Oil Exploration in Somalia: Prospects for Peace or Conflict

THE GEOPOLITICS OF OIL EXPLORATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOMALIA
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the
Degree of Master of ………………………… of …………… University
2018
DECLARATION
This proposal is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other
University
………………………….. …………………
Signature Date
(REG. NO.)
This proposal has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor
………………………….. ……………….
Signature Date
Dr. ……….
University of….
ii
DEDICATION
This research project is dedicated to …
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my gratitude to …
iv
Table of Contents
DECLARATION......................................................................................................................ii
DEDICATION........................................................................................................................iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT......................................................................................................iv
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.............................................................................viii
Table of Figures.......................................................................................................................ix
List of Tables............................................................................................................................x
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................................xi
CHAPTER ONE:.....................................................................................................................1
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY.....................................................................................1
1.1 Background to the Study..................................................................................................1
1.1.1 Somalia’s Oil Geology and Exploration...........................................................................4
1.1.2 Understanding Somalia’s Oil Stratigraphy.......................................................................4
1.2 Statement of the Problem.................................................................................................6
1.3 Objectives of the Study....................................................................................................7
1.4 Research Questions..........................................................................................................7
1.5 Significance of the Study.................................................................................................8
1.6 The Delimitation of the Study..........................................................................................9
1.7 Limitations of the Study...................................................................................................9
1.8 Chapter Outline..............................................................................................................10
CHAPTER TWO...................................................................................................................11
LITERATURE REVIEW......................................................................................................11
2.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................11
2.2 Background of Resource-Related Conflicts in Africa...................................................11
2.2.1 Theorizing the Prevalence of Oil-Related Conflicts.......................................................12
v
2.2.2 Cases of Oil-Related Conflicts in Africa........................................................................15
2.3 Actors in Oil Related Conflicts......................................................................................27
2.4 The Oil Politics in Somalia............................................................................................28
2.5 Theoretical Framework..................................................................................................34
2.6 Theoretical Review........................................................................................................36
2.6.1 Environmental Justice Theory.........................................................................................36
2.7 Conceptual framework...................................................................................................38
CHAPTER THREE:..............................................................................................................40
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.........................................................................................40
3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................40
3.2 Research Design.............................................................................................................40
3.3 Target Population...........................................................................................................40
3.4 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size............................................................................40
3.5 Unit of analysis..............................................................................................................41
3.6 Methods of Data Collection...........................................................................................41
3.6.1 Sources of Data...............................................................................................................41
3.6.2 Questionnaires.................................................................................................................42
3.6.3 Interview Guide...............................................................................................................42
3.6.4 Focus Group Discussion.................................................................................................42
3.8 Validity and Reliability..................................................................................................43
3.8.1 Validity of Instruments...................................................................................................43
3.8.2 Reliability of Instruments................................................................................................43
vi
3.9 Data Analysis.................................................................................................................43
3.10 Ethical Issues................................................................................................................44
CHAPTER FOUR:.................................................................................................................45
OIL POLITICS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE............................................................45
4.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................45
4.2 Demographic Overview of Somalia...............................................................................45
4.3 Somalia’s History and Colonial Legacies......................................................................46
4.4 The Evolution of Conflict in Somalia............................................................................47
4.5 Clan Politics and Conflicts.............................................................................................49
4.6 Al-Shabaab: Evolution of a Social Movement (2005-2018)..........................................52
4.7 The Dynamics of Oil......................................................................................................57
4.8 The Emerging Oil Conflict in Somalia..........................................................................58
4.9 Analysis of the Oil Politics in Somalia..........................................................................61
4.9.1 Mechanisms and Manifestations of Resource Curse......................................................61
4.9.2 Will the discovery of Oil Trigger Conflict?....................................................................62
4.9.3 Existence of Rebel Groups and External Actors.............................................................65
4.9.4 Ethnic Fractionalization in Somalia................................................................................67
4.9.5 Political Grievance..........................................................................................................69
4.9.6 Somalia’s External Actors...............................................................................................74
4.9.7 Overlapping Concession Agreements.............................................................................75
4.10 Summary......................................................................................................................76
CHAPTER FIVE:..................................................................................................................77
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................77
vii
5.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................77
5.2 Summary........................................................................................................................77
5.3 Conclusions....................................................................................................................78
5.4 Recommendations..........................................................................................................80
References...............................................................................................................................83
LIST OF APPENDIX............................................................................................................91
Appendix I: Questionnaires..................................................................................................91
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
AMISOM African Mission in Somalia
APF African Peace Facility
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
ESU Exploration Security Unit
EU European Union
HOA Horn of Africa
FGS Federal Government of Somalia
GIA Galmudug Interim Administration
GRS Galmudug Regional State
MNC Multinational Corporation

viii
NACOSTI National Commission for Science and Technology
ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPU Oil Protection Unit
SNM Somali National Movement
SNRS Somali National Regional State
SPM Somali Patriotic Movement
SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TFG Transitional Federal Government
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UN United Nations
USA United States of America
USC United Somali Congress
Table of Figures
Figure 2.1: Resource-Related Conflict in Africa.....................................................................14
Figure 2.2: Pictorial view of Somalia’s oil blocks in Nogal and Darhoor...............................29
Figure 2.3: Somalia’s oil basins in Nogal and Darhoor...........................................................30
Figure 4: Somaliland and Puntland..........................................................................................32
Figure 2.5: Conceptual Framework..........................................................................................37
Figure 4.6: Oil Exploration in the Ogaden Region..................................................................58
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List of Tables
Table 3.1: Key Informants.......................................................................................................39
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ABSTRACT
The research examines the geopolitics of oil exploration and the prospects for peace and
stability in Somalia. It focuses on the conditions surrounding the exploration and exploitation
of oil in Somalia and argues that, the operating environment is littered with several negative
trajectories that might jeopardize the process and plunge the country into deeper instability.
This study proceeds from the fact that Somalia is in the process of oil prospecting and the
potential oil find will have the potential of ushering the country into the league of countries
having this precious energy resource. Limited studies on the potential for peace and stability
in this situation have inspired this study as a way of filling the research gap and offering
informed opinions on how best to manage this resource to ensure peace and stability is
engendered. As a result, this study adopted the following objectives; to establish the
background and historical evolution of the conflict in Somalia; to examine the role of the
various actors in the conflict in Somalia; to analyze the oil politics in Somalia and it effect on
peace and stability, and to recommend plausible measures to ensure that oil exploration and
exploitation contributes to Somalia’s peace and stability. This study is a significant
endeavour that not only enriches the scholarly debate on how Somalia’s peace and stability
can benefit from the exploitation of the oil resource. It also provides informed views and
opinions to policy makers on just how the issue can be best handled. The study adopted the
resource curse model as its guide, in order to understand whether Somalia is likely to prove
or disprove the hypothesis that a resource endowment most likely creates conditions of
conflict and general socio-economic and political ruin. After reviewing existing literature on
the subject area, this study established that there is a gap in the literature on how Somalia as a
country can realize peace and stability. The study chose a qualitative research design to guide
its data gathering and analysis. This design was picked owing to its major advantage of
enabling the researcher to access an array of information and enabling for a comprehensive
examination of this contemporary issue. Based on this analysis, the paper predicts that
conflict is highly likely in the case of Somalia unless sustained mitigating measures on a
multilevel approach are undertaken. where oil is not necessarily the cause, it must be
understood as an intensifying factor on the already existing institutional weaknesses and
possible conflict dynamics. The study eventually concludes with several policy
considerations, among them the temporary halt in oil exploration to allow for harmonized
legal frame working, sustained efforts to address the root causes of the conflict and an
address of the governance and legitimacy issues facing the country.
xi
CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
1.1 Background to the Study
The prevalence of conflicts on the African continent has often come with debilitating
consequences to the populace. The rabidity of these conflicts has often resulted in wanton
loss of lives, the displacement of many more-within and across state boundaries, as well as
the destruction of the economies and polities of these countries 1. Whereas the root causes of
these conflicts are multidimensional-from socio-economic to political sticking points, most of
these conflicts have been known to be driven by the quest for control of fossil fuels. Auty’s
(2004) thesis on ‘The Resource Curse’ has heavily been employed to explain why such
resources are never a portent of development but rather a foreboding of doom and gloom for
a country. He argued that such endowments are actually magnets of economic ruin and
catalysts of conflict and instability due to the stirring up of combinations of ‘grievances’ and
‘greed’ which are hard to resolve in such an environment of high expectations.
To say that it is only in Africa that violent conflicts have been fought over the control of
resources- and more so oil- is an understatement. The current international system is
increasingly becoming energy-dependent, with global production processes requiring
constant supplies of energy sources. As such, fossil fuels have become a focal point in the
quest by countries for energy and geopolitics has now been dominated by powerful countries
and Multinational Companies (MNCs) scrambling for spheres of influence to profit from the
control of these resources2. Oil is a major source of income for governments and profits to
corporations who produce and distribute it. By the singular fact that oil is a vital commodity
in this globalized world, any disruptions in supply or pricing often have devastating
1
Le Billon, Philippe. "The resource curse." The Adelphi Papers 45, no. 373 (2005): 11-27.
2
Klare, Michael T. Blood and oil: The dangers and consequences of America's growing dependency
on imported petroleum. Metropolitan Books, 2007.
1
consequences to the world economy and that is why the major powers often adopt foreign
policies that seek to dominate this oil sector.
The dependence on oil, coupled with the increasing demand for it, has contrasted with the
inability to meet demand (or albeit at the right price). The result has been interruptions in
production flows and pricing, with and the measures taken by states either to access or
dominate it have been interpreted as belligerence by communities within the resource area or
states, thus providing a valid reason for war 3. This has caused the main areas of production
and transit routes to turn into areas of tension and conflict. Ultimately, the frequency and
intensity of these conflicts has depended on the environment in which decisions and political
strategies are made, and the relationship between demand and supply and on the geography
of the production and distribution of oil - the main oil sources and reserves span regions that
cross more than one country or are located in areas of high political, social and military
instability4.
The larger Middle East, the South China Sea (Vietnam, China, Japan, Philippines), Iraq and
Iran (especially the Persian Gulf), Russia, Ukraine, and Venezuela have emerged as the major
conflict hotspots in the last three decades and this situation is likely to be replicated into the
future. The Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, the Sudanese civil war of 1983-2005 and the Gulf
war of 1990-1991 had heavy oil-resource undertones 5. In this geopolitical quest for the oil
resource, peace and stability has become at times a mirage as most often these conflicts have
become intricately enmeshed in the distinct local socio-economic and political histories of
conflict. Whereas the intensifier has been the quest for determining who controls and
distributes the benefits of this oil; the context of these inter-state and intra-state conflicts has
3
Klare, Michael T. Blood and oil: The dangers and consequences of America's growing dependency
on imported petroleum. Metropolitan Books, 2007.
4
Auty, Richard. "Natural resources and civil strife: a two-stage process." Geopolitics 9, no. 1 (2004):
29-49.
5
Patey, Luke Anthony. "State rules: Oil companies and armed conflict in Sudan." Third World
Quarterly 28, no. 5 (2007): 997-1016.
2
been the rivalries (at communal and inter-state level). In these contexts, is also the age-old
conflicts on land, religious and ideological differences as well as ethnic divisions over the
control of grazing lands and political power. In most of these conflicts, the discovery of oil
has signified boom times ahead, as previously there was no other major resource that could
be used to engineer economic development.
Conflicts in the Niger Delta, over the Bakassi Peninsula (between Nigeria and Cameroon)
also indicate the perceived benefits with which oil exploration and mining will ultimately
bring to an otherwise poverty-impoverished region. The inter-state conflict between Tanzania
and Malawi over their boundary in Lake Tanganyika has taken a new dimension with oil
exploration discovering the potential oil and natural gas deposits on the sea bed of the lake.
Likewise, the Horn of the Africa (HOA) region has also witnessed one of the devastating
wars over the control of oil. The unmanageable differences between Sudan and its southern
portion eventually led to the split of Sudan- one of the largest countries in Africa by
geographical area. This conflict is now being fought over the territorial reach of both Sudan
and South Sudan as the region in contest has been proven, after exploration, of having sizable
quantities of oil6.
Further south of the Horn, Somalia is the centre of global attention following the discovery of
potential oil fields. Estimates suggest that Somali’s offshore oil and gas fields could contain
110 billion barrels-more than Kuwait’s fields, potentially making the area the fifth largest
global producer. Further onshore finds have put it at loggerheads with her South-western
Neighbour-Kenya7. The news of this recent discoveries has been greeted with a lot of
optimism, that the amount of wealth associated with such resources has the potential to
catalyse development and transform the country into an economic hub based on its strategic
6
Leben Nelson Moro, Dr. "Still Waiting for the Bonanza: The Oil Business in South Sudan after
2005." (2013).
7
Walls, Michael, and Steve Kibble. "Somalia: oil and (in) security." Review of african political
economy 39, no. 133 (2012): 525-535.
3
position in the region8. Another hydrocarbon analysis by the World Bank and United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), in 1992, ranked Somalia second only to Sudan as the top
prospective producer. Drawing from the country’s history, concerns have been raised
regarding its readiness to allow for commercial oil production. However, Somalia has also
been the theatre of a damaging civil war, with decades of clannism and clan rivalries
rendering this country ungovernable for the most part after the deposition of Siad Barre in
1991.
1.1.1 Somalia’s Oil Geology and Exploration
Somalia’s history of oil exploration is not new in the discourse of Africa’s rich natural
resource economies. Evidence suggests that Somalia’s history of oil exploration dates back
several decades in the colonial period9. Italian and British geologists pioneering work led to
the identification of potential oil reserves in Somalia. Subsequent exploratory activity by an
Italian company Agip (now Eni) and a US –based Sinclair oil Corporation begun to study
Somalia’s oil geology in the 1950s10.
In the late 1980s, another phase of hydrocarbon exploration began spearheaded by five major
international oil corporations; ConocoPhillips, Shell (Pectin), Eni, Amoco, Total and
Texaco11. Yet with the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and the ensuing war, these
companies –together with other actors such as BP and Chevron- declared force majeure and
put their operations on hold. Ultimately, hopes for embarking on oil production in Somalia
were buried when the US-led and UN-approved humanitarian intervention ‘Restore Hope’ in
1992/93 failed to bring political stability to the country.
8
Ibid
9
10
11
Didas, Muhumuza, Jakob Grandjean Bamberger, Kristian Skovsted, Kennedy Mkutu Agade, and
Asebe Regassa Debelo. "The Political Economy of Extractives in the Borderlands." (2016).
4
1.1.2 Understanding Somalia’s Oil Stratigraphy
The territory of Somalia is located at the edge of the Africa’s continent and it is part of the
Somali Peninsula, the region commonly referred to as the Horn of Africa. Somalia has the
largest coast line in Africa which extends to 1,000km long the red sea and 1,900km along the
Indian Ocean. The total surface area of Somalia is approximately 637,650 km2 (Africa Union,
Working Report, 2014). Seismic analysis of Somalia’s geology indicates that there at least
eight petroleum basins in Somalia that hold potential prospects ready for exploration and
development12. These include; Daban basin, Migiurtinia Basin, Mudugh Basin, Mogadishu
Basin (Ex Coriolei Basin), Chismaio and Lamu Basin, El-Wak Mandera Basin and Ogaden
Basin. Some of these sedimentary basins have deposit thicknesses more than five Kilometres
and contain good source rocks, reservoir rocks, seals and traps necessary for oil and gas to
deposit.
Based on this analysis, the Federal Republic of Somalia is determined to join the race of
commercial oil production in Africa. Specifically, in 2012, the Federal Republic of Somalia
(FGs) signed an agreement for the exploration of potential offshore and onshore oil fields
with Soma and Gas Explorations13. Further, in 2014, the Federal Ministry of Minerals and
Water Resources signed an agreement for the exploration of potential offshore and onshore
oil fields with Shell Gas exploration. Additionally, it’s well known there is renewed interest
for Somalia’s oil geology and the country has witnessed a host of activities as numerous
actors rush to secure concessions with the government of Somalia14.
12
Ibid
13
Obi, Cyril. "Oil as the ‘curse’of conflict in Africa: peering through the smoke and mirrors." Review
of African political economy 37, no. 126 (2010): 483-495.
14
Obi, Cyril. "Oil as the ‘curse’of conflict in Africa: peering through the smoke and mirrors." Review
of African political economy 37, no. 126 (2010): 483-495.
5
The attractiveness of Somalia’s oil endowments is basically based on the promising large
profits15. For the first time in many years, it is clear that the fragile state, of the Horn has a
unique opportunity to transform the lives of its people and consequently lay the foundation
stones for a better and prosperous country for its future generations. Additionally, if well
invested this wealth can go a long way to having positive spill overs in the region. However,
beneath this optimism there are concerns that ought to be addressed if Somalia is to realize
the full benefits of its newly discovered wealth. Against this backdrop, this paper examines
the conditions surrounding the exploration and exploitation of oil in Somalia and argues that,
the operational environment is littered with negative trajectories that might jeopardize the
process as well as derail its prospects for peace and stability. It is on the basis of this
information that this research sought to understand just how the discovery of oil in Somalia
would be a blessing as projected or will it be a curse as it is the case with other oil rich
countries in Africa and whether the exploration and exploitation of oil in Somalia exacerbate
conflict. Furthermore, just how has the involvement of international actors impacted the
prospects for peace and stability in the country.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The discovery of oil in Somalia has revealed enormous potential for political and social
development of the country. For the first time in many years, it is projected that these
discoveries have the potential to dramatically increase government revenues, a substantial
blessing to the people of Somalia, if the revenues are invested well in reconstructing the
dilapidated infrastructure, promoting development and investing in human capital. Somalia is
therefore at an epoch-changing time, where it can rebuild its economic history through the
exploitation of this vital resource while at the same time ensuring that the structural causes of
15
economy 39, no. 133 (2012): 525-535.
6
this conflict can be addressed. Peace and stability can be engendered through the
redistribution of the benefits of this oil.
Existing researches on Somalia have explored the political economy of conflict on Somalia 16.
Furthermore, growing literature has documented the role played by international actors in
fuelling and/or resolving the conflict in Somalia. There are further expositions on the impact
of the Al Shabaab on the conflict and the prospects for peace. However, there is inadequate
literature on the potential for peace and stability in the discovery, exploration and exploitation
of the oil finds in Somalia. What Somalia ought to do right to avoid falling into the trap of oil
being a resource curse? This question has not been fully covered in literature and therefore,
the existing literature on ‘Resource wars’ and ‘resource curse’ do not mention the Somali
context.
Researches on the intractability of conflict in Somalia, examine the causes, drivers and
dynamics of the war17. Whereas Petterson’s study is a valuable addition to the existing body
of literature, it acknowledges in its study there is need for further research on other
influencers of peace and stability in Somalia. Though she does not mention oil as one such
determinant, this study will seek to fill this gap in literature by examining the geopolitics of
oil exploration and how they will affect peace and stability in Somalia. A further study on the
impact of the entry of the various international and local actors on the various aspects of life
in Somalia18. The study proceeded to investigate how the discovery and consequently the
actual exploration will affect the fragile security environment within and between the various
autonomous or semi-autonomous political entities, clans, armed groups, and international oil
companies.
16
Kaldor, Mary. "New and old wars (Cambridge." Polity 4 (1999
17
Abdi, Y. H. Internationalization of Somali Internal Conflict by External Actors
(2000-2014), Unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Nairobi. (2015
18
7
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The broad objective of this study was to examine the conditions surrounding the exploration
and exploitation of oil in Somalia. This study sought to achieve the following objectives;
1. To establish the background and historical evolution of the conflict in Somalia,
2. To examine the role of the various actors in the Somalia conflict,
3. To analyze the oil politics in Somalia and it effect on peace and stability,
4. Recommend plausible measures to ensure that oil exploration and exploitation contributes
to Somalia’s peace and stability.
1.4 Research Questions
These following research questions guided the study;
1. What is the contextual background and evolution of the conflict in Somalia?
2. What role has the various actors played in the Somalia conflict?
3. To what extent has the oil politics affected peace and stability in Somalia?
4. Which measures can be taken to ensure that oil exploration and exploitation in Somalia’s
does threaten peace and stability?
1.5 Significance of the Study
The study sought to fill the gap in existing literature on the prospects for peace and stability
especially after the exploration and discovery of significant oil finds in Somalia. The limited
studies on the geopolitics of oil and the resultant impact on peace and stability made this
study worthwhile and distinct. This is because this study was to build on the knowledge about
the underlying factors in this conflict to introduce the dimension of the oil politics occasioned
by the exploration of oil. This study argued that such a discovery added a new dimension to
the yet-to-be resolved entrenched differences among the various actors. The paper draws on
8
the literature of the natural resource curse which has been used to widely explain the reasons
for the continued conflicts among the natural resource rich economies in the developing
countries. The “Resource Curse” has been a topic of study for decades and is now a well-
established term in both academic literature and the public domain. Building on the findings
of Balthasar (2014), Reitano & Shaw (2013), Walls & Kibble (2012), and Anderson &
Browne (2011) we argue that the mere belief in the existence of oil and the related ongoing
oil exploration trigger a number of the negative trajectories associated with the resource curse
such as corruption and violent conflict.
This study also sought to make a contribution to the contemporary debate on oil exploration
as a source of insecurity in the Horn of Africa region. The findings inform the debate and
form a basis for further research. It also provides information relating to threats and
challenges of oil exploration activities on national security in the Horn of Africa, particularly
in Somalia. Additionally, the finding of the study will be a critical assert to policy makers that
enhances their ability to make informed policies based on research on the impact of oil
exploration and eventual extraction on national security and how to make it less of a security
challenge in the Horn of Africa, and in Somalia to be specific.
1.6 The Delimitation of the Study
The geographical delimitation of this study was in the Horn of Africa country of Somalia as a
state entity existing by virtue of the imperial legacy. Whereas the country has experienced
breakaways in the form of Puntland in north eastern Somalia and Somaliland in north western
Somalia (see Figure 2.4), this study will focus on the dynamics of conflict as have affected
the whole country, as well as how local and international actors made this conflict intractable.
This study focused on the period between 1991 and 2017. This periodization was based on a
time when the country degenerated into deep-seated conflict, with the latent phase of post-
independent Somalia gradually turning into violence, after the overthrow of Siad Barre. This
9
was a period when clannism, regional actors (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya) and international
actors entered the country either to take sides in the conflict or to attempt to resolve the
conflict. As this conflict raged, the key issues were brought to the fore; issues which will be
examined. Subsequently, this study sought to domicile the issue of oil and its exploration-as a
dimension in this conflict in Somalia as well as a potential facilitator of peace and stability in
the country.
1.7 Limitations of the Study
This study foresaw various challenges that might have handicapped the research. First of all,
the scanty literature on the subject area was a probable obstacle to the conduct of an extensive
research. The researcher overcame this by consulting wider sources of information; by not
being limited to books and journal articles but also researches conducted on the area.
Furthermore, the researcher sourced for and obtained seminar papers and relevant policy
documents.
Logistical and time constraints were also projected to pose a challenge to this research. The
logistical challenges emanated from the data gathering and analysis, since some of them were
restricted in access either due to their sensitivity or because of the requirements for
subscription or purchase. The researcher overcame this by pooling financial resources to
facilitate access to these informative sources. Moreover, the researcher networked with
various sources who facilitated access to vital information on the subject area.
1.8 Chapter Outline
This research is divided into five chapters with each chapter covering a specific topic area as
follows;
Chapter one is the introduction, providing a background to the study. It grounds this study
within the global context-as an issue requiring concerted policy and practical attention as well
10
as a research problem that demands scholarly study to fill the gap in literature. This chapter
further lists the objectives of the study, the significance of the study and the limitation and
delimitation of the study.
Chapter two is a review of the existing literature, to provide a synthesis of what has been
written on the subject area. This chapter critiques this literature while at the same time laying
bare the gaps in literature that this study intended to fill. A relevant theoretical framework
used to guide the scholarly approach to this study is also provided in this chapter.
Chapter three on the other hand provides the methodology that guided the various processes
in data gathering and analysis. It is an illustration as to the objectivity and the scientific rigour
employed in carrying out this research. It has sections on the research design, the data
gathering and analysis processes, validity and reliability as well as ethical considerations.
Chapter four is an analysis of the data gathered with informed inferences made based on the
data gathered. Chapter five is the concluding chapter of this study, containing a summary of
the study as well as conclusions based on the observations made in the previous chapter.
Recommendations are also made on the way forward to ensure that peace and stability is
engendered by a purposive approach in addressing the oil resource being explored and in
Somalia.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a critical review of the existing literature on the topic area under study.
It informs this study as to the extent of research on the geopolitics of oil and its enabling
factor to peace and stability. The chapter identifies the thematic areas canvassed in the studies
carried out while critiquing their extent in addressing the gap in literature that is the concern
of this study. Lead scholars and their views are presented as a way of ensuring that this
11
research is well founded in the scholarly body of knowledge. Subsequently a guiding
theoretical framework is discussed to provide a thematic guide to this study.
2.2 Background of Resource-Related Conflicts in Africa
Oil is a major commodity that drives global production processes. As a collective goods
problem, the extraction, mining and sale of this precious commodity is always laden with
conflict igniters. As such, the African continent, has been found to have immense deposits of
oil. And this has come with a myriad of problems, as these countries grapple with how best to
tap the perceived benefits of having this resource. However, resource-based conflicts have
sapped the energies of these countries, to the point that the possession of this resource has
now made such conflicts to assume intractable dimensions. Existing studies on oil-related
conflicts in Africa have sought to address different dimensions of the conflicts. Stokes and
Raphael (2010) observe that Africa’s unique oil type 19 has actually predisposed it to a
scramble for this commodity.
Africa is emerging as a continent with a significant amount of oil, particularly in the Gulf of
Guinea. With the world economy seeking new reserves of oil energy besides those in the
Middle East, Russia and the Americas, Africa is increasingly becoming the centre of focus,
partly because of lesser oil nationalism as witnessed in these other regions. As of 2007,
Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon were
producing an estimated 5,120 million barrels per day. The Gulf of Guinea alone produces 7.1
per cent of total world production of oil20.
With Africa’s rich endowment in oil and other resources, several studies have highlighted the
prevalence of conflict in such countries; whether inter-state or intra-state. Watson (2010)
19
This type of oil has been highly regarded for its environment-friendliness and the low cost of
refining. - “sweet” (low in impurities) and “light” (easily convertible to gasoline).
20
12
enumerates Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Chad and Congo-Brazzaville as the documented cases of
conflict.
2.2.1 Theorizing the Prevalence of Oil-Related Conflicts
In theorizing why, oil has become a conflict trap in Africa, many studies on the subject
proceed from Collier and Hoeffler’s (2001) study which posited that the combination
between greed and grievance predispose an oil-rich country to slide into conflict due to
unmanaged expectations and unaddressed wants. The exploitation of these circumstances by
internal (militias) and external actors (diaspora, MNCs and governments) polarize the
positions and cause tensions on oil resource management to become a full-blown civil
conflict21.
Of all natural resources, oil has been found to have the highest risk of civil conflict 22. About
23 percent of countries dependent on oil exports have experienced civil war in any 5-year
period, a figure that dwarfs the 0.55 percent for countries without natural resources 23. The
study clearly, illustrates that despite its potential, the discovery of oil wealth is not a cure for
underdevelopment.
Maphosa (2011) observes that from the empirical studies carried out in Africa, “countries
whose wealth is largely dependent on the exportation of primary commodities such as oil are
highly prone to civil violence”. He further observes that there are linkages in such conflicts
between those with no interest in nation building (but bent on profiteering) and those who
seek the control of the state and its resources and eventually seek to maximize the
opportunities that come with such control24. While this study does not undertake detailed
21
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and grievance in civil war." Oxford economic papers 56,
no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
22
no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
23
no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
24
Maphosa, Sylvester Bongani. "Natural Resources and Conflict: Unlocking the economic dimension
of peace-building in Africa." (2012).
13
examination of oil-related conflicts, it identifies the linkages and the drivers of natural
resource conflicts as well as useful recommendations on how to address such conflicts. For
instance, his recommendations on improving resource governance, involvement of the civil
society and local communities, investments in other sectors of the economy and facilitating
community-based peace building initiatives provide areas of exploration in this proposed
study. Scholarly, discourse and resources on the relationship between resources endowment
and armed conflicts gained currency in the late 1990s when empirical and theoretical
literature arose indicating a statistical correlation between a country’s natural resource
endowment and the occurrence of violent civil war25. Since then, several models have
emerged to attempt to explain the factors that affect the risk of conflicts26.
Akinyemi (2007) observes that, the fact that there have been several domestic conflicts on the
African continent associated with the competition over natural resources, has given credence
to the popular notion of “resource curse” on resource rich economies. According to
Akinyemi, the assumption is basically that, the mere existence of a valuable and highly
sought after natural resource can trigger and perpetuate conflict. The abundance of natural
resources does not automatically lead to development and wealth27.
25
Maphosa, Sylvester Bongani. "Natural Resources and Conflict: Unlocking the economic dimension
of peace-building in Africa." (2012).
26
Aimé, Elsa González. State and Societal Challenges in the Horn of Africa: Conflict and processes
of state formation, reconfiguration and disintegration. Centro de Estudos Internacionais, 2017.
27
no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
14
Source: The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), 2018
Figure 2.1: Resource-Related Conflict in Africa
In the figure above, a plausible link is being revealed as to the prevalence of conflict in
resource- rich countries. Influential literature done by Le Billon, 2003; Fearon and Laitin,
15
2003; investigates the relationship between oil abundance and civil conflict. These studies
generally allude to a positive relationship between resource abundance and incidence of
conflict. When focusing on country-specific cases and using resource discoveries for study,
the results portray a significantly varied result: Lei and Michaels (2014), for instance posit
that that giant oil discoveries increase the incidence of internal armed conflicts within 4-8
years of discovery. Bazzi and Blattman (2014), instead, do not find a significant association
between changes in oil wealth and the probability of conflict. This study will augment these
existing researches, by examining the Somalia case, which is yet to attract considerable
scholarly attention.
Auty (2004) is regarded as the authority in explaining just how a resource blessing actually
turns to be a source of conflict and underdevelopment. According to him, such a resource
may be a conflict driver either when they are concentrated in one area (point resource) or
scattered over wider region (diffuse resource). The fact that not the exploitation of such a
resource is dominated by an exclusive expatriate (highly skilled few) causes latent tension as
to the wider implication of such an activity28.
2.2.2 Cases of Oil-Related Conflicts in Africa
Alao’s study (2007) on Sudan is reveals a country split into 450 diverse ethnic group that
have created a myriad of social, religious and cultural identities. With these politicized and
ideologized identities, Sudan has, according to Alao, the second highest number of explicitly
28
29-49.
16
resource-related conflict. He identifies the actors in the oil politics of Sudan and South Sudan
as being oil multinational Talisman which was the first to commence commercial exploitation
in September 1999 when it acquired 25 percent stake in the Great Nile Petroleum Operating
Company (GNPOC) when it bought out cash-starved Arakis Energy 29. It shrewdly calculated
that U.S. economic sanctions against Sudan would ensure there was little competition from
the big American oil companies. Talisman’s other partners in the GNPOC are Chinese
National Petroleum Company (CNPC) with 40 percent; Malaysia’s state-owned oil
companies, Petronas, with 30 percent; and the Sudan’s state-owned oil company with 5
percent. This arrangement saw “the Chinese and the Sudanese supply manpower; the
Malaysians supply the Muslim credential necessary to do business with radical Islamic
regime and Talisman supplies the oil-field expertise”30. Despite the war, oil continues to
substantially contribute to the national economy.
Accordingly, the study by the Enough Project (2013) reveals the vagaries of conflict between
Sudan and South Sudan brought about by conflict. This study reveals that approximately 5%
of violent conflicts in South Sudan since 2011 have been explicitly resource-related-
occurring almost exclusively in the oil-rich Unity state and the Abyei region. The vast
majority of this type of conflict seen in South Sudan comprises of battles, primarily between
government forces and rebel groups. Abyei is responsible for about a quarter of Sudan’s total
crude oil output31. In addition to battles and violence against civilians, directly-resource-
related conflict also takes the form of riots and protests in Africa.
29
Grant, J. Andrew, WR Nadège Compaoré, Matthew I. Mitchell, and Timothy M. Shaw. "Prospects
and trends in the governance of Africa’s natural resources: Reflections on the role of external and
internal actors." In New Approaches to the Governance of Natural Resources, pp. 267-284. Palgrave
Macmillan, London, 2015.
30
Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and John L. Esposito, eds. Muslims on the Americanization path?.
Oxford University Press, 2000.
31
Johnson, Douglas H. "Why Abyei matters: the breaking point of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace
Agreement?." African Affairs 107, no. 426 (2007): 1-19.
17
Cascao (2013) analyses the matrix of water, land and oil conflicts in the Horn of Africa. She
traces the genesis of oil exploration in South Sudan by companies such as Chevron and how
eventually the discovery of oil became the fuel for the conflict that developed other
undertones; from land, identity, culture, religion and political power. She is extensive in her
study, exposing the different angles in this conflict. It is a useful study that informs this
proposed research as to areas of focus.
Similarly, Purcell (2014) analyses the myths of oil riches prevailing in this region. Purcell
further examines the regional conflicts linked to these oil myths in this HOA region. There
have been numerous myths held by HOA nations on matters oil with the most prevalent one
being the abundance of oil. Purcell observes how the amplification of this myth in the media
and government circles has added a new dimension-the capture of this resource by
geopolitical interests that eventually create conflict situations. The analysis by Purcell
provides useful information on the beliefs and perceptions held by communities in which oil
exploration has been undertaken. It lays bare the “entitlement” that these communities have
of this vital commodity, which is perceived as the panacea to their years of nomadic lifestyle
and attendant conflict. From this analysis, this study deduces the sources of conflict, while at
the same time shedding light on the probable courses of action to ameliorate this situation. It
is insightful as it brings the qualitative research attributes in its presentation of the opinions
and belief systems prevalent in the issues of oil.
South Sudan emerged as the newest member of sovereign nations in 2011 with a lot of hope
and promise owing to the potential for development hinged on the numerous resources in this
country. Expectations turned to resignation as the country cataclysmically descended into a
costly civil war. The studies written on this country portray the oil resource curse as a major
factor driving the conflict. The Sentry (2018), a report initiative if the Enough Project and
Not on our Watch (NOOW) chronicles the actors and interests in this conflict. For instance,
18
this report identifies the linkages between control of the oil sector and the funding to the
government and rebels. This report is invaluable in its exposition on how not to manage a
country’s resources. It however fails to research on the structural causes of conflict to
establish whether oil was the major factor. Its focus on how oil is fuelling the conflict,
however useful as a study, does not lay bare the history of the socio-economic history of the
conflict. This proposed study will pick valuable insights on how oil plays a role in fuelling
conflict. It will however seek to move away from being superficial in examining the
Somalian case.
Grawert (2010) carried out a more comprehensive study on the oil-related conflict in Sudan
and South Sudan than The Sentry report. In it, Grawert examines the role played by good
governance and effective management of resources as a predisposition towards sustainable
peace. Besides examining the structure of the conflict, he further examines how such
conflicts have been managed through the negotiation of peace agreements that include wealth
sharing. He cites The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area and The
Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States as
examples. This study learns that the discovery and subsequent exploration of oil usually
elevates the expectations of communities32. That the moment the local population, previously
with no hope of development is aware of such a resource, such a community/communities stir
up expectations that always end up to become grievances and thus latent conflict unless
demands for land compensation, employment, environmental security and local development
are met.
These studies by Grawert and Purcell further lay the foundation for this study to advance this
line of research; previously intermittent, less violent and resolvable conflicts have become
32
Leben Nelson Moro, Dr. "Still Waiting for the Bonanza: The Oil Business in South Sudan after
2005." (2013).
19
complex conflicts when oil discovery and exploration comes into the picture. This proposed
study will seek to explore these areas in its examination of the Somali case.
Sharamo and Mwanzia (2011) complement studies undertaken by Grawert (2012) and Purcell
(2014). Their study is however more historical, examining the conflict from right after
independence and the onset of the First Civil War between 199-1972. Oil politics contributed
to the outbreak of the conflict in South Sudan, and later, it became an essential strategic
resource to fight for33. The discovery of oil altered the relationship between the South and the
North; the Sudanese president sought control of the oil to the extent that the pipeline was now
to be constructed via Port Sudan, a key town in the North 34. The studies by Patey (2014) and
Ross (2004) provides insights on the legitimization of oil fields, foreign oil companies as
targets in this struggle for the control of resources. There are however inadequate accounts of
the conflict at the very initial stage. There is still no clear guide on initiatives undertaken to
resolve this conflict. it can however be observed that at the time of their writing, the conflict
dynamics were yet to be fully come to light. This proposed study therefore seeks to
comprehensively address these gaps in literature by contextualizing oil exploration and the
conflict matrix therein.
Alao’s (2007) study documents Nigeria’s rise to be a major oil-producing nation in the world.
This resource endowment has brought with it the most complex oil-related politics in the
African continent. Similar studies undertaken by Butt (2003) and Abiodun (2007) reveal a
country that was previously dependent on its agricultural exports, particularly cocoa, palm
oil, and groundnuts, with the discovery of oil becoming an economic and political game
changer. These studies are rich in historiographical material on Nigeria’s oil politics and the
resultant conflict. They are however limited by the period of their study, with new
33
Quarterly 28, no. 5 (2007): 997-1016.
34
Quarterly 28, no. 5 (2007): 997-1016.
20
dimensions in the oil politics emerging, especially in the Somalian context- a situation that
obliged this study.
Kishi (2018) provides an analysis of oil-related conflicts in Nigeria, revealing the extent to
which the oil resource has contributed to heightening ethnic, regional and religious tensions
in the country. Statistics provided by Kishi show that about 5% of violent conflicts in Nigeria
since 1997 have been explicitly resource based with oil workers being kidnapped or taken
hostage and civilians being killed, and many more displaced. From Kishi’s study, valuable
information relevant to this study was provided. For instance, it is clear that failure to
effectively manage this oil resource has culminated into corruption, bad governance,
unemployment, insecurity, and a total indifference to poverty alleviation. Collectively, all
these issues have become key drivers of conflict that underlie much of the anger and
resentment in Nigeria. This study will sustain Kishi’s approach to examining how the failure
to manage the oil politics often leads to conflict and instability
The exemplification oil related conflict is presented by Kadafa, (2012) who presents the
causes, actors and issues in the conflict over oil in Nigeria. It complements previous studies
by Kishi (2018) and Alao (2007) though its analysis is rich in content on the conflict between
the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the military regime of the
late General Sani Abacha deployed a military task force on Ogoni land to keep the peace. The
consequences of this military response led to the hanging of the MOSOPs President, Saro-
Wiwa along with eight other compatriots on trumped up charges in November 1995 in an
attempt to violently suppress the growing Ogoni resentment at their mistreatment. From this
study by Kadafa (2012) it is established that the Nigerian government’s failure to address real
issues of grievances particularly by failing to deliver fair access to oil profits coupled with
inability to build a better livelihood for its people and not only for the local communities but
also the wider population, is what has brought about the growing conflict. The clash between
21
the government and the local people has also been observed in Sudan, where the oil fields of
the south have been coveted by both Khartoum and her southern region. Oil conflicts is
Sudan is extremely complex35.
Peterson’s (2012) study on Nigeria examines the resource curse, with a particular focus on
how this supposed resource has created a petro-state that has exacerbated corruption and
conflict. This is a study that provides an economic analysis of oil resource management to
obviate the oil resource curse. In it, this study is informed of the effects of mismanagement of
the oil resource and how best to circumvent such a situation. The study is however limited in
its usefulness as it does not adequately address the structure of conflict in this economy.
Neither does it examine how the country degenerated into this situation of oil being a
resource curse. Furthermore, its relevance is in doubt as most of its secondary data is not
contemporary, thus failing the test of addressing a topical issue.
Babatunde (2012) provides a more comprehensive study than Peterson’s (2012). The former
provides an examination of the nature and magnitude of the cost of the perennial oil-related
conflicts in the Niger Delta. Babatunde (2012) delves into the conflict in this part of Nigeria,
richly providing statistics and insights into the origin of this conflict. For instance, it is
hypothesized that the struggle by the local communities in securing increased local
participation in the oil business and adequate access to the oil revenues and the failure to
address these concerns has actually given rise to ethnic militias. These militias have taken it
upon themselves the responsibility of challenging the established oil companies- a situation
that is causing local conflict dynamics to assume an international dimension. Babatunde
reports that 40% of Nigeria’s oil has been lost to these militant saboteurs, in the process
denying Nigeria valuable foreign exchange while creating a long-lasting environmental
disaster. When this study will be examining the Somalian case, it will be aware of the role
35
Gonzalez, Adrian. "Petroleum and its impact on three wars in Africa: Angola, Nigeria and Sudan."
Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development 16 (2010): 58-86.
22
played by local communities, oil companies, the government in ensuring effective use of the
oil resource and the management of the attendant conflict system. This study will further
examine the initial point of contact between these actors in the conflict, something that
Babatunde (2012) and Peterson (2012) have not done in their studies.
Watson (2010) concurs with Babatunde’s observation by adding that the Niger Delta has
effectively been militarized with the Nigerian government actually getting AFRICOM’s help,
just as the rebels shore up their resources from the oil loot. In the case of Cameroon, armed
groups working from Nigeria have carried out attacks in Bakassi, Douala, Limbe and Kribi in
a region rich in oil (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2011). The research by Gauthier and Zeufack
(2011) details the oil sector and the political economy of managing this resource. While this
report elaborates on the aftermath of the oil discovery and the activities that have led to the
mismanagement of the resource, it fails to explore the structure of the oil-related conflict in
the country. This study will, endeavour to explore this conflict angle at the root stage of oil
exploration as is the case in Somalia.
While most existing literature that examine the “Resource Curse” have tended to acquiesce
with the thesis put forward by Auty (1993) that the blessing of nature’s endowments in actual
fact tends to be a curse. This study is a departure from the general trend of malaise brought
about by oil. To Ghana offers vital lessons to other African countries in how best to manage
the oil resource and avoid the pitfalls that come with the possession of this resource 36. With
oil having been discovered in 2007, Ghana has managed to institute systematic processes that
have ensured the effective management of the oil resource. Obeng-Odoom’s (2012) study
provides a different perspective on the prevalent narrative of oil being a resource, with the
country’s working governance structures and effective planning and implementation of
36
Obeng-Odoom, Franklin. "Problematising the resource curse thesis." Development and Society 41,
no. 1 (2012): 1.
23
policies ensuring that all stakeholders are involved in decision- making. This study will seek
to establish whether this situation can be replicated in the case of Somalia.
Patey (2012) carries out a related study on Liberia notes that the discovery of an estimated
3,200 million barrels of oil in the Gulf of Guinea where Liberia Sierra Leone and Guinea
share a boundary has transformed the region into a “Wild West” with companies and
governments rushing to seal oil exploration deals. Pailey’s study supports Obeng-Odoom’s
study as he provides a narrative that if oil exploration, mining and distribution of benefits is
undertaken well, then the resource curse can actually be avoided.
Sogge (2017) studies the Angolan case by examining to what extent the preponderance of oil
explains Angola’s troubled politics and non-inclusive politics. In this probe on the so-called
resource curse, Sogge examines the impact of this resource on economic growth and
development, on conflict and on the provision of basic public goods and human development.
Furthermore, Sogge (2017) focuses his attention on the impact of this oil resource on
governance. In his conclusion, it is clear that rent-seeking, corruption, violence and neglect of
public needs were present long before oil rents came on stream. Nor were those miscreations
conceived wholly within Angola (2017;257). Rather, a country’s experience with oil has to
take into account the multiplicity of actors and issues; both local and international. This study
augments the studies done in the various countries, though Sogge (2017) is comprehensive in
this historical analysis of the Angolan case. This proposed study will seek to establish
whether in actual case Somalia is headed the Angolan way or it can actually mitigate the
situation and be on the rid of the conflict scenario as Obeng-Odoom’s (2012) prescribes.
Molemele (2015) takes a different approach to conflict studies by examining the factors that
have prolonged civil conflicts in Africa. She identifies the legacy of colonialism, the
geopolitics of the Cold War and the ethnicization of civil conflict. She argues that Africa’s
endowment with huge deposits of natural resources has caused the continent to be attractive
24
to business. Consequently, the scramble for oil has attracted foreign interests and such
external interests have made the local conflicts intractable. From Molemele’s (2015) study, it
is revealed that MNCs actually benefit from (as subsequently prolong) the chaos and the lack
of accountability and as such, may have no interest in stopping conflict. This is quite
informative to the current study since it seeks to establish whether Somalia is on the path
towards overcoming this context.
Molemele (2015) singles out Angola for focus. She traces the root causes of the conflict and
identifies the Cold War factor as the catalyst to this conflict. Whereas there may be no Cold
War factor in the Somali case, this proposed study will perhaps pursue the angle of big power
rivalry in the rush for control of energy resources. Chinese, Turkish, and Western presence
will be examined in this context to understand their role in the conflict and conflict resolution
process.
Gonzalez (2010) observes that despite her oil and diamond wealth, she still ranks as one of
the poorest countries in Africa. The study provides an insight into the failings of the different
peace accords that were designed to resolve the civil war, though failing as a result of the
weaknesses on issues of inclusivity, political governance and the sharing of the national
wealth. The 1975 Alvor Agreement and the Bicesse Accords are a study on how to avoid
such pitfalls and ensure that conflict addresses all the dimensions of the conflict
comprehensively. Angola is the largest oil-producing country in southern Africa where oil
was discovered in the country in 1955, mainly in the Kwanza valley 37. Expansion in oil
production came in the late 1960s, when further discoveries were made in the coastal reserve
of Cabinda a region with an approximate area of 2,800 square miles and an estimated
37
25
population of 600,00038. There is a topographical characteristic that underscores the politics
of oil in Cabinda as the region is divided from the rest of the nation by a sixty-kilometre-wide
strip.
This, as will be noted in more detail later, remains a vital issue in the politics of resource
ownership in the republic. Cabinda area accounts for almost “60% of Angolan oil production,
projected at approximately 900,000 barrels a day.” (J.G Porto, 2003). Further discoveries in
the area led to oil becoming Angola’s principal export by 1973, with the annual range of its
income from oil wavering between US$1.8 and $3.0 billion. (Global Witness not dated).
According to sources, Oil installations remained unaffected for most of the war period, and
the country’s largest oil field in the north coast region of Cabinda remained under the control
of the MPLA government. However, in October 1992, following the resumption of war after
the 1991 truce, oilfields b5ecame primary military targets39.
Brittani (2012) and Mouawad (2014) conducted researches that portrayed the negative
impacts of mismanaging the oil reserve. In these complementary studies, the two scholars
highlight key factors in this quest for control of the oil resource: from the Cold War politics
and the attendant ideological differences to the domestic ethnic and political differences. De
Beer and Gamba (2013) add that MPLA’s “protracted authoritarian governance” had
excluded particular regions of ethnic groups from power and the benefits of resource
exploitation-a situation that gave the two rebel parties opportunity to peruse military options
and therefore prolong the war.
38
39
26
Chad is another country that has discovered considerable reserves of oil. Attendant conflict in
the country have attracted studies on the relationship between the oil resource and conflict.
Yorbana (2017) provides a summary report on the same. He presents the various arguments
on whether this resource is a blessing or a curse. This study mirrors the one carried out by
Purcell (2014). It is a unique study as it provides qualitative accounts of people’s perspectives
of their entitlements on the presence of oil. In one such notable account, Yorbana (2017;69)
quotes a peasant as having expressed the belief that by their land having been endowed with
oil, God purposed that they actually enjoy it and the widespread myth in Chad and Nigeria is
that oil is actually a legacy of wealth that has been handed over from ancestors to their
descendants. From such accounts, it can be deduced that the exploration and mining of oil
wealth can never be removed from the cultures and beliefs of the people. This study echoes
the best practice undertaken in Ghana and Liberia to ensure that local communities actually
benefit from the resource. This study argues that for Somalia to manage the conflict around
the exploration and mining of oil, there has to be structures of engaging all the actors in this
issue, more so, the communities living in those areas.
A more comprehensive study undertaken on the oil-related conflict in Chad is provided by
Humpreys (2005) who observes that the discovery of oil reserves led to the incidence of
violent coup d’états as military elements who sought exclusive access to the benefits accruing
from the mining of this resource40. It is clear that there were no clear institutional structures in
place to manage expectations and ensure proper utilization of this resource. He lays possible
scenarios of the disintegration of the state as a result of mismanagement of the oil resource;
first, he points to the “state capture” by the military industrial complex who use the state
machinery not for public good but for exploitation. According to Humpreys (2005), such a
40
Dode, Robert O. "The political economy of resource curse and the Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria:
Matters arising." European Journal of Sustainable Development 1, no. 2 (2012): 235-248.
27
situation leads to neglect of national security (territorial boundaries, internal insurgencies) 41.
Secondly, certain parts of the country, feeling marginalized find no place for their benefit and
establish secession. Thirdly, other economic sectors suffer due to mismanagement, corruption
and poor governance.
Ali and Harvie (2013) present Libya’s experience with oil. They emphasize the importance of
oil to Libya’s economy as a major source of revenue, contributing 91% revenue for most of
the new millennium. Ali and Harvie observe that at one time Libya was the world’s fourth
largest crude oil producer (2013; 275). And Libya’s thriving human security indicators, for a
long time pointed to the oil revenue. The failure to address the conflict dimension is
complemented by Chipaike’s (2012) study which puts forward the argument that the
geopolitics of oil led to the eruption of the conflict in 2011. The study presents a history of
Libya’s experience with oil and her conflict with the West. It is an illustration of how oil can
be a magnet to various conflict dimensions, which will be examined in this study.
In summary, the existing literature on oil-related conflicts in Africa have singled out the
Niger Delta and Sudan-South Sudan conflicts for study. Valuable insights have been obtained
on the causes, the structure of these conflicts as well as their socio-economic and political
impacts on the countries affected. These studies have also hinged their studies on the
“Resource Curse” debate, either proving or contesting its application to the African context.
These studies however fail to address the critical issue of managing conflict at the initial oil
exploration stage, and such expositions are further missing in the Somalia context, a situation
that motivates this study to embark on this study.
41
Dode, Robert O. "The political economy of resource curse and the Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria:
Matters arising." European Journal of Sustainable Development 1, no. 2 (2012): 235-248.
28
2.3 Actors in Oil Related Conflicts
ACLED (2017) provides a comprehensive statistical expose of the continental conflict trends
in Africa. In this study, the analysis identifies the various actors in conflict; ranging from the
insurgent groups, the government and its military (34%), political militias which
contributed30% of all organized armed conflict in Africa. There is also the categorization of
rebels as the other most active agent in conflict. In this last classification, it is identified to be
most active, causing substantial losses of human lives. This ACLED study provides a
valuable insight into conflict trends. It singles out Somalia for attention. This study obtained
valuable information on the recent conflict trends, with the Al Shabaab identified as a major
factor contributing to the 48% spike in fatalities in 2016 alone. The study however does not
list the issues and interests of the various actors, a gap that this study sought to fill.
A more comprehensive study on the actors in conflict is undertaken by Abdi (2015) who case
studies the various domestic and international actors in the Somali conflict 42. The study
explores the reasons for entry into the conflict in Somalia by various state actors as well as a
host of local actors, multilateral state and non-state actors. Oil and gas investors as the latest
entrants to Somalia43. This is a significant development, observes Abdi, as it is altering the
dimension of the conflict as oil has now become a resource worth fighting over and even self-
governing areas are now establishing themselves as major political players. This study sought
to deepen the understanding of these actors to the conflict especially in relation to the
discovery of oil in Somalia-something that Abdi’s study did not attend to conclusively.
The EU and the USA for study due to their diverse approaches to security in their pursuit of
their geopolitical security interests44. He singles out the African Peace Facility (APF) and the
42
43
44
Balthasar, Dominik. "Oil in Somalia: adding fuel to the fire." Somalia: The Heritage Institute for
Policy Studies (2014).
29
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as areas of cooperation in the Horn of Africa
(for the EU) with the USA opting for unilateral actions in support of the Somali government.
Balthasar’s (2014) builds on the classical work done by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and
Sambanis and Herge (2006) who did a classical research on the various actors. The actors’
nomenclature is however richly displayed in a study by the World Bank (2005) titled
“Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics”. Hansen (2016) also undertakes a
comprehensive study on the various actors, dwelling on the clannism in Somalia. These
studies equipped this study with the literature on the various actors. However, there was
inadequate information provided on oil-related actors and their role in ensuring peace and
stability. It was with this in mind that this study was premised.
2.4 The Oil Politics in Somalia
Ahali and Ackah (2014) examine the demographic and oil history of Somalia- with the latter
tracing the exploration of oil during British colonialism. After decades of inactivity, renewed
activity revealed considerable amounts of oil. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below reveal the oil finds in
Noogal and Darhoor.
30
Figure 2.2: Pictorial view of Somalia’s oil blocks in Nogal and Darhoor
Source: Ahali and Ackah (2014), page 3
31
Figure 2.3: Somalia’s oil basins in Nogal and Darhoor
Source: Ahali and Ackah (2014), page 3
The figure above provides an insight on the conflicts of irredentism and the obstacles faced
by Somalia to realizing lasting peace. As Ahali and Ackah (2014) explain, Somalia’s state
institutions are weak, as a result of decades of destruction and neglect. From this study, it is
further revealed that the democratic checks and balances characteristic of a stable political
system are non-existent- a situation that predisposes the country to the vagaries of spoil
politics. This study provides an insightful view of the structure of the state and state of
governance. This study will seek to advance on this framework laid by Ahali and Ackah
(2014) in examining the result of this weak political base as the driver of the oil-related
conflict in this country. it can be inferred that corruption, and failure of politicians to manage
the oil and gas sector, conflict dimensions in Somalia will likely be reshaped.
32
Musau (2013) provides an account of clan mobilization and clannism and how such control
over weak political institutions is a threat to Somalia’s peace and stability. This study reveals
the extent with which clannism as a political ideology has taken hostage political
organization in Somalia. He notes that clans dictate power, resource distribution, recruitment
to clan and political identities as well as recruitment and loyalty of the Somali forces. It is
also learnt from Musau’s study that there is an absence of a robust civil society in Somalia- A
situation that precludes purposive state building in Somalia due to the strong clan ties that
predate state formation in Somalia. Musau’s elucidation of the power sharing between the
ruling class Hawiye clan and the Darod clan epitomize the stranglehold of the clans on
political power. The study however fails to address the politics of oil and how they are
enmeshed in clannish.
Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) map the oil exploration and conflict matrix in Somalia and
Ethiopia. They outline the legal and political status of the different political entities existing
in the larger Somalia. Besides examining the potential onset of the Dutch Disease at the
projected economic windfalls from oil revenues, Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) lay out a
scenario of unequal distribution of oil revenues since the political structures are dominated by
political centralization in clans where decision making is exclusive and secretive. The
desegregation of the Somalia state, accounted for in this study by Bamberger and Skovsted
(2016) is further indicative of the politics of control of resources, and in reference to figures
2.2 and 2.3 above, the Somalia state’s splinter political entities have established themselves in
this region.
33
Figure 4: Somaliland and Puntland
Source: Bamberger and Skovsted (2016), Page 13
In such an unfolding scenario, the Federal Government of Somalia has had to seek local and
international alliances to enable it to prevent dominance of the oil sector by the dominant
clans in Puntland and Somaliland. Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) provide an educative
account of this situation, and their topical study provides rich up-to-date accounts of the
political and economic situation in Somalia. For instance, these scholars mention the
Galmudug Regional State (GRS) as one of the political entities playing a role in the oil
politics of South Central Somalia. In this account, Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) analyze
how the FGS has sought an ally in the GRS. The several oil companies in Greater Somalia
have also had to deal with competing legal jurisdictions that are contestable at every stage of
operation. These conflicts are not only a feature of Somaliland and Puntland but also in
34
Central and Ogaden regions of Somalia. Another conflict front with Kenya was opened on
the offshore oil blocks.
Hagmann (2014) advances the oil politics in the Ogaden region by observing that the Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF) has found renewed legitimacy in the struggle for the
liberation of their region from Chinese and Ethiopian exploration. Hagmann (2014) identifies
numerous players in the oil politics of Somalia; from Chinese, British and French oil
companies to the Ethiopian, Turkish and Russian interests and the local inter-clan rivalries.
2015 World Bank Report supports these studies by Hagmann (2014) and Bamberger and
Skovsted (2016). This WB report observes that the oil politics of Somalia is layered with
multiple levels of government and that lack of consensus on control has elevated the risk of
this resource fuelling an extensive conflict in Somalia.
Balthasar (2014) confirms the analyses by Bamberger and Skovsted (2016). He proceeds to
examine the preparedness of Somalia from this oil windfall and concludes that the economic
and political structures are basic, unable to handle the emerging complexity of managing the
oil economy. He predicts that such oil exploration is bound to foster tensions. He cites a case
in Puntland where ten people lost their lives after local militias took up armed to eject
geologists from undertaking oil exploration in Puntland as the Warsangeli clan nullified the
contracts entered into by Puntland and the geologists.
The extent of the clan politics domination of oil politics is outlined in Ali’s (2016) study on
the Somali clan system and how it is a key ingredient to political stability in Somalia. Ali
traces the history of clan politics and just as Ahali and Ackah (2014) had done extensively
provides the rivalries between the two major clans of Darod and Hawiye and the numerous
sub-clans forming these two solid ordering units. He also introduces the dimension of
overarching American interests in it geo-strategic engagement with the FGS, a situation that
pits one clan against another in the quest for dominance. Ali’s study, though useful in its
35
explanation on clannism and clan politics, it fails to tie oil politics to this conflict system and
thus does not address the causal factors and remedies to the potential conflict arising from the
oil-related conflict. It will be the duty of this study to examine salient features of oil politics
and how they predispose Somalia towards conflict. There will be an examination of ways in
which this country can steer itself towards managing this conflict.
2.5 Theoretical Framework
Academic discourse about the origins of conflict particularly, though not exclusively,
domestic conflict, has been informed mainly by two theoretical approaches. The first
approach associates conflict and violence with the nature and behaviour of human beings.
According to this view, war (read conflict) results from selfishness, from misdirected
aggressive impulses of human beings45. Again, other causes are considered as secondary and
therefore have to be interpreted only in the light of these causes46.
Distinct theoretical frameworks have emerged to explain the occurrence of contemporary
conflicts. This study proceeds from the theorizing on the resource curse also referred to as
the paradox of plenty gets its name from the binary way in which it affects an economy. The
Resource curse concept was introduced by Richard Auty in his book Sustaining Growth in
Mineral economies47. According to him, the Resource Curse refers to the phenomenon of
worse economic performance in resource abundant countries comparing to resource poor
countries48.
45
Burton, John Wear. Recent Developments in the Theory of International Relations. Stevens & Sons,
1964.
46
Ibid
47
29-49.
48
36
The problem is seen more in less developed countries with relatively concentrated and
undiversified industrial sectors49. They continue stating that in such countries, once a natural
resource is discovered, available investment capital tends to gravitate to this industry. The
new industry becomes a source of economic growth and relative economic prosperity, as jobs
and disposable income that were previously absent become available. As a result, according
to this theory, the nation becomes overly dependent on the price of commodities, and overall
gross domestic product becomes extremely volatile. Additionally, government corruption
often results when proper resource rights and an income distribution framework are not
established in the society, resulting in unfair regulation of the industry.
This theory has been advanced further by Balthasar (2014) and Bamberger and Skovsted
(2016b) who state that abundant natural resources including oil and diamond have posed as a
security challenge to many states in Africa since such resources are being explored and
exploited in contexts which are conflict-prone. Naturally, abundant non-renewable resources
are expected to boost a nation’s socio-economic growth. However, from the oil reserves of
the Middle East to the diamond mines of West Africa, it has been revealed that populations in
countries with a wealth of natural resources have not benefitted much, furthermore many
citizens have experienced worse outcomes owing to corrupt governance and conflict50.
The resource curse framework is therefore applicable to this study as it helps in establishing
potential impacts of oil exploration and exploitation in Somalia given the pre-existing conflict
situation. Guided by the framework, vulnerability, risk and opportunity are the three
dimensions around which the study presents its argument. A country’s over-reliance on
unearned natural resources may cause the economy to underperform and political institutions
49
Martinez-Conde, Susana, Jorge Otero-Millan, and Stephen L. Macknik. "The impact of
microsaccades on vision: towards a unified theory of saccadic function." Nature Reviews
Neuroscience 14, no. 2 (2013): 83.
50
37
to weaken, thus making the country more vulnerable to experiencing conflict 51. Risk is
conceptualized as contexts in which some resource industries like oil are more susceptible to
conflict and insecurity due to their direct links to the access and control of wealth. This study
analyzed the Somali conflict situation as a new war predominantly fuelled by issues
domestic. As Kaldor (2006) observes, inter-state wars were waged between state armies, with
goals often of a geopolitical nature and victory/success was in capture of territory. War aims
were financed via taxation and mobilizing the general population. In this new generation of
new wars, the control of resources and territory as well as the mobilization of identities has
become the mode of prosecuting war. This study established this in the case of Somalia. In
this case, greed and grievance becomes a justification for seeking to control or controlling
such a resource52. Peace and stability therefore becomes a challenge of managing equity and
justice in redistribution of benefits of this resource besides addressing the other age-old root
causes of the conflict.
2.6 Theoretical Review
2.6.1 Environmental Justice Theory
This theory was developed by Schlosberg (1999). It has undergone reviews from then and has
been refocused to entail the broad perspectives of community and ecology. Schlosberg (2007)
tried to reconcile the distributive concepts of Social Justice Theorists and Environmental
Justice groups on the one hand and the individualistic Concepts of Environmental justice
groups and the Collective concepts of Ecological theorists on the other hand. In developing
this theory, Schlosberg (1999) draws from the works of various scholars. Schlosberg (2007)
combines the notion good distribution and bad distribution two concepts on recognition that
they are mutually inclusive. Therefore, Environmental justice theory is about justice in
distribution of the environmental ‘bad’ and ‘goods’53. This is a deduction drawn after an
51
52
no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
53
Ibid
38
extensive review and development of initial concepts of environmental justice to include a
global perspective and the community rather than just focusing on the individual. More
specifically, environmental justice refers to fairness in the distribution of environmental
‘goods’ or ‘bads‘and fairness in providing information and opportunities necessary for
people to participate in decisions about their environment54.
According to Schlosberg (2013), environmental ‘bads’ are the negatives of the environment
that include pollution, arid environment and health risks while the environmental ‘goods’
entail the benefits of the environment including the good food, clean water, fresh air etc. It is
observed that the environmental ‘bads’ are distributed only to the lower and less privileged
members of society. For instance, in the USA, polluted and dirty areas were associated with
the people of colour and blacks55. This brings in the issue of segregation along socio-
economic parameters such as race, economic status, ethnic grouping etc. Governments have
not made much effort towards improving the situations in such areas whereas much efforts
have been invested in the more privileged areas that are considered economically viable. This
disparity will automatically create a feeling of alienation among those groups and entities that
experience the environmental “bads”. Somalia has faced marginalisation by successive
Somalian governments in terms of socio-economic neglect. A native Somalia would use the
metaphor of “going to Somalia” from Somalia to imply traveling ‘down-country’. This is
because of the feeling that they are not part and parcel of the beneficiaries of the national
cake. With the discovery of oil, they hoped this situation would be reversed.
The other aspect of the environmental justice theory is justice to the environment. Schlosberg
(2013) argues that the element of capabilities is crucial to the harmonious existence of the
environment with not only the human entities but with the non-human entities. If this
capability is disrupted more so by the human entities, it creates the inability of the
environment to sustain the non-humans in the environment. Thus, justice will not only have
been done to the environment but the non-human elements. This can be through
environmental degrading acts such as pollution. Such acts disrupt the ecosystem and causes
disharmony which affects both human and non-human entities. Upstream, Midstream and
Upstream oil activities are human acts with potential to degrade the environment. With lack
of, or shoddy, Environmental Impacts Assessments (EIAs), pollution and land degradation
54
Muigua, Kariuki, and F. Kariuki. "ADR, access to justice and development in Kenya." In
Strathmore Annual Law Conference 2014 held on, vol. 3. 2014.
55
Bullard, Robert D. "Confronting environmental racism in the twenty-first century." Global
Dialogue 4, no. 1 (2002): 34.
39
will occur with serious socio-economic disruptions to the humans and non-humans. The same
is true for offshore oil exploration companies in Somalia county. Reported pollution, related
illnesses of residents of Lokichar and death of their livestock is just an early manifestation of
the repercussions of injustice to the environment’s capabilities to sustain itself.
As Okuthe (2015) observes, Somalia weak mining and environmental policies and laxity in
enforcing them exposes Somalia to environmental challenges. He further warns that many
new oil - exporting countries failed to give adequate attention to the environmental and social
aspects of petroleum sector in its early development stages. Inevitably, this will have far
reaching negative political and economic impact for the government, oil industry and the
society as a whole. Eventually, ignored environmental justice aspects of oil exploitation, such
as mining and environmental policies, community information and participation, prudent
allocation of oil proceeds etc., will contribute to rise of the resource curse challenges.
While the resource curse theory was used to explaining the challenges posed by poor resource
management policies, the environmental justice theory augmented it by looking by at
community engagement in oil exploration and the intricate relationships within the
environment and how it is affected by oil exploration activities in respect to communal
distribution of the ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ besides the need for information on oil exploration,
extraction and the expected benefits.
2.7 Conceptual framework

The framework conceptualized the three variables: that is, the independent variable,
dependent variable and the intervening variables.
40
The conceptual framework showing the relationship of variables indicated in the Figure
Social Security
Cultural sites and practices
Family roles setup
Politics
Environmental pollution and health

risks
Human rights abuse and exploitation

Economic Security
Effects of Security Grazing lands
implication Oil Traditional economic activities
Exploration Employment opportunities
Activities in Infrastructure development
Somalia Emerging Security Management Issues
Government Policies Community Participation
Security management strategies

and Business
Role of civil societies
Practices
Natural resource management
policies
Corruption
Tender allocation
Indigenised ownership
Exploitation of indigenous people

Independent variable Intervening variables Dependent variable
Figure 2.5: Conceptual Framework Adequacy of security personnel
Oil discovery as factor of

insecurity
above.
CHAPTER THREE:
41
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This section contains the scientific research framework employed in the conduct of this
research. The research design, sampling procedures and procedures to ensure the quality of
data collected will be examined in this section.
3.2 Research Design
The study adopted a cross-sectional survey research design. This research design was best
suited to studies aimed at finding out the prevalence of a phenomenon, situation, problem,
attitude or issue by taking a cross-section of the population 56. Kumar (2014) further notes that
cross-sectional survey research design is useful in obtaining the overall picture as it stands at
the time of the study. The design was chosen because the study seeks to make an assessment
of the security effects of oil exploration on the socio-economic activities of Somalia
residents, as at the time the study was conducted. Furthermore, Cross-sectional research
design are comparatively cheaper to undertake and easy to analyse since it involves one
contact with the study population. However, follow - up studies required to track changes
over time.
3.3 Target Population

The target population for this study were residents of Somalia and Employees of oil
companies. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2009) the target population answers most
critical characteristics of the population. The target population of the study was 10,000
residents. The respondents were selected because they live, work in Somalia and are expected
to be affected by impacts of oil exploration.
3.4 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size
According to Kothari and Garg (2014) sampling is the procedure by which some elements of
a population are selected as representative of the entire population. Sampling enables a
researcher to draw conclusions about the entire population. As samples size of 384
respondents was selected using Yamane formula on sample size:
56
Barber, Brad M., Yi-Tsung Lee, Yu-Jane Liu, and Terrance Odean. "The cross-section of speculator
skill: Evidence from day trading." Journal of Financial Markets 18 (2014): 1-24.
42
Where n = is the sample size
N = the target population (10,000)
e = precision level (0.05)
Therefore:
n=(10000)/1+(10000*0.0025)
= 384
Table 3.1: Key Informants
Ser Informant Number Remarks
1 Oil Expatriates 6 Purposive sampled
2 Chiefs 6 Purposive sampled
3 Security Officers 4 Purposive sampled
Total 12
The Key informants were purposively sampled. Kumar (2014:189) indicates that purposive
sampling is used reliant on the researcher’s judgement as to who can provide the best
information to achieve the objectives of the study. From table above, key informants comprised
of 6 oil expatriate employees, 6 administrators/chiefs, and 4 security officers was purposively
sampled.
3.5 Unit of analysis
The units of analysis for this study was the resident of Somalia; comprising of both the
indigenous and non-indigenous individuals who reside and/or work in oil refining companies
and are affected by oil exploration activities.
3.6 Methods of Data Collection
3.6.1 Sources of Data

The research was utilized both primary and secondary data. The secondary data was obtained
from textbooks related to the study, journals, presented conferences papers and government
reports as well as the internet. The primary data on the other hand was obtained from the
respondents using interview schedules and focused group discussions.
43
3.6.2 Questionnaires
Tools and instruments that will be used to collect primary data included questioners and
interview guides. Questionnaires will be used to collect primary data. Questionnaires will
contain both open ended and close ended questions, open ended questions will be used to
gather information on opinions of the respondents i.e.to measure the objective responses
while close ended will be used to help in ensuring standardization and compatibility of
information i.e. to measure subjective responses, questionnaires will be administered using
drop and pick method.
3.6.3 Interview Guide

According to Kothari (2009) interview schedule is the most appropriate for investigations that
are thorough. Interview schedule enable the researcher to get in-depth details and required
data by asking probing questions. An interview schedule made it possible to obtain
information necessary to meet exact goals of the study 57. The interview schedules consisted
of both open and closed ended questions and was used to collect data from indigenous
residents and the Key informants. Open ended items were used to collect qualitative data
while closed ended was used to collect quantitative data
3.6.4 Focus Group Discussion

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) consisting of 8 respondents was drawn from the
Community elders. Participants in FGDs was purposively recruited to capture differences in
residents’ perspectives about Oil exploration activities and its implications on their social and
economic activities. According to Sekaran (2013), FGDs allow a researcher to get deeper
insight into a situation or phenomenon. FGDs yielded qualitative data given that the questions
were open ended. FGDs captured what the respondents said in a given context. The
researcher also captured on how the community participates for instance their attitudes,
perceptions, opinions and experiences in relation to oil exploration.
57
Getange, KennedyNyambeche, and Jacob Machogu Onkeo, and A. J. Orodho. "Alternative sources
of funding for free day secondary education (FDSE) in public schools in Kisii Central District, Kisii
County, Kenya." International Organization of Scientific Research (IOSR) Journal of Dental and
Medical Sciences (IOSR-JDMS) 13, no. 4 (2014): 14-23.
44
3.8 Validity and Reliability
3.8.1 Validity of Instruments
Validity measures whether the individual results of an instrument are meaningful and allows
the researcher to draw sound conclusions from the sample population being studied. Content
validity was realized through proper “inspection” and “sieving” of the information. Various
themes, as guided by the objectives of the study, was adopted, providing the benchmarks for
which to admit or reject information.
3.8.2 Reliability of Instruments
Reliability checks confirm whether the results of an instrument are stable and consistent, and
it’s the extent to which a given measuring instrument produces the same effect each time it is
used. This study achieved reliability through the assembly and coding of information
gathered to ensure that only credible information was used. Moreover, the researcher was
keen to identify and document the opinions of respondents and authorities in the field of
study without any biases and subjectivity.
3.9 Data Analysis
The study was used the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software to analyze
the data obtained. This software was necessary due to the multiple questionnaires that was
available for the analysis, moreover, it was appropriate for the analysis of quantitative data.
The software also generated accurately the findings using graphs and pie charts. The data
collected was analyzed and presented using descriptive statistics. Schacher (2002), has stated
that descriptive studies be analyzed using descriptive statistics. Content analysis was used to
analyze qualitative data. Correlations, the statistical technique was adopted to show whether
and how strongly pairs of variables are related, was used to ascertain such relationships.
45
3.10 Ethical Issues
Before starting data collection, the researcher got the introductory letter from the University.
The research permit was obtained from the targeted university; the management was asked
for permission. The researcher sought permission from the research body. He had the
responsibility of protecting people’s rights, privacy, and sensitivity. There was a need to
ensure that there is confidentiality by keeping their anonymity and secrecy secure. The
participants were informed about the study topic and study objectives; this is one way of
promoting integrity. At this point, data confidentiality from the participants was maintained.
The participants were informed that the study is carried out for academic purposes only.
There was a moral responsibility of the data obtained; in this case, there was no information
misuse. In case the researcher wants to use the information for other purposes, the
participants will be asked. In case of any clarification, it was done before filling the
questionnaires. The researcher did not carry out that the study that will physical or
psychological hurt the participants. According to Anderson and Steneck (2011) defined
plagiarism as using another person’s work without their knowledge, or claiming credit for
something that was done by another person. In this paper, all journal and articles were cited
using the standard APA Referencing System.
46
CHAPTER FOUR
OIL POLITICS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the basis for the subsequent analysis of the prospects of peace in
Somalia after the discovery of oil. As such, it provides a situational overview of the conflict
in Somalia; the genesis of the conflict and its dynamics since its flare up more than three
decades ago. Eventually, the study takes an analytical approach in dissecting the possibilities
of peace at this time that Somalia is seeking to exploit its oil resource.
4.2 Demographic Overview of Somalia
Somalia constitutes the part of Eastern Africa commonly called the Horn of Africa. The
country spans approximately 640,000km2, with its borders and coastline measuring 2,340km
in length58. It borders Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti to the northwest, the Gulf of Aden to the
north, the Indian Ocean and Guardafui Channel to the east, and Kenya to the southwest 59.
Based on United Nations estimates Somalia has a population of 15.1 million 60, with a 51-year
life expectancy and the infant mortality rate at 108 out of 1000 live births61.
The Somali people are relatively homogenous in language and faith (Sunni), despite the
presence of small minority groups who are not ethnically Somali. Somali–speaking people
form one of the largest ethnic groups in Africa, spreading throughout the Horn of Africa,
from the Awash Valley62, through the Ethiopian Ogaden, and also found in northern Kenya as
58
Ahali, Aaron Yao Efui, and Ishmael Ackah. "Oil Resource Governance in Somalia: Are they
Susceptible to the Resource Curse?." (2014): 1-15.
59
Ibid
60
Jaczewska, Barbara, Tomasz Wites, Marcin Wojciech Solarz, Maciej Jędrusik, and Małgorzata
Wojtaszczyk. "Geographies of world population: Demographic trends in the contemporary world." In
New Geographies of the Globalized World, pp. 3-29. Routledge, 2018.
61
Wam, Per Egil, and Shonali Sardesai. Conflict in Somalia: drivers and dynamics. World Bank,
2005.
62
Lewis, Ioan Myrddin, Ioan Lewis, ASCAP, and Michael J. Dwyer. Understanding Somalia and
Somaliland: culture, history, society. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
47
far as the Tana River Lineage fortifies the society and people are grouped according to clans
and sub clans. The main clan families in Somalia according to tradition include Darood,
Digil-Rahanweyn, Dir and Hawiye. Under these four there are many sub clans and sub-sub
clans. The people of Somalia are mostly pastoralists with a considerable number also
practicing farming and fishing63. There are no official records of population figures in
Somalia and it is estimated that the population is 10 million Somalis 64. The incessant conflict
has distorted settlement patterns,
4.3 Somalia’s History and Colonial Legacies
The Somali people’s origin is unclear, however according to an important mythology the
Somalis are said to originate from the Arabian Peninsula, possibly even from a group of
Islamic missionaries sent by the Prophet around AD 615 65. For many centuries there have
been substantial relations with the Arabian Peninsula for example through migration,
missionary work and trade66.
Following the efforts of the Islamic missionaries the Somalis embraced Islam, although they
failed to adopt the Arabian Peninsula’s predominant fundamentalist version of Islam,
Wahhabism. Instead the Somali people chose to stick with Sufism, their version of Islam
represented predominantly by brotherhoods such as the Ahmadiya, Qadiriya and Salihiya67.
Like many other states in Africa, the state of Somalia came about as a result of the late 19 th
century colonisation of Africa by Europeans68. Even though the area that came to form part of
the Somalia state was for centuries already occupied by the Somali people, the region only
63
64
Klugman, Jeni, Lucia Hanmer, Sarah Twigg, Tazeen Hasan, Jennifer McCleary-Sills, and Julieth
Santamaria. Voice and agency: Empowering women and girls for shared prosperity. The World Bank,
2014.
65
Møller, Bjørn. The Somali conflict: The role of external actors. No. 2009: 03. DIIS report, 2009.
66
Møller, Bjørn. The Somali conflict: The role of external actors. No. 2009: 03. DIIS report, 2009.
67
Ibid
68
Dersso, Solomon A. "The Somalia Conflict implications for peacemaking and peacekeeping
efforts." Institute for Security Studies Papers 2009, no. 198 (2009): 24.
48
came to be known as the present-day state of Somalia due to European colonial rule69. The
late 19th century scramble for Africa saw European colonial powers dividing up the nation of
Somalia amongst themselves70. The northern region (present day Somaliland) was controlled
by Britain, where ethnic Somalis inhabited much of the northern parts 71. Present day Djibouti
came under the rule of France, while in 1905 Italian powers took over vast territories adjacent
to the eastern coast which eventually came to form most of the present-day Somalia 72. Aside
from the colonial powers, however, the kingdom of Abyssinia - which spanned current
Ethiopia - also extended into territories that were mostly populated by Somali people. Such
territories form most of the recent region in Ethiopia formerly called Ogadeen73.
4.4 The Evolution of Conflict in Somalia
Somalia achieved her independence on 1st July 1960 and it was the 1960 Independence
constitution that merged the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland 74. The
constitution advocated for a centralized Somali state even though federalism was aspired
which included the creation of eight administrative regions. During the first regime which
was a multi-party era (1960-1969), there was the set-up of administrative regions even though
power remained at the center.
The militarization of the state was initiated and perfected during the Siad Barre regime just as
the Cold War politics was sucking it into this East-West rivalry. Due to her geological
positioning, Somalia had attracted the attention of the Soviet Union and the USA. After the
coup d’état in 1969, the Somali state became increasingly militarized and centralized even
69
Bayne, Sarah. The European Union's Political and Development Response to Somalia. ECDPM,
2001.
70
Ibid
71
Ibid
72
Bayne, Sarah. The European Union's Political and Development Response to Somalia. ECDPM,
2001.
73
Ibid
74
Appiah, Kwame Anthony, and Henry Louis Gates, eds. Africana: The encyclopedia of the African
and African American experience: The concise desk reference. Princeton University Press, 2003.
49
though there were occasional federalist structures under his then ideology of scientific
socialism75. According to Bradley (1994), the Siad Barre’s regime played a key role in hyper–
militarization of Somalia since its inception. Said Barre, was particularly, adept of using the
tensions of the Cold War and superpower interests to solicit a vast array of arms for his
government. The Soviet Union and the US also played a major in arming the country.
Largely, the arsenals of weapons driving the current conflict in modern Somalia are to some
extent leftovers of the Cold War arms76.
As observed this phenomenon is a major subject of concern for the security and stability of
countries in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, foreign military, financial and technical
assistance to the countries involved is another key contributor of conflicts. This predatory
state that was increasingly centralizing was in sharp contrast to the traditional kinship system
that was egalitarian and based on clannism and the authority of the elders.
The 1977-78 Ogaden war was the first of three major armed conflicts waged between 1977
and 1991. These conflicts devastated the Somali nation, causing considerable losses of lives,
destroying the national fabric and ensuring that weapons of war were now readily available to
rebel movements with state claims or secessionist ambitions. This fragmentation and violence
ensured that a violent takeover of power was inevitable as it happened in 1991. These
negative experiences under a unitary state would lead to the self-declared republic of
Somaliland in 1991 bringing the utility of a decentralized governance structure that also
incorporated traditional norms77.
The fall of the Mohamed Siad Barre regime in 1991 had serious implications on the Somali
institutions. By the time Siad Barre seized power in a military coup in 1969, the country had
been into a period of nine years with visible structural weaknesses. The military government
75
Ibid
76
Bradbury, Mark. The Somali conflict: prospects for peace. Oxfam GB, 1994.
77
Zoppi, Marco. "Somalia: federating citizens or clans? Dilemmas in the quest for stability." Journal
of Contemporary African Studies 36, no. 1 (2018): 54-70.
50
destroyed even the rudimentary structures of a functioning state such as the legislator,
judiciary and the civil service. Therefore, it has been said that the collapse of the Somali state
was not just a chance but a process which had been triggered since independence.
This resort to violence was began by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF),
established in 1978 by Abdullahi Yusuf from the mainly Majerten clan movement. Its
uprising against government repression in the northeast of the country and was met with
harsh repression. The Somali National Movement (SNM) formed in 1982 on its part drew its
support from the Isaaq clan in an insurgency that lasted over five years in Burco and
Hargeisa. The government responded with a ferocious assault on the Isaaq clan, killing some
50,000 people and forcing 650,000 to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti78. Rebellion was also from
the USC (United Somali Congress) - Hawiye clan, and the SPM- (Somali Patriotic
Movement) Ogaden clan.
The country become fragmented in terms of clan lineage and patronage and the resulting
drought due to introduce another twist on the causes of conflict. The absence of political
formations capable of channeling the anger of the Somalis to change the divisive legacy of
Said Barre caused conflict. The overthrow of the Barre regime precipitated calamitous events
in the country with clan-based militias morphing into formidable rival units seeking to
control the state. Wanton plunder of government and private resources became widespread,
with agricultural communities the worst affected 79. The clan-cleansing and famine led to a
dire situation in the early and mid-1990s with the international community slow to respond.
A limited response in the form of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)
failed to sustain the gains built by a ceasefire agreement brokered between Ali Mahdi
Mohamed and General Farah Aideed. This intervention was opposed largely due to its
78
2005.
79
2005.
51
perceived interference and favouritism and its lack of legitimacy led to the infamous “Black
Hawk Down” catastrophe where a US helicopter was shot down and scores of US military
men were murdered.
4.5 Clan Politics and Conflicts
The clan structure is a fundamental political unit essential for individual and group survival,
particularly during conflict times80. Until the colonial period, the Somali “nation” did not
have a single political unit81. Any forms of political identity were based on clan affiliations82.
Prior to colonialism, the Somali society had a social order which was underpinned by the
Xeer, a set of rules and norms which drew on the Islamic religious values to govern political
and economic life83. After the Xeer, the next important structure was the clan system in pre-
colonial times during which, every Somali had to be a subject to a chief in a hierarchical
order of subject, tribe, chief and colonial structures84. The effect of colonialism was thus to
upset the Somali society from a previously decentralized structures85.
For the British indirect approach, this did not influence the Somali social structures but in
contrast, the Italian style of administration interfered with the social structures by creating
undefined hierarchical and bureaucratic structures. The resultant was a Somali elite that in
part embraced commercialism and departed from previous Xeer structures. This would then
explain why these legacies of colonialism began to create tensions following the merging of
British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland86.
80
81
82
83
84
Ibid
85
Loubser, Helge-Mari, and Hussein Solomon. "Responding to state failure in Somalia." Africa
review 6, no. 1 (2014): 1-17.
86
Ibid
52
The history of conflicts in Somalia is long and it predates the colonial period. The modern-
day conflicts have however, been driven by a plethora of issues and they remain mostly intra-
Somalia in character87. In the recent past, the conflicts in Somalia has assumed a different
dimension spilling over to neighboring countries. Additionally, the Pan -Somalia ideology
has become entrenched within the country and the regional states. As observed in literature
the Pan-Somali ideology is said to have no regard for international law or for the regulation
and recognition of the colonial borders. The conflict is further compounded by the Ethiopia–
Eritrea conflict, with Somalia becoming the incentive for a proxy war between the two
countries.
Following the outbreak of the civil war and the ensuing collapse of the Siad Barre regime in
the early 1990s, Somalia reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, consisting of
solidifying their leadership based on clan, religious and customary laws. The Somali people
have been divided since the colonial times into five major parts: Djibouti, Northern Frontier
District (NFD), Ogaden, British and Italian colonies. Only two of those territories united and
formed the independent Somali Republic in 1960. The British colonial separation of the
Somali people has since become a source of conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia88.
As mentioned earlier clannism is the most powerful unit of political organization. In 1969,
General Mohammed Siad Barre, a member of the Marehan sub–clan of Darod, seized power
in a military coup and renamed the country the Somalia Democratic Republic, based on
Scientific Socialism89. During his reign, he signed numerous policies that outlawed clans and
their structures, but concentrated political power in his Marehan sub–clan, his maternal
87
88
89
53
Ogaden sub–clan and the Dolbahante sub–clan of his principal son-in-law 90. According to
Lewis, all these sub-clans belong to the Darod clan and this explains the reasons for their
dominance in Somali’s body of politics. Other than setting the stage for futile clan conflicts,
the initial stage of Siad Barre rule has been described as a period characterized by a
concentration of problems such as local development and the consolidation of the regimes
authority. However, persistent political exclusion of other clans and crackdown on the
religious establishment became a major source of conflict between the regime and those
excluded from the mainstream politics, economics and social spheres of the country91.
The clan structure in Somalia further complicates oil resource extraction in that, while there
are tensions on how to govern oil resources in both the federal government and the
autonomous regions (Somaliland, Puntland, Khaatumo state (disputed), clan dynamics come
to play. Somaliland and which defected in 1991 is largely dominated by the Isaaq clan which
includes the Dir and the Darod clan families. It performs statehood functions but lacks
international recognition. In Puntland, a regional state created in 1998, is administered by the
members of the Darood/Harti clan collective. This clan collective comprises the Majerten,
Dhulbahante, and Warsangeli among other clans. Power is shared proportionally relative to
clan strength92.
With other political institutions in Somalia collapsing, the clan structure has proved to be the
referent point of allegiance. The largest and dominant clans have been the Hawiye and the
Darod clans with the other clans coalescing around these two for a share of state power such
as the Dir, Rahanweyn, Isaaq and the Digil93. Strong bonds and alliances bind people into
these clan structure. These clans have established monopolies in their regions with fierce
90
Ibid
91
Ibid
92
Hoehne, Markus Virgil. Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and
conflicting political visions. Rift Valley Institute, 2015.
93
Musau, Stephen. "Clans’ and clannism’s control over weak political institutions." Clan and State
Politics. Pisa: Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (2013): 13-17.
54
wars of control being fought among the various clans and sub-clans. Clannism has emerged
as a political ideology has taken hostage political organization in Somalia. Musau (2013)
notes that clans dictate power, resource distribution, recruitment to clan and political
identities as well as recruitment and loyalty of the Somali forces.
Clan and regional conflicts over oil resources can be deciphered from contestations around
the oil reserves in the Nugaal valley in the Sool region as a case in point. The oil reserves
have been disputed between Somaliland and Puntland94. This additionally would complicate
how international oil prospecting interests do not only negotiate with autonomous regions but
also how they engage with the federal government.
4.6 Al-Shabaab: Evolution of a Social Movement (2005-2018)
The prolonged lawlessness, has however, attracted a host of issues that have had negative
effects on its sovereignty. Specifically, a chunk of Somalia is still under the control of al-
Shabaab, and jihadi militants allied to international terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda.
According to sources, al-Shabaab activities over the past 10 years have increased in intensity
causing serious consequences on human life and economic advancement of the country.
Religion has for a long time been a significant cause of conflict in Somalia. They rally the use
of the ever contended sharia law. Islam has been responsible for a number of suicide bombs
which are seen as a form of religious act.
While there is no consensus in scholarship on the exact dates for the rise of the al-Shabaab
movement in Somalia, the more widely held view is that the group emerged in 2005. Its
eventual rise post 2007 is largely attributed to the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia
in late 2006 following the takeover of Mogadishu by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)
which briefly governed Mogadishu and other territories in South Central Somalia. The group
94
55
emerged as a loose social movement made up of ex-militias and NGO participants in
Somalia95.
The rise of the Islamic Courts Union (2006) is however traceable to the broader discourse of
state collapse in Somalia in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime.
The rise of the Islamic Courts generally was the need to regulate the state following the
failures of the Somali state and the international community to provide a semblance of law
and order in the country. Post the state collapse, the need to control predatory militias as well
as addressing inter-clan disputes necessitated the presence of these courts.
In 2000 a joint council was set up complete with a militia that would apprehend criminal.
Eventually, this led to the rise of the Supreme Court of the Islamic Courts Union in 2004
which simply became known as the Union of Islamic Courts (UCI) led by among others
Sheikh Shariff Ahmed96. While its genesis is traced to the period around 2005, its eventual
rise has been attributed to the December 2006 intervention by Ethiopia. This intervention
and the subsequent occupation by Ethiopian forces over a two-year period gave immense
credibility to the Al-Shabaab. This social movement emerged with a national rhetoric that it
was defending the Somali nation from foreign intrusion (the Ethiopians) with whom they had
have fraught relations since the 1970s.
Secondly, the movement adopted a religious framing to enable recruitment into their ranks
which would in part be to defend their Muslim country 97. By relying on a religious frame, the
Al- Shabaab was successful in framing her Ethiopian neighbors’ as Christian invaders on
their Muslim lands’. This subsequent mounting would enable them the legitimacy to launch
an intervention against their Ethiopian ‘invaders’ which would help to grow the ensuing
95
Mueller, Jason C. "The evolution of political violence: The case of Somalia’s al-Shabaab."
Terrorism and political violence 30, no. 1 (2018): 116-141.
96
97
Ibid
56
insurgency. This foreign intervention helped then in their framing as the single most-
important actor to defend their Somali nation from ‘foreign intervention’. Kenya’s
intervention in Somalia in 2011 would bear the same fate 98. The Somali-Ethiopia relations
have been fraught with tensions since the 1970s. In the 1970s, the tensions between the two
neighbors had centered on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia that is inhabited by ethnic Somalis
and which is disputed between the two. In the 1990s, the Islamist organization Somali
Islamist group Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and which had become popular in the disputed
Ogadeni region arose.
Over the 1990s and the subsequent entry into of the Global War on Terror post 9/11, this
group, Ethiopian officials began to get concerned with remnants of the AIAI and their
possible linkages with radical Islamist organizations. At the height of the invasion, it was
feared to that members of the AIAI had infiltrated the UIC. These fears were also shared by
the United States with concerns that no efforts would be spared to ensure that a post-
collapsed Somalia did not turn into a haven for terrorist organizations99.
Ethiopia would also partly intervene in order to support the then weak transitional federal
government (TFG). The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) would be set up in
2007 to safeguard strategic locations in Mogadishu for the TFG 100. Progressively, a series of
drought induced famine also contributed to the rise of insurgency. There were factional rifts
as the insurgency spread101.
Al-Shabaab (meaning youth in Arabic), according to sources, is a social movement that is
often termed as a Sunni-Salafi organization. It relies on the variant of Islam that is. The broad
claim of Wahhabist teachings is to develop a so called ‘righteous state’ Wahhabism drawing
98
Ibid
99
Ibid
100
101
Ibid
57
on Prophet Muhamed teachings (PBUH) and which are anchored on an Islamic theology 102.
While the movement has relied on an ideology that aspires towards an ‘Islamic caliphate’ it is
much more than this. It has often deployed a national rhetoric to build on its support base
with claims of foreign invasion on their land103.
This social movement owing to different circumstances has also evolved in its tactics. At its
early formation (2006-2007) it had capacity to administer territory. In other times it has
operated as a military outfit. Post the 2011 period, the group has had to change tact owing to
loss of territory and principally through the intervention of Kenya and AMISOM troops. In
this respect the group has resulted to the use of asymmetrical guerilla warfare style.
Increasingly the group has also adopted suicide attacks.
Over time and while moving beyond selective targeting of individuals such as the police, the
military, including journalists and institutions such as educational facilities, one of the most
notable trend of the group has been to target non- Muslims. Owing to the group’s
transnational reach in the region, the Westgate attack in Kenya in September 2013 had this
semblance104. Post 2010, the movement also began to have a transnational reach with targets
outside of Somalia. This marked a new strategic direction for the movement with a focus on
‘oppositional forces.’ They would demonstrate this with the July 2010 Kampala bombings
during the World Cup season in retaliation of Ugandan troop’s presence there105.
Following Kenya’s intervention in October 2011 under the Operation Linda Nchi (Operation
Protect the Country), there would be a rise on attacks on Kenyan territory. This Kenyan
intervention was billed as a security intervention to counter Al-Shabaab insurgency in the
north and coastal part of the country. While security reasons were billed as the singular
intervention, other strategic interests such as the securing of infrastructural projects were
102
Ibid
103
ibid
104
Ibid
105
ibid
58
additional explanations. It was notable that Kenya’s foreign policy had largely been non-
interventionist since 1963. But through the Operation Linda Nchi operation in 2011, Kenya
took on a military intervention in Somalia. This intervention would then create a safe zone in
Jubaland. This safe zone would then create a buffer zone between Al-Shabaab controlled
territory and Kenya. In the long run, this military intervention would create a safe space for
relocation of Somali refugees in Kenya106.
Nevertheless, this intervention would be used by the al-Shabaab to be a similar trope of
‘foreign invasion’ and as such the so called ‘enemy’ would be confronted at home. This was
most notable with the Westgate attack in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013 which claimed
over 60 lives. In April 2015, the Garissa University College in Kenya attack would be
attributed to the same social movement. Increasingly too, the movement has also notably
since 2009 been recruiting part of its membership from Kenya. Notwithstanding the internal
leadership rifts in the organization pitting Robow and Hassan Awey against the Godane
faction. The Godane faction would announce in 2012 an alliance with the Al-Qaeda. This rift
in part had been occasioned by Al-Shabaab alliance with Al-Qaeda movement. Other source
of contention in the movement and mainly directed at the Godane faction and claimed by
Awey was the indiscriminate targeting of civilians.
There had also been unease within the regional commanders on the supposed alliance to Al-
Qaeda. The contention among the membership then was that the organization in announcing
an alliance with the Al-Qaeda could have been perceived to be a puppet under a foreign
organization107. In the post 2010 period and under Godane’s leadership, the organization had
the presence of foreign fighters who brought different capabilities to the organization. These
included suicide bombing, bombs making, and assassinations. He however remained wary of
these foreign ‘experts ‘even as he consolidated his powers within the movement. Some of
106
ibid
107
Ibid
59
these foreign experts came from Kenya, Sudan, and Pakistan among other places.
Recruitment in the Kenyan coast has targeted both marginalized and privileged individuals
who are often brainwashed through religious ideologies108.
4.7 The Dynamics of Oil
As pointed out in the literature review, the endowment of natural resources to a country has
more often been linked to the addition of another dimension armed conflicts 109. In the Somali
context, the discovery of this resource came at a time when the country is yet to find a
resolution to its conflict. Before the discovery of oil was a game changer: scarce resources
such as water pasture, arable land has meant that the little available provide the reason for
violent appropriation. The 3,300km of largely unprotected coastline has also provided
another porous border for the entry of contraband- of which weaponry has been the key
driver of war. In this context, the splinter of the country into various autonomous entities and
a further fractionalization has seen miniature governments controlling sections of the country.
It is within this context that western commercial oil exploration companies have operated
from, with rival self-governing units claiming to authorize such activities and assuming
exclusive right over the oil finds110.
In the literature review, Fearon and Laitin (2003) noted that a dependence on oil exports in
one way or another increases the likelihood of civil war onset by 10 percent with Ross (2001,
2004a, 2004b and 2005), regarding oil as one of the most robust predictors of armed
conflicts. This finding is reinforced by several other studies using data and measurements of
oil wealth (Niemeyer 2007, Dube and Vargas 2007, Persson 2008).
108
Hansen, Stig Jarle. Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The history and ideology of a Militant Islamist group.
109
no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
110
60
While oil exploration is historically traced to 1948, a number of major oil companies signed
concession agreements with the Siad Barre regime in the 1980s though the ensuing conflict in
the late 1980s and early 90s prevented any progress in exploration. Since then, the scramble
for oil has seen Somaliland and Puntland award oil exploration licences to overlapping
territories within their control. This situation is exacerbated by Somalia’s 2012 Constitution
which allowed for autonomous regions within Somalia to contract oil companies to carry out
oil exploration. As Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) observe these oil companies (among
them Norwegian DNO and Canadian Africa Oil) became part of the conflict in Somalia by
playing into the politics of regional and ethnic dominance, thus contributing to the divisions
in the country. As a result, the FGS is potentially being denied of its oil revenues and a vital
resource for the development of the country. It is evident that oil finds due from the oil
exploration are fragmenting the country along distinct rivalries that have played a major part
in the conflict matrix of Somalia. Arguably, a new front in the conflict is being opened, with
a new issue in the conflict being added. The moment Somalia will discover the extent of her
oil resources, there will be significant socio-economic and political realignments whose effect
on peace and stability are under study in this research.
4.8 The Emerging Oil Conflict in Somalia
Somaliland and Puntland have emerged as potential conflict spots due to the substantial oil
exploration activities in these regions. The two autonomous regions have potential oil finds
(see Figure 2.3). Contextually, both regions are dominated by the Dhulbahante and
Warsangeli sub clans of the Darod clan. Border disputes over the territorial reach of Puntland,
Somaliland and the greater Somalia have been accentuated by the entry of oil exploration
companies that operate in these disputed area-risking attacks from the armed ethnic
militias111. The entry of these companies has attracted the attention of home governments who
111
61
have sought security guarantees on behalf of these Companies. For example, ConocoPhillips,
one such company has secured the influence of the US government to ensure the TFG
enables the company to reap the benefits of the oil concession.
Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) identify another dimension in this emerging oil conflict; the
aspirations for international recognition have meant that Somaliland has assumed a radical
war posture regarding the control of resources within her reach and the subsequent
partnerships with governments and companies. Special police units created have been
mandated not only to safeguard the security and property of oil prospecting companies but
also to safeguard the territorial integrity of these competing autonomous units and the TFG.
This privatization of security has further ingrained the already toxic violent psyche of the
nation. In the GRS, competing onshore and offshore finds have pitted this self-governing
region with the TFG. Further conflict areas are onshore with Kenya and in the Ogaden
region.
In the Ogaden region, the intricate conflict with Ethiopia might open a new war front due to
the fact that the oil exploration companies are raising the tensions over the irredentist claims
of the Ogaden.
62
Figure 4.6: Oil Exploration in the Ogaden Region
Source: Bamberger and Skovsted (2016; 21)
The ONLF has come out to rightfully claim this resource as Ogadeni and for all Ogaden112.
This exploration is happening at the same time as Ethiopia is also undertaking oil exploration
activities in the Ethiopian Ogaden region and has regarded any transboundary activity by the
112
63
ONLF and Al Shabaab as a declaration of war113. The potential of regionalization of this
conflict is real as security needs and oil claims have increased armaments within this region
and because of the value of oil to the communities and countries, it has become a winner-
takes-all when one group manages to control regions with this reserve.
4.9 Analysis of the Oil Politics in Somalia
4.9.1 Mechanisms and Manifestations of Resource Curse
In a study focusing on the mechanism between natural resources and conflicts, Humphry
(2005), discusses the following principle mechanisms. The nature of the state (weak or failed)
has commonly been cited as a key mechanism for explaining the link between natural
resources and armed conflicts 114. In a series of papers on the role of resources in conflict 115
proposes that state weakness makes conflict more likely by reducing states’ ability to resolve
societal conflicts. His arguments draw on the work of scholars who argue that oil wealth in
Middle-Eastern states have sustained weak state apparatuses with little capability of resolving
social conflicts116.
Di John (2007) also observed that in these states, elites maintain power through corruption
and patron-client relationships, rather than through an establishment of a social contract
based on deliverance of public goods financed through taxation 117. Fearon and Laitin (2003),
therefore, note that, oil states are less likely to have strong institutions and bureaucracies
since they are less likely to rely on them for revenue as non-oil dependent states.
113
114
Humphreys, Macartan. "Natural resources, conflict, and conflict resolution: Uncovering the
mechanisms." Journal of conflict resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 508-537.
115
Ross, Michael L. "How do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from thirteen cases."
International organization 58, no. 1 (2004): 35-67.
116
Ross, Michael L. "How do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from thirteen cases."
International organization 58, no. 1 (2004): 35-67.
117
Di John, Jonathan. "Oil abundance and violent political conflict: A critical assessment." The
Journal of Development Studies 43, no. 6 (2007): 961-986.
64
The lack of legitimacy and political, administrative and military capacity makes them more
vulnerable to insurgency and rebellion. Additionally, with limited bureaucratic capacity and
presence in tax collection, the state’s ability to stay informed of what happens at the
grassroots level remains limited, making planning and execution of insurgency and rebellion
easier118.
It is furthermore argued that as states become more independent of its citizens, predatory
behaviour amongst those in power becomes less costly and more likely, and reduces the need
for leaders to make long-run political bargains with interest groups119. Taxation and revenues
are therefore unpredictable, and when resource rents collapse and disappear, as they
eventually do due to their non-renewable nature and fickle value, elites might find themselves
in a financial situation dependent on arbitrary confiscation in order to maintain power 120. The
mismanagement of wealth combined with historical circumstances might create long lasting
grievances, making especially secessionist conflict more likely 121. Weak state institutions
have also been linked to slow economic growth and low-income levels, factors that have been
shown to increase the likelihood of conflict122.
4.9.2 Will the discovery of Oil Trigger Conflict?
Based on research and experiences from other oil rich economies, the advent of oil is likely to
incite home grown pressure which might weaken all gains made by the government of
establish permanent amity and stability. As seen from the case of Puntland, oil production can
118
Di John, Jonathan. "Oil abundance and violent political conflict: A critical assessment."
The Journal of Development Studies 43, no. 6 (2007): 961-986.
119
120
121
122
Lujala, Päivi. "The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources."
Journal of peace research 47, no. 1 (2010): 15-28.
65
become a fuel that generate local insecurity. Possible areas of conflict may arise from,
awarding of contracts to international companies and signing of over lapping concessions. A
recent example is demonstrated in the case of Mahmud ‘Adde’ Muse 2005, where he signed
an agreement with business officials from the United Arab Emirates and changed some
clauses in the constitution to win some interest.
Additionally, the discovery oil in itself has attracted a host of activities as international oil
companies set in to begin a prolonged period of excavation. This influx of activities has led to
increased securitization of the area. The presence of these companies has resulted in the
formation of an Exploration Security Unit (ESU) – a special branch of the Puntland Security
Forces whose sole purpose is to provide security for the security companies. The increased
creation and deployment of private security companies might result to a backlash with
existing agencies especially the AMISOM forces working on the stabilization of the country.
A situation like this will not only fragment the country’s security apparatus, further, but it
also reduces it and makes it extremely difficult for the federal government to establish
monopoly of its security.
Sambanis and Herge (2006) find oil to be linked with armed conflict but points out that their
analysis can only be held true in relation to smaller types of armed conflicts, and therefore
questions the robustness of the link between conflict and oil. In their defence, Sambanis and
Herge (2006) add that, their position is based on a number of unsatisfactory proxy variables.
Buhaug (2006) in this case adds that the size of conflict moderates the effect of oil on
conflict. Other scholars who question the link between oil and conflict altogether include,
Smith, 2004, Conrad 2009, Di John 2007, Alexeev and Watts 2007, Murshed and Tadjoeddin
2007, Basedau and Lay 2009, Dube and Vargas 2007, Obi 2010).
After reviewing numerous studies, it is clear that there seems to be no direct link between
resource and armed conflicts. However, scholars particularly pay attention to the mechanism
66
supposedly connecting natural resources to armed conflict 123. With the wrong conditions
present, the discovery of oil most likely provides the catalyst to conflict. In the case of
Somalia, its history is laden with incessant conflict, to the point of state and nation collapse.
The issues in the conflict have been largely control of the state though resource control has
been also in the mix. Therefore, when a precious commodity such as oil is potentially
available in large parts of the country controlled by armed groups with external connections
and interventions, the conflict is likely to reignite.
The task that ahead for the government of Somalia is to ensure that all clans of the country
benefit from the proceeds of the oil. As read from literature, unequable distribution of the
profits could catalyse rifts and political tensions at sub-national levels. To avoid this scenario
from occurring, the federal state needs to build a formidable structure that will gain grounds.
It should be noted that several literatures on resource curse has laid emphasis on the need for
good governance with emphasis on capacity building and anti-corruption mechanisms.
One of the longstanding issues characteristic of Somali history is conflicts over border lines
and territorial independence. As a matter of fact, it should be noted that Somalia has the
longest coastline of about 3025km on the mainland of Africa. Some of the recently
discovered oil basins spread across the coastline by-passing contested boarders. A recent UN
report highlights a brewing row between Kenya and Somalia over a maritime boarder which
may trigger conflict. According to the report, the issue between Kenya and Somalia is not a
historical dispute, but a territorial argument that came after the discovery of oil and gas along
the shared border124. Consequently, research has shown that most of the regional conflicts in
the Horn of Africa, are largely ecological.
123
Smith, Benjamin. "Oil wealth and regime survival in the developing world, 1960–1999." American
Journal of Political Science 48, no. 2 (2004): 232-246.
124
67
An assessment conducted by analysts also pointed that the relationship between Mogadishu
and Puntland could deteriorate further if oil prospects prove successful (African Confidential,
2013). Likewise, there is also tension with Somaliland. The dispute between Hargeisa and
Mogadishu over the control of Somali airspace is a classic example which has the probability
to escalate if oil findings in Somaliland is deemed commercially viable. Additionally, current
debates regarding the imagined nature of Somali state have strongly been influenced by
demands to consolidate the territories of Somali into a federal state which has consequently
been disputed since the Said Barre’s era.
4.9.3 Existence of Rebel Groups and External Actors
The most defining feature of an armed conflict is the presence and interest or rebel group
capable of large – violence 125. Virtually, all governments maintain armies 126. The defining
aspect of armed conflicts as observed by Collier and colleagues (2009) is the presence of an
opposing force. For such a group to react however, there must be a reason for convergence.
However, there seems to be no consensus in literature why rebel groups cause violence and
why they engage with government through violent means. But based on the literature of
motivators of violence127, have identified three main motivators namely; Economic greed,
political grievances and -military and financial feasibility. In the case of Somalia, a
multiplicity of rebel movements and insurgents
Conflict is not a new phenomenon and applying concepts and information acquired by
historians should therefore be beneficial128. Historical characteristics of a state play an
125
no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
126
Ibid
127
no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
128
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. All international politics is local: The diffusion of conflict, integration,
and democratization. University of Michigan Press, 2009.
68
important role in explaining the causes and drivers of conflicts 129. In spite of this, there have
been some researchers who have included historical factors in the study of armed conflict.
Some have, for example, attempted to look at the effect of colonial heritage130, but no robust
effect has been found.
The two variables that have demonstrated to be the most robust is a previous history of
conflict and “peace years”131. Collier et al. (2009) incorporate these jointly into the concept of
a “conflict trap”. The variables jointly provide controls for fixed effects that might have
occurred before the initial war, which are likely to make the country prone to future wars, and
legacy effects of previous wars, which are expected to fade with time. From the findings it is
evident that the failure to manage this resource may negatively affect the economy of
Somalia. Influx of unearned resources from oil exploitation may cause the ‘Dutch disease’ to
occur, resulting in its trade-based sector, particularly the export of livestock products, to be
less competitive. Literature on resource curse indicates that huge reserves of national
resources such as oil and gas have great potential to improve the wellbeing of a country
(United Nations Development Program, 2006). Contrary to this belief, most countries gifted
with such resources have recorded abysmal programs in items of economic growth and
poverty levels.
This indicates that in spite of its significant potential, oil wealth is not a cure for development
and armed conflict. For instance, while countries such as Botswana, Indonesia and Norway
have profited enormously from oil, others like Venezuela, Nigeria and Ghana have registered
negative growth results (Humphreys, 2007). In view of the resource curse framework
discussed in chapter two, we have seen that states endowed with a natural resource in
129
130
no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
131
69
abundance experience worse economic development trajectories than states without such
resources. Evidence demonstrates that there is a negative correlation between natural
resources and economic growth with respect to states which accrue a large portion of their
revenue from rents, as opposed to taxes from citizens132.
Furthermore, it can be argued that mismanagement of the rents, rather than the rents
themselves, is the underlying problem with natural resource abundance. To this effect it can
be said that the resource curse is not an inevitability, rather it is a phenomenon where human
agency can play a significant role in catalysing or correcting its impacts 133. Therefore, not
only does political agency play a role in explaining the paradox of plenty, it can also resolve
it. Nevertheless, doubt still remains as to whether the political elite in Somalia are capable of
sufficiently managing these challenges to avoid such adverse economic impacts.
It has also been noted that a country’s political landscape can be negatively affected by the
resource curse. First, natural resource abundance grants political elites increased autonomy
from their citizens, thereby making them less accountable. Second, due to the influx of
unearned resources, leaders have access to increased amounts of capital to beef up security
mainly used to enforce their authoritarian rule.
4.9.4 Ethnic Fractionalization in Somalia
Studies have shown the potential of ethno linguistic fractionalization to substantially increase
the likelihood of conflict. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), for example, observe that ethno
linguistic fractionalization to have been underestimated in economic studies of conflict.
While some studies have confirmed this, many others have found no such indication.
132
Auty, Richard. "Natural resources and civil strife: a two-stage process." Geopolitics 9, no. 1
(2004): 29-49.
133
Roll, Michael, and Sebastian Sperling. "Fuelling the World-Failing the Region." Oil Governance
and Development in Africa’s Gulf of Guinea. Abuja: Friedrich-EbertStiftung (2011).
70
However, it has been established that conflict is likely in more ethnically diverse societies 134.
Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) find ethnic, religious, and language fractionalization (social
fractionalization) to significantly increase the likelihood of civil war. According to their
results, a diverse country is three times more likely to experience conflict than a homogenous
country. Smith (2004) also finds ethnic diversity to increase the likelihood of civil war and
notes that diverging results may be due to how one measures conflict.
In Philip’s (2010) and Gonzalez’ (2010) preposition on the types of resource war is the
abundant resource war whereby a wealth of resources can result in less democracy, poor
economic growth, and greedy behaviour by competing elites. Accordingly, dominant
resources and its control by the state leaders will lead to little hope for those outside state
patronage to improve the quality of their lives or gain a decent standard of living. This
analysis mirrors the precarious situation in Somalia. Additionally, violence might become the
most appropriate method of maintaining control for the governing body, which should create
and sustain profitable patterns of resource exploitation and wealth distribution. Subsequently,
this study opines that this resource war or the threat of it, might become an intrinsic part of
the political economy of resource exploitation in Somalia and there is need for remedial
measures of addressing the conflict.
Among the more robust demographic findings in the conflict literature is population. De
Soysa (2002) finds population and population density to be related to conflict onset, as do135.
Population in this context is used to refer to a group of individuals of the same species
occupying a defined geographic space136. Populations may be relatively small and closed, as
on an island or they may be more diffuse and without a clear boundary between them and a
134
Aaron, Kiikpoye K., and John M. Patrick. "Corporate social responsibility patterns and conflicts in
Nigeria’s oil-rich region." International Area Studies Review 16, no. 4 (2013): 341-356.
135
no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
136
Ibid
71
neighbouring population of the same species137. In the case of Somalia, the population is
sparse, relative to land mass, though the fact that these regions are well patrolled by
marauding armed groups ensures that there is a potential for conflict. Control of these areas
inhabited is difficult for a weak government, let alone patrolling over 5,000km of land and
sea borders. According to Smith (2004), population density always serves as a control
measure of the size of a country, whereas larger countries in terms of population are expected
to be more prone to conflict and protest than smaller ones 138. De Soysa and Wagner (2003)
furthermore point out that the effect of population is dependent on how conflict is measured.
Somalia’s peace and stability therefore rests on the ability of a legitimate government
managing to establish control across the country.
Several physical geographic features have been proposed as predictors of conflict.
Researchers have examined the amount of forest area, total length of borders, number of
bordering countries, total amount of land area, length of riverbeds, and more139. Physical
geographical features are either man-made or naturally-created features of the Earth.
According to Dixon (2009) natural geographical features consist of landforms and
ecosystems such as: terrain types, physical factors of the environment.
However, research has shown that, the theoretical foundation for the link between
mountainous terrain and conflict is not well developed, mostly due to it being treated as a
control variable, rather than an explanatory variable, in most studies of conflict. Therefore,
where it has been included it has been hypothesized that mountainous terrain can provide
rebels with a safe haven outside the reach of the state’s reach140. It is uncertain if this is in fact
137
De Soysa, Indra, and Eric Neumayer. "Resource Wealth and the Risk of Civil War Onset: Results
from a New Dataset of Natural Resource Rents, 1970—1999." Conflict Management and Peace
Science 24, no. 3 (2007): 201-218.
138
139
140
72
the case, but since it has been shown to be somewhat consistent across studies, it seems
beneficial to maintain the awareness of the potential for it.
4.9.5 Political Grievance
According to Hanlon and Yanacopulos (2006), there is no consensus regarding the effect of
loot seeking on rebel recruitment. However, numerous case studies have often highlighted
rebel movements only appear in quest for economic rewards141. Hanlon and Yanacopulos
(2006) give reference to the case of FARC in Colombia and FMLN in El Salvador where
membership conditions were gruelling and looting often prohibited142. However, there are
several types of arguments as to how natural resources are connected to grievances 143.
However, all of them revolve around the issue of dissatisfaction with their distribution and
extraction. The compelling arguments as to why political grievances could link natural
resources to armed conflict onset, testing the grievance mechanism is difficult as they are
intangible, and therefore cannot be tested directly 144. According to Humphry, grievances are
also linked to dissatisfaction with the state, and separating between a weak-state mechanism
and the grievance mechanisms is therefore difficult.
The issues addressed in this section illustrate how the current oil exploration and potential
future exploitation affect the conflict dynamics of the country in the context of the prevailing
challenges such as contested statehoods and borderlines, overlapping authorities, and recent
conflict characterized by famine, war, civil war, clan conflict, foreign military interventions,
piracy, and terrorism. While there is yet to be consensus on the potential figures on oil
141
Espedal, Terje Mikal. "The relationship between natural resources and armed conflict onset:" It's
complicated". A quantitative analysis of how natural resources affect internal armed conflict onset
during the period 1950-2003." Master's thesis, The University of Bergen, 2012.
142
Ibid
143
144
73
reserves in Somalia, there is a possibility that Somalia could be sitting on huge oil reserves.
The history of oil exploration dates back the colonial era when Italian and British geologists
discovered oil seeps in the country’s north145. In the 1990s the World Bank launched several
initiatives to investigate the potential of oil and gas in Somalia.
It was on the basis of such initiatives that the Siad Barre regime sold oil concessions in the
Northern region of the country before the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. The collapse
of the state in 1991 led to the halting of initiatives to explore her rich natural resources such
as iron ore, bauxite and most notably oil.
In the literature, there exists five areas where oil is being explored in Somalia. These include
the Nugaal Block which is on the border of Puntland and Somaliland and which has had
disputes within the two regional governments. There is the Naroor block to be found in
Puntland. Other areas include the Berbera PSA in Somaliland, and offshore blocks on the
border with Kenya and Samhah in the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, the Lamu basin remains
contested between Kenya and Somalia146.
The oil exploration in Somalia also occurs in an environment marked by weak governance
regimes and a presence of other security threats in the country that have ranged from piracy
to terrorism. Given Al-Shabaab presence in the country, they could disrupt the extractives
industry147. It is notable to mention however that the regions where oil prospects are ongoing
(Puntland and Somali Land) are relatively stable in terms of governance 148. Inter-clan’s
agreements would need to be carefully navigated to ensure stability in oil exploration. The
tendency therefore to situate the discovery of oil amidst a broader fragile space should thus
not be generalized. In Somali and owing in part to minimal state presence, the oil extraction
145
Shaw, Mark, and Tuesday Reitano. "The evolution of organised crime in Africa-towards a new
response." Institute for Security Studies Papers 2013, no. 244 (2013): 28.
Ibid
146
147
148
74
field has seen the privatization and militarization of these spaces for energy security. This has
seen the presence of private security firms performing state like functions that even extend
beyond the extractives areas149.
A major contention across the extractive industry and which goes beyond the present case
study is that of transparency and accountability in oil contracts and revenue sharing. The lack
of accountability in contexts such as Nigeria is a case in point. In the Somali context, there
are claims that the republic’s national oil law crafted in 2007 was the work of Canadian
lawyers with additional support from Kuwaiti. The contention being that this law vastly
underestimated the oil reserves in the country while allocating meagre oil royalties. This turn
of circumstances additionally speaking to gaps in negotiation150.
It is pertinent to observe that both Puntland and Somaliland have separate oil prospecting
agreements bringing into question the role of the central government in Mogadishu. While
the 2007 petroleum law gives the autonomous regions the right to engage in oil explorations,
including the requirement that signed deals be approved by Somali national parliament.
Additionally, it calls for half of all oil inputs in each autonomous region revert to the
central/federal government151.
In spite of this law, the Somaliland government continued to sign bilateral deals for oil
explorations in territories that continued to be disputed. Given that autonomous regions have
been signing contracts with oil exploration firms without the involvement of the federal
government in the past, a complication arises. How are contractual obligations and property
rights to be navigated in a context of oil exploration?152
149
economy 39, no. 133 (2012): 525-535.
150
Ibid
151
152
75
Complicating the oil exploration question is a new trigger that was initiated by a Somali
cabinet resolution in June 2012 that claimed a 200 nautical mile inside Kenya’s territory and
which is currently the subject of litigation pitting Kenya and Somalia at the International
Court of Justice.
This ongoing case lodged by Somali to the court seeks for a delimitation of maritime
boundaries on the Indian Ocean Coast and which are claimed by Kenya 153. Kenya in part and
filling an admissibility challenge to the International Court of Justice would argue that it had
in fact signed an agreement with the Somali transitional federal government of Somalia in
2009 which supported Kenya’ claim on that territory.
The area under dispute between Kenya and Somalia is about 64 thousand square kilometers.
This dispute would be escalated by the federal government of Somalia decision to refer the
matter to the International Court of Justice. The initial source of dispute on part of Kenya’s
shoreline was underlined by claims that Kenya had already sold off 6 oil and gas fields close
to her border with Somalia on the Coastal shore to international firms.
Kenya’s oil interests are additionally considered to have been part of the motivation to launch
attacks on the Al-Shabaab in October of 2011. There is no outright possibility that this
dispute would trigger a military conflict between Kenya and Somalia. In any case, the two
countries are bound together in neutralizing the security threats posed by the Al-Shabaab 154. It
is however the security interests that continue to be adduced on Kenya’s intervention in
Somalia in 2011155. Arbitration for the case would seem to be more sound option156.
153
Anderson, David M., and Jacob McKnight. "Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern
Africa." African Affairs 114, no. 454 (2014): 1-27.
154
155
Anderson, David M., and Jacob McKnight. "Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern
Africa." African Affairs 114, no. 454 (2014): 1-27.
156
76
Underlying the dynamics of oil production is the fear of ‘resource curse’ or the ‘Dutch
disease, a phenomenon that has affected former less endowed economies with sudden wealth
from oil rent. Economists have argued that natural resources rent injected into an economy
has the potential to impact an economy negatively157. In ordinary circumstances however,
natural resources should propel a country to positive economic development.
The discovery of oil and other minerals has however been a bringer of calamitous times for
countries in Africa, a situation that could potentially mirror and anticipate the course of
Somalia’s oil resources. Academic debates centered on the resource curse framework have
posited that this has been the case owing to the general levels of poor governance and culture
of impunity. There is evidence that the Persian Gulf regions and the diamond mines in the
region have experienced a similar fate. They have suffered in the past from exploitative
commercial relations, poor governance and war. Drawing from Kenya and the recent
discovery of oil in Somalia County, there is already speculation that the oil resources could
also turn into a curse if governance issues are not addressed. In the Kenyan case, there have
been claims of lack of transparency around the question of oil extraction and which could
potentially turn it into a resource curse158.
The underlying view is that unearned resources from natural resources rent lead to an over-
valuation of currencies which leads to the rise of real exchange rates. The wider implication
of this, is that salaries rise, the cost of production appreciates with a negative drop in the
competitive sectors of the economy. Somalia’s economy has largely been dominated by
agriculture and livestock production. This additionally is complicated too by potential price
volatility of primary commodities such as oil which would impact negatively on an economy
sustained by natural resource rents.
157
158
77
Related to the ‘Dutch disease’ framework, Somalia’s weak governance structures with
various characteristics as a fragile/weak state then raises the question of how these resources
would be managed159. In averting a resource course for Somalia, good governance would help
unlock herself from the ‘Dutch Disease’.
While commendable steps are ongoing in the governance sector in Somalia, the stability of
the country would matter for the extraction of her natural resource rent 160. In contextualizing
the resource curse, the natural resource ‘rent’ in places characterized by weak governance,
affects the political landscape.
The state is captured by the ruling elite who siphon off the proceeds of natural resources and
as such they cease being accountable to the citizenry. The net effect of this is the rise of
authoritarianism in a state. The authoritarianism would in this context be made possible by
the strengthening of the security apparatus made possible by the presence of oil capital.
When this is tied to the prevalence of corruption in Somalia, navigating the resource curse
through sound governance would further assist to wade off social divisions that would
emanate from the lack of transparency. These are all potential risks that stare at Somalia’s
leadership as they navigate how they will prudently manage their abundance of oil
resources161.
4.9.6 Somalia’s External Actors
Right from its political history Somalia has been a centre of activity attracting interest from
regional and international actors. Analysts have shown that in the early part of the 1990s, the
link between the international humanitarian intercession and the interest of Western oil
159
Ahali, Aaron Yao Efui, and Ishmael Ackah. "Are They Predisposed to the Resources Curse? Oil in
Somalia." International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy 5, no. 1 (2015): 231-245.
160
161
78
companies, and today’s international military engagement is often assumed to be compelled
by the pursuit for oil exploration in Somalia 162. A fact to substantiate this assertion is shown
in one of the six steps set out by the United States prior to recognizing the Federal
Government of Somalia (FGS). The legitimacy of the Union of Islamic Courts was, for
instance enhanced with the support of HOA and American support. According to the Heritage
Institute for Policy Studies, (2013), the rule set out that the Somali government recognizes the
rights of US oil companies following the collapse of Said Barre’s government is a testament
to the role of external actors in contributing to the peace and stability of Somalia.
Considering Somalia’s weak state institutions, as well as its de facto lack of sufficient checks
and balances and its nascent democratic structures, the wealth that the oil sector promises to
accrue is likely to have adverse effects on politics. Rampant corruption in the country will
impede the transparent and fair management of the oil assets, thereby fostering social
divisions which is among the key conflict drivers in Somalia 163. External actors, despite their
vested interests in Somalia can play a role in establishing the conditions for peace.
AMISOM’s activities bespeak of this contribution, though long-lasting actions ought to
originate from the Somali nation.
4.9.7 Overlapping Concession Agreements
Conflict is further made highly probable due to disputed property rights resulting from oil
production companies signing conflicting contracts with heads of different political bodies in
Somalia164. In such a scenario, there is a high likelihood that oil enterprises will increasingly
endeavour to hold the political leaders to account so as to ensure the protection and
162
Gibbs, David N. "Realpolitik and humanitarian intervention: The case of Somalia."
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS-DORDRECHT- 37, no. 1 (2000): 41-56.
163
Ross, Michael L. "How do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from thirteen
cases." International organization 58, no. 1 (2004): 35-67.
164
79
enforcement of their contract rights, consequently putting fragile social relations under even
more strain. Petro Quest Africa for instance in February 2013 made an agreement for a block
with the local administration of Galmudug (a state in the south of Puntland). Petro Quest’s
contract conflicted with Shell’s claim of an offshore block and this led to Shell writing a
letter to the federal government in April 2013 demanding the protection of their exclusive
rights to the block, increasing the likelihood of a violent ‘solution’165.
Somalia’s legal situation, however, does not offer any solution to the concession rights issues.
To begin with, Somalia’s oil law passed in 2008 is vague and leaves much room for differing
interpretations, albeit being regarded as one of the most progressive legislations in the
country. Furthermore, important questions about which political actors are allowed to be
signatories to oil production deals to begin with remain unclear. Conflicting jurisdictions and
legal frameworks engender legal and political as well as armed struggles, with the security of
expatriates providing for concern. Ransom money paid to pirates during the heydays of
piracy in the Indian Ocean may return further inland. Moreover, international oil enterprises
become direct actors in the Somalia conflict crisis by putting additional strain on the already
tense relations between all the different actors in the Somali conflict crisis, that is, regional
administrations of Puntland and Somaliland, the federal government of Somalia and local
clans.
Oil concession agreements can even, prior to exploitation, lead to disputes and controversies
both between the different political entities in the region and with international oil companies.
Since 2013, the Federal Government of Somalia has entered into several concession
agreements with oil companies and their respective governments. Several violent
manifestations of these tensions have been registered as well. For instance, in 2014, a DNO
exploration team was ambushed in Sool by a clan militia, forcing DNO to flee to Hargeisa
165
Manson, Katrina. "Somalia: Oil thrown on the fire." Financial Times 13 (2013).
80
without any fatalities166. Further back in 2006, Range Resources’ oil exploration undertakings
in Puntland exacerbated clan tensions between Warsangeli and the local Puntland
administration (Majerten). Puntland’s security forces, which, in collaboration with Majerten
leaders, were allegedly instructed to safeguard Range Resources’ equipment, killed over
thirty people triggering the Warsangeli to form a new militia. The militia later went on to
swear allegiance to Al Shabaab and even defended an Al Shabaab territory in 2014167.
4.10 Summary
This chapter examined the oil evolution of the conflict in Somalia and how the discovery of
oil has altered the peace prospects. In this sub-section, it was established that the country’s
conflict grew for most of the authoritarian years of Siad Barre’s regime and that the interplay
of external and domestic actors combined to set Somali along a path of state collapse and
dysfunctionalism as a sovereign entity. The entry of oil as a factor only accentuates the
situation since long lasting peace is still a mirage. With the root causes of conflict yet to be
addressed, the actors to the conflict are likely to find another issue to be prosecuted in the
conflict unless mitigating measures are addressed. Concerted efforts are therefore needed to
tackle the root causes of the conflict and to ensure equitable gain from the oil resource.
166
Oppegaard, Sigurd Martin Nordli. "The Strains of Luxury. Labor in the Platform Economy. The
Case of Uber Black in Oslo." Master's thesis, 2018.
167
Bamberger, Jakob Grandjean, and Kristian Skovsted. Concessions and conflicts: Mapping oil
exploration in Somalia and Ethiopia. No. 2016: 02. DIIS Working Paper, 2016.
81
CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Introduction
This concluding chapter provides a review of what has been studied as well as the final
inferences and plausible lines of action to ensure that peace and stability is realized in
Somalia.
5.2 Summary
The focus of this study was on the Somalian case where the country has found peace and
stability elusive for most of its post-independence life. The disintegration of the country has
been systematic and catastrophic, with government collapse in the 1990s ushering in decades
of virulent clannism and secessionism that has split the country into fractions controlled by
armed groups. Whereas the TFG, aided by the AU and AMISOM as well as other
international backers have sought to ensure it re-establishes control over Somalia, conflict
dynamics still point to a conflict yet to be resolved since the Al Shabaab and other groups are,
together with the autonomous units, causing division in the country. With oil a new factor in
this conflict, this study sought to analyze how this country will convert this resource into a
blessing and not a curse.
Chapter One presented the structure of the study, providing a background of the issues, the
statement of the problem as well as the objectives. The study adopted these objectives; To
establish the background and historical evolution of the conflict in Somalia, to examine the
role of the various actors in the conflict in Somalia, to analyze the oil politics in Somalia and
it effect on peace and stability and recommend plausible measures to ensure that oil
exploration and exploitation contributes to Somalia’s peace and stability. The main argument
of this chapter was that there is need for a scholarly study on the prospects of peace in
82
Somalia, especially at a time when it is on the verge of obtaining windfalls from the oil
resource. Whereas many studies have pronounced themselves on the discovery of a precious
non-renewable resource as a resource curse, the same has not been comprehensively
undertaken in Somalia’s case.
A subsequent literature review in Chapter two presented a critique of the existing literature
and grounded this study in the gap in literature as identified. The resource curse model was
adopted to guide this study while the methodology that guided this study was laid out in
chapter three. The analysis of the conflict system is laid out in chapter four, with an extensive
examination of the various actors in the conflict and how they are shaping up for a potential
oil related conflict.
5.3 Conclusions
In conclusion, the presence of oil in any political or geographical context should lead to
growth. This is because oil revues help countries to undertake capital investments, expand
economies and create opportunities for its youthful generation. However, this has not been
the case with most the countries in Africa, where majority of the oil producing countries have
experienced inverse relationship between oil production and economic growth. This situation
has been described as the oil curse. Somalia unlike other countries in Africa, has a unique
opportunity to avert the negative effects of the oil curse, way before the exploration,
exploitation and production begins. According to research, for a country to succeed, it ought
to have effective institutions and promote transparency and accountability in the allocation oil
revenues. This should be proceeded with sound investment in the productive sector of the
economy to boost economic growth as well as create employment.
This study also concludes that the prospects for peace in Somalia are mixed; on one hand the
potential for economic growth and development is possible with oil exploration signifying
substantial oil finds. On the other hand, the decades- old conflict still has its actors and issues
83
that have for long not comprehensively resolved. This study concludes that with large areas
of the country balkanized along ethnic, regional and political divides, the discovery of the oil
resource- unless purposively addressed in this conflict context, there is a likelihood that
Somalia will also experience the resource curse.
Another conclusion is that the geopolitics of oil will likely make Somalia become a new
hotspot for control of the oil resource. As many powerful governments such as China, the
USA, Russia and Turkey seek newer sources of energy, they are likely to find Somalia
irresistible because of the geopolitical positioning of the country vis-à-vis the global shipping
lanes and potential markets. Control of the resource in Somalia will be less arduous a task as
compared with the struggles for control of the same resource in Venezuela and the Middle
East. With weak governments and potential for arm twisting through aid, Somalia is likely to
become a pawn in this struggle for energy.
This study further concludes that the haphazard entry and legitimation of oil exploration
companies is actually reducing the leverage of the Somali governments and its autonomous
regions have in ensuring that Somalia makes the most of this resource. The entry of this
multiple players in the oil sector are complicating the conflict dynamics. The multiplicity of
oil exploration contracts with these governing entities are actually giving clout to emerging
actors to the conflict while legitimizing otherwise unrecognized entities. In this situation,
Somalia is stating at the intricate web of the conflict actually becoming worse. Instead of
focusing on development, these new entrants are actually solidifying their zero-sum positions
in this conflict situation.
5.4 Recommendations
As a result of the analysis and inferences made in this study, the following recommendations
are made;
84
First of all, the various governing units and the TFG should in the short term freeze oil
exploration contracts and dialogue on the appropriate legal and administrative mechanisms of
allowing these companies to operate. This stop gap measure should be intended to allow for
multisectoral consultations and an evaluation of the Somali economic and political climate in
order to create a suitable environment for the proper exploitation of this resource.
Drawing on the resource curse thesis, the broad failures of anticipating the impacts of oil
extraction has the possibility of not only worsening the already existing security situation, but
also opening new frontiers of conflicts. In the immediate start of extraction, there would be
direct loss of livelihoods, that could be accompanied by the possible displacement and which
would disrupt individuals’ everyday life.
Secondly, the TFG should, with the help of other local and international partners build sound
governance through functioning legal and political structures. The traditional structures of
governance ought to be fully functional for crises of legitimacy and identity to be addressed.
For Somalia to create conditions for peace and stability, it has to also navigate the
international and regional interests in oil. In terms of national interests, ensuring that all of
the regional interests are properly taken care of. This would include the social investments,
infrastructure and the associated benefits that would be derived from oil. Partnership with an
established oil-producing country(ies) can help the country to acquire best practice in the
exploitation and use of this resource. Furthermore, Somalia ought to enrol in initiatives such
that make it possible for residents to peer review documents oil exploration and extraction
transactions.
Purposive steps should also be taken to demilitarize the country by allowing only legitimate
security sector players to thrive and systematically thinning the operating space of operating
space of insurgents and armed groups. The international community can partner with the TFG
and the autonomous units to widen the reach of governance and also ensuring maximum
85
control of the Somali border. Care would thus be needed for Somalia to put in place
mitigation measures to pre-empt grievances turning into conflicts. Taking a practical example
from the Nigerian case study, the lax regulation of existing laws by the federal government
has meant that oil multinationals have operated with impunity. The poor enforcement of
environmental standards has meant that oil multi-nationals have not been held accountable
for environmental degradations with wide ranging impacts for human.
Diversifying the natural resource rent from the non-oil economic sector should also be
considered. This would then mean investing the proceeds of oil to other non-oil sectors of the
economy such as trade and manufacturing. The net effect of diversifying into other economic
sectors of the economy would have a positive economic growth trajectory for the country.
This would result in additional income generating ventures, address unemployment while
shielding herself from the negative economic effects occasioned by price volatilities of oil in
the international market. Somalia too is in a process of reconfiguring its statehood and such
has to manage the associated complexities so as to manage prudently her natural resources. It
would be judicious to observe however the absence of a singular framework that would
address the resource curse dynamic.
It is imperative too for continuous dialogue between the federal government and the regions
around oil extraction. A debate too that is important to have in the context of oil extraction is
associated impacts of oil extraction in the community. This would help to pre-empt
grievances that could arise from resource extraction. Investing in these concerns would help
obstruct the experiences of oil rich regions such as the Niger Delta experiences in Nigeria
where a series of environmental grievances have come to the fore. The Niger Delta region has
held a growing spectacle of violence that is tied to both environmental grievances and
resource sharing.
86
Among others there would be the additional risk that the new conflict fault lines would arise
out of rapid population flow into resource rich areas. This could create conflicts between
residents of a particular region and the newcomers seeking to benefit from oil extraction 168. In
the context of a federal and clan structures in Somalia, the aforementioned would not be far-
fetched possibilities. Anticipating the socio-economic impacts and the counter-mitigation
measures would thus be necessary for Somalia.
168
87
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LIST OF APPENDIX
Appendix I: Questionnaires
This questionnaire is designed to gather research information on the project “influence of
credit management on commercial banks performance, a case of equity bank, Kenya.” For
section A, please fill only in one blank where appropriate.
SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Respondent’s Particulars
1. What is your gender?
Male [ ]
Female [ ]
2. For how long have you worked in the institution?
Less than 1 year [ ]
6-10 years [ ]
1-5 years [ ]
Over 10 years [ ]
3. What is your age bracket?
Below 20 [ ]
21-30 [ ]
31-40 [ ]
41-50 [ ]
51 and above [ ]
4. What is your highest level of formal education?
Certificate [ ]
Diploma [ ]
92
Bachelor [ ]
Master’s Degree [ ]
Other- Specify ……………………......................
5 How long have you worked in the organization?
Less than 2 years [ ]
2-5 years [ ]
6-10 years [ ]
More than 10 years [ ]
The Trends of Oil Related Conflicts

1. Has oil resulted insecurity incidents in south Somalia?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
2. How do you rate the extent to which oil exploration contributes to insecurity Somalia
residents?
Very High Extent [ ]

High Extent [ ]
Medium Extent [ ]
Low Extent [ ]
Very Low Extent [ ]
Explain
…………………………………………………………………………………….............
..
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………….
3. Does the oil exploration affect social activities among Somalia residents?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
93
Explain
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
4. Do the indigenous people feel primarily entitled to oil benefits?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
Explain…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
5. What are some of the impacts of these security threats?
.............................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
6. Do you agree that oil exploration has security effects social activities among Somalia
residents?
Strongly Agree
Agree
Undecided
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Explain
…………………………………………………………………………………….................
.................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................
The Relationship between Oil and Conflict in Somalia
1. On a scale of 1-5, where 1=Very significant, 2=Significant, 3 =Neither significant nor
insignificant, 4= Insignificant and 5=Very insignificant; How would you rate the
general significance of security implication oil exploration on security among Somalia
residents?
Very significant ( )
Significant ( )
Neither significant nor insignificant ( )
94
Insignificant ( )
Very insignificant ( )
2. On a scale of 1-5, where 1= Very High Extent, 2= High Extent, 3 = Medium Extent, 4=
Low Extent and 5=Very Low Extent; how does oil exploration affect security of the
following aspects of social activities among Somalia residents.
Very High High Medium Low Very

Extent Extent Extent Extent Low
Extent
Category 1 2 3 4 5
Cultural sites and

practices
Family roles setup
Environmental pollution
and health risks
Politics
Human Rights
Security Challenges Arising From Oil Exploration in Somalia

1. Is oil exploration a serious threat in Somalia?
Yes [ ]
No [ ]
2. What are the main sources of main economic activities of the residents within
Somalia?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
3. Does oil exploration affect economic activities among Somalia?
Yes [ ]
95
No [ ]
Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
Explain your answer
……………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………..
4. To what extent does oil exploration affect security of economic activities in Somalia?
Very High Extent [ ]

High Extent [ ]
Medium Extent [ ]
Low Extent [ ]
Very Low Extent [ ]
Explain…………………………………………………………………………………….........
......
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………..5.
On a scale of 1-5, where 1=Very significant, 2=Significant, 3 =Neither significant nor
insignificant, 4= Insignificant and 5=Very insignificant; How would you rate the general
significance of security implication of oil exploration on economic activities among Somalia
residents?
Very significant ( )
Significant ( )
Neither significant nor insignificant ( )
Insignificant ( )
Very insignificant ( )
Explain your answer
…………………………………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………………………………………………..
96
SECURITY MANAGEMENT ISSUES DUE TO OIL EXPLORATION
7. Is there sufficient community participation in oil exploration and natural resources
management activities?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
8. What security management strategies/measures have been instituted in the area since
oil discovery?
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
9. In your opinion, are the security management measures instituted sufficient?

YES [ ] NO [ ]
Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………….
10. Are there human rights abuses since oil discovery in Somalia?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
11. Are civil societies participating in oil exploration activities?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
Explain
97
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
12. To the best of you knowledge, what resource management policies are in place for oil
exploration?
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………….
13. Are the resource management policies adequate?

YES [ ] NO [ ]
Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
14. What measures can be instituted to curb negative security effects of oil exploration?
a) ………………………………………………………………………………
b) ………………………………………………………………………………
c) ………………………………………………………………………………
d) ………………………………………………………………………………
98

Oil Exploration in Somalia: Prospects for Peace or Conflict

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THE GEOPOLITICS OF OIL EXPLORATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR

PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOMALIA

Degree of Master of ………………………… of …………… University

This research project is dedicated to …

I would like to express my gratitude to …

1.1 Background to the Study..................................................................................................1

1.1.1 Somalia’s Oil Geology and Exploration...........................................................................4

1.1.2 Understanding Somalia’s Oil Stratigraphy.......................................................................4

1.2 Statement of the Problem.................................................................................................6

1.3 Objectives of the Study....................................................................................................7

1.4 Research Questions..........................................................................................................7

1.5 Significance of the Study.................................................................................................8

1.6 The Delimitation of the Study..........................................................................................9

1.7 Limitations of the Study...................................................................................................9

1.8 Chapter Outline..............................................................................................................10

2.2 Background of Resource-Related Conflicts in Africa...................................................11

2.2.1 Theorizing the Prevalence of Oil-Related Conflicts.......................................................12

2.3 Actors in Oil Related Conflicts......................................................................................27

2.4 The Oil Politics in Somalia............................................................................................28

2.5 Theoretical Framework..................................................................................................34

2.6 Theoretical Review........................................................................................................36

2.6.1 Environmental Justice Theory.........................................................................................36

2.7 Conceptual framework...................................................................................................38

3.2 Research Design.............................................................................................................40

3.3 Target Population...........................................................................................................40

3.4 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size............................................................................40

3.5 Unit of analysis..............................................................................................................41

3.6 Methods of Data Collection...........................................................................................41

3.6.1 Sources of Data...............................................................................................................41

3.6.3 Interview Guide...............................................................................................................42

3.6.4 Focus Group Discussion.................................................................................................42

3.8 Validity and Reliability..................................................................................................43

3.8.1 Validity of Instruments...................................................................................................43

3.8.2 Reliability of Instruments................................................................................................43

3.10 Ethical Issues................................................................................................................44

4.2 Demographic Overview of Somalia...............................................................................45

4.3 Somalia’s History and Colonial Legacies......................................................................46

4.4 The Evolution of Conflict in Somalia............................................................................47

4.5 Clan Politics and Conflicts.............................................................................................49

4.6 Al-Shabaab: Evolution of a Social Movement (2005-2018)..........................................52

4.7 The Dynamics of Oil......................................................................................................57

4.8 The Emerging Oil Conflict in Somalia..........................................................................58

4.9 Analysis of the Oil Politics in Somalia..........................................................................61

4.9.1 Mechanisms and Manifestations of Resource Curse......................................................61

4.9.2 Will the discovery of Oil Trigger Conflict?....................................................................62

4.9.3 Existence of Rebel Groups and External Actors.............................................................65

4.9.4 Ethnic Fractionalization in Somalia................................................................................67

4.9.5 Political Grievance..........................................................................................................69

4.9.6 Somalia’s External Actors...............................................................................................74

4.9.7 Overlapping Concession Agreements.............................................................................75

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project

AMISOM African Mission in Somalia

APF African Peace Facility

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

ESU Exploration Security Unit

HOA Horn of Africa

FGS Federal Government of Somalia

GIA Galmudug Interim Administration

GRS Galmudug Regional State

MNC Multinational Corporation

ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front

OPU Oil Protection Unit