946 ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF the biographical sections. Biography is the stuff of popular books, and indeed the introductory wine-making analogy seems aimed at a general audience. Yet while not technical enough for philosophers, the book seems too technical for nonphilosophers. ‘The ancedotal style often pro- vides little explanation where the nonphilosopher would need it. Omit- ting explanations by pleading lack of space is not helpful, and I fear, gives the reader the idea that besides the persistent name dropping, the author is also guilty of “topic dropping.” For example, it is not helpful being told without any explanation that Russell’s logical system uses modus ponens (p. 13). Nor is it helpful to see “naturalized epistemol- ogy” used well before the discussion of Quine (p, 63). Since the logical symbolism itself plays no role in Stroll’s explanations, his introduction of symbols seems counterproductive and nothing but an attempt to im- press. [lis introduction of the Sheffer stroke in a general overview of Russell's logic seems to function in the same way (p. 14) Readers generally may be annoyed by the many jejune claims like the following: “The boldness and power of these conclusions shook the Philosophical world” (p. 103). “Then comes a shocker, the first of many” (p. 104). “No single sentence can summarize Wittgenstein’s later philosophy” (p. 113). “Wittgenstein’s . . . philosophy is deep and difficult to understand ...” (p. 115). “One could write a whole book on these two passages. But their originality is palpable” (p. 253) Then there are the sorts of things good copy editing should have caught: continuing the discussion of Russell across chapters, Stroll's writing at the beginning of chapter nine that it has two parts when it has three, introducing a list of the 25 subjects of the published Schilpp vol- umes and then listing only 24 (p. 250), and writing “Seyyed Hossein Nast (whom I have never heard of)” (p. 250). I suspect the book was written and published in haste.— Raymond Woller, University of Georgia. SuAREZ, Francisco. On the Formal Cause of Substance: Metaphysical Dis- putation XV. Translated by John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy. Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation, vol. 36, Milwaukee: Marquette versity Press, 2000, 217 pp. Paper, $25.00—This latest volume in the long-running Marquette University series Mediewal Philosophical Texts in Translation provides students of late medieval, renaissance, and carly modern philosophy with an important new resource, While Suarez’s significance in the history of philosophy is well known, his writings have been rather inaccessible to students ignorant of Latin. Of the 54 disputations that constitute his most famous work, the Metaphys- ical Disputations, only 13 have been iranslated into English prior to the volume under review. The present volume presents Sudirez’s extended discussion of the issuc of substantial and accidental forms. In addition to the translation itself, the translators provide a brief introduction, indi- ces (both name and subject), a brief bibliography restricted to works in English as well as basic notes. Most of these notes idenilify sources (al-SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS: 947 though some sources are left. unidentified) and provide basic explica- tion of difficult arguments and technical terms. In the Disputation itself, Suarez follows his typical procedure of can- vassing a wide array of previous opinions on the topic under consider- ation. This methodology in itself makes Sudrez well worth reading as he provides a encyclopedic compendium of prior thought on the subject of substantial forms. Starting with a consideration of the need to posit substantial forms, Suarez concludes that the rational soul provides the best evidence for such forms. Nonetheless, he also admits that the ra- tional soul is peculiar in that it is the only substantial form that arises from nothing by a proper creation. All other substantial forms result from the potency of pre-existing matter and are not the result of cre- ation as such, bul. can be considered created only insofar as the compos- ite is created. Thus matter is always logically presupposed in any pro- duction of form other then the rational soul. Turning to the nature of substantial forms, Suarez takes a position at odds with that of Thomas Aquinas. For Suarez, the substantial form is not that which gives being to the composite, but simply is the act that constitutes the essence of a composite. Interestingly, he sees his thought as consistent with the Ar- istotelian teaching (Physics, IL3) that form is the nature of the essence. Tt would be an interesting project to juxtapose recent interpretations of Aristotle's theory of form with the nuanced view thal Suarez provides, After discussing the existence and nature of substantial form, Suarez turns to a discussion of form’s causalily, First he distinguishes between the causality of the form in relation to an entity’s first act and its second act: the former concerns the principle by which the form acts, while the latter refers to the action of the form itself. Consequently, he argues that in relation to an entity's first act form is a principle of actuality through itself simply by being present. to its matter or the composite. In relation to an entity's second act, the emphasis resides in the union of form and matter in a composite. Again, a crucial consideration on be- half of his position is found by considering the human soul. Because the human soul can exist apart from the body, the act of the form must. be really distinct from the form itself, As a result, the union resulting from form is its proper act. Finally, he discusses the unicity of substantial form, following Thomas Aquinas in rejecting a plurality of substantial forms in one substance. Here he uses Ockham’s razor to point out that just because there is an essential predicate picking out a function, there is no reason to posit a separate substantial form for each such predicate. Since the summary I have provided gives little indication of the richness and depth of Suarez's treatment of the issue of substantial form, the translators have done a great service in making this disputation avail- able to students of scholastic philosophy. ‘The translation itself is clear, accurate, and readable, rendering Suérez’s limpid Latin prose into useful English. There are a number of typographical errors, but none mars the meaning of the text. The bibli- ography, although restricled to works in English, has several notable omissions: for example, Dennis Des Chene's Physiologia: Natural Pl losophy in Late Aristotelian. and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: Cornell948 ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF University Press, 1996) is directly relevant to the subject of Suarez and substantial form.—James 13. South, Marquette University. TRIFC ll, Cecilia, Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Centur . 1250. 1270): Motion, Infinity, Place, and Time. Boston; Brill, 2000. vii + 289 Pp. n. p.—Since Marshall Clagett’s (1953) work in the 1950s the impor- tance of the Mertonian physicists in fourteenth century Oxford has been well understood. The recovery of Aristotle as a source for contempo- rary philosophy of physics, initiated by William Wallace's important study The Modeting of Nature (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic Univer sity of America Press, 1996), has made the development of Aristotelian physics no longer a historical curiosity. Trifogli’s stady of Oxford phys- ies in the thirteenth century adds substantially to our understanding of Aristotle’s contribution, or rather one might say, to how Aristotelian physics was received at that time: what they made of it. Inevitably, the story has to be told in terms of debate, sinc there is enough latitude in. Aristotle’s own writings to permit a variety of interpretations. Historically, Trifogli draws on earlier work in identifying certain manuscripts as the work of a group of Oxonians, writing between 1250 and 1270, only two of whom are known by name, William Clifford and Geoffrey Aspall. (Interestingly these men were working in Oxford dur- ing the period of the founding of the colleges, for instance University College in 1249 and Merton, the home of the next generation of Oxford physicists in ). Also of historical interest is the attitude these au- thors display toward Averroes. The paradoxical relation of the greatest Islamic commentator to the philosophy of the Latin Middle Ages, (heir dependence and their critical distance, is particularly evident in these works, The commentaries under discussion deal with quite fundamental physical concepts: motion, infinity, place, and time. The problem of the ontological status of motion hinges on the inter- pretation of the more general notion of change, something not being X and then being X. How is this transition to be understood? Trifogli sets her discussion of the English commentator's in a fairly comprehensive historical survey, beginning with Simplicius. ‘That motion is always with respect to something that belongs to a category is common ground. The most important predecessor is Averroes and Trifogli devotes nearly twenty pages to a very detailed study of his views and their reception. The issue is that between Averroes's,forma account and the via account offered by his critics. For Averroes all that is required is the idea of in- complete to complete form, while for the crities, motion (change) is dis- tinct from the form, a real via ad formam. That there can be any debate about. the maiter seems to depend on the phrase mots ets actus in Aris totle’s definition, allowing the English commentators to reject the sim- ple forma account of Averroes. So “motion is a res [a something] over and above the mobile substance and the form acquired by this sub- stance through motion” (p. 75).