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    © All Rights Reserved
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    111 views20 pages

    Klaus Eder Social Construction of Nature

    Uploaded by

    ErickGalán-Castro
    Introducción

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
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    The Social Construction of Nature x PREFACE ‘with restorational intentions, to plead for a ‘Catholic spirit’ in imteracting with nature. Such an escape will be systematically avoided in this book. That also defines the theoretical intention of this book: to sketch out the Foundations of a social critique of ecological reason by starting from a ‘comparative analysis ofthe relationship to naturein different societies. Such ‘eeritique is the opposite of restoration. It may use elements of tradition, but it does not remain bound to them. This prevents any restorational intent ‘The attempt to develop a concept of practical rationality in the recon- struction of the cultural foundations of man’s relationship to nature runs like ‘i leitmotif through the following considerations and analyses. Whether the attempt to make explicit the implicit cultural prerequisites of ‘ecological communication’ Jeads to a practical rationality beyond ulilitarian reason remains an open question as long as we restrict ourselves to ideological critique. Te becomes a political question 2s soon us we situate the discourse ‘on nature in its practical context and transform a philosophical question into ‘ sociological one, This eventually will help us to know more precisely why ecological reason is so difficult to realize in our society. Acknowledgement Thanks to Paul Statham for constructive discussions of Part TIT and for helping to put the text into good English INTRODUCTION In the history of modemity, ecological reason is the youngest variant of practical reason. Just as the Protestant spirit has dominated practical reason to date, it also dominates ecological reason. The Protestant spirit of ecological reason aims at a rational form of adaptation to nature, an ecologically compatible form of dealing with nature, Tt turns against the unlimited exploitation of nature. {1 opposes irresponsible interaction with nature and pleads for the preservation of the “natural environment’ for ‘current and future gencrations. Its concerned with the survivalof nature. In short, the prevailing ecological reason is a form of practical reason that repraduces the Protestant spirit. Since the beginning of modern society, the Protestant spirit of ecological season has been seeking to reduce practical reason to utilitarian reason, It stands for a ulilitarian form of practical rationality. Doubts regerding this form of practical reason have been growing, however, along with the ecologies crisis of advanced industrial socicties: This telternative? meaning ‘of the ecologically rational is supposed to go beyond the utilitarian form of practical reason. In the following, this alternative relationship of society to nature can be paraphrased as the idea of a communicative form of practical tionality. What is at stoke i9 this alternative relationship is the issue of a st nther. a setter fife in ‘his alternative relationship will be explained below as a ert prevailing industria} unde standing of nature. Such a critique of ecolog son presumes a form-—which must stil be clarified —of theoretical reason ‘This theoretical reason no. longer seeks to instruct or to. say. which understanding of nature is correct and which is false. Its only remaining function is a negative one: its function isto enlighten people on the illusions ‘of practical reason. Theoretical ceason no longer consists in ‘anticipating the conditions for the possibility of practical reason, but rather ia providing enlightenment on the illusions tied to it. Such a form of criticizing ecological feason forces o triple theoretical refraction. Tt compels us, first of all, to correct the culture-theoretical ignorance in the description of societal relationships to nature, Second, it forces a correction of the evolutionary theoretical perspective on the history of the relationship between society ‘and nature, Third, to the extent the “ecology of ecological reason’ becomes a theme, it requires a concept of rationality which remains to be clarified. The three key concepts of a theoretical reflection on socictal relationships to ‘ature ~ culture, evolution and sationality - will frst be briefly explained. Sociological analysis, which treats the societal relationship to nature as & 2 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF NATURE problem of practical reason, first requires a radicalization of the sociological perspective in terms of cultural theory. The point is to reconstruct the symbolic forms in which nature is represented, beyond the ullitarian relationship to nature which has become the cultural norm. These symbolic forms examine the ‘natural’ foundations of the social world: the seasonal rhythms or the cycle of life and death. This world cannot be guided by norms, such as the relations between I and Other. One cannot guide it, nor ccan one intervene in its almost frightening regularity. This uncontrollabiligy forces us to characterize this world as thal which is mysterious, unknown and incomprehensible, withdrawn from society and at the same time remaining within i ‘Such ® cultural theory sensitizes us 10 the symbolic foundations of ‘communication which are prerequisites for all communication prior to any normative generalization of expectations. One could call these the aspects of aa society that are taken for granted, the unanalysed aspects of a lifeworld ~ ‘that which controls social relations between people even before any social onder exists. Such cultural certitudes are also changed by communication; they are disenchanted and enchanted at the same time; they are simul- taneously rationalized and mystified. This is the origin of the paradox that ‘communication destroys cultural certitudes and yet relies on such certitudes in order 10 continue at all, Obviously these cultural cestitudes are inexhaustible; there is no reservoir of them that could be consumed or cexlsausted in tke course of history. Tusteud, dis 1eser voit is veplenished over and over again with new cultural certitudes over the course of social development. What has been characterized as the ‘reenchantment of the world” (Moscovict 1976) is an indication thet even modern culture continu: ally produces such certitudes encw. Cullure resembles a Hy that generates more heads regardless of how many are chopped o Second, if enlightened by culvural theory, 2 sociological snalysis of th societal relationship to nature changes our perspective on evolutionary theory. The notion that society seeks to survive in nature hus dominated evolutionary thought in sociology. The social construction of nature opens Up two differing and competing forms of social evolution in the history of human societies: a natural evolution and a cultural evolution. Far-reaching, modifications of a theory of evolution are tied to this distinction, Navural evolution changes the form of social interaction with nature. Society uses its knowledge of nature to increase its ‘productive forces’. This increases the ‘complexity of society and, above all, the social division of labour. Cultural evolution, on the other hand, changes the nules of responsible action in society. Ttuses normative rales to promote its ‘moral progress’. This leads to fn intensification of social conflicts, which forces the differentiation of communicative forms of conflict resolution, ‘The relationship of natural and cultural evolution in the history of human societies has been decided (albeit with differing justifications) in the classical sociological theories of evolution from Mrx to Luhmann in favour of a primacy of natural evolution. ‘These theories describe social evolution as a INTRODUCTION 3 continuous differentiation of society away from nature. The further this natural evolution advances, the more complex the relations of society to the environment become and the more precatious the equilibrium between nature and society becomes. This notion also sustains the current enviton- mental discourse to a large extent, Such theories become problematic when they assign rankings to the stages of natural evolution designating the relative cultural (moral, aesthetic) perfection of society. Historical experi- ‘ence rather tends to hinder such assignments. Cultural evolution seems ‘more tobe a process which —at every stage of natural evolution comes into effect, is impeded, partially succeeds and is again reversed. Cultural evolution is @ process that is attempted again and again and only rarely succeeds. ‘At every stage of natural evolution, that is, in simple, traditional and ‘modem societies, we find starting points of acultural evolution, an evolution which is categorized in the self-concept of the respective society as ‘perfection’. Modern society, which believed it had the Key to. this perfection, is compelled to conclude that there is 1 “dialectic of enlighten- ment’, It additionally concludes that its cultural evolution threatens to Gestroy its own natural prerequisites and thus the conditions for the possibility of further natural evolution, And it concludes that its cultural ‘evolution scarcely provides it with the means to break off this process of self-destruction. The doubts as to the possibility of a social evohition of suviety ia the seuse uf a highe: cultaial development Yecome all too understandable. A theory of social evolution must, therefore, incorporate the tension between natural and cultural evolution in the history of humsn societios as a theoretical problem and clarify the relationship of the two. That also implies breaking with 1 sociological th formation that have equated socist development of productive forces andior social differentiation, Those traditions cap be ‘understood from the perspective of cultural heory us nzturalisie cheories of social evolution, The programme of a culturalist theory of social evolution ‘opposes this, It centres its theory formation on the (empirical) question of ‘what type of cultural evolution has taken place in various societies, where ‘and to what degree Enlightened by evolutionary theory, sociological analysis of the societal relationship to nature also changes the notion of a practical reason in interaction with nature ~ this is the thitd implication of the sociological ‘analysis of societal relationships with nature. ‘The central question of this theory of social evolution is not whether societies fit into a classification scheme of natural evahution (which they do, more or less badiy!). The central question is rather whether the appropriation of nature is tied to earning processes in the dimension of practical reason, and what type of reason in action jt ip tied to. It is not surprising that theoretical reason is increasingly irritated when it seeks to view social evolution from the perspective of rationality ‘Such questions do not arise so long as the criterion of rationality is sought 4 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF NATURE in‘pure reason’. From the perspective of purereason’, society appearstobea pure by-product of the evolution of the human mind. This evolution is measured on the scale of the cognitive capacity for adaptation to and control ‘of the respective environment, And humankind, since reason is part ofits psychicequipment,issuperiorhere tootherspecies. Reason, asKan(says, isa gift of nature that makes humankind the master of nature. Yet the ‘human history ofnature’ shows that there is no theoretical reason beyondall practical reason. Every societal relationship to nature that incorporates theoretical reason on various levels ofits evolution is at the same time the expression of practical reason. Theoretical reason merely elevatesthe ability ofhumankind toadapt othe environment. Iidoes not constitute asocietal relationship with nature. Practical reason, on the contrary, makes it possible to act responsibly ia the world which has been made cognitively possible by theoretical reason. ‘Thus an answer can be given to the central question for the critique of ecological reason, that is, whether and to whal extent the social appropri: ation of nature is ‘rational’. The problem of rationality is not that people's notions of nature must be correct. Rationality does not presume that people no longer hold magical ideas about the world, That would be a question of “theoretical reason’. The ptoblem of rationality is rather in what way people’s praxis can be labelled cational ~ no matter how magical their sotions may be. And that isa question of ‘practical reason’. Practical reason fs largely indepenstent of the possibilities theoretical reason opens up. Ics rot a privilege of societies that can claim a higher theoretical ronson for themselves. The rationality of a society is— this is the quintessence of thes reflections ~ the result of a social evolution of practical reason, This threefold theoretical relractina of the concepts of eu frafonatity ndatian for a theary of the sock le. Ht suggests makin according to whether a social evolution of practical reason relies on poi (or autopoiesis!) oF on practice (or communicative self-creation!).! difference between practice and poiesis, or the empirical proportion in which they are mixed, explains different forms of practical rationality and different paths of social evolution. With this programmatic approach, we are no longer continuing to write a ‘universal history’ of practical reason, but beginning instead to write 2 ‘multiversal history’ of practical reason. ‘The question of the specific practical rationality of ecological reason can be adequately formulated only inthe framework of such a multiversat history ‘The question can be formulated as to how much ecological reason is & continuation of practical reason, or whether it is a starting point for an ‘alternative’ practical reason, cling developmental paths 1 This distinction refers tothe conceptual choles snaking ue difference of he way in which ‘abesmas and Lahnann conceive soil realty. CE Lshmann (1964) and Habermas (196, 18). INTRODUCTION 5 ‘This programmatic approach also changes the empirical perspective. The empirical enquiry is: where does one find the starting points in social evolution for a cultural evolution that embodies this ‘alternative’ reason? TPhis question opens a broad field of investigation — for concrete analyses of evolutionary changes, for comparative studies, as well as for case studies, ‘There isno methodological royal road for such analyses; we are eft with the usual efforts of comparative analysis. There is ne privileged historical time ‘and no privileged geographical space for such analyses. Cultural evolution ‘occurs in simple, traditional and madera societies. There is no society that ‘excludes cultural evolution. There are only differences in the extent to which ‘cultural evolution can be obstructed. And, contrary to the rationality claimed for it, modern culture seems more fo belong to those societies in which the extent afself-obstruction of cultural evolution has become largest ‘The following text is divided into theee parts. Part T lays down the foundations in cultural theory for a critique of ecological reason. In the framework ofacritique of the open and concealed naturalism of sociological theory formation, an attempt is made to describe the societal relationship to nature as a human history of nature, which breaks up the logic of natural evolution. The concept of a human history of nature prohibits making “theoretical reason the regulative principle of this human history of nature Instead, it enquires into practical reason, into responsible dealing with that ‘which has made the evolution of the human spirit possible. The reconstruc tion of a human history of nature shove that no interaction with nature ie beyond the bounds of practical reason. quires into the logic of cultural practices of the appropriation of nature. This is done with analyses of food taboos, sacrificial rituals and out eating, that is 10 say. $9 orms of the consumptive jon of nature. Food taboos determine what may be eaten and rohibited, This boundary between the edible and inedible dees net just have economie functions; beyond that, it contains an impish morality. cellence, for they seek to control and civilize by symbolic forms the violence which is inherently present in all interaction with nature (including that with people, who are always also part of nature). This civilization is explained in a contrast between two models of interaction with nature: the model of carnivorous culture and that of vegetarian culture. They contain antithetical options of social construction, with specific consequences for the repro-

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