10, 1992. Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be
[acquired] it in 1976 until the time when the owner of the land, possession thereof
defendant took possession forcibly, two cannot be wrested through a summary action
years ago; for ejectment of petitioner, who had been
occupying it for more than one (1) year.
P a g e | 18
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
Respondents should have presented their suit Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing,
before the RTC in an accion publiciana or Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
an accionreivindicatoria, not before the MTCC
in summary proceedings for forcible entry. 6 SECOND DIVISION
Their cause of action for forcible entry had
prescribed already, and the MTCC had no G.R. No. 132197 August 16, 2005
more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and
... JUANITO KING & SONS, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
Further, a court's lack of jurisdiction over the SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH
subject matter cannot be waived by the ONG, Respondent.
parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence
or even express consent. A party may assail DECISION
the jurisdiction of the court over the action at
any stage of the proceedings and even on Tinga, J.:
appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of
a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of In a Decision1 dated 6 January 1998, the
jurisdiction, even if an answer has been Former First Division of the Court of Appeals
belatedly filed we likewise held in Bayog v. overturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial
Natino[.] Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the
Moreover, even if the MTC has jurisdiction MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
over the subject matter, the complaint should complaint for unlawful detainer. This petition
still be dismissed because petitioner failed to for review prays for the reversal of the
prove that the controverted 108 sq. m. lot is aforesaid Court of Appeals’ Decision.
part of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Petitioner
admitted that she has never seen the The case originated from a complaint for
Cadastral Map of San Felipe, Zambales, and ejectment filed by petitioners against
relied only on the Survey Notification respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 2376,
Card20 from the Bureau of Lands,21 with a before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In
sketch of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Said card, the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of
however, does not reflect the 108 sq. m. lot their ownership of three (3) parcels of land
subject of this case. Neither did petitioner covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
cause the survey of Cadastral Lot No. 2650 Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners
after the construction of a new road to prove likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth
that the segregated portion on the western Ong’s ownership of the lots previous to theirs.
side is part thereof. Ei incumbit probotio qui On 26 January 1995, Atty. Joseph M. Baduel,
dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty,
who denies, must prove.22 Failing to discharge wrote respondents informing them of its intent
this burden, the dismissal of the complaint is to use the lots and asking them to vacate
proper. within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
letter. But respondents refused to vacate,
In the same vein, ownership of the lot in thereby unlawfully withholding possession of
question cannot be awarded to respondent said lots, so petitioners alleged.
considering that OCT No. P-13011, 23 and the
Survey Plan24 were not formally offered in Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King
evidence. While the issue of ownership may be and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the
passed upon in ejectment cases for the sole lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty
purpose of determining the nature of through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In
possession,25 no evidence conclusively show turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate
that the lot in question is covered by said OCT Realty had acquired the properties from the
No. P-13011 or any other title of respondent. respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed
WHEREFORE, the May 16, 1999 decision of of sale and the transfers of title consequential
the Municipal Trial Court of San Felipe, thereto were subsequently sought to be
Zambales, the January 26, 2000 decision of annulled by respondents in a complaint filed
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Iba, on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC
Zambales, and the March 12, 2004 decision of against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty.2 Per
the Court of Appeals, are ANNULLED and SET record, this case is still pending resolution.
ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction. The complaint
in Civil Case No. 328 is DISMISSED. Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment
case on 24 April 1996, with the decision
SO ORDERED.
P a g e | 19
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
ordering respondents to vacate the premises (5) On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue
in question and to peacefully turn over issued an Order denying respondents’ Motion
possession thereof to petitioners. for Reconsideration.
On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March (6) On 9 July 1997, respondents received a
1997 a judgment affirming the MTC’s decision copy of the aforementioned 23 June
in its entirety. 1997 Order.
On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of (7) On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with
appeal. However, on the following day, they the Court of Appeals their motion for an
filed a motion for reconsideration. additional period of ten (10) days within which
to file their Petition for Review.
On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued
an Order which concurrently gave due course (8) On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with
to respondents’ notice of appeal filed on 8 May the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review.
1997; denied their motion for reconsideration
dated 9 May 1997,3 and granted petitioners’ Petitioners assert that the Petition for
motion for immediate execution pending Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day
appeal. period for appeal. They theorize that the
period started running on 28 April 1995, the
In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed date of receipt of the RTC decision, and ended
with the Court of Appeals and treated as on 13 May 1997. According to them, this
a Petition for Review, the appellate court ruled reglementary period could not have been
that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of
case as there was no contract between the the Motion for Reconsideration because of the
parties, express or implied, as would qualify filing one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal.
the same as one for unlawful detainer. Thus, This Notice of Appealdated 8 May 1997, albeit
the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were the wrong mode of appeal, expressly
set aside. manifested their intention to file a petition for
review to either the Court of Appeals or the
Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition Supreme Court.4
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The principal issues raised before this Petitioners further argue that respondents,
Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has after having filed the Notice of Appeal which
already become final and executory at the time was given due course by the RTC, cannot take
the petition for review was filed; (ii) whether an inconsistent stand such as filing a Motion
the allegations in the complaint constitute a for Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did
case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which
by the MTC; and, (iii) whether petitioners, as started running from the date of receipt of the
registered owners, are entitled to the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on
possession of the subject premises. 13 May 1997.
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by
in this case. Sec. 1 provides: criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court provides that the proper mode
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. -- of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a
A party desiring to appeal from a decision of notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed
the RTC rendered in the exercise of its perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal.
appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, In the case at bar, a petition for review before
paying at the same time to the clerk of said the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of
court the corresponding docket and other appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the
lawful fees, depositing the amount of ₱500.00 filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is
for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial considered as if no appeal was interposed.
Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition. The petition shall be filed and served Now on the second and more important issue
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the raised by petitioners: whether
decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial the Complaint satisfies the jurisdictional
of petitioner’s motion for new trial or requirements for a case of unlawful detainer
reconsideration filed in due time after properly cognizable by the MTC.
judgment. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket and The MTC considered itself as having
other lawful fees and the deposit for costs jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and
before the expiration of the reglementary disposed of the same in favor of petitioners.
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The
additional period of fifteen (15) days only Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts
within which to file the petition for review. No and found the complaint to be one not for
further extension shall be granted except for unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds,
the most compelling reason and in no case to namely: that the allegations fail to show that
exceed fifteen (15) days. petitioners were deprived of possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed and that there is no contract, express or
with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, implied, between the parties as would qualify
petitioners should have filed a Petition for the case as one of unlawful detainer.
Review with the Court of Appeals and not
a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we We disagree with the Court of Appeals.
consider this to have been remedied by the
timely filing of the Motion for The complaint for unlawful detainer contained
Reconsideration on the following day. Section the following material allegations:
3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the
withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter ....
of right, before the filing of the appellee’s brief.
Applying this rule contextually, the filing of 3. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2,
the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the
as an effective withdrawal of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-
defective Notice of Appeal. A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the
Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and Lot No.
Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of
the Motion for Reconsideration and started to the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, all
run again from the receipt of the order situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. said Transfer Certificate of Titles are hereto
A Motion for Additional Time to File the
P a g e | 21
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has
respectively and made an integral part hereof; been held to imply possession on the part of
defendant, which was legal in the beginning,
4. That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the having no other source than a contract,
previous registered owner of said lots; express or implied, and which later expired as
a right and is being withheld by
5. That as the previous registered owner of defendant.12 In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of
said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her Appeals,13 we held that a simple allegation
husband and co-defendant Jerry Ong have
been living in the house constructed on said that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
lots; possession from plaintiff is sufficient.
6. That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the Based on this premise, the allegation in
undersigned counsel, wrote defendants a the Complaint that:
letter informing them or their intent to use
said lots and demanded of them to vacate said . . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants
lots within 30 days from receipt of said letter. have refused and still refuse to vacate said
Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession
"D" and made an integral part thereof; of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving
plaintiffs of the use of their lots;14
7. That despite demand to vacate, the
defendants have refused and still refuse to is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful
vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding detainer case.
possession of said lots from plaintiffs and
depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged
that they are the registered owners of the lots
8. That in unlawfully withholding the covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and
possession of said lots from the plaintiffs, 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have
plaintiffs have suffered damages in the form of allowed respondents, the former owners of the
unearned rentals in the amount of ₱10,000.00 properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless,
a month they eventually sent a letter to respondents
asking that the latter vacate the said lots.
. . . .8 Respondents refused, thereby depriving
petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly,
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the complaint establishes the basic elements
the nature of an action as well as which court of an unlawful detainer case, certainly
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of sufficient for the purpose of vesting
the complaint and the character of the relief jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
sought.9
Respondents would like to capitalize on the
Respondents contend that the complaint did requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo
not allege that petitioners’ possession was dela Paz v. Panis.15 But the citation is a mere
originally lawful but had ceased to be so due reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 7016 of the Rules of
to the expiration of the right to possess by Court. The case doesid not provide for rigid
virtue of any express or implied contract. standards in the drafting of the ejectment
complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v.
The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals Diaz17 justifies a more liberal approach, thus:
on the presence of a contract as a requisite to
qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer . . . The principle underlying the brevity and
contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and
on the matter. unlawful detainer cases rests upon
considerations of public policy. Cases of
In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals,10 it was forcible entry and detainer are summary in
held that the allegation in the complaint that nature, for they involve perturbation of social
there was unlawful withholding of possession order which must be restored as promptly as
is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful possible and, accordingly, technicalities or
detainer. It is equally settled that in an action details of procedure should be carefully
for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the avoided.18
defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession from the plaintiff is deemed Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of
sufficient, without necessarily employing the the incidents of the pending case involving the
terminology of the law.11 annulment of deed of sale and title over said
property. Petitioners know better than to
P a g e | 22
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
question this in an ejectment proceeding, not matter if ownership is claimed by either
which brings us to the nature of the action in party. Therefore, the pending actions for
this case. declaration of nullity of deed of sale and
Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of
Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate
MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being the ejectment case.
an accion reivindicatoriaaccording to them, on
the ground that petitioners were constantly In Drilon v. Gaurana,23 this Court ruled that
claiming ownership over the lands in the guise the filing of an action for reconveyance of title
of filing an action for ejectment. In over the same property or for annulment of
their Comment,19 respondents maintain that the deed of sale over the land does not divest
they occupy the subject lots as the legal the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible
owners. Petitioners, on the other hand, are entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the
seeking recovery of possession under a claim rationale being that, while there may be
of ownership which is tantamount to recovery identity of parties and subject matter in the
of possession based on alleged title to the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment
lands, and therefore is within the original of title and/or reconveyance, the rights
jurisdiction of the RTC, so respondents asserted and the relief prayed for are not the
conclude. same.24
Misamis Oriental
Assuming, however, that the disputed land Civil Case 689 of the Court of First Instance of
has been clearly identified, acquisitive Batangas was an action to quiet title over a
prescription will still not lie in favor of the piece of land filed on March 20, 1959, by
petitioners because they were not able to spouses Basilio Perez and Petra Montalbo with
prove that they have been in possession of the spouses Nicolas Mendoza and Margarita
property for the requisite number of years. Macalalad as defendants. According to the
Prescription requires public, peaceful, complaint, the land in controversy is located
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the in barrio Dagatan, municipality of Taysan,
property in the concept of an owner for ten Batangas, with an area of approximately
years, in case the possession is in good faith 4,765 sq. meters, declared for taxation
and with just title.38 purposes in the name of the "Heirs of
Estanislao Montalbo", and is "bounded on the
Aside from the testimony of Leonardo north by a school site, on the east by Calixto
Vacalares that certain tenants of the Flores, on the south by a creek, and on the
petitioners cultivated the land for a total of west by a creek and the land of Gregorio
seven years, the petitioners did not present Mendoza." On the basis of evidence adduced
any other evidence to show that they have by the parties, the trial court then presided by
been in actual possession of the property for Hon. Lorenzo Relova rendered judgment on
at least ten years. February 19, 1962, dismissing the complaint
and declaring the spouses Mendoza "to have a
The petitioners’ argument that the payment of better right to the property in question."1
taxes on the property since May 31, 1948
constitutes proof of their possession of the Spouses Perez elevated the Relova decision to
subject land for thirty-five years is untenable. the Court of Appeals which, however,
Tax declarations and receipts are not affirmed in toto the findings of the court a quo,
conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, and declared that "upon the evidence it has
they constitute mere prima facie proof of been shown by a great preponderance that the
ownership of the property for which taxes land in question belongs to the defendants."2
have been paid. In the absence of actual,
public and adverse possession, the declaration The case is now before Us on a petition
of the land for tax purposes does not prove for certiorari filed by spouses Perez.
ownership.39
The findings of fact both of the trial court and
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the the Court of Appeals may be briefly
petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court summarized as follows:
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.
The litigated parcel of land was originally part
SO ORDERED. of a bigger tract owned by Estanislao
Montalbo. When Estanislao died in 1918, his
Puno, J., Chairman, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, properties passed on to his children Petra,
and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. Felisa, and Pedro all surnamed Montalbo, and
because Pedro died single the two women
FIRST DIVISION remained as the only heirs. By mutual
8 agreement Petra and Felisa divided between
themselves the lands of their father and the
parcel of which the litigated land was a part
P a g e | 28
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
was assigned to Felisa. Sometime in 1922 Estanislao who died in 1918 and since that
Felisa exchanged the above-mentioned parcel date the two sisters were in possession of said
with a land belonging to her aunt. Andrea land. In 1934 a deed of partition of the various
Montalbo, a sister of her father. The reason for properties of Estanislao was executed between
the exchange was that Andrea wanted to Petra and the heirs of Felisa, and the land in
donate a piece of land to the municipality for question was divided equally, between them;
use as a school site and the land of Felisa was among those who signed as witnesses to that
what the municipality preferred as it was agreement was Andrea Montalbo(Exh. D for
adjacent to other properties of the petitioners). In 1952 Felisa's husband, Jose
municipality. (Exh. 5 for defendants Mendoza) Ortega, and children sold their one-half share
Upon her acquisition of Felisa's to spouses Petra Montalbo and Basilio Perez,
aforementioned land, Andrea donated to the now petitioners, but the deed of sale was lost
municipality the northern portion thereof a year after. Sometime in 1946 petitioners
which constituted almost one-half of the entire leased the property to the Mendozas and when
parcel, and since then that portion was the lease expired in 1951 they demanded for
declared for taxation purposes by the the return of the land but the Mendozas
municipality together with its adjoining refused and so petitioners had to file an
properties (Exhs. 6, 6-A, 6-B).1äwphï1.ñët In ejectment suit before the justice of the peace
1927 the remainder of the lot was given by court of Taysan which was still pending at the
Andrea Montalbo to her daughter Margarita time of the trial of the civil case in 1960. (tsn.
Macalalad on the occasion of her marriage to witness Basilio Perez, December 15, 1960, pp.
Nicolas Mendoza, and from the time of their 16-34)
marriage the couple possessed the said
property. That donation was confirmed For not giving credit to the foregoing evidence,
subsequently in a public instrument dated petitioners now assail the adverse decision of
August 15, 1951 (Exh. 2 for the Mendozas). respondent court on four assigned errors.
Nicolas Mendoza sought to transfer the tax
declaration of the property to his name and of 1. Petitioners contend that respondent court
his wife and for that purpose he submitted a erred in considering the criminal case for
deed of exchange of property dated January falsification res adjudicata on the matter of
14, 1922, allegedly executed by Felisa ownership of the land in litigation when the
Montalbo and Andrea Montalbo in the "question of ownership was not actually and
presence of the municipal secretary Rafael directly in issue in the criminal case and the
Manahan (Exh. 5). When Basilio Perez came to latter was not the proper vehicle for the
know about the supposed deed of exchange, determination of the ownership of the land."
he had it investigated and upon discovering (p. 9, petitioners brief) Petitioners refer to
that the signature of Rafael Manahan portions in the decision of respondent
appearing on the document was forged, he court, viz:
filed a criminal complaint before the Fiscal's
office which led to an accusation for The land in question, together
falsification of private document against with that portion that was
Andrea Montalbo and Nicolas Mendoza. Only acquired by the municipality of
Nicolas Mendoza was arraigned and tried and Taysan, the identity of which is
was convicted by the Court of First Instance of admitted by the parties, belonged
Batangas, but on appeal he was acquitted by to Felisa Montalbo, as held in the
the Court of Appeals for insufficiency of decision of the Court of Appeals,
evidence to show that he participated in thus — "The said parcel of land
affixing the signature of Rafael Manahan or previously belonged to Felisa
that he was aware of the falsity of the Montalbo (married to Jose
document in question when he presented it to Ortega), who inherited it from
the tax assessor's office.3 Notwithstanding the her deceased father, the
forged signature of Rafael Manahan on the aforecited Estanislao Montalbo;",
document Exhibit 5, there is sufficient and the land in question was
evidence to prove that an exchange of property donated propter nuptias by
did in fact occur in 1922 between Andrea and Andrea Montalbo to Margarita
Felisa Montalbo, and that Felisa's land passed Macalalad and Nicolas Mendoza,
on to Andrea who in turn gave part of it to the the defendants, (Margarita
municipality and part to her daughter, Macalalad is the daughter of
Margarita; hence, the decision in favor of the Andrea Montalbo) on the
spouses Mendoza. occasion of their marriage on
February 27, 1927, as found
On the other hand, petitioners contend that and held in the decision of the
the disputed property was inherited by Petra Court of Appeals, thus — "and
and Felisa Montalbo from their father this land was acquired by the
P a g e | 29
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
donor (Andrea Montalbo) by But whatever error was committed by
means of a barter with her own respondent court in this regard, the same is
parcel of land planted with not sufficient to nullify the appealed decision.
bamboos and mango trees"
Analyzing the decision of respondent court.
Upon the basis of the findings of We see that the latter made its own appraisal
fact and conclusion arrived at in and evaluation of the evidence existing in the
the decision of the Court of record relative to the possession and
Appeals, it clearly appears that ownership of the land in question. Thus it said
although the document of that the conclusions arrived at by the Court of
exchange of the lands was found Appeals in the criminal case to wit(1) that
to be falsified, nevertheless the there was an exchange of lands consummated
Court found upon the facts as between Andrea and Felisa and (2) that the
demonstrated by the evidence exchanged land was later donated by Andrea
that the land in question to her daughter Margarita in 1927, "can
"previously belonged to Felisa hardly be doubted if we take account of the
Montalbo (married to Jose undisputed fact that the defendants have been
Ortega), who inherited it from in possession of the land since 1927, and the
her deceased father, the plaintiffs (meaning spouses Perez) have not
aforesaid Estanislao attempted to disturb defendants' possession of
Montalbo ..."; that said land was the land until 1952 when said plaintiffs filed
donated propter nuptias by an action of unlawful detainer against the
Andrea Montalbo to the defendants." (p. 7 of appealed decision at p.
defendants on the occasion of 21, SC rollo; emphasis supplied) Continuing,
their marriage on February 27, respondent court expounded:
1927; and that "this land was
acquired by the donor by means Contrary to the allegation in the
of a barter with her own parcel of complaint — "That plaintiffs were
land planted with bamboos and in possession of the land prior
mango trees". From the context and up to January, 1946, when
of the decision the natural and the same was leased to the
logical inference is that factually defendants ...", and the
the exchange of the lands had testimony of Basilio Perez to the
been consummated.... (pp. 6-7, same tenor, the evidence has
CA decision at pp. 20-21, rollo; conclusively shown that the
emphasis supplied to indicate defendants have been in
disputed statements) continuous possession of the land
since 1927 to the present time,
Undoubtedly, there is merit to the contention and they have built a house on
of petitioners that the pronouncements or the land in 1928 where they have
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals resided and lived to the present,
in the criminal case concerning the possession as testified to by the defendant
and ownership of the land now in litigation in Mendoza, ....
the civil case, do not constitute the law on the
matter and cannot be taken or adopted as a The plaintiffs have contended,
basis for deciding the question of ownership of however, with the support of the
said land in this civil case. Since there is no testimony of Basilio Perez, that
identity of parties in the two cases — the the possession of the defendants
petitioners here not being parties in the since 1946 was that of a mere
criminal case — and the object or subject lessee of the land. On this
matter in the criminal prosecution is different, matter, the trial court said, "the
the latter being concerned with the guilt or records do not show any
innocence of accused Nicolas Mendoza for documentary evidence to support
falsification of private document, it follows such contention. Nor is any
that the judgment in the criminal action document, say receipts of
cannot be used as evidence in the civil case payment of rentals presented to
where the issue is ownership of a piece of bolster their theory. On the
land. It is the rule that the plea of res contrary their averment has been
judicata generally cannot be interposed strongly denied by the
except where the parties, facts, and questions defendants and the records show
are the that it was only in 1952 that a
same,4 hence, the judgment in a criminal case civil action was instituted by the
cannot be pleaded as res judicata in a civil plaintiffs against the defendants
action.5 in the Justice of the Peace Court
P a g e | 30
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
of Taysan, Batangas, for detainer First, the northern boundary of the land in
and damages", and said controversy is undisputably a school site
allegation of possession of the which originally was part of a bigger tract
defendants as lessees of the land belonging to Estanislao Montalbo. This is
"is not supported by positive and admitted by petitioner Basilio Perez who to a
convincing evidence". We find no question propounded by his counsel, Atty.
reason to disagree with the Panganiban, declared:
foregoing findings of fact and
conclusion of the trial court Mr. Panganiban:
because the same is supported (Counsel of
by the preponderance of petitioners)
evidence, and the plaintiffs have
not pointed to us any fact of Q. According to
significance or influence which these tax
have been disregarded by the declarations which
court, other than the testimony you said covers the
of Basilio Perez who testified land in question,
about the supposed contract of the boundaries on
lease. (pp. 21-22, 23, ibid.; the north, school
emphasis supplied) site; on the east,
land of Calixto
Digging further into the evidence of herein Flores; on the
petitioners, respondent court found for itself south, estero; and
that the agreement of partition dated May 27, on the west, estero
1934, Exhibit D, is not incontrovertible proof and Gregoria
that in 1934 the litigated property belonged in Mendoza, why is it
common to Petra and the heirs of Felisa that there is a
Montalbo both of whom may have been guided discrepancy?
by the fact that the property was still declared
for taxation purposes in the name of A. Because from
Estanislao Montalbo, and that the document the whole parcel of
of partition "did not overcome the evidence on land a portion was
record that Andrea Montalbo became the taken for the school
owner of the land, and that since 1927 the site, and that which
defendants have been in continuous remains now is the
possession of the land, openly, adversely and land in question,
in the concept of owners thereby acquiring sir. (tsn December
ownership of the land through acquisitive 15, 1960, pp. 22-
prescription." (p. 10 of CA decision at p. 24, 23)
SC rollo)
No explanation however was offered by Perez
Independently therefore of the as to how that portion became a school site.
pronouncements of the Court of Appeals in On the other hand, there is evidence of
the criminal case, respondent court examined respondent Mendoza that because Andrea
the evidence in this civil case and made its Montalbo wanted to donate a piece of land to
own findings of fact on the basis of which it be used as a school site and the municipality
affirmed the decision of the trial court. preferred the location of the land inherited by
Felisa from her father, the two women
We could have stopped here and resolved this exchanged lands after which Andrea gave one-
petition under well-entrenched precepts in half of the property to the municipality while
Philippine jurisprudence that findings of fact the remaining portion which is the land now
of the Court of Appeals are as a rule in litigation was donated propter nuptias to
conclusive and binding upon this her daughter Margarita way back in 1927. (tsn
Court;6 nonetheless, to set our mind at rest October 24, 1961, pp. 14-18) This donation of
that the conclusions of respondent court were Andrea was not disproved by any evidence of
not grounded on speculation, surmises or petitioners. On the part of respondents
conjectures,7 We went over the evidence before Mendoza, their documentary evidence,
Us. Exhibits 6, 6-A and 6-B, show that the
municipality of Taysan declared the donated
Certain salient facts strongly support the property in its name as early as July, 1925,
claim of respondents Mendoza over the which supports respondents' claim that the
property in dispute: exchange of properties between Andrea and
Felisa Montalbo took place sometime in 1922.
P a g e | 31
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
Second, the provincial authorities authorities only in 1946 when the Mendozas occupied the
dealt with the Mendozas for the widening of property as lessees; (2) the testimony of
the provincial road which traverses the land in Nicolas Mendoza was corroborated by witness
question. Nicolas Mendoza testified that the Adriano Gonzales, a retired justice of the
land covered by the complaint actually peace of Taysan, Batangas, who declared that
consists of two lots which he described in his he knew the Mendozas since 1937 and he saw
sketch, Exhibit 1, with letters "A" and "B" them living on the land in question and they
respectively, separated by a provincial road have not changed residence at all since he had
leading to the municipality of Lobo; that lot known them (tsn December 6, 1961, pp. 5-6);
"A" which is the bigger parcel is the one and (3) the respondents Mendoza were the
donated to his wife, Margarita, by Andrea ones who were living on the property and not
Montalbo on the occasion of their marriage in the petitioners at the time the provincial
1927 (Exh. 2); while lot "B" was bought from government in 1937 widened the Lobo road
Donata Mendoza in 1951 as shown by the which crosses said land.
deed of sale, Exhibit 7; that sometime in
1937-38, the province widened the provincial The court a quo and the respondent appellate
road traversing the two lots, and he and his court did not err when they upheld the claim
wife were approached by the provincial of ownership of the Mendozas principally on
authorities more particularly, Engineer the ground that the latter were in actual
Ramirez, for them to give without possession of the property since 1927 and
compensation from lot "A" a stretch of land of were sought to be dispossessed by petitioners
one meter in width to widen said road, and herein only in 1952 when an ejectment suit
they agreed. At that time Donata Mendoza still was filed against them.
owned lot "B" and she was also asked to give
part of her land for the road but she was paid Possession is an indicium of ownership of the
for the value of the plants destroyed in the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the
process.(tsn October 24, 1961, pp. 32-34) For presumption that he holds the thing under a
his part, petitioner Perez admitted during the claim of ownership.8 Article 433 of the Civil
cross-examination conducted by the opposite Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under
counsel, Atty. Julio Enriquez, that the claim of ownership raises a disputable
provincial authorities did not deal with him at presumption of ownership. The true owner
all during the widening of that particular road. must resort to judicial process for the recovery
(tsn September 25, 1961, p. 34) This is of of the property." In Chan vs. Court of Appeals,
marked significance, because if it were true as et al., L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737,
claimed by petitioners that they were in this Court upheld the finding of the Court of
possession of the property since the death of Appeals that the litigated property belonged to
Estanislao Montalbo in 1918 or even after the the private respondents therein based on their
deed of partition in 1934, they would have possession of the property, not only because
been the persons approached by the such findings of fact of the appellate court are
authorities for the widening of the road. The conclusive and binding on this Court but
fact that the Mendozas were the ones who because the conclusion is in accordance with
gave away part of the land for the widening of Articles 433 and 531 of the Civil Code. 9
the Lobo road shows that they were in
possession of the property and were living As we have here conflicting claims of
there at the time. possession by the parties over the land in
controversy and because the fact of
Third, respondents Mendoza have been in possession cannot be recognized at the same
possession of the property since 1927 in time in two different personalities except in
concept of owners thereof. We have the cases of co-possession, the present possessor
testimony of respondent Nicolas Mendoza that is to be preferred pursuant to Article 538 of
after the land was donated to his wife in 1927 the Civil Code which We quote:
they built a house on it and lived there
continuously, witness referring particularly to Possession as a fact cannot be
what he described as lot "A" in his sketch recognized at the same time in
Exhibit 1. (tsn October 24, 1961, pp. 7, .30- two different personalities except
31) Respondent's testimony was found both by in the cases of co-possession.
the trial and appellate courts credible because Should a question arise
(1) petitioner Basilio Perez himself admitted regarding the fact of possession,
during cross-examination that even before the the present possessor shall be
last world war the Mendozas had constructed preferred; if there are two
a house on the land in litigation (tsn possessors, the one longer in
September 25, 1971, pp. 37-39; see Exh. E-3) possession; if the dates of the
which admission disproves the allegation in possession are the same, the one
the complaint and Perez' testimony that it was who presents a title; and if all
P a g e | 32
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
these conditions are equal, the new document but an old one thus confirming
thing shall be placed in judicial Mendoza's theory that it was executed in or
deposit pending determination of about the year 1922 as appearing in the
its possession or ownership document or five years before his marriage.
through proper proceedings." 10 (pp. 1, 5, 6 of Exh. J, folder of exhibits) Thus,
if the document Exhibit 5 was held to be
The pretension of petitioners that the forged, it was simply because the municipal
possession of the Mendozas is that of a mere secretary, Rafael Manahan, did not sign it and
lessee was not believed by the trial judge and not for any other reason. What is material and
the appellate court not only because of the relevant to the civil case is that both the trial
absence of any written or oral evidence on the court and respondent appellate court found
matter other than the bare testimony of for a fact that there was an exchange of lands
petitioner Basilio Perez, but also due to the between Andrea and Felisa Montalbo on the
circumstances present in the case which We basis of evidence other than the disputed
indicated and enumerated at pages 7 to 9 of Exhibit 5. As to what the evidence is, has been
this decision. In fine, it is a fact that the discussed above.
Mendozas are presently in possession of the
property and the presumption of ownership in Petitioners cite Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil.
their favor has not been successfully rebutted 728 where this Court stated inter alia that
by evidence that they are mere lessees of the the introduction of a forged instrument by a
land in their possession as claimed by witness renders the testimony of the latter
petitioners. practically worthless. That statement however
is not applicable to the situation before Us
2. In their second assigned error, petitioners because in Gonzalez the particular document
contend that respondent court should not or receipt referred to was found to be entirely
have given weight to the evidence of false as to its contents, handwriting, and
respondent Mendoza because the latter's signature, whereas here all that was found to
Exhibit 5 was proven to be a falsified be false is the signature of a witnessing
document. official.
To recall, Exhibit 5 is the alleged deed of 3. The last argument of petitioners is the
exchange or barter of lands between Andrea object of the third assigned error. It is
and Felisa Montalbo dated January 14, 1922. contended that the appellate court erred in
On this point, petitioners overlook the fact not giving effect to the deed of partition,
that Exhibit 5 was made the basis of a Exhibit D, notwithstanding the fact that the
criminal accusation of falsification of private name of Andrea Montalbo appears in the
document solely on the allegation that the document as one of the witnesses thereto.
signature of Rafael Manahan, the person
before whom the parties to the document Exhibit D appears to be a document dated
allegedly appeared, was not his. There was no May 27, 1934, wherein certain properties
finding in that criminal case as per decision allegedly belonging to Estanislao Montalbo
rendered therein that the barter or exchange were divided between Petra Montalbo and Jose
of lands between Andrea and Felisa Montalbo Ortega, husband of deceased Felisa Montalbo.
did not in effect take place. On the contrary, Petitioner Basilio Perez declared that one of
what appears in said decision offered by the parcels of land mentioned in the document
petitioners as their Exhibit J are the following is the land now in litigation which is
findings of the Court of Appeals, viz: that the particularly marked as Exhibit D-1. He also
land donated by Andrea Montalbo to her testified that Exhibit D was signed by him and
daughter Margarita Macalalad "was acquired his wife, Petra Montalbo, by Jose Ortega,
by the donor by means of a barter with her husband of deceased Felisa Montalbo, and
own parcel of land planted with bamboos and thumbmarked by the latter's children all in
mango trees"; that while it is true that his presence. (tsn December 15,1960, pp. 19-
because of this presentation of the falsified 24) Surprisingly, however, Basilio Perez did
document appellant (now respondent Nicolas not at all mention during the course of his
Mendoza) was able to secure the declaration of testimony that the old woman, Andrea
the property donated in his name, no criminal Montalbo, signed the deed of partition as a
liability should be imposed upon him in the witness. We have gone over the transcript of
absence of any evidence that he presented Basilio Perez' declaration on direct and cross-
said exhibit with the knowledge that it was examination (tsn December 15, 1960, pp. 15-
forged "especially if we take into consideration 34; September 25, 1961, pp. 3-40) and at no
the fact that he and his wife were and are still instance did he ever state that Andrea
in possession of the land donated since 1927"; Montalbo was present during the preparation
that in fact, the color and appearance of the of the document, that she read or knew the
document in question show that it is not a contents thereof which by the way consists of
P a g e | 33
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
six handwritten pages, and that she signed POTENCIANO GALANG, LEONCIA GARCIA,
her name on the document. It was incumbent BIENVENIDO TAPNIO, LYDIA BALINGIT
upon petitioners to identify the signature of VDA. DE GARCIA, BENEDICTO GARCIA,
Andrea Montalbo on the document if her ROMULADO GARCIA, AMY GARCIA,
signature was truly there. As a matter of fact, ALEXANDER GARCIA, LUDIVINA GARCIA,
examining the document Exhibit D We MONTANO GUEVARRA, CORAZON LAMPA,
entertain doubts whether the name referred to RUDY LAMPA, EDUARDO LAMPA,
by petitioners is "Andrea Montalbo", for, as ILLUMINADA GUEVARRA, CARMELITA
written, it also can read "Maria Montalbo". At MASANQUE VDA. DE GARCIA, MA.
any rate, whatever is the import of said deed CONCEPCION AQUINO VDA. DE
of partition, the same binds only the parties GUEVARRA, HONZAI GUEVARRA, RODA
thereto but does not affect third persons such REBECCA GUEVARRA, RUTH GUEVARRA,
as Andrea Montalbo or the herein Mendozas in minors represented by their mother Ma.
the absence of proof that they participated in Concepcion Vda. de Guevarra, PRIMITIVA
one way or another in the preparation and GUEVARRA, JOSIAS N. GARCIA, LUCITA M.
execution of thedocument. As it is, Andrea GARCIA, VICTOR M. GARCIA, LUTERO M.
Montalbo was a stranger to that deed of GARCIA, SAMSON M. GARCIA,
partition and any recital therein concerning FELIXBERTO M. GARCIA, JR.,
the property under litigation cannot be used HERMENIGILDA GARCIA, CONSTANCIO
as evidence to prejudice her and her GARCIA, REYNALDO GARCIA, AGAPITA
successors-in-interest or place her in estoppel GARCIA, ERNESTO GARCIA, NORICO
as to her claims over the property. Res inter GARCIA, PACIFICO GARCIA, NORMANDO
alios acta alteri nocere non debet. A GARCIA, ARTURO GARCIA, ESTELLA
transaction between two parties ought not to GARCIA, DIOSDADO GARCIA (representing
operate to the prejudice of a third person or LEONCIA GARCIA), GREGORIA MENDOZA,
stranger. 11 ELEUTERIA BAUTISTA, PEDRO ATIENZA,
BENITA SAMANIEGO, NENE SAMANIEGO
4. In the fourth assignment of error, (representing FLAVIANA GALANG), LETICIA
petitioners claim that the appellate court REYES, MANUEL REYES (representing
should have rendered a decision in their favor. MARCIANA GALANG), CARMEN ROQUE
That both the trial court and respondent VDA. DE DIMABUYU, PORFIRIO R.
appellate court have correctly evaluated the DIMABUYU, CARMEN R. DIMABUYU,
evidence, has been clearly demonstrated by CARIDAD R. DIMABUYU, PEDRO R.
Us. DIMABUYU, MARCOS DIMABUYU
(representing GERTRUDES
IN VIEW OF ALL THE ABOVE GALANG), respondents.
CONSIDERATIONS, We find no reversible
error in the decision under review and We Heminio Z. Canlas for petitioners.
AFFIRM the same with costs against
petitioners. Lagunzad, Juan, Rubin & Cabaron Law Office
for respondents.
So Ordered. G.R. No. 101929 January 6,
1993
PADILLA, J.:
9
BENJAMIN DIZON, ZACARIAS DIZON, In this petition for review on certiorari,
AFRICA DIZON, PERFECTO DIZON, petitioners seek to nullify the decision ** of
CARMEN DIZON (Heirs of Paula Galang), the Court of Appeals, dated 29 April 1991, in
JULIA GALANG, CONSOLACION TABORA, CA-G.R. CV. No. 14312, the dispositive
ABELARDO TABORA, CECILIA TABORA, portion of which reads as follows:
AVELINA TABORA, TRINIDAD TABORA,
REMEDIOS TABORA, VIRGINIA TABORA, WHEREFORE, the appealed
DELFIN TABORA, PENINA TABORA, judgment is hereby REVERSED;
FRANCISCO TABORA, CIPRIANA GALANG, and the Deed of Extra-Judicial
RUFINO DELOS SANTOS, PEPITO DELOS Settlement of the estate of the
SANTOS (Heirs of Donata Vergara), ARNEO deceased Dionisio Galang (Exh.
VERGARA, BENIGNO VERGARA, JOSE "D"), in so far as it relates to Lots
VERGARA, SCION VERGARA, DEMETRIA 3548 and 3562 the Bacolor
VERGARA (all heirs of Dionisio Cadastre, and Transfer
Galang), petitioners, Certificates of Title Nos. 182670-
vs. R and 182671-R issued by virtue
COURT OF APPEALS, AUREO REYES, thereof are hereby declared null
AURELIO SAMIA, ALFONSO SAMIA, and void.
P a g e | 34
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
Conformably, the Register of conducted, and on 19 May 1919, the Court of
Deeds concerned is hereby First Instance ordered the issuance in
ordered to cancel the said titles; Cadastral Case No. 14, of OCT Nos. 9010 (for
and subject Lots 3548 and 3562 lot 3548) and 9102 (for lot 3562) in the name
are hereby adjudicated to the solely of Dionisio Galang ( hereafter Galang).
heirs of the deceased co-owners
to be partitioned among them as Respondents, who are heirs of Galang's
follows: sisters, claim that Galang and his five (5)
sisters had partitioned the subject lots on 27
a. one-sixth to the Heirs of June 1920, as embodied in an unnotarized
Marciana Galang; affidavit executed by Galang (Exh. "C"). As a
consequence thereof, Galang's sisters
b. one-sixth to the Heirs of constructed their houses on Lot 3548. The
Dionisio Galang; structures passed on from generation to
generation, with each of Galang's sisters and
c. one-sixth to the Heirs of their descendants enjoying the benefits
Flaviana Galang; therefrom. No one questioned or disturbed
them until the petitioners (heirs of Galang),
d. one-sixth to the Heirs of informed them that the lots in question were
Gertrudes Galang; titled in Galang's name and had been
partitioned, on the basis of a Deed of
e. one-sixth to the Heirs of Extrajudicial Partition (Exh. "D"), into three (3)
Potenciana Galang; equal parts corresponding to his (Galang's)
three (3) children; that petitioners had
succeeded in subdividing the lots and in
f. one-sixth to the Heirs of
obtaining titles thereto in their name (TCT
Leoncia Galang.
Nos. 182670-R and 182671-R) despite their
(respondents') earlier demands for an
Costs against defendants-
extrajudicial settlement of their dispute.
appellees.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that
SO ORDERED. 1
the cadastral case which culminated in the
issuance of the original certificates of title over
It appears that on 21 August 1984, Aureo the subject lots in the sole name of Galang,
Reyes, et al. (hereafter "respondents") filed an was a proceeding in rem, thus binding on the
amended complaint before the Regional Trial whole world; that when original certificates of
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed title (OCT Nos. 9010 and 9102) were issued on
as Civil Case No. 6752, for the annulment of a 9 January 1922 to Galang, respondents did
deed of extra-judicial settlement and partition not raise any objection until March 1983
of the estate of Dionisio Galang, claiming to when they filed the complaint in Civil Case No.
have been deprived thereby of their shares, as 6752, or after a lapse of sixty-one (61) years.
co-owners, in Lot Nos. 3548 and 3562 Bacolor
cadastre, and that OCT Nos. 9010 and 9102,
The trial court3 upheld Galang's titles over the
issued in the name of Dionisio Galang,
lots which, as aforestated, had been issued as
covering said lots, are fraudulent and should
early as 1922 in his name. The trial court
therefore be annulled and cancelled.
further held that respondents' action had long
prescribed, having been filed only on 24
The facts of the case, as culled from the Court March 1983, or after a lapse of sixty-one (61)
of Appeals decision, are as follows: long years from the issuance of said titles. The
court also noted respondents' failure to
The spouses Hilario Galang and Martina establish their relationship to Galang's five (5)
Laxamana owned two (2) lots located in San sisters, premising their claim solely on an
Agustin, Potrero, Municipality of Bacolor, unsubstantiated assertion that they are
Province of Pampanga. They had six (6) descendants of the deceased Galang
children, namely, Dionisio, Marciana, sisters.4 The presence or construction of the
Potenciana, Flaviana, Leonora and Gertrudes. houses on Lot No. 3548 was also not
considered as evidence in respondents' favor,
The spouses (Hilario and Martina) mortgaged since no proof was submitted establishing
the aforesaid lots to Camilo Angeles. It is respondents' right to occupy the place. The
alleged by the respondents that Dionisio documentary evidence (Exh. "C" and "C-1")
Galang redeemed these lots in his own name, allegedly showing co-ownership among
despite the fact that part of the funds used for Dionisio and his co-heirs, was likewise ignored
the redemption came from his sisters.2 A by the trial court as this did not specifically
cadastral survey involving the two (2) lots was refer to the disputed Lots 3548 and 3562.
P a g e | 35
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
On appeal by the respondents, respondent as complete payment for the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court by discharge of the land we co-
upholding respondents' rights. It focused on inherited, which is the one we
two (2) issues. partitioned this date also, which
Thus — was mortgaged to the Angeles
family.7
Are the properties in question
owned in common by the However, as can be gleaned from the
predecessors-in-interest of foregoing, there is no reference to Lot Nos.
appellants and appellees? And 3548 and 3562. Said affidavit is not therefore
has appellants' present action for a sufficient basis or support for what is
partition prescribed?5 alleged by respondents as a partition among
Dionisio and his now deceased sisters. It does
The appellate court declared that co- not, as correctly stated by the trial court,
ownership existed between respondents' amount to anything insofar as the two (2) lots
predecessors-in-interest and those of involved in this case are concerned:
petitioners, on the basis of Galang's affidavit
which, although unnotarized, was nonetheless Even their presentation of the
an ancient document, pursuant to Sec. 22, document purportedly executed
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, since it was by Dionisio Galang on June 27,
executed on 27 June 1920. As such, proof of 1910 (Exh. "C" and "C-1") where
its due execution and authentication could be the latter acknowledges that he
dispensed with, according to the appellate and his co-heirs named therein
court. as co-owners of a certain
property which they had
Hence, this recourse in turn by the mortgaged to a certain family
petitioners. surnamed Angeles does not
amount to anything for nothing
We find the petition impressed with merit. in this document shows that it
pertains to the two lots involved
It is a fact that Dionisio Galang's ownership herein. It merely referred to a
over the disputed lots (3548 and 3562) had certain "land" which Dionisio
been judicially confirmed on 19 May 1919 in Galang and his co-heirs "co-
Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. No. 51, which inherited" and partitioned
is a proceeding in rem and hence binding "on without any indication as to
the whole world." OCT No. 1056 (9010) and which property is being referred
OCT No. 1057 (9102) were, as a consequence, to.8
issued on 9 January 1922. None of Galang's
co-heirs objected to or protested their We likewise agree with the trial court that in
issuance. These titles became indefeasible and the absence of definite proof establishing
incontrovertible. Then it was only after sixty- respondents' link/relationship to their alleged
one (61) years or on 24 March 1983 that the predecessors-in-interest, i.e., the Galang
descendants of Galang's co-heirs asserted co- sisters, they do not have any cause of action,
ownership claims over the subject lots. and the suit for partition must necessarily fall.
The trial court aptly observed:
It is true that Galang executed an affidavit,
unnotarized at that, on 27 June 1920 which . . . the plaintiffs thru their
states in part as follows (per English witnesses Bienvenido Tapnio,
translation [Exh. Marcos Dimabuyu, Pedro
"C-1"]):6 Atienza, and Carmelita Galang,
tried to prove that all the
That on this date, I have received plaintiffs herein are heirs and
from all my sisters and nephews direct descendants, respectively,
who are my co-heirs, namely of Marciana Galang, Potenciana
Potenciana Galang, Flaviana Galang, Flaviana Galang,
Galang, Gertrudes Galang, who Leoncia Galang and Gertrudes
are my sisters, and Silverio Galang who, in their lifetime,
Garcia and Hilarion Samia, in together with their late brother
their own names and for their Dionisio Galang, are the co-
brothers and sisters who are also owners of these two lots, namely,
co-heirs, the sum of ONE Lots Nos. 3548 and 3562.
HUNDRED AND SIX PESOS Lamentably, all that was proved
(P106.00), Philippine Currency, in the process by the plaintiffs
thru these witnesses despite
P a g e | 36
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
several proddings and water collected upon their lands and in the
suggestions made by the court Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into
toward this end was that each of the Taliptip River. From that year however, the
these plaintiffs are just related to defendant, without any right or reason,
one another in varying degrees of converted the land in Paraanan into a
relationship. They failed to fishpond and by means of a dam and a
establish their connection or bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the
relationship with any of these water through said place into the Taliptip
five sisters save for their River, that in consequence the lands of the
unfounded averment that they plaintiff became flooded and damaged by the
are indeed descendants and stagnant waters, there being no outlet except
heirs of these deceased through the land in Paraanan; that their
individuals.9 plantation were destroyed, causing the loss
and damages to the extent of about P1,000,
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The which loss and damage will continue if the
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is obstructions to the flow of the water are
hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the allowed to remain, preventing its passage
trial court dated 3 October 1986 in Civil Case through said land and injuring the rice
No. 6752 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. plantations of the plaintiffs. They therefore
asked that judgment be entered against the
SO ORDERED. defendant, declaring that the said tract of land
in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement
Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur. permitting the flow of water from the property
of the plaintiffs, and that, without prejudice to
the issuing of a preliminary injunction, the
defendant be ordered to remove and destroy
the obstructions that impede the passage of
the waters through Paraanan, and that in
future, and forever, he abstain from closing in
10 any manner the aforesaid tract of land; that,
upon judgment being entered, the said
G.R. No. 4223 August 19, 1908 injunction be declared to be final and that the
defendant be sentenced to pay to the plaintiffs
NICOLAS LUNOD, ET AL., plaintiffs- an indemnity of P1,000, and the costs in the
appellees, proceedings; that they be granted any other
vs. and further equitable or proper remedy in
HIGINO MENESES, defendant-appellant. accordance with the facts alleged and proven.