OO ee Ey eS MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY LANGUAGEThe book contains three lectures on Mimamsa Philosophy of Language which were delivered as Wilson Philological Lectures at the University of Mumbai in October, 2001. The Ist lecture deals with the Theory of Language, the second with the Function of Grammar and the third with the Role of Speaker’s Intention in Verbal Understanding. The book is the first of its kind to study the Parvamimarhsa System from the point of view of Philosophy of language. It has been shown here how the standpoint of Pirvamimaihsa on Philosophy of Language resembles that of the most recent standpoint on understanding a text in a Discourse Analysis in which the intention of the competent reader or capable interpreter plays the most important role.MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGESri Garib Das Oriental Series No.271 MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE UJSJWALA JHA Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit University of Pune Sri Satguru Publications A Division of Indian Books Centre Delhi, IndiaPublished by Sri Satguru Publications, Indological and Oriental Publishers A Division of Indian Books Centre 40/5, Shakti Nagar, Delhi-110007 India Email: ibcindia@vsnl.com Website: http://www. indianbookscentre.com First Edition : Delhi, 2002 ISBN 81-7030-761-9 Printed at Chawla Offset Printers, Delhi 110 052Dedicated to Prof. Smt.S.S.Dange and to The Loving Memory of Prof. S.A.DangeSAPP Ra ATT TTT RAT | ageciterdt I aet ayes a: 11 Bra: agp faaet woe Tamer ae Atert sR | Wer @ gfe: fear array: 1Acknowledgement I express my thankfulnesss towards the authorities of the University of Mumbai who invited me for delivering the. 'Wilson philological Lectureship Endowment’ lectures of the year 2001. 1 wish to thank Prof. Smt. S.S. Dange, Retd. R.G. Bhandarkar Professor of Sanskrit University of Mumbai and Prof Smt. A.B. Bakre, Head, Deptt. of Sanskrit, University of Mumbai for their kind hospitality. These lectures were delivered in the University of Mumbai on 15, 16 and 17th of October, 2001. This gave me an opportunity to coordinate my thoughts on mimamsa_ philosophy of language and put them in a concrete form of these Icctures. | remain thankful to the University of Mumbai for the same. Talso express my sincere thanks to the staff of the department, particularly Dr. Gauri Mahulikar, Dr. Madhavi and all students of the department who attended these lectures. Among the audience were also staff of other departments of the University of Mumbai to whom I am thankful. Particularly Prof. Anna Kutty, (Prof. and Head of the Deptt. of German) Dr. Rajyarama, Department of Linguistics deserve mention for their kind attendance for all the three lectures. Dr. Ajgaonkar also made it possible to remain present in all the three lectures inspite of his busy schedule. I thank them all heartily for their cooperation. I also thank the University authoritics for allowing me to publish the Iecture-scries. I also thank my husband and daughter who managed everything in my absence from home for three days. Lastly I sincerely thank Sri Satguru Publications. Indian Books Centre for readily accepting this work for printing and doing the job neatly.Preface Last year, i.e. in the year 2001 I was invited by the University of Mumbai to deliver the 'Wilson Philological Lectureship Endowment' series of three lectures. In keeping with the title of the series, | delivered three lectures on "Mimamsa Philosophy of Language". These three lectures are published here in the book form. I wish that readers of this book should appreciate the fact that Purvamimamsa needs to be studied from a fresh, modem point of view. This will enable us to place ourselves in an appropriate manner in the field of "Philosophy of Language" as such a study will help one pinpoint our own contribution in this modern field of philosopher's intcrest.I. Ii. CONTENTS Acknowledgement Preface Introduction Theory of Language Function of Grammar Role of Intention of Speaker in Verbal Understanding Appendix-1 Appendix-IT Appendix-IIT XI XV 30 46 59 76Introduction Purvamimamsa . popularly known as mimamsa is one of the six orthodox systems if Indian philosophy. It is comparatively less popular system in the scholastic world, mostly because of its connection with the Vedic rituals which are more or less obsolate today. But one feeds that today the system of mimamsa should be focused at from a different angle and should be studied in a fresh modern perspective. The reason behind this is : that mimamsa has connection with Vedic rituals is a half-truth. To makc it complete one must remember that this connection is not direct but is only through the Vedic sentences. In other words, mimamsa concerns itself to the Vedic sentences primarily. Though the aim of interpretting Vedic sentences was to help the performance of the rituals at one point of time, today, when the importance of the rituals has been faded down we should concentrate on the first and foremost concern of mimams4 namely interpretting Vedic sentences meaningfully, and should study the principles of interpretation set forth by the system. Only because these possess a great potential to interact meaningfully with modem disciplines like discowerse-analysis, philosophy of language etc. In short, if we study mimamsa today as the ancient Indian science of sentence- interpretation, its contribution as such and if we try to find out what mimamsa_ has to offer to the modem linguistics, semantics etc. on one hand and to the field of machine translation etc on the other, it will certainly yield interesting results. Having this in mind I had started writing something after studying mimamsa theory of language, mimamsa view on grammar, mimamsa_ view on the intention of speaker and its role in verbal understanding. Hence, when I was invited by the University of Mumbai to deliver the Wilson PhilologicalLectureship Endowment Icctures in the year 2001 I decided to talk on 'Mimamsa Philosophy of Language’ The theme, 'mimamsa philosophy of Language was divided into three issues (i) Mimamsa Theory of Language (ii) Mimamsa_ view on Function of Grammar. and (iii) Mimamsa view on the Role of Speaker's Intention in Verbal Understanding These lectures are being published here. These should throw some light on mimamsa_ contributions to this field which is so-called modern aspect of Western Philosophy. When mimamsa is studied from this point of view one is astonished to learn the ultramodem theories of linguistics in general and semantics in particular in the texts more than one and a half millenia ago. One feels mimamsa has a lot to contribute to these modem branches of human knowledge.About the Lecture-I Mainly. the "Theory of Language’ put forth by mimamsa in keeping with its basic tenets needs to be looked at a-fresh. When mimamsa says that the relationship between word and its meaning is natural and not artificial or made by someone, it gives strong logical basis to say this which is really difficult to refute. This theory has also been upheld by some of the modem linguists. By accepting such a theory, on one hand, the system has established the validity and authority of the Veda beyond all possible doubt and on the other has done away with the necessity of postulating god as the speaker of the Veda. This also contributed to logical simplicity on one hand and saved the task of answering many difficult questions which arise if god is accepted on the other. The 'Theory of Language Acquisition’ accepted to be beginningless and named as YeeraeR is nothing else but today's ‘Direct Method of Language-Acquisition' which is considered to be the best one by sincere language teachers. The theory that word is enternal and is only manifested when uttered seems to be true even in today's age only if understood as ‘sound-waves' are present in the space always (i.e. only with a slight modification on word-level). By accepting the meaning of the word is a universal, eg. the meaning of the word ‘cow’ is ‘cowness’, and not an individual, mimamsa_ has achieved two plus points : (i) meaning of a word is also eternal just as a word is and (ii) logical simplicity. When these points are taken into account and considered seriously, one feels that “The Theory of Language’ put forth by mimmsa holds water.About the Lecture 2 As we come to the issue of the function of grammar as begun by Jaimini and discussed by sabara and further by Kumarila we enjoy the reading of the text just as we enjoy reading texts on modern linguistics. The view of opponent in this context is the view of modern linguists so far as grammar is concerned. In the conclusion on the issue of grammar we find that the necessity of grammar has been established more on the basis of traditional arguments than logical ones. One understands the importance of grammar so far as acquisition of 2nd-3rd languages is concerned so also one understands the necessity and validity of using any language in grammaticaly approved ways ; one accepts the nicities of grammatically correct language but it seems to be difficult or rather impossible to refute the arguments of the opponent if looked at in a proper perspective. In short. what the opponent wants to say is : It is not possible for grammatical science to encompass vocabulary of any language in its totality as the same is limitless and grammar has limitations. One feels that opponent has come close to the very recent theories of modern linguistics. Another point that is vehemently put forth by the opponent is that there is no word in a language which should be labelled as “grammatically sub-standard’ one only because even if that word (eg. gavi) is used the listener understands the meaning without any sort of difficulty. If the word expresses its meaning alright and there is no difficulty in the verbal understanding of the hearer, what on earth can make the word sub-standard (a-sadhu) ? The distinction of standard (sadhu) and substandard (a-sddhu) is not acceptable to the opponent so far as words are concerned. He says : all words are standard; all should be used while speaking. (34 ara a:, 84: wfaae7)! This is the very first lesson of linguistics that a student has to digest to learn linguistics in proper perspective today. That this opinion has been discarded in the conclusion on the topic is quite a different matter but that this opinion was held andstrongly established at that time is more significant. This is why mimamsa__ should be studied cven in the 21st century and in all time to come. About the lecture 3 The third issuc also is very interesting. Mimamsa view on the role of speakers intention in verbal understanding is consistent with the ‘Theory of Language’ put forth by the system. It is accepted, as we have already seen, that language is an eternal phenomenon, the word, meaning, the relationship between the two all are beginningless. So the Veda, being a form of language is also beginningless. Thus, there is no speaker of the Veda. Once, there is no speaker, there cannot be any role to be played by the intention of the speaker. Hence, the Vedic sentences are to be interpretted on the basis of the Veda alone. For doing so, mimamsa evolved various principles of interpretation for understanding Vedic sentences. If one extends the same theory of verbal understanding. namely, a sentence has to be understood on the basis of the whole discourse. in its proper context and in the proper perspective to any written text, for that matter, then it is not improper to say that the proper context and the perspective both are understood from the text itself. Thus, the main contribution of mimamsa in the field of verbal understanding can be stated in just two words : ananyalabhyah sabdarthah. The meaning of the word is not obtainabole from anything else than the word. Mimamsa_ holds that it is impossible to understand the intention of the speaker but for human limitations. Therefore, it is not possible to depend upon the knowledge of the same for arriving at verbal understanding. Language is a means of communication. It has at least two forms (i) spoken and (ii) written. When there is a live situationwhere communication between two parties takes place in a spoken form of language, it is or it may be considered possible that the intention of the speaker may be clarified by himself or herself in an ambiguous situation. But when a reader is left with a written text, the author of which has disappeared in the pavilion of time, he virtually has no access to the intention of the speaker. The only way left with him is to attempt the understanding of the text with the help of the text itself and perhaps the commentaries thereon. This is possible if the text is studied as a whole considering its beginning, its end, the objective. the repetitions occurring in it so on and so forth. The purpose of the text also plays a very important role in understanding the text in an appropriate manner. This, actually, is the position of mimamsa. Trying to understand and interpret the discourse as a whole on its own basis Tequires some principles of interpretation. These are evolved by mimamsa and this is a very significant contribution of mimamsa. Though, evolved for understanding the Veda and Vedic sentences originally, these principles are useful in understanding any text, any discourse, the authgr of which is not available to the reader. This issue has been discussed in the third lecture. It shows how mimamsa can contribute to various modem fields of human knowledge. These lectures have been based on basic mimamsa_ texts such as (i) the aphorisms of Jaimini, (ii) the commentary of Sabara and (iii) the Tantravartika of Kumarila Bhatta on the Sabarabhasya. These original sanskrit sources have been given in the end of the book.I THEORY OF LANGUAGE Respected chairperson, Prof. Smt. Dange, Head of the Department of Sanskrit Prof Smt. Bakre. Students and friends, At the very outset I express my thankfulness to the authorities of the University of Bombay, for inviting me to deliver the, ‘Wilson Philological Lectureship Endowment’ lecture series of this year. I, particularly, thank Prof. Smt. Bakre for the same and I also express my gratitude towards Prof. Smt. Dange. Before going to the main theme of today's lecture namely Mimamsa Theory of Language, let us refresh our acquaintance with the Purvamimamsa system. Let us also understand the exact meaning of "Mimamsa Philosophy of Language” To begin at the very beginning, ‘what is philosophy’? Vhilosophy means discovering the true nature of a thing. What do we mean ? In a broad manner we may say ‘to know a pot as pot und to call a pot, a pot, is philosophy. When we rise higher from this very elementary level and think in a broader perspective we realise that there are many «questions like ; whatever is around us, whatever we call the world- what is the true nature of it? What is the meaning of its existence ? Whether the world is real or false ? These questions occur because all our experiences about the world are not very consistent. Let us2. Mimamsa Philosophy of Language explain : When one is thirsty one takes a glass of water which quenches his or her thirst but when one runs after mirage taking it to be water his behavious is frustarated i.c. inconsistent with his perception of water ! Then a question arises : whether water is real or not ? Is it the case that sometimes it is real and sometimes false ? Orit is false only ? If there are many such examples and in general this is the nature of things in the world which constitute the world then, Who created such a world and why ? What is the purpose of this world ? How am I related to it ? Is that relation true or it also is false ?” are some of the questions, which may be said to be the philosophical questions. Philosophy strives hard to solve these and such questions. One Parisian Poct has compared this world with a manuscript which has lost its first and the last page. Really an appropritate and beautiful simile. Philosophy aims at finding out these two pages. If they are found. we will get valuable informations regarding the author of the manuscript, when was it written, what for is it written so on and so forth. But the fact is : these two pages are not found ! This is the reason why one has to infer one has to postulate the beginning and the end of the manuscript on the basis of whatever is seen, on the basis of the middle visible portion. This attempt is called philosophy. Another important point to be noted is : Whatever questions disturb a philosopher regarding the world around us, the same questions he faces regarding the ‘Language phenomenon’ also, What is language ? What are words ? What are meanings ? What is the relation between the two ? Who created language ? When ? Is there any end to this ? How the rapport between the speaker and the listener is cstablished ? ctc. ctc. An attempt to answer these questions is, “Philosophy of Language”.Theory of Language 3 If one peeps in the Western Philosophy. one realizes that “Philosophy of Language” has been a point of discussion in that tradition only after Frege, Russell and Witgenstein i.e. for last 100- 125 years or so. But our Mimamsa system has been dealing with this topic for not less than 2000 years! There, of course, is a reason behind this. Again, to begin at the very beginning : the source of all Indian Philosophy is the Veda. If we divide Indian Philosophy broadly into the heterodox and orthodox systems then we find that the heterodox systems came into being only to oppose the ritual culture based on the Veda and the orthodox systems came into being to refute this opposition on one hand and to establish the ritual culture and basically the Veda as the authentic source of Dharma on the other. In other words, the Buddhist, Carvaka and the Jaina systems were in opposition of the Vedic culture and to continue this culture, the first and foremost need was to maintain the sanctity and the authority of the Veda because the Veda was the very basis of this culture. That the orthodox systems could achieve this goal is known to us from the history. They adopted different ways and means to do this. Leaving aside all other systems let us now concentrate on Purvamimamsa system alone. The term, ‘Mimamsa’ has occurred in the 7aittiriya samhita, Chandogya Upanishad. Etc and in all these places it means : coming toa certain decision after thinking about all the pros and cons about something doubtful. This Mimamsa system set a goal before it : To show that each and every sentence, each and every word i.c. cach and every syllable of the Veda is meaningful and purposeful by interpreting the Vedas i.e. each and every Vedic sentence meaningfully. This is the reason why mimamsa is basically a science of sentence-interpretation and bears the names like, ‘Vakyasastra’, ‘Vakyarthasastra’ quite significantly.400 Mimamsa Philosophy of Language In short. the object of mimamsa is Vedic sentences and the main aim of the system is to systematize all the Vedic sentences in a proper manner and to establish the validity of the Veda beyond all possible doubt ! Both these tasks are stupendous which Jaimini. the Sitrakara accepted and he made out some principles of interpreting Vedic sentences and wrote them down in a sutra-form. He divided the Vedic sentences into five types : Vidhi, mantra, namadheya. nisedha and arthavada, on one hand and set forth the main presupposition of mimamsa that the veda is meant for inducing a man into some action or the other on the other. Action or Activity is main and everything clse comes in the context of an activity only as subordinate to it. These two and all principles of sentence- interpretation aim at systematizing the Vedic sentences and interpreting them . To establish the authority of the Veda beyond all possible doubt mimamsa determined and declared its Theory or Language. It discussed its “Philosophy of Language’ in various contexts. With this background, Ict us now try to understand mimamsa theory of Language. The following points should we take into Consideration : (i) Origin of language (ii) Nature of word (iii) Nature of meaning (iv) Relation between word and meaning and (vy) Acquisition of language If one wants to put the mimamsa theory of language in just one sentence, he may say : Language is a beginninglessTheory of Language 5 phenomenon. Words, their meanings. the rrelation between the two all are cternal ! Jaimini wrote an aphorism : “Autpattikastu Sabdasya arthena inam upadesah avyatirekas ca arthe anupalabdhe tat pramanam badardvanasya anapeksatvat.” While sambandhah tasya ji commenting upon this, the commentator Sabarasvamin specified apauruseyah Sabdasya arthena sambandhah. The relation between word and meaning is not created by any human being. Now why such a stand is taken ? Let us take an example of a Vedic sentecnce : Agnihotram juhuyat svargakamah. Vedic injunctions are of this type. Now what does one understand from the above sentence ? One who is desirous of heaven should perform agnihotra ritual. In other words, this sentence states the cause and effect relationship between agnihotra and heaven. It says that agnihotra ritual is the cause and heaven is its effect. Now it is easily acceptable that whatever this sentence is saying is not or does not come under the purview of human experience on one hand and that whatever the sentence is stating is stated in no ambiguous terms by the sentence, on the other. Now further if we think, this sentence cannot be taken to be stating something false because it is contradictory to say that a sentence says something and that is not existent. This again could have been false if these had been any doubt, any ambiguity in the sentence. Or this would have been false if there would arise any sublating cognition afterwards. As none of these is the case with reference to the Vedic sentence mentioned earlier, whatever the sentence says must be true. And as that does not come under the purview of human experience, it cannot be a sentence of any human being This is quite understandable but then a question arises : Whose sentence is this ? The answer that mimamsa has given to this6 = Mimansa Philosophy of Language question is : this and all such sentences are beginningless. They do not belong to any speaker i.¢. no speaker has uttered these sentences. Once this is said, there arise so many questions. so many doubts in the minds of opponents ! One fundamental objection comes from the idealist i.e. Buddhists. He says. there is no relation between word and meaning at all so there is no question of who made this ? Whether human being created this or not ? The ground for :taking such a position is: the opponent argues: there could not be the relation of identity between the two because if there had been identity then when one utters the word ‘knife’. his mouth should be cut and when he utters the word ‘modaka’ his mouth should be full of the sweet. But this does not happen and so there is no identity between them. Other relations such as cause and effect relationship or substratum— superstratum relationship are quite impossible because word is in the mouth and the meaning elsewhere! Mimamsa answers this question as follows: the relationship which subsists between the two namely, name and named relationship or revealer and revealed relationship is not mentioned by you. The relationship between the two according to us is bodhya- bodhaka-bhava. The word is bodhaka and the meaning is bodhya. Then further a question is put by the opponent that if what you say is correct then how is it that when a word is heard for the first time it is not a revealer ? It does not reveal the meaning at the first instance. The answer that is given to this question by mimamsa__ is remarkable. The argument is this: In every case we accept experience as our proof. We say Sabda is revealer of meaningTheory of Language 7 because we experience that when a word is uttered a meaning is I its meaing when it is heard for the first time only because we observe that it revealed. We understand that the word does not ri so happens. As many times one requires to know that this is the name of the particular thing or meaning we understand that after so many times one understands that meaning from that word only through such an observation! Let us take an example to make the point clear. The eyes are scers. But unless there is sufficient light they cannot see. Now. because of this fact we do not conclude that eyes do not see ! Let us be more clear. The argument is this: It is true that eyes see. But cycs alone i.e. only on their own accord cannot see. They require the help of other factors. These are called sahakarikaranas technically. In short, eyes are necessary but not sufficient to sce. In the same manner, a word is revealcr of its meaning only when and if the relationship between the two is known ! Thus, when this point is made clear another objection is raised in this way: Let us accept that there is a relationship between word and meaning and also that the nature of this relationship is revealer and revealed relationship. But you also will have to accept that word and meaning are quite different from each other just as the rope and the pot are different from each other. This leads us to the point that as the relation between the rope and the pot is man-made because the two are two different things, and are brought together by some human being, in the same manner the relation between word and meaning is also created by some human being as they also are two different things. and once the relation is created he composed the Vedas to use the words in a good way. Mimamsa does not accept this. in reply mimamsa states : the relation between word and meaning is natural, inartificial and8 = Mimamsa Philosophy of Language this is how the authority of the Veda is unquestionable. When the answer is so brief, the chain of further questions is inevitable! The first and foremost question is: How do you know this ? The answer is : Because we don not know anybody as the maker of the relationship between word and meaning, Again the same objection and same question: How do you know this ? The answer is we do not perceive anybody as the maker of relationship! This again is not acceptable to the opponent. He argues: How can you perceive someone? This phenomenon took place long back. People might have forgotten the person who created the relation between word and meaning ! Now, this is something, which is not acceptable to the commentator of mimarisa . He explains : Sometimes a person digs a well for people or someone makes a garden for people to take rest. Gradually, it so happens that people forget that this well was dug by such and such person or this garden was made by such and such person because of some reason or the other. Sometimes the family of the person is lost or sometimes the region where the well or the garden was constructed tums into a barren land etc. All this is understandable. But this cannot be an example parallel to the relationship of word with its meaning. If you ask why then the answer is that relationship between a word and a meaning is not a well or a garden ! What do you mean ? Mimamsa explains: Sce it is possible to behave with the well or with the garden without remembering who constructed it or who is the creator of it but it is not possible to do so with words without remembering who created the relation between a word and a meaning. Sabarasvamin explains :Theory of Language 9 If one forgets Panini or if one does not agree with Panini's opinion then he will never understand the vowels a, ai and au from the word Vrddhi.In other words, if we forget who wrote the sutra Vrddhir Gdaic i.e. if one forgets who created the relationship between the word Vrddhi and the meaning namely 4, ai and au, it is impossible for him to understand anything from the siitray like Vrddhir yasyacamadih etc. This makes it clear that if a person creates a relationship between a word and a meaning then while using that word to refer to that meaning one has to remember the maker of that relation ! Further, even if this forgetting the maker of the relation is granted, we cannot grant the maker of relationship because there is no proof to do so. As there is no proof, it remains only a postulation and if we think about the language-acquisition on the part of a child we directly can perceive what actually happens. A child listens to the conversation of two elderly persons. And from this it acquires language. Those elderly people also had done the some way and had acquired language in their childhood. Thus, this tradition is beginningless. This is why the relation between word-meaning also is beginningless. Another point is: If we, for the arguments sake, accept that there was a point of time when there was no relation between words and meanings, and there was somebody who actually created the relations, then our stand is that this activity of relating word with its meaning itself is not possible ! Because if one wants to relate a word with its meaning he will do so with the help of some words. Then one may ask who created the relation between those words and their meanings and with what words ? If you say may be someone did this with some words then one will put the same question regarding those words. This chain of questions will never end and the result will be infinite regress and nothing else. To10 Mimamsa Philosophy of Language avoid this. you will require to accept certain words which have eternal relation with their meanings. This is what we are saying. In other words, this proves the cternal tradition of language- acquisition, which we want to defend. This tradition is proved directly and so there cannot be any doubt about it. After so much of discussion over the relation between word and meaning an objection is raised from another angle. It is argued that this relation cannot be accepted to be eternal because one of the relata, namely, word itself is temporary. The logic behind this argument is a relation could be eternal only when the relata are so Otherwise, if it is the case that a relatum is temporary then the relation cannot be eternal. The opponent argues that the word is not eternal. there are many points, which point to this fact. The first point is that word is uttered and that means it was not there before it was uttered Secondly, it does not last after it is uttered. Thirdly, we use such expressions with reference to word, ‘Don't make noise’ etc. These also point to the fact that word is produced. We also talk about the original form and modified from of the word. eg. In the word dadhyatra we say ‘i’ is the original form and ‘ya’ is its modification. This would not have been possible if the word had been one and eternal. Now, all these are answered by the commentator one by one in the following manner: So far as the first point is concerned, it is common to both of us. It is true that word is uttered and heard but it does not prove that it is temporary. It does not prove that there was no word before it was uttered. Our position is that word is always there it only gets manifested when it is uttered. So far as the use of the verb ‘make’ ‘do’ is concerned, we wish to say that it is used with reference to the use of word and not with reference to word itself. It also can be explained with the help of a day-to-daytheory of Language 11 exampic: When a person wants to ask a person to make heaps of cow-dung he is asked to “make the cow-dung” So far as the prakrti and vikrti of a word are concemed our opinion is : there is nothing called prakrti or vikriti of a word but they are two different words. None of them is the original form of a word and nonc is the modification. The proof for this is if onc wants to utter ‘ya" he does not begin to pronounce i and then docs not reach “ya” but he directly utters ‘ya’ only. Now the commentator has added a few more points to establish the eternity of sound or Sabda. He says: We say I uttered the word cow 10 times, we never say I uttered 10 ‘cow’ words. This also points to the fact that there is only one word its utterances are many. One more point may be noted here that as we see. perceive the cause of pata, namely, tantus and we understand that cloth depends upon threads so we do not see anything on which a word depends and we can say that from this cause word is produced. Still one more point is word is uttered for somebody else and hence it has to be eternal. If it is destroyed immediately, the other person will not have verbal understanding. And the most important point is that word conveys a meaning, which is cternal. This is the stand of mimamsa that a universal is the meaning of a word. Let us take an example to make the point clear: When a word say, ‘cow’ is uttered, the listener understands ‘all cows’ which means he understands the universal ‘cowness’ from the word ‘cow’ The point is, when the meaning of a word is nitya or eternal it is impossible that somebody made its relation to a word afterwards. In short, word and its meaning, both being eternal, the relation between the two is also eternal.12. Mimamsa Philosophy of Language So far so good. But the matter is not yet over. Even if one accepts that word is eternal. meaning is eternal and the relation between the two is also eternal, still, words are not the means of communication. We communicate through sentences. And what are sentences ? Sentences are clusters of words. We form sentences by arranging words in a particular order. This means that sentences are different constructions of different words. As they are constructions or compositions they are made by someone. Vedic sentences also are sentences and therefore, they also must be compositions of someone. One feels that here a mimamsaka is really in trouble! But let us sce how mimamsaka_ solves this problem. The commentator argues: See what is sentence-meaning ? It is nothing but qualified word-meaning. The Sanskrit term is Visista-padartha. In other words, meaning of word alone is ultimately meaning of a sentence. So it is not the case that pada-samudaya gives rise to the sentence meaning but it is the word meaning, which contributes to it. And so even the Vedic sentence cannot be treated as a creation of a human being. In other words, this question who arranged the words to form a sentence is not a very relevant question with reference to the Vedic sentences. In out day-to-day behaviour we know that people arrange words in different manners but not in the Veda. The mimamsaka wants to make two important points here: (1) Activity is the main thing in sentence and word-meanings getting connected with an activity is a sort of natural process. It does not really expect an intervention of a person and (2) The meaning that we understand from the Vedic sentence is something beyond the range of human experience.Theory of Language 13 Actually, it is the second point. which seems to be more important in not accepting any human agency so far as the Vedic sentences are concemed. Thus. mimamsa_ theory of language aims at establishing the eternity of (i) Language phenomenon (ii) Word (iii) Meaning (iv) The relation between the two (i.e. ii and iii) and (vy) Vedic sentences.II FUNCTION OF GRAMMAR Friends, Yesterday, we have seen how mimamsa_ established the etemity of word and how the relationship between a word and its meaning is eternal because the meaning conveyed by a word is eternal. Our today's topic is : Function of Grammar. In the mimamsa -dargana there is one vyakaranadhikarana where the issue is discussed quite at length. We said yesterday that the relation between the word and its meaning is not created by anyone - it is cternal. This can be proved on the basis of the process of language acquisition by a child. The vrddhavyavadhara from which a child learns its language, points to the beginninglessness of words and their relation with their meanings Now, in the language, as there is a word namely, ‘gauh’ there also are words like gavi, goni, gopotalika etc. Now there is a doubt regarding these and such words : As the word gauh. is standard to refer to the meaning namely an animal having dewlap etc, are the words gavi etc also pramana ? Or among there words, one word is beginningless i.e. anadi and other words are apabhramsa ?/unction of Grammar 15 Now on this, the opinion of the opponent is : All words are anadi because it is our experience that even from the words such as gavi etc. We do understand the animal having dewlap etc. This is our regular experience and from this it can be said that the same was the case before one hundred years and even before so this tradition is beginningless. It has already been stated (in the commentary on the Jaiminisutra 1.1.5) that there was no maker of relation between word and meaning. Therefore. all words are standard ones and one may use all words while speaking. All words make us understand the meaning eg. Hastah, karah,, panih ctc. The main point to be noted is, words are uttered to convey some meaning and their result is not something invisible like merit etc. Another point is there is no astra which can regulate the usage of words and therefore one should never say that one word is standard and others are its apabhramsa forms, one word is sadhu and others are asadhu. Now in this context Kumarila Bhatta has raised various fundamental, thought provoking and interesting points. These help us understand the funciton of Grammar on one hand and the limitations of the same on the other. Let us look into some of them. First of course, let us understand the opponent's point of view, then we shall look into the siddhanta. The first objection against grammar is : there is no unanimity in the opinicn of the teachers of Grammar. Sutra-kara - Vartikakara and Bhasyckara differ on various issues. Then in such situation what shoulc we understand from thesc texts ? There also are many ‘a texts written by Manu, Vasistha, Gautama etc. but tn these the-e is no difference of opinion and hence it is easy to understand their intention and to infer the Sruti sentences from them. But Dharm16 Mimamsa Philosophy of Language Parasparena cdc Vigitavacanah sthitah Sutravartika-bhasyesi Kim tatradhyavasiyatam (Tantravartika of Kumarila on the Sabarabhasya on Jaiminisutra 1.3.24) Another point is what is the purpose of Grammar is not at all made clear by the Sttrakara. One cannot argue that he might have forgotton it because it is such a big work that it is not possible to forget to mention its purpose. This is the tradition that even if the purpose of a book or of a system is very well known, the author should state its purpose at the very outsct. This encourages the reader to look into the book. For example, take the Jaiminisiitra or Apastamba Paribhasa sutra which state in the beginning that they are going to discuss dharma and yajna respectively. On the other hand the discipline of Grammar is so terse and he does not state dharma-artha-kama or moksa as its purpose. If one argues that because it is too well-known he did not state it then we cannot accept this defense only because the grammarians are still unable to decide it. If one argues that let Dharma alone be the purpose of grammar also and let us here understand Dharma as the knowledge of grammar or using grammatically correct words, then this also is not a very good argument because this reflects the two opinions of Bhasyakara and the Vartikakara respectively, and this is unable to decide which one between the two is Dharma. If one is accepted to be so then the other one becomes adharma! Another important point is : Vyakarana is a Sadi Sastra. Its author is quite well remembered and hence its knowledge or its application can never be treated as dharma. Our position is that the Veda does not depend upon grammar neither does it have any expectancy towards it.Function of Grammar 17 Adimattvacca dharmatvam Naiva jit@na-prayogayoh Na hi vyakaranapeksa Vartate Vaidik wtih (ibid) Here, one may argue that Vyakarana is not only the rules regarding the usage of words, but it also encompasses the words with reference to which various rulcs are enjoined. This is what the bhasyakara Pataiijali has stated. He says : Laksya-laksane vyakaranam. When vyakarana also includes words which are eternal, Vyakarana also should be treated as eternal. But this argument does not stand because words which are referred to by the term Laksya here, are quite different from the Jaksanas i.e. the rules of grammar on one hand and as they are innumerable they cannot be known by any rule on the other ! On this many questions can be raised from the grammarians point of view namely : (i) The eternity of grammar is stated in the Veda itself by the sentence : tasmadesa vyakrta vag udyata iti (ii) There is a sentence : ‘Ekah Sabdah samyak jndtah suprayuktah sastranvitah svarge loke Kamadhug bhavati' From this sentence that grammar is an instrument of Dharma is quite clear ! (iii) There is one negation : 'Jasmad brahmanena na mlecchitavai ndpabhdsitavai mleccho ha va esa yad apasabdah. Now what is actually prohibited here ? A brahmin should not use the words which are not grammatical’ This is what the grammarians have in mind. But the opponent says. All these18 Afimamsa Philosophy of Language sentences refer to the Vedic speech and not to grammar. The meaning of the word apasabda is made very clear by the opponent. ‘Apasahda' is either (i) all specch excepting the Vedic language or (ii) it is the language of m/ecchas who reside outside aryavarta. Now one important sentence is taken up for consideration. The sentence is - ‘ahitagnir apasabdam prayujya prayascittiyam sarasvatim istim nirvapet'. How to understand this sentence is a question. The opponent argues, once the meaning of ‘apasabda' is made clear, there should not be any problem in interpretting this sentence. This sentence enjoins an explanation in case the consecreted person uses ordinary language or he uses any mleccha language. This does not mean that he should perform expiatory Tite if he uses a word which is not standardized by grammar ! Why not ? The opponent says there are rasons why this is so. The point is had it been the case that using words which are not standardized by grammar is a great sin then ahitagnis would not have used such words. But the fact is all ahitagnis are found to use such so-called ungrammatical words without any hesitation ! It docs not seem to be possible that all of them are promped to commit such a great sin, which will bring bad name to them ! Now if one asks why then obviously the answer is : those who are Sista and always follow the ritious path, very rarely commit some mistake, some sin. But while using the words like gavi etc. noone has the feeling of committing any sin or noone else feels hatred towards such a person as one fecls with reference to performing any prohibited activity such as kalanja-bhaksana. Moreover, in thousands of ahitagnis even a single person is not seen to use only those words, which are standardized by the grammarians. As a proof to this statement the opponent has given various ungrammatical usages employed by persons like Manu, ASvalayana etc. and even Panini himself. He says :Function of Grammar 19 Kalpasiitra-smrtigrantha-mimamsa-grhyakarinah Sistah drstah prayunjand apasabdan anckasah (ibid) Here begins the list of persons and the ungrammatical usages employed by them. (1) Masaka has stated ‘samanam itanam Syenena” (2) Even Chandogyasitrakara has stated samdanam itram gava aikahikena. Now, the word ‘ifaram’ is ungrammatical. It should have been itarat |! Samanam itarat Syenena would have been grammatically correct usage. GB Similarly, the same Sitrakara has used atmanepada where parasmani-pada would have been appropriate as the fruit of the action does not go to the preists, though the action of praise is performed by them. The sentence is : ahine bahispavamanaih sadasi stuviran. 4 A$valayana also has committed such so-called mistakes. In one place we find him saying, ‘pratyasitva prayascittam juhuyuh’. Now here the root is compounded with the prefix but still he has not used lyap but he has used k1vd only. In another place, “djyena aksini djya’, there was no scope for the /yap as the root is not compounded with any prefix: still he has used it. In Narada's Siksa we find,” Pratyuse Brahma Cintayet. This is just like using the words like gavi etc. 6 (6) We find Manu saying, ‘jfatarah santi metyuktva’. He should have said ‘Santi ma ityuktva’. So he has made the sandhi discarding the rules of grammar.20) Mimamsa_ Philosophy of Language (7) Even our Jaimini has said. “Gavyasya ca tadadisu™ (VJaiminisitra VIIL.2.18) The word gavya here has been used in the sense of gavamayana sacrifice. This is not allowed by grammar. As per the rules of grammar the word gavya can be used only with reference to cither the limbs of cow or with reference to the things produced from a cow's body Jaimini has also made a usage like “dyavostatheti cet’. He should have said “dyavaprthivyoh’ to be strictly grammatical. (8. In the grhyasiitras we find ‘miirdhany abhijighranam where abhighranam was the proper expression. 9 In the Nirukta also we find many non-paninian usages. While giving the etymology of the word, ‘brahmana’. Niruktakara has said. ‘Brahmano bravanat’ i.e. he has discarded the rule, ‘bruvo vaci’ given by Panini. (10) In the itihasa and purdnas we find many such usages e.g. a word ubhabhya’ means ‘a stroke of two tusks of an elephant’ —this is impossible to explain on the basis of any rule of grammar. (11) Even in the Vedas there are so many words which do not fall under the purview of either chandasa or samanya type of rules. Take for instance, Madhyam apasya tisthati nicinavaram varunah kabandham (Rgveda IV.4.30) Here, how can one explain and justify that dpasya is an alternative form of apam formed from the stem ap which is a consonant ending always feminine and plural. There is no sutra to justify this.Function of Grammar 21 Hence, the point is, there is no necessity of grammar only because it is impossible for the system to take into consideration all words, which are used by pcople. In other words, the system cannot encompass its object at all ! This becomes more vivid when we find that those who are experts, who are authorities of grammar also use ungrammatical words comparable with gavi goni etc. It is really fascinating to note that here Kumarila mentions Panini — the sufrakara, Katyayan - the vartikakara and pataiijali-the bhasyakara — the three munis of vyakarana, using non-grammaticat words. Kumarila points out of course, in the purvapaksa, Ye’ pi vyakarnanasyaiva Pare pare pratisthitah Sutaram te pi gavyadi Tulyan eva prayunjate Sutra-vartika-bhasyesu DrSyate capasabdanam Asvaridha katham casvan Vismareyuh Sacetanah (ibid) There is one rule of Panini : Janikartuh prakrtih. There are two ungrammatical words in this sitra. They are apasabdas as they are not correct grammatically. Let us see what are the two words : Sce what is jani ? Jani , as per the rule, ‘ikstipau dhatunirdese’, stands for the root, J/jan. So the word janikarta will mean the maker of the root jan but Panirti does not want to say that let the maker of the root Jjan be callecl an apadana, and the meaning which is intended namely, ‘an effect which is being22. Mimamsa Philosophy of Language produced cannot be understood from the word jani as per the rules of grammar, Thus, according to grammar the word jani is the vacaka of the root jan and not of anything else. Hence, as it is impossible to understand ‘a poor person’ from the word ‘horse’, so it is impossible to understand, ‘the thing being produced’, from the werd Jani because it stands only for the root jan. The second mistake is the formation of the compound, ‘janikartr’ There is a rule, ‘trjakabhyam kartari. This rule prohibits the formation of compound with the word ending in the suffixes tri and aka. Discarding this rule the compound is formed which is an apasabda. This will not yield the result of using grammatical words ! In another rule, ‘tafprayojako hetus ca’ also the formation of compound ‘fatprayojaka’ is wrong. Tuming to the bhasyakara now, he has used the expression aviravika-nydyena in onc place. Now, this is a fatpurusa compound in which one constituent is a dvandva samasa. In this. the case ending of the first member of the first compound has to be dropped as per the rule: Supo dhatu-pratipadikayoh but the bhasyakara has not dropped it. In some other place mahabhasyakara states : anyatha krtva coditam anyatha kytva pariharah. This ‘anyatha krtva’ is not a correct expression here. He should have used namu/ as per the tule, ‘anyatha evam katham itthamsu siddhaprayogas cet’, which he has not done. If one argues that all these can be made sadhu or grammatical or standard by calling them nipdtas. then this is not a sound argument at all, because those which do not fall under the purview of any stra only can be made grammatical through the name nipdta but all the cases cited above are found in the domain of some rule or the other.Function of Grammar 73 Here, again one may argue that the rules of grammar are not applicable to the rules themselves. But this also is not an acceptable argument because, the words appearing in one sifra can easily become the object of another sutra — there is nothing wrong in it and also no difficulty is there. Even mahabhasyakara has done so, c.g. Kutvam kasman na bhavati Vrddhir adaice iti etc. Further, if this argument is accepted then the whole grammar will be composed by the apasabadas and then how could it be pramana / authoritative ? Through all these and such arguments the opponent wants to establish the redundancy of the system called grammar. The Vedas are cternal and the system of grammar man-made, then how is it explicable that the Veda has the expectancy of grammar ? This is the whole point that the opponent is trying to make through his arguments. One may remind the opponent here, that though the sitrakara has not mentioned the purpose of grammar, the bhayyakara has Vividly explained how and why grammar is necessary. Opponent says : Whatever Prayojanas are mentioned by Pataiijali are all superfluous! These purposes are served by many other means and hence grammar becomes superfluous. Let us take just one example to make the point clear :The first purpose stated by Patafijali is raksa. Raksa means Vedaraksa. Pataiijali argues that for preservation of Vedic text one must lear grammar. Because grammar gives the knowledge of correct and otherwise words! The opponent argues : Grammar operates only on the level of words. The Vedas are eternal which consist of the sentences having peculiar arrangements of words and hence, grammar does not have anything, or has very little to do with the preservation of the Veda. Moreover, if the Vedics had thought that grammar will protect the Veda then they would have gone to the grammarians to remove24 Mimamsa Philosophy of Language their doubts but this does not happen. An example that the opponent has given from our day-to-day behaviour to metaphorise this fact is: Yadi Vyakarnanad raksam Manviran Vedavadinah Vaiyakaranagehesu Chindyuste Vedasamsayan Kaksavalamibinam nityam Ko nama karakam Vahan Tam anadrtya Saucartham Anyatah Kartumarhati (ibid) Further, the opponent says if a person is sick, then he goes to a doctor (vaidya) to find out what is his ailment, what is the medicine for it etc. Because Ayurveda is the science of medicine. But when a person learning Veda has any doubt or illusion regarding a syllable or a word or a sentence of the Veda, he does not take recourse to either grammar or a grammarian but goes to a senior co-student ot the Veda! And hence it is clear that the Veda is preserved in its totality by the students of the Veda. Thus, the conclusion is exactly opposite to what bhasyakara has said : Tasmad Vedaraksartham tavan nadhyeyam vyakaranam In this way the opponent has established how there is no purpose to be scrved by the system of grammar. He has taken into account each of the purposes stated by Pataiijali, and has shown how none of them can really be said to be the prayojana of grammar. The main point of all this discussion is : Words are uttered for understanding their meanings and not for earning some merit. All words convey their meanings alike and therefore, all should be