Page 1 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and
JOSELITO TAMAYO, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN,
RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants.
PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the
aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newly-
installed government of President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly
challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos
loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension
and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence.
On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known
"Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court
against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with
the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Raul
Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86-47617
against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero;
Criminal Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo;
Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal
Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed were
Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to
the murder of Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX, Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial
ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including
two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police
officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of
their testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary
evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various
photographs taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to
be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a
permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities.
Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day.
Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu
singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between.
Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western
Police District, arrived and asked the leaders for their permit. No permit
could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes
to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was
refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo
ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega added "Sige, sige gulpihin
ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and
truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of
them fought back and threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd
fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized. 1
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese
Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular
movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the
fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and
Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!"
Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin,
Page 2 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas
nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged
Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the
gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to
cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. 2 He then saw a man
wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various
habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in
pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed the following post-mortem findings:
and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the
group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo
Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm.,
to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the
frontal region, right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left
maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their
side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left
fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to
side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0
Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to
x 4.0 cm. left suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right
tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from
elbow.
behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused
Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right
even as he was already fallen.3 Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan
knee.
boxed him on the left side of his head and ear.4 Accused Nilo Pacadar
punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan.
Patayin!"5 Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0
victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and cm., upper lip.
kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip
Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal
repeatedly boxed him.6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the region; right temporal region; occipital region, right side.
victim but did not notice what he did.7
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off cranial fossa; right anterior cranial fossa.
the blood from his face. He sat on some cement steps8 and then tried to
flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the
process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Other visceral organs, congested.
Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?"9
Page 3 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food
materials and fluid.10
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press
people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the
event which became front-page news the following day, capturing national
and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to order the
Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate
the incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by
Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who could
give information leading to the arrest of the killers. 11 Several persons,
including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the
police, and on the basis of their identification, several persons, including
the accused, were apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the
mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito
Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by
the prosecution12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon
City.13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of
the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his
office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that
time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he
cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos
admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting
Salcedo. 17 He said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why
his face appeared in some of the photographs. 18 Unlike the other accused,
Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y
Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day.
According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los
Santos, merely viewed the incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because
he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified
that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The maulers
however ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer
opted not to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo
Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo
guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery and
sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion
temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however,
found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused
and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver
Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the
aforementioned cases as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery,"
Criminal Case No. 86-47322, the Court finds that the
Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the two (2)
Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged
and hereby acquits them of said charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case
No. 86-47617, the Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison,
Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principals for the crime of Murder, defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and, there being
no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby
imposes on each of them an indeterminate penalty of
from FOURTEEN (14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum,
to TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal,
as Maximum;
Page 4 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case
No. 86-47790, the Court finds the Accused Richard de los
Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for
the crime of Murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being no other extenuating
circumstances, the Court hereby imposes on him an
indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS,
TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;
4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No.
86-48538 the Court finds the Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal, for the crime of "Murder"
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY
(20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case
No. 86-4893l, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed
to prove the guilt of the Accused for the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said
charge;
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case
No. 86-49007, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed
to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of
said charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-
49008, the Court finds the said Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder
under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate
penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS
of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS,
FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los
Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are
hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs
of Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as
actual damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of the costs
of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar,
Romeo Sison, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito
Tamayo had been under detention during the pendency
of these cases shall be credited to them provided that
they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly
with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered
to release the Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and
Rolando Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are
being detained for another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez
has become moot and academic. The Petition for Bail of
the Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo
is denied for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega are hereby cancelled. 22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the
decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the
penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion
perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by
Page 5 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide
because the information against him did not allege the said qualifying
circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar
y Abe, Joel Tan y Mostero and Richard de los Santos are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED
of being an accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has
been imposed in the instant consolidated cases, the said
cases are now hereby certified to the Honorable
Supreme Court for review. 24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court inasmuch as Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us for automatic review of
the decision of the Court of Appeals against the four accused-appellants
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO CITE
ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR AVERMENT
THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO HAVE COME
FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE DEATH OF STEPHEN SALCEDO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL,
SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF THE ACCUSED
CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT, THE
ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN
THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE
PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS MURDER AND
NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS
AFFRAY. 25
Page 6 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
I suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REACHING A CONCLUSION OF FACT UTILIZING
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NON-SEQUITUR
CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF THE
VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO THE RULES
OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O", "P", "V", TO "V-48",
"W" TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE
AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER THE SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER,
NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE FACTUAL GROUNDS
SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT. 26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the testimonies of the two in prosecution
eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because
they are unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve any credence.
According to them, the testimonies of these two witnesses are
by General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn
statements to the police geared at providing a new or improved
version of the incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly
identified a detention prisoner in another case as accused
Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and
unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him several
times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward
announced by General Lim, much less that both or either of them ever
received such reward from the government. On the contrary, the evidence
shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his
sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling, even before
announcement of any reward. 29 He informed the police that he would
cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw them
again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make
them and his testimony incredible. The sworn statements were made to
identify more suspects who were apprehended during the investigation of
Salcedo's death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial
court on the witness stand for being argumentative and evasive. 32 This is
not enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did not exhibit
this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his
testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his
evasiveness at some instances. Except for compelling reasons, we cannot
disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering
their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand.
As trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal
dimensions of a witness' testimony.
Page 7 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does
not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make his
whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a
truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons
with imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of
a witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to
the others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses'
testimonies corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of
the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe
with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the
medical and documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, testified that the victim had various wounds on his body
which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one hard
object. 35 The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by
punches, kicks and blows from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of
intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in Salcedo's skull which
may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as
fistblows, kicks and a blunt wooden instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched.
Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with
stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly
disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and "P," it erroneously gave evidentiary
weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-
13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the
police intelligence-operatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent
dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn
statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents
thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the other
prosecution witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a
surplusage. If appellants wanted to impeach the said affidavit, they should
have placed Pat. Flores on the witness stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was
being mauled at the Luneta — starting from a grassy portion to the
pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, 41 — as he
was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his
assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo
and the mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the
Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 46 and
the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned
by appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons
who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in
evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and
testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. 48 The
value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or
reproduction of the original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its
accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. 50 The
photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the
pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either
by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent
witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to
its accuracy. 52 Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its
exactness and accuracy. 53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as
part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr.
objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. 54 However,
when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas,
counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-
1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and
therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. 55 The
photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused
Page 8 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty.
Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their
respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At
subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-
examine all the accused who took the witness stand. 56 No objection was
made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at
the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their
admissibility. 57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is
anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not
presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by
some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is
an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs
are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when
appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified
themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal
that only three of the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo
Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses
lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison
appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely
running after the
victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the
pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not
exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of
the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not
record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally
identified by Sumilang and
Banculo61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball
identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of
conspiracy among the principal accused and in convicting them of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal
code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. — When,
while several persons, not composing groups organized
for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each
other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a
confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of
the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased, but the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be
identified, such person or persons shall be punished
by  prison mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious
physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon all those who shall have used violence
upon the person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be
several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized
for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted
one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone
was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence can be identified.62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the
course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof
cannot be ascertained.63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between
one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred
Page 9 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided
eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while
later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists
picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking
turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion
and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at
this stage of the incident.64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as
much as fifty in number65 and were armed with stones with which they hit
the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive
force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself.
They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument
several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was already
fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up,
prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face.
But his attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not
defend himself nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried
to save him from his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting
Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his
pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use
of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the
instant case. There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately
and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants' safety from any defense
the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and
unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing
a yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against the
rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well
found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and
run away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the
slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked. 66
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the
information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated in this case because the attack against Salcedo was sudden
and spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called
"Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the
time they were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a
unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death
of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to who
among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain
a conviction. 67 Each of the conspirators is liable for all acts of the others
regardless of the intent and character of their participation, because the
act of one is the act of all. 68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages,
P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of
the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three
years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi
Arabia. 69 The reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the
anguish wrought on his widow and three small children, 70 warrant an
increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity
of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim. 71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and
modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel
Tan and Richard de los Santos are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder without any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance and are each hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with
the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS
Page 10 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

of prision mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS

of reclusion temporal as maximum;

3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay

jointly and severally the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the
following amounts:

(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;

(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and

(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the

death of the victim.

Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Page 11 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. No. 216021, March 02, 2016
SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The expectations of a person possessed with full control of his faculties
differ from one who is totally deprived thereof and is unable to exercise
sufficient restraint on his. Thus, it is but reasonable that the actions made
by the latter be measured under a lesser stringent standard than that
imposed on those who have complete dominion over their mind, body and
spirit.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the July
10, 2014 Decision1 and the December 15, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35894 which affirmed the May 30, 2013
Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 03, Tuguegarao City (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. 13283, finding accused Solomon Verdadero y Galera
(Verdadero) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
In an Information,4 dated September 9, 2009, Verdadero was charged with
the crime of murder for killing Romeo B. Plata (Romeo), the accusatory
portion of which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province
of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused SOLOMON VERDADERO armed with a Rambo knife, with intent to
kill, evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA,
thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which caused his death.
Contrary to law.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On June 3, 2011, Verdadero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty."
During the pre-trial, he invoked the defense of insanity but did not consent
to a reverse trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.6
Evidence of the Prosecution
The evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following:
On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Maynard Plata
(Maynard) and his father Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station.
Together with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to report that
Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump. 7
After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men
made their way home on a tricycle but stopped at a drugstore as Maynard
intended to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded towards a store
near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug
store, Maynard saw Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by
the shouts of Ronnie.8
Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back with
the use of a Rambo knife. He again struck Romeo's upper back, just below
the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero
attempted to attack him as well. He defended himself using a small stool,
which he used to hit Verdadero in the chest. 9
Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance. The
responding police officers arrested Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie
brought Romeo to a clinic but were advised to bring him to the Cagayan
Valley Medical Center (CVMC). Romeo, however, died upon arrival at the
CVMC. Based on the Post-Mortem Examination Report, his cause of death
was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to
multiple stab wounds and hack wounds.10
Evidence of the Defense
Page 12 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
The evidence for the defense did not refute the material allegations but
revolved around Verdadero's alleged insanity, to wit:
Since 1999, Verdadero had been an outpatient of CVMCs Psychiatric
Department as he claimed to hear strange voices and had difficulty in
sleeping. Sometime in 2001, Miriam Verdadero (Miriam), Verdadero's
sister, again brought him to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC after he
became violent and started throwing stones at a tricycle with a child on
board. Verdadero was confined for two (2) months and was diagnosed to
be suffering from mental depression.
On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given
medications to address his mental illness. Verdadero would irregularly
consult with his doctors as he had a lifelong chronic disease. Then, in 2009,
he was again confined for the fourth (4th) time at CVMC due to a relapse.
On March 12, 2009, Miriam proceeded to CVMC, after she heard of the
stabbing incident. There, she saw Verdadero removing the IV tubes
connected to his body and, thereafter, locked himself inside the comfort
room. Eventually, Verdadero was given sedatives and was transferred to
an isolation room after Miriam informed the nurses of the incident. 11
On March 20, 2009, he was transferred to the Psychiatry Department after
Dr. Leonor Andres-Juliana (Dr. Andres-Juliana) had diagnosed that he was
having difficulty sleeping. Dr. Andres-Juliana opined that Verdadero
suffered a relapse, as evidenced by his violent behaviour.
Acting on the January 4, 2011 Order of the RTC, Dr. Ethel Maureen
Pagaddu (Dr. Pagaddu) conducted a mental examination on Verdadero.
She confirmed that as early as 1999, he was already brought to CVMC and
that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003. Dr. Pagaddu
agreed with Dr. Andres-Juliana that Verdadero had suffered a relapse on
the day of the stabbing incident.12
The RTC Ruling
On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for
the crime of homicide. The dispositive portion of which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused SOLOMON VERDADERO y Galera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the felony of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him:
1. To suffer an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from twelve (12)
years of prision mayor [as maximum] as minimum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; and,
2. To pay the heirs of Romeo Plata the amounts of:
    a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
    b. P50,000.00 as moral damages and
    c. P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages; and,
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the
prosecution failed to establish the presence of treachery and evident
premeditation to qualify the killing to murder. The trial court, however,
opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an exempting
circumstance. The trial court posited that Verdadero was unsuccessful in
establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the time he stabbed
Romeo or that he was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous
with the commission of the crime.
Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of
homicide. The appellate court agreed that the defense was able to
establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic attacks, but was
unable to prove that he was not lucid at the time of the commission of the
Page 13 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
offense. The decretal portion of the decision states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. The
Judgment, dated May 30, 2013, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao City, Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 13283, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
CA in its resolution, dated December 15, 2014.
Hence, this present petition, raising the following
ISSUE
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PETITIONER'S CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE
TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.
Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of insanity.
He claims that Maynard even admitted that he was not in the proper state
of mind when they were at the police station before the stabbing took
place. Further, it appeared that Verdadero was having hallucinations after
the stabbing incident as testified to by Dr. Andres-Juliana. Verdadero notes
that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that he had a relapse at the time of the
stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.
In its Comment,15 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that
the present petition presented a question of fact, which could not be
addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, it asserted that the CA did not misapprehend the facts as the
evidence presented failed to completely establish Verdadero's insanity at
the time of the stabbing.
In his Manifestation (in Lieu of Reply), 16 Verdadero indicated that he would
no longer file a reply as his petition for review already contained an
exhaustive discussion of the issues.
The Court's Ruling
The present petition primarily assails the conviction despite his defense of
insanity. Before delving into the merits of the case, a discussion of the
procedural issue is in order.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45;
Exceptions
The OSG argues that the Court should not entertain Verdadero's petition
for review as it principally revolves around the issue of his insanity — a
question of fact which should no longer be addressed in a petition for
review. The Court disagrees.
Generally, questions of fact are beyond the ambit of a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as it is limited to reviewing only
questions of law. The rule, however, admits of exceptions wherein the
Court expands the coverage of a petition for review to include a resolution
of questions of fact. In Laborte v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers'
Cooperative et al.,17 the Court reiterated the following exceptions to the
rule that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45, to wit: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record.
The present petition mainly delves into Verdadero's state of mind at the
time of the stabbing incident. Obviously, it is a question of fact, which,
ordinarily is not entertained by the Court in a petition for review. As will be
discussed below, the Court, nevertheless, finds that the circumstances in
Page 14 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
the case at bench warrant the application of the exception rather than the
rule.
Insanity must be present at the time the crime had been committed
To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense
claiming that he had suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia. Under Article
12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is exempt from criminal
liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid interval. The defense of
insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved for there is a presumption
that the acts penalized by law are voluntary. 18
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero
was brought to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he
was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward
sometime in 2009 due to a relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric
care from the time of his first confinement in 1999 until the stabbing
incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20,
2009.
Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia and
the only thing left to be ascertained is whether he should be absolved from
responsibility in killing Romeo because of his mental state.
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions.19 A showing that an accused is suffering from
a mental disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him from
the consequences of his act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability.20
In People v. Florendo,21 the Court explained the standard in upholding
insanity as an exempting circumstance, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there
is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e.,
appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment
because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus probandi rests upon him who
invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by
clear and convincing evidence.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In People v. Isla,22 the Court elucidated that insanity must relate to the
time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the
offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he must be
adjudged guilty for the said offense. In short, in order for the accused to be
exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must
categorically demonstrate that: (1) he was completely deprived of
intelligence because of his mental condition or illness; and (2) such
complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or
immediately before the commission of the offense.
In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the commission of
the crime because such defense is in the nature of a confession or
avoidance.23 As such, he is duty bound to establish with certainty that he
was completely deprived, not merely diminished, of intelligence at the
time of the commission of the crime. Failing which, Verdadero should be
criminally punished for impliedly admitting to have stabbed Romeo to
death.
Proving insanity is a tedious task for it requires an examination of the
mental state of the accused. In People v. Opuran24 the Court explained how
one's insanity may be established, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of
another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured
and judged by his behavior. Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be
known by outward acts, by means of which we read the thoughts, motives,
and emotions of a person, and then determine whether the acts conform
to the practice of people of sound mind.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties which is manifested in language and conduct. xxx
Page 15 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony
which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the
accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based
on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
In the earlier case of People v. Austria,25 the Court elucidated that evidence
of the mental condition of the accused during a reasonable period before
and after the commission of the offense is material, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is
permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition during a
reasonable period before and after. Direct testimony is not required nor
are specific acts of disagreement essential to establish insanity as a
defense. A person's mind can only be plumbed or fathomed by external
acts. Thereby his thoughts, motives and emotions may be evaluated to
determine whether his external acts conform to those of people of sound
mind. To prove insanity, clear and convincing circumstantial evidence
would suffice.
Guided by the precepts laid out by the above-mentioned jurisprudence,
the Court finds that Verdadero sufficiently proved that he was insane at
the time of the stabbing. Thus, the Court takes a view different from that
of the CA as the latter concluded that Verdadero's insanity was not clearly
proven.
It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental state
at the exact moment the crime was committed. This, however, is not fatal
to the finding that he was insane. His insanity may still be shown by
circumstances immediately before and after the incident. Further, the
expert opinion of the psychiatrist Dr. Pagaddu may also be taken into
account.
Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering a relapse
at the time of the stabbing incident. During her testimony, she stated as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On direct examination
Atty. Tagaruma
Q: By the way what was the mental condition of the accused referred
which involved your diagnosis as a life long chronic disease?
Witness
A: The accused was diagnosed schizophrenia, sir.
Q: When for the first time Solomon Verdadero was diagnosed with
schizophrenia?
A: It was on July 21, 2003, sir. xxx
Q: As an expert witness tell the Honorable Court if a person who has
relapse of schizophrenia could distinguish his act?
A: This mental disorder influence (sic) the impulse. It could at the time of
the commission of the crime that the impulse control and judgment of an
individual was affected sir.
Q: Could it be accurate to state that a person who has the relapse of
schizophrenia could not distinguish any act from right or wrong?
A: There is a possibility, sir.
Court
Q: Why did you say that Solomon Verdadero has the possibility of relapse
upon admission on March 19, 2009?
A: There was a period of relapse meaning the symptom was present and
there must be a remission if the symptom is abated, your Honor.
xxx
Atty. Tagaruma
Q: You have read for the record the report of Dr. Juliana on the alleged
violent behavior of Solomon Verdadero on March 12, 2009 which is the
date of the incident, as an expert psychiatrist is it possible that the violent
behavior of Solomon Verdadero on March 12, 2009 was the basis of Dr.
Juliana in diagnosing that the accused was in relapse upon admission on
March 12, 2009?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Following the remark of scientific conclusion of Dr. Juliana, Dr. Janet
Page 16 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

Taguinod and the conclusion made by you, is it also your conclusion that observations made by Maynard, a witness for the prosecution. In his
Solomon Verdadero was in relapse on March 12, 2009 due to violent testimony, Maynard gave his opinion on Verdadero's behavior and
behavior? appearance when they met at the police station, to wit:
A: Yes, sir. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On cross examination
On cross examination
Atty. Tagurama
Prosecutor Aquino Q: Having made the report against Solomon Verdadero, do I (sic) correct to
say that you are familiar with Solomon Verdadero even before March 12,
Q: But definitely during the disorder of the patient, the relapse would 2009?
somewhat be continued even when medications is administered to him? A: Yes, sir.
A: The symptom is controlled although there is a circumstances (sic) that
the patient may have relapse (sic) even with medication, sir. Q: Tell us why you are familiar to him even prior to March 12, 2009?
A: We are neighbors, sir.
Q: If a continuous medication was undertaken by the accused-patient in
this case could that have a long effect on his mental condition? Q: You are immediate neighbors?
A: Continuous medication could somehow control the symptom and not A: Yes, sir
absolutely eradicate the symptom.
Q: Since you are neighbors with Solomon Verdadero you see him almost a
Q: On March 12 , 2009 the accused-patient was on a lucid interval, in view (sic) time?
of the medication undertaken as of January 19, 2009? A: Yes, sir. I saw him daily.
A: It's haphazard, sir.
Q: When you see Solomon Verdadero daily you see his actuation?
xxx A: Yes, sir.

Court
Q: Madam witness what type of schizophrenia the accused was diagnosed?
A: Undifferentiated, your honor.26
[Emphases Supplied]
Dr. Paggadu, without any reservations, stated that Verdadero was suffering
a relapse of his schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. In
contrast, she was hesitant to opine that Verdadero might have been in a
lucid interval because of the medications taken. Thus, it is reasonable to
conclude, on the basis of the testimony of an expert witness, that
Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time he stabbed Romeo.
Further, the finding of Verdadero's insanity is supported by the
xxx
Q: Sometimes he boxes when he is not in his proper mind, what aberrant
behavior did you observe from him?
A: That's the only thing I observed and sometimes he steal (sic), sir.
Q: For a long time that Solomon Verdadero is your neighbor does his
relapse or what you called not in his proper mind occurred often?
A: It occurred once in a while, sir.
Q: When you said it occurred once in a while, this relapse may occur once
a week?
A: Yes, sir.
Page 17 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

Q: Prior to March 12, 2009, when did you first observe that Solomon
Verdadero appears not in his proper mind?
A: He was not in his proper mind for a long time, sir.
Q: Maybe it could be 5 months before March 12, 2009?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Court
Q: You testified that you observed the accused not in his proper mind for
the passed (sic) years before this incident was he also violent like what
happened on March 12, 2009?
Witness
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: When you went to the police station you allegedly reported the stolen
fan belt do I get you right that Solomon Verdadero was with you at the
police station?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: When he was with you at the police station what did you observe?
A: He was not again in his proper mind (sumro manen), your Honor.
xxx
Q: You said that he was not on his proper mind for the passed (sic) years?
A: Yes, your honor.27cralawred
[Emphases Supplied]
Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for a
long time. He had observed that there were times that Verdadero
appeared to be of unsound mind as he would sometimes become violent.
On the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard perceived that Verdadero
was again of unsound mind noting that he had reddish eyes and appeared
to be drunk. Moreover, he was immediately transferred to the psychiatry
department because of his impaired sleep and to control him from
harming himself and others.28
These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony
that drinking wine, poor sleep and violent behavior were among the
symptoms of a relapse, the same testimony that was used as basis for his
previous diagnosis.29 The evidence on record supports the finding that
Verdadero exhibited symptoms of a relapse of schizophrenia at the time of
the stabbing incident. Thus, Dr. Pagaddu reiterated Dr. Andre-Juliana's
conclusion that Verdadero was having a relapse of his illness on that
fateful day.
Further, on March 22, 2009, he was officially diagnosed to have suffered a
relapse of schizophrenia. Generally, evidence of insanity after the
commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however, may be appreciated
and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal behavior before or
simultaneous to the crime.30

Q: Can you describe his appearance?
A: His eyes was (sic) very sharp and reddish.
xxx
Q: As far as his appearance is concern (sic) do you remember his actuation
or how he was reacting?
A: Yes, your honor. He was somewhat drank (sic).
Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done
with utmost care and circumspection as the State must keep its guard
against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a general plea of
insanity.31 The circumstances in the case at bench, however, do not
indicate that the defense of insanity was merely used as a convenient tool
to evade culpability.
The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero already
raised the defense of insanity and remained steadfast in asserting that he
was deprived of intelligence at the time of the commission of the offense.
Page 18 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

He no longer offered any denial or alibi and, instead, consistently harped

on his mental incapacity. Unlike in previous cases 32 where the Court denied He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Romeo B. Plata the amounts of
the defense of insanity as it was raised only when the initial defense of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and
alibi failed to prosper, Verdadero's alleged insanity was not a mere P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages, plus interest on all damages
afterthought. awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
decision until the same shall
In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not have been fully paid.
totally free him from the responsibilities and consequences of his acts.
Article 12(1) of the RPC expressly states that "[w]hen an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the court shall order
his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons
thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same court." Instead of incarceration,
Verdadero is to be confined in an institution where his mental condition
may be addressed so that he may again function as a member of society.
He shall remain confined therein until his attending physicians give a
favorable recommendation for his release.

Verdadero still liable for damages in spite of his exoneration

In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from

criminal responsibility. He is, nevertheless, responsible to indemnify the
heirs of Romeo for the latter's death. An exempting circumstance, by its
nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is
freed from the criminal liability. 33

The amount of damages awarded, however, must be modified in order to

conform to recent jurisprudence.34 The P50,000.00 civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the RTC must each be increased to
P75,000.00. In addition, an interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per
annum should be imposed on all damages awarded computed from the
finality of the decision until the same have been fully paid.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-appellant

Solomon Verdadero y Galera of Homicide by reason of insanity. He is
ordered confined at the National Center for Mental Health for treatment
and shall be released only upon order of the Regional Trial Court acting on
a recommendation from his attending physicians from the institution.
Page 19 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. No. 206770               April 2, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NOEL PRAJES and ALIPA MALA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated May 30, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 00462, which affirmed the
Decision2 dated June 29, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch 15, finding Noel Prajes (Prajes) and Alipa Mala (Mala)
(accused-appellants) guilty for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The Antecedents
The accused-appellants were accused of violating Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 via an Information filed with the RTC of Cebu and docketed
as Crim. Case No. CBU-63836. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:
That sometime on 04 September 2002, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conniving and confederating with each other and mutually helping one
another, with deliberate intent, did then and there sell, trade, dispense,
deliver and/or give away to a National Bureau of Investigation Operative
who posed as buyer: White Crystalline substances having a total net
weight of 195.6580 grams placed inside three (3) transparent plastic packs:
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug locally
known as shabu, without authority of law. 3
The accused-appellants pleaded "not guilty" when arraigned. After pre-
trial, trial on the merits ensued. 4
According to the prosecution, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
Cebu City received reports that the accused-appellants were engaged in
the sale of illegal drugs. Following surveillance operations conducted
during the last week of August 2002, a buy-bust operation was organized
by the NBI for September 4, 2002.5
Thus, at around 1:00 p.m. on September 4, 2002, NBI’s informant, Rene
Sabayton (Sabayton) transacted with the accused-appellants for a
supposed buyer’s purchase of shabu weighing 200 grams for
₱180,000.00.6 At 4:00 p.m., the buy-bust team, headed by Senior Agent
Atty. Angelito Magno (Atty. Magno) and composed of NBI Supervising
Agent Vicente Minguez (SA Minguez), Special Investigator Teodoro
Saavedra (SI Saavedra), SI Ray Tumalon (SI Tumalon), SI Danilo Garay and
SA Rennan Oliva, proceeded to Kinasang-an, Pardo, Cebu City where the
purchase would be made. SI Tumalon was designated the poseur-buyer.
Atty. Magno prepared the buy-bust money amounting to ₱4,500.00,
composed of nine ₱500.00 bills dusted with fluorescent powder and which
were combined with boodle money.7
As previously arranged with Sabayton, Prajes met up with Sabayton and SI
Tumalon in a makeshift house in Kinasang-an, where Mala later joined
them. Since Prajes had not brought with him the illegal drugs to be sold,
the group proceeded to his father’s house which was only 15 to 20 meters
away from the makeshift house8 and there, SI Tumalon received the illegal
drugs from Prajes.
While they were at the ground floor of the house, Prajes handed to SI
Tumalon two packs of shabu having a total weight of 100 grams. When SI
Tumalon pointed out that he needed 200 grams, Prajes instructed Mala to
produce more stock. Mala left the house, then later came back with
another pack, which he handed to SI Tumalon. Thereafter, SI Tumalon gave
one bundle of the buy-bust money to Prajes, and the other bundle to
Mala.9
Upon the accused-appellants’ receipt of the buy-bust money, SI Tumalon
introduced himself to them as an NBI agent. SI Tumalon made a "missed
call" to SA Minguez’s phone, the team’s pre-agreed signal to indicate that
Page 20 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
the sale had been consummated, and then arrested the accused-
appellants.10 Soon thereafter, the other members of the buy-bust team
arrived. The accused-appellants were handcuffed and brought to the NBI
office, where their photographs and fingerprints were taken. 11 At the NBI
office, SI Tumalon handed the buy-bust money and three packs of shabu to
SI Saavedra, who placed his markings on the packs of shabu. SI Saavedra
also prepared the letter-request for examination of the illegal drugs, which
he personally turned over to Chemist Rommel Paglinawan 12 of the Forensic
Chemistry Section, Central Visayas Regional Office of the NBI. A laboratory
examination of the three packs sold by the accused-appellants to SI
Tumalon confirmed that the specimen contained methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. An ultraviolet examination performed by the NBI
also confirmed the presence of fluorescent powder on the accused-
appellants’ hands.
The accused-appellants denied the charge against them. Prajes claimed
that at about 4:00 p.m. on September 4, 2002, he was sleeping at his
house in Kinasang-an when a neighbor, Renante Paradero (Paradero),
woke him up to inform him that some persons were looking for him. He
then proceeded to Paradero’s house and there saw Sabayton, whom he
had previously met in a "sniffing session" and who had called him up at
around 1:00 p.m. on September 4, 2002 for the purchase of shabu.
Sabayton was with two companions, who inquired from Prajes about the
purchase. Prajes, Sabayton and his two companions then proceeded to the
house of Prajes’ father, where Prajes received the drugs from a person
sent by a certain "Alex". Prajes handed the pack of shabu to Sabayton,
then was immediately handcuffed by SI Tumalon. Sabayton hit Prajes’
handcuffed right hand with money that was brought by the buy-bust team.
Thereafter, Prajes was taken to the NBI Office.
For Mala’s defense, witness Magdalena Abarquez claimed that at around
4:00 p.m. on September 4, 2002, she saw Mala enter the house of Prajes.
When he tried to leave the house, he was prevented by someone who was
inside the house.13
Sabayton was called on the witness stand by the defense as a hostile
witness. He claimed that he was arrested by NBI operatives on September
3, 2002. While at the NBI office, the operatives asked for a gift or "regalo"
by giving names of persons whom they could arrest, in exchange for his
freedom. Thus, he gave the name of Prajes and coordinated with the latter
for the drug purchase.14 After Prajes presented the shabu to Sabayton
during the buy-bust operation, he called on Mala to test and sniff the
shabu. Before the latter could do so, SI Tumalon pointed a gun at the
accused-appellants and handcuffed them. When Prajes refused to receive
the buy-bust money, SI Tumalon slapped the money on Prajes’ handcuffed
hands. Notwithstanding Sabayton’s participation in the buy-bust which led
to the arrest of the accused-appellants, he was neither released from jail
nor relieved from prosecution for his violation of R.A. No. 9165. 15
The RTC Ruling
On June 29, 2004, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15, rendered a
Decision16 finding the accused-appellants guilty for violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentencing them to each suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay fine of ₱500,000.00. 17 Dissatisfied with the
trial court’s ruling, the accused-appellants appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated May 30, 2012, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of
the RTC. The appellate court found no credence in the denials that were
posed by the accused-appellants. Instead, it found credible the evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime of illegal
sale of drugs, as well as its showing that there was sufficient compliance by
the NBI operatives with the rule on chain of custody.
The Present Appeal
Hence, the present appeal wherein the accused-appellants insist on the
prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
accused-appellants also question the subject drugs’ identity and the NBI’s
observance of the rule on the chain of custody. They argue that it was
unclear as to who actually marked the subject packs of shabu, and that
Page 21 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
there were no photographs and physical inventory of the seized items,
even when the same are required under the law.
This Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
At the outset, the Court reiterates the settled rule that "the findings of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect.
This is truer if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When
the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, x x x,
said findings are generally binding upon us[,]"19 save in settled exceptions
such as: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4)
when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (7) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (8) when the findings
of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.20 Upon review, the Court has
determined that the present case does not fall under any of these
exceptions. We find no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings,
and consequent rulings, of the trial and appellate courts.
On the issue of chain of custody, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 mandates
that "[t]he apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
[seized] drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]"
In relation thereto, Section 21 of the law’s Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) provides in part:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. — x x x:
(a) x x x the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
These "[s]tatutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated
prohibited drugs and related items are designed to ensure the integrity
and reliability of the evidence to be presented against the accused. Their
observance is the key to the successful prosecution of illegal possession or
illegal sale of prohibited drugs."21
In a line of cases, the Court has nonetheless explained that "while the
chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, ‘as it is almost
always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.’" 22 The limitation on chain
of custody is also recognized in the afore-quoted Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165’s IRR, as it states that non-compliance with the rules’ requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items. In resolving drug cases, we then repeatedly emphasize that "what is
essential is ‘the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.’"23
Page 22 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
On the issue of the subject drugs’ marking as part of the chain of custody
requirement, the accused-appellants point out that SI Tumalon and SI
Saavedra both named SI Saavedra as the one who marked the seized
drugs, but witnesses SA Minguez and Atty. Magno each testified that it was
SI Tumalon and the forensic chemist, respectively, who effected such
marking. The Court, however, agrees with the CA’s observation that
although there were conflicting accounts by the prosecution witnesses as
to the person who actually marked the seized drugs, the failure of SA
Minguez and Atty. Magno to identify the said person could be readily
explained by the fact that they had no actual participation in the
evidence’s marking. As against their conflicting statements, what were
significant were the testimonies of SI Tumalon and SI Saavedra, being the
persons who actually seized, endorsed and marked the evidence. Both
agreed that following the accused-appellants’ arrest, the seized packs of
shabu were handed by SI Tumalon to SI Saavedra, who was the one who
placed the markings on the evidence,24 before the same were brought to
the laboratory for examination. As aptly explained by the appellate court:
SA Minguez may have incorrectly assumed that it was SI Tumalon, their
poseur-buyer, who made the markings on the packs of shabu that were
confiscated in the ensuing confusion. However, SI Tumalon himself
testified that he turned-over the drugs to SA Saavedra. Atty. Magno’s
statement that it was "maybe our Forensic Chemist" who made the
markings on the three packs is inconsequential when considered with the
positive testimonies of SI Tumalon and SA Saavedra. SA Minguez and Atty.
Magno assumed supporting roles. It was SI Tumalon who was in the thick
of things so to speak, as he was the poseur-buyer and he was the one who
took the shabu from accused-appellants and handed it to SA Saavedra for
marking. Moreover, SA Saavedra’s identification of his own handwriting
puts any doubt to rest.25 (Citations omitted)
The fact that the marking was performed by SA Saavedra only upon the
buy-bust team’s arrival at the NBI office did not adversely affect the
prosecution’s case against the accused-appellants. Given the situation at
the house where the accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto
and then arrested by the buy-bust team, the failure of SA Saavedra to mark
the seized drugs at the said site was justified. In his testimony before the
trial court, SA Minguez described that after the accused-appellants’ arrest,
their neighbors interfered and rallied for the accused-appellants, even
compelling members of the buy-bust team inside the house to seek the
immediate aid of their peers so that they could leave the premises. 26
Even the failure of the prosecution to present a physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs did not render inadmissible the packs of
shabu that were seized from the accused-appellants, especially as we
consider that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs did not
appear to have been compromised. This was similar with the Court's ruling
in People v. Torres27 and Ambre v. People,28 wherein we affirmed the
conviction of the accused notwithstanding some deviations from the
required procedure on physical inventory and photographs of the seized
items.1âwphi1
As against the accused-appellants' denial, an inherently weak defense, the
evidence presented by the prosecution deserves credence. The following
elements of illegal sale of shabu were sufficiently established during the
trial: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale,
and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing.29 During a planned buy-bust operation, SI Tumalon
served as a poseur-buyer and was able to successfully purchase packs of
shabu weighing 195 grams, more or less, from the accused-appellants for a
total consideration of ₱180,000.00. The payment was handed to the
accused-appellants by SI Tumalon. An examination conducted by the
Forensic Chemistry Section, Central Visayas Regional Office, NBI in Capitol
Site, Cebu City, confirmed that the packs contained methylamphetamine
hydrochloride.30 There was nothing on record which would indicate that
the substance purchased by SI Tumalon from the accused-appellants
during the buy-bust operation was different from the subject of the NBI
Forensic Chemistry Section's examination, and that which was eventually
presented by the prosecution in court to establish their case against the
accused-appellants.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 30, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 00462 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 23 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. No. 184758               April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
SONNY SABDULA y AMANDA, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the February 8, 2008 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02726, which affirmed the January 29, 2007
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82, Quezon City. The
RTC decision found appellant Sonny Sabdula y Amanda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). The trial court
imposed on him the penalty of life imprisonment.
THE FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states:
That on or about the 1st day of February, 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully,
and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker
in the said transaction, 0.10 (zero point ten) gram of white crystalline
substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 The prosecution presented
Police Officer (PO) 2 Bernard Centeno at the trial, while the testimonies of
PO3 Joselito Chantengco and PO1 Alan Fortea became the subject of the
parties’ stipulations. The appellant and Shirley Sabdula, on the other hand,
took the witness stand for the defense.
The evidence for the prosecution established that in the morning of
February 1, 2004, a confidential informant told the members of the Central
Police District (CPD) in Baler, Quezon City about the illegal drug activities of
one alias "Moneb" at a squatter’s area in San Roque II, Quezon City. Acting
on this information, operatives of the Station Intelligence and Investigation
Branch, Baler Police Station 2, CPD formed a buy-bust team composed of
PO2 Centeno (the designated poseur-buyer), PO1 Fortea, PO2 Rolando
Daduya, PO1 Victor Porte, PO1 Louise Escarlan and PO1 Noel de Guzman. 6
At around 7:00 p.m., the buy-bust team and the informant went to the
target area. When they arrived there, the informant introduced PO2
Centeno as his "kumpare" to the appellant. PO2 Centeno asked the
appellant if he could "score" two hundred pesos worth of shabu. 7 The
appellant responded by taking out a plastic sachet from his pocket, and
handing it to PO2 Centeno. PO2 Centeno in turn handed ₱200.00 to the
appellant, and then gave the pre-arranged signal.
As the other members of the buy-bust team were rushing to the scene,
PO2 Centeno introduced himself as a police officer and arrested the
appellant. Afterwards, he frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-bust
money from his right pocket.8
The police thereafter brought the appellant to the Baler Police Station 2 for
investigation. Upon arrival, PO2 Centeno gave the seized plastic sachet to
SPO2 Salinel who, in turn, handed it to PO3 Chantengco who made a
request for laboratory examination that PO3 Centeno brought, together
with the seized item to the Central Police District Crime Laboratory for
analysis.9 Per Chemistry Report No. D-140-2004 of Engr. Leonard Jabonillo
(the forensic chemist), the submitted specimen tested positive for the
presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). 10
In his defense, the appellant testified that between 8:00 to 9:00 p.m. on
January 29, 2004, he was on board a taxi at C5 Road, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
City, when a group of about five (5) men pointed their guns at him and told
Page 24 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
him to get out of the vehicle. After he alighted, the armed men told him to
board a mobile car11 and brought him to the Baler Police Station. At the
station, the police asked him to remove his clothes, and confiscated his
wallet, bracelet, cap and ₱300.00. The police then told him that he would
be detained for drug charges and that he would be jailed for 40 years. 12
Shirley’s testimony was summarized by the RTC as follows:
x x x On February 1, 2004, she was at home when her brother was brought
to Precinct 2, Baler[,] Quezon City. On January 29, 2004, at about 11:00
p.m., she received a text message from Allan Fortea, a policeman, telling
her to call a certain number if she loves her brother. The next day, at about
8:00 a.m., she called Fortea at the number he gave her. He told her that his
brother at Station 2 Baler Quezon City and asked her to produce
₱200,000.00 as ransom for her brother. She asked him if he could talk to
him. He allowed her and her brother to talk and the latter pleaded to her
for help and cried. Fortea told her not to talk in their dialect and took the
phone. Fortea then told her to see him at SM North Edsa Car Park on
January 30, 2004 at 7:00 p.m. Fortea did not come. At about 9:00 p.m., she
proceeded to Station 2 and met Fortea. He asked her about the money but
she told him she cannot afford it. Her brother was then detained when she
failed to give in to the said demand.13
The RTC, in its decision dated January 29, 2007, found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It also ordered the appellant to pay
a ₱500,000.00 fine.
THE CASE BEFORE THE CA
The appellant appealed his conviction to the CA where his appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02726. In its decision of February 8, 2008,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA held that the prosecution successfully established all the elements
of illegal sale of shabu: PO2 Centeno, the poseur-buyer, positively
identified the appellant as the person who gave him shabu weighing 0.10
gram in exchange for ₱200.00. The CA also ruled that the buy-bust team
were presumed to have performed their duties regularly. It added that the
appellant failed to impute improper motive on the part of the arresting
officers.
The CA further held that the chain of custody over the seized plastic sachet
were properly established, even if the time of the actual marking of the
seized item had not been shown.
THE PETITION
In his present petition,14 the petitioner claims that he was not selling drugs
when the police arrested him. He adds that his alibi was corroborated by
his sister, Shirley. He also argues that the seized plastic sachet was not
properly marked by the police.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the police were
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. It further
maintains that the chain of custody over the seized drug was not broken. 15
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to ACQUIT the appellant for the
prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We restate at the outset the constitutional mandate that an accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The burden lies with the prosecution to overcome this presumption
of innocence by presenting the required quantum evidence; the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the
weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required
evidence, the defense does not even need to present evidence in its own
behalf; the presumption prevails and the accused should be declared
acquitted.16
I. No moral certainty on the corpus delicti
Page 25 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
A successful prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs requires more than the
perfunctory presentation of evidence establishing each element of the
crime, namely: the identities of the buyer and seller, the transaction or sale
of the illegal drug and the existence of the corpus delicti.
In securing or sustaining a conviction under RA No. 9165, the intrinsic
worth of these pieces of evidence, especially the identity and integrity of
the corpus delicti, must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This
requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug's unique characteristic
that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.
Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of
the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug
presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the
accused-appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug
pushing under RA No. 9165 fails.17
a. The ‘Marking’ Requirement vis-à-vis the Chain of Custody Rule
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 (which
implements R.A. No. 9165) defines chain of custody as the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to the receipt in the
forensic laboratory, to safekeeping and the presentation in court for
identification and eventual destruction.
The Court explained the importance of establishing the chain of custody
over the seized drug in the recent case of People of the Philippines v.
Joselito Beran y Zapanta @ "Jose," 18 as follows:
The purpose of the requirement of proof of the chain of custody is to
ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug are
preserved, as thus dispel unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the
evidence. To be admissible, the prosecution must establish by records or
testimony the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit, from the time it
came into the possession of the police officers, until it was tested in the
laboratory to determine its composition, and all the way to the time it was
offered in evidence.
Thus, crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs
or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.
"Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-
buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Long before
Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure
of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs casts reasonable
doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is
vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference.
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are
seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the
criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.19
The records in the present case do not show that the police marked the
seized plastic sachet immediately upon confiscation, or at the police
station. Nowhere in the court testimony of PO2 Centeno, or in the
stipulated testimonies of PO3 Chantengco and PO1 Fortea, did they
indicate that the seized item had ever been marked. Notably, the members
of the buy-bust team did not also mention that they marked the seized
plastic sachet in their Joint Affidavit of Arrest.
How the apprehending team could have omitted such a basic and vital
procedure in the initial handling of the seized drugs truly baffles and
alarms us. We point out that succeeding handlers of the specimen would
use the markings as reference. If at the first or the earliest reasonably
available opportunity, the apprehending team did not mark the seized
items, then there was nothing to identify it later on as it passed from hand
to hand. Due to the procedural lapse in the first link of the chain of
Page 26 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
custody, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized
shabu that the prosecution introduced into evidence.
We are not unaware that the seized plastic sachet already bore the
markings "BC 02-01-04" when it was examined by Forensic Chemist
Jabonillo. In the absence, however, of specifics on how, when and where
this marking was done and who witnessed the marking procedure, we
cannot accept this marking as compliance with the required chain of
custody requirement. There was also no stipulation between the parties
regarding the circumstances surrounding this marking. We note in this
regard that it is not enough that the seized drug be marked; the marking
must likewise be made in the presence of the apprehended violator. As
earlier stated, the police did not at any time ever hint that they marked the
seized drug.
In Lito Lopez v. People of the Philippines20 we acquitted the accused for
failure of the police to mark the seized drugs. The Court had a similar ruling
in People of the Philippines v. Merlita Palomares y Costuna; 21 the Court
acquitted the accused for the prosecution’s failure to clearly establish the
identity of the person who marked the seized drugs; the place where
marking was made; and whether the marking had been made in the
accused’s presence. These recent cases show that the Court will not
hesitate to free an accused if irregularities attended the first stage of the
chain of custody over the seized drugs.
b. The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No.
9165, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
[Emphasis ours]
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; [Emphasis
ours]
In the present case, no evidence was produced showing that the members
of the buy-bust team had extended reasonable efforts to comply with
these requirements in handling the evidence. The lapse is patent from the
following exchanges during trial:
FISCAL ROGELIO ANTERO:
Q: x x x After the body frisk and the recovery of the buy-bust money from
the person of the accused, what happened next?
PO2 CENTENO:
A: We went to the station and turned over to the desk officer for proper
disposition.
Page 27 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

xxxx These exchanges further show that the apprehending team never
conducted an inventory nor did they photograph the confiscated item in
Q: How about the pieces of evidence you recovered? the presence of the appellant or his counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, or an elective official either at the
A: I also turned it over to the desk officer, sir. place of seizure, or at the police station. The Joint Affidavit of the police did
not also mention any inventory conducted of any photograph taken.
Corollarily, there was no certificate of inventory or inventory receipt and
Q: Who was the desk officer?
photographs of the seized drugs attached to the records.
A: SPO2 Salinel, sir.
In People v. Gonzales,23 the police failed to conduct an inventory and to
photograph the seized plastic sachet. In acquitting the accused based on
Q: What did the desk officer do with the evidence? reasonable doubt, we explained that [t]he omission of the inventory and
photographing exposed another weakness of the evidence of guilt,
A: He designated the investigator. Then, the investigator made the proper considering that the inventory and photographing — to be made in the
request for Crime Lab. presence of the accused or his representative, or within the presence of
any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected
Q: Who was the investigator? official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory —
were really significant stages of the procedures outlined by the law and its
A: PO3 Chantengco. IRR.24

xxxx We recognize that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No.
9165 may not always be possible. Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR, in fact,
Q: Why do you know that the duty desk officer turned over the pieces of offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements under
evidence to Chantengco? paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e., "non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
A: I was there, sir. and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
of and custody over said items[.]" This saving clause, however, applies only
Q: What happened when this pieces of evidence was turned over to the
where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses and thereafter
investigator?
cited justifiable grounds to explain them. In all cases, the prosecution must
have established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
A: The investigator made the request for Crime Lab. seized had been preserved.25

Q: After the request for laboratory examination of specimen was made. These conditions were not met in the present case as the prosecution did
[W]hat happened next? not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of the
apprehending team to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of
A: We immediately brought [sic] to the Crime Lab. for examination. 22 the seized drug. We stress that the justifiable ground for non-compliance
Page 28 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
must be adequately explained; the Court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist.
II. No Presumption of Regularity
in the Performance of Official Duties
The CA relied on the presumption that regular duties have been regularly
performed in sustaining the appellant’s conviction. This presumption of
regularity, however, is disputable; any taint of irregularity taints the
performance undertaken and negates the presumption. 26 It cannot by itself
overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt.27
In the present case, the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized from petitioner due to the failure of the police to mark,
inventory and photograph the seized plastic sachet effectively negated the
presumption of regularity. The procedural lapses by the police put in doubt
the identity and evidentiary value of the seized plastic sachet. Our ruling in
People v. Cantalejo28 on this point is particularly instructive:
As a general rule, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended
the accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the
presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. However,
when the performance of their duties is tainted with irregularities, such
presumption is effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot
by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by evidence
cannot be regarded as binding truth.29
In fine, we hold that the totality of the presented evidence do not support
a finding of guilt with the certainty that criminal cases require. The
procedural lapses committed by the apprehending team show glaring gaps
in the chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt on whether the shabu
seized from the appellant was the same shabu that were brought to the
crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as
evidence. In the absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drug bought
and sold, the body of the crime - the corpus delicti - has not been
adequately proven. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the
elements of the crime charged.1âwphi1
The Court is one with all the agencies concerned in pursuing a serious and
unrelenting campaign against illicit drugs. But we remind our law enforcers
to be ever mindful of the procedures required in the seizure, handling and
safekeeping of confiscated drugs. Observance of these procedures is
necessary to dispel any doubt of the outcome of arrests and buy-bust
operations, and to avoid wasting the efforts and the resources in the
apprehension and prosecution of violators of our drug laws. 30
WHEREFORE, in light of all these premises, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
February 8, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No.
02726. Appellant Sonny Sabdula y Amanda is hereby ACQUITTED for failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is otherwise
legally confined for another cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this
Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Page 29 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. No. 205202, June 09, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NENITA GAMATA Y
VALDEZ, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 11, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04839 which affirmed the
Decision2 dated September 15, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 64 in Criminal Case Nos. 06-1344 to 1345 finding
Nenita Gamata y Valdez (accused-appellant) guilty in Criminal Case No. 06-
1344 for violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 06-1344 to which the accused-
appellant pleaded “Not Guilty” contained the following
accusations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 25TH day of July 2006, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver to
another, zero point zero three [0.03] gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug, in exchange of Php.500.00
pesos.3 [sic]
Meanwhile, the information in Criminal Case No. 06-1345 indicted the
accused-appellant for illegal possession of 0.14 gram of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, an act punishable under Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.4 Considering, however, that the accused-
appellant was acquitted by the RTC of such criminal charge, the present
discussion shall concern only Criminal Case No. 06-1344.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Police Officer 2
Renie Aseboque (PO2 Aseboque), Noel Pulido (Pulido) and Juan Siborboro,
Jr., both operatives of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC), and
Police Inspector May Andrea Bonifacio (P/Insp. Bonifacio), Forensic
Chemist of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. Their
declarations depicted the following events:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On July 25, 2006, an information was received by Senior Inspector Joefel
Felongco Siason (S/Insp. Siason) of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Force (SAIDSOTF), Makati City, from a confidential asset of
the MADAC that rampant illegal drug peddling in Laperal
Compound, Barangay Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City was being carried out
by the accused-appellant, Jun Gamata (Jun), Toto Madera and Totoy
Pajayjay. Apparently, their names are also included in the watch list of the
MADAC.
Forthwith, a team composed of SAIDSOTF police officers and MADAC
operatives was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation against the said
subjects. During the briefing, PO2 Aseboque was designated as the poseur-
buyer while the rest of the team members were assigned to be his back-
up. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) under Pre-Coordination Sheet Control Number MMRO-
072506-0212 duly acknowledged to have been received by PO1 Nemencio
V. Domingo of the PDEA.5 One piece of a P500.00 bill was also marked for
use in the operation.6
At around 4:30 p.m., the team, together with the confidential informant,
proceeded to the subject area. The team members positioned themselves
in spots where they can monitor the possible transaction. Meanwhile, PO2
Aseboque and the informant walked towards Laperal Compound and
thereupon noticed a woman clad in white t-shirt and maong pants. The
informant identified her to PO2 Aseboque as the accused-appellant.
The two of them then approached the accused-appellant whom PO2
Aseboque queried as to the whereabouts of Jun. In response, the accused-
appellant said that Jun was not around and that “kami nandito lang, bakit
kukuha ba kayo?” PO2 Aseboque comprehended her response as the
Page 30 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
street language used in the dealing of dangerous drugs and that she
actually meant that she was selling shabu if they wanted to buy one. PO2
Aseboque repeated his query to which the accused-appellant replied,
“Wag niyo ng hintayin si Jun, ako meron.” PO2 Aseboque took her
response as a confirmation that she was indeed selling shabu. He then
asked her if she had P500.00 worth of shabu. The accused-appellant took
out one plastic sachet from her right pocket and handed it over to PO2
Aseboque who in turn examined its contents and thereafter handed the
buy-bust money to the accused-appellant. As she was placing the money
inside her pocket, PO2 Aseboque made the pre-arranged signal to his buy-
bust team mates by lighting a cigarette.
Upon seeing MADAC operative Pulido rushing towards the scene, PO2
Aseboque held the accused-appellant and introduced himself as a police
officer. He directed her to empty the contents of her pockets but she
refused. This prompted PO2 Aseboque to order Pulido to dig into the
accused-appellant’s pockets. Pulido complied and discovered three more
pieces of transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
suspected as shabu along with the buy-bust money and P120.00 of the
accused-appellant’s personal money.
The accused-appellant was then informed of her constitutional rights while
the sachet she sold to PO2 Aseboque was immediately marked by the
latter with his initials “REA” while those recovered by Pulido were marked
with “REA-1”, “REA-2”, and “REA-3”. At the crime scene, PO2 Aseboque
also prepared an Acknowledgment Receipt 7 which he and the arresting
team signed.
The accused-appellant and the seized evidence were subsequently brought
to the Makati SAIDSOTF office where they were turned over to PO2 Rafael
Castillo (PO2 Castillo) for investigation, interrogation and proper
disposition. At the same office, PO2 Aseboque executed an Affidavit of
Arrest8 and a Supplemental Affidavit.
Along with a Request for Laboratory Examination 9 prepared by S/Insp.
Siason, Pulido brought the seized specimens to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The same were received by a certain Relos, officer of the day, in the
presence of Crime Laboratory Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Bonifacio.
P/Insp. Bonifacio conducted the necessary tests on the subject specimens
and the results thereof yielded positive results for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, she tagged each item with tape
markings and reduced her findings in Physical Science Report Number D-
506-06S.10 She then turned over the specimens to the evidence custodian
from whom she later on retrieved them upon the instructions of the
prosecutor after the filing of criminal informations against the accused-
appellant.11
The defense refuted all of the above occurrences and claimed, through the
testimony of the accused-appellant, that at around 3:00 p.m. of July 25,
2006, she had just finished taking a bath when she heard someone banging
the door of her house in Laperal Compound. When she opened the door,
five armed men in civilian clothing greeted her and asked for Jun, her
brother-in-law. When she answered them that she did not know Jun’s
whereabouts, they began searching her house. Since Jun actually resides at
about five houses away from hers, the armed men were unable to locate
him at the accused-appellant’s house. They then handcuffed the accused-
appellant and loaded her in a van where she saw her neighbor, Alaw, and a
certain Jonalyn Silvano. The three of them were brought to the SAIDSOTF
office where the accused-appellant was shown items that will be used as
evidence against her.12
In a Decision13 dated September 15, 2010, the RTC sustained the
prosecution’s version and held that the pieces of evidence submitted
established the presence of the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
viz: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, object and consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Both
elements were found present in the poseur-buyer’s positive identification
of the accused-appellant as the person from whom he was able to
purchase P500.00 worth of shabu.
The accused-appellant’s denial and alibi were rejected for being
unsubstantiated. Her imputations of frame-up to the police officers were
likewise found uncorroborated by convincing proof and thus overthrown
by the presumption of regularity attached to the performance of the police
officers’ official duties.
Page 31 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
The RTC disposed thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [judgment] is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Finding the accused NENITA GAMATA y VALDEZ, GUILTY in
Criminal Case No. 06-1344 of the charge for violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 and sentencing her to life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(Php500,000.00);
2. ACQUITTING the accused NENITA GAMATA y VALDEZ in Criminal
Case No. 06-1345 of the charge for violation of Section 11, Article
II of RA 9165.
SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis ours)
On appeal, the accused-appellant argued for her acquittal on the ground
that the identity of the drugs seized from her was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to supply all the links in
the chain of their custody. She further pointed out the inconsistent
testimonial and documentary evidence on the markings placed on the
seized items. The accused-appellant also questioned the failure of the
police officers to comply with the procedure laid down in Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 particularly, the preparation of the inventory and
taking of photographs of the seized items.15
In a Decision16 dated May 11, 2012, the CA denied the appeal and
concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC that the identities
of the buyer and seller as well as the consummation of the sale of illegal
drugs was proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution through
the straightforward testimony of the poseur-buyer himself, PO2 Aseboque,
as believably corroborated by two other members of the buy-bust team
and by extensive documentary evidence. The CA rejected the accused-
appellant’s arguments and held that the same were disproved by the
evidence on record, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused-appellant contends that while [PO2] Aseboque maintains that he
had custody of the items seized from her, Pulido testified that he was the
one who held the items recovered from accused-appellant. A careful
perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes, however, reveals that there
was actually no inconsistency as what Pulido testified to as the items that
was with him were the ones he recovered from the pocket of the accused-
appellant and not the one that was subject of the sale. x x x
xxxx
x x x [W]hen Pulido testified as to the seized items, he was referring to
those sachets that he was able to fish out of the pocket of accused-
appellant and he held on to the same as [PO2] Aseboque had his hands full
trying to restrain accused-appellant. x x x Pulido corroborated [PO2]
Aseboque’s statement that it was the latter who prepared the inventory of
the items seized from the accused-appellant. x x x
xxxx
It is noted that the four sachets were already marked with the initial of the
apprehending officer at the scene of the crime. The act was attested to by
the rest of the arresting team and the markings were reflected in the
acknowledgement report. Even if [PO2] Castillo failed to note in his spot
report that the items were marked with the initial of [PO2] Aseboque, it
could not be discounted that the items were the ones seized from the
person of accused-appellant because if the same were different, the items
that were turned over to the forensic chemist P/Insp. Bonifacio would not
have borne the initial of [PO2] Aseboque considering that from the hands
of [PO2] Castillo, the seized items were personally handed by him to Relos,
who in turn gave the same to P/Insp. Bonifacio who was, likewise, present
when [PO2] Castillo handed the items to Relos. Moreover, [P/Insp.]
Bonifacio explained that there is actually no difference between the
marking “REA” and “R.E.A.” x x x
xxxx
In addition, an examination of the letter request (Request for Laboratory
Examination) shows that while the signatory mentioned that the item
Page 32 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
subject of the sale was marked as “REA”, when he attached the sachet to
the request, the signatory made a handwritten reference to the attached
specimen as “R.E.A.” To Our mind, the presence or absence of the
punctuation marks is of no moment as the request was precisely clear that
the items to be examined were the ones attached to the request
itself.17 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA also dismissed the accused-appellant’s contentions that the
statutory procedure for the inventory and photograph of the seized items
was not observed. The CA held that the absence of a media representative
or an elected public official during the inventory was not material to
overturn a conviction as it did not pertain to the elements of the crime
charged. The CA further stressed that non-compliance with the inventory
and photograph requirements will not render void and invalid the seizure
and custody over the items.
Accordingly, the decision disposed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED and the
appealed Decision dated September 15, 2010 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City, in Criminal Case No. 06-1344 for
Violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.18cralawlawlibrary
The accused-appellant is now before the Court pleading for her acquittal
based on the same arguments raised in her Appellant’s Brief before the
CA.19
Ruling of the Court
The Court denies the appeal.
The arguments proffered in support of the accused-appellant’s plea for
acquittal has already been exhaustively traversed by the CA and based on
evidence on record, the Court finds no reversible error imputable to the
appellate court and the trial court in finding her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal sale of shabu defined and penalized under Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165.
Illegal sale of prohibited drugs is consummated at the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. In a buy-bust operation, the crime is
consummated when the police officer makes an offer to buy that is
accepted by the accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them
involving the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the police officer. 20 In
order to successfully prosecute the offense, proof beyond reasonable
doubt of two elements must be satisfied by the prosecution, viz: (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the
consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the
payment for the thing.
As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, the presence of both requisites was
clearly established by the testimony of the poseur-buyer himself, PO2
Aseboque, who positively testified that the illegal sale took place when he
gave the P500.00 marked money to the accused-appellant in exchange for
the shabu, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WITNESS [PO2 Aseboque]: After I asked her if where is Jun, she told me
that Jun is not around, sir.
PROS. PAGGAO: What did you do next?
WITNESS: She said: Kami nandito lang, bakit kukuha ba kayo?
PROS. PAGGAO: What did you understand by that?
WITNESS: It is a street language that they are using with dangerous drugs,
so it is understood that we are going to buy shabu, sir.
PROS. PAGGAO: What did you reply, if any?
WITNESS: I asked her, “Si Jun wala ba?”
PROS. PAGGAO: Any answer from the woman?
Page 33 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
WITNESS: She said, “Wag n’yo ng hintayin si Jun, ako meron.”
PROS. PAGGAO: What did you do?
WITNESS: I asked her if she has worth Five Hundred Pesos, sir.
PROS. PAGGAO: What was her reply, if any?
WITNESS: She told me that she has worth Five Hundred Pesos, sir.
PROS. PAGGAO: And, after that, what did you do, if any?
WITNESS: She took one plastic sachet from her right pocket, sir.
PROS. PAGGAO: What did she do with that?
WITNESS: She handed that to me, sir.
PROS. PAGGAO: And, upon receiving the sachet of shabu, what did you do?
WITNESS: I checked it first if it has contents, sir.
PROS. PAGGAO: After checking, what did you do?
WITNESS: I then handed the buy bust money worth Five Hundred Pesos,
sir.
PROS. PAGGAO: And, after she received the Five Hundred Pesos, what
happened next?
WITNESS: While she is putting the buy bust money inside her pocket, I
made the pre-arranged signal by lighting a cigarette, sir.
xxxx
PROS. PAGGAO: Now, you have been mentioning of Nenita against [sic]
whom you were able to buy shabu and the one you arrested, is she in the
courtroom?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
PROS. PAGGAO: Will you kindly step down and tap her shoulder?
(The witness tapped the right shoulder of a female person and that woman
upon being asked of her name answered: Nenita
Gamata)21cralawlawlibrary
The CA was also correct in ruling that the failure of the arresting officers to
strictly comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
916522 mandating the procedure for the inventory and photograph of
seized illegal drugs did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized
from the accused-appellant. As held in People v. Cardenas:23
[N]on-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of
the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or
seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3
of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant
to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to
be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If
there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to
the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that
will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized
drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
admissibility—but of weight—evidentiary merit or probative value—to be
given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence
depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.24 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This is especially true when the chain of custody of the corpus delicti or the
illegal drug itself was shown to be unbroken,25 as in this case. Testimonial
and documentary evidence show that the poseur-buyer, PO2 Aseboque,
marked the seized illegal drug at the crime scene with his initials “REA”. At
Page 34 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

the same place, he also prepared an Acknowledgment Receipt of the items
seized from the accused-appellant whose refusal to sign was duly noted in
the same document.26 The seized item was then immediately turned over
by PO2 Aseboque to SAIDSOTF investigating officer PO2 Castillo. 27 On the
same day, PO2 Castillo brought the seized illegal drug, together with the
Request for Laboratory Examination,28 to the PNP Crime Laboratory where
it was received by a certain Relos in the presence of Forensic Chemist,
P/Insp. Bonifacio.29 In her Physical Science Report No. D-506-06S,30 the
contents of the seized item marked REA weighed 0.03 gram tested positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. After her examination,
P/Insp. Bonifacio turned over the seized item to the evidence custodian
from whom she later retrieved them upon the instructions of and for
submission to the prosecutor. On the witness stand, P/Insp. Bonifacio
categorically identified the specimen presented as evidence as the very
same specimen which she tested based on the marking she placed
thereon: “D-506-06S”.31
Indeed, the following links in the chain of custody of the seized illegal drug
were duly accounted for, to wit: (1) the seizure and marking of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic
chemist to the court.32
turned over to PO2 Castillo and then received by P/Insp. Bonifacio were
one and the same.
Further, the failure of the evidence custodian to take the witness stand did
not weaken the case for the prosecution because P/Insp. Bonifacio was
able to positively identify that the evidence submitted in court was the
very same specimen which she subjected to laboratory examination and its
contents tested positive for shabu.34
In sum, the Court finds no reversible error in the conviction meted the
accused-appellant. The penalty of life imprisonment and ?500,000.00 fine
imposed upon her were in accord with Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.35
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED and the Decision
dated May 11, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04839 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The alleged discrepancy between the testimony of PO2 Aseboque that he

placed the marking REA on the seized item, the forensic chemist’s report
stating that the specimen was marked “R.E.A.” and the absence of any
such description in the Spot Report33 of PO2 Castillo did not cause a gap in
the chain of custody. As exhaustively discussed by the CA, the identity and
integrity of the seized item was preserved because, despite lack of
accurate description in the Spot Report, P/Insp. Bonifacio testified that the
item she received for laboratory examination bore the markings “REA”
placed by PO2 Aseboque at the crime scene. It is for this same reason that
the punctuation marks after the letters R, E and A in her Physical Science
Report No. D-506-06S did not alter the identity and integrity of the actual
specimen marked as “REA.” The specimen marked at the crime scene,
Page 35 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. No. 207664               June 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GIL SALVIDAR y GARLAN, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review1 is the Decision2 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on
October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04989 affirming, albeit with
modification as to the wordings of one of the penalties imposed, the
Decision3 dated April 11, 2011 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 120 in Criminal Case Nos. C-78532-33, convicting Gil
Salvidar y Garlan (accused-appellant) for violation of Sections 5 4 and
11,5 Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.6
Factual Antecedents
The informations filed before the RTC against the accused-appellant
partially read as follows:
CRIM CASE NO. 78532
Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165
"That on or about the 12th day of November 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without authority of law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 RAMON GALVEZ, who
posed, as buyer, ten (10) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each
containing dried MARIJUANA fruiting tops weighing 0.37 gram, 0.35 gram,
0.40 gram, 0.28 gram, 0.35 gram, 0.36 gram, 0.32 gram, 0.36 gram, 0.67
gram & 0.57 gram, a dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription therefore, knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to law."
CRIM CASE NO. 78533
Violation of Section 11, Art. II, RA 9165
"That on or about the 12th day of November 2007, in Caloocan City[,]
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control one (1) transparent plastic box containing dried MARIJUANA
fruiting tops weighing 29.01 grams, when subjected for laboratory
examination gave positive result to the tests of Marijuana, a dangerous
drug.
Contrary to law."7
During arraignment, the accused-appellant entered a "not guilty" plea. Pre-
trial then ensued. Since the two cases were filed against the same accused
and revolve around the same facts and evidence, they were consolidated
and tried jointly.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution offered the following as witnesses: (a) Police Officer 3
Ramon Galvez (PO3 Galvez), the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation
conducted against the accused-appellant; (b) PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2
Hipolito), likewise a member of the buy-bust operation; (c) Senior Police
Officer 1 Fernando Moran (SPO1 Moran), then the investigator-on-duty to
whom the accused-appellant and the seized evidence were turned over at
the police station; and (d) Police Chief Inspector Albert S. Arturo (PCI
Arturo), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Northern Police District Crime
Laboratory Office, Caloocan City, who conducted the examination on the
evidence seized from the accused-appellant.
PO3 Galvez testified that on November 12, 2007, he was ordered by their
chief to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reported illegal drug
selling activities in Don Antonio Street, Barangay19, Caloocan City. A
confidential informant told the police that a certain "Keempee," who
would later on be identified as the herein accused-appellant, was
Page 36 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
notoriously selling marijuanain the area. A buy-bust team was thereafter
formed. PO3 Galvez was designated as the poseur-buyer, PO3 Fernando
Modina (PO3 Modina) as team leader, and PO2 Hipolito as back-up
member. A hundred peso bill, marked with PO3 Galvez’s initials, was
prepared. To send a signal to the other members of the buy-bust team of
the consummation of the transaction with the accused-appellant, PO3
Galvez was instructed to throw a lit cigarette.8
The buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. PO3 Galvez and the
informant saw the accused-appellant near the front door of his house,
stripping marijuana leaves. The rest of the team remained in the
perimeter. PO3 Galvez approached the house, uttered "Keempee, pakuha
nga ng damo, halagang isang daan," and gave the latter the 100.00 marked
money. The accused-appellant then held ten (10) pieces of plastic, which
appeared to contain marijuana and white pieces of paper, placed them
inside a Marlboro pack, and handed them all to PO3 Galvez. When PO3
Galvez threw a lit cigarette, PO2 Hipolito joined him in arresting the
accused-appellant, who was apprised of his constitutional rights. After a
further search, one transparent plastic box containing what likewise
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves, one plastic sachet with white
pieces of paper, and a few empty transparent plastic sachets were also
seized from the accused-appellant.9
PO3 Galvez marked the ten (10) plastic sachets with "GSG/RG 11/12/07"
representing his and the accused-appellant’s initials and the date the
imprint was made. The rest of the items seized were marked with
"GSG/RH," the last two letters representing PO2 Hipolito’s initials. The
accused-appellant and the seized items were thereafter taken to the police
station and turned over to SPO1 Moran, who prepared the letter request
for laboratory examination. The crime laboratory tested the seized items
and found the same to be marijuana.10
PO2 Hipolito corroborated PO3 Galvez’s testimony about the conduct of a
buy-bust operation and the turnover of the accused-appellant and the
seized items to the investigator at the police station. Additionally, PO2
Hipolito stated that he held the accused-appellant whilePO3 Galvez was
marking some of the seized items. The accused-appellant was turned over
to PO3 Modina upon the latter’s arrival, while PO2 Hipolito marked the
rest of the seized items.11
The prosecution and the defense entered into stipulations and admissions
of facts anent:
(a) SPO1 Moran’s (1) having caused the buy-bust money to be
photographed; (2) receipt, while at the police station, of the
person of the accused-appellant and the items allegedly seized
from him; (3) preparation of the evidence acknowledgment
receipt, affidavit of arrest of the police officers, and referral slip to
the inquest prosecutor; (4) preparation of a letter request for
laboratory examination of the seized items; and (5) receipt of the
result of the laboratory examination, which yielded positive for
marijuana;12 and
(b) PCI Arturo’s (1) receipt of a letter request for laboratory
examination of ten (10) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing white pieces of paper and dried marijuana
fruiting/flowering tops; (2) conduct of a laboratory examination
Science Report No. D-382-07 stating therein the result of the
laboratory examination.13
The testimonies of SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo were thus dispensed with.
Version of the Defense
The defense, on its part, offered the testimonies of the accused-appellant
and his son, Guillar Salvidar (Guillar).
The accused-appellant claimed that contrary to the prosecution’s
statements, he was instead arrested at around 4:00 p.m. of November 11,
2007. While playing a video game with Guillar, he stood up to get snacks
for the latter. Several men arrived, brought him to their vehicle, and
handcuffed him. He was subsequently asked to reveal the identities of big
time drug pushers in the area. The accused-appellant was unable to
comply with the order and was brought to the Sangandaan precinct. The
Page 37 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
men, who seized the accused-appellant, turned out to be police officers.
PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran belonged to the group. They inquired from
him about his and his wife’s employment. The men then asked him to
settle the case for 30,000.00. He told them that he did not have money.
When his wife arrived, she argued with the police officers. The officers got
angry and informed him that he would be indicted. 14
Guillar corroborated the accused-appellant’s testimony about the date of
the arrest and their whereabouts at that time. He added that three
policemen arrived. They dragged his father out of the video game shop and
the latter, in turn, resisted. Guillar cried while he chased his father who
was taken away, but the former’s attempt was futile. Guillar went home to
inform his mother about the incident.15
Ruling of the RTC
On April 11, 2011, the RTC rendered a decision, 16 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Premises considered, this court finds and so holds the accused Gil Salvidar
y Garlan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of [R.A. No. 9165], x x x and imposes upon him the following:
(1) In Crim. Case No. C-78532, the penalty of Life Imprisonment
and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos ([P]500,000.00); and
(2) In Crim. Case No. C-78533, the penalty of Imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to Fourteen (14) years and a
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos ([P]300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of these cases consisting of ten (10) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets each containing dried MARIJUANA fruiting tops
weighing 0.37 gram, 0.35 gram, 0.40 gram, 0.28 gram, 0.35 gram, 0.36
gram, 0.32 gram, 0.36 gram, 0.67 gram & 0.57 gram[,] as well as the one
(1) transparent plastic box containing dried MARIJUANA fruiting tops
weighing 29.01 grams[,] are hereby confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the government to be dealt with in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC found the accused-appellant’s defense of denial and claim of
attempted police extortion as bare, hence, unmeritorious. The trial court
declared that the testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team
deserve full faith and credit, unless it can be shown that they did not
properly perform their duties, or that they were inspired by ill motives. The
accused-appellant, in this case, did not personally know the policemen and
had no previous altercation with any of them, which could have otherwise
prompted the filing of fabricated charges against him. Besides, the police
officers could not have been oblivious of the fact that Section 29 of R.A.
No. 9165 imposes the penalty of death upon persons found guilty of
planting dangerous drugs as evidence.18
Citing People v. Cueno19 and People v. Rigodon,20 the RTC emphasized that
only two basic elements must be present for the charge of illegal sale of
drugs to prosper, namely: (a) the determination of the identities of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In the case at bar, PO3 Galvez
gave a detailed account of how the sale involving the accused-appellant
was consummated and his testimony was corroborated by PO2 Hipolito.
The seized items were also positively identified and the unbroken chain of
custody over the same was established.21
The Parties’ Arguments Before the CA and its Ruling
The accused-appellant challenged the above ruling before the CA claiming
that the prosecution’s version of what transpired was highly incredible.
The members of the buy-bust team narrated that the accused-appellant
was packing and selling his illegal merchandise in public view. This,
however, is improbable and contrary to common experience. 22
The accused-appellant also alleged that the prosecution failed to establish
an unbroken chain of custody over the evidence. There was no explicit
testimony that the specimens were marked in the presence of the
accused-appellant. There was likewise no proof that the items were
photographed and inventoried in the presence of a member of the media,
Page 38 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
a Department of Justice (DOJ) representative, and an elective government
official.23
Further, not all who had custody of the specimens testified on the
condition of the same upon receipt and the precautions they took to
preserve their integrity. It is perplexing as well why SPO1 Moran delivered
the seized items twice to the crime laboratory – at first to a certain PO1
Bolora at 9:40 p.m. of November 12, 2007, and subsequently to PCI Arturo
at 9:45 p.m. of the same date. While PO1 Bolora’s custody over the seized
items merely lasted for a few minutes, still, he should have testified
because that short span of time was more than sufficient to destroy the
integrity of the evidence.24
Admittedly, there are exceptions to the strict implementation of the rules
and procedures mandated by R.A. No. 9165. However, the prosecution
should have, at the outset, recognized the procedural lapses and cite
justifiable grounds for the omissions, failing at which, a taint of doubt is
cast upon the presumption that official duties have been performed with
regularity.25 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the appeal
arguing that drug pushers have become more daring in selling their wares
without regard for place and time.26
The prosecution had likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt that an
illegal sale of ten (10) plastic sachets containing marijuana was
consummated and the accused-appellant was the vendor. The same ten
(10) plastic sachets were seized from the accused-appellant, then later on,
identified and offered as evidence during the trial. PO3 Galvez and PO2
Hipolito had testified in detail about the conduct of the buy-bust
operation, including the markings done on the plastic sachets and
transparent box seized from the accused-appellant in the place where he
was arrested, and no irregularity can be ascribed as to the concerned
police officers’ performance of duties. 27
On October 31, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Br. 120 in 1) Crim. Case No. C-78532 sentencing the
Accused-Appellant to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos(Ph₱500,000.00) is AFFIRMED; and, 2) Crim. Case
No. C-78533 is likewise AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the
penalty imposed in that the Accused-Appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Twelve(12) years and One(1) day, as minimum, to
Fourteen(14) years, as maximum. Costs against the Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.28
In affirming the accused-appellant’s conviction, the CA cited the following
grounds:
Settled is the rule that in the prosecution for illegal sale of drugs, it is
material to prove that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the evidence of corpus delicti. Said
otherwise, the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs are: 1)the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another;
and 2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited drug.
In the instant case, PO3 Galvez’[s] testimony proves that the sale of illegal
drugs actually took place. x x x [T]he Accused-Appellant was caught in a
buy-bust operation freely and knowingly selling and delivering prohibited
drugs. x x x.
x x x The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the
Accused-Appellant committed the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. It was able to prove the following elements: 1) the accused is in
possession of an object identified as a prohibited drug; 2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and, 3) he freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.
The records manifestly show that, after the buy-bust team arrested the
Accused-Appellant, the procedural body search was conducted on his
person. The search led to the discovery of one (1) transparent plastic box
containing an undetermined amount of suspected dried marijuana
Page 39 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
leaves(later weighed at 29.01 grams), which he freely possessed knowing
the same to be prohibited drugs. After the conduct of laboratory
examinations, the same yielded positive for marijuana. Further, he failed to
present any document authorizing him by law to possess the same. x x x.
The Accused-Appellant’s allegation that the prosecution failed to preserve
the integrity and prove the identity of the seized drugs, holds no water.
In all cases involving the handling and custody of dangerous drugs, the
police officers are guided by Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165. The language of the foregoing provision
shows that the failure of the police officers to strictly comply with it is not
fatal and does not render the evidence adduced against the Accused-
Appellant void and inadmissible. What is important is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
At bench, there was compliance with the said provision and the integrity of
the drugs confiscated from the Accused-Appellant remained intact. The
chain of custody of the seized drugs, later on determined to be marijuana,
was not shown to have been broken. The records show that, after PO3
Galvez bought ten(10) pieces of plastic sachets suspected of containing
marijuana, the Accused-Appellant was bodily searched and found to be in
possession of one(1) transparent plastic box containing an undetermined
amount of suspected dried marijuana leaves. Immediately thereafter, the
confiscated drugs were marked with the initials "GSG/RG 11/12/07" and
"GSG/RH" and inventoried at the place of arrest and in the presence of the
Accused-Appellant. PO3 Galvez and PO2 Hipolito then brought the
Accused-Appellant to the Sangandaan police station where the same were
turned over to SPO1 Moran. Thereafter, the latter prepared the Evidence
Acknowledgment Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory
examination of the seized substances for determination of the presence of
any dangerous drugs. PCI Arturo conducted the laboratory test and found
them positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
What is more, during the trial, PO3 Galvez and PO2 Hipolito were able to
positively identify all the plastic sachets containing marijuana with
markings "GSG/RG 11/12/07" and "GSG/RH" as the same ones that they
confiscated from the Accused-Appellant. x x x.
In comparison to the prosecution’s evidence, all that the Accused-
Appellant could raise is the defense of denial.1âwphi1 x x x The defense of
denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of
the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties. Bare denial of the Accused-Appellant
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the prosecution witness. x x
x.
The Accused-Appellant’s allegation that the police officers were exacting
Thirty Thousand Pesos(Ph₱30,000.00) from him has no basis. Other than
his bare allegations, unsupported by concrete proof, We cannot give such
imputation a second look.29 (Citations omitted)
The CA modified the wordings of the penalty imposed by the RTC on the
accused-appellant for violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165. The CA
emphasized that the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied.
Consequently, the proper penalty should be "expressed at a range whose
maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law, and
the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed." 30
Issues
The accused-appellant and the OSG both manifested that they no longer
intended to file supplemental briefs.31
Hence, the issues before this Court are the same ones raised before and
disposed of by the CA. Essentially then, the Court is once again asked to
determine whether or not: (a) the testimonies of the members of the buy-
bust team about the accused-appellant’s illegal selling activities and
possession of marijuana while the latter was at the front door of his house
and within public view are credible; and (b) the prosecution had complied
with the procedural requirements mandated by Section 21 32 of the
Page 40 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 as regards the
chain of custody over the evidence seized from the accused-appellant.
Ruling of the Court
The instant appeal lacks merit.
In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law, appellate courts
tend to rely heavily on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, because the latter had the unique opportunity, denied to the
appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under direct and cross-examination. Hence, its
factual findings are accorded great respect, even finality, absent any
showing that certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the
elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied.33
In the instant appeal, the RTC and CA uniformly found that PO3 Galvez’s
and PO2 Hipolito’s testimonies anent the conduct of the buy-bust
operation were categorical, detailed, and credible. 34 Moreover, the
accused-appellant had not ascribed any ill motive against the two police
officers which could have otherwise induced them to fabricate the charges.
As the first issue, the accused-appellant claimed that it was highly
improbable for him to peddle and possess marijuana right in front of his
house and within public view. This allegation fails to persuade especially in
the light of the court’s observation that of late, drug pushers have turned
more daring and defiant in the conduct of their illegal activities. 35
Anent the second issue, the Court finds the chain of custody over the
evidence seized from the accused-appellant as unbroken and that there
was sufficient compliance with Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165.
PO3 Galvez positively testified that he marked the ten (10) plastic sachets
containing marijuana and the pieces of white paper while still in the place
where the accused-appellant was arrested, and in the presence of the
latter.36 PO2 Hipolito did the same relative to the plastic container with
marijuana likewise found in the accused-appellant’s possession. 37 When
the members of the buy-bust team arrived in the police station, they
turned-over the person of the accused-appellant and the items seized from
him to SPO1 Moran, who in turn, prepared the Evidence Acknowledgment
Receipt and letter request for laboratory examination. 38 Thereafter, PCI
Arturo conducted the laboratory examinations and found the specimens to
be marijuana.39 These were the same items identified by the prosecution
witnesses and presented to the trial court as evidence.
The accused-appellant lamented that the evidence seized were not
photographed and inventoried in the presence of a member of the media,
a representative from the DOJ, and an elective government official. While
this factual allegation is admitted, the Court stresses that what Section 21
of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 requires is "substantial" and not necessarily
"perfect adherence,"40 as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 41
The accused-appellant attempted to establish that there was a breach in
the chain of custody over the evidence seized from him by pointing out
that SPO1 Moran twice delivered the items to the crime laboratory – at
first to a certain PO1 Bolora and later, to PCI Arturo. 42 The Court notes that
despite the foregoing allegation, the defense agreed with the prosecution
to dispense with the testimonies of SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo. The
parties entered into stipulations and admissions of facts as regards the
participation of the aforementioned two. This is no less than an admission
on the part of the defense that there was nothing irregular in SPO1 Moran
and PCI Arturo’s performance of their duties relative to preserving the
integrity of the evidence which fell in their custody. Had the accused-
appellant sincerely believed that there was indeed a breach in the chain of
custody over the seized items, he would have insisted on putting SPO1
Moran and PCI Arturo on the witness stand for cross-examination.1âwphi1
In sum, the Court finds the herein assailed decision affirming the RTC’s
conviction of the accused-appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 as amply supported by both evidence and
jurisprudence. The Court agrees as well with the CA in its modification of
Page 41 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

the wordings of the penalty imposed on the accused-appellant for violation

of the above-mentioned Section 11, as the same is mandated by Section 1
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated

October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04989 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
Page 42 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Page 43 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. No. 205610               July 30, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RAMONITO VILLARTA y RIVERA and ALLAN ARMENTA y CABILES, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
1
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals Decision  dated 20 July 2012 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04953 affirming the Regional Trial Court 2 (RTC) Joint
Decision3 dated 26 October 2010 in Criminal Case Nos. 14948-D, 14949-D,
14950-D, 14951-D and 14952-D, convicting herein appellant Ramonita
Villarta y Rivera alias Monet (Villarta) for Violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,'' and herein appellant Allan
Armenta yCabiles alias Ambo (Armenta) for Violation of Section 11 of the
same law.
Appellant Villarta was charged in three (3) separate Informations, 4 all
dated 24 April 2006, for Violation of Sections 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs), 11 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and 15 (Illegal Use of
Dangerous Drugs), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory
portions of which read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14948-D
On or about [20 April 2006] in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the [herein appellant Villarta], not being lawfully
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, deliver and give away to [Police Officer 2 (PO2) Ronald R. Caparas], a
police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance, which was found
positive to the test for ephedrine, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said
law.5 (Emphasis supplied).
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14949-D
On or about [20 April 2006] in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the [appellant Villarta], not being lawfully authorized to
possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one
(1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white
crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for ephedrine, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. 6 (Emphasis supplied).
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14950-D
On or about [20 April 2006] in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the [appellant Villarta], not being lawfully authorized by
law to use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly use, smoke and ingest into his body a methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and, that this is the first offense of the
[appellant Villarta] under Section 15, of the abovecited law, who after a
confirmatory urine test, was found positive to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the
above-cited law.7 (Emphasis supplied).
Appellant Armenta was charged in two (2) separate Informations, 8 all
dated 24 April 2006, for Violation of Sections 11 and 15, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory portions of which read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14951-D
On or about [20 April 2006] in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [the herein appellant Armenta], not being lawfully
authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody
and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03
gram of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test
for ephedrine, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. 9 (Emphasis
supplied).
Page 44 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14952-D
On or about [20 April 2006] in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the [appellant Armenta], not being lawfully authorized
by law to use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly use, smoke and ingest into his body a THC-metabolites, a
dangerous drug, and, that this is the first offense of the [appellant
Armenta] under Section 15, of the above-cited law, who after a
confirmatory urine test, was found positive tothe test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the
above-cited law.10 (Emphasis supplied).
Upon arraignment,11 both appellants pleaded NOT GUILTY to the
respective charges against them. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution presented PO2 Ronald R. Caparas (PO2 Caparas), who
acted as the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted against
appellant Villarta;12 PO2 Jesus Cambronero (PO2 Cambronero), who acted
as the immediate back-up of PO2 Caparas;13 and Police Senior Inspector
Sandra Decena Go (P/Sr. Insp. Go), the forensic chemical officer who
conducted physical, chemical and confirmatory tests on the items seized
from the appellants.14 The testimony, however, of the other prosecution
witness PO1 Allan Mapula (PO1 Mapula) was dispensed with per
stipulation of the parties that: (1) he is the investigating officer in these
cases; and (2) he was the one who prepared the Affidavit of Arrest of PO2
Caparas and the Request for Laboratory Examination, aswell as the
Request for Drug Test.15
On the side of the defense, both appellants were presented to contradict
all the allegations of the prosecution.16
The respective versions of the prosecution and the defense, as accurately
summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On 19 April 2006 at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, PO2 [Caparas] was
at the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)
office in Pasig City. A confidential informant arrived and spoke with Police
Inspector Ronaldo Pamor [P/Insp. Pamor]. The informant gave the tip that
a certain MONET was selling shabualong Urbano Velasco Avenue,
Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. As a result, [P/Insp. Pamor] conducted a short
briefing attended by [Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1)] Baltazar, PO2
Camb[r]onero, PO2 Monte, [Police Officer 1 (PO1)] Caridad, PO1 Mapula
and PO2 Caparas. [P/Insp.] Pamor instructed PO1 Mapula to prepare a pre-
operational report17 to be submitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), and directed PO1 Caparas to act as the poseur-buyer while
PO2 Camb[r]onera was to serve as his back-up.
In preparation for their operation, PO2 Caparas marked two pieces of the
One-Hundred Peso (₱100.00) bill with his initials "RRC" on the lower right
portion. Tout de suite, the team, together with the confidential informant
proceeded to Velasco Avenue. There, they went inside an alley located at
the Cupa Compound. However, they learned from the two persons
standing along the alley that MONET had already left. [P/Insp.] Pamor
instructed the informant to inform them whenever MONET would return.
The following day, at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the confidential
informant called and tolda member of the SAID-SOTF that MONET was
already in the target place.Subsequently, the buy-bust team met with the
former at the market terminal. PO2 Caparas and the informant again
proceeded to Velasco Avenue. When they reached Cupa Compound, the
latter secretly told PO2 Caparas that MONET was standing at the alley.
They approached MONET. The informant then told him: "Pare iiscore to"
referring to PO2 Caparas. He told MONET that he would buy ₱200.00
worth of shabuafter which, he handed MONET the money. At this point, a
male person arrived and asked MONET: "Pare, meron pa ba?" MONET
retorted: "Dalawang piraso na lang ito." The male person then gave
MONET ₱100.00. Immediately thereafter, MONET handed one sachet to
PO2 Caparas and the other one to the male person. PO2 Caparas examined
the sachet and gave the pre-arranged signal by wearing his cap. He then
introduced himself as a police officer, and arrested MONET who was
identified as [herein appellant] Ramonito Villarta [y Rivera]. When the
other members of the team arrived, PO2 Caparas told PO2 Camb[r]oner[o]
thatthe other male person was also possessing shabu. In a bit, he was also
apprehended and identified later on as [herein appellant] Allan Armenta [y
Page 45 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Cabiles] @ AMBO. PO2 Caparas recovered from MONET the marked
money and one plastic sachet while PO2 Camb[r]onero recovered from
AMBO the other plastic sachet. Both PO2 Caparas and PO2 Camb[r]onero
marked the items they had seized.
At the police station, PO1 Mapula prepared the requests for drug test and
laboratory examination. Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory. Forensic Chemical Officer
[P/Sr. Insp. Go] received the above-mentioned requests and conducted
laboratory tests on the subject specimens. The seized drugs gave positive
result for ephedrine, a dangerous drug. Likewise, the drug tests showed
that the respective urine samples of MONET and AMBO were positive for
methamphetamine and THC metabolites, both of which are dangerous
drugs.
The defense proffered a divergent version of the facts.
Both MONET and AMBO denied the charges. MONET asseverated that
between 3:00 o’clock and 4:00 o’clock inthe afternoon of 19 April 2006, he
was resting in the room he was renting. Suddenly, four armed male
persons entered looking for a certain "Jay Jay." When he replied that he
did not know such person, he was brought and detained in Pariancillo. It
was there where he first met AMBO.
On the other hand, AMBO maintained that between 1:00 o’clock and 2:00
o’clock in the afternoon on evendate while waiting for a tricycle in front of
the 7-11 Store, three armed persons approached him. One of them placed
his arm around his shoulder, the other one handcuffed him, while the third
called for a tricycle. Subsequently, he was brought to the Pariancillo
Headquarters. When heasked why he was arrested, the aforesaid men did
not answer him. At the headquarters, he was frisked since they were
looking for a cellular phone which he had allegedly snatched. When
nothing was found with him, he was mauled and forced to confess where
he brought the phone. It was there where he got to know MONET. 18
On 26 October 2010, the RTC, after considering the testimonies of both
parties, rendered its Joint Decision,the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 14948-D, this Court finds the [herein
appellant] Ramonito Villarta yRivera aliasMonet, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs of 2002, and he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
₱500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency;
2) In Criminal Case No. 14949-D and Criminal Case No. 14951-D,
this Court finds the [appellants] Ramonito Villarta yRivera
aliasMonetand Allan Armenta yCabiles alias Ambo, guiltybeyond
reasonable of the crime of Violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs of 2002 and they are each sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
3) Criminal Case No. 14950-D and Criminal Case No. 14952-Dfor
Violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs of 2002 against
[appellants] Ramonito Villarta y Rivera alias Monetand Allan
Armenta y Cabiles aliasAmbo are ordered DISMISSED.
In the meantime, the Branch Clerk ofCourt is directed to transmit the
dangerous drugs, "ephedrine," subject of these cases to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency for its disposition in accordance with
law.19 (Emphasis supplied).
The RTC elucidated that the prosecution has sufficiently established all the
elements for a successful prosecution of illegal sale of prohibited drugs,
which is in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. PO2
Page 46 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Caparas, who acted as the poseur-buyer, specifically stated that appellant
Villarta sold tohim one-heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
0.02 gram of white crystalline substance worth ₱200.00. It was seized and
later on found positive to the test for ephedrine, a dangerous drug. Their
transaction was proven bythe actual exchange of the marked money
consisting of two ₱100.00-pesobills, and the drug sold. PO2 Caparas
positively identified appellant Villarta as the seller of the said oneheat
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance,
which was later on confirmed as ephedrine, a dangerous drug, by P/Sr.
Insp. Go, the Forensic Chemist, who performed laboratory examination on
all the seized items.20
As for the charge of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, which is in
violation of Section 11, Article II ofRepublic Act No. 9165, against both
appellants, the RTC also found that all the elements thereof were
completely satisfied. When the appellants werearrested by PO2 Caparas
and PO2 Cambronero, they were both found in possession of
dangerousdrugs. Both of them could not present any proof orjustification
that they were fully authorized by law to possess the same. Having been
caught in flagrante delicto, there is prima facieevidence of animus
possidendior intent to possess.21
In dismissing the charge of illegal use of dangerous drugs in violation of
Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, against both appellants, the
RTC applied the provisoof the afore-stated Section 15. The RTC, thus, held
that when a person is found tohave possessed and used dangerous drugs
at the same time, Section 15 shall not be applicable in which case the
provisions of Section 11 shall apply. 22
The RTC likewise held that despite the non-compliance with the
requirements of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items,
the integrity and evidentiary value of the same were properly preserved
because the chain of custody appears not to havebeen broken. Thus, in its
entirety, there was substantial compliance with the law. 23
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Joint Decision dated 26
October 2010.24
Hence, the present appeal raising the same assignment of errors in their
Appellants’ Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, towit: (a) the trial court
gravely erred in pronouncing the guilt of the [appellants] despite the
obvious non-compliance with the requirements for the proper custody of
seized dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165; and (b) the trial court
gravely erred in pronouncing the guilt of the [appellants] notwithstanding
the failure of the prosecution to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the allegedly seized dangerous drugs. 25
This Court sustains appellants’ conviction.
Essentially, the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight
on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons
since the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying.26 This rule finds aneven more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals 27 as
in this case.
After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds no compelling reason
to deviate from the lower courts’ findings that, indeed, the appellants’ guilt
on the respective charges against them were sufficiently proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like ephedrinein
this case, the following elementsmust be sufficiently proved to sustain a
conviction therefor: (1) the identity of the buyer, as well as the seller, the
object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.What is material is proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
dangerous drugs seized as evidence. The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires merely the consummation of the
selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the
drug from the seller. Settled is the rule that as long as the police officer
went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by
appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former; the crime is
considered consummated by the delivery of the goods. 28
Page 47 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
In the present case, this Court totallyagrees with the lower courts that the
aforesaid elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were adequately and
satisfactorily established by the prosecution.
To note, appellant Villarta, who was caught in flagrante delicto, was
positively identified by PO2 Caparas, who acted as the poseur-buyer, as the
same person who sold the one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance, later confirmed as
ephedrine, for a consideration of ₱200.00.The said one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet of ephedrinewas presented in court, which PO2
Caparas identified to be the same object sold to him by appellant Villarta.
Moreover, the same bears the markings RRV/RRC 04-20-06, which he had
written at the scene of the crime. "RRV" represents the initials of appellant
Villarta while "RRC" represents the initials of PO2 Caparas. The marking
"04-20-06" represents the date the said drug was seized. PO2 Caparas
similarly identified in court the recovered marked money from appellant
Villarta consisting of two ₱100.00-peso bills in the total amount of ₱200.00
with markings "RRC" on the lower right portion thereof. 29
Likewise, the testimony of PO2 Caparasclearly established in detail how his
transaction with appellant Villarta happened starting from the moment
their informant introduced him to appellant Villarta as someone interested
in buying his stuff, up to the time he handed to appellant Villarta two
₱100.00 peso bills marked money amounting to ₱200.00and, in turn,
appellant Villarta handed him the one heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet of ephedrinethus consummating the sale transaction between
them. PO2 Caparas caused the one-heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
of ephedrineto be examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. The item
weighing 0.02 gram was tested positive for ephedrineas evidenced by
Chemistry Report No. D-355-0630 prepared by P/Sr. Insp. Go, Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City. 31
From the foregoing, it is already beyond question that appellant Villarta’s
guilt for illegal sale of ephedrine, a dangerous drug, in violation of Section
5, Article II of RepublicAct No. 9165 was proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.
With respect to the prosecution ofillegal possession of dangerous drugs,
the following facts must be proved: (a) the accused was in possession of
dangerous drugs, (b) such possession was not authorized by law, and (c)
the accused was freely and consciouslyaware of being in possession of
dangerous drugs.32
In the case under consideration, this Court also conforms to the lower
courts’ findings that all the elementsof illegal possession of dangerous
drugs were adequately proven by the prosecution.
It bears emphasis that when the sale transaction between PO2 Caparas
and appellant Villarta was on-going, another male person, who was later
on identified to be appellant Armenta, came in and also bought one-heat
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance later on confirmed to be ephedrine, a dangerous drug. Upon the
consummation of the sale transaction,between PO2 Caparas and appellant
Villarta, the former gave the pre-arranged signal by wearing his cap. PO2
Caparas then introduced himself as the police officer and arrested
appellant Villarta. PO2 Caparas then recovered from appellant Villarta the
marked money and another one-heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance later on confirmed as
ephedrine, a dangerous drug. When the immediate back-up officer, PO2
Cambronero, arrived, PO2 Caparas informed him that appellant Armenta
was in possession of one-heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
0.03 gram of white crystalline substance,which the latter just bought from
appellant Villarta. Thus, appellant Armenta was also apprehended and PO2
Cambronero recovered from him one heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance confirmed to be
ephedrine, a dangerous drug.33 Clearly, both appellants were found in
possession of dangerous drugs. As observed by the RTC, which the Court of
Appeals affirmed, both appellants could not present any proof or
justification that they were fully authorized by law to possess the same.
Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is prima facieevidence of
animus possidendior intent to possess.
Now, going to the issue raised by the appellants on the failure of the
prosecution to comply with Section 21,Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
Page 48 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
this Court similarly affirms the findings of both lower courts that such
failure will not render the appellants’ arrestillegal or the items
seized/confiscated from them inadmissible.
In People v. Ventura,34 this Court held that:
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under
Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as follows:
(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall,immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.1âwphi1
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision, stipulates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall,immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x
x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.
Under the same proviso, non-compliance with the stipulated procedure,
under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over saiditems, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers.
Clearly, the purpose of the procedure outlined in the implementing rules is
centered on the preservationof the integrityand evidentiary valueof the
seized items.35 (Emphasis supplied). The chain of custody requirement
performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as
to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the
prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into
possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. 36
In the case at bench, after PO2 Caparas seized and confiscated the one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of ephedrine,
which was the subject of the sale transaction, as well as the one heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of ephedrine, which
was recovered from appellant Villarta after he was arrested and ordered to
empty his pocket, and the marked money used in the buy-bust operation,
the former immediately marked the seized drugs atthe place of arrest. He
put the markings RRV/RRC 04-20-06 on the seizeddrug subject of the sale
and the markings RRV/RRC on the seized drug recovered from appellant
Villarta. PO2 Cambronero, the immediate back-up of PO2 Caparas, also
recovered from appellant Armenta one-heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 0.03 gram of ephedrine. PO2 Cambronero, who was then
beside PO2 Caparas, similarly marked the seized drug from appellant
Armenta at the place of arrest. They then brought the appellants, together
with the seized items at their station. Where PO1 Mapula, the investigating
officer, prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination, 37 the Request
for Drug Test38 and the Affidavit of Arrest of PO2 Caparas.39 Thereafter,
PO2 Caparas personally brought all the seized items to the crime
laboratory for examination. The seized items were examined by P/Sr. Insp.
Go and they all yielded positive results for ephedrine, a dangerous drug.
When the seized items were offered in court, they were all properly
identified by the prosecution witnesses. These facts persuasively proved
that the three plastic sachets of ephedrine presented in court were the
Page 49 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

same items seized from the appellants during the buy-bust operation.The
integrity and evidentiary value thereof were duly preserved.

It has been judicially settled that in buy-bust operations, the testimony of

the police officers who apprehended the accused is usually accorded full
faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed
their duties regularly. This presumption is overturned only if there is clear
and convincing evidence that they were not properly performing their duty
or that they were inspired by improper motive. 40 In this case, there was
none.

In comparison to the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, all that

the appellants could muster is the defense of denial and frame-up. Denial
or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it can just as
easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violation of DangerousDrugs Act. The defense of frameup
or denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of
the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties.41 In the present case, the bare denial
of the appellants cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the
prosecution witnesses.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated 20

July 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04953 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
Page 50 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Page 51 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. No. 206366               August 13, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BALAQUIOT y BALDERAMA, Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated 29 August 2012 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04595. In the said decision,
the appellate court affirmed the conviction of herein appellant Eduardo B.
Balaquit for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts are as follows:
On 11 June 2008, appellant was arrested during a buy bust operation
performed by officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camiling,
Tarlac. He was thereafter charged with the offense of illegal sale of shabu
under an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tarlac.3 The Information reads:
That on June 11, 2008 at on or about 10 AM at Bobon 1st , in the
Municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there
willfully and feloniously sell to one another one (1) heat sealed plastic
sachet containing 0.049 grams of met[h]amphetamine hydrochloride
commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, without being authorized
by law.
Appellant was arraigned on 26 August 2008 and entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented, among others, the following object
evidence:
1. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.049
grams of white crystalline substance.The plastic sachet is dated
"11 June 2008" and marked with "JSE-EBB,"4 and
2. Chemistry Report D-184-085
The foregoing object evidence weresupplemented by the testimonies of
Police Officer Jay Espiritu (PO3 Espiritu), Special Police Officer Noli
Daraman (SPO1 Daraman) and police chemist Jebie Timario (Mr. Timario).
PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman were the police officers who conducted
the buy-bust operation that led tothe arrest of the appellant. Their
testimonies recounted the following events:6
1. On 11 June 2008, PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman engaged in a
buy-bust operation against appellantafter receiving confirmation
from the Chief Intelligence Officer(CIO) of the Camiling PNP that
the former was involved in the peddling of shabu. The
confirmation from the CIO came at the heels of a week-long
surveillance on the appellant conducted by the Camiling PNP.
2. As the designated poseur-buyer of the operation, PO3 Espiritu
met with the appellant outside the latter’s residence at Bobon 1st,
Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Daraman,on the other hand, hid behind a
tree about ten (10) to twenty(20) meters from where PO3 Espiritu
and appellant were standing.
3. PO3 Espiritu was able to negotiate and successfully purchase
from the appellant one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet.1âwphi1 In exchange, PO3 Espiritu handed to the appellant
a previously marked ₱500 bill. After the transaction, PO3 Espiritu
proceeded to arrest appellant. SPO1 Daraman, who was able to
witness the exchange, emerged from his hiding place and aided in
the arrest of the appellant.
4. PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman retrieved from appellant the
marked ₱500 bill. They then proceeded to call the barangay
Page 52 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
officials of the place to witness the inventory of the plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance and the marked money.
Photographs of the plastic sachet, the marked bill and of the
appellant were also taken.
5. PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman brought the appellant and the
recovered items to the Camiling PNP station. The plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance were then dated "11 June
2008" and marked with "JSE-EBB"—the initials of both PO3
Espiritu and the appellant. 6. On 12 June 2008, PO3 Espiritu and
SPO1 forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory the plastic sachet,
now dated "11 June 2008" and marked "JSE-EBB," along with a
request for laboratory examination.
In his testimony, PO3 Espiritu also identified the plastic sachet dated "11
June 2008" and marked with "JSE-EBB" presented by the prosecution as
the very one he retrieved from the appellant during the buy-bust. 7
Mr. Timario, on the other hand, isa police chemist for the Camiling PNP
and the one who conducted laboratory examination on the contents of the
plastic sachet dated "11 June 2008" and marked "JSE-EBB." He is also the
signatory of Chemistry Report D-184-08. Mr. Timario testified that per
Chemistry Report D-184-08, hewas able to confirm that the contents of the
plastic sachet dated "11 June 2008" and marked "JSE-EBB" are positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.8
The defense, for its part, relied on the testimonies of the appellant and his
brother, Exequil Balaquit (Exequil).
In substance, appellantdenied being caught, in flagrante, selling shabuand
claimed that he was merely a victim of a police frame-up. He professed the
following version of events:9
1. On the date and time of the supposed buy-bust, he was in a day
care center where he bought some sopasfor his children. On his
way home, he encountered two (2) men aboard a motorcycle. 2.
One of the two (2) men aboard the motorcycle alighted and drew
a gun at him. At that point, SPO1 Daraman arrived and introduced
himself and the one pointing a gun at him as policemen.
3. Afterwards, SPO1 Daraman and other police officers led him to
an alley. One of the police officers twisted his arms. At the alley,
he was forced to sign a report. Later, the barangay captain also
arrived and signed the same report.
4. He was then brought to the Camiling PNP station where he was
detained.
Exequil corroborated the denial of his brother. He recounted that he saw
the appellant, arm-twisted and all, being led to an alley by police officers. 10
On 24 June 2010, the RTC rendered a decision 11 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal sale of shabuunder
Section 512 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In doing
so, the RTC gave full faith and credenceto the version of the prosecution as
established by the testimonies of PO3 Espiritu, SPO1 Daraman and Mr.
Timario. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
Aggrieved, appellant appealedthe RTC decision to the CA.
On 29 August 2012, the CA rendered a decision affirming the RTC. Hence,
this appeal.
In this appeal, appellant claims that the RTC and the CA erred in giving full
faith and credence to the version of the prosecution. To support his claim,
he cites three (3) circumstances:
1. The prosecution never presented as a witness the CIO of the
Camiling PNP.
2. The Camiling PNP never coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Page 53 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
3. The representation by the prosecution that the appellant was
under surveillance prior to the buy-bust is not believable. If it
were true, then the Camiling PNP could have just applied for a
search warrant against the appellant.
These circumstances, the appellant believes, destroy the credibility of the
prosecution story that the Camiling PNP really undertook a genuine
buybust operation and also lend trustworthiness to his own version that he
was merely a victim of a frame-up.
At any rate, the appellant adds thathis acquittal for the two charges is in
order because the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
offense charged. Appellant claims that the identity of the shabuthat was
presented by the prosecution in evidence issuspect in view of the failure by
PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman to mark the plastic sachet they allegedly
retrieved during the buy-bust immediately thereat as required by Section
2113 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Appellant points
out that PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman, by their own testimonies,
admitted to marking such plastic sachetonly after bringing the same to the
police station.
OUR RULING
We deny the appeal.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving full faith and
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
We find no error on the part of the RTC and the CA in sustaining the
prosecution’s version of events. The circumstances cited by the appellant
does not at all destroy its credibility:
First. The non-presentation as a witness of the CIO of the Camiling PNP
does not discount that a legitimate buy-bust operation was undertaken in
this case. The conduct of the buy-bust operation was already adequately
established by the testimonies of PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman who
were the very participants of such operation. Indeed, the testimony of the
CIO would, at most, merely corroborate the testimonies of PO3 Espiritu
and SPO1 Daraman.
Second. The appellant’s qualm regarding the absence of coordination
between the Camiling PNP and the PDEA is also immaterial. In People v.
Roa,14 this Court ruled that prior coordination with the PDEA is not a
condition sine qua nonfor the validity of every entrapment operation
conducted by police authorities:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust
operation.1âwphi1 While it is true that Section 8615 of Republic Act No.
9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of
Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related
matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA’s participation a
condition sine qua nonfor every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is
just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 16 of
the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in
apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the
PDEA.17 A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination
with the PDEA.
Third. The assertion that the Camiling PNP could have just applied for a
search warrant instead of conducting a buy-bust operation is irrelevant to
the issue of whether a legitimate buy-bust operation was, in fact,
undertaken. The decision whether to apply for a search warrant or to
conduct instead a buy-bust operation on any given case is a matter
rightfully addressed to the sound discretion of the police officers. Certainly,
police officers have the right to choose which legal means or processes are
best suited, given the circumstances, in accomplishing the task they are
called upon to perform.
Verily, appellant is left with only his denial to fend off the serious
accusations against him. Such denial, by itself, however, cannot overcome
the weight traditionally accorded toaffirmative testimonies by police
officers with unsullied credibility.18 The RTC and the CAwere, therefore,
Page 54 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
correct in giving full faith and credit to the open court narrations of PO3
Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman.
Corpus delicti of the offense
proven beyond reasonable doubt
We also find that the corpus delictiof the offense was adequately proven in
this case.
A review of the evidence on recordwill show that the prosecution was able
to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the shabuthat it claims as
having been sold by the appellant:
1. PO3 Espiritu testified that he was able to buy ₱500.00 worth of
shabuinside a transparent plastic sachet from appellant, which he
brought to the Camiling PNP station.19
2. Upon arrival at the station, PO3 Espiritu Espiritu testified that
he dated the plastic sachet "11 June 2008" a marked it with "JSE-
EBB." Afterwards, a request for laboratory examination was
prepared.20
3. The next day, plastic sachet dated "11 June 2008" and marked
"JSE-EBB" was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory along with the
request for laboratory examination. 21
4. At the PNP Crime Laboratory, Mr. Timario conducted
examination on the contents of the plastic sachet dated "11 June
2008" and marked "JSE-EBB" that yielded positive results for
shabu.22
5. Afterwards, the shabuwas retrieved for purposes of the trial. 23
Evidently, the prosecution was able to account for each and every link in
the chain of custody over the shabu, from the moment it was retrieved
during the buy-bust operation up to the time it was presented before the
court as proof of the corpus delicti.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the failure by PO3 Espiritu and SPO1
Daraman to mark the seized shabuimmediately at the place where the
buy-bust was conducted will notautomatically impair the integrity of the
chain of custody so established. Strictly speaking, marking the seized
contraband at the nearest police station,rather than at the place where the
buy-bust operation was conducted, is not even a violation of the procedure
set forth in Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Thus, in People v. Resurreccion,24 this Court explained:
Accused-appellant broaches the view that SA Isidoro’s failure to mark the
confiscated shabuimmediately after seizure creates a reasonable doubt as
to the drug’s identity. People v. Sanchez,25 however, explains that RA 9165
does not specify a time frame for "immediate marking," or where said
marking should be done:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not
expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in
warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station
rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the enter the chain and
are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done ( 1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation.1âwphi1
To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is
required is that the marking be made in the presence of the accused and
upon immediate confiscation. "Immediate confiscation" has no exact
definition. Thus, in People v. Gum-Oyen,26 testimony that included the
marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of the
accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain of
custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even
marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.
(Emphasis supplied)
Verily, We are satisfied that the corpus delicti of the offense in this case
was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Page 55 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The

Decision dated 29 August 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 04595 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
Page 56 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Page 57 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. No. 190175               November 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDWIN CABRERA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this appeal is the June 18, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00784 which affirmed in all
respects the March 5, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 15, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-64615, finding appellant
Edwin Cabrera (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 3 (RA 9165) and sentencing
suffer the penalty oflife imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.
Factual Antecedents
After receiving information from residents of Sitio Galaxy, Tangke, Talisay,
Cebu and a report from a confidential asset of the illegal drug activities of
appellant, police officers from the Talisay Police Station composed of POI
Leopoldo Palconit (POI Palconit), P03 Isaias Cabuenas, and P02 Joel Cunan
conducted a buy-bust operation against appellant on September 30, 2002.
At about 4:30 p.m., poseur-buyer POI Palconit, together with the
confidential asset, approached appellant who was standing outside his
house. The confidential asset introduced PO I Palconit to appellant as a
person who wanted to buy shabu. PO 1 Palconit gave appellant two
marked ₱50.00 bills, while the latter handed to him two plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance. Thereupon, PO I Palconit made the
pre-arranged signal by touching his head with his right hand. His back-ups
then rushed to the scene and simultaneously therewith POI Palconit
arrested the appellant. He then put the markings "EC" on the two plastic
sachets and brought the same to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory for forensic examination.4 The· following day or on
October 1, 2002, a Complaint/Information was filed against appellant
charging him with violation of Sec. 5, Article II, of RA 9I65 as amended, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
That on or about 4:30 P.M. of September 30, 2002, at Tangke, Talisay City,
Cebu, Police Operatives of Talisay City Police Station proceeded to Tangke,
Talisay City, Cebu to conduct buy[-]bust operation [resulting in] the arrest
of one (1) Edwin Cabrera and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above[-]named accused without the authority of the law, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, [recover] from [his]
possession, custody and control, [t]wo (2) xx x plastic pack[s] of white
crystalline substance believed to be shabu, other paraphernalia in [his]
illegal activity and [t]wo [f]ifty[-p]eso [b]ill[s] used as mark[ed] money with
[the markings] SN.WD565189 and VH234189 (Recovered White
[Crystalline] Substance submitted to Crime Lab. [ f]or examination.
CONTRARY TO LA W.5
The chemistry report6 from the PNP Crime Laboratory later revealed that
the white crystalline substance with a total weight of O. I I gram inside the
two plastic sachets marked with "EC" tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
Appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged.7 He denied the
accusations against him and offered his own version of the story.
According to appellant, at around 4:30 p.m. of September 30, 2002, he was
at the alley outside his house washing clothes. 1bree men then
approached him. They requested him to buy shabu and gave ₱200.00. He
acceded and thus went to the house of a certain Rey Campo (Campo)
which is about 50 meters or six houses away from his house. After buying
shabu from Campo, he went back to his house to give it to the three men.
Thereupon, four policemen arrived and searched his house, but recovered
nothing therefrom. Appellant claimed that he was familiar with one of the
policemen, PO 1 Palconit, because he would see him conducting raids in
Sitio Galaxy. Appellant thus averred that he would never sell shabu to POI
Palconit because he knew that he is a police officer.8 Ruling of the Regional
Trial Court
Page 58 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
In a Decision9 dated March 5, 2007, the RTC convicted appellant of the
crime charged, viz: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court
hereby finds accused Edwin Cabrera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and in the absence of any
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a FINE of FNE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (₱500,000.00) PESOS, together with all the accessory penalties
provided for by law. The physical evidence is hereby forfeited in favor of
the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.10
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal to the CA, appellant questioned the legality of the alleged
buybust operation. He pointed to the absence of a prior surveillance and
pre-operation report. He likewise assailed the non-presentation in court of
the confidential informant and of the marked money. Moreover, he
alleged a break in the chain of custody by emphasizing that the
confiscation of the specimen happened at 4:30 p.m. of September 30,
2002 while the submission of the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination was made only at 10:50 p.m. of the same day. Because of
these, appellant averred that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.11
12
In its Decision  dated June 18, 2009, the CA held that the testimony of PO
1 Palconit and the existence of the dangerous drug seized from appellant
more than sufficiently proved the crime charged. PO 1 Palconit positively
identified appellant as the person who sold to him the plastic sachets
containing the white crystalline substance which was confirmed in the
laboratory examination as shabu and later brought to and identified in
court.
The appellate court likewise upheld the legality of the buy-bust operation.
It ratiocinated that prior surveillance is not required in a buy-bust
operation especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their
informant during the entrapment, as in this case. Neither is the submission
of a pre-operation report necessary for a conviction under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 as long as the elements of the offense are sufficiently
established by the prosecution. Further, there is no need to present in
court the confidential informant and the marked money. Presentation of
the confidential informant is only required when there are material
inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witness which is not
the case here, since POI Palconit's testimony was found by the trial court
to be credible and convincing. In the same way, presentation of the
marked money is not required either by law or jurisprudence.
The CA did not likewise give credence to appellant's claim of gap in the
chain of custody as it found the identity and integrity of the drugs to have
been established and preserved by the prosecution. Besides, the defense
admitted the existence, due execution and genuineness of the chemistry
report and the specimen submitted.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 5, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
("RTC"), 7th Judicial Region, Branch 15, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No.
CBU-64615, finding appellant Edwin Cabrera guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is
AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.13
Appellant thus interposes this appeal where he raised as additional
assignment of errors the lack of physical inventory of the seized specimen
and the non-taking of its photograph pursuant to Section 2114 of the
Implementing Rules of RA 9165.15
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Page 59 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

The Court has gone over the assailed Decision of the CA and found the preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the
appellate court's resolution on the issues raised, as well as its conclusions, evidence has been tampered with. [Appellant] bears the burden to make
to be in order. Hence, the Court finds no need to dwell on them again. some showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to
overcome a presumption of regulaiity in the handling of exhibits by public
With regard to the non-compliance by the police officers with Section 21 of officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharged their
the Implementing Rules of RA 9165 as alleged by appellant in his duties. This is also bolstered by the defense's admission of the existence,
Supplemental Brief, particularly the lack of physical inventory of the seized due execution and genuineness of the request for laboratory examination,
specimen and the non-taking of photograph thereof, the Court notes that the Chemistry Report ai1d specimens submitted.19
appellant raised the same only in this appeal. The records of the case is
bereft of any showing that appellant objected before the RTC regarding the Thus, the Court upholds appellant's conviction for violation of Section 5,
seizure and safekeeping of the shabu seized from him on account of the Article II of RA 9165 as well as the penalty imposed upon him. It must,
failure of the police officers to maintain an unbroken chain of custody of however, be added that appellant is not eligible for parole. 20
the said drugs. The only time that appellant questioned the chain of
custody was before the CA but not on the ground of lack of physical WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed June 18, 2009 Decision
inventory or non-taking of photograph, but on the alleged gap between of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00784 is AFFIRMED
the time of confiscation of the specimen and the time of its submission to with the MODIFICATION that appellant Edwin Cabrera is not eligible for
the PNP Crime Laboratory. But even then, it was already too late in the day parole.
for appellant to do so. Appellant should have raised the said issue before
the trial court.16 In similar cases, the Court brushed aside the accused's SO ORDERED.
belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person were
inadmissible because the arresting officers failed to comply with Section 21
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
of RA 9165.17 "Whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers
Associate Justice
from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because
[appellant] did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized
from him. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he
must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal." 18 Besides and as
already mentioned, the CA had already aptly concluded that the identity of
the seized drugs was established by the prosecution and its integrity
preserved, viz:

Record show[ s] that after the arrest, PO 1 Palconit immediately marked

the sachets of shabu with [appellant's] initials, requested a laboratory
examination of the confiscated substance and himself brought the sachets
of shabu on the same day to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory. Thus, the
identity of the drugs had been duly preserved and established by the
prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be
Page 60 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Page 61 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. No. 207988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BRIAN MERCADO y SARMIENTO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
1 charges.5 Trial thereafter proceeded.
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision  of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04942 affirming the Decision 2 in Criminal Case
Nos. C-77992 and C-77993 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 120 of Caloocan City. The RTC Decision found accused-appellant
Brian Mercado y Sarmiento (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002."
The Facts
The accused-appellant was charged of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in two (2) Informations, both dated 31 July 2007,
which respectively read as follows:
Crim. Case No. 77992 (For violation of Section 5, R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 27th day of July, 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 RAMON GALVEZ, who posed, as
buyer, a plastic sachet containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.02 gram, a dangerous drug, without
corresponding license or prescription therefore, knowing the same to be
such.3
Crim. Case No. 77993 (For violation of Section 11, R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 27th day of July, 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control Two
(2) sachets containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu)
weighing 0.02 gram & 0.02 gram, respectively, when subjected for
laboratory examination gave positive result to the tests of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.4
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to said
Based on the evidence presented and on the stipulations and admitted
facts entered into by the parties, the summary of factual findings is stated
as follows:
The Version of the Prosecution
[A]t around 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 2007, acting on a tip from a confidential
informant that accused-appellant was selling shabu, the Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) organized a buy-bust operation [with] SPO2 Wilfredo Quillan as team
leader, PO3 [Ramon] Galvez as poseur- buyer, and SPO1 [Fernando]
Moran, PO2 Eugene Amaro, PO2 Celso Santos and PO3 Jose Martirez as
members. After SPO2 Quillan briefed the buy-bust team, a pre-operation
report was prepared. PO3 Galvez was provided with two (2) one hundred-
peso bills which he marked on the right portion with his initials "RG". Then,
the team and the informant boarded a passenger jeepney and proceeded
to Phase 3-D, Camarin, Caloocan City. When the informant pointed to
accused-appellant, PO3 Galvez approached him and said, "[p]’re, pa-iskor
naman", offering to buy P200.00 worth of shabu. He then handed the buy-
bust money and accused-appellant brought out from his pocket three (3)
pieces of plastic sachets, chose one (1) sachet and gave it to PO3 Galvez. As
the sale was already consummated, PO3 Galvez introduced himself as a
police officer, arrested accused-appellant, and gave the pre-arranged
signal to his companions by scratching his nape. When SPO1 Moran rushed
in, PO3 Galvez marked the plastic sachet with "BMS/RG" and told SPO1
Page 62 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Moran about the remaining two (2) plastic sachets in accused-appellant’s
pocket. SPO1 Moran then frisked him and confiscated the items which he
marked as "BMS/FM-1" and "BMS/FM-2". Thereafter, they brought
accused- appellant and the confiscated items to the SAID-SOU office in
Samson Road, Caloocan City, and turned them over to the investigator,
PO2 [Randulfo] Hipolito, who prepared the corresponding evidence
acknowledgment receipt and request for laboratory examination.
Qualitative examination conducted on the confiscated three (3) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance,
each weighing 0.02 gram, yielded positive for methylampethamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.6
The Version of the Defense
On July 26, 2007, at around 9:30 to 10:00 in the evening, accused-
appellant returned the jeepney he was driving to the garage of Phase 3-B,
Camarin, Caloocan City. He was walking home when a jeepney with police
officers on board suddenly stopped in front of him. PO3 Galvez asked
accused-appellant where he came from. He answered that he just came
from driving his jeepney showing the police officers his driver’s license.
Accused-appellant was then forced to ride in the jeepney where he saw
eight (8) persons in handcuffs. He was brought to the police station and
was told to produce ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) in exchange for his
liberty, otherwise, a case would be filed against him. Unable to produce
the money, accused-appellant faced the present charges. 7
The Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 finding the accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The dispositive portion of which is hereunder
quoted, to wit:
Premises considered, this court finds and so holds that:
(1) The accused Brian Mercado y Sarmiento GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and imposes upon him the
following:
(a)In Crim. Case No. C-77992, the penalty of Life
Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00); and
(b)In Crim. Case No. C-77993, the penalty of
Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
Fourteen (14) years and a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).1âwphi1
The drugs subject matter of these cases are hereby confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with
law.9
The trial court concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution
sufficiently satisfied the quantum required for accused- appellant’s
conviction. It declared that the fact of sale was sufficiently established
upon showing the complete detailed manner of negotiation of said sale,
exchange of consideration, and handing of the subject of the sale. The
court a quo ruled that, as long as the police officer went through the
operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the accused-appellant,
and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered
consummated by the delivery of goods.10 Likewise, the testimonies of the
police officers who participated in the buy-bust operation appear credible
and reliable since absence of any showing of ill-motive on their part to
concoct trumped charges, they enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties.11 On the other hand, the denial of the
accused- appellant and his mere allegation of extortion were found to be
unsubstantiated by any convincing and credible evidence. Hence, being
considered as negative, weak, and self-serving evidence, accused-
appellant’s bare denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the
Page 63 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
prosecution’s witnesses and the physical evidence which supported said
judgment of conviction.12
The Ruling of the CA
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision in
convicting the accused-appellant. It ruled that failure to comply with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal,
nor will it result to the inadmissibility in evidence against the accused of
the illegal drugs seized in the course of the entrapment operation. What is
of utmost relevance is the preservation of the integrity and maintenance of
the evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs, for in the end, the
same shall necessarily be the thrust that shall determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The prosecution therefore must simply show
that the seized item recovered from appellant was the same item
presented in court and found to be an illegal/prohibited drug. These were
all established and proven beyond reasonable doubt in the instant
case.13 Accordingly, the prosecution was able to sufficiently bear out the
statutory elements of the crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of such
drugs committed by accused-appellant. The disposal on appeal reads:
It is well-settled that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desire the court to reject
the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Thus, as
the trial was already concluded, [w]e can no longer turn back to find out
the justifiable grounds for the omission of the legal requisites.
In any case, the procedural lapse did not render accused- appellant’s arrest
illegal or the evidence adduced inadmissible. If there is non-compliance
with Section 21, the issue is not of admissibility, but of weight – evidentiary
merit or probative value – to be given the evidence. After a scrutiny of the
records, [w]e find the evidence adduced more than sufficient to prove the
charges against accused-appellant. Therefore, considering that no
circumstance exists to put the trial court’s findings in error, [w]e apply the
time-honored precept that findings of the trial courts which are factual in
nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring
errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.
FOR THESE REASONS, [w]e DENY the appeal and AFFIRM the assailed
February 23, 2011 Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court,
Branch 120.14
Moreover, the appellate court emphasized that, during trial, accused-
appellant neither suggested that there were lapses in the safekeeping of
the suspected drugs that could affect their integrity and evidentiary value
nor objected to their admissibility. Accused-appellant was then precluded
from raising such issue which must be timely raised during trial. 15
Upon elevation of this case before this Court, the Office of the Solicitor
General manifested that it will no longer file its supplemental brief and,
instead, will adopt all the arguments in its brief filed before the CA. 16 On
the other hand, accused-appellant raised the issue that the court a quo
gravely erred in convicting him notwithstanding the police operatives’
patent non-compliance with the strict and mandatory requirements of R.A.
No. 9165.
The Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of
the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused of the alleged sale
and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, in violation
of Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. No. 9165.
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
The Court finds no valid reason to depart from the time-honored doctrine
that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, and in this case their
testimonies as well, the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed
unless the consideration of certain facts of substance and value, which
have been plainly overlooked, might affect the result of the case. 17
Page 64 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Upon perusal of the records of the case, we see no reason to reverse or
modify the findings of the RTC on the credibility of the testimony of
prosecution’s witnesses, more so in the present case, in which its findings
were affirmed by the CA. It is worthy to mention that, in addition to the
legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty,
the court a quo was in the best position to weigh the evidence presented
during trial and ascertain the credibility of the police officers who testified
as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation and in preserving the integrity
of the seized illegal drug.
This Court has consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.18 In other words, there is a need to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused actually sold and
delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former indeed knew
that what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a prohibited
drug.19 To reiterate, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, plus the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence. 20 On the
other hand, we have adhered to the time-honored principle that for illegal
possession of regulated or prohibited drugs under Section 11 of the same
law, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.21
Undoubtedly, the prosecution had indeed established that there was a
buy-bust operation22 showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered
the shabu for value to PO3 Ramon Galvez (PO3 Galvez), the poseur-buyer.
PO3 Galvez himself testified that there was an actual exchange of the
marked-money and the prohibited drug. Likewise, accused-appellant was
fully aware that what he was selling was illegal and prohibited considering
that when PO3 Galvez told him, "pre, pa-iskor naman," the former
immediately answered, "magkano?," then when the poseur-buyer replied,
"dos lang," it resulted to the production of three (3) pieces of plastic
sachets from accused-appellant’s pocket. Thereafter, the corpus delicti or
the subject drug was seized, marked, and subsequently identified as a
prohibited drug. Note that there was nothing in the records showing that
he had authority to possess them. Jurisprudence had pronounced
repeatedly that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.23 Above all,
accused-appellant likewise failed to present contrary evidence to rebut his
possession of the shabu. Taken collectively, the illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs by accused-appellant were indeed
established beyond reasonable doubt.
By way of emphasis, in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there
is evidence to the contrary.24 In this regard, the defense failed to show any
ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police operatives to impute
such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an
innocent person, such as in the case of accused-appellant. As a matter of
fact, aside from accused-appellant’s mere denial and alleged extortion
against him, no evidence was ever presented to prove the truthfulness of
the same. Incidentally, if these were simply trumped-up charges against
him, it remains a question why no administrative charges were brought
against the police officers. Moreover, in weighing the testimonies of the
prosecution’s witnesses vis-à-vis that of the defense, it is a well-settled rule
that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial judge, the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.25
To reiterate, in the absence of any showing that substantial or relevant
facts bearing on the elements of the crime have been misapplied or
overlooked, this Court can only accord full credence to such factual
assessment of the trial court which had the distinct advantage of observing
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses during the trial. Absent any
proof of motive to falsely charge an accused of such a grave offense, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the
findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall
prevail over his/her bare allegation.26
Page 65 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Furthermore, this Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody
rule,27 a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and
the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 28
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with
unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. 29
Alongside these rulings are our pronouncements, just as consistent, that
failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of
seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is "the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused."30 Thus:
From the point of view of jurisprudence, we are not beating any new path
by holding that the failure to undertake the required photography and
immediate marking of seized items may be excused by the unique
circumstances of a case. In People v. Resurreccion, we already stated that
"marking upon immediate confiscation" does not exclude the possibility
that marking can be at the police station or office of the apprehending
team. In the cases of People v. Rusiana, People v. Hernandez, and People v.
Gum-Oyen, the apprehending team marked the confiscated items at the
police station and not at the place of seizure. Nevertheless, we sustained
the conviction because the evidence showed that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items seized had been preserved. To reiterate
what we have held in past cases, we are not always looking for the strict
step-by-step adherence to the procedural requirements; what is important
is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. We succinctly explained this in People v. Del Monte when we
held:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law,
particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the
drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in
evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or
these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule
which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence
must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be]
accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that
will bring about the non- admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized
drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
admissibility, but of weight
— evidentiary merit or probative value — to be given the evidence. The
weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the
circumstances obtaining in each case.31 (Emphases supplied and citations
omitted)
From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the
prosecution established that they had custody of the drug seized from the
accused from the moment he was arrested, during the time he was
transported to the police station, and up to the time the drug was
submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. The same witnesses
also identified the seized drug with certainty when this was presented in
court. With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no
conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on
Page 66 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
the integrity thereof as evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is
therefore safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the testimonies
show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the accused-appellant
at the time of the buy-bust operation was the same one tested,
introduced, and testified to in court. This fact was further bolstered by the
stipulations entered into between the parties as to the testimony of
Forensic Chemical Officer of the Northern Police District Crime Laboratory
Office, Caloocan City, Police Chief Inspector Albert S. Arturo. 32 In other
words, there is no question as to the integrity of the evidence against
accused-appellant.
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the position taken by the CA when it
expounded on the matter:
It is well-settled that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject
the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Thus, as
the trial was already concluded, [w]e can no longer turn back to find out
the justifiable grounds for the omission of the legal requisites.
In any case, the procedural lapse did not render accused- appellant’s arrest
illegal or the evidence adduced inadmissible. If there is non-compliance
with Section 21, the issue is not of admissibility, but of weight – evidentiary
merit or probative value – to be given the evidence. After scrutiny of the
records, [w]e find the evidence adduced more than sufficient to prove the
charges against accused-appellant. Therefore, considering that no
circumstance exists to put the trial court’s findings in error, [w]e apply the
time-honored precept that findings of the trial courts which are factual in
nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring
errors, gross misapprehensions of facts and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. 33
Again, although this Court finds that the police officers did not strictly
comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
such noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drug
seized from the accused-appellant, because the chain of custody of the
evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case.
As correctly found by the appellate court:
The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-
bust operation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court. A circumspect study of the evidence
movements reveal the integrity and the evidentiary value of the suspected
drugs were safeguarded. PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran testified that they
marked the suspected drugs with "BMS/RG", "BMS/FM-1" and "BMS/FM-
2" in the presence of accused-appellant immediately upon confiscation.
Then, they brought accused-appellant and the confiscated items to their
office, entrusting custody to investigator PO2 Hipolito. Contrary to
accused-appellant’s claim, there is no hiatus in the third and fourth link in
the chain of custody. The defense admitted that, upon receipt of the items,
PO2 Hipolito prepared the corresponding evidence acknowledgment
receipt and request for laboratory examination. The request for laboratory
examination, which the prosecution offered as part of its documentary
evidence, bears a stamp stating PO2 Hipolito was the one who delivered
the marked confiscated items to PNP Crime Laboratory, with forensic
chemist PSI Arturo as the receiving officer. PSI Arturo then conducted the
examination which yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. When the prosecution presented the marked plastic sachets in
court, PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran positively identified them as those
recovered from accused- appellant in the buy-bust operation. Considering
that every link was adequately established by the prosecution, the chain of
custody was unbroken.34
In fine, considering the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution,
the denial and allegation of extortion of the accused-appellant fails. Courts
generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility with
which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that
is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more
credibility than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who testify
Page 67 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the

crime committed.35 Consequently, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
decisions of the RTC and the CA. Accused-appellant Bryan Mercado y
Sarmiento is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA- G.R. CR HC No.

04942 dated 26 September 2012, is AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
Page 68 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Page 69 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. No. 174673
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is
to assist and facilitate a trial court's function to be able to receive all the
evidence of the parties, and evaluate their admissibility and probative
value in the context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in
order to arrive at a conclusion as to the facts that transpired. Having been
able to establish the facts, the trial court will then be able to apply the law
and determine whether a complainant is deserving of the reliefs prayed for
in the pleading.
Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules
without a clear demonstration of the injury to a substantive right of the
defendant weighed against 19 years of litigation actively participated in by
both parties should not be encouraged.
There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion,
when the Sandiganbayan dismisses a case on demurrer to evidence
without a full statement of its evaluation of the evidence presented and
offered and the interpretation of the relevant law. After all, dismissal on
the basis of demurrer to evidence is similar to a judgment. It is a final order
ruling on the merits of a case.
This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions dated May 25, 20062 and September 13, 2006.3 The
Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to
have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence 4 and granted the
Motion to Dismiss of respondents Spouses Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa
Gimenez (Gimenez Spouses) based on demurrer to evidence. 5
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), instituted a Complaint6 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting,
Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the
Sandiganbayan.7 "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth . . .
acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]" 8
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the
positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of
the Gimenez Spouses.9 The Republic presented the testimonies of Atty.
Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of
Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department
of PCGG.10 Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned
or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.11
On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo
R.V. Daniel’s testimony.12 The Republic then manifested that it was "no
longer presenting further evidence."13 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to file its formal offer of
evidence."14
On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30)
days or until April 28, 2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of
evidence."15 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
of the same date.16
On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until
May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. 17 This
Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8,
2006.18 Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the
Republic.
In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan
noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence
notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the
date it terminated its presentation of evidence.19 Thus, it declared that the
Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence. 20
Page 70 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
The first assailed Resolution provides:
It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the presentation of its
evidence on February 27, 2006, and it appearing further that it failed or
otherwise neglected to file its written formal offer of evidence for an
unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days (i.e., 30 days original
period plus two extension periods totaling 45 days), the filing of said
written formal offer of evidence is hereby deemed WAIVED.
WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants’ evidence shall proceed on
June 22 and 23, 2006, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning as
previously scheduled.21
Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated
May 30, 2006.22 He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as
there was no evidence to support its cause of action.23 Fe Roa Gimenez
filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to
prosecute.24 Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio
Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.25
Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June
15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first
assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence. 26 The
pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of documentary exhibits attached
to the Motion are summarized as follows:
Exhibits A to G and series consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of
Income Tax Withheld On Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At
Source, Schedule of Interest Income, Royalties and Withholding Tax,
Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from
1980-1986 proving his legitimate income during said period. Exhibits H
-J and series refer to the Deeds of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title
proving that spouses Gimenezes acquired several real properties.
Exhibits K and series (K-1-K-4) pertain to Checking Statements Summary
issued by the Bankers Trust Company (BTC) proving that Fe Roa Gimenez
maintained a current account under Account Number 34-714-415 with
BTC. Exhibits L and series (L1-L-114) are several BTC checks, proving that
from June 1982 to April 1984, Fe Roa Gimenez issued several checks
against her BTC Current Account No. 34-714-415 payable to some
individuals and entities such as Erlinda Oledan, Vilma Bautista, The Waldorf
Towers, Cartier, Gliceria Tantoco, Bulgari, Hammer Galleries and Renato
Balestra, involving substantial amount of money in US Dollars. Exhibits M
and series (M1-M-25) are several The Chase Manhattan Bank (TCMB)
checks drawn against the account of Fe Roa Gimenez under Account
Number 021000021, proving that she issued several checks drawn against
her TCMB account, payable to individuals and entities such as Gliceria
Tantoco, Vilma Bautista and The Waldorf Towers, involving substantial
sums in US Dollars. Exhibit N is the Philippine National Bank (PNB), New
York Branch Office Charge Ticket No. FT 56880 dated December 9, 1982 in
the amount of US$30,000.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she received
said enormous amount from the PNB, New York Branch Office, with
clearance from the Central Bank, which amount was charged against PNB
Manila. Exhibit N-1 is the PNB New York Branch Advice to Payee No. FT
56535 dated November 12, 1982 in the amount of US$10,990.00 for Fe
Roa Gimenez proving her receipt of such amount as remitted from
California Overseas Bank, Los Angeles. Exhibits O and series (O1-O-8) refer
to several Advices made by Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve Bank in
Switzerland to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she maintained a
current account with said bank under Account Number 107094.50 and that
from July 30, 1984 to August 30, 1984, she placed a substantial amount on
time deposit in several banks, namely, Hypobank, Luzemburg, Luxemburg,
Societe Generale, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.
Exhibit P is the Certification dated March 19, 2002 issued by Director
Florino O. Ibanez of the Office of the President proving that Fe Roa
Gimenez, from January 1, 1966 to April 1, 1986, worked with the Office of
the President under different positions, the last of which as Presidential
Staff Director with a salary of P87,072.00 per annum.
Exhibit Q and series (Q-1-Q-18) is the Affirmation of Ralph Shapiro filed
with the United States Court of Appeals in the case entitled, "The Republic
of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al." which discussed certain
acts of Fe Roa Gimenez and Vilma Bautista, among others, in relation to
the funds of the Marcoses.
Page 71 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Exhibits R and S and series (R-1, R-9; S-1-S-10) refer to the Certificate of
Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education,
Inc., the Amended Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education,
Inc., the Treasurer’s Affidavit executed by Ignacio Gimenez and the
Director’s Certificate executed by Roberto B. Olanday, Ignacio Gimenez
and Roberto Coyuto, Jr. proving Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Olanday’s
interests in GEl Guaranteed Education, Inc.
Exhibits T and series (T-1-T-8) are the Advices made by the Bankers Trust
AG Zurich-Geneve Bank in Switzerland to Ignacio Gimenez proving that he
maintained a current account with said bank under Account Number
101045.50 and that from March to June, 1984, he placed a substantial
amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Credit Lyonnais,
Brussels, Societe Generale, Paris, Credit Commercial De France, Paris and
Bank of Nova Scotia, London.
Exhibits U and V and series (U-1-U-5; V1-V-18) consist of the Affidavit
dated April 25, 1986 and the Declaration dated June 23, 1987 including the
attachments, of Oscar Carino, Vice-President and Manager of the PNB New
York Branch, narrating in detail how the funds of the PNB New York Branch
were disbursed outside regular banking business upon the instructions of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos using Fe Roa
Gimenez and others as conduit.
Exhibits W and series (W-1-W-4) are the Debit memos from the PNB to Fe
Roa Gimenez while Exhibits X and X-1 are the Acknowledgments of said
respondent, proving that she received substantial amounts of money
which were coursed through the PNB to be used by the Marcos spouses for
state visits and foreign trips.
Exhibit Y and series (Y-1-Y-2) is the Letter dated August 25, 1986 of Juan C.
Gatmaitan, Assistant Chief Legal Counsel of PNB to Charles G. LaBella,
Assistant United States Attorney regarding the ongoing investigation of
irregular transactions at the PNB, New York Branch proving that PNB
cooperated with the United States government in connection with the
investigation on the irregular transactions of Oscar Carino at PNB New York
Branch.
Exhibit Z is the service record of Fe Roa Gimenez issued by Florino O.
Ibanez of the Office of the President which proves that she worked with
the Office of the President from 1966-1986 holding different positions, the
last of which was Presidential Staff Director.1âwphi1
Exhibits AA and series (AA-1 –AA-2) are the several Traders Royal Bank
checks drawn against Account No. 74-702836-9 under the account name of
Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that she issued said checks payable to
individuals and entities involving substantial amount of money.
Exhibits BB and CC and series (BB-1–BB-17; CC-1-CC-3) are the several
Transfer of Funds Advice from Traders Royal Bank Statements of Account
of Fe Roa Gimenez, proving that she maintained a current account under
Account No. 74-7028369 at Traders Royal Bank.
Exhibits HH and series (HH-1-HH-3) are the Certification dated October 3,
2002 of Lamberto R. Barbin, Officer-in-Charge, Malacanang Records Office,
that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of spouses Marcoses for the
years 1965 up to 1986 are not among the records on file in said Office
except 1965, 1967 and 1969; the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of
December 31, 1969 and December 31, 1967 of former President Ferdinand
Marcos; and the Sworn Statement of Financial Condition, Assets, Income
and Liabilities as of December 31, 1965 of former President Ferdinand
Marcos. These documentary exhibits prove the assets and liabilities of
former President Marcos for the years 1965,1967 and 1969.
Exhibit II and series is [sic] the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of
December 31,1969 submitted by Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that her
assets on that period amounted only to P39,500.00.
Exhibit KK is the Table of Contents of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the
Sandiganbayan entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Ignacio B. Gimenez
and Fe Roa Gimenez, et. al.", including its Annexes which prove the assets
and liabilities of spouses Gimenezes.
Page 72 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Exhibits KK-1 up to KK-12 are several transfer certificates of title and tax
declarations in the names of spouses Gimenezes, proving their acquisition
of several real properties.
Exhibits KK-15, KK-18, KK-20 up to KK-27, KK-30, KK-32 up to KK-38 and KK-
40 are the General Information Sheet, Certificate of Filing of Amended
Articles of Incorporation, and Amended Articles of Incorporation of various
corporations. These prove the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez
has substantial interests.
Exhibits KK-41 up to KK-44 are the Writs and Letters of Sequestration
issued by the PCGG which prove that the shares of stocks of Ignacio
Gimenez in Ignacio B. Gimenez, Securities, Inc. and the real properties
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 137638, 132807, 126693 and
126694 located in San Fabian, Pangasinan, were sequestered by the PCGG.
Exhibit KK-45 is the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph S.
Lee and Alexander M. Berces, Team Supervisor and Investiogator, [sic]
respectively, of IRD, PCGG, proving that the PCGG conducted an
investigation on New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction
Corporation, and OTO Construction and Development Corporation in
relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday.
Exhibits KK-48, KK-49 and KK-50 are certain Lis Pendens from the PCGG
addressed to the concerned Register of Deeds informing that the real
properties mentioned therein had been sequestered and are the subject of
Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan.
Exhibits KK-51, KK-51-A, KK-52 and KK-52-A are the Letter and Writ of
Sequestration issued by the PCGG on Allied Banking Corporation and
Guaranteed Education Inc. pursuant to its mandate to go after ill-gotten
wealth.
Exhibits NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 refer to the Memorandum To All
Commercial Banks dated March 14, 1986 issued by then Central Bank
Governor Jose B. Fernandez and the Letter dated March 13, 1986 of Mary
Concepcion Bautista, PCGG Commissioner addressed to then Central Bank
Governor Fernandez requesting that names be added to the earlier
request of PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga to instruct all commercial banks
not to allow any withdrawal or transfer of funds from the market
placements under the names of said persons, to include spouses
Gimenezes, without authority from PCGG.
Exhibits KK and series, NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 which prove the various
real properties, business interests and bank accounts owned by spouses
Gimenezes were part of the testimony of Atty. Tereso Javier.
Exhibit RR and series (RR-1-RR-23) are the Affidavit dated July 24, 1987 of
Dominador Pangilinan, Acting President and President of Trader’s Royal
Bank, and the attached Recapitulation, Status of Banker’s Acceptances,
Status of Funds and Savings Account Ledger wherein he mentioned that
Malacanang maintained trust accounts at Trader’s Royal Bank, the balance
of which is approximately 150-175 million Pesos, and that he was informed
by Mr. Rivera that the funds were given to him (Rivera) by Fe Roa Gimenez
for deposit to said accounts.
Exhibits SS and series (SS-1-SS-29) are the Affidavit dated July 23, 1987 of
Apolinario K. Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank and
attachments, which include Recapitulation, Status of Funds, and Messages
from Traders Royal Bank Manila to various foreign banks. In his Affidavit,
Medina divulged certain numbered confidential trust accounts maintained
by Malacanang with the Trader’s Royal Bank. He further stated that the
deposits were so substantial that he suspected that they had been made
by President Marcos or his family.
Exhibit TT and series (TT-1-TT-3) is [sic] the Memorandum dated July 19,
2005 of Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development
Department of PCGG regarding the investigation conducted on the ill-
gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, the subject matter of Civil Case No.
[0]007. He revealed that during the investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of
spouses Gimenezes, it was found out that from 1977 to 1982, several
withdrawals, in the total amount of P75,090,306.42 were made from Trust
Account No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B. Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez
Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.
Page 73 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Exhibits RR, SS, TT and their series prove that spouses Gimenez maintained
bank accounts of substantial amounts and gained control of various
corporations.1âwphi1 These are also being offered as part of the testimony
of Danilo R.V. Daniel.27 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and
granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss. 28 According to the
Sandiganbayan:
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the
higher ends of substantial justice militate against dismissal of cases purely
on technical grounds, the circumstances of this case show that the ends of
justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton disregard of the
Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are designed
for the proper and prompt disposition of cases. . . .
The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the
formal offer of evidence fail to persuade this Court. The missing exhibits
mentioned by the plaintiff’s counsel appear to be the same missing
documents since 2004, or almost two (2) years ago. The plaintiff had more
than ample time to locate them for its purpose. . . . Since they remain
missing after lapse of the period indicated by the Court, there is no reason
why the search for these documents should delay the filing of the formal
offer of evidence.
[Petitioner’s] counsel . . . admits that faced with other pressing matters, he
lost track of the time. We cannot just turn a blind eye on the negligence of
the parties and in their failure to observe the orders of this Court. The
carelessness of [petitioner’s] counsel in keeping track of the deadlines is an
unacceptable reason for the Court to set aside its Order and relax the
observance of the period set for filing the formal offer of
evidence.29 (Citation omitted)
The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its
case for an unreasonable length of time and to comply with the court’s
rules.30 The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by
the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies. 31 However, the
persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were not
presented.32 Hence, the evidence lacked probative value. 33 The dispositive
portion of the assailed Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, there being no valid and cogent justification shown by the
plaintiff for the Court to Grant its Motion for Reconsideration and admit its
Formal Offer of Evidence, the plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and to
Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss
on Demurrer to Evidence filed by the defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez and
adopted by defendant Fe Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The case is
then DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.34 (Emphasis in the original)
The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3,
2006 before this court.35
The Gimenez Spouses were required to comment on the Petition. 36 This
court noted the separate Comments37 filed by the Gimenez Spouses.38 The
Republic responded to the Comments through a Consolidated
Reply39 dated June 22, 2007.
In the Resolution40 dated August 29, 2007, this court required the parties
to submit their memoranda.41
On February 18, 2008, this court resolved to require the parties to "move
in the premises[.]"42
On March 2, 2012, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open
Proceedings, to File and Admit Attached Supplement to the Petition for
Certiorari.43 In this Supplement, the Republic argued that the second
assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006 was void for failing to state
the facts and the law on which it was based.44 This Motion was granted,
and the Gimenez Spouses were required to file their Comment on the
Supplement to the Petition.45 Thereafter, the Republic filed its Reply.46
Page 74 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Rejoinder47 dated December 19, 2012 which was
expunged by this court in a Resolution48 dated January 23, 2013. Ignacio
Gimenez’s Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Rejoinder 49 was
denied.50
The Republic raised the following issues:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in dismissing the case in
the light of the allegations in the Complaint which were substantiated by
overwhelming evidence presented vis-a-vis the material admissions of
spouses Gimenezes as their answer failed to specifically deny that they
were dummies of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and that they
acquired illegal wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income in a
manner prohibited under the Constitution and Anti-Graft Statutes.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s
Motion to Admit Formal Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere
technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due process.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in making a sweeping
pronouncement that petitioner’s evidence do not bear any probative
value.51
The issues for consideration of this court are:
First, whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy to
assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions; and
Second, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner
Republic of the Philippines waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence
and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s
Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
We grant the Petition.
I
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez pictures petitioner as being confused as to
the proper mode of review of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions. According to
him, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion.52 Hence, petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 and not a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.53 Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any error, and
petitioner has to show that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. 54
Observance of the proper procedure before courts, especially before the
Sandiganbayan, cannot be stressed enough. Due process is enshrined in
the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights.55 "Due process [in criminal
cases] guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved[.]"56 "Mere suspicion of guilt should not sway
judgment."57
To determine whether a petition for review is the proper remedy to assail
the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, we review the nature of actions for
reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages.
Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages
for ill-gotten wealth are also called civil forfeiture proceedings.
Republic Act No. 137958 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture
proceedings may be instituted against public officers or employees who
"[have] acquired during his [or her] incumbency an amount of property
which is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as such public
officer or employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed
prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired." 59
This court has already settled the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil
forfeiture cases:
. . . violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the
forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. 60
Page 75 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,61 this court re-affirmed the doctrine that
forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in
nature.62 Civil forfeiture proceedings were also differentiated from plunder
cases:
. . . a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate
and different from a plunder case. . . . In a prosecution for plunder, what is
sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand,
all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence,
under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his
legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said
properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable
nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed
from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent
public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth. 63 (Citation
omitted)
To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings
under Republic Act No. 1379 is the same with other civil cases —
preponderance of evidence.64
When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the
dismissal is equivalent to an acquittal.65
As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an
acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.66
Hence, the Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:
Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting
an accused’s demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 67 (Citation omitted)
In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner
correctly filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the mode of appeal from
judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
II
Petitioner argues that substantial justice requires doing away with the
procedural technicalities.68 Loss of vital documentary proof warranted
extensions to file the Formal Offer of Evidence. 69 Honest efforts to locate
several missing documents resulted in petitioner’s inability to file the
pleading within the period granted by the Sandiganbayan. 70
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner cannot fault the
Sandiganbayan for its incompetence during trial.71 Even if the evidence
were formally offered within the prescribed period, PCGG’s evidence still
had no probative value.72 It is solely petitioner’s fault "that the persons
who certified to the photocopies of the originals were not presented to
testify[.]"73 It is also misleading to argue that the pieces of documentary
evidence presented are public documents.74 "The documents are not
public in the sense that these are official issuances of the Philippine
government."75 "The bulk consists mainly of notarized, private documents
that have simply been certified true and faithful." 76
According to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez, petitioner tries to excuse its
non-filing of the Formal Offer of Evidence within the prescribed period by
raising its efforts to locate the 66 missing documents. 77 However, the issue
of the missing documents was laid to rest during the hearing on November
16, 2004.78 The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until March 2005 to
produce the documents; otherwise, these would be excluded. 79 The
Page 76 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
testimonies of the witnesses related to the missing documents would also
be expunged from the case records.80
Moreover, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that "[t]he Sandiganbayan
did not err when it ruled that the great bulk of the documentary evidence
offered by the PCGG have no probative value."81 Aside from the 66 missing
documents it failed to present, almost all of petitioner’s pieces of
documentary evidence were mere photocopies.82 The few that were
certified true copies were not testified on by the persons who certified
these documents.83
Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of
evidence. Testimonial evidence is offered "at the time [a] witness is called
to testify."84 Documentary and object evidence, on the other hand, are
offered "after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence." 85 Offer
of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally unless
permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence. 86
More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be
formally offered to be considered by the court. Evidence not offered is
excluded in the determination of the case.87 "Failure to make a formal offer
within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit
it."88
Rule 132, Section 34 provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional
guarantee of due process. Parties must be given the opportunity to review
the evidence submitted against them and take the necessary actions to
secure their case.89 Hence, any document or object that was marked for
identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered and the
opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross-
examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it." 90
This court explained further the reason for the rule:
The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary because
judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its
function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for
which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this
allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not
be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial
court.91 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
To consider a party’s evidence which was not formally offered during trial
would deprive the other party of due process. Evidence not formally
offered has no probative value and must be excluded by the court. 92
Petitioner’s failure to file its written Formal Offer of Evidence of the
numerous documentary evidence presented within the prescribed period
is a non-issue. In its first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan declared that petitioner waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence when it failed to file the pleading on May 13, 2006, the
deadline based on the extended period granted by the court. Petitioner
was granted several extensions of time by the Sandiganbayan totalling 75
days from the date petitioner terminated its presentation of evidence.
Notably, this 75-day period included the original 30-day period.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit
Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, and the Formal Offer of Evidence.
In resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Formal Offer of Evidence, the Sandiganbayan found the carelessness of
petitioner’s counsel unacceptable. According to the Sandiganbayan, it
could not countenance the non-observance of the court’s orders.
This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover
the assets and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their close
Page 77 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees.93 Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding
technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten
wealth:
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has
seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay
or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases
resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the
Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or
perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost
two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and
reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases
on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought
out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally
determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying
technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks. 94 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit,
belatedly. Petitioner hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to
present its evidence as shown in its extensive Formal Offer of Evidence. As
petitioner argues:
Undeniable from the records of the case is that petitioner was vigorous in
prosecuting the case. The most tedious and crucial stage of the litigation
and presentation of evidence has been accomplished. Petitioner
completed its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten nature and
character of the funds and assets sought to be recovered in the present
case. It presented vital testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of
voluminous record proving the gross disparity of the subject funds to
spouses Gimenezes’ combined declared income which must be reconveyed
to the Republic for being acquired in blatant violation of the Constitution
and the Anti-Graft statutes.95
This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous
documentary evidence in cases of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired
throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute corruption and take
back what rightfully belongs to the government and the people of the
Republic.
This is not the first time that this court relaxed the rule on formal offer of
evidence.
Tan v. Lim96 arose from two civil Complaints: one for injunction and
another for legal redemption, which were heard jointly before the trial
court.97 The defendant did not file a Formal Offer of Evidence in the
injunction case98 and merely adopted the evidence offered in the legal
redemption case.99 The trial court held that the defendant’s failure to file
his Formal Offer of Evidence in the injunction case rendered the plaintiff’s
evidence therein as uncontroverted.100 The Court of Appeals reversed the
Decision and was affirmed by this court.101 This court ruled that while the
trial court’s reasoning in its Decision was technically sound, a liberal
interpretation was more appropriate and in line with substantial justice:
It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the rules directs the court to
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered and that under
Section 35, documentary evidence is offered after presentation of
testimonial evidence. However, a liberal interpretation of these Rules
would have convinced the trial court that a separate formal offer of
evidence in Civil Case No. 6518 was superfluous because not only was an
offer of evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was being jointly heard
by the trial court, counsel for Jose Renato Lim had already declared he was
adopting these evidences for Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court itself
stated that it would freely utilize in one case evidence adduced in the
other only to later abandon this posture. Jose Renato Lim testified in Civil
Case No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his
testimony since at the time it was made, the rules provided that
testimonial evidence is deemed offered at the time the witness is called to
testify. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical
case as they are devised chiefly to secure and not defeat substantial justice.
Page 78 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
....
The logic of the Court of Appeals is highly persuasive. Indeed, apparently,
the trial court was being overly technical about the nonsubmission of Jose
Renato Lim’s formal offer of evidence. This posture not only goes against
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure decreeing a liberal
construction of the rules to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive
litigation but ignores the consistent rulings of the Court against utilizing
the rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice. Despite the intervening
years, the language of the Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-
General, still remains relevant:
"x x x. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is
to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself
which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the
means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to
an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made
effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and
takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes
incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave
criticism."102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Furthermore, "subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure."103
Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the
number of delays petitioner incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of
Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering ill-gotten wealth, this court is
of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed and petitioner
be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The
Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be reversed.
III
According to petitioner, the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by respondents and dismissed the case despite
a "prima facie foundation [based on the pleadings and documents on
record] that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly
disproportionate to their lawful income or declared lawful assets." 104
Similarly, the Complaint alleged specific acts committed by respondent
Ignacio Gimenez:
[T]aking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection, by
himself and/or in unlawful concert and active collaboration with former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos for the purpose of
mutually enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure and recovery
of assets illegally obtained: (a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in several
corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining
Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National Resources, Philippine
Oversees, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources; (b) unlawfully obtained,
through corporations organized by them such as the New City Builders, Inc.
(NCBI), multi-million peso contracts with the government buildings, such as
the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as projects of
the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and
Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage of the
Government and the Filipino people; and (c) in furtherance of the above
stated illegal purposes, organized several establishments engaged in food,
mining and other businesses such as the Transnational Construction
Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology
Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T Development Corporation, RBO
Agro Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining
Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation,
GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc. 105
Despite the specific allegations in the Complaint, petitioner contends that
respondents merely gave general denials to the allegations in the
Complaint.106 "[N]o specific denial [was] made on the material allegations
[in] the [C]omplaint."107
Page 79 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the Sandiganbayan was
correct in granting the Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez claims that petitioner cannot be excused
from filing its Formal Offer of Evidence considering the numerous
extensions given by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had all the resources
and time to gather, collate, and secure the necessary evidence to build its
case.108 Petitioner’s presentation of evidence took 19 years to complete,
and yet it failed to submit the necessary documents and pleading. 109
Similarly, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez argues that petitioner was negligent
in failing to comply with the Sandiganbayan’s orders considering the
inordinate amount of time given to petitioner to present evidence, which
resulted in only five witnesses in 19 years.110
To determine the propriety of granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
based on Demurrer to Evidence, we review the nature of demurrer.
Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If
the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
In Oropesa v. Oropesa111 where this court affirmed the dismissal of the case
on demurrer to evidence due to petitioner’s non-submission of the Formal
Offer of Evidence,112 demurrer to evidence was defined as:
. . . "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue." We have also
held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of
the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as
he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not
entitled to the relief sought."113 (Citations omitted)
This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to
evidence:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law,
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence
together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be
drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a
demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is
likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the
plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably
inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the
material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an
allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the
plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery. 114
Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines
when acting on a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence:
What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to
evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts
and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that
which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such
as capacity to sue. . . .115 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Petitioner, in its Supplement to the Petition, argued that the testimonial
evidence it had presented and offered during trial warranted consideration
and analysis.116 The Sandiganbayan erroneously excluded these
testimonies in determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not,
hence:
. . . even assuming that the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s formal offer
of evidence, petitioner still had testimonial evidence in its favor which
should [have] been considered. It behoved then upon the Sandiganbayan
Page 80 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
to discuss or include in its discussion, at the very least, an analysis of
petitioner’s testimonial evidence.117
With our ruling reversing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions on petitioner’s
Formal Offer of Evidence, what should be determined now by the
Sandiganbayan is whether petitioner’s evidence is sufficient to entitle it to
the relief it seeks after the Sandiganbayan rested its case. Petitioner is
required to establish preponderance of evidence.
In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted
respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on the lack of Formal Offer of
Evidence of petitioner. At the same time, it observed that the pieces of
documentary evidence presented by petitioner were mostly certified true
copies of the original. In passing upon the probative value of petitioner’s
evidence, the Sandiganbayan held:
On another note, the evidence presented by the plaintiff consisted mainly
of certified true copies of the original. These certified copies of
documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff were not testified on by
the person who certified them to be photocopies of the original. Hence,
these evidence do not appear to have significant substantial probative
value.118
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for making "a general and sweeping
statement that the evidence presented by petitioner lacked probative
value for the reason that they are mainly certified true copies which had
not been testified on by the person who certified [them]." 119 Thus, its right
to due process was violated when the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s
documentary evidence in the same Resolution which dismissed the case. 120
Petitioner argues that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity
and authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by
petitioner;121 and b) the documents it presented were public documents,
and there was no need for the identification and authentication of the
original documentary exhibits.122 Petitioner relies on the Sandiganbayan
Order123 dated August 6, 2002. The Order reads:
Considering the manifestation of Atty. Reno Gonzales, counsel for
plaintiff/PCGG, that the defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, through counsel, is
willing to stipulate that the documents to be presented and identified by
the witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the PCGG, the parties
agreed to dispense with the testimony of Ma. Lourdes Magno.
WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, the continuation of the presentation of
plaintiff’s evidence is set on October 9 and 10, 2002, both at 8:30 o’clock
[sic] in the morning.
SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to
the PCGG’s functions prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section
3(b),125 and form part of the official records of the PCGG: 126 "Certifications
as to the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her
salaries and compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR
Income Tax Returns and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the
declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles of Incorporation of
various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on various
corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money
which prove that they acted as conduit in the disbursement of government
funds."127
On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s
documents are not "official issuances of the Philippine
government."128 They are mostly notarized private
documents.129 Petitioner’s evidence has no probative value; hence, a
dismissal on demurrer to evidence is only proper. 130 Respondent Fe Roa
Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in holding that the
majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has no probative value,
considering that most of these documents are only photocopies. 131
The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves
better treatment.
Page 81 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have
been ruled upon. Save for certain cases, the original document must be
presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of
the document.132 This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.— When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.
In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may
be presented133 as provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. —
If the document is in the custody or under the control of adverse party, he
must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.—
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
In Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,134 citing Estrada v. Hon. Desierto,135 this
court clarified the applicability of the Best Evidence Rule:
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only
when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope
of the rule is more extensively explained thus —
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule
applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence
is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any
other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for
accounting for the original.
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is
offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the
fact of execution of the documents is allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath,
etc., et al., 91 Phil[.] 565). x x x
In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that —
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of the
Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6,
Page 82 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence
rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s
discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be
served by requiring production.
"x x x x x x x x x
"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been
abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute
arised [sic]. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves
universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may
be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to
inspect it."
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and
weighed in evidence the photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs,
and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the existence of
respondent’s loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never
the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent’s position
that the PNs in the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534) never
existed, while the PNs in the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534)
were merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs
representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied
receipt of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for
another purpose. Respondent further admitted the letters she wrote
personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank
acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were
just meant to keep up the ruse of the simulated loans. Thus, respondent
questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or when the
former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were
executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the documents, and
which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply
to the evidence presented by petitioners regarding the existence of
respondent’s loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule admits of the
following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of
Court[.]136 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts,
documents are classified as either public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of
the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and
the manner of proof for public documents:
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.— Documents consisting of entries
in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
Page 83 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
SEC. 24. Proof of official record.— The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.— Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk
of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
....
SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.— An authorized public record
of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy
thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate
certificate that such officer has the custody.
....
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents.— Every instrument duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved. (Emphasis supplied)
Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this
court pronounced:
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the
documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by
virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it
is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other
writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by
law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by
law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in
court.137 (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section
19 of the Rules of Court is material with regard to the fact the evidence
proves. In Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,138 this
court ruled that:
. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated:
....
"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer"
include those specified as public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132
of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath, or
jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under
Section 23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave
rise to their execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is
proof that Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories), and of
the date of the latter (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is proof
that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated
thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Additionally, under Section 30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in
Page 84 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same).
The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties
attending the execution of the different kinds of public instruments. Official
duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly performed. As
regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are required
to be sworn to by the person making them, the only portion thereof
executed by the person authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed therefore
applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public merely attests
that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the
date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits are notarized
documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be
received with caution.139 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation,140 this court discussed the
difference between mere copies of audited financial statements submitted
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial statements
obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which are public documents
under Rule 132, Section 19(c) of the Revised Rules of Evidence:
The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial
statements of SMMC. Financial statements (which include the balance
sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow) show the fiscal
condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The financial
statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public
accountants (like those presented by petitioner) are audited financial
statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as [a]
general rule, private documents. However, once financial statements are
filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become
public documents.
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its
admissibility as evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence
even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On the
other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they
are properly authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:
....
Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as
evidence were mere copies of the audited financial statements submitted
to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies presented were
certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured
from the BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have
been public documents. Thus, the statements presented were private
documents. Consequently, authentication was a precondition to their
admissibility in evidence.
During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a
document presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly executed or
that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by
mistake or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a
memorandum attesting to the increase in the corporation’s monthly
market revenue, prepared by a member of his management team. While
there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to
establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available
must be presented. The best proof available, in this instance, would have
been the testimony of a representative of SMMC’s external auditor who
prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none,
the audited financial statements were never authenticated. 141 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,142 this court held that mere
collection of documents by the PCGG does not make such documents
public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of
its investigations does not make them per se public records referred to in
the quoted rule.
Page 85 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno,
who testified that these public and private documents had been gathered
by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the
Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents were
submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their
contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to
them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify only
to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived
from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she
obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the
documents themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits
or Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while
affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as
hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally
prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own
language in writing the affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants.
For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.143 (Citations omitted)
Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s
witnesses.
Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that
tended to establish a presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten
wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s incumbency as public officer
and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her
and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful income or properties.
Petitioner presented five (5) witnesses, two (2) of which were Atty. Tereso
Javier and Director Danilo R.V. Daniel, both from the PCGG:
Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the
Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then
Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG, who
testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the
control of spouses Gimenezes.144
Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of
petitioner’s testimonial evidence:
1) Exhibit "KK"145 was offered "for the purpose of proving the
assets or properties of the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa
Gimenez, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier." 146

2) Exhibits "KK-1" to "KK-12"147 inclusive of sub-markings, were

Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by
offered "for the purpose of proving the real properties acquired
petitioner was cursory. Its main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss
by the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as
on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no evidence to consider due
part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."148
to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the
totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.
3) Exhibits "KK-15," "KK-18," "KK-20," "KK-27," "KK-30," "KK-32" to
"KK-38" and "KK-40"149 were offered "for the purpose of proving
Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this
the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez has interest, and as
court finds it clear from the second assailed Resolution that the
part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."150
Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented by
petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring
petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any basis or justification. 4) Exhibit "KK-45"151 was offered "for the purpose of proving that
the PCGG conducted an investigation of New City Builders, Inc.,
Page 86 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO Construction
and Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez
and Roberto O. Olanday, and as part of the testimony of Tereso
Javier."152
5) Exhibits "KK-48" to "KK-50"153 were offered "for the purpose of
proving that the PCGG formally filed notices of lis pendens with
the Registers of Deeds of Taytay, Rizal, Lucena City, Quezon and
San Fabian, Pangasinan over the properties mentioned in said
notices in connection with Civil Case No. [0]007 pending with the
Sandiganbayan, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier." 154
6) Exhibits "KK-51" to "KK-52"155 and their sub-markings were
offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG sequestered
the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation and Guaranteed
Education, Inc. as stated in the said writ/letter of sequestration,
and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."156
7) Exhibits "NN" to "QQ"157 and their sub-markings were offered
"for the purpose of proving that the PCGG formally requested the
Central Bank to freeze the bank accounts of the spouses Igancio
[sic] B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez and that the Central Bank,
acting on said request, issued a memorandum to all commercial
banks relative thereto. They are also being offered as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."158
8) Exhibits "RR" to "RR-23"159 were offered "for the purpose of
proving that Dominador Pangilinan, former Acting President and
President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an affidavit on July 24,
1987 wherein he mentioned Malacanang trust accounts
maintained with the Traders Royal Bank the balance of which was
very high, approximately 150-175 million pesos, as indicated in
the monthly statements attached to his affidavit. They are also
being offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel." 160
9) Exhibits "SS" to "SS-29"161 were offered "for the purpose of
proving that Apolinario K. Medina, Executive Vice President of
Traders Royal Bank, executed an Affidavit on July 23, 1987
wherein he mentioned about certain numbered (confidential)
trust accounts maintained with the Traders Royal Bank, the
deposits to which ‘were so substantial in amount that (he)
suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his
family. They are also being offered as part of the testimony of
Danilo R.V. Daniel."162
10) Exhibits "TT" to "TT-3"163 were offered "for the purpose of
proving that Director Danilo R.V. Daniel of the Research and
Development Department of the PCGG conducted an
investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of the spouses Ignacio and
Fe Roa Gimenez and found that from 1977 to 1982, the total sum
of P75,090,306.42 was withdrawn from the account No. 128 (A/C
76-128) in favor of I.B Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe
Roa Gimenez. They are also being offered as part of the testimony
of Director Danilo R.V. Daniel."164
The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a
demurrer to evidence which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.
The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the
determination of its probative weight is canonical. 165
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to [be] considered at all. On the other hand,
the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it
proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as
such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules
on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as
witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to
question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence,
failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As
earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value.166 (Citations omitted)
Page 87 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
The Sandiganbayan should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine,
et al.167 where this court held that it is better to admit and consider
evidence for determination of its probative value than to outright reject it
based on very rigid and technical grounds.168
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the
rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of
doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or
technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial
or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or
competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them.169 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover
ill-gotten wealth. In case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in
granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An order
granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits. 170 This is
because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action,"171 it specifically "pertains to the merits of the
case."172
In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza,173 this court defined a judgment rendered
on the merits:
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed
facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections"; or when the
judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal
or merely technical point."174 (Citations omitted)
To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits
of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his [or
her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence
shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought." 175 The order of
dismissal must be clearly supported by facts and law since an order
granting demurrer is a judgment on the merits:
As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a
judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision
clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is
based.176 (Citation omitted)
To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally
offer documentary evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.
IV
Respondents did not fail to specifically deny material averments in the
Complaint.
Under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must specify
each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and,
whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial."177 There are three modes of specific
denial provided for under the Rules:
1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the
truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable,
setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to
support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the
complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by
stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint,
which has the effect of a denial.178
In paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the PCGG, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, averred that:
Page 88 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
14. Defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, by herself and/or in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue
advantage of her position, influence and connection and with grave abuse
of power and authority, in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of
assets illegally obtained:
(a) actively participated in the unlawful transfer of millions of
dollars of government funds into several accounts in her name in
foreign countries;
(b) disbursed such funds from her various personal accounts for
Defendants’ own use[,] benefit and enrichment;
(c) acted as conduit of the Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos in purchasing the New York properties,
particularly, the Crown Building, Herald Center, 40 Wall Street,
200 Wall Street, Lindenmere Estate and expensive works of
arts;179
In their Answer, respondents claimed that;
9. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the
allegations contained in paragraphs 14(a), 14(b) and 14(c), the truth being
that defendant Fe Roa never took advantage of her position or alleged
connection and influence to allegedly prevent disclosure and recovery of
alleged illegally obtained assets, in the manner alleged in said
paragraphs.180
Similarly, the PCGG made material allegations in paragraph 16 of the
Complaint:
16. Defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez, taking undue advantage of his
relationship, influence, and connection, by himself and/or in unlawful
concert and active collaboration with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos, for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves and
preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained, among
others:
(a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, in several
corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje
Mining Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National
Resources, Philippine Overseas, Inc. and Pioneer Natural
Resources;
(b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by them
such as the the [sic] New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multimillion
peso contracts with the government for the construction of
government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports
Complex and Dining Hall as well as projects of the National
Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika
Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage to Plaintiff and
the Filipino people.
(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized
several establishments engaged in food, mining and other
businesses such as the Transnational Construction Corporation,
Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology
Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T Development Corporation,
RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal
Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal
Mining Corporation, GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B.
Gimenez Securities, Inc.181
To which respondents specifically denied through the following paragraph:
11. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the
allegations contained in paragraphs 16, 16(a), 16(b) and 16(c) that
defendant Gimenez allegedly took advantage of his alleged relationship,
influence and connection, and that by himself or in alleged unlawful
concert with defendants Marcos and Imelda, for the alleged purpose of
enriching themselves and preventing the discovery of alleged illegally
obtained assets: (1) allegedly acted as dummy, nominee or agent of
defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) allegedly obtained multi-million peso
projects unlawfully; and (3) allegedly organized several establishments, the
Page 89 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
truth being: (1) that defendant Gimenez never acted as dummy, nominee
or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) that defendant Gimen[e]z
never once obtained any contract unlawfully; and (3) that defendant
Gimenez is a legitimate businessman and organized business
establishments legally and as he saw fit, all in accordance with his own
plans and for his own purposes.182
In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong,183 this court held that using "specifically" in
a general denial does not automatically convert that general denial to a
specific one.184 The denial in the answer must be so definite as to what is
admitted and what is denied:
A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the
defendant. A general denial does not become specific by the use of the
word "specifically." When matters of whether the defendant alleges having
no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge, an alleged "ignorance or
lack of information" will not be considered as a specific denial. Section 11,
Rule 8 of the Rules also provides that material averments in the complaint
other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the answer should be
so definite and certain in its allegations that the pleader’s adversary should
not be left in doubt as to what is admitted, what is denied, and what is
covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a belief.185 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
However, the allegations in the pleadings "must be contextualized and
interpreted in relation to the rest of the statements in the pleading." 186 The
denials in respondents’ Answer comply with the modes provided for under
the Rules. We have held that the purpose of requiring specific denials from
the defendant is to make the defendant disclose the "matters alleged in
the complaint which he [or she] succinctly intends to disprove at the trial,
together with the matter which he [or she] relied upon to support the
denial."187 The denials proffered by respondents sufficiently disclosed the
matters they wished to disprove and those they would rely upon in making
their denials.
To summarize, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion to Dismiss
on demurrer to evidence. It erred in making a sweeping declaration on the
probative value of the documentary evidence offered by petitioner and in
excluding other evidence offered during trial without full evaluation based
on reasons grounded in law and/or jurisprudence.
V
The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f
the motion [to dismiss] is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed [the movant] shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence." As this court held:
[I]f a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal
is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence. The movant who presents a demurrer to the plaintiff’s
evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court
disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the
appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal
order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The
appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on
the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.188 (Citations omitted)
This procedure, however, does not apply.
In this case, we principally nullify the assailed Resolutions that denied the
admission of the Formal Offer of Evidence. It only follows that the Order
granting demurrer should be denied. This is not the situation contemplated
in Rule 33, Section 1.189 Respondents were not able to even comment on
the Formal Offer of Evidence. Due process now requires that we remand
the case to the Sandiganbayan. Respondents may, at their option and
through proper motion, submit their Comment. The Sandiganbayan should
then rule on the admissibility of the documentary and object evidence
covered by the Formal Offer submitted by petitioner. Respondents then
may avail themselves of any remedy thereafter allowed by the Rules.
Page 90 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated May

25, 2006 and September 13, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in
Civil Case No. 0007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to
the. Sandiganbayan for further proceedings with due and deliberate
dispatch in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
Page 91 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
G.R. No. 206590
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession
of shabu, primordial importance must be given to "the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused." 1
This is an appeal from the June 23, 2011 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00744 that aft1rmed in toto the April 12, 2007
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guiuan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 3, in Criminal Case Nos. 2079 and 2078, finding Myrna
Gayoso y Arguelles (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 (illegal sale of a dangerous drug) and 11 (illegal possession of a
dangerous drug), Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, respectively, and
imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱500,000.00 for selling shabu, and the indeterminate prison term of eight
(8) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day, as maximum, for possessing 0.53gram of shabu.
Factual Antecedents
The Information in Criminal Case No. 2078 contained the following
accusatory allegations against appellant:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:30 o'clock in the
morning at Jetty, Brgy. Hollywood, Guian, Eastern Samar, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned
accused who acted without the necessary pennit from proper authorities
whatsoever, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and folonioμsly hi:i.ve
in her possession, control and custody eleven (11) x x x sachets
(containing] Methamphdamme Hydrochloride commonly known as
"shabu" weighing 0.53 [gram], a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. 4
The Information in Criminal Case No. 2079 charged appellant in the
following manner:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:00 o'clock in the
morning at Jetty, Brgy. Hollywood, Guian, Eastern Samar, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
who acted without the necessary permit or authority whatsoever, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, deliver and dispense one
(1) pc. small heat sealed sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
commonly known as "shabu" weighing 0.06 [gram], a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.5
During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of ''not guilty" in both cases.
Joint trial then ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
Based on the testimonies of SP03 Victorino de Dios (SP03 De Dios), SP03
Rolando G. Salamida (SP03 Sa1amida), P02 Rex Isip (P02 Isip), SP04
Josefina Bandoy (SP04 Bandoy), P/Insp. Eleazar Barber, Jr. (PI Barber),
PS/Insp. Benjamin Cruto (PSI Cruto ), and the documentary exhibits, the
following facts emerged:
PI Barber of the PNP6 Guiuan Police Station directed SP03 De Dios to
conduct a surveillance on appellant after receiving several reports that she
was peddling prohibited drugs. Three weeks later, SP03 De Dios confirmed
that appellant was indeed engaged in illegal drug activities. PI Barber filed
for and was issued a search warrant. However, prior to implementing the
search warrant, PI Barber decided to conduct a "confirmatory test-buy"
Page 92 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
designating SP03 De Dios as poseur-buyer and giving him ₱200.00 marked
money for the operation.
On March 24, 2004, SP03 De Dios and a civilian asset proceeded to the
house of appellant and asked her if they could buy shabu. The sale was
consummated when appellant took the marked money from SP03 De Dios
after giving him a sachet of shabu. SP03 De Dios immediately informed PI
Barber by text message about the successful "confirmatory test-buy". PI
Barber and his team of police officers who were positioned 100 meters
away n1shed towards the house of appellant. He also instructed SP03 De
Dios and the civilian asset to summon the Barangay Chairman to witness
the search of the house. When he arrived together with a ko,gawad  and a
media representative, SP03 Salamida read the search warrant to appellant.
During the search of the house, SP04 Bandoy found a tin foil under the
mattress. SP03 De Dios took it from SP04 Bandoy and gave it to SP03
Salamida who found seven sachets of shabu  inside, in addition to the four
sachets of shabu  found inside the right pocket of the short pants of
appellant. The search of the house also revealed several drug
paraphernalia. An inventory of seized items was prepared and the same
was signed by the Barangay Chairman, P02 Isip, SP04 Bandoy, and
appellant. The sachets of shabu  were brought to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) then to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
qualitative examination. The results of the examination verified that the
seized sachets contained shabu.
Version of Appellant
Appellant denied the charges against her. She claimed that on March 24,
2004, somebody forcibly kicked the front door of her house and tried to
break it open. When she opened the door, PI Barber pushed her aside and
told his companions to move quickly. They went directly to her room;
when P02 Isip emerged therefrom seconds later, he was holding a
substance that looked like tawas.  SP03 De Dios and SP03 Salamida went in
and out of her house. She maintained that the search warrant was shown
to her only after an hour and that the sachets of shabu  were planted. She
argued that the police officers fabricated the charges against her since her
family had a quarrel with a police officer named Riza1ina Cuantero
regarding the fence separating their houses.
The Ruling of the' Regional Trial Court
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and
illegal possession of shabu.  It declared that the prosecution ably
established the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu  through
the testimonies of its witnesses who arrested appellant after selling a
sachet of the illegal drug in a "test-buy operation" and for possessing 11
sachets of the same drug in her house after enforcing a search watrant
immediately thereafter. Appellant had no evidence that she had license or
authority to possess the shabu.
The RTC ruled that the evidence sufficiently established the chain of
custody of the sachets of shabu from the time they were bought from
appellant and/or seized from her house, to its turn over to the PDEA and
submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The RTC rejected
appellant's defense of denial and frame-up in view of her positive
identification by eyewitnesses as the criminal offender.
The RTC therefore sentenced appellant to life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of ₱500,000.00 for the illegal sale of shabu.  It also sentenced appellant
to suffer the indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day,
as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as
maximum and a fine of ₱300,000 for illegal possession of shabu.
From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA. In her Brief, 7 she
assailed the validity of the search warrant claiming that it was not issued
by the RTC upon determination of probable cause. She argued that the
"'confirmatory test-buy" conducted by the poseur buyer and the
confidential asset was not valid since they forced her to engage in a drug
sale. She maintained that the shabu  presented during trial was
inadmissible in evidence due to several gaps in its chain of custody.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Brief for the
Appellee8 praying for the affirmance of the appealed Decision. It argued
Page 93 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
that the evidence on which the RTC based its determination of probable
cause was sufficient for the issuance of the search warrant. It asserted that
the "test-buy operation" was an entrapment and not an inducement. The
OSG maintained that the shabu confiscated from appellant was admissible
in evidence since the prosecution established the proper chain of custody.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed in toto  the RTC ruling finding appellant guilty of
unauthorized sale and possession of shabu.  The CA ruled that all the
elements for the sale of shabu were established during the "test-buy
operation". It held that the illegal sale of shabu  was proven by SP03 De
Dios who participated in said operation as the designated poseur buyer.
His offer to buy shabu with marked money and appellant's acceptance by
delivering the illegal drug consummated the offense. The CA likewise
declared that the elements for possession of shabu  were present in the
case against appellant. After appellant's arrest for illegal sale of shabu,  a
valid search resulted in the discovery of 11 sachets of shabu inside her
house, which were under her possession and control. She did not have
legal authority to possess the same and failed to overcome the
presumption that she consciously knew she was in possession of the illegal
drug discovered in her home.
The CA noted that the examination by the trial judge established probable
cause in issuing the search warrant, The deposition of P03 Salamida shows
that he had personal knowledge of appellant's drug activities, and the
same served as basis for the finding of probable cause for the purpose of
issuing a search warrant.
The CA was not swayed by appellant's contention that the "test-buy
operation" amounted to instigation since it is settled jurisprudence that a
"decoy solicitation" is not tantamount to inducement or instigation. The CA
was also unconvinced by appellant's claim that the proof against her was
inadmissible since the prosecution failed to show strict compliance with
Section 21 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules on the custody and
disposition of the evidence.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. 9 On July 15, 2013,10 the Court notified
the parties to file their supplemental briefs. However, appellant opted not
to file a supplemental brief since she had extensively argued her cause in
her appellants' brief.11 For its part, the OSG manifested that it would not
file a supplemental brief since its appellee's brief filed in the CA had
already discussed and refuted the arguments raised by appellant. 12
Our Ruling
The RTC Issued A Search Warrant After
Finding Probable  Case
Appellant contends that there was no probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrant. She claims that PI Barber had no personal knowledge
of her alleged drug dealings.
There is no merit in this contention.
Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 13 The
probable cause must be "determined personally by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."14 Probable cause does
not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty.
The determination of the existence of probable cause is concerned only
with the question of whether the affiant has reasonable wounds to believe
that the accused committed or is committing the crime charged. 15
Here, the records reveal that the trial court issued the search warrar1t
after deposing two witnesses, namely PI Barber and SP03 Salamida. In
particular, the disposition of SP03 Salamida shows that he had personal
knowledge of appellant's drug pushing activities which served as basis for
the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Thus,
whether or not PI Barber had personal knowledge of the illegal drug
Page 94 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
activities committed by appellant will not adversely affect the findings of
probable cause for the purpose of issuance of search warrant.
Confirmatory test-buy solicitation does
not constitute instigation.
Appellant argues that the "confirmatory test-buy" by the police officers
was not valid since she was induced by the' designated poseur buyer, SP03
De Dios, and the confidential informant to sell the seized shabu.
There is no merit in this argument.
In inducement or instigation - the criminal intent originates in the mind of
the instigator and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator practically induces the
would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes
a co-principal. ['This is distinguished from entrapment wherein] ways and
means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing the
lawbreaker inflagrante delicto.16
The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not prohibited
by law. It does not amount to instigation. As in this case, the solicitation of
drugs from appellant by the poseur buyer merely furnishes evidence of a
course of conduct.17 The police received an intelligence report that
appellant habitually deals with shabu.  They designated a poseur buyer to
confirm the report by engaging in a drug transaction with appellant. There
was no proof that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell illegal drugs
to him.
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, appellant still deserves an
acquittal as will be discussed below.
The chain of custody of evidence was not established
Appellant impugns the prosecution's failure to establish the charges of
illegal sale and possession of shabu  against her due to the gaps in the
chain of custody and the assailable integrity of the evidence in view of non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
There is merit in this protestation.
The offense of illegal sale of shabu has the following elements: "(1) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the
sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor." 18 On
the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of shabu has the following
elements: "(l) the accused is in possession of an item or an object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug." 19 In
the prosecution for illegal sale and possession of shabu, there must be
proof that these offenses were actually committed, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.20
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of [ shabu,]  conviction cannot be
sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of said drug. The
identity of the [shabu]  must be established with moral certainty. Apart
from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact
that the [shabu] illegally possessed and sold x xx is the
same [shabu]  offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with
the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. 21
"The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed."22
Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to
presentation in court for destruction." 23 In People v. Havana,24 the Court
expounded on the custodial chain procedure in this wise:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires
that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
Page 95 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and
the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard
because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of
custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real
evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has
failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard obtains in case the
evidence is susceptible of alteration, tampering, contamination and even
substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering -without regard to
whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Thus, as a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated
item must be established:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to
the court.25
Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of
his/her initials and signature on the items after they have been seized. It is
the starting point in the custodial link. It is vital that the seized items be
marked immediately since the succeeding handlers thereof will use the
markings as reference.26 The chain of custody rule also requires that the
marking of the seized contraband be done "(l) in the presence of the
apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation." 27
In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the
seized items with their initials in the presence of appellant and
immediately upon confiscation. While P02 Isip testified that the seized
sachets of shabu  were marked in the police station,28 no evidence was
presented to show that the marking was accomplished in the presence of
appellant. Moreover, the author of the markings on said items was never
identified. None of the police officers admitted placing the markings. There
was therefore a complete absence of evidence to prove authorship of the
markings.
While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this
contemplates a case of warrantless searches and seizures. 29 Here, the
police officers secured a search warrant prior to their operation. They
therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its
implementation. However, the police officers failed to mark immediately
the plastic sachets of shabu seized inside appellant's house in spite of an
Inventory of Property Seized that they prepared while still inside the said
house. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with the marking of
evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes the first gap in the
chain of custody.
The turnover of the seized shabu from the arresting officers to the
investigating officer in the police station constitutes the second link in the
chain of custody.1âwphi1 In this regard, the Court takes note that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person to
whom the seized items were turned over at the police station. While SP03
Salamida was identified as the property custodian of the police station, this
does not necessarily mean that he is also the investigating officer. There is
nothing in the records to substantiate this presumption. This total want of
evidence gains importance considering that none of the arresting officers
presented as witnesses identified the shabu  presented during trial as the
Page 96 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence
same shabu seized from appellant. Thus, the second link in the chain of
custody is missing.
The transfer of the seized shabu  from the investigating officer to the
forensic chemist in the crime laboratory is the third link in the chain of
custody. While the seized shabu  was turned over by PI Barber to the PDEA,
he no longer had any personal knowledge of the manner it was handled
therein. He also did not identify the police officer in whose custody the
seized sachets of shabu  were placed at the PDEA. He left it to the
responsibility of the PDEA to forward the seized shabu to the crime
laboratory. The request for laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies
the police officer who delivered the seized shabu  as a certain SPO1 Asis,
but he was not presented to testify that the shabu  delivered to the crime
laboratory was the same shabu  confiscated from appellant. There is a third
break in the chain of custody.
Nothing also can be gained from the testimony of the forensic chemist PSI
Cruto. His testimony is not clear and positive since he failed to assert that
the alleged packs of chemical substance presented for laboratory
examination and tested positive for shabu were the very same substance
allegedly recovered from appellant. His testimony was limited to the result
of the examination he conducted and not on the source of the substance.
From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was established at
all. What we have here are individual links with breaks in-between which
could not be seamlessly woven or tied together. The so-called links in the
chain of custody show that the seized shabu  was not handled properly
starting from the actual seizure, to its turnover in the police station and
the PDEA, as well as its transfer to the crime laboratory for examination.
The Court therefore cannot conclude with moral certainty that
the shabu  confiscated from appellant was the same as that presented for
laboratory examination and then presented in court.
It is indeed desirable that the chain of custody should be perfect and
unbroken. In reality however, this rarely occurs. The legal standard that
must therefore be observed "is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused."30 Here, the Court finds that the
apprehending officers failed to properly preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu.  There are just too many breaks
and gaps to the effect that a chain of custody could not be established at
all. Failure of the prosecution to offer testimony to establish a substantially
complete chain of custody of the shabu and the inappropriate manner of
handling the evidence prior to its offer in court diminishes the
government's chance of successfully prosecuting a drug case.31
Aside from the failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of
custody, another procedural lapse casts farther uncertainty on the identity
and integrity of the subject shabu. This refers to the non-compliance by
the arresting officers with the most basic procedural safeguards relative to
the custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1), Article
II of RA 9165, which reads as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drug
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Corollarily, Section 2l(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
provides as follows:
Page 97 of 97 Real and Demonstrative Evidence

Section 2l(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and The Superintendent for the Correctional Institute for Women is
control of the drug shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE the appellant from custody,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the unless she is held for another lawful cause.
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the SO ORDERED.
media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and a public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be Associate Justice
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable,
in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, farther, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizure
of and custody over said items.

In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical inventory

of the seized items at the place where the search warrant was served in
the presence of a representative of the Department of Justice, nor did it
photograph the same in the presence of appellant after their initial custody
and control of said drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the
same. Neither was an explanation offered for such failure. While this
directive of rigid compliance has been tempered in certain cases, "such
liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations can be
applied only when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are
properly preserved."32 Such an exception does not obtain in this case.
"Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of the [shabu]  in view of
the broken linkages in the chain of custody. [Thus,] the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to the
[apprehending officers] by the courts below cannot arise." 33

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00744 dated June 23, 2011 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Myrna Gayoso y  Arguelles is hereby ACQUITTED of the
charges, her guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt.