Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Author(s): M. S. Shivakumar
Source: Economic and Political Weekly , Apr. 25 - May 1, 1998, Vol. 33, No. 17 (Apr. 25 -
May 1, 1998), pp. 952-954
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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The most significant area of Marxist- movements were concerned. Administrative Cambodia was swept up in the holocaust
Leninist influence upon the Pol Pot group measures were seen as capable of totally of the US war against the Vietnamese in the
was in its use of organisational strategy transforming
and the entire society in a very
1960s, and suffered the agony of American
control techniques very similar to thoseshortof period of time, on condition that theysaturation bombing and the Pol Pot regime
Stalinist Russia. Among those tactics were were backed by the construction of a new in the 1970s. If US bombing propelled the
the aspiration to use quasi-absolute power moral and political universe. The Khmer Khmer Rouge to seize power, why did China
through control of the military and party Rouge believed that victory is historically back Pol Pot until his death? Many analysts
apparatus at the highest level. The Khmer inevitable, so setbacks encountered were notargue that the repression of the Pol Pot
seen as against the mainstream of social
Rouge chose their cadre on the basis of skill, regime was modelled on Maoist China, and
class background and effectiveness within development. The political approach, the tacit Chinese support to Pol Pot's experiment
a given group. They enjoyed no special evacuation of the cities, was a means of from the very beginning was most obvious
privileges. Many survivors of that period dealing with an enemy of little perceived as at that time there were thousands of Chinese
socio-economic substance. Further,
have testified that the mechanics of reorgani- technical experts living in Cambodia, mainly
sation went fairly smoothly, indicating Kampuchea's historical predicament had
working in industry, transport and energy.
considerable skill on the part of the Khmer provoked intense nationalist fervour It is believed that the logic of the cultural
Rouge in managing its affairs. Most Khmer among the Khmer Rouges. Pol Pot merely revolution, radically applied in Pol Pot's
seized the nationalist card and pursued
Rouge efforts appealed to the youth and poor Cambodia,
an was to make revisionism in the
expansionist approach, invading border
peasants, who joined them in large numbers. future impossible, and hence the Revolution
areas of Vietnam. It was meant to distract
However, they were able to retain control eternal. However, in the late-1980s mounting
over large groups of people in four ways:
people's attention from mainstream issues. problems and overwhelming evidence against
However, this was also presumably done at
threat and collective memory of force; by Pol Pot forced China to distance itself. In
the insistence of China.
controlling movement in and out of the work reality, after normalising its relations with
becomes more apparent when we browse the The Review of Political Economy appears as a supplement to the last issues
available facts that establish that the Khmer
January and July.
Rouge and Pol Pot were at no stage, in the
For copies write to
early 1970s, the unchallenged leaders of the
revolution. Given the US's readiness to Circulation Manager
disclaim responsibility where it could not Economic and Political Weekly
achieve 'peace with honour', what alter- Hitkari House, 284,
natives were available, in 1975,to the Kampu- Shahid Bhagatsingh Road, Mumbai 400 001
cheans? Did the US back Kampuchean