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THE USE OF SCHEMA THEORY IN THE DESIGN OF INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS: A PHYSICS

EXAMPLE
Author(s): PETER W. HEWSON and GEORGE J. POSNER
Source: Instructional Science, Vol. 13, No. 2 (JULY 1984), pp. 119-139
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23368979
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Instructional Science 13 (1984) 119 139


Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam - Printed in the Netherlands

THE USE OF SCHEMA THEORY IN THE DESIGN OF


INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS: A PHYSICS EXAMPLE

PETER W. HEWSON
Department of Physics, University of Witwatersrand, I Jan Smuts Avenue, Johannesburg
South Africa

GEORGE J. POSNER
Department of Education, Cornell University, Stone Hall, Ithaca, New York, NY 14853,

ABSTRACT

What are the implications of cognitive science for the design of instructiona
its central concern with meaningful learning? This question was addressed dur
improve the quality of learning in an introductory non-calculus college physi
major intellectual problem that many students face is the development of a cohe
information provided to them. The absence of a conceptual framework may
rapid loss of information often observed among many students shortly after th
Lack of a conceptual framework also may account for the frequent use of
approaches to using formulae. This report cites the use of schema theory for the
generative schema or a set of schémas that could be used by students to integrate
content, and for the design of a means for representing and teaching the sch
instructional materials.

Introduction

What are the implications of new developments in cognitive psychology for


the design of instructional materials? This is a question we tried to answer during
an attempt to improve the quality of learning in an introductory non-calculus
college physics course. A major intellectual problem that we believe many
students face is the development of a coherent view of the information given to

This research was supported in part by a Hatch Research Grant in both the Physics Department
and the Education Department while the senior author was a Visiting Lecturer at Cornell
University (1978-1979).

0020-4277/84/$ 03.00 © 1984 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

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120

them in their courses. In the absence of a conceptual framework, there may be a


rapid loss of information soon after a test. After reviewing recent developments
in cognitive psychology, and particularly the branch of cognitive psychology
concerned with human information processing (often termed "cognitive science")
[1], we decided that the central psychological concept in our work should be the
"schema" and that the basic problems were: a) the development of a generative
schema that could be used by students to integrate most, if not all, of the physics
content; and b) the design of a means for representing and teaching that schema
in our instructional materials. In this article we discuss the psychological basis
for our materials, describe an approach to the design of instructional materials,
and pose a series of questions arising from this study that now merit further
investigation.

The Psychological Basis for the Materials

The materials are based on psychological theories about the process of


understanding. According to these theories, understanding a phenomenon is a
cognitive task which places intellectual demands on the student. The task facing
the students is to identify or construct an appropriate conception of underlying
phenomena and to bring those conceptualizations to bear on the phenomenon.
Our notion of "conception" has been termed a "script" when the individual is
faced with understanding a series of events, a "frame" or "schema" when the
individual is faced with a perceptual task, and a "schema" when the individual is
faced with a paragraph comprehension task [2], For the present discussion we
adopt the term "conception" to encompass all of the above constructs. Concep
tions function passively by providing students with formats in which new
information is placed. They function actively as sets of expectations which serve
as a plan for searching the new information. According to this theory, concep
tions consist of sets of interrelated variables, each with a given range of permissi
ble values. They are interrelated insofar as the assignment of a value to one of the
variables sets constrains permissible ranges of values for other variables. The
variables act as a set of "slots" into which new information is placed, thereby
providing students with expectations for the new information [3], Conceptions
thus make understanding of experiences possible and particular conceptions
determine what meanings students will infer.
In order to apply this theory of understanding to the teaching of introducto
ry physics, it was necessary to identify major conceptions in the course content.
The major conception to emerge was "change," which provided the conceptual
framework for the entire course. We then sought to identify "slots" or variables
to be accounted for in our conception of change. We were surprised to learn that
only a few variables were needed, with those variables describing a variety of
physical phenomena.

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121

The Central Conception ("Change"), Its Associated Variables,


and Its Representation as a Network

Our first objective is the determination of changing features in physical


phenomena. These are called the "objects" of change (x). A standard notation for
the change in x is Ax meaning that x is changing from an initial state (x;) to a final
state (Xf). Changes in states among physical phenomena often are associated
with other "correlated changes" Ay (e.g., changes in time, At). Moreover, some
changes are studied in conjunction with their causes, z. In general, these few
variables associated with change are sufficient for describing a significant por
tion of physics content. For reasons of parsimony and to help students re
member these variables as a structured set, we adapted a diagrammatic form
originally developed by Norman and Rumelhart (1975) as shown in Fig. 1.
The arrows (i.e., "directed lines") in the network in Fig. 1 provide the sense
in which the diagram is read. Thus, Fig. 1 has the following meaning: "Ax is
when there is a change which has as its object x, which changes from state Xj to
state xf. This change occurs during Ay (i.e., during a change inj) and is caused by
z." Note that the different directed lines need not be read in a particular order.
Furthermore, the network should not be confused with a flow diagram (indicat
ing some form of logical order or time sequence).
This is the basic change network. Appendix A includes an excerpt from an
introductory section of the materials to demonstrate our approach to the teach
ing of this fundamental conception. These materials employ a prototypical
example serving as a "cognitive bridge" [4], thereby providing an analogical link
between things the student already knows and some new framework. One hopes
that this approach will make meaningful learning more probable while also
facilitating subsequent physics instruction.

Fig. 1. The basic change network.

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122

Some Examples of Change Networks in Physics

In kinematics, the basic change network is used twice. In the first case, the
object of change (x) is the position of some point, the change in x is the
displacement of the point and Ax is correlated with the corresponding change in
time At, thereby producing the velocity of the point v. Since kinematics is the
description of motion, we do not consider the cause of motion. In the second
case, changes in velocity v are correlated with changes in time producing
acceleration, as shown in Fig. 2.
The directed lines, labelled "is named" and "has value," are necessary when
any network is applied in a particular situation. They make explicit the connec
tion between the general conceptual structure and readings taken in a specific
situation.
Just as it is important to ask "what is changing?" in any given situation, it
also is appropriate to ask "what is not changing?" Different answers to this
question provide two important special cases in kinematics: First, where the
velocity is constant (i.e., Av = 0); and second, where acceleration is constant (i.e.,
when there is an unchanging correlation between a changing velocity and time).
Dynamics arises from kinematics when the question of what causes motion
is considered. Different answers to this question distinguish Aristotelian and
Newtonian viewpoints when applied to a constant velocity situation. A complete

"change of velocity of A"


2 ms

hasas, CHANGE
v object
named from/state
is/'
"velocity
of A" 1 f- '' f
has/value has\val
1 0 ms

Fig. 2. This change network shows t

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123

"net or
resultant force'

i s \ named

Av

i s when

^caused
when by

has as
< . CHANGE
1 \ v
and obj ec t
'and
named from/state \ to state
Jfnd\ is/
etc
"vel oc. i ty" v.

Fig. 3. This change network represents the conceptual structure underlyi


dynamics.

change network representation of the conceptual structure underlying most


dynamics problems in an introductory physics course is shown in Fig. 3. This
representation should be compared with that given by the mathematical repre
sentation of the same conceptual structure.

Fr = ma; Ft = F\ + F2 + F^ + ...

The advantage of the network is that it makes explicit, in a qualitative sense,


features of the mathematical description that are implicit and taken for granted
by an expert. A specific example is the conception of change underlying accelera
tion: There is the unification of the motion of an object, on the one hand, with the
properties of the object and its surrounds, on the other hand, through the
concept of a net or resultant force.
The treatment of a conserved quantity, such as mechanical energy, follows
directly from a discussion of what is not changing during some example of
motion or interaction. Since this quantity (e.g., mechanical energy) is constant,
while its constituent parts (e.g., kinetic, potential energy) could be changing, it is
convenient to think of these constituent changes as correlated changes. The
precise nature of the correlation is, of course, different from the above and is
expressed by the equation

AK + AUi + AU2 + ■ • • = 0

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124

Fig. 4. This extended change network shows the conservation of mechanical energy.

A simplified network for such a situation is shown in Fig. 4.


The supplementary course materials focused almost exclusively on dynam
ics. The use of change as a basic underlying conception is, nevertheless, likely to
be applicable in two general categories. Firstly, it might be applied to any topic
that involves change and correlated change. Since calculus is the mathematical
tool for handling these areas, change networks possibly may be considered as a
technique for developing a conceptual, qualitative and physical understanding
of the power and utility of calculus. Secondly, it might be applied to any topic
involving symmetry, conservation and invariance. Examples of both these cate
gories occur within the course material.
There is support for our contention that change is a significant concept in
physics and that the lack of clarity about it can cause confusion. Trowbridge and
McDermott (1980) found that a significant proportion of first year students at
the University of Washington used a position criterion to determine the relative
velocity. Students indicated that two objects were going at the same speed at the
position where the faster object overtook the slower one. This suggests confusion
between position * and change of position, Ax, in a correlated time interval as
applied to the motions of two objects. The appropriate change network explicitly
distinguishes between x and Ax.

Effects on Students

The course materials were used in a self-paced, audio-tutorial, mastery


oriented freshman physics course (cf. Brown et al., 1977). They supplemented
existing resources (e.g., textbooks, study guide, audio and video tapes, and
laboratory experimentation). To determine the effects these materials had on
students, we interviewed two students after they had completed an objective
course evaluation. One student proclaimed that the change networks were
crucial to his understanding physics. The second student suggested that the

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networks provided no information to make the rest of the work any less
confusing. Is there an explanation for these differences in attitudes toward the
same course material?
The first student (JH) was a male, senior, agronomy major, with no
previous background in high school or college physics. He proclaimed a poor
background in mathematics and enrolled in the course to complete a graduation
requirement. He said that whenever he approached a subject he felt that he had
to "go back to the beginning to know where it was coming from." He always
looked for organization in the subject. He was really enthusiastic the first time he
had seen organization in agronomy; it had transformed his view of what learning
was about and he wanted all of his courses to be as the agronomy course was -
physics being no exception. The supplemental materials provided the means for
organizing physics. In contrast to other course materials which seemed mathe
matically oriented and leading to a "plug-in-equations" approach, the physics
materials seemed to relate the physics to the real world, enabling him to make
connections. In being more specific about how he used these materials, he said
that they enabled him to "picture the process," not in the sense of a snapshot or
physical model, but in the sense of a conceptual understanding; they enabled him
to assign meaning to the physical situation, to follow through from specific data
to meaning, cause, etc. They provided a specific framework for tackling a lab.
"When you don't know what's happening, you know where to begin; you ask
'what is changing? what is causing the change?"'. As he commented on his
questionnaire, "Many times, I referred back to the supplementary handouts to
try to understand what I was dealing with in the activities."
This student worked slowly, but kept a very good lab notebook. He
attempted and passed eight units - six at the first attempt and two at the second
attempt - receiving additional credit for his lab notebook and a final assigned
grade of B+.
The second student (BS) was a female, sophomore, nutrition major. She
had completed the New York State Regents physics and mathematics in high
school as a background and was enrolled in a college calculus course concurrent
ly. In approaching any course, she said that she did all of the required work but
nothing more. She stated that she never missed lectures because she learned
better from listening and writing. She got bored easily when reading. She found
that memorization did not work well in college and that one had to have an
underlying understanding and knowledge of concepts. In regards to physics, all
the reading assignments seemed very "simple," and did not prepare her for
problems or tests which seemed much more "difficult" and complex. Although
the reading and problems were concerned with the same issues, the reading did
not help. She had to get specific help on specific problems. When she saw a
problem for the first time, she did not know where it came from in the reading.
The supplemental materials with the change networks provided no assistance

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whatsoever in bridging the gap. They were clear when read, yet too "simple."
Perhaps there should be more "difficult" assignments.
This student worked very conscientiously, attempting and passing eight
units. Four units were completed at the first attempt, one at the second attempt,
two at the third attempt, and one at the fourth. Her final assigned grade was B.
Our assessment of these interviews is the following. We would like to believe
that the materials served their intended purposes in the case of the first student,
and that his performance was in accord with our expectations for those mate
rials. In the second case, there apparently was little benefit to the student. One
almost wonders whether both students were using the same materials! On the
basis of the two interviews, however, we do feel that the approach merits further
investigation. An understanding of why the approach worked for one student
and not the other may be the crucial issue. Not only could this understanding
contribute to meaningful revisions, it may help the many other students whose
responses were similar to those of BS.
Suggestions for improving the course materials were received from a
number of students. A common theme in many of these comments was that the
materials were too simple, that they did not bridge the gap between principles
and their applications, and that they should be more task-oriented. No student
questioned the value or validity of the course materials; they just seemed to be
unable to "use" them.

J H appears to have been able to use the material based on his need fo
organization. In contrast, BS referred to the need to shift from memorizing
content to full understanding. One may argue that she did not perceive that a
being the function of the change networks. Thus, the existence of a mental set for
organization may differentiate JH from BS. JH also saw the materials
providing a systematic framework for tackling a lab assignment. He frequently
referred back to them to try to understand specific issues, thereby possibly
helping him confront different problems. BS required specific help from a tuto
on specific problems and realized little tangible guidance from the materials. On
additional possibility is that the materials did not provide explicit associations
between concepts and laboratory work. Students may have had to "ad lib" that
association, with some students performing better than others. An additional
claim by J H was that the materials enabled him to "picture the process" in a
conceptual sense - proceeding from specific data to meanings and causes
thereby relating physics to real events. In other words, the materials provided J H
with a physical and non-quantitative view which he found helpful. For BS, th
materials provided no assistance in bridging perceptual and conceptual gap
and appeared to provide little help toward her completing the units. Both BS an
J H passed the same number of units at the mastery level and their final cours
grades, B and B+, scarcely differentiate between the students. Where, then, doe
one draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable methods and to wh

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extent must degree of understanding be assessed in school performance? How do


we help students develop an awareness of their approaches to physics? Until
ways of differentiating between the apparent approaches of BS and JH are
possible (and especially in the context of large service courses), underlying
ambiguity will remain in mastery learning approaches.

Discussion

We have described the development of instructional materials for a college


physics course and underlying psychological motivations for those develo
ments. Also cited were two strikingly different student responses to tho
developments, therein revealing a number of questions about innovations
college-level physics instruction. In raising these issues, our desire is to stimulat
further research pertaining to these issues. Larkin (1979) raises a number
issues germane to our work. She discusses three ideas arising from an examin
tion of "what makes an expert in physics?"
The first idea is that of a condition-action unit specifying an action ("apply
v = u + at") together with conditions under which the actions are to be carrie
out ("«, a, t are known, and a is constant in time"). According to models o
psychological processing, the human brain would store a large number of such
units. Those condition-action units can be specified at a variety of levels in detai
depending on whether one is trying to determine a basic approach to a problem
or perhaps performing detailed mathematical operations in the final stages of
solution. Some difficulties arise, for example, when a student in unable t
identify a very general condition and, thus, does not know what action to take
Other difficulties arise when the student has not learned an appropriate cond
tion and, thus, takes an inappropriate action.
The second idea is that of large-scale functional units "which allow related
bits of information to be stored, accessed, and used coherently." Thus, differen
bits of information which are often used together can be recalled as a coheren
unit. Equations such as F—ma and a — v/t are examples of fairly localized
functional units. A much larger functional unit would include principles, equa
tions, and approaches of the "energy method" or "force method" to solvin
mechanics problems. Typically, students learn small units of information and
are provided very little explicit instruction in building up successively larger
functional units.
The third idea is that of "low-detail representation and procedures, which
are used for comprehensive planning of detailed or complex work." In other
words, it is important to treat a problem in a broad, qualitative perspective
before proceeding to the fine detail, which often is quantitative and mathemati
cal. Typically, students do not attempt a problem using qualitative reasoning.

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Rather, they begin with an equation - encouraged all too often by teachers who
will talk about how to approach the problem while writing down only the
appropriate mathematics.
The importance of this last point is supported by Clement (1977), who
claims that it is important that students develop different types of knowledge
about any given section of physics content. They should have practical knowl
edge, qualitative physical models and concrete mathematical models - in addi
tion to formal symbolic equations. In other words, they should be able to
represent their knowledge about physics in different ways, and be able to
translate one form of representation into another.
Returning to the issue of how experts differ from beginners (in the context
of solving introductory physics problems), some of Larkin's conclusions are:
experts have a much larger store of appropriate condition-action units than do
beginners; experts have more large-scale functional units than do beginners
while both have approximately the same number of basic principles (even
though beginners apply those principles piecemeal rather than as part of a
large-scale unit); and, expert problem-solvers generally begin their solution with
a qualitative representation of the problem and qualitative statements about the
problem. This is followed by their translating these representations and state
ments into mathematical equations. Beginners, on the other hand, try to work
quantitatively from the outset.
These ideas now raise a number of questions about our materials.

1. Could extended change networks, such as the one in Fig. 4, serve as large-scale
functional units? Larkin discusses the idea in the context of problem-solving,
whereas we initially concentrated on comprehension and understanding.
However, one of the functions of a large-scale functional unit is to organize
subject matter, and this is necessary for both problem-solving and under
standing. JH saw change networks serving this function whereas BS did not.
So, the question remains an open one.
2. Since change networks are primarily qualitative and relational in nature,
could they provide a means for planning an approach to a problem through
explicit reminders of the relationships between the concepts relevant to the
problem? This function would be reminiscent of Larkin's low detail represen
tations^and procedures. JH used change networks as a means for thinking
quantitatively and in physical terms about the world - a qualitative represen
tation of a problem situation, as it were. Could other students easily be helped
to do likewise?
3. Change networks provide a representation of content material different from
formal equations, physical models, practical knowledge or graphs. As noted
above, Clement (1977) argues that a learner needs to construct different
representations of new knowledge and to compare these new representations

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with one another. Thus, is a representation of content material by means of


change networks likely to be a helpful addition to the range of representations
listed above?
4. We had implicitly assumed that a better understanding, provided by change
networks, could by itself lead to better problem-solving. The comments by BS
point to weaknesses in this assumption. Thus, change networks do not
eliminate the need for condition-action units, particularly at the level of
specificity required for problem-solving. Could they, however, form an im
portant component in any problem-solving strategy serving to identify the
broader context of the problem? Without such a context it might be more
difficult to identify whether or not a condition was satisfied prior to taking the
corresponding action. Some support for this position comes from JH who
was able to use the idea of change for generating questions to ask when he did
not know how to proceed. Why, then, did change networks fail in this
function with other students?

This study also raises more general questions. We used central, unifying
conceptions and network-type representation of these conceptions as our basis
for design of instructional materials. Other educators might want to consider the
applicability of this approach to their own disciplines by asking:

• Is there a small set of fundamental conceptions that underlies knowledge in


their field?
• How might these conceptions best be represented?
• How can these fundamental conceptions be taught to the novice?
• Are there a set of paradigmatic problems students are expected to learn to
solve?
• Would the specification of condition-action units be helpful to students in
other disciplines?

Some disciplines do not emphasize problem-solving to the same extent as


does physics (e.g., the biological sciences and some social and behavioral sci
ences). In such disciplines, representations of central conceptions may be suffi
cient for achieving course objectives because such disciplines typically emphasize
developing a conceptual framework or set of frameworks, with problem-solving
playing a secondary role.
In conclusion, we suggest that the use of schema theory in instructional
materials may be worth considering if, at the outset of some instructional
program, acquisition of a conceptual framework is desirable. Such frameworks
enable the student to use subsequent instruction to add sophistication and detail
to this general framework [5], Learning, from the perspective of schema theory,
is analogous to an architecture based on steel frame construction. The steel
frame is constructed first, with walls, floors, ceilings and stairs to follow. This

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130

approach to learning is in contrast to the brick(-by-brick)-and-mortar approach


of more inductivist perspectives [6]. If a synoptic view of the subject matter is an
objective, the schema approach may be worthy of further exploration.

Notes

1 For a summary of recent work in cognitive science and its application to educational technol
ogy, see Posner (1978).
2 For the first attempt at viewing the comprehension process with a schema theory, see Bartlett
(1932).
3 For presentations of this theory see Anderson, Spiro, and Anderson (1978), and Anderson,
Reynolds, Schallert, and Goetz (1977).
4 This term was borrowed from Novak (1977).
5 Compare with the "spiral" curriculum of Bruner ( 1960) and the elaboration theory of Reigeluth
et al. (1980).
6 Robert Gagné's work exemplifies the inductivist perspective. See especially Gagné and Rriggs
(1979). In that book he introduces the "bricks and mortar" metaphor (p. 152). For an
explication of the contrast between conductivist ("bottom-up") and hypothetical-deductive
("top-down") approaches to education, see Strike and Posner (1976). The epistemological and
psychological assumptions of the "top-down" approach, and particularly the "conceptual
change" variant of this approach (inspired by the work of Thomas Kuhn and Stephen
Toulmin), are generally consistent with schema theoretical approaches.

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APPENDIX

Physics as the Study of Change

A very useful way of thinking about physics is to regard it as


change. The idea of change on its own is very simple, but since so m
things can change in a large number of different ways, the study
quickly can become complicated. We want to be able to describ
change, to explain why things change, and to say what happens t
objects when things change. So our study can very easily become t
handle. In physics we try to reduce this complexity by looking a
possible objects, and their most fundamental interactions; oth
reduce the complexity by concentrating on different aspects of the

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE

So let us look at what we need in order to describe how things c


first thing to note is that we have to specify what it is that is changing
the color of your jeans, the amount of money in your bank account,
while on a diet, the direction in which you are travelling. We shal
object of change, and interpret the word "object" rather broad
characteristics, properties or variables in general, rather than takin
only physical objects. For example, it is the color of your jean
changed rather than their "jeanness" (they have not changed into
you go on a diet it is not your "being" that has changed but your we
not become someone else). The second thing we need to specify is th
and the end of change; e.g., from dark blue to light blue, from $ 100 to
145 lbs to 137 lbs, from south to south-west. The third thing to note is
of change. This depends on the beginning and end of change and,
on the difference between the beginning and end. This differen
express if the beginning and end states are specified in numbers - e.
account changed by $400 and your weight by 8 lbs.
In both thesï cases you will realize the importance of specifyin
tion of change - gaining $400 and losing 8 lbs is very different fro
and gaining 8 lbs. Without numbers, we cannot express the amount
simply, e.g. the color of your jeans, but nevertheless in physics we f
useful to use a special notation for the amount of change - a change in a
as Ax, and spoken as "delta x.n We define Ax in the following way

© 1981 Peter Hewson and George Posner

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133

Ax — Xf — X;

where X; is the initial state of x, at the beginning of the change and x{ is the final
state of x, at the end of the change. You can easily check that A (bank
balance) = + $400 and A (weight) = - 8 lbs, so the definition Ax is consistent
with our usual understanding of change and its direction, as we explained it
above.

To summarize the important ideas expressed above, we could say "delta x


means that an object, x, changes from one state, xin;tjal, to another state, xfinal."
It is convenient to represent all these points diagrammatically in a way that
reminds us that they are linked together in a particular way. We shall call this
diagram a change network: (Fig. Al). We could read this network in the
following way: "delta x is when there is change which has as its object x which
changes from an initial state X; to a final state xf."*
Thinking of your jeans, we could say: "delta (color of jeans), or what we
call 'fading,' means that the color of your jeans changes from its initial state
of dark blue, to its final state of light blue." Fig. A2 shows the change net
work for your jeans where "is named," as a label for line, means that a varia
ble, which can have many possible values, has been given a name which al
ways identifies it, regardless of the value it has: "has value" as a label indicates
that a variable, in a specified situation, has one particular value.
This is the basic change network which we shall be using repeatedly
through our study of physics. We shall find that, whenever we investigate

Fig. AI. The elements of change.

*A word about the arrows or directed lines: these lines, together with their labels (e.g., is
when), are designed to help us read the network. The networks are not flow-charts in that the
direction of the lines is totally arbitrary and represents only grammatical conventions. That is,
the direction tells us which way to read. For instance, we know from the way the line is
pointing to read "Ax 15 whe.n rH A Mf.F" as "delta x is when (there is) a change ..." rather than
"a change is when (there is) a delta x."

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134

"fading"

i s \ named

^ias an
object
is/named from/state \to state
■yn.
"color Of X. x r
jeans" , 1 \
has / value has \ value

dark blue 1ight blue

Fig. A2. The basic change network applied to fading jeans.

something that is changing, it will be necessary to find out explicitly


Xj, x{ and Ax are. Being clear about these will help greatly in your un
ing of physics. Now, thinking about dieting, answer the following qu

1.1 What would be the object of change?


1.2 What might we name Ax?
1.3 What might be a possible value for x;?
1.4 What might be a reasonable value for xf for a successful diet?
for an unsuccessful diet?

CORRELATED CHANGE

Knowing that your jeans have faded in the sun is important,


not all we need to know. You would take a very different at
fading if it had happened during the course of a single day, co
fading as a result of five years constant wear. The change n
would be identical for both cases, so it clearly does not inclu
significant about the two examples of fading, and as such would
usefulness. So how can we include something which would tell
ple, about the rapidity of change? This clearly depends on the tw
ent time intervals during which the same color change occurr

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135

plaint to the manufacturer who guaranteed color fastness would stand or fall,
not simply on the amount of color change, but on the amount of color
change in relation to the length of time since purchase.
In other words, it is important to ask whether there was anything else
that was changing while x was changing; i.e., whether Ax could be correlated
with a change in some other quantity - in the case above we wanted to see
how color change correlated with elapsed time. Since, by and large, things do
not change instantaneously, we can always correlate Ax with elapsed time A;,
and we shall find that, in most cases we consider in physics, it will be useful to
consider change in relation to time, i.e., the rate of change.
Time is not, of course, the only thing that changes while your jeans
faded. The amount of radiant energy from the sun falling on your jeans, the
strength of the denim material and the president of the United States could
have changed during those 5 years. Not all changes are, of course, significant
in the matter of your fading jeans; but some are clearly of importance, and at
a later stage we shall look at some of them in detail. For the moment, howev
er, we shall simply note that some things other than time can change Ajc,
while concentrating on time. We can incorporate the correlated change into
the change network as shown in Fig. A3.
You will note that we have added a new sort of directed line labelled
"during." This is just our way of indicating a correlated change. There is one
very important point to notice about the correlated change network. We hav

"time
interval

*• 5 years

"color of
*"i f "time"
jeans"
has/value has\valueha^ value has Rvalue
dark blue light blue'1976 1981
Fig. A3. The correlated change network applied to fading jeans.

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136

40 lbs

named

named

Fig. A4. Change due to dieting. See Qn. 1.6.

used At to mean the time interval during which Ax changes. Since At itself
represents a change in time, it, too, has been represented in the change net
work on the right in Fig. A3.

1.5 Write out in words the meaning of this change network for time.

Earlier, in question 1.1 to 1.4, you were asked to specify .v, the name of
Ax, and x{. In other words a successful diet might have been described as
follows: "a weight loss (or a successful diet) is when there is a change in
weight from an initial weight to a lower final weight".

1.6 Now fill in the missing parts of the network shown in Fig. A4.

CHANGE AND NO CHANGE

Although we have been talking about things which are chang


does not mean that things that are not changing are unimportan
manufacturers want to be able to advertise that their clothing will
or fade; in other words, that the size will not change, nor will the c
certainly true that a world in which nothing stayed the same from
would be chaotic. You would never be sure that your clothes would f
morning, that you could find your way from bedroom to bathr
what you ate as food yesterday would not kill you today. At the

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137

"time
interval"
named

object \
/ ~ / \ / \
i sj named f rom / named
state
"color of "time"
t. tf
x. x,

jeans"
has s va 1 ue has \va 1 ue
J value has ^alue h^s value has\^,
dark blue dark blue 1976 1981

Fig. A5. The change network for color fast jeans.

treme, a world in which nothing changed . . . there would be no n


day, you would not grow older, you could not move, and so on.
So some things change, and others do not, and most things p
alternate: changing at one time and not at another. As far as the
networks are concerned, however, we can see that we can use the same
network, if we realize that a constant x is simply a special case; one in
the initial state has the same value as the final state x(. In other w
could represent an example of color fast jeans as shown in Fig. A5.
You will note the inclusion of the correlated time interval, and realize
that, as before, the significance of the lack of change depends on its relation
to the time interval involved. If, in fact, your jeans had not changed their
color with five year's wear, that would be rather remarkable.
In general, then, we shall be looking at examples of properties, character
istics, quantities, etc. (what we call the objects of change) that might not be
changing. We shall want to find out what relationship, if any, exists between
them in their correlated change. If some things remain constant while others
change, that, too, will be important. There will be many examples of both
situations in the physics you will be doing in this course.

EXPLANATION OF CHANGE

By and large, things do not usually change all of their own

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138

other words, the description of change which we have discussed above does
not go far enough, even though it is an essential beginning. It raises questions
such as: What caused the change? Why is the change of two quantities corre
lated? Generally we try to answer these questions by pinpointing the cause of
the change. Here we can run into some problems because it is not always
clear what caused the changé. Was it the sun, or wear, or regular washing, or
bleach which changed the color of your jeans? If your bank balance increases
by $400, was this change caused by your benevolent aunt who gave you the
money, or you yourself who deposited the money, or the accounting machine
that printed out your credited bank statement? In some cases it seems that
things do change all by themselves. Is anything causing time to pass while you
read this paragraph?
Having difficulty in explaining what caused the change, or why two
changes are correlated (and in some cases having to admit defeat) is no reason
to stop looking for explanations. So, to remind ourselves of the importance
of this aspect of the study of change, we indicate the cause in the change
network shown in Fig. A6.
Later on we shall see that physics is very particular about what counts as
a cause of change, but this is not the time to try to unravel those complexities.
It will be sufficient to remember that looking for explanations will be impor
tant.

In summary, when we consider change, there are a small number of

"fading"

i s \ named "time inverval

s/ named

At has

slwher

x *
object
tate
i^named f rom ^tate \to state from/s amed
"color of x. x, t. "time"
jeans"
i
f -i *f.

i has //a 1 ue has^value h^/s value has^/alue


dark blue light blue 1976 1981
Fig. A6. Showing what causes change.

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139

points to bear in mind. Firstly, we have to be very clear about what it is that
is changing, or as we call it, the object of change. Secondly, we need to
specify the initial and final states of the object of change, or, if you like, we
take measurements at the start and finish. Thirdly, we need to consider the
amount of change, and this depends directly on the initial and final states.
Fourthly, we need to find out if anything else is changing along with the
initial object of change. Fifthly, we need to seek an explanation for the
change, for the correlation of two changes; in other words, to find out what,
if anything, is causing the changes. Finally, we use a change network to re
mind ourselves that these different things are all linked together, and there
fore are important, in any study of change.

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