Taliban 1

Taliban
Taliban
‫ﻃﺎﻟﺒﺎﻥ‬

Participant in the Civil war in Afghanistan, the War in Afghanistan (2001–present)

Flag used by the Taliban (1997–2001)

Active Sept. 1994 – Sept. 1996 (militia)
Sept. 1996 – Dec. 2001 (government)
2004–present (insurgency)

Ideology Islamism
Islamic fundamentalism
Pashtun nationalism

Leaders Mullah Mohammed Omar

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar
Mullah Obaidullah Akhund

Area of Afghanistan and Pakistan

operations

Strength [1]
45,000 (2001 est.)
[2]
11,000 (2008 est.)
[3]
36,000 (2010 est.)

Originated as Students of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam

Allies Pakistan (Inter-Services Intelligence)

Haqqani network
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin
Islamic Emirate of Waziristan
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
East Turkestan Islamic Movement
Al-Qaeda and Chechens

Opponents United States armed forces

International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF)
Military of Afghanistan

The Taliban, alternative spelling Taleban,[4] (ṭālibān, meaning "students" in Arabic) is an Islamist militia group that
ruled large parts of Afghanistan from September 1996 onwards. Although in control of Afghanistan's capital (Kabul)
and most of the country for five years, the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan gained diplomatic recognition
from only three states: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. After the attacks of September 11
2001 the Taliban regime was overthrown by Operation Enduring Freedom. The Taliban mostly fled to neighboring
Pakistan where they regrouped as an insurgency movement to fight the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (established
in late 2001) and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).[5]
Taliban 2

Most Taliban leaders were influenced by Deobandi fundamentalism. Many also strictly follow the social and cultural
norm called Pashtunwali. The Taliban movement is primarily made up of members belonging to Pashtun tribes, the
largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.[6] The main leader of the Taliban movement is Mullah Mohammed Omar.[7]
Omar's original commanders were "a mixture of former small-unit military commanders and madrassa teachers."[8]
While in power, the Taliban enforced one of the strictest interpretations of Sharia law ever seen in the Muslim
world,[9] however most of their critisism came from leading Muslim scholars.[10] They became notorious
internationally for their treatment of women.[11]
The Taliban's allies include the Pakistani army as well as Arab and Central Asian militants.[12] [13] [14] Al Qaeda
supported the Taliban with regiments of imported fighters from Arab countries and Central Asia. In the late period of
the war, of an estimated 45,000 force fighting on the side of the Taliban, only 14,000 were Afghans.[13] [15] Today
the Taliban operate in Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. US officials say one of their headquarters is in or near
Quetta, Pakistan.[16] The Taliban engage in terrorism against the civilian population of Afghanistan. According to a
report by the United Nations, the Taliban were responsible for 76% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2009.[17]

Etymology
The word Taliban is Pashto, ‫ ﻃﺎﻟﺒﺎﻥ‬ṭālibān, meaning "students", the plural of ṭālib. This is a loanword from Arabic
‫ ﻃﺎﻟﺐ‬ṭālib,[18] plus the Indo-Iranian plural ending -an ‫( ﺍﻥ‬the Arabic plural being ‫ ﻃﻼﺏ‬ṭullāb, whereas ‫ ﻃﺎﻟﺒﺎﻥ‬ṭālibān is
a dual form with the incongruous meaning, to Arabic speakers, of "two students"). Since becoming a loanword in
English, Taliban, besides a plural noun referring to the group, has also been used as a singular noun referring to an
individual. For example, John Walker Lindh has been referred to as "an American Taliban", rather than "an
American Talib". In the English language newspapers of Pakistan the word talibans is often used when referring to
more than one taliban. The spelling 'Taliban' has come to predominate over 'Taleban' in English.[19]

History

Emergence
After the fall of the communist Mohammad Najibullah-regime in 1992, several Afghan political parties agreed on a
peace and power-sharing agreement (the Peshawar Accords). The Peshawar Accords created the Islamic State of
Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a transitional period. According to Human Rights Watch:
The sovereignty of Afghanistan was vested formally in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, an entity created in
April 1992, after the fall of the Soviet-backed Najibullah government. [...] With the exception of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, all of the parties... were ostensibly unified under this government in April 1992.
[...] Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, for its part, refused to recognize the government for most of the period
discussed in this report and launched attacks against government forces and Kabul generally. [...] Shells and
rockets fell everywhere.[20]
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar received operational, financial and military support from Pakistan.[21] Afghanistan expert
Amin Saikal concludes in Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival:
Pakistan was keen to gear up for a breakthrough in Central Asia. [...] Islamabad could not possibly expect the
new Islamic government leaders... to subordinate their own nationalist objectives in order to help Pakistan
realize its regional ambitions. [...] Had it not been for the ISI's logistic support and supply of a large number of
rockets, Hekmatyar's forces would not have been able to target and destroy half of Kabul.[22]
In addition, Saudi Arabia and Iran – as competitors for regional hegemony – supported Afghan militias hostile
towards each other.[22] According to Human Rights Watch, Iran assisted the Shia Hazara Hezb-i Wahdat forces of
Abdul Ali Mazari, as Iran attempted to maximize Wahdat's military power and influence.[20] [22] [23] Saudi Arabia
supported the Wahhabite Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and his Ittihad-i Islami faction.[20] [22] Conflict between the two
Taliban 3

militias soon escalated into a full-scale war. A publication by the George Washington University describes:
[O]utside forces saw instability in Afghanistan as an opportunity to press their own security and political
agendas.[24]
Due to the sudden initiation of the war, working government departments, police units or a system of justice and
accountability for the newly-created Islamic State of Afghanistan did not have time to form. Horrific crimes were
committed by individuals of different factions. Rare ceasefires, usually negotiated by representatives of Ahmad Shah
Massoud, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi or Burhanuddin Rabbani (the interim government), or officials from the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), commonly collapsed within days.[20]
Meanwhile southern Afghanistan was neither under the control of foreign-backed militias nor the government in
Kabul, but was ruled by local leaders such as Gul Agha Sherzai and their militias. In 1991, the Taliban (a movement
originating from Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-run religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan) also developed in
Afghanistan as a politico-religious force, reportedly in opposition to the tyranny of the local governor.[25] Mullah
Omar started his movement with fewer than 50 armed madrassah students in his hometown of Kandahar.[25] The
most credible and often-repeated story of how Mullah Omar first mobilized his followers is that in the spring of
1994, neighbors in Singesar told him that the local governor had abducted two teenage girls, shaved their heads, and
taken them to a camp where they were raped repeatedly. 30 Taliban (with only 16 rifles) freed the girls, and hanged
the governor from the barrel of a tank. Later that year, two militia commanders killed civilians while fighting for the
right to sodomize a young boy. The Taliban freed him.[25] [26]
The Taliban's first major military activity was in 1994, when they marched northward from Maiwand and captured
Kandahar City and the surrounding provinces, losing only a few dozen men.[27] When they took control of Kandahar
in 1994, they forced the surrender of dozens of local Pashtun leaders who had presided over a situation of complete
lawlessness and atrocities.[27] [28] The Taliban also took-over a border crossing at Spin Baldak and an ammunition
dump from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In the course of 1994, the Taliban took control of 12 of 34 provinces not under
central government control, disarming the "heavily armed population". Militias controlling the different areas often
surrendered without a fight.[9]
At the same time most of the militia factions (Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami, Junbish-i Milli and Hezb-i Wahdat) which
had been fighting in the battle for control of Kabul were defeated militarily by forces of the Islamic State's Secretary
of Defense Ahmad Shah Massoud. Bombardment of the capital came to a halt.[29] [30] [31] Massoud tried to initiate a
nationwide political process with the goal of national consolidation and democratic elections, also inviting the
Taliban to join the process and to contribute to stability.[15] Ahmad Shah Massoud had been named "The Afghan
who won the cold war" by The Wall Street Journal.[32] He had defeated the Soviet Red Army nine times in his home
region of Panjshir, in north-eastern Afghanistan.[33] Massoud, unarmed, went to talk to some Taliban leaders in
Maidan Shar to convince them to join the initiated political process, so that democratic elections could be held to
decide on a future government for Afghanistan. He hoped for them to be allies in bringing stability to Afghanistan.
But the Taliban declined to join such a political process. When Massoud returned unharmed to Kabul, the Taliban
leader who had received him as his guest paid with his life (he was killed by other senior Taliban) for failing to
execute Massoud while the possibility had presented itself.
The Taliban started shelling Kabul in early 1995 but were defeated by forces of the Islamic State government under
Ahmad Shah Massoud.[30] see video [34] Amnesty International, referring to the Taliban offensive, wrote in a 1995
report:
This is the first time in several months that Kabul civilians have become the targets of rocket attacks and
shelling aimed at residential areas in the city.[30]
The Taliban's early victories in 1994 were followed by a series of devastating defeats that resulted in heavy
losses.[28] Pakistan started to provide stronger military support to the Taliban.[12] [22] Many analysts like Amin
Saikal describe the Taliban as developing into a proxy force for Pakistan's regional interests which the Taliban
decline.[22] On September 26, 1996, as the Taliban with military support by Pakistan and financial support by Saudi
Taliban 4

Arabia prepared for another major offensive, Massoud ordered a full retreat from Kabul.[35] The Taliban seized
Kabul on September 27, 1996, and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Taliban Emirate against United Front

Creation of the United Front

The Taliban imposed on the parts of Afghanistan under

their control their interpretation of Islam. The Physicians
for Human Rights (PHR) analyze:
"To PHR's knowledge, no other regime in the
world has methodically and violently forced half of
its population into virtual house arrest, prohibiting
them on pain of physical punishment".[36]
Women were required to wear the all-covering burqa,
they were banned from public life and denied access to
health care and education, windows needed to be covered
so that women could not be seen from the outside, and
they were not allowed to laugh in a manner they could be Ahmad Shah Massoud (right) with Pashtun anti-Taliban leader

heard by others.[36] The Taliban, without any real court or and later Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Haji Abdul Qadir
hearing, cut people's hands or arms off when they were
accused of stealing.[36] Taliban hit-squads watched the
streets, conducting brutal public beatings.[36]

Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum, two former archnemeses, created the United Front (Northern
Alliance) against the Taliban that were preparing offensives against the remaining areas under the control of
Massoud and those under the control of Dostum. see video [37] The United Front included beside the dominantly
Tajik forces of Massoud and the Uzbek forces of Dostum, Hazara factions and Pashtun forces under the leadership of
commanders such as Abdul Haq, Haji Abdul Qadir, Qari Baba or diplomat Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai. From the
Taliban conquest in 1996 until November 2001 the United Front controlled roughly 30% of Afghanistan's population
in provinces such as Badakhshan, Kapisa, Takhar and parts of Parwan, Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman, Samangan,
Kunduz, Ghōr and Bamyan.

Taliban massacres
According to a 55-page report by the United Nations, the Taliban, while trying to consolidate control over northern
and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians.[38] [39] UN officials stated that there had
been "15 massacres" between 1996 and 2001.[38] [39] They also said, that "[t]hese have been highly systematic and
they all lead back to the [Taliban] Ministry of Defense or to Mullah Omar himself."[38] [39] In a major effort to retake
the Shomali plains, the Taliban indiscriminately killed civilians, while uprooting and expelling the population.
Kamal Hossein, a special reporter for the UN, reported on these and other war crimes. Upon taking Mazar-i-Sharif in
1998, about 4,000 civilians were executed by the Taliban and many more reported tortured.[40] [41] The Taliban
especially targeted people of Shia religious or Hazara ethnic background.[38] [39] Among those killed in Mazari
Sharif were several Iranian diplomats. Others were kidnapped by the Taliban, touching off a hostage crisis that
nearly escalated to a full scale war, with 150,000 Iranian soldiers massed on the Afghan border at one time.[42] It was
later admitted that the diplomats were killed by the Taliban, and their bodies were returned to Iran.[43]
The documents also reveal the role of Arab and Pakistani support troops in these killings.[38] [39] Bin Laden's
so-called 055 Brigade was responsible for mass-killings of Afghan civilians.[13] The report by the United Nations
Taliban 5

quotes eyewitnesses in many villages describing Arab fighters carrying long knives used for slitting throats and
skinning people.[38] [39]

Pakistani military interference

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf – then as Chief of Army Staff – was responsible for sending thousands of
Pakistanis to fight alongside the Taliban and Bin Laden against the forces of Massoud.[12] [44] [45] [15] In total there
were believed to be 28,000 Pakistani nationals fighting inside Afghanistan.[15] 20,000 were regular Pakistani soldiers
either from the Frontier Corps or army and an estimated 8,000 were militants recruited in madrassas filling regular
Taliban ranks.[13] The estimated 25,000 Taliban regular force thus comprised more than 8,000 Pakistani
nationals.[13] [46] A 1998 document by the U.S. State Department confirms that "20–40 percent of [regular] Taliban
soldiers are Pakistani."[12] The document further states that the parents of those Pakistani nationals "know nothing
regarding their child's military involvement with the Taliban until their bodies are brought back to Pakistan."[12]
Further 3,000 fighters of the regular Taliban army were Arab and Central Asian militants.[13] From 1996 to 2001 the
Al Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri became a state within the Taliban state.[47] Bin Laden sent
Arab recruits to join the fight against the United Front.[33] [47] Of roughly 45,000 Pakistani, Taliban and Al Qaeda
soldiers fighting against the forces of Massoud only 14,000 were Afghan.[13] [15]

Ahmad Shah Massoud

Ahmad Shah Massoud was the only major anti-Taliban

leader who never left Afghanistan for exile and who was
able to defend vast parts of his territory against the
Taliban. Abdul Rashid Dostum and his forces were
defeated by the Taliban in 1998. Dostum subsequently
went into exile.

In the areas under his control Massoud set up democratic

institutions and signed the Women's Rights
Declaration.[15] In the area of Massoud, women and girls
did not have to wear the Afghan burqa. They were
allowed to work and to go to school. In at least two
known instances, Massoud personally intervened against Map of Afghanistan in late 1996; Massoud (red), Dostum (green),
cases of forced marriage.[15] To Massoud there was and Taliban (yellow)
reportedly nothing worse than treating a person like an
object.[15] He stated:

"It is our conviction and we believe that both men and women are created by the Almighty. Both have equal
rights. Women can pursue an education, women can pursue a career, and women can play a role in society –
just like men."[15]
Author Pepe Escobar wrote in Massoud: From Warrior to Statesman:
"Massoud is adamant that in Afghanistan women have suffered oppression for generations. He says that 'the
cultural environment of the country suffocates women. But the Taliban exacerbate this with oppression.' His
most ambitious project is to shatter this cultural prejudice and so give more space, freedom and equality to
women – they would have the same rights as men."[15]
While it was Massoud's stated conviction that men and women are equal and should enjoy the same rights, he also
had to deal with Afghan traditions which he said would need a generation or more to overcome. In his opinion that
could only be achieved through education.[15] Humayun Tandar, who took part as a Afghan diplomat in the 2001
International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, said that "strictures of language, ethnicity, region were [also]
stifling for Massoud. That is why ... he wanted to create a unity which could surpass the situation in which we found
Taliban 6

ourselves and still find ourselves to this day."[15] This applied also to strictures of religion. Jean-José Puig describes
how Massoud often led prayers before a meal or at times asked his fellow Muslims to lead the prayer but also did not
hesitate to ask a Christian friend Jean-José Puig or the Jewish Princeton University Professor Michael Barry:
"Jean-José, we believe in the same God. Please, tell us the prayer before lunch or dinner in your own language."[15]
Human Rights Watch cites no human rights crimes for the forces under direct control of Massoud for the period from
October 1996 until the assassination of Massoud in September 2001.[48] One million peolple fled the Taliban, many
to the area of Massoud.[44] [49] National Geographic concluded in its documentary "Inside the Taliban":
The only thing standing in the way of future Taliban massacres is Ahmad Shah Massoud."[44]
The Taliban repeatedly offered Massoud a position of power to make him stop his resistance. Massoud declined. He
explained in one interview:
"The Taliban say: "Come and accept the post of prime minister and be with us", and they would keep the
highest office in the country, the presidentship. But for what price?! The difference between us concerns
mainly our way of thinking about the very principles of the society and the state. We can not accept their
conditions of compromise, or else we would have to give up the principles of modern democracy. We are
fundamentally against the system called "the Emirate of Afghanistan"."[50]
"There should be an Afghanistan where every Afghan finds himself or herself happy. And I think that can only
be assured by democracy based on consensus."[51]
Massoud with his Proposals for Peace [52] wanted to convince the Taliban to join a political process leading towards
nationwide democratic elections in a foreseeable future.[50] Massoud also stated:
"The Taliban are not a force to be considered invincible. They are distanced from the people now. They are
weaker than in the past. There is only the assistance given by Pakistan, Osama bin Laden and other extremist
groups that keep the Taliban on their feet. With a halt to that assistance, it is extremely difficult to survive."[51]
In early 2001 Massoud employed a new
strategy of local military pressure and global
political appeals.[53] Resentment was
increasingly gathering against Taliban rule
from the bottom of Afghan society including
the Pashtun areas.[53] Massoud publicized their
cause "popular consensus, general elections
and democracy" worldwide. At the same time
he was very wary not to revive the failed
Kabul government of the early 1990s.[53]
Already in 1999 he started the training of
police forces which he trained specifically in
order to keep order and protect the civilian
population in case the United Front would be
In spring 2001 the anti-Taliban leader Ahmad Shah Massoud stated that the
Taliban and Al Qaeda had introduced "a very wrong perception of Islam" and
successful.[15]
warned about a large-scale attack on U.S. soil being imminent.
In early 2001 Ahmad Shah Massoud addressed
the European Parliament in Brussels asking
the international community to provide humanitarian help to the people of Afghanistan.[54] see video [55] He stated
that the Taliban and Al Qaeda had introduced "a very wrong perception of Islam" and that without the support of
Pakistan and Bin Laden the Taliban would not be able to sustain their military campaign for up to a year.[56] On this
visit to Europe he also warned that his intelligence had gathered information about a large-scale attack on U.S. soil
being imminent.[57]

The president of the European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, called him the "pole of liberty in Afghanistan".[58]
Taliban 7

On September 9, 2001, Massoud, then aged 48, was the target of a suicide attack by two Arabs posing as journalists
at Khwaja Bahauddin, in the Takhar Province of Afghanistan.[59] [60] Massoud died in a helicopter taking him to a
hospital. The funeral, though in a rather rural area, was attended by hundreds of thousands of mourning people.Sad
day [61] (video clip).
The assassination was not the first time Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Pakistani ISI, and before them the Soviet KGB,
the Afghan Communist KHAD and Hekmatyar had tried to assassinate Massoud. He survived countless
assassination attempts over a period of 26 years. The first attempt on Massoud's life was carried out by Hekmatyar
and two Pakistani ISI agents in 1975, when Massoud was only 22 years old.[23] In early 2001, Al-Qaeda would-be
assassins were captured by Massoud's forces while trying to enter his territory.[53] The assassination of Massoud may
have had a connection to the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. soil, which killed nearly 3000 people, and which
appeared to be the terrorist attack that Massoud had warned against in his speech to the European Parliament several
months earlier [62] .
John P. O'Neill was a counter-terrorism expert and the Assistant Director of the FBI until late 2001. He retired from
the FBI and was offered the position of director of security at the World Trade Center (WTC). He took the job at the
WTC two weeks before 9/11. On September 10, 2001, O'Neill told two of his friends, "We're due. And we're due for
something big.... Some things have happened in Afghanistan. [referring to the assassination of Massoud] I don't like
the way things are lining up in Afghanistan.... I sense a shift, and I think things are going to happen ... soon."[63]
O'Neill died on September 11, 2001, when the South Tower collapsed.[63]
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Massoud's United Front troops ousted the Taliban from power in
Kabul with American air support in Operation Enduring Freedom. In November and December 2001 the United
Front gained control of much of the country and played a crucial role in establishing the post-Taliban interim
government of Hamid Karzai in late 2001.

NATO invasion, Taliban overthrow and insurgency

Prelude
After the September 11 attacks on the U.S. and the PENTTBOM investigation, the United States made the following
demands of the Taliban,[64] and refused to discuss them:
1. Deliver to the U.S. all of the leaders of Al-Qaeda
2. Release all foreign nationals that have been "unjustly imprisoned"
3. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers
4. Close immediately every terrorist training camp
5. Hand over every terrorist and their supporters to appropriate authorities
6. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps for inspection
The U.S. petitioned the international community to back a military campaign to overthrow the Taliban. The U.N.
issued two resolutions on terrorism after the Sept.11 attacks. The resolutions called on all states to "[increase]
cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism" and specified
consensus recommendations for all countries. The Security Council did not authorize military intervention in
Afghanistan of any kind, and nowhere in the U.N resolutions did it say military operations in Afghanistan were
justified or conformed to international law.[65] Despite this, NATO approved a campaign against Afghanistan as
self-defense against armed attack.[66]
On September 21, the Taliban responded to the ultimatum, promising that if the U.S. could bring evidence that bin
Laden was guilty, they would hand him over, stating that they had no evidence linking him to the September 11
attacks.[67]
On September 22, the United Arab Emirates, and later Saudi Arabia, withdrew recognition of the Taliban as
Afghanistan's legal government, leaving neighbouring Pakistan as the only remaining country with diplomatic ties.
Taliban 8

On October 4, the Taliban agreed to turn bin Laden over to Pakistan for trial in an international tribunal[68] that
operated according to Islamic Sharia law, but Pakistan blocked the offer as it was not possible to guarantee his
safety.[69] On October 7, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan offered to detain bin Laden and try him under Islamic
law if the U.S. made a formal request and presented the Taliban with evidence. A Bush administration official,
speaking on condition of anonymity, rejected the Taliban offer, and stated that the U.S. would not negotiate their
demands.[70]

Coalition attack
Still on October 7, and less than one month after the Twin Towers fell, the U.S., aided by the United Kingdom,
Canada, and other countries including several from the NATO alliance, initiated military action, bombing Taliban
and Al-Qaeda-related camps.[71] [72] The stated intent of military operations was to remove the Taliban from power,
and prevent the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations.[73]
The CIA's elite Special Activities Division (SAD) units were the first U.S. forces to enter Afghanistan (noting that
many different countries intelligence agencies were on the ground or operating within theatre before SAD, and that
SAD are not technically military forces, but civilian paramilitaries). They joined with the Afghan United Front
(Northern Alliance) to prepare for the subsequent arrival of U.S. Special Operations forces. The United Front
(Northern Alliance) and SAD and Special Forces combined to overthrow the Taliban with minimal coalition
casualties, and without the use of international conventional ground forces. The Washington Post stated in an
editorial by John Lehman in 2006:
What made the Afghan campaign a landmark in the U.S. Military's history is that it was prosecuted by
Special Operations forces from all the services, along with Navy and Air Force tactical power,
operations by the Afghan Northern Alliance and the CIA were equally important and fully integrated.
No large Army or Marine force was employed.[74]
On October 14, the Taliban offered to discuss handing over Osama bin Laden to a neutral country in return for a
bombing halt, but only if the Taliban were given evidence of bin Laden's involvement.[75] The U.S. rejected this
offer, and continued military operations. Mazari Sharif fell November 9, triggering a cascade of provinces falling
with minimal resistance. Many local forces switched loyalties from the Taliban to the Northern Alliance. On the
night of November 12, the Taliban retreated south from Kabul. On November 15, they released eight Western aid
workers after three months in captivity. By November 13, the Taliban had withdrawn from both Kabul and
Jalalabad. Finally, in early December, the Taliban gave up Kandahar, their last stronghold, dispersing without
surrendering.
Taliban 9

Resurgence

Before the summer 2006 offensive began, indications existed that

soldiers in Afghanistan had lost influence and power to other groups,
including potentially the Taliban. A notable sign was rioting in May
after a street accident in the city of Kabul.[76] [77]
The continued support from tribal and other groups in Pakistan, the
drug trade, and the small number of NATO forces, combined with the
long history of resistance and isolation, indicated that Taliban forces
and leaders were surviving. Suicide attacks and other terrorist methods
not used in 2001 became more common. Observers suggested that
poppy eradication, which destroys the livelihoods of rural Afghans,
and civilian deaths caused by airstrikes encouraged the resurgence.
These observers maintained that policy should focus on "hearts and US propaganda flyer offering individuals "wealth
minds" and on economic reconstruction, which could profit from and power beyond your dreams" and "millions of
dollars" for working against the Taliban
switching from interdicting to diverting poppy production—to make
medicine.[78] [79]

In September 2006, Pakistan recognized the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan, an association of Waziristani chieftains
with close ties to the Taliban, as the de facto security force for Waziristan. This recognition was part of the
agreement to end the Waziristan War, which had exacted a heavy toll on the Pakistan Army since early 2004. Some
commentators viewed Islamabad's shift from war to diplomacy as implicit recognition of the growing power of the
resurgent Taliban relative to American influence, with the U.S. distracted by the threat of looming crises in Iraq,
Lebanon, and Iran.

Other commentators viewed Islamabad's shift from war to diplomacy as an effort to appease growing discontent.[80]
Because of the Taliban's leadership structure, Mullah Dadullah's targeted killing in May 2007 did not have a
significant effect, other than to damage incipient relations with Pakistan.[81]
By 2009, a strong resistance was created, known as Operation Al Faath, the Arabic word for "victory" taken from the
Koran.,[82] [83] [84] in the form of a guerrilla war. The Pashtun tribal group, with over 40 million members (including
Afghanis and Pakistanis) had a long history of resistance to occupation forces, so the Taliban may have comprised
only a part of the insurgency. Most post-invasion Taliban fighters were new recruits, mostly drawn from local
madrasas.
In early December, the Taliban offered to give the U.S. "legal guarantees" that it would not allow Afghanistan to be
used for attacks on other countries. The U.S. ignored the offer, and continued military action.[85]

Targeted killings

The United States and United Kingdom have used targeted killings,
mainly by SOF forces, and sometimes by drones, to kill Taliban
leaders. British forces also used similar tactics, as well as United
Kingdom Special Forces, to eliminate individual Taliban commanders,
mostly in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Among the more notable of
the targeted killings of Taliban:

• In June 2004, the U.S. killed Nek Muhammad Wazir, a Taliban

commander and al-Qaeda facilitator, along with five others, in an
Predator drone
apparent Predator missile strike in South Waziristan, Pakistan.[86]
[87] [88]
Taliban 10

• In November 2008, Rashid Rauf, British/Pakistani suspected planner of a 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot, was
killed by a missile launched from a U.S. drone on the well-guarded compound of a Taliban commander in North
Waziristan, carried out by the CIA's Special Activities Division.[89] [90]
• In August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban umbrella group, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
which he formed from an alliance of about five pro-Taliban groups, who was thought to have commanded up to
5,000 fighters and to have been behind numerous attacks in Pakistan including the assassination of Benazir
Bhutto, was killed (along with a Taliban lieutenant, seven bodyguards, his wife, and his mother- and
father-in-law) in a U.S. CIA Special Activities Division drone missile attack on his father-in-law's house in South
Waziristan, where he was staying.[91] [92] [93] [94] [95] [96] [97]
• During Operation Herrick since 2002, British special forces killed at least 50 high and local Taliban commanders
in targeted killings in Helmand Province, which in the U.K. was received both positively and negatively by the
media. One specific killing, by Corporal Craig Harrison of the Household Cavalry, though initially a classified
operation, was later revealed to have broken the record for longest confirmed sniper kill, at a range of 2,475 m
(2,707 yd).[98]
• According to Guantanamo Bay charge sheets, the United States Department of Defense believes the Taliban
maintains a 40-man undercover unit called "Jihad Kandahar", which is used for undercover operations including
assassination.[99]

Civilian casualties
According to a report by the United Nations, the Taliban were responsible for 76 % of civilian casualties in
Afghanistan in 2009.[17]
According to Human Rights Watch, the Taliban's bombings and other
attacks which have led to civilian casualties "sharply escalated in
2006" when "at least 669 Afghan civilians were killed in at least 350
armed attacks, most of which appear to have been intentionally
launched at non-combatants."[100] [101] By 2008, the Taliban had
increased its use of suicide bombers and targeted unarmed civilian aid
workers, such as Gayle Williams.[102]

The United Nations reported that the number of civilians killed by both
the Taliban and pro-government forces in the war rose nearly 50%
between 2007 and 2009. In the first half of 2008, the Taliban killed 495
civilians, and the allies 276.[103] The high number of civilians killed by
the Taliban is blamed in part on their increasing use of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), "for instance, 16 IEDs have been planted in
girls' schools" by the Taliban.[103]

Criticism of tactics and strategy

In 2009, Colonel Richard Kemp, formerly Commander of British Colonel Richard Kemp, former Commander of
British Forces in Afghanistan
forces in Afghanistan and the intelligence coordinator for the British
government, drew parallels between the tactics and strategy of Hamas
in Gaza to those of the Taliban. Kemp wrote:
Like Hamas in Gaza, the Taliban in southern Afghanistan are masters at shielding themselves behind the
civilian population and then melting in among them for protection. Women and children are trained and
equipped to fight, collect intelligence, and ferry arms and ammunition between battles. Female suicide
bombers are increasingly common. The use of women to shield gunmen as they engage NATO forces is
now so normal it is deemed barely worthy of comment. Schools and houses are routinely booby-trapped.
Taliban 11

Snipers shelter in houses deliberately filled with women and children.[104] [105]

Ideology

Overview
The Taliban initially enjoyed goodwill from Afghans weary of the warlords' corruption, brutality, and incessant
fighting.[106] However, this popularity was not universal, particularly among non-Pashtuns.
The Taliban's extremely strict and anti-modern ideology has been described as an "innovative form of sharia
combining Pashtun tribal codes,"[107] or Pashtunwali, with radical Deobandi interpretations of Islam favored by JUI
and its splinter groups. Also contributing to the mix was the jihadism and pan-Islamism of Osama bin Laden.[108]
Their ideology was a departure from the Islamism of the anti-Soviet mujahideen rulers they replaced who tended to
be mystical Sufis, traditionalists, or radical Islamicists inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan).[109]
Under the Taliban regime, Sharia law was interpreted to forbid a wide variety of previously lawful activities in
Afghanistan. One Taliban list of prohibitions included: pork, pig, pig oil, anything made from human hair, satellite
dishes, cinematography, and equipment that produces the joy of music, pool tables, chess, masks, alcohol, tapes,
computers, VCRs, television, anything that propagates sex and is full of music, wine, lobster, nail polish,
firecrackers, statues, sewing catalogs, pictures, Christmas cards.[110] They also got rid of employment, education,
and sports for all women, dancing, clapping during sports events, kite flying, and characterizations of living things,
no matter if they were drawings, paintings, photographs, stuffed animals, or dolls. Men had to have a fist size beard
at the bottom of their chin. Conversely, they had to wear their head hair short. Men had to wear a head covering.[111]
Many of these activities were hitherto lawful in Afghanistan. Critics complained that most Afghans followed a
different, less strict, and less intrusive interpretation of Islam. The Taliban did not eschew all traditional popular
practices. For example, they did not destroy the graves of Sufi pirs (holy men), and emphasized dreams as a means
of revelation.[112]
Taliban have been described as both anti-nationalist and Pushtun nationalist. According to journalist Ahmed Rashid,
at least in the first years of their rule, they adopted Deobandi and Islamist anti-nationalist beliefs, and opposed "tribal
and feudal structures," eliminating traditional tribal or feudal leaders from leadership roles.[113] According to Ali A.
Jalali and Lester Grau, the Taliban "received extensive support from Pashtuns across the country who thought that
the movement might restore their national dominance. Even Pashtun intellectuals in the West, who differed with the
Taliban on many issues, expressed support for the movement on purely ethnic grounds."[114]
Like Wahhabi and other Deobandis, the Taliban do not consider Shiʻi to be Muslims. The Shia in Afghanistan
consist mostly of the Hazara ethnic group which totaled almost 10% of Afghanistan's population.[115]
The Taliban were averse to debating doctrine with other Muslims. "The Taliban did not allow even Muslim reporters
to question [their] edicts or to discuss interpretations of the Qur'an."[116]
Taliban 12

Treatment of women
The Taliban forced women to wear the burqa in public.[118] They were
allowed neither to work nor to be educated after the age of eight, and
until then were permitted only to study the Qur'an.[11] They were not
allowed to be treated by male doctors unless accompanied by a male
chaperon, which led to illnesses remaining untreated. They faced
public flogging in the street, and public execution for violations of the
Taliban's laws.[36]

Employment for women was restricted to the medical sector, because

Taliban religious police beating a woman in
male medical personnel were not allowed to look at them. One result of Kabul on August 26, 2001.
[117]

the banning of employment of women by the Taliban was the closing

down in places like Kabul of primary schools not only for girls but for boys, because almost all the teachers there
were women.[119] Women were required to wear the burqa, a traditional dress covering the entire body except for a
small screen to see out of. Taliban restrictions became more severe after they took control of the capital. In February
1998, religious police forced all women off the streets of Kabul, and issued new regulations ordering people to
blacken their windows, so that women would not be visible from the outside.[120]

Bamyan Buddhas
In 1999, Mullah Omar issued a decree protecting the Buddha statues at
Bamyan, two 6th century monumental statues of standing buddhas
carved into the side of a cliff in the Bamyan valley in the Hazarajat
region of central Afghanistan. He did this because Afghanistan had no
Buddhists, so idolatry would not be a problem. But in March 2001 the
statues were destroyed by the Taliban of Mullah Omar following a
decree stating: "all the statues around Afghanistan must be
destroyed."[121]

Yahya Massoud, brother of the anti-Taliban and resistance leader

Destruction of Bamyan Buddha statues by the
Ahmad Shah Massoud, recalls the following incident after the
Taliban
destruction of the Buddha statues at Bamyan:
"It was the spring of 2001. I was in Afghanistan's Panjshir Valley, together with my brother Ahmad Shah
Massoud, the leader of the Afghan resistance against the Taliban, and Bismillah Khan, who currently serves
as Afghanistan's interior minister. One of our commanders, Commandant Momin, wanted us to see 30 Taliban
fighters who had been taken hostage after a gun battle. My brother agreed to meet them.
I remember that his first question concerned the centuries-old Buddha statues that were dynamited by the
Taliban in March of that year, shortly before our encounter. Two Taliban combatants from Kandahar
confidently responded that worshiping anything outside of Islam was unacceptable and that therefore these
statues had to be destroyed. My brother looked at them and said, this time in Pashto, 'There are still many sun-
worshippers in this country. Will you also try to get rid of the sun and drop darkness over the Earth?'"''[122]
Taliban 13

Explanation of ideology
The author Ahmed Rashid suggests that the devastation and hardship of the Soviet invasion and the following period
influenced Taliban ideology.[123] The Taliban were often "barely literate," and did not include scholars learned in
Islamic law and history. The refugee students, brought up in a totally male society, not only had no education in
mathematics, science, history or geography, but also had no traditional skills of farming, herding, or
handicraft-making, nor even knowledge of their tribal and clan lineages.[123] In such an environment, war meant
employment, peace meant unemployment. Dominating women simply affirmed manhood. For their leadership, rigid
fundamentalism was a matter not only of principle, but of political survival. Taliban leaders "repeatedly told" Rashid
that "if they gave women greater freedom or a chance to go to school, they would lose the support of their rank and
file."[124]

Public execution of woman known as Zarmina by
the Taliban at the Ghazi Sports Stadium, Kabul,
November 16, 1999. The mother of five had been
found guilty of killing her husband while he slept,
[125] [126]
after being beaten by him.
Criticisms
The Taliban were criticized for their strictness toward those who
disobeyed their imposed rules. Many Muslims complained that most
Taliban rules had no basis in the Qur'an or sharia. Mullah Omar's title
as Amir al-Mu'minin was criticized on the grounds that he lacked
scholarly learning, tribal pedigree, or connections to the Prophet's
family. Sanction for the title traditionally required the support of all of
the country's ulema, whereas only some 1,200 Pashtun
Taliban-supporting Mullahs had declared Omar the Amir. "No Afghan
had adopted the title since 1834, when King Dost Mohammed Khan
assumed the title before he declared jihad against the Sikh kingdom in
Peshawar. But Dost Mohammed was fighting foreigners, while Omar
had declared jihad against other Afghans."[127]

Another criticism was that the Taliban called their 20% tax on truckloads of opium "zakat", which is traditionally
limited to 2.5% of the zakat-payers' disposable income (or wealth).[127]
The Taliban have also been accused of being hypocritical, as intelligence picked up by Predator drones and other
battlefield cameras is at odds with the notion that they are pious warriors of God. Thermal-imagery technology
housed in a sniper rifle and ground-surveillance footage showed and recorded separate Taliban in southern
Afghanistan committing bestiality.[128]
Taliban 14

Governance

Overview
Rashid described the Taliban government as "a secret society run by
Kandaharis ... mysterious, secretive, and dictatorial."[129] They did not
hold elections, as their spokesman explained:
The Sharia does not allow politics or political parties. That
is why we give no salaries to officials or soldiers, just
food, clothes, shoes, and weapons. We want to live a life
like the Prophet lived 1400 years ago, and jihad is our
right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet, and we
are only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted
for the past 14 years.[130]

They modeled their decision-making process on the Pashtun tribal

council (jirga), together with what they believed to be the early Islamic
model. Discussion was followed by a building of a consensus by the
"believers".[131] Before capturing Kabul, there was talk of stepping
aside once a government of "good Muslims" took power, and law and Taliban in Herat

order were restored.

As the Taliban's power grew, decisions were made by Mullah Omar without consulting the jirga and without
consulting other parts of the country. He visited the capital, Kabul, only twice while in power. Instead of an election,
their leader's legitimacy came from an oath of allegiance ("Bay'ah"), in imitation of the Prophet and the first four
Caliphs. On April 4, 1996, Mullah Omar had "the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed" taken from its shrine for the
first time in 60 years. Wrapping himself in the relic, he appeared on the roof of a building in the center of Kandahar
while hundreds of Pashtun mullahs below shouted "Amir al-Mu'minin!" (Commander of the Faithful), in a pledge of
support. Taliban spokesman Mullah Wakil explained:

Decisions are based on the advice of the Amir-ul Momineen. For us consultation is not necessary. We
believe that this is in line with the Sharia. We abide by the Amir's view even if he alone takes this view.
There will not be a head of state. Instead there will be an Amir al-Mu'minin. Mullah Omar will be the
highest authority, and the government will not be able to implement any decision to which he does not
agree. General elections are incompatible with Sharia and therefore we reject them.[132]
The Taliban were very reluctant to share power, and since their ranks were overwhelmingly Pashtun they ruled as
overlords over the 60% of Afghans from other ethnic groups. In local government, such as Kabul city council[129] or
Herat,[133] Taliban loyalists, not locals, dominated, even when the Pashto-speaking Taliban could not communicate
with the roughly half of the population who spoke Dari or other non-Pashtun tongues.[133] Critics complained that
this "lack of local representation in urban administration made the Taliban appear as an occupying force."[134]
Taliban 15

Organization
Consistent with the governance of early Muslims was the absence of
state institutions or "a methodology for command and control" that is
standard today even among non-Westernized states. The Taliban did
not issue press releases, policy statements, or hold regular press
conferences. The outside world and most Afghans did not even know
what their leaders looked like, since photography was banned.[135] The
"regular army" resembled a lashkar or traditional tribal militia force
with only 25,000 men (of whom 11,000 where non-Afghans).
Taliban insurgents in northern Afghanistan after
Cabinet ministers and deputies were mullahs with a "madrasah
they surrendered to the Afghan National Police.
education." Several of them, such as the Minister of Health and
Governor of the State bank, were primarily military commanders who
left their administrative posts to fight when needed. Military reverses that trapped them behind lines or led to their
deaths increased the chaos in the national administration.[136] At the national level, "all senior Tajik, Uzbek and
Hazara bureaucrats" were replaced "with Pashtuns, whether qualified or not." Consequently, the ministries "by and
large ceased to function."[134]

The Ministry of Finance had neither a budget nor "qualified economist or banker." Mullah Omar collected and
dispersed cash without book-keeping.

Conscription
According to the testimony of Guantanamo captives before their Combatant Status Review Tribunals, the Taliban, in
addition to conscripting men to serve as soldiers, also conscripted men to staff its civil service.

Economy

Ariana airlines
Ariana Afghan Airlines was a key node in Al Qaeda's infrastructure, which was to move money, personnel and
materiel.[137]
According to the Los Angeles Times:[137]
With the Taliban's blessing, Bin Laden effectively had hijacked Ariana, the national civilian airline of
Afghanistan. For four years, according to former U.S. aides and exiled Afghan officials, Ariana's passenger
and charter flights ferried Islamic militants, arms, cash and opium through the United Arab Emirates and
Pakistan. Members of Bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist network were provided false Ariana identification that
gave them free run of airports in the Middle East.
Taliban 16

Opium
Opium poppies are a traditional crop in Afghanistan, and, with the war
shattering other sectors of the economy, opium became its largest
export.
"The Taliban have provided an Islamic sanction for
farmers ... to grow even more opium, even though the
Koran forbids Muslims from producing or imbibing
intoxicants. Abdul Rashid, the head of the Taliban's
anti-drugs control force in Kandahar, spelled out the
Opium in alleged Taliban safehouse in Helmand
nature of his unique job. He is authorized to impose a
strict ban on the growing of hashish, "because it is
consumed by Afghans and Muslims." But, Rashid told me without a hint of sarcasm, "Opium is
permissible because it is consumed by kafirs in the West, and not by Muslims or Afghans."[138]

In 2000 Afghanistan's opium production accounted for 75% of the world's supply. On July 27, 2000, the Taliban
issued a decree banning cultivation.[139] By February 2001, production had reportedly been reduced from 12600
acres (51 km2) to only 17 acres (7 ha).[140] Opium production was reportedly cut back by the Taliban not to prevent
its use, but to increase its price, and thus increase the income of Afghan poppy farmers and tax revenue.[141]
In October 2009 an article, citing "American and Afghan officials", appeared in The New York Times stating that the
Taliban derive important funding from the opium trade but other sources such as foreign donations provide
more.[142]

Deforestation
The so-called "transportation mafia" operating out of Pakistan working with the Taliban "cut down millions of acres
of timber in Afghanistan for the Pakistani market, denuding the countryside without attempting reforestation. They
stripped rusting factories, ... even electricity and telephone poles for their steel and sold the scrap to steel mills in
Lahore."[143]

Emerald mines
The Taliban took over emerald mines in Pakistan's Swat valley (not a tribal area), once the 'Switzerland of Pakistan',
a popular tourist area for skiers. The government did not react to the move. The Taliban reached an agreement with
the region's mining labor allowing the Taliban to keep one-third of the miners' output, while equally sharing costs.
The Taliban does not take part in the mining operations.[144]

Business dealings
In 1997, the Taliban and Unocal negotiated arrangements for CentGas to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to
Pakistan.[145] Reportedly, a deal was struck but later collapsed,[146] rumored to be because of competing negotiations
with Bridas, an Argentine company.[147]

International relations
During its time in power, the Taliban regime, or "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan", gained diplomatic recognition
from only three states: the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, all of which provided substantial aid.
The other nations including the United Nations recognized the government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (parts
of whom were part of the United Front (Northern Alliance) as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
Taliban 17

Pakistan
The "vast majority" of the Taliban's rank and file and most of the leadership, though not Mullah Omar, were Koranic
students who had studied at madrasas set up for Afghan refugees, usually by JUI. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, JUI's
leader, was a political ally of Benazir Bhutto. After Bhutto became prime minister, Rehman "had access to the
government, the army and the ISI," whom he influenced to help the Taliban.[148]
Pakistan's ISI supported the previously unknown Kandahari student movement,[149] the Taliban, as the group
conquered Afghanistan in the 1990s.[150]
From 1994 onwards Pakistan has been the force behind the Taliban. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf – then as
Chief of Army Staff – was responsible for sending thousands of Pakistanis to fight alongside the Taliban and Bin
Laden against the forces of Massoud.[12] [44] [45] [15] In total there were believed to be 28,000 Pakistani nationals
fighting inside Afghanistan.[15] 20,000 were regular Pakistani soldiers either from the Frontier Corps or army and an
estimated 8,000 were militants recruited in madrassas filling regular Taliban ranks.[13] The estimated 25,000 Taliban
regular force thus comprised more than 8,000 Pakistani nationals.[13] [46] A 1998 document by the U.S. State
Department confirms that "20–40 percent of [regular] Taliban soldiers are Pakistani."[12] The document further states
that the parents of those Pakistani nationals "know nothing regarding their child's military involvement with the
Taliban until their bodies are brought back to Pakistan."[12] Further 3,000 fighters of the regular Taliban army were
Arab and Central Asian militants.[13] Of roughly 45,000 Pakistani, Taliban and Al Qaeda soldiers fighting against the
forces of Massoud only 14,000 were Afghan.[13] [15]
Human Rights Watch also writes, "Pakistani aircraft assisted with troop rotations of Taliban forces during combat
operations in late 2000 and ... senior members of Pakistan's intelligence agency and army were involved in planning
military operations."[151] Pakistan provided military equipment, recruiting assistance, training, and tactical
advice.[152] Officially Pakistan denied supporting the Taliban militarily.
Author Ahmed Rashid claims that the Taliban had "unprecedented access" among Pakistan's lobbies and interest
groups. He also writes that they at times were able to "play off one lobby against another and extend their influence
in Pakistan even further".[153] By 1998–99, Taliban-style groups in Pakistan's Pashtun belt, and to an extent in
Pakistan-administered Kashmir, "were banning TV and videos ... and forcing people, particularly women, to adapt to
the Taliban dress code and way of life."[154]
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the U.S. operation in Afghanistan the Afghan Taliban leadership has
largely fled to Pakistan where they regrouped and created several shuras to coordinate their insurgency in
Afghanistan. On February 8, 2009, U.S. commander of operations in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal and
other officials said that the Taliban leadership was in Quetta, Pakistan, though the Pakistani government, an official
U.S. ally, denied this.[16]
From 2010, a report by a leading British institution claimed that Pakistan's intelligence service still today has a
strong link with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Published by the London School of Economics, the report said that
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) has an "official policy" of support for the Taliban. It said the ISI
provides funding and training for the Taliban, and that the agency has representatives on the so-called Quetta Shura,
the Taliban's leadership council, which is believed to meet in Pakistan. The report, based on interviews with Taliban
commanders in Afghanistan, was written by Matt Waldman, a fellow at Harvard University.[155]
"Pakistan appears to be playing a double-game of astonishing magnitude," the report said. The report also linked
high-level members of the Pakistani government with the Taliban. It said Asif Ali Zardari, the Pakistani president,
met with senior Taliban prisoners in 2010 and promised to release them. Zardari reportedly told the detainees they
were only arrested because of American pressure. "The Pakistan government's apparent duplicity – and awareness of
it among the American public and political establishment – could have enormous geopolitical implications,"
Waldman said. "Without a change in Pakistani behaviour it will be difficult if not impossible for international forces
and the Afghan government to make progress against the insurgency." Afghan officials have long been suspicious of
the ISI's role. Amrullah Saleh, the former director of Afghanistan's intelligence service, told Reuters that the ISI was
Taliban 18

"part of a landscape of destruction in this country".[156]

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban)

Before the creation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban(Pakistan), some of their leaders and fighters were part of the 8,000
Pakistani militants fighting in the War in Afghanistan (1996-2001) and the War in Afghanistan (2001-present)
against the United Islamic Front and NATO forces.[13] Most of them hail from the Pakistani side of the Af-Pak
border regions. After the fall of the Afghan Taliban in late 2001 most Pakistani militants including members of
today's TTP fled home to Pakistan.
After the creation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in 2007, headed by Baitullah Mehsud,[157] its members have
officially defined goals to establish their rule over Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. They engage the
Pakistani army in heavy combat operations. Some intelligence analysts believe that the TTP's attacks on the
Pakistani government, police and army strained the TTP's relations with the Afghan Taliban.[158] [159]
The Afghan Taliban and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan differ greatly in their history, leadership and goals although
they share a common interpretation of Islam and are both predominantly Pashtun.[158] The Afghan Taliban have no
affiliation with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and routinely deny any connection to the TTP. The New York Times
quoted a spokesman for the Afghan Taliban stating that:
"We don't like to be involved with them, as we have rejected all affiliation with Pakistani Taliban fighters ...
We have sympathy for them as Muslims, but beside that, there is nothing else between us."[160]
The Afghan Taliban have always relied on support by the Pakistani army in the past and are still supported by them
today in their campaign to control Afghanistan.[12] [14] Regular Pakistani army troops fought alongside the Afghan
Taliban in the War in Afghanistan (1996-2001).[15] Major leaders of the Afghan Taliban including Mullah Omar,
Jalaluddin Haqqani and Siraj Haqqani are believed to enjoy safe haven in Pakistan.[14] In 2006 Jalaluddin Haqqani
was called a 'Pakistani asset' by a senior official of Inter-Services Intelligence.[14] Pakistan regards the Haqqani's as
an important force for protecting its interests in Afghanistan and therefore have been unwilling to move against
them.[14]
Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar asked the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in late 2008 and early 2009 to stop attacks
inside Pakistan, to change their focus as an organization and to fight the Afghan National Army and ISAF forces in
Afghanistan instead.[160] In late December 2008 and early January 2009 he sent a delegation, led by former
Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah Abdullah Zakir, to persuade leading members of the TTP to put aside differences
with Pakistan.[160]
Some regional experts state the common name "Taliban" may be more misleading than illuminating.[158] Gilles
Dorronsoro, a scholar of South Asia currently at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington
says:
"The fact that they have the same name causes all kinds of confusion."[158]
As the Pakistani Army began offensives against the Pakistani Taliban, many unfamiliar with the region thought
incorrectly that the assault was against the Afghan Taliban of Mullah Omar which was not the case.[158]
The Pakistani Taliban was put under sanctions by U.N. Security Council for terrorists attacks in Pakistan and 2010
Times Square car bombing attempt.[159]

Malakand Taliban
Malakand Taliban is militant outfit led by Sufi Muhammad and his son in law Molvi Fazalullah.[161] Sufi
Muhammad is in government custody, however, Molvi Fazalullah is believed to be in Afghanistan.[161] In the last
week of May 2011, eight security personnel and civilians fell victim to four hundred armed Taliban who attacked
Shaltalo check post in Dir, a frontier District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, located few kilometers away from Afghan
border.[161] Although, they have been linked with Waziristan-based Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), however, the
Taliban 19

connection between these two groups is of symbolic nature.[161]

Al Qaeda
In 1996, bin Laden moved to Afghanistan from Sudan. He came without invitation, and sometimes irritated Mullah
Omar with his declaration of war and fatwas against citizens of third-party countries,[162] but relations between the
two groups improved over time, to the point that Mullah Omar rebuffed his group's patron Saudi Arabia, insulting
Saudi minister Prince Turki while reneging on an earlier promise to turn bin Laden over to the Saudis.[163]
Bin Laden was able to forge an alliance between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The Al Qaeda-trained 055 Brigade
integrated with the Taliban army between 1997 and 2001. Several hundred Arab Afghan fighters sent by bin Laden
assisted the Taliban in the Mazar-e-Sharif slaughter.[164] The so-called Brigade 055 was also responsible for
massacres against civilians in other parts of Afghanistan.[13] From 1996 to 2001 the organization of Osama Bin
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had become a virtual state within the Taliban state.
Taliban-Al-Qaeda connections were also strengthened by the reported marriage of one of bin Laden's sons to Omar's
daughter. While in Afghanistan, bin Laden may have helped finance the Taliban.[165] [166]
After the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, bin Laden and several Al-Qaeda members were indicted in U.S.
criminal court.[167] The Taliban rejected extradition requests by the U.S., variously claiming that bin Laden had
"gone missing",[168] or that Washington "cannot provide any evidence or any proof" that bin Laden is involved in
terrorist activities and that "without any evidence, bin Laden is a man without sin... he is a free man."[67] [169]
Evidence against bin Laden included courtroom testimony and satellite phone records.[170] [171] Bin Laden in turn,
praised the Taliban as the "only Islamic government" in existence, and lauded Mullah Omar for his destruction of
idols such as the Buddhas of Bamyan.[172]
At the end of 2008, the Taliban was in talks to sever all ties with Al-Qaeda.[173]
In 2011, Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn at New York University's Center on International Cooperation
proclaimed that the two groups did not get along at times before the September 11 attacks, and they have continued
to spar since. Contrary to the established perception that they are of one mind, the Taliban and al-Qaeda are not in
lockstep. In fact, the Taliban in Afghanistan could be persuaded to renounce the infamous terrorist group led by
Osama bin Laden.[174]

Iran
Iran has historically been an enemy of the Taliban. In early August 1998, after attacking the city of Mazar, Taliban
forces killed several thousand civilians and 10 Iranian diplomats and intelligence officers in the Iranian consulate.
Alleged radio intercepts indicate Mullah Omar personally approved the killings.[175] In the following crisis between
Iran and the Taliban, the Iranian government amassed up to 200,000 regular troops on the Afghan-Iranian
border.[176] War was eventually averted.
Many U.S. senior military officials such as Robert Gates,[177] Stanley McChrystal,[178] David Petraeus[179] and
others believe that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps nowadays is involved in helping the Taliban to a certain
extent. Reports in which NATO states accused Iran of supplying and training some Taliban insurgents started
coming forward since 2004/2005.
"We did interdict a shipment, without question the Revolutionary Guard's core Quds Force, through a known
Taliban facilitator. Three of the individuals were killed... 48 122 millimetre rockets were intercepted with their
various components... Iranians certainly view as making life more difficult for us if Afghanistan is unstable.
We don't have that kind of relationship with the Iranians. That's why I am particularly troubled by the
interception of weapons coming from Iran. But we know that it's more than weapons; it's money; it's also
according to some reports, training at Iranian camps as well."[180]
—General David Petraeus, Commander of US-NATO forces in Afghanistan, March 16, 2011
Taliban 20

United States
Foreign powers, including the United States, briefly supported the Taliban, hoping it would restore order in the
war-ravaged country. For example, it made no comment when the Taliban captured Herat in 1995, and expelled
thousands of girls from schools.[181] These hopes faded as the Taliban began killing unarmed civilians, targeting
ethnic groups (primarily Hazaras), and restricting the rights of women.[107] In late 1997, American Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright began to distance the U.S. from the Taliban. The next year, the American-based oil company
Unocal withdrew from negotiations on pipeline construction from Central Asia.[182]
One day before the capture of Mazar, bin Laden affiliates bombed two U.S. embassies in Africa, killing 224 and
wounding 4,500, mostly Africans. The U.S. responded by launching cruise missiles on suspected terrorist camps in
Afghanistan, killing over 20 though failing to kill bin Laden or even many Al-Qaeda. Mullah Omar condemned the
missile attack and American President Bill Clinton.[183] Saudi Arabia expelled the Taliban envoy in protest over the
refusal to turn over bin Laden, and after Mullah Omar allegedly insulted the Saudi royal family.[184] In mid-October
the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to ban commercial aircraft flights to and from Afghanistan, and freeze
its bank accounts worldwide.[185]
Adjusting its counterinsurgency strategy, in October 2009, the U.S announced plans to pay Taliban fighters to switch
sides.[186]
On November 26, 2009, in an interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour, President Hamid Karzai said there is an
"urgent need" for negotiations with the Taliban, and made it clear that the Obama administration had opposed such
talks. There was no formal American response.[187] [188]
In early December 2009, the Taliban offered to give the U.S. "legal guarantees" that they would not allow
Afghanistan to be used for attacks on other countries. There was no formal American response.[85]
On December 6, U.S officials indicated that they have not ruled out talks with the Taliban.[189] Several days later it
was reported that Gates saw potential for reconciliation with the Taliban, but not with Al-Qaeda. Furthermore, he
said that reconciliation would politically end the insurgency and the war. But he said reconciliation must be on the
Afghan government's terms, and that the Taliban must be subject to the sovereignty of the government.[190]
In 2010, General McChrystal said his troop surge could lead to a negotiated peace with the Taliban.[191]
Allegations of connection to CIA There have been many claims that the CIA directly supported the Taliban or
Al-Qaeda. In the early 1980s, the CIA and the ISI (Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency) provided arms and
money, and the ISI helped gather radical Muslims from around the world to fight against the Soviet invaders.[192]
Osama Bin Laden was one of the key players in organizing training camps for the foreign Muslim volunteers. "By
1987, 65,000 tons of U.S.-made weapons and ammunition a year were entering the war."

United Kingdom
After 9/11, the United Kingdom froze the Taliban's assets in the U.K., nearly $200 million by early October
2001.[193] The U.K. also supported the U.S. decision to remove the Taliban, both politically and militarily.[194]
The UN agreed that NATO would act on its behalf, focusing on counter-terrorist operations in Afghanistan after the
Taliban had been "defeated". The United Kingdom took operational responsibility for Helmand Province, a major
poppy-growing province in southern Afghanistan, deploying troops there in the summer of 2006, and encountered
resistance by re-formed Taliban forces entering Afghanistan from Pakistan. The Taliban turned towards the use of
improvised explosive devices.[195]
In 2008, the U.K. announced plans to pay Taliban fighters to switch sides or lay down arms;[196] later, in 2009 the
United Kingdom government backed talks with the Taliban.[197]
Taliban 21

India
India is one of the Taliban's most outspoken critics. India was concerned about growing Islamic militancy in its
neighborhood, and refused to recognize the Taliban regime.[198] Ahmad Shah Massoud also had close ties to
India.[199]
In December 1999, Indian Airlines Flight 814 en route from Kathmandu to Delhi was hijacked and taken to
Kandahar. The Taliban moved its militias near the hijacked aircraft, supposedly to prevent Indian special forces from
storming the aircraft, and stalled the negotiations between India and the hijackers for days. The New York Times later
reported that there were credible links between the hijackers and the Taliban.[200] As a part of the deal to free the
plane, India released three militants. The Taliban gave a safe passage to the hijackers and the released militants.[201]
Following the hijacking, India drastically increased its efforts to help Massoud, providing an arms depot in
Dushanbe, Tajikistan.[202] India also provided a wide range of high-altitude warfare equipment, helicopter
technicians, medical services, and tactical advice.[203] According to one report, Indian military support to
anti-Taliban forces totaled US$70 million, including five Mi-17 helicopters, and US$8 million worth of high-altitude
equipment in 2001.[204] India extensively supported the new administration in Afghanistan,[205] leading several
reconstruction projects[206] and by 2001 had emerged as the country's largest regional donor.[207]
In the wake of recent terrorist attacks in India, there have been growing concerns about fundamentalist organisations
such as the Taliban seeking to expand their activities into India. During the 2011 ICC Cricket World Cup which was
co-hosted in India, Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik and Interpol chief Ronald Noble revealed that a
terrorist bid to disrupt the tournament had been foiled; following a conference with Noble, Malik said that the
Taliban had begun to base their activities in India with reports from neighboring countries exposing their activities in
the country and a Sri Lankan terrorist planning to target cricketers was arrested in Colombo.[208] [209] [210]
Kashmir-based militant groups thought to have ties with the Taliban have historically been involved in the Jammu
and Kashmir insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir.[211] In 2009, the Times of India called for India to reassess
its Taliban threat.[212]

United Nations and NGOs

A major issue during the Taliban's reign was its relations with the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). Twenty years of continuous warfare had devastated Afghanistan's infrastructure and
economy. There was no running water, little electricity, few telephones, functioning roads or regular energy supplies.
Basic necessities like water, food, housing and others were in desperately short supply. In addition, the clan and
family structure that provided Afghans with a social/economic safety net was also badly damaged.[116] [213]
Afghanistan's infant mortality was the highest in the world. A full quarter of all children died before they reached
their fifth birthday, a rate several times higher than most other developing countries.[214]
International charitable and/or development organisations (NGOs) were extremely important to the supply of food,
employment, reconstruction, and other services. With one million plus deaths during the years of war, the number of
families headed by widows had reached 98,000 by 1998.[215] Thus Taliban restrictions on women were sometime a
matter not only of human rights, but of life and death. In Kabul, where vast portions of the city had been devastated
from rocket attacks, more than half of its 1.2 million people benefited in some way from NGO activities, even for
water to drink.[216] The civil war and its never-ending refugee stream continued throughout the Taliban's reign. The
Mazar, Herat, and Shomali valley offensives displaced more than three-quarters of a million civilians, using
"scorched earth" tactics to prevent them from supplying the enemy with aid.[217]
Despite the aid, the Taliban's attitude toward the UN and NGOs was often one of suspicion, in place of gratitude or
even tolerance. The UN operates on the basis of international law, not Sharia, and the UN did not recognize the
Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Additionally, most foreign donors and aid workers, were
non-Muslims. As the Taliban's Attorney General Maulvi Jalil-ullah Maulvizada put it:
Taliban 22

Let us state what sort of education the UN wants. This is a big infidel policy which gives such obscene
freedom to women which would lead to adultery and herald the destruction of Islam. In any Islamic
country where adultery becomes common, that country is destroyed and enters the domination of the
infidels because their men become like women and women cannot defend themselves. Anyone who
talks to us should do so within Islam's framework. The Holy Koran cannot adjust itself to other people's
requirements, people should adjust themselves to the requirements of the Holy Koran.[218]
Taliban decision-makers, particularly Mullah Omar, seldom if ever talked directly to non-Muslim foreigners, so aid
providers had to deal with intermediaries whose approvals and agreements were often reversed.[134] Around
September 1997 the heads of three UN agencies in Kandahar were expelled from the country after protesting when a
female attorney for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was forced to talk from behind a curtain so her face
would not be visible.[219]
When the UN increased the number of Muslim women staff to satisfy Taliban demands, the Taliban then required all
female Muslim UN staff traveling to Afghanistan to be chaperoned by a mahram or a blood relative.[220] In July
1998, the Taliban closed "all NGO offices" by force after those organizations refused to move to a bombed-out
former Polytechnic College as ordered.[221] One month later the UN offices were also shut down.[222] As food prices
rose and conditions deteriorated, Planning Minister Qari Din Mohammed explained the Taliban's indifference to the
loss of humanitarian aid:
We Muslims believe God the Almighty will feed everybody one way or another. If the foreign NGOs
leave then it is their decision. We have not expelled them.[223]
In 2009 a top U.N official called for talks with Taliban leaders.[224] In 2010 the U.N lifted sanctions on the
Taliban,[225] and requested that Taliban leaders and others be removed from terrorism watch lists.[226] In 2010 the
U.S. and Europe announced support for President Karzai's latest attempt to negotiate peace with the Taliban.[227]

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University Press. ISBN 0-300-08340-8.

Notes
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Taliban 23

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[106] Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim world / editor in chief, Richard C. Martin, Macmillan Reference USA : Thomson/Gale, c2004
[107] Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, (2004).
[108] Rashid 2000, pp. 132, 139.
[109] Rashid 2000, p. 87.
[110] Waldman, Amy.
[111] US Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Afghanistan 2001 (http:/ / www. state. gov/ g/ drl/ rls/ hrrpt/ 2001/ sa/ 8222. htm).
[112] Roy, Olivier, Globalized Islam, Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 239.
[113] Rashid 2000, p. 92.
[114] Foreign Military Studies Office, "Whither the Taliban?" by Mr. Ali A. Jalali and Mr. Lester W. Grau (http:/ / www. fas. org/ irp/ world/
para/ docs/ 990306-taliban. htm).
[115] Human Rights Watch Report, `Afghanistan, the massacre in Mazar-e-Sharif`, November 1998. Incitement of violence against Hazaras by
governor Niazi. (http:/ / www. hrw. org/ reports98/ afghan/ Afrepor0-03. htm#P186_38364)
[116] Rashid 2000, p. 107.
[117] Rawa.us (http:/ / www. rawa. us/ movies/ beating. mpg)
[118] MJ Gohari (2000). The Taliban: Ascent to Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 108–10.
[119] Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban. Yale Nota Bene Books, 2000, p.106.
[120] Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban. Yale Nota Bene Books, 2000, p. 70.
Taliban 26

[121] Luke Harding (March 3, 2001). "How the Buddha got his wounds" (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ Archive/ Article/ 0,4273,4145138,00.
html). London: Guardian. . Retrieved August 27, 2010.
[122] Yahya Massoud (July 2010). "Afghans Can Win This War" (http:/ / www. foreignpolicy. com/ articles/ 2010/ 07/ 30/
afghans_can_win_this_war). Foreign Policy. .
[123] Rashid 2000, p. 32.
[124] Rashid 2000, p. 111.
[125] "Taliban publicly execute woman" (http:/ / www. rawa. org/ murder-w. htm), Associated Press, November 17, 1999; also see Antonowicz,
Anton. 'Zarmina's story"], The Daily Mirror, June 20, 2002.
[126] Rawa.us (http:/ / www. rawa. us/ movies/ zarmeena. mpg)
[127] Rashid 2000, pp. 41–42.
[128] "The Case for Calling Them Nitwits – Magazine" (http:/ / www. theatlantic. com/ magazine/ archive/ 2010/ 07/
the-case-for-calling-them-nitwits/ 8130/ ). The Atlantic. June 30, 2007. . Retrieved October 23, 2010.
[129] Rashid 2000, p. 98.
[130] Rashid 2000, p. 43 Interview with Mullah Wakil, March 1996
[131] Rashid 2000, p. 95.
[132] Interview with Taliban spokesman Mullah Wakil in Arabic magazine Al-Majallah, 1996-10-23.
[133] Rashid 2000, pp. 39–40.
[134] Rashid 2000, pp. 101–102.
[135] Rashid 2000, p. 5.
[136] Rashid 2000, p. 100.
[137] Long Before Sept. 11, Bin Laden Aircraft Flew Under the Radar (http:/ / articles. latimes. com/ 2001/ nov/ 18/ news/ mn-5593). Los
Angeles Times. 18 November 2001|
[138] Rashid 2000, pp. 118–119.
[139] "Opioids homepage" (http:/ / opioids. com/ ). opioids.com. . Retrieved August 27, 2010.
[140] Afghanistan, Opium and the Taliban (http:/ / opioids. com/ afghanistan/ index. html).
[141] Benjamin, Daniel, The Age of Sacred Terror by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, New York: Random House, c2002, p.145) (source:
Edith M. Lederer, "U.N. Panel Accuses Taliban of Selling Drugs to Finance War and Train Terrorists," Associated Press, 2001-05-25.
[142] "Many Sources Feed Taliban’s War Chest", by Eric Schmitt, October 18, 2009, [[The New York Times (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2009/
10/ 19/ world/ asia/ 19taliban. html?_r=1& hp)]]
[143] Rashid 2000, p. 192.
[144] Taliban take over Swat’s emerald mines (http:/ / www. dawn. com/ wps/ wcm/ connect/ Dawn Content Library/ dawn/ news/ pakistan/
nwfp/ taliban-take-over-swat-emerald-mines--za) Dawn Media Group, 2009-03-25.
[145] BBC, " Taliban in Texas for talks on gas pipeline (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ west_asia/ 37021. stm)".
[146] BBC, Afghan Pipeline Deal Close (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ west_asia/ 21007. stm)".
[147] BBC, " Taliban says it's ready to sign Turkmen pipeline deal (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ s/ w_asia/ 44521. stm)".
[148] Rashid 2000, p. 26.
[149] Julian West (September 23, 2001). "Pakistan's godfathers of the Taliban hold the key to the hunt for Bin Laden" (http:/ / www. telegraph.
co. uk/ news/ worldnews/ asia/ pakistan/ 1341405/ Pakistans-godfathers-of-the-Taliban-hold-the-key-to-hunt-for-bin-Laden. html). London:
Daily Telegraph. .
[150] Carlotta Gall (March 3, 2010). "Former Pakistani officer embodies policy puzzle" (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2010/ 03/ 04/ world/ asia/
04imam. html). New York Times. .
[151] (July 2001) Crisis of Impunity (http:/ / www. unhcr. org/ refworld/ docid/ 3bd540b60. html). (Report).
[152] Frantz 2001
[153] Rashid 2000, pp. 185–186
[154] Rashid 2000, pp. 93, 137.
[155] "Discussion Papers" (http:/ / english. aljazeera. net/ mritems/ Documents/ 2010/ 6/ 13/ 20106138531279734lse-isi-taliban. pdf). . Retrieved
12 December 2010.
[156] "Afghan ex-intel chief opposed Karzai peace plan" (http:/ / www. reuters. com/ article/ idUSTRE6571VE20100608). Reuters. June 8,
2010. .
[157] Tighe, Paul and Katz, Ian (August 10, 2009). "Pakistan Challenges Taliban to Show Leader Mehsud Still Alive" (http:/ / www. bloomberg.
com/ apps/ news?pid=20601087& sid=akFq_Knl5Gd0). Bloomberg. . Retrieved 2009-08-09.
[158] Shane, Scott (2009-10-22). "Insurgents Share a Name, but Pursue Different Goals" (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2009/ 10/ 23/ world/ asia/
23taliban. html). The New York Times (The New York Times Company). . Retrieved 2011-01-26.
[159] UNSC slaps sanctions on Pakistani Taliban (http:/ / www. rediff. com/ news/ report/ unsc-slaps-sanctions-on-pakistani-taliban/ 20110730.
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[160] Carlotta Gall, Ismail Khan, Pir Zubair Shah and Taimoor Shah (March 26, 2009). "Pakistani and Afghan Taliban Unify in Face of US
Influx" (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2009/ 03/ 27/ world/ asia/ 27taliban. html). New York Times. . Retrieved March 27, 2009.
[161] http:/ / outlookafghanistan. net/ topics. php?post_id=828
[162] Wright 2006, pp. 246–247, 287–288.
Taliban 27

[163] Wright 2006, pp. 288–289.

[164] Rashid 2000, p. 139.
[165] International Terrorism And the Case Of Usama bin Laden (http:/ / www. lebarmy. gov. lb/ article. asp?ln=en& id=1328), Lebanese Army
Website.
[166] However, Lawrence Wright claims bin Laden was almost completely broke at this time, cut off from his family income and fleeced by the
Sudanese.Wright 2006, pp. 222–223.
[167] PDF of indictments (http:/ / fl1. findlaw. com/ news. findlaw. com/ hdocs/ docs/ binladen/ usbinladen1. pdf).
[168] CNN report (http:/ / www. cnn. com/ WORLD/ meast/ 9902/ 13/ afghan. binladen. 02/ index. html).
[169] BBC article stating that bin Laden in "a man without sin" (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ south_asia/ 217947. stm).
[170] CNN records of evidence against bin Laden (http:/ / archives. cnn. com/ 2001/ LAW/ 02/ 14/ embassy. bombing. 02/ index. html).
[171] Cooperative Research records of evidence against bin Laden (http:/ / www. cooperativeresearch. org/ entity. jsp?entity=osama_bin_laden).
[172] Bin Laden, Messages to the World, (2006), p.143, from Interview published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi in London, Nov. 12, 2001 (originally
published in Pakistani daily, Ausaf, Nov. 7), shortly before the Northern Alliance entry into Kabul.
[173] "Sources: Taliban split with al Qaeda, seek peace" (http:/ / edition. cnn. com/ 2008/ WORLD/ asiapcf/ 10/ 06/ afghan. saudi. talks/
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[174] Allgov.com (http:/ / www. allgov. com/ US_and_the_World/ ViewNews/ Surprise_Taliban_and_Al_Qaeda_are_Worlds_Apart_110209)
[175] Rashid 2000, pp. 74–75.
[176] Iranian-Afghan tensions. (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ military/ library/ news/ 1998/ 09/ wwwh8915. html)
[177] Gates Warns Iran Over Afghan "Double Game" (http:/ / www. cbsnews. com/ stories/ 2010/ 03/ 08/ world/ main6277025. shtml)
[178] US General Accuses Iran Of Helping Taliban (http:/ / www. eagleworldnews. com/ 2010/ 05/ 31/
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[179] Iran Is Helping Taliban in Afghanistan, Petraeus Says (Update1) (http:/ / www. bloomberg. com/ apps/ news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=aru5H2YB1Tv8& refer=india)
[180] Jha, Lalit K (March 16, 2011). "Concern in US over increasing Iranian activity in Afghanistan" (http:/ / www. pajhwok. com/ en/ 2011/ 03/
16/ concern-us-over-increasing-iranian-activity-afghanistan). Pajhwok Afghan News (PAN). . Retrieved 2011-01-13.
[181] Rashid 2000, p. 177.
[182] "US pledges support for Afghan oil pipeline if Taliban makes peace" (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ world/ west_asia/ 38115. stm). BBC
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[183] Reuters, "Taliban blame Clinton scam for attacks", 1998-08-21.
[184] Rashid 2000, pp. 138, 231.
[185] Rashid 2000, p. 78.
[186] "U.S. set to pay Taliban members to switch sides" (http:/ / www. cnn. com/ 2009/ POLITICS/ 10/ 28/ afghanistan. taliban. pay/ index.
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[187] "IPS Inter Press Service" (http:/ / ipsnews. net/ text/ news. asp?idnews=49701). Ipsnews.net. . Retrieved August 27, 2010.
[188] "Right after interviewing Karzai" (http:/ / amanpour. blogs. cnn. com/ 2009/ 12/ 06/ right-after-interviewing-karzai/ ). CNN. . Retrieved
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[189] Homan, Timothy R. (December 6, 2009). "bloomberg.com" (http:/ / www. bloomberg. com/ apps/ news?pid=20601087&
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[190] Reuters (September 11, 2001). "Pentagon sees reconciliation with Taliban" (http:/ / www. stuff. co. nz/ world/ 666993). stuff.co.nz. .
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[191] (AFP) – Jan 24, 2010 (January 24, 2010). "google.com/hostednews/afp/article" (http:/ / www. google. com/ hostednews/ afp/ article/
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[192] Fitchett, Joseph (September 26, 2001). "What About the Taliban's Stingers?" (http:/ / www. iht. com/ articles/ 2001/ 09/ 26/ stinger_ed3_.
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[194] Conflict in Afghanistan: a ... – Google Books (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=bv4hzxpo424C& pg=PA154& dq="united+ kingdom"+
taliban#v=onepage& q="united kingdom" taliban& f=false). Books.google.com. 2003. ISBN 9781851094028. . Retrieved November 4, 2010.
[195] "General Sir Michael Jackson: We must maintain our will in Afghanistan" (http:/ / www. telegraph. co. uk/ news/ newstopics/
onthefrontline/ 2171923/ General-Sir-Michael-Jackson-We-must-maintain-our-will-in-Afghanistan. html). London: Telegraph. June 21, 2008.
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[196] Meo, Nick (August 9, 2008). "British cash to buy off Taliban 'goes to farmers'" (http:/ / www. telegraph. co. uk/ news/ worldnews/ asia/
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[197] "UK news" (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ uk/ feedarticle/ 8628150). The Guardian (London). January 23, 2008. . Retrieved April 9,
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[198] The idea of Pakistan, by Stephen P. Cohen (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=sOTZqI5zREoC& pg=PA248& dq=india+ taliban&
client=firefox-a#PPA250,M1).
[199] Massoud joins hands with India (http:/ / www. rawa. org/ massoud. htm).
[200] Bombay terrorist reveals links with IC 814 hijackers (http:/ / www. rediff. com/ news/ 2001/ dec/ 07ter. htm).
Taliban 28

[201] India reaches out to Afghanistan (http:/ / www. atimes. com/ atimes/ South_Asia/ GH30Df01. html).
[202] India's Afghan policy (http:/ / mea. gov. in/ opinion/ 2003/ 03/ 07o01. htm).
[203] India joins anti-Taliban coalition (http:/ / www. janes. com/ security/ international_security/ news/ jir/ jir010315_1_n. shtml)
[204] India and Pakistan, by Duncan Mcleod (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=EqDdfZwSc3EC& pg=PA93& dq=india+ hijacking+
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[205] Tharoor, Ishaan (December 5, 2009). "India, Pakistan and the Battle for Afghanistan" (http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ world/ article/
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[207] Bajoria, Jayshree (July 22, 2009). "India-Afghanistan Relations" (http:/ / www. cfr. org/ publication/ 17474/ indiaafghanistan_relations.
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[208] Terrorism threat in India during World Cup: Malik (Express Tribune) (http:/ / tribune. com. pk/ story/ 137011/
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[209] Taliban trying to enter India: Malik (The News) (http:/ / www. thenews. com. pk/ NewsDetail. aspx?ID=13081)
[210] Terrorist plotting World Cup attack nabbed: Rehman Malik (The Times of India) (http:/ / timesofindia. indiatimes. com/ world/ pakistan/
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[211] At Border, Signs of Pakistani Role in Taliban Surge - New York Times (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2007/ 01/ 21/ world/ asia/ 21quetta.
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[212] India forced to reassess Taliban threat (Times of India) (http:/ / articles. timesofindia. indiatimes. com/ 2009-03-31/ india/
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[213] Rashid 2000, p. 126.
[214] UNCP Country Development Indicators, 1995.
[215] Quoting the ICRC (http:/ / www. blackwell-synergy. com/ doi/ abs/ 10. 1111/ j. 1478-0542. 2005. 00141. x?cookieSet=1&
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[216] Rashid 2000, p. 72.
[217] Rashid 2000, pp. 64, 78.
[218] Maulvi Jalil-ullah Maulvizada, June 1997 interview with Ahmed Rashid; Rashid 2000, pp. 111–112.
[219] Rashid 2000, p. 65.
[220] Rashid 2000, p. 71.
[221] Aid agencies pull out of Kabul (http:/ / www. bmj. com/ cgi/ content/ full/ 317/ 7155/ 369/ a) The building had neither electricity or
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[222] Rashid 2000, pp. 71–72.
[223] Agence France-Presse, "Taliban reject warnings of aid pull-out", 1998-07-16.
[224] "UN official calls for talks with taliban leaders" (http:/ / sify. com/ news/
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[226] "UN Reduce Taliban names on terror list" (http:/ / www. upi. com/ Top_News/ US/ 2010/ 01/ 25/
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External links
• Alternative discourse: A review of the former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan's autobiography (http://www.
dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/04-alternative-discourse-qs-03) by
Qurat ul ain Siddiqui
• Taliban in Oxford Islamic Studies Online (http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/
e2325?_hi=14&_pos=4)
• Taliban's website (English) (http://www.alemarah.info/english/) How Do I Get in Touch With a Terrorist
(http://www.slate.com/id/2231637) Slate. October 2009
• The Taliban's Secret Photos (http://link.brightcove.com/services/link/bcpid271557392/bctid1151557602)
• Future Opioids: Afghanistan, Opium and the Taliban (http://opioids.com/afghanistan/index.html)
• The National Security Archive – The September 11th Sourcebooks (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index.htm) Volume VII: The Taliban File September 2003
Taliban 29

• "Is One of the Lost Tribes the Taliban?" (http://www.momentmag.com/Exclusive/2007/2007-04/

200704-Taliban.html) – from Moment Magazine (April 2007)
• The Taliban Diaries (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\06\20\story_20-6-2009_pg3_5)
by Shaukat Qadir, Daily Times, 2009-06-20
• Taliban (http://english.aljazeera.net/category/organisation/taliban) collected news and commentary at Al
Jazeera English
• Taliban (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/taliban) collected news and commentary at The Guardian
• Taliban (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/) collected news and
commentary at The New York Times
• Works by or about Taliban (http://worldcat.org/identities/lccn-no98-126907) in libraries (WorldCat catalog)
Criticism of ideology
• Afghanistan's Taliban: Not a valid interpretation of Islam (http://islamfortoday.com/taleban8.htm), Islam For
Today
Insurgency
• Battling Taliban: Where Does It Stop? (http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/
news/specials/) ongoing coverage from Dawn in Pakistan
• Return Of The Taliban (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/) from PBS Frontline, October
2006
• Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance (http://icosgroup.net/modules/reports/struggle_for_kabul) from the
ICOS, December 8, 2008
• Held by The Taliban: A Reporting Trip Becomes a Kidnapping (http://projects.nytimes.com/
held-by-the-taliban/#part-1) from The New York Times, 2008–2009
• Military Raids, Backing of Corrupt Government Undermining Stated US Goals in Afghanistan (http://www.
democracynow.org/2010/10/29/killing_reconciliation_military_raids_backing_of) – video report by
Democracy Now!
Article Sources and Contributors 30

Article Sources and Contributors

Taliban  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=444042512  Contributors: *x stab my heartx*, -Kerplunk-, ...adam..., 0, 11alondon, 137.205.8.xxx, 1orbitx, 2, 205.188.193.xxx,
45tom67, 7Beckham, 84user, ACSE, AJCham, AVand, AYousefzai, AaronCBurke, AbdaliPashtoon, Abdullahazzam, Abeezio, Abhask, Abhijitsathe, Abid akmal, AdRock, Adamgodd92,
Adashiel, Addshore, Adikhebat, Aeromotive1, Aervanath, Afghanvoice, Afranelli, Afrique, Afromcbenny, Ageekgal, Agerskov, Agnaramasi, AhmadMUJ, Ahoerstemeier, Ahuskay,
Airplaneman, Ajraddatz, Alan Liefting, Alansohn, Alex Kennedy, Alex128183, Alex43223, AlexanderKaras, Alexdb2005, Alexissenoski, Alexsau1991, Ali@gwc.org.uk, Aljakra, Alkaida,
AllenTM, Allstarecho, AlphaGamma1991, Alsandro, Amakuru, Aminullah, Amos Han, Andre Engels, Andrejose, AndresTM, Andrew Hampe, AndrewRT, Andrewlp1991, Andrewpmk, Andries,
Andrwsc, Andy Marchbanks, Angelo De La Paz, Anna Lincoln, Ano-User, Anonymous editor, Anotherclown, Antandrus, Anthony Appleyard, Antonio Lopez, Arakunem, Arfan, ArielGold, Art
LaPella, Artaxiad, Arthur Warrington Thomas, Artimand, Artyom, Ashleyevoo, Ashmoo, Ashthecat3, AssistantX, Astronautics, Astroview120mm, Atmamatma, Augchen, AvicAWB,
Avicennasis, AxelBoldt, Axlq, Aziz1005, B. Fairbairn, BD2412, BGlassman, BYF, Baa, Bad Night, Badams, Bagande, BamyanMan, Bananarepublic, Baronnet, Barrykuda, Barrylb, Bdelisle,
Beeple, Beepu, Beh-nam, Bejnar, Ben Ben, Benabik, Bencherlite, Benno3352, Berrettsmum, Bestlyriccollection, Betacommand, Betaeleven, Bgoldring1, Bhalli619, Bidabadi, Biderz5,
BigManOnMulberryStreet, Bigbluefish, Bigplans, Bigtimepeace, Bikeable, Bill Conn, Birdazi, Birdie, Bkell, Black-Velvet, Bladiebla, Blanchardb, Bletch, Bloomington882005, Blue Tie,
BlueSapphires, Bluuurgh, BobaFett85, Bobblewik, Bobbo, Bobdobbs1723, Bobmack89x, Bobo192, Boghog, Boing! said Zebedee, Bongwarrior, BoogaLouie, Boothy443, Bornhj,
Bostonbrahmin20, BrainyBabe, Brennanmcclure, Brenont, Brian Kendig, Briancromack, Brichcja, Bridies, Brion VIBBER, Britt-luvs-kim, BrokenSegue, BrokenSphere, Brufnus, Bryan Derksen,
Btipling, Bubba hotep, Budhen, Buffer v2, Bungle, Burntguitarist, CSSELL, CalJW, Caltas, Carayan, Carl Sixsmith, Carwynevans, Cassowary, Caulds, Cb2000, Cdc, Celebau, Celestra,
CenozoicEra, Cfrydj, Chain27, Chaithanya.krishnan, Charles Matthews, Charles Sturm, CharlesMartel, Chas1776, Chealer, CheetahMan1, Chendy, Chenhsi, Chris 73, Chrisahn, Chrisjj, Chuck
Smith, Chwyatt, Cigrainger, Cireshoe, CiriloMechas, Cleared as filed, Cloclofoshosho, Closedmouth, Cloud 9, Coelacan, Colinrorr, Colonel E, Comandante, Cometstyles, Comlag225,
Commking, CommonsDelinker, ConMan, Connormah, Conversion script, Copperchair, Coredesat, Corvus cornix, Courcelles, Crazyoldheshe, Cream horn, Credema, CredoFromStart, Csmunro,
Curps, Cvalin, Cwolfsheep, CylonCAG, D6, DARTH SIDIOUS 2, DMCer, DOSGuy, DRTllbrg, DSachan, DW Celt, Daf, DagnyB, Damonff, Dan1690, DanKeshet, Danianjan, DanielCD,
DanielDemaret, Danieldis47, DarkArcher, DarkFalls, Darklilac, Darolew, Darwinius, Dave6, Daveagp, Davewild, David Ludwig, Davron, Dawn Bard, Dawnseeker2000, Daystrom, Dazza1888,
Dbachmann, Dcandeto, De Administrando Imperio, DeadEyeArrow, Deadcatmuseum, Deadlymura, Deathawk, Debnathsandeep, Dedonite, Defender Owl, Dejitarob, Dejo, Dejvid, Delirium,
Delldot, Delphii, DemonicPartyHat, Denis MacEoin, Denna Haldane, DennyColt, DerHexer, Descend Terror, Dfrg.msc, Dguertin, Dh100, Dinosaur puppy, Dirkbb, Diving2010, Dkhera,
Dmerrill, Dmoss, DocWatson42, Dogman263b, Dojarca, Doktor Waterhouse, Donkeyballs12, Dorrellc, Download, Downtown dan seattle, Dp412, Dracian56, Dragon's Light, Dragonnas,
Drcwright, Dreadstar, Drmies, Drunken Pirate, Drw, Drydom, Dss2mtm, Dudeman5685, Dukeofomnium, Dulciana, Dupes, Dupree3, Durin, DurraniPashtoon, DurraniPashtun, Dust Filter,
Dweller, Dynamo152, Dynex811, EME44, ERcheck, Earthlyreason, Ebonmuse, Ed Poor, EdH, Eduardo Sellan III, EgorNZ, Eigenlambda, Eion, El C, Electionworld, Elementine, Elian, Elipongo,
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Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 31

Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

Image:Flag of Taliban.svg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_Taliban.svg  License: unknown  Contributors: AnonMoos, Antemister, Dbachmann, Gripweed, Homo
lupus, Jeff G., Lexicon, Liftarn, Mattes, OsamaK, Vmenkov, Xiengyod, 12 anonymous edits
File:Massoud and Qadir 2.PNG  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Massoud_and_Qadir_2.PNG  License: Fair Use  Contributors: JCAla
File:1996afghan (1).png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:1996afghan_(1).png  License: GNU Free Documentation License  Contributors: Rangeley at en.wikipedia. Later
version(s) were uploaded by Noclador at en.wikipedia.
File:Massoud 2000.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Massoud_2000.jpg  License: Fair Use  Contributors: JCAla
Image:Taliban bounty flyer.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Taliban_bounty_flyer.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: CIA
File:081131-F-7734Q-001.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:081131-F-7734Q-001.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: U.S. Air Force photo/Lt Col Leslie Pratt
Image:afghan 082.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Afghan_082.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Europecentral
File:Taliban beating woman in public RAWA.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Taliban_beating_woman_in_public_RAWA.jpg  License: Creative Commons
Attribution 3.0  Contributors: RAWA
File:Destruction of Buddhas March 21 2001.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Destruction_of_Buddhas_March_21_2001.jpg  License: unknown  Contributors:
Beh-nam, Gump Stump, RedCoat10, Sj, Voyagerfan5761
File:Taliban execute Zarmeena in Kabul in1999 RAWA.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Taliban_execute_Zarmeena_in_Kabul_in1999_RAWA.jpg  License:
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0  Contributors: RAWA
File:Taliban-herat-2001 retouched.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Taliban-herat-2001_retouched.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: bluuurgh
File:Taliban in northern Afghanistan.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Taliban_in_northern_Afghanistan.jpg  License: unknown  Contributors: Tamkeen ( Pajhwok
Afghan News)
File:ANA soldier shows opium captured in an alleged Taliban safe house in Helmand.jpg  Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:ANA_soldier_shows_opium_captured_in_an_alleged_Taliban_safe_house_in_Helmand.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Sean K. Harp

License
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