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INTRODUCTION
What is man that You should take thought of him,
And the son of man that You care for him?
Yet You have made him a little lower than God,
And You crown him with glory and majesty!
You make him to rule over the works of Your hands.
Psalm 8:4–6a (New American Standard)
That is a question that has been capturing people’s attention for some
time. In a biblical anthropology, humankind would be male and female–
sexual. Humankind would also exist in the image of God, but in a fallen
state. It is largely the causes, the implications, and the influence of that fallen
state that concerns this series. All who write, do so from a human perspec-
tive. Consequently, this chapter concerns evil in the context of human sin
and imperfection.
What is the difference between evil and sin, or between sin and imperfec-
tion? Are these all words for roughly the same thing, or is there a substantial
difference across the range that they provide?
When people think of evil, names like Adolf Hitler and Charles Man-
son come to mind. There is something quantitatively horrendous in ha’shoah
(the Holocaust). Six million European Jews were systematically killed using
everything that the country of Germany could use and turning the coun-
try into what some have called a genocidal state. Is evil simply a matter of
the scope of sinister intent? When Manson was apprehended and caught on
camera, there was something malevolent, more than merely deranged, some-
thing qualitatively fiendish in his eyes; he had masterminded and persuaded
several devoted followers to commit multiplied murder. Is evil a demonic
quality of spirit?
Ironically, evil can be associated with the church as well. The various
inquisitions, crusades, witch-hunts, and religious wars—all conducted in
the name of God—provide a gruesome history that cannot be glossed over,
rationalized, or ignored. Neither can the cruelties committed every day in
religious congregations where rigid legalism runs over people for the sake of
righteousness and in which performance-based economies reward the loss of
self in devoted conformity. One need not go to the deception and destruction
caused by a Jim Jones, a cultic figure who leads his flock into mass suicide; the
evil that lurks right next to one as he or she sits in the pew on Sunday is bad
enough. This is what C. S. Lewis (1961) wrote about in the Screwtape Letters,
in which he envisioned demons working in the lives of Christians even as
they sit together in church.
What follows is a defining comparison and contrast of the concepts of evil,
sin, and imperfection, especially illustrated through the clinical examples of
gestalt therapy—a system that is not religious or essentially nomothetic in
itself, yet that does provide a model of health and one that has adopted the
phenomenological ethics of Emmanuel Levinas—both of which are useful in
order to consider evil, sin, and imperfection from a clinical perspective.
EVIL
Two words in Greek stood for the concept of evil. One was kakos, and the
other was ponēros. Kakos meant “bad” or “evil” and its derivatives meant to
harm, embitter, do wrong, and be an evil-doer. Ponēros pointed to being in
poor condition, sick, bad, poor, evil, and wicked (Achilles, 1975).
During the classical Greek period, kakos meant bad in the sense of lacking
something and always in contrast to agathos (good). In secular Greek, there
were four uses: (a) negligible, unsuitable, and bad; (b) morally bad or evil;
(c) weak or miserable; and (d) harmful or unfavorable. The Pythagoreans
regarded evil to be a metaphysical principle, but Democritus, Socrates, and
Plato regarded evil to result from ignorance in that an unenlightened person
does evil involuntarily. Conversely, according to these philosophers, enlight-
enment leads to knowledge and frees a person from evil, “causing him to do
good and so creating the moral man” (Achilles, 1975, p. 562). Plato eventu-
ally created a metaphysical dualism, spirit and matter, by synthesizing these
two concepts, asserting that evil resides in the physical and material. Also in
Hellenistic thought, evil was considered to be imperfection.
Both kakos and ponēros translated the Hebrew words rá and rā´âh (bad,
badness, evil, misery, distress; Brown, Driver, & Briggs, 1907/1978) about
SIN
By contrast, sin in reference to Hitler and Manson would mean they did
something bad and were guilty. Sin can refer to a single failure or transgres-
sion, but that can also extend to one’s complete ruination (Günther, 1978).
The most general word for sin is hamartia, followed by adikia and its cog-
nates, and then parabasis and paraptōma. Table 14.1 compares and contrasts
the various meanings of these words in classical Greek, the translation of
Hebrew words in the LXX, and their use in the New Testament.
Relative Understandings for the Concept of Sin
IMPERFECTION
Recently, while interacting in a listserv discussion group of professionals
someone corrected me on something, and I responded by saying, “How nice
to be imperfect.” It was sarcastic. I did not feel nice, and I was not happy to be
corrected; however, someone else on the list responded to what I had written,
affirming that yes, indeed, it was nice to be imperfect. That puzzled me. What
could be nice about that? Was it the freedom that person might have felt not
to have to live up to a standard, not to have to perform according to someone
else’s sense of “the way it should be?” I could not figure it out.
We are finite. Limited. We are made in the image of God, and we have
some of His attributes, but we have those attributes only to a point. God has
the capacity to love to an infinite degree, without measure, but we do not.
Our love comes in dribbles and mixed with all kinds of other motives and
behaviors that makes it diluted in quality.
people what to do. It does not pass judgment. It follows the figures of inter-
est and the current experience, and it advocates acceptance however a person
enters the circle of contact. Still, no system in which people work with other
people can be values neutral. People bring into a system all their relative
beliefs and morals; it cannot be helped.
Nonetheless, the phenomenological ethics of Emmanuel Levinas has
become important to gestalt therapists. Utilizing his system of thought, the
client or patient becomes mystery, the transcendent presence which is the
other person. Gestalt therapists recognize that to characterize that other
person in the process of case conceptualization, even to diagnose them,
requires that one “thematize” the other person (represent the other person
as an intentional object that stands in the place of the actually existing other
whenever the therapist perceives or contemplates that person). Levinas con-
siders this thematizing to be violence, and an ethical breach. Thus, through
the acceptance of his thinking, gestalt therapy adopts a moral posture. It’s as
if to say, “Thou shalt not thematize.” To do so might be considered turning
aside from the dialogical stance.
That sets up a problem. If a therapist cannot conduct therapeutic business
(assessment, case conceptualization, and treatment planning) without doing
violence to the client, then what is to be done? Is there a way around such an
apparent impasse?
James K. A. Smith (2002) suggested the iconic look. He contrasted the idol
with the icon. The idol is an end in itself; it is the object of worship. However,
an icon is not an end in itself; it points beyond itself to something greater. In
the case of gestalt therapists, it is possible to perceive the client as an icon;
that is, when we attend to the client in the aboutness of the therapeutic pro-
cess, we see the other person, but we do not sum them up in our minds nor
strive to completely “figure them out.” We remain close to their phenomenal-
ity, their subjective experience, and we accept that what we see and hear of
the client only points to something greater—their being.
AN ETHICS IN PRACTICE
So, how do we pull all this together to make some useful observations?
The goal is to explore these concepts using a clinical heuristic so as to see
what evil, sin, and imperfection look like in that kind of light.
First, a primary consideration is the emotional consequence that follows
either feeling one has done something bad or one is something bad. This is
the difference between guilt and shame. Both guilt and shame are self-con-
scious emotions (Tangney & Fischer, 1995); they arise because of the subjec-
tive sense of a social audience whose opinion matters. Whereas guilt (I have
done something wrong) can be made amends for, shame (I am something
CONCLUSION
This chapter presented working definitions for the concepts of evil, sin, and
imperfection. Sin is a deviation from the norm, often out of ignorance. Evil is
an ongoing and active opposition to the norm. Imperfection is a state of being
characterized by the presence of sin. The “norm” in terms of a spiritual life is
God, but the norm can also be any standard of life that produces an ethic in
which people sense a right way and a wrong way of living or doing something.
The example of gestalt therapy praxis was offered, with its adoption of Emman-
uel Levinas’s philosophy of alterity as an ethic, and that helped to extend the
understanding of how evil, sin, and imperfection compare and contrast.
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