PLATO'S CONCEPT OF MIMESIS

Leon Golden

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D. W. LUCAS raises a profoundly important point for Platonic aesthetics
when he writes:
If the world is only a shadow of reality, who wants a shadow of a shadow—unless
the representation of the shadow can reveal something of the reality behind the
shadow? Plato alone among early philosophers had it in his power to exalt the
artist and set him up as the hierophant through beauty of reality. But he chose to
do nothing of the sort, though in the Symposium (209 A) he took a step along the
path which could have led in that direction. So his verdict was condemnation,
however reluctant, of the arts, which are allowed only to be of some slight use in
elementary education and, in the Laws, for innocent relaxation.1

The present paper seeks to affirm a point which Lucas denies: that Plato
actually believed that art (the 'shadow of a shadow') 'can reveal some-
thing of the reality behind the shadow'.
We are in a favourable position today to comprehend the meaning
of the classical concept of mimesis because of a series of careful investiga-
tions which have been carried out by scholars in recent decades. These
investigations have taken two general directions. One group of studies
has concentrated on the precise range of meaning of mimesis in actual
Greek usage and the most significant results in this area have been achieved
by Roller, Else, and Sorbom. Other scholars, and most especially McKeon
and Verdenius, have significantly deepened our understanding of mimesis
as part of the general philosophical system of Plato and Aristotle.
We must begin by ascertaining the range of meaning possible for
mimesis. Here we will see that, while the principal investigators differ
with each other on many details, they all affirm that this term can refer to
a creative action that far transcends the notion of mere copying that often
is implied by the word 'imitation'. Roller was the first of the scholars
mentioned above to make this point.2 He argued, on the basis of a de-
tailed survey of the use of this term, that many of the early occurrences of
mimesis and related words appeared in contexts where music and dance
played prominent roles. From this he concluded that the word originally
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denoted an aspect of dance and that the verb mimeisthai (to imitate)
primarily meant 'to represent through dance' ('durch Tanz zur Darstel-
lung bringen'). At various places in his work Roller uses the terms 'Dar-
stellung' (representation) and 'Ausdruck' (expression) as appropriate
renderings of mimesis when used in an artistic context, and opposes them
to 'Nachahmung' (copying), which is the mechanical, photographic
reproduction of an object. While he does not give a precise definition of
his terms for 'representation' and 'expression', Roller does indicate their
general field of reference by opposing them to photographic reproduc-

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tion, which he says is the very opposite of the artistic process. By empha-
tically asserting that while mimesis can in certain contexts mean 'copying',
it nevertheless bears a totally different meaning as an aesthetic term, he
suggests an important creative function for this concept. Roller's failure
to be more precise about the meaning of his terms for 'representation'
and 'expression', and his locating of the basic meaning of mimesis in the
area of dance, have evoked criticism from other scholars.
Gerald Else, in strong opposition to important aspects of Roller's
interpretation, undertook an analysis of all of the occurrences of mimesis
and its related forms in the fifth century B.C.3 Else discovered three nuances
of meaning in the use of mimesis at this time:
i. 'Miming:' direct representation of the looks, actions, and/or utterances of
animals or men through speech, song, and/or dancing (dramatic or protodramatic
sense): Arist. Poet. I (1447 b 10) and Frag. 72 R. h. Horn. Apoll. 163; Aesch. Cho. 564;
Pind. Pyth. 12.21; idem Frag. 94 b Sn.; idem Frag. 107 a Sn. 2. 'Imitation' of the actions
of one person by another, in a general sense, without actual miming (ethical sense):
Theog. 370 (date perhaps doubtful). 3. 'Replication': an image or effigy of a person
or thing in material form (mimema only): Aesch. Frag. 364 N 8 .; idem, P Oxy. 2162.4

Important aspects of this formulation are also disputed by scholars,

but what is important for the present study is that Else, like Roller, has
identified a sense of mimesis which involves an interpretative act as op-
posed to mechanical, physical reproduction. Of the second nuance
he has discussed above, he writes: 'Sense (2) is an easy step from sense (1),
since miming, though accomplished by physical means, gains its point
and piquancy from the rendering of characteristic facial expression, gesture,
movement, tone of voice, that is, is "ethical" and not merely physical....'
If the artist is to express the special ethos or character of a person or object
he must use physical means (often symbolically) to suggest the proper
direction of interpretation to his audience. The degree of subtlety,
complexity and ambiguity that is associated with the art work in its
physical manifestation is of course what is responsible for the variety of
judgements that are possible in the criticism of art.
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 PLATO'S CONCEPT OF MIMESIS
Sorbom's investigation of the empirical evidence for the use of
mimesis in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. takes issue with a number of
conclusions arrived at by his predecessors.5 He too, however, uncovers
an interpretative dimension of mimesis. He argues that the original sense
of this word was derived from the term mimos, which designated a certain
kind of actor and his performance. In his view the verb 'to imitate'
originally meant 'to behave like a mime actor' or 'to give something
a mime-like character'. Sorbom indicates that the procedures followed
by a mime actor were 'characterized by a desire to make something clear,

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to caricature, to choose the characteristic details of something, or strongly
emphasize some of the characteristic traits of phenomena in representing
them'. In common usage the term appears to have lost its vividness and it
came to mean 'to do the same thing as some one else does'. It also became,
however, the technical term for artistic creation for Xenophon, Plato
and Aristotle.
The three studies we have cited reveal that many important details
about the origin and use of the term mimesis are uncertain. One point
on which these investigations do agree is that mimesis was used to describe
a process that went beyond the copying of external form to the represen-
tation of essential character. It makes little difference if we call this process
'representation' and 'expression' with Koller, or imitation in an 'ethical
sense' with Else, or an activity designed to 'make something clear' with
Sorbom. In all cases it refers to the evocation of a deeper than surface
reality and it is this nuance of meaning which illuminates the true signi-
ficance and thrust of the great Platonic and Aristotelian theories of
aesthetic imitation.
Our understanding of Plato's concept of mimesis has been greatly
aided by the major investigations into this subject that have been
undertaken by McKeon and Verdenius. We must begin by understanding
that for Plato mimesis is not a term which has a single specific meaning or
application. Rather it undergoes a series of extensions as it is used in
various contexts in the dialogues and is left, as McKeon says, 'universal
in scope and indeterminate in application'. Even though we have no single,
univocal definition of this term, we can draw some significant conclu-
sions about it from its pervasive appearance in a wide variety of contexts.
First, we are well aware that for Plato poetry and all of the other arts
such as painting, music and the dance are forms of imitation. But for
Plato words themselves are imitations of the things they describe and the
individual letters that constitute words are also imitations. Plato asserts,
moreover, that all existing governments are imitations of a true idea of
government and that written laws are imitations of a true idea of laws.
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Indeed the structure of the very universe itself reflects mimetic principles
since, in McKeon's words, it consists of 'the model form, the imitation of
the model and the Space or Receptacle in which Becoming takes place'.
The visible universe in which we dwell is thus only a copy, an imitation
of a truly real, unchanging, intelligible world. For Plato mimesis is a
great formal principle that penetrates every aspect of our existence.
McKeon has clarified the nature of this principle in the following state-
ment:

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In its expansion and contraction, the word 'imitation' indicates the lesser term of the
proportion of being to appearance: if God is, the universe is an imitation; if all
things are, shadows and reflections are imitations; if the products of man's handicraft
are, his representations of them are imitations. If imitation is to be avoided, it is
because of the danger of imitating, through error, ignorance, or falsehoood, that
which is not or that which is less than it might be or is less than that which imitates it.6

Here McKeon not only helps us see the role played by mimesis in Plato's
world view but he also provides a correct understanding of the famous
passages in the Republic where Plato banishes poets from his ideal state
because they are imitators. By this dramatic action Plato warns us that
imitation is not, and can never be, reality; that it is far inferior to reality;
and that we must never be satisfied with it as a substitute for reality.
Nevertheless we should not miss the profound irony that these strictures
against imitation are laid down in a literary form that is itself identified
as a type of mimesis by Aristotle in the Poetics.1 In Plato's philosophy we
must obviously place the highest value on reality over imitation;
but we must also sadly realize that, at least until the soul is released from
the body, the principal means at our disposal for apprehending reality
are imitative ones. As McKeon says: 'Images and copies, however, as the
metaphor would suggest, provide no satisfactory substitute for reality,
though they are a necessary stage in the approach to reality. To under-
stand the image we must know the reality; but to know the reality we
must dispose of images.'
It is now important for our understanding of Plato's concept of mimesis
to see in a concrete way how imitation can be used in the service of our
approach to reality itself. In the Cratylus (423 C-424 B) we are told that
names are 'imitations' of the essential nature of things, and at 426 C-427
D we are informed that letters possess the capacity of representing real
qualities in the names of things. Plato justifies this phenomenon by indicat-
ing that individual letters are similar to, and therefore appropriate images
of, various qualities of things themselves. At 431 C-D he explicitly states
that the difference between a good and bad name is that the good name,
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by revealing the essence of the thing named, is a good image of it while
a bad name is a bad image of it. We are told, moreover, in the Laws
(668 A-B) that the goal of an imitation is to be similar to its original and
not to be pleasant, as many think. It is the similarity of the imitation to its
model that allows it to be used as a device for learning about reality.
Not all imitations manifest this similarity because, as we are told in the
Sophist (267 B), only some imitators have knowledge of what they imi-
tate. When, however, good imitations are fashioned by imitators who
have knowledge, the appropriate conditions exist under which the study

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of imitations can lead to an insight into reality. We shall see shortly how
Plato uses various forms of mimesis throughout his work to investigate the
nature of reality.
We have discussed mimesis as a formal principle underlying the struc-
ture of the universe for Plato and we are now ready to concentrate our
attention on mimesis as an aesthetic phenomenon. Here we owe a great
debt to Verdenius, who has clarified Plato's real attitude toward art with
great perception. Verdenius's starting-point is the highly ambiguous
status of the artist in the Platonic world view. On the one hand we are
told in the Ion and other works that the poet is divinely inspired and the
servant of the Muse, and on the other hand we are informed in this dia-
logue and elsewhere that the poet's words are confused, contradictory
and not to be trusted. Now the inspiration itself must be good and re-
lated to truth, for it is sent by the divine Muse who must be free from evil
intent. Thus the confusions and contradictions which characterize poetry
must be the result of the poet's own human limitations. The fact that the
poet is inspired by the divine Muse indicates that his task is to represent
something deeper than mere surface resemblances. In rejecting the view
that the poet's goal is to express 'the facts of everyday life in their casual
succession' Verdenius says:

If this were the only aim of his art, imitation would never fail. That it does fail, is an
indication that it also refers to something not directly observable and describable,
to a more general aspect of reality. Evidently it is the task of the poet to represent
these general values through the medium of human life. Imitating characters and
actions he must at the same time try to evoke an idea of their ultimate principles.
These lie so far from his natural range of thought that he needs the help of divine
inspiration. Unfortunately, the ecstatical condition which brings him into contact
with the Muse also precludes him from fully understanding her intentions. He can
only register his impressions, or in other words, imitate the images which present
themselves to his mind. Consequently, his representations are lacking inarticulateness:
they remain tentative suggestions, in which the general and the particular, the
abstract and the concrete, the essential and the accidental are blended so much that
the work taken as a whole appears to be inconsistent.8

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Here we have a clear statement of the predicament of the poet, who

with all of his human limitations attempts, in Verdenius's fine phrase,
'to translate a divine message into human language'.
What, then, is the artist to do? He could concern himself with
realistic imitations of objects and justifiably earn philosophical scorn for
occupying himself with phenomena that are two degrees removed from
reality. He might, however, accept his mission as the interpreter of the
divine message and, conscious of the great risks and dangers of his choice,
seek to give concrete representation to his visions of ultimate reality. The

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first route offers the artist easy but meaningless success; the second, an
opportunity for-great glory that is not easy to achieve. We must now
inquire into the conditions that make it possible, even though very diffi-
cult, for an artist to approach ultimate reality. Plato's own dialogues,
themselves forms of mimesis, are proof that he regarded it as both
feasible and valuable for the artist to undertake this task.
In a sense the answer to our problem has already been given. Earlier
we saw how the universe for Plato was constructed on a model-copy
basis. Under this conception there are different levels of being which
reflect degrees of approximation to eternal reality. The empirical world
in which we live is not genuine reality but only an approximation of it,
which Plato explicitly says can reveal something of the real world which
it imitates. This is so because, as we have seen previously, the similarity
of the copy to its model permits us to learn about reality. Verdenius de-
scribes the situation in which various levels of being approach ultimate
truth in different degrees as the 'hierarchical structure of reality'.
In these circumstances thought can be an imitation of reality, spoken
words of actual things, physical sounds of divine harmony, earthly time
of eternity, law of truth, human government of true government,
devout men of the gods, visible figures of intelligible ones; and thus we
have proof, Verdenius argues, that Platonic imitation means the approxi-
mation of reality and not merely the production of a true copy.
A connection, therefore, exists among all levels of the hierarchical
structure of reality. Using an image, Verdenius describes this connection
as 'a gradually fading sheen of eternal radiance [which] may be said to
pervade all stages of reality' and he recognizes that the goal of true art
is to evoke 'something of that higher realm of being which also glimmers
through phenomenal reality'. It is precisely because lower levels of being
are imitations of higher levels in the hierarchical structure of reality that an
inspired poet has a chance of apprehending some aspect of the truth.
To do this he will have to discipline himself severely to focus his atten-
tion on the pale gleam of transcendental light that faintly illuminates our
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empirical world. His own inherent weaknesses as a man and artist, and the
dimness of our vision of reality at its best, make the task extremely
difficult.
We are now in a position to summarize the Platonic attitude towards
imitation. For Plato our ultimate goal is the apprehension of reality and
we must never be content with imitations or confuse them with reality.
Nevertheless our lives are lived in an empirical world that is itself a mimesis
of the real, intelligible one, and we must accept the hierarchical structure
of reality as a fact of existence. The significance of artistic mimesis is that,

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reflecting a principle which governs the structure of the universe, it
offers us an opportunity by which we can move from the obscure to the
clear, from the false to the true, in those situations where the artist is
inspired, wise, skilful and sufficiently honest and humble never to take
too seriously his achievement or to impute to it more than it actually
accomplishes. If we could approach ultimate reality directly we would,
but since this is impossible (at least until death severs our souls from our
bodies) then ascension to reality through various stages of mimesis is
the only path open to us. The artist can be our guide in this process of
apprehending something of ideal reality, but we must never forget the
powerful limitations under which he works. Verdenius states the
Platonic view of art concisely in the following words :
Art, therefore, has a double aspect: in its visible manifestation it is a thing of the most
inferior value, a shadow; yet it has an indirect relation to the essential nature of
things. The intensity of this relation depends upon the degree to which the artist
succeeds in illuminating the higher aspects of the intermediate plane, viz. of visual
reality. . . . It is true that the Greek artist followed nature, but he did not stick to its
casual aspects; he rather tried to detect its deeper meanings. He was well aware of the
fact that the essential nature of things is not identical with their visual appearance,
but that it must still be represented in natural forms. He also knew that suggesting a
deeper meaning is not to be achieved through deforming nature but through
clarifying its fundamental structure.9

Thus Plato's attitude toward mimesis does not represent rejection of this
process—something that would be impossible given the hierarchical
structure of reality—but it does require extreme caution in the use and
interpretation of this necessary technique in the approach to absolute
reality. Indeed since, as we have seen, good imitations fashioned by imita-
tors who have knowledge can illuminate the nature of true reality, they
are used by Plato throughout his work. A study of any Platonic dialogue
will demonstrate how deeply the mimetic process penetrates the work
of this philosopher who is often alleged to be the enemy of mimesis.
In this regard I propose now to analyze in some detail the Phaedo, which
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fully illustrates all the types of mimesis used by Plato. First, we need to
call attention to the three general types of imitation that are found
throughout Plato's work; metaphorical language, myth and the dialogue
form itself.
The use of metaphors and similes in the work of Plato is widespread.
In the Sophist (218 D, 221 B-C) the Stranger uses the image of angling to
clarify the essential nature of the Sophist. In the Symposium (215 A)
Alcibiades uses the Silenus and satyr figures to explain the inner nature of
Socrates. In the Theaetetus (150 A) the image of the midwife is invoked

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to provide insight into Socrates's procedure as a teacher and philosopher.10
Throughout the dialogues many additional examples can be found, as
will be evident from our discussion of the Phaedo.
Beyond the use of metaphorical language there is the extremely im-
portant use of myth by Plato.11 In the Critias (107 B-D) we are told that in
discussing divine matters we must use imitations and representations of
them since we do not possess scientific knowledge in this area. These are
circumstances in which Plato frequently has recourse to myth, which is a
mimesis of a truth or insight that cannot be demonstrated scientifically.
An excellent example of just such a myth is found in the Phaedo.
Finally, as Aristotle observed, the dialogue form itself is a type of
mimesis. Not only does it make use of metaphor and myth, but it is con-
structed with attention to characterization, setting and dramatic confron-
tation as the means of expressing philosophical insight. All the dialogues
exemplify the procedure described in the Republic (588 B) of learning
about reality by 'forming an image of the soul in conversation.' Here too
the Phaedo will offer us clear evidence for this procedure.
Let us begin our analysis with the metaphorical language of the
Phaedo. In responding to a question by Cebes concerning a report that he
had begun to write poetry in prison, Socrates explains that
a dream had come to him urging him to 'make music'. He originally
interpreted this dream metaphorically as meaning to continue the
pursuit of his philosophical activity since 'philosophy is the greatest form
of music' (60 E-61 A). Here the beautiful harmony of audible music is
used to suggest the exquisite, intelligible harmonies of philosophy.
When Cebes later expresses the fear that the soul will be destroyed
when the body dies, Socrates replies that Cebes seems to suffer from a
childish fear. Cebes responds by urging Socrates to argue against this
fear by assuming that 'perhaps there is a child within us' who is frightened
of this possibility. The image of the child within every adult, who fears
the unknown quantity of death, clarifies the character of that emotion
by comparing it to a real child's helpless terror in the face of ghosts and
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spirits (77 D-E). Subsequently Socrates, arguing about the nature of the
soul, tells Cebes that whenever the soul is associated with the body
'it wanders about and is confused and dizzy as if it were drunk' (79 C-D).
The confused attempts of the soul, when encumbered by the body, to
reach absolute truth are clarified by the image of the erratic gait of a
drunken man who stumbles toward his goal with great difficulty.
When Simmias shows special consideration for Socrates on the grounds
that he must feel great anguish because of his imminent death, Socrates
responds by comparing himself to the swans who sing throughout their

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lives but who 'sing most and best' when they are about to die and go 'to
the God whose servants they are' (84 E-85 B). Socrates describes himself
in the image of a 'fellow servant' of the swans and by this he means that he,
like the swans, sees the moment of death as one of rapture, for he will be
free from the many infirmities of body and able at last to look upon God
and perceive absolute truth. Later, when answering an argument of
Simmias that suggests that the soul is weaker than the body (86 E-87 E),
Cebes makes use of the image of a dying cloakmaker and his last cloak.
The cloakmaker has made and outlived many cloaks in his lifetime and the
fact that his final cloak survives him does not mean that he is a weaker
thing than a cloak. This image, Cebes argues, illuminates the relationship
between the soul and the body for, on the analogy of the cloakmaker
and his cloaks, the soul is seen as wearing out many bodies during its
existence and then finally expiring encased in its last body.
The discussion of whether or not the soul is a 'harmony', which takes
place at 85 E and 92 A fF., is a prime example of the use of metaphor in this
dialogue to clarify a concept that is otherwise difficult to subject to analysis.
Simmias raises the question at 85 C-86 D of whether the soul is not like
musical harmony which is destroyed when the physical basis for creating
harmony, the wood and strings of the musical instrument, is destroyed.
Because it is incorporeal and yet intimately associated with corporeal
elements, the familiar notion of harmony seems to be a useful metaphor for
suggesting a possible truth about the more mysterious reality of the soul.
The similarity between image and object is sufficiently intriguing to
warrant an extended discussion. Subsequent logical and dialectical
analysis shows inconsistencies between the nature of musical harmony
and other characteristics of the soul that had been agreed upon, and
Socrates is able to win agreement that the soul cannot be a harmony.
The procedure followed here by Socrates and Simmias is very instructive
for our understanding of the role of mimesis in Plato. Working with a
concept about which they have no certain knowledge, they find a pos-
sible approach to it through a metaphorical image which appears to be
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similar to it. After the image has been introduced into the discussion a
logical and dialectical analysis is made which shows the degree to which
the image is a valid or invalid representation of the reality under investiga-
tion. This use of mimesis is summed up in the final such image used by
Socrates in this dialogue when he cites those who damage their eyes by
gazing too long at an eclipse to explain why he cannot look directly at
reality, but must view it through representations.
Thus for Plato familiar images are often the necessary starting-point
for the understanding of the more obscure phenomena of reality. Once a

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suggestive metaphor is discovered, however, logic and dialectic must then
determine the extent to which the image actually does clarify ultimate
reality.
The second form of mimesis frequently employed by Plato is the
introduction of myth at a critical point in the argument. In the Phaedo
such a myth occurs at the conclusion of the discussion concerning the
immortality of the soul, and its purpose is to suggest the nature of ulti-
mate reality. In the myth Socrates pictures our situation as one in which
we actually live in hollows, not on the earth's surface. There the many
impurities of water, mist and air which have flowed into these hollows
impair our vision although we do not realize it. From our lowly and
unfavourable position we view the sun and stars in the same way that
people who might live at the bottom of the ocean would perceive them:
we think that we see clearly when actually we have only a distorted view
of reality. Through indolence we never struggle upward to the surface
to behold the true sun and stars in place of the pale images that filter
through the mist. If we ever reached this vantage point, we would see
that the world viewed from the surface of the earth was infinitely superior
to the world in the hollows. This imaginative picture is meant to repre-
sent the wide chasm separating the world of images and the world of
true reality. Socrates further portrays the real world as an infinitely beauti-
ful one where colours and precious stones stagger us with an abundance
and loveliness unobtainable in our world. The seasons and climate in this
real world are such that there are no diseases and men live much longer
than we do and suffer no impairments of sight or hearing and are
far superior to us in wisdom. Best of all, here men have immediate
contact with the gods and see all things as they really are.
Socrates then presents an elaborate picture of the many rivers and
streams of the true earth, which leads him to a discussion of the disposi-
tion of the souls of the dead. He tells us that those who have lived a life
that was not characterized by exceptional virtue or vice travel by way of
the Acheron to the lake where they are purified and are rewarded or
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punished as they deserve. Those, however, who have committed incurable
evils are cast into Tartarus and never emerge. Those who have committed
curable evils of a serious nature are also thrust into Tartarus but are carried
by the rivers into the Acherusian lake where they beg forgiveness from
those they have outraged. If they succeed, they emerge from Tartarus but
if not they must make repeated circuits until they do win pardon from
their victims. Those who have lived with exceptional piety and goodness
and who have been purified by philosophy go to live for the rest of time
in places too beautiful to describe (114 B-C). Then Socrates explicitly

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states the moral of the myth: the rewards of beholding absolute
reality in all its splendour are so great, men should do all in their power
to attain virtue and wisdom in their lives.
In a passage of great significance Socrates gives an explicit evaluation
of the meaning of the myth he has elaborately constructed. He observes
that to insist that this myth precisely reflects reality itself would not be
fitting for a man of good sense. The picture he has drawn, however,
bears some important resemblance to reality and it is a worthy task for a
man of sense to explore this similarity (114 D). We clearly see that the
extensive myth of the Phaedo is a representation of the hierarchical struc-
ture of the Platonic universe and that Socrates uses the myth to remind
us that the visible world and its apparent truths are themselves imperfect
images of a higher reality which it is worth a man's life to apprehend.
The world of absolute reality is not susceptible to sight or touch.
It can be attained only by isolating meaningful, suggestive images in
this world and refining these images by rigorous logical and
dialectical processes. Thus the myth of the Phaedo is a symbolic statement
which suggests the character of absolute reality.
Finally mimesis is utilized in the work of Plato in the dialogue form
itself. The dialogue is a representation of men in action, sharing many
important qualities with dramatic literature. The 'plot' of the dialogue
is the central philosophical argument whose significance is illustrated and
carried to fruition by the assembled characters. The setting of the scene
and the careful characterization of the participants play important roles
in clarifying the philosophical 'action' of the Platonic dialogue.
Thus at the beginning of the Phaedo (57 A ff.) we have a conversation
between Phaedo and Echecrates about the circumstances leading up to
Socrates's death. Details are mentioned such as the reason for the delay
in Socrates's execution after the trial and the names of the friends who
were there during his final hours, and what their emotions were. After
this introduction we see Socrates himself newly released from his chains,
rubbing his leg and instructing his friends to take his wife home because
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of her great sorrow and weeping. The atmosphere of deep gloom which
prevails among Socrates's companions as they prepare to watch him
die is the appropriate setting for the discussion of the immortality of the
soul, which is the principal philosophical issue at stake in the Phaedo.
In this dialogue, as much as in any tragedy, three-dimensional characters
interact with each other; in the Platonic view, however, their words and
actions, suggesting more accurately the nature of true reality, are of far
greater significance than those which regularly graced the theatre of
Dionysus.

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The skillful representation of Socrates prior to the time of his execution
is of great dramatic and philosophical interest (63 D-E). He is informed
by Crito that the official in charge warns against excessive conversation
before the administration of the poison or else additional doses may be
required. Socrates sharply rejects the warning with typical indifference
to his own physical comfort. It is a rejection and an indifference that are
rooted in the principle that governs the conduct of the true philosopher:
to practise during his entire life how to die and to be dead (64 A-B).
This striking doctrine, validated by Socrates's last hours, has an interesting
impact on Simmias. He laughs, although he has no desire to laugh in
those sad circumstances, and responds that most people would agree
that philosophers desire death and deserve it. Socrates replies that these
people would be right but that they do not know the real sense in which
their words are true. Socrates is portrayed as having the tenacious courage
of the true philosopher, who eagerly awaits the separation of the soul
from the body so that he may finally gaze upon true reality. The strength
of his inner certitude allows him to comfort his friends, who but for their
deep grief ought to be comforting him. This characterization of Socrates
is clearly meant to emphasize the depth and solidity of the philosophical
principles to which he has dedicated, and sacrificed, his life.
Perhaps the most important scene in which the inner nature of Socrates
is portrayed occurs at 115 B ff. where a poignant interchange takes
place between Socrates and Crito. Here Crito gloomily asks how he is
to bury Socrates and is told that he may do it in any way he wishes pro-
vided only that he can really take hold of Socrates after death. For Crito
has missed the point of the dialogue and Socrates's deepest teachings
about the nature of human, existence, which assert that death is the moment
when genuine life begins as the soul is freed from the body and can behold
the ineffable beauty of true reality. The Socrates who gently consoles his
grief-stricken friends and faces his death with optimism and integrity is
both image and embodiment of the philosophical wisdom inherent in the
argument of the dialogue. The vivid, three-dimensional representation
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 PLATO'S CONCEPT OF MIMESIS
of Socrates and his companions in earnest discussion about the immortality
of the soul acts like a potent tragic drama to invoke emotional empathy
as well as intellectual involvement. Because the thoughts and feelings of
Crito and Simmias are for the most part ours also, we are forced to try
to reconcile our sympathetic seconding of their expressions of grief with
our admiration for the awesome, heroic stance of Socrates. Being involved
in this way we are driven to clarify our conflicting responses and thus we
become, as Plato intended, partners in the intellectual enterprise of the
dialogue.12 By uniting subtle and powerful emotional effects worthy of

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Homer and the great tragedians with the dialectical quest for truth,
Plato creates in the Phaedo a superior example of artistic mimesis.
We are now in a position to summarize the role of mimesis for Plato.
We have seen that Plato recognizes a hierarchical structure of reality
in which we must constantly seek to move from the copy or image
before us to a higher level more closely associated with true reality.
We may do this either by careful logical and dialectical analysis of forms
of mimesis given in nature or else by constructing new ones, as occurs
in the arts. An image is valuable, however, only in so far as it accurately
reflects its model. Such an image can sometimes be created by an artist
who is inspired but is more likely to be achieved by one who also possesses
knowledge. The discovery of a suggestive metaphor, myth or other
image is the first important step in the process of apprehending reality;
it must, however, be followed closely by a profound logical and dialec-
tical analysis of the degree to which it accurately reflects the truth of
which it is an image. Plato's own practice in writing the dialogues shows
how necessary the use of mimesis is in the search for ultimate reality. It
must, however, be handled carefully and above all it must never be con-
fused with true reality. By skillfully uniting intellectual and emotional
dimensions the Phaedo shows how a great work of philosophy and a great
work of artistic mimesis can be one and the same.
Thus we reject Lucas's view that Plato judged all art to be necessarily
trivial. At its best artistic mimesis offers a means, and sometimes the only
means, for moving from the world of appearances to the world of
reality.

REFERENCES'
1
D. W. Lucas, Aristotle: Poetics (Oxford, Century,' Classical Philology 53 (1958)
1968) pp. 260-1. 73-90.
2
H. Roller, Die Mimesis in der Arttike * Op. Cit., p. 79.
5
(Bern, 1954). G. SSrbom, Mimesis and Art: Studies in
3
G. F. Else, 'Imitation' in the Fifth the Origin and Early Development of an
130
 LEON GOLDEN
Aesthetic Vocabulary (Uppsala, 1966). A
concise summary of his conclusions is
given at pp. 204-8.
6
R. McKeon, 'Literary Criticism and the
Concept of Imitation in Antiquity', in
Critics and Criticism: Ancient and Modern, Platonic dialogues 'from the outside'.
ed. by R. S. Crane (Chicago, 1952) p.
154. For the centrality of the concept of
mimesis in the philosophy of Plato see
A. Dies, Autour de Platon (Paris, 1927)
p- 594-5-
7
See Poetics, 1447 b 9-13.
8 W. J. Verdenius, Mimesis: Plato's
Doctrine of Artistic Imitation and its
Meaning to us (Leiden, 1949) pp. 12-13.
9
Op. cit., pp. 19-20.
10
As has been noted by H. L. Sinaiko,
Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato: Socrates' irony, that we are compelled
Dialogue and Dialect in Phaedrus, Republic, to admit to ourselves our ignorance,
Parmenides (Chicago, 1965) p. 2, four
images are used to establish the character
of Socrates in the dialogues. He is
described as a gadfly in the Apology
because he disturbs the torpor of his
fellow-citizens with irritating questions,
a philosophic midwife in the Theaetetus
because he brings the ideas of others to
birth, a torpedo fish in the Meno because
of the similarity between the 'numbing
and paralysing' attack of that animal
and a Socratic onslaught, and as a
statue of Marsyas the satyr in the
Symposium because, while both are
externally ugly, they open to reveal
deep inner beauty. The capability which
images have of suggesting or revealing
an ultimate truth is well illustrated by
their application to Socrates's intriguing
personality.
11
The use of myth by Plato is a large and
complex subject. Two useful discussions
of the problem are L. Edelstein, 'The
Function of the Myth in Plato's Philo-
sophy', Journal of the History of Ideas, 10 usually happens in Platonic dialogues
(i949)i PP- 470-1 and K. Reinhardt,
Platons Mythen (Bonn, 1927), pp. 149-50
12
The mimetic qualities of the Platonic
dialogues are perceptively discussed by
J. Klein, A Commentary on Plato's Meno
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1956) pp. 3-31. He
writes: "It seems that it is not enough
to talk about the dramatic character of
We have to play our role in them, too.
We have to be serious about the
contention that a Platonic dialogue,
being indeed an 'imitation of Socrates',
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actually continues Socrates's work. This
again is by no means a novel view.
There is immediate plausibility in it.
And yet its consequences are hardly
ever accepted. These are that we, the
readers, are being implicitly questioned
and examined, that we have to weigh
that it is up to us to get out of the
impasse and to reach a conclusion, if it is
reachable at all. We are one of the
elements of the dialogue and perhaps
the most important one (pp. 7-9). . . .
A properly written text will tend to
transform the unavoidable deficiency
of writing into a lever of learning and
understanding. By imitating a discussion
the character of incompleteness can be
accentuated: as we all know, the move-
ment inherent in any discussion, if it
does not reach an end in complete
agreement or complete clarification
(which may happen but rarely happens),
is the best inducement for its continu-
ation. A properly written text will have,
therefore, to initiate this movement and
keep it alive by stringing it along decisive
questions and partial or ambiguous
answers. This, in itself, is nothing but
an outgrowth of Socrates' veiled way
of speaking. But beyond that, answers
can be given in a written text by the
very action it presents. That is what
and what constitutes their dramatic or
mimetic quality' (p. 17).