1. Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF
September 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was
nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses
the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceeding, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure
of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not
posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work
experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
2.
ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO,
PETITIONER.
B.M. No. 2540
September 24, 2013
FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar
exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the
Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled
to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging
through his things, he found said Notice. He then
realized that he had not signed in the roll, and
that what he had signed at the entrance of the
PICC was probably just an attendance record.
He thought that since he already took the oath,
the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as
important. The matter of signing in the Roll of
Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE
seminars, he was required to provide his roll
number for his MCLE compliances to be
credited. Not having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll
number.
About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed
the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies
this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither
willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken
belief and an honest error of judgment.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended
that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter
lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no
valid justification for his negligence in signing in
the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign
the Roll of Attorneys.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition
subject to the payment of a fine and the
imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension
from the practice of law.
Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him
the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty
reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions. In this case, said action is not
warranted.
The Court considered Medado’s demonstration
of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit
after the passage of more than 30 years; that he
has shown that he possesses the character
required to be a member of the Philippine Bar;
and that he appears to have been a competent
and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at different firms and companies.
However, Medado is not free from all liability for
his years of inaction.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to
know the law and its consequences.
Medado may have at first operated under an
honest mistake of fact when he thought that
what he had signed at the PICC entrance before
the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized
that what he had signed was just an attendance
record, he could no longer claim an honest
mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, he should have known that he was not a
full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have
made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge,
he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of
law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. At the heart of
Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise
applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to
conduct themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a
full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed
upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one
(1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was
also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during
the one-year period, petitioner was not allowed
to engage in the practice of law.
3. IN RE: Reinstatement of Rolando S.
Torres
AC # 5161, July 11, 2017
FACTS: This is a petition filed by Rolando
Torres for judicial clemency for his
reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys.
The case of disbarment Torres got
involved in was a case of forgery that he
participated and consented to for his client
(Ting-Dumali vs. Torres, 2004), and he was
found guilty by the SC for violating Canons
1 & 10 of the CPR. Ultimately, he was
disbarred by the SC in the aforementioned
case.
Torres filed the necessary MRs
(twice), but both were denied with finality
by the court and expressed that no further
pleadings will be entertained. Still, he filed
motions that beg for his reinstatement and
even wrote to associate judges and even
the Chief Justice for compassion and mercy.
Consistently, such motions were expunged
in the Court’s resolutions, again stressing
that no further pleadings will be entertained
in the case at bar. Undaunted, Torres kept
on filing similar motions and the court either
expunges such or denies it with finality.
After 10 years lapsed, Torres filed a
petition seeking judicial clemency and for
him to be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys. It was denied once more, with
the SC explaining that Torres failed to
provide substantial proof of his reformation
and reconciliation with his sister-in-law, the
original complainant in the disbarment case
against him. Moreover, he did not
demonstrate any remorse from his
fraudulent acts committed against the
original complainant. Even with the SC
ruling against him, he still filed the instant
petition seeking the same remedies from
the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rolando Torres
should be granted judicial clemency by the
court.
HELD: NO.
The principle which should hold true
for lawyers, being officers of the court, is
that judicial clemency, as an act of mercy
removing any disqualification, should be
balanced with the preservation of public
confidence in the courts. Thus, the Court
will grant it only if there is a showing that it
is merited. Proof of reformation and a
showing of potential and promise are
indispensable. In Re: The Matter of the
Petition for Reinstatement of Rolando S.
Torres as a member of the Philippine Bar,
the Court laid down the following guidelines
in resolving requests for judicial clemency,
to wit:
 1. There must be proof of remorse and
reformation. These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the
officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, judges or judges associations
and prominent members of the community with
proven integrity and probity. A subsequent
finding of guilt in an administrative case for the
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from
the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for
clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use
by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise
(such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and
the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well
as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors
and circumstances that may justify clemency.
The SC held that Torres failed to
prove any of the aforementioned and
merely rehashed all the several testimonials
and endorsements that were previously
denied by the SC. Hence, his petition was
denied.
4. Conrado N. Que, Complainant, v. Atty
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., Respondent
A.C. No. 7054, 11 November 2014
Facts:
    Que accused Revilla, Jr. of willfully delaying
the final judgment of the lower court against his
client. Respondent successfully filed a petition of
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, two
petitions of annulment of title and a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial
Court, and a petition for declaratory execution of
the lower court’s decision against his client.
Issue:
    Whether or not the respondent violated
various canons and provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Held:
    Respondent’s abuse of court remedies by
filing multiple actions praying for the same cause
delayed the execution of the final judgment of
the court. The respondent’s willful and revolting
falsehood is also alleged by the complainant that
unjustly maligned and defamed the good name
and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico
who was the previous counsel of the
respondent’s clients. The respondent’s repeated
attempts go beyond legitimate means allowed by
professional ethical rules in defending the
interests of his clients. The respondent violated
his duty as an attorney “never to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law.”
    Due to the respondent’s multiple violations on
the CPR, and is found liable for professional
misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath;
Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10;
Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 10; Rules 12.02
and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR);
and Sections 20 (d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court
disbarred the respondent from the practice of
law.
5. FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the
Minors JURIS ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO and
GABRIEL ENRICO T. MACARRUBO as
represented by their Mother/Guardian,
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO,
complainant, v. ATTY. EDMUNDO L.
MACARRUBO, respondent.
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004.
Facts:
Florence Teves Macarrubo, complainant, filed
on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L.
Macarubbo,respondent, with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines alleging that respondent
deceived her into marrying him despite his prior
subsisting marriage with a
certain Helen Esparza. The complainant averred
that he started courting her in April 1991, he
representing himself as a bachelor; that they
eventually contracted marriage which was
celebrated on two occasions administered by
Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December
18, 1991 in the latter’s Manila office, and the
second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian
Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and
that although respondent admitted that he was
married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he
succeeded in convincing complainant, her family
and friends that his previous marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent
entered into a third marriage with one Josephine
T. Constantino; and that he abandoned
complainant and their children without providing
them any regular support up to the present time,
leaving them in precarious living conditions.
Respondent denied employing deception in his
marriage to complainant, insisting instead that
complainant was fully aware of his prior
subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that
she dragged him against his will to a “sham
wedding” to protect her and her family’s
reputation since she was then three-months
pregnant. He submitted in evidence that in the
civil case “Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J.
Teves,” it declared his marriage to complainant
void ab initio. He drew attention to the trial
court’s findings on the basis of his evidence
which was not controverted, that the marriage
was indeed “a sham and make believe” one,
“vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and intimidation,
and further exacerbated by the existence of a
legal impediment” and want of a valid
marriage license. Respondent raised the
additional defenses that the judicial decree
of annulment of his marriage to complainant is
res judicata upon the present administrative
case; that complainant is in estoppel for
admitting her status as mere live-in partner to
respondent in her letter to Josephine
T. Constantino. Stressing that he had always
been the victim in his marital relations,
respondent invoked the final and executory
August 21, 1998 in the case “Edmundo L.
Macarubbo v. Helen C. Esparza,” declaring his
first marriage void on the ground of his wife’s
psychological incapacity.
It is recommended that respondent Atty.
Edmundo L. Macarrubo be suspended for three
months for gross misconduct reflecting
unfavorably on the moral norms of the
profession. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be
suspended for gross misconduct
Ruling:
While the marriage between complainant and
respondent has been annulled by final judgment,
this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge
of impropriety. He and complainant started living
as husband and wife in December 1991 when
his first marriage was still subsisting, as it was
only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage
was annulled, rendering him liable for
concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with
the good moral character that is required for the
continued right to practice law as a member of
the Philippine bar. Even assuming that
respondent was coerced by complainant to
marry her, the duress, by his own admission as
the following transcript of his testimony reflects,
ceased after their wedding day, respondent
having freely cohabited with her and even begot
a second child by her. Thus, respondent
Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross
immorality and is hereby disbarred from the
practice of law.
6. Sebastian v. Calis
FACTS: Marilou Sebastian was referred
to Atty. Calis who promised to process all
necessary documents required for her trip to the
USA for a fee of Php 150, 000. She made a
partial payment of Php 20, 000 which was
received by the wife of said lawyer. Calis
demanded another Php 65, 000 and told
Sebastian to resign from her job as
stenographer of the Commission on Human
Rights. Sebastian issued Calis a check worth
Php 65, 000, and the lawyer furnished her some
documents and told her to assume another
identity.
Sebastian demanded the return of her
Php 150, 000 after realizing that she will be
travelling with a spurious document. The lawyer
assured her she has nothing to worry about.
Sebastian gave the lawyer her remaining
balance before her departure.
She was detained in Singapore and was
deported back to the Philippines. She demanded
the return of her money, and so Calis gave her
partial refunds. She then gave a demand letter
for the return of Php 114, 000 which Calis
ignored. She then found out Calis transferred to
another residence with apparent intentions to
evade responsibility. She then filed a complaint
for disbarment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Calis is guilty of
gross misconduct.
RULING: Yes. Herein respondent is
guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
contrary to Canon I, Rule 101 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent
deceived the complainant by assuring her that
he could give her visa and travel documents;
that despite spurious documents nothing
untoward would happen; that he guarantees her
arrival in the USA and even promised to refund
her the fees and expenses already paid, in case
something went wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a
lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They
reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are
unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship
with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath.
The lawyers oath is not mere facile words drift
and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be
upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the
office of an attorney requires that he should be a
person of good moral character. This requisite is
not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law, its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of
law.
7.
In Re Tagorda (1929)
G.R. No. 32329 | 1929-03-23
Subject: Solicitation of employment by an
attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension
Facts:
Luis Tagorda, a practicing attorney and a
member of the provincial board of Isabela,
admits that previous to the last general
elections he made use of a card written in
Spanish and Ilocano, stating in essence that
he can execute a deed of sale for the
purchase of land, can renew lost documents
for animals, can execute any kind of
affidavit, etc. He further admits that he is the
author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant
of barrio in his home municipality written in
Ilocano stating that despite his membership
in the Board of Isabela, he will still have his
residence in Echague in order to live and
serve the people there as a lawyer and
notary public. In the letter, he also offered
three pesos for land title registration.
Held:
Solicitation of employment by an
attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension
1. The worthiest and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the
establishment of a well- merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced, but must be the
outcome of character and conduct. The
publication or circulation of ordinary simple
business cards, being a matter of personal
taste or local custom, and sometimes of
convenience, is not per se improper. But
solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted
by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is
equally unprofessional to procure business
by indirection through touters of any kind,
whether allied real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure the
drawing of deeds or wills or offering
retainers in exchange for executorships or
trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer.
2. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to
volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in
rare cases where ties of blood, relationship
or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up
strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at
common law.
3. In this case, he clearly violated the law
when he printed a card stating his expertise
and announcing his services as a lawyer.
He also violated the same when he wrote a
letter to the lieutenant stating his desire to
serve the people of Echague and asking the
lieutenant to express this to his people. The
court then suspended him from the practice
of law for the period of one month.
8. TAN TEK BENG VS. TIMOTEO A. DAVID
A.C. NO. 1261. December 29, 1983
Facts: This case was instituted by Tan Tek Beng
against David for allegedly not living up to their
agreement that lawyer David will give one-half of
his professional fees to an intermediary or
commission agent but he he also bound himself
not to deal directly with the clients.
The business relation between David and Tan
Tek Beng did not last. David clarified that the
partnership was composed of himself as
manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager
and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and
financier.  When Jacinto became ill and the cost
of office maintenance mounted, David
suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest
some money or shoulder a part of the business
expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said agreement is
tantamount to malpractice.
RULING: The Court held that the said
agreement is void because it was tantamount to
malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers”
The practice of law is a profession and not a
business. A lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others. The
Court censures David for entering such void and
unethical agreement and discountenances his
conduct, not because of the complaints, but
because David should have known better.
Respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of
malpractice.
9. Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot A.C.
No. L-1117 March 20, 1944 THE DIRECTOR
OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
FACTS: The respondent, who is an attorney-at-
law, is charged with malpractice for having
published an advertisement in the Sunday
Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as
follows: Marriage license promptly secured thru
our assistance & the annoyance of delay or
publicity avoided if desired, and marriage
arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on
any matter free for the poor. Everything
confidential. Appearing in his own behalf, Bayot
initially denied having published the
advertisement, but later on admitted the
allegations and prayed for the “"the indulgence
and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to
repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical
rules of the law profession." Bayot also said that
the said ad was published in the Tribune only
once and that he never had any case at law by
reason thereof.
ISSUE: W/N Bayot's published advertisement in
the Tribune constitutes malpractice in the law
profession.
RULING: It is undeniable that the advertisement
in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for
an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.) Considering his plea for
leniency and his promise not to repeat the
misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so
decided that the respondent should be, as he
hereby is, reprimanded.
10. Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993
Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to
order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of
Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to
perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law.” The advertisements complained
of by herein petitioner are as follows:
It is the submission of petitioner that the
advertisements above reproduced are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members of
the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in
his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits
the fact of publication of said advertisements at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in
the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services
should be allowed supposedly in the light of the
case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona,  reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Issue:
            Whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised
by it constitutes practice of law and, in either
case, whether the same can properly be the
subject of the advertisements herein complained
of.
Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the
services offered by the respondent constitute
practice of law. The definition of “practice of law”
is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another
with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with the
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely
offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been
offering. While some of the services being
offered by respondent corporation merely
involve mechanical and technical know-how,
such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law
offices, or the computerization of research aids
and materials, these will not suffice to justify an
exception to the general rule. What is palpably
clear is that respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory
and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real.
In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption,
it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for
the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and
stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With
its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may
be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services
it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court
since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely to court appearances
but extends to legal research, giving legal
advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
That fact that the corporation employs
paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
nature of the services it renders which thereby
brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it
has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the
legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession,
advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
proscription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is
a profession. The canons of the profession tell
us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer
is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as
well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention.
That publicity is a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He
easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome
result of propaganda.
11. Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie [A.C. No.
2131 May 10, 1985]
FACTS:
[R]espondent Vicente A. Torres, using the
letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains
the names of the ten lawyers, asked a certain
Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of
Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E.
Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his reply
dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be
informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker
& McKenzie “and if not, what is your purpose in
using the letterhead of another law office.” Not
having received any reply, he filed the instant
complaint. As admitted by the respondents in
their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a
professional partnership organized in 1949 in
Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in
30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside
from being members of the Philippine bar,
practicing under the firm name of Guerrero &
Torres, are members or associates of Baker &
McKenzie.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Baker & McKenzie, an alien law
firm, could practice law in the Philippines.
HELD:
NO. Respondents were enjoined from practicing
law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
RATIO:
Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm,
cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Rules of Court).
[R]espondents’ use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constituted a representation that
being associated with the firm they could “render
legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment”. This
was unethical because Baker & McKenzie was
not authorized to practice law here.
12. Regala v. Sandiganbayan (1996)
Facts: A complaint was filed before the
Sandiganbayan by the PCGG against
Eduardo Cojuangco for recovery of illgotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks.
Among the defendants in this complaint are
Regala, Angara, Cruz, Concepcion, Vinluan,
Lazatin, Escueta, and Hayudini who are all
partners of ACCRA Law Firm. ACCRA law
performed legal services for clients. More
specifically, the members of the law firm
delivered to its client stock certificates
endorsed in blank representing the shares
registered in the client's name, and a blank
deed of trust or assignment covering said
shares. In the course of this, ACCRA law
came to know the assets of their clients as
well as personal and business
circumstances. They also assisted in the
organization and acquisition of companies
and they also acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations
involved in sequestration proceedings.
(coco levy scandal) The PCGG said that
they would drop the ACCRA law partners
from the complaint if they comply with the
following conditions:
1. Disclosure of identity of its clients 2.
Submission of documents substantiating
lawyer-client relationship 3. Submission of
the deeds of assignments the ACCRA law
partners executed in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution
that basically said that until ACCRA lawyers
prove the existence and identity of their
clients, they cannot excuse themselves from
the consequences of their acts. So they are
still impleaded in the complaint. (So names
of their clients in exchange for exclusion
from the complaint)
Issues: 1. W/N the ACCRA lawyers should
be subjected to the strict application of the
law of agency 2. (ETHICS RELATED) W/N
the attorney-client privilege prohibits
ACCRA lawyers from revealing identity of
their client(s) and the other information
requested by the PCGG
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The ACCRA lawyers are being
prosecuted solely on the basis of activities
and services performed in the course of
their duties as lawyers. They are being
impleaded in the complaint so it can be
used as leverage to compel them to name
their clients and consequently to enable the
PCGG to nail these clients. PCGG has NO
valid cause of action against the ACCRA
lawyers and should exclude them. A lawyer-
client relationship is MORE than a principal-
agent relationship because he possesses
special powers of trust and confidence
reposed on him by his client. A lawyer is
also as independent as the judge of the
court, thus his powers are entirely different
from and superior to those of an ordinary
agent. Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client
relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct
and duties that breathe life into it, among
those, the fiduciary duty to his client which
is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high
degree of fidelity and good faith.
2. YES. While the general rule is that a
lawyer should name his client (Just in case
Sir asks: Reasons on naming client 1. Court
has right to know, 2. Attorney-client
relationship does not exist if there is no
client, 3. Privilege pertains to the subject
matter of the relationship, 4. Due process –
right to know), the general rule DOES not
apply in this case.
The general rule is qualified by some
exceptions. Client identity is privileged
where a strong probability exists that
revealing the client’s name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer’s advice. So basically,
when disclosure would open the client to
liability, his identity is privileged. The
circumstances involving the engagement of
lawyers in the case at bench, therefore,
clearly reveal that the instant case falls
under at least two exceptions to the general
rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's
name would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue of the
case, which is privileged information,
because the privilege, as stated earlier,
protects the subject matter or the substance
(without which there would be no attorney-
client relationship). The preparation of the
deed of assignment was part of their service
to their clients. More important, it constituted
an integral part of their duties as lawyers. If
ACCRA lawyers will identify their clients,
they would implicate them in the very
activity for which legal advice had been
sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-
gotten wealth in the aforementioned
corporations.
14. ACA v. SALVADO
A.C. No. 10952 | January 26, 2016
By: Karen P. Lustica
 
FACTS:
Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative
complaint3 for disbarment against Atty.
Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.014
and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant alleged, among others, that
sometime in 2010, he met Atty. Salvado
through Atty. Samuel Divina (Atty. Divina),
his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado
introduced himself as a lawyer and a
businessman engaged in several businesses
including but not limited to the lending business;
that on the same occasion, Atty. Salvado
enticed the complainant to invest in his
business with a guarantee that he would be
given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every
month; and that he was assured of a
profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as
the latter had various clients and investors.
As consideration for these investments, Atty.
Salvado issued several post-dated checks in
the total amount of P6,107,000.00,
representing the principal amount plus
interests. All checks were drawn from
PSBank.
Upon presentment, however, complainant
was shocked to learn that the
aforementioned checks were dishonored as
these were drawn from insufficient funds or a
closed account.
Complainant made several verbal and written
demands upon Atty. Salvado. As time went
by, however, Atty. Salvado began to avoid
complainant’s calls and text messages. This
prompted complainant to refer the matter to
his lawyer Atty. Divina, for appropriate legal
action.
Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of
Dishonor on Atty. Salvado, directing him to settle
his total obligation in the amount of
P747,000.00. Atty. Salvado refused to receive
the said notice.
Complainant went to Atty. Salvado’s house to
personally serve the demand letter. A certain
“Mark” who opened the gate told the filing clerk
that Atty. Salvado was no longer residing there
and had been staying in the province already.
As they were about to leave, a red vehicle
arrived bearing Atty. Salvado. Complainant
quickly alighted from his vehicle and confronted
him as he was about to enter the gate of the
house. Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told him
that he had not forgotten his debt. During this
conversation, Atty. Salvado assured complainant
that he was working on “something” to pay his
obligations. He still refused to personally receive
or, at the least, read the demand letter.
REPORT THIS AD
Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to
settle his obligations.
Atty. Salvado denied that he told complainant
that he had previously entered into various
government contracts and that he was
previously engaged in some other businesses
prior to engaging in the lending and
rediscounting business. Atty. Salvado asserted
that he never enticed complainant to invest in his
business, but it was Atty. Divina’s earnings of
good interest that attracted him into making an
investment.
The checks he issued were merely intended as
security or evidence of investment.
Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past,
there were instances when he would request
complainant not to deposit a check knowing that
it was not backed up by sufficient funds. This
arrangement had worked until the dishonor of
the checks, for which he readily offered his
house and lot located in Marikina City as
collateral.
Investigating Commissioner recommended that
Atty. Salvado be meted a penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months.
IBP-BOG adopted and approved the
recommendation with modification – increased
the period of suspension from six (6) months to
two (2) years.
ISSUE:
WON ATTY. SALVADO should be suspended
for he violated CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath
HELD:
YES.  secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a
1. The public is, indeed, inclined to rely
on representations made by lawyers.
As a man of law, a lawyer is
necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model
citizen. A man, learned in the law like
Atty. Salvado, is expected to make
truthful representations when dealing
with persons, clients or otherwise. For
the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had
observed, complainant’s being beguiled
to part with his  money and believe
Atty. .Salvado as a lawyer and
businessman was typical human
behavior worthy of belief. The Court
finds it hard to believe that a person like
the complainant would not find the
profession of the person on whose
businesses he would invest as important
to consider. Simply put, Atty.
Salvado’s stature as a member of the
Bar had, in one way or another,
influenced complainant’s decision to
invest.
2. The excuse of “gullibility and
inadvertence” deserves scant
consideration. Surely, Atty. Salvado is
aware that promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws of the land is
the primary obligation of lawyers. When
he issued the worthless checks, he
discredited the legal profession and
created the public impression that
laws were mere tools of convenience
that could be used, bended and
abused to satisfy personal whims
and desires. In Lao v. Medel, the
Court wrote that the issuance of
worthless checks constituted gross
misconduct, and put the erring
lawyer’s moral character in serious
doubt, though it was not related to
his professional duties as a member
of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is
Atty. Salvado’s business relationship
with complainant. His issuance of the
subject checks display his doubtful
fitness as an officer of the court.
Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and
Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
15. Jimenez v. Francisco 2004 A.C. No.
10548, December 10, 2014
Facts: Complainant was shocked upon reading
the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by
Jimenez against her. She felt even more
betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty.
Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal
lawyer and Clarion’s corporate counsel and
disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for
representing conflicting interests. According to
her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s
transactions. More significantly, the principal
documents relative to the sale and transfer of
Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted
by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law
office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively
participated in the transactions involving the sale
of the Forbes property. Without admitting the
truth of the allegations in his affidavit,
complainant argued that its execution clearly
betrayed the trust and confidence she reposed
on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant
prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.
Issue: Whether respondent’s actively and
passively allowing Clarion to make untruthful
representations to the SEC and in other public
documents, still constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney.
Held: Yes, While the Court finds no violation of
the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of
privileged communication, the acts of Atty.
Francisco, in actively and passively allowing
Clarion to make untruthful representations to the
SEC and in other public documents, still
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in
his office as attorney, for which a suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months is
warranted. Atty. Francisco could have prevented
his entanglement with this fiasco among the
members of Jimenez’s family by taking an
upfront and candid stance in dealing with
Jimenez’s children and complainant. He could
have been staunch in reminding the latter that
his tasks were performed in his capacity as legal
counsel for Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as it
may, Atty. Francisco’s indiscretion does not
detract the Court from finding that the totality of
evidence presented by the complainant
miserably failed to discharge the burden of
proving that Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At
most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion
and, based on the affirmation presented, of
Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to
establish that Atty. Francisco committed a
violation of the rule on conflict of interests.