476 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 22:4 OCT 1984

lace argues that it was his ad h eren ce to the A ristotelian m ethod o f scientific, neces­
sary dem onstration which en cou raged G alileo to adopt a m ethod o f reasoning which,
w hile expressed in hypothetical language, nevertheless satisfied the requirem ents o f
dem onstration. G alileo took this m ethod from Aquinas and B u rid an as seen th rou gh
his Jesuit sources, and W allace presents several instances o f its application in both
G alileo’s early works and the m ore m ature works o f his m iddle and late periods.
W allace’s position on G alileo’s use o f ex suppositione reasoning has caused m uch
debate in the past (and in response W allace has append ed a clarification to his
original essay), and Prelude taken as a w hole will certainly elicit additional con tro­
versy. T h e precise results o f that debate are still uncertain, but it is clear that when
the dust settles we will know far m ore about G alileo’s early period and sources. For
this we owe Father W allace o u r sincere thanks.
S t e v e n J. L ivesey

University o f Oklahoma, Norman

J o rg e J. E. G racia, translator. Suarez On Individuation. Metaphysical Disputation 5, Indi­

vidual Unity and Its Principle. M ilw aukee: M arquette U niversity Press, 1982. Pp. ix
+ 299. $20.00.

Suarez on Individuation is an im portant Latin book felicitously translated and prop erly
annotated. T h e translated text, on a topic o f contem porary controversy, is accom pa­
nied by an exp lan atory introduction, a glossary o f the kind Alluntis and W olter
included in their translation o f Duns Scotus’s Quodlibetal Questions On The Power o f God
(Princeton 1975), and a B ibliography o f “ R ecent Discussions on S u arez’s M etaphys­
ics.” I will say som ething about each elem ent after a few general rem arks.
T h e translation is n eeded because o f the tim ely subject and to increase the corpus
o f S u arez’s Metaphysical Disputations available in English. Suarez is not only an in ge­
nious philosopher, he is also a learned (if not always accurate) and dedicated summa-
rizer o f the positions and argum ents he supports or rejects. H e influences the history
and also com m ents on it. T h is w ork presents theories in perspective, historically
situated in ways that m ake them intelligible, tracing their influences to their sources
and to later effects.
G racia, by his carefu l distinction am ong the various aspects o f the questions about
individuation and individuality and his awareness o f the way such issues have been
confused recently with notions o f ‘individual essence,’ presents a text and introd u c­
tory explanation that can m ake a positive advance in the sophistication o f cu rren t
discussions. For one thing S u arez’s exposition o f the d ifferen ces am ong Scotus, A q u i­
nas, and O ckh am is lucid.
T h e notes and glossary go a lon g way toward G racia’s objective “ to facilitate
u n derstan d ing” (viii) with ad ept explanations, citations, references to places in the
works Suarez is referrin g to and d e ft accounts o f technical expressions, e.g., the
“nature o f individuality” (24, note 1) and “ designated m atter” (for Aquinas) (25, note
8). T h e glossary, like the Scotus glossary m entioned above can be consulted fo r its
application to oth er texts by the referen ces given in it and its correlation to a selective
index o f Latin and English words.
 BOOK REVIEWS 477

T h e device o f selecting a single English translation for principle uses o f m ultivo­

cal Latin expressions and repeatin g the Latin original in brackets when the transla­
tion requires a variant in English is very helpful and ties in with the selective Latin-
English ind ex, keyed to the Glossary.
A d d to that a carefu l bibliography, an intelligent introduction, a sensitive transla­
tion (with sensible bracketed interpolations) and an effo rt to m ake the unw ieldy
academ ic Latin com e ou t less soporifically in English than it m ight deserve. T h e jo b is
done as it o u g h t to be, both at the scholarly and the historical levels.
It cannot be denied that Suarez is tortuous and prolix. Even in this good a
translation, one m ight plod the ju n g le o f opinions, objections and replies, and miss
the w hole point o f S u arez’s doctrine. G racia explains it in about twenty-five pages o f
Introduction. T h e m ain idea is that Suarez distinguished the d ifferen t loci dem and in g
explanation: (1) the diversity and plurality am ong things and (2) the indivisibility o f
actual beings. A quinas seems to have concentrated on exp lainin g how individuals
com e to be “ d ifferen t accordin g to n um ber,” and how certain analogous d ifferen ces
cam e about (individualization am ong angels, w ho are only specifically d ifferen t from
one another). S u arez’s contribution is to insist that the account o f what makes an
existing thin g indivisible into com ponent beings (when it is a prim ary substance, at
least) is the basic explanatory factor from w hich individuation, as d ifferen ce from all
oth er things, necessarily results. G racia highlights the overall doctrine in fou r princi­
ples (23 -25).
W hat he d oesn ’t do, and th ere’s no way to avoid this com plaint, is explain how
Suarez could be right that (1) “the principle o f individuation o f a thing is a th in g’s
entity” and (2) the individuation o f a thing is really its indivisibility and (3) the
relative distinction (individuation) o f the thing from all oth er things is caused by its
principle o f individuation, its entity. G racia d oesn ’t challenge S uarez’s text with the
claim that the entity o f an individual is posterior, logically, to its individuation because
the thing cannot be unless individuated, and so its being cannot be the cause o f what is
a necessary condition o f its being. M aybe th ere’s an obvious answer, one so obvious it
would explain why G racia did not con fron t the text with the question. Still I’d like to
have been told w hat it is and why I should regard Suarez as having m ade an advance
over the com peting views he recounts.
Sim ilarly, when “ individuation” and cognate expressions are applied to angels,
kinds, G od, the divine persons, and others, some glim pse o f S u arez’s doctrine o f
analogous predication o u gh t to have been o ffe re d so that m odern readers w ould see
Suarez was not given to careless violation o f the very truth-conditions he’d specified
fo r the expressions he was analysing, but rather used his words in conscious and
systematic variation o f such conditions.
Lastly, this disputation (see esp. Sect. 6 n. 5) is a good illustration o f the dow nhill
inertia by which technical discourse com plicates itself and creates m ore and m ore
abstractions. Suarez ends up saying that “ substantial form is intrinsically ‘a this’ by its
very entity, from w hich its individual d ifferen ce is taken in the last d egree or reality”
(124). It m akes one yawn and causes suspicion. Y e t one should not entirely lose
patience. Suarez was a d eep as well as a facile and adaptive thinker. I f we overlook
his em broilm ent in technical discourse, which he mistakes fo r the subtleties o f Duns
478 JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 22:4 OCT 1984

Scotus, he o ffe rs a m ore p ro fo u n d , basically m ore challenging, presentation o f the

“ pros” and “cons” o f various accounts o f individuation that can readily be fou n d
am ong o u r contem poraries.
B y the way, Suarez does not discuss trans-w orld individuals, sameness o f indi­
viduals across possible worlds: (1) such talk was not fashionable; (2) he was smart
en ou gh to see that there cou ld not be a universal dom ain o f possible individuals (see
also his doctrines on eternal truths, re: essences); (3) counterfactual sam eness, as
needed, could be accounted fo r if a distinction from all actual things w ere itself the
logical result o f a principle o f indivisibility that is intrinsic to a thin g fo r a th in g ’s
“entity” and is both sufficient and necessary fo r its b eing the same thin g u n d e r all
conditions u n d er which it w ould be at all, and be d ifferen t from every oth er thing.
T h is is a w ork worth ow n ing and readin g, well presented and indispensible to any
respectable library that stocks m edieval philosophy.
J ames F. R o s s
University o f Pennsylvania

Jeann e H aight. The Concept o f Reason in French Classical Literature 16 3 5 —1690. T o ­

ronto: U niversity o f T o ro n to Press, 1982. Pp. 208. $30.00.

T h is book, w hich is based on a d octoral dissertation, contains a w ealth o f m aterial

concern in g uses and definitions o f the term s raison, raisonnable, raisonner, and rai-
sonnement in the seventeenth cen tu ry and interesting discussions o f num erous views
about the nature o f reason and its relations to truth, m orality, and beauty. Jeann e
H aigh t’s extensive acquaintance with the w orks o f C orneille, Racine, Molifere, P ous­
sin, Felibien, La R ochefou cau ld , Bossuet, Boileau, Fenelon, Fontenelle, B ayle, and
m any others and h er suggestive analyses, classifications, and com parisons o f their
views should ensure h er study a favorable reception am ong students o f French litera­
ture. She also attem pts to deal with m ore philosophical figures and views, notably,
D escartes’ and M alebranche’s. For a variety o f reasons, philosophers and historians
o f philosophy will be less favorably im pressed by h er study.
In discussions o f Descartes and M alebranche, there are som e rath er surprising
statements. A b o u t M alebranche, she claim s that he “expand[s] on D escartes’ notion
o f innate ideas. . . ” (34) and that he “describe[s] a Socratic conception o f learn in g
w hich has innate ideas at its base” (80). T h is is surprising in view o f M alebranche’s
unequivocal rejection in the Recherche, B ook 3, Part 2, C h ap ter 4, (am ong oth er
places) o f the view that the ideas we use in perceiving and thin kin g are innies ou creees
avec nous. H aigh t seems to have been aw are o f passages like this, fo r she adds that
M alebranche “goes beyond the notion o f innate ideas to the possibility o f actual and
continued contact with G od th rou gh reason ” (81). T h a t she is inclined to attribute
contradictory views to M alebranche seems to arise from a lack o f precision as to w hat
exactly constitutes a doctrine o f innate ideas. O n page 35, she claim s that, accord in g
to M alebranche, G od is “the origin o f m oral . . . o rd e r.” T h is claim is in d ire n eed o f