DEL ROSARIO v.

FERRER GR 187056

September 20, 2010

Facts:

On August 27, 1968 spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled
"Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their
granddaughter, Jarabini, covering a house and lot in Pandacan, Manila.

The deed of donation reads:

It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the
surviving spouse.

It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales will continue to occupy
the portions now occupied by them.

It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any other
distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate and
wherever situated.

It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right, ownership, possession
and administration of this property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition and
Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death of the DONORS.*

Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the
deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees,
however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.

Later on, Jarabini, the granddaughter, filed a "petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968
deed of donation mortis causa" before the RTC of Manila. Asuncion opposed the petition,
invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her.

After trial, the RTC found that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos, the donors’
intention being to transfer title over the property to the donees during the donors’ lifetime,
given its irrevocability.

Issue: W/N the donation inter vivos or mortis causa? – Inter vivos.

Ruling: That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is
not controlling. If a donation, by its terms, is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the
fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.

Irrevocability is Absolutely Incompatible with Conveyances Mortis Causa. – A donation

mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

Thus, in Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that "irrevocability" is a quality

absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is
precisely the essence of the act. The express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive
standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos."

In the case at bar, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa
shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the
donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect
the irrevocability of the donation.

*Donor-Spouses Only Maintained Beneficial Ownership. – The donors in this case, of

course, reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of the property" and
made the donation operative upon their death. But the SC has consistently held that such
reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the
donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated
property while they lived.

Acceptance Indicates Donation is Inter Vivos. – Notably, the three donees signed their
acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required. The SC has held that an
acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement
only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not
be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.

In Case of Doubt, Inter Vivos. – As Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case
of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in
order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
 LAO HU NIU v. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

GR 12379, 36 Phil. 433, March 14, 1917

Facts:

This case involves an exclusion from PH of a Chinese Woman and her minor children. The
woman claims to be the wife of a former resident Chinese merchant who died in the PH owning
property therein and leaving as his only heirs the wife and her children.

Issue 1: W/N the widow and minor children of deceased resident Chinese merchant have the
right to enter PH as such widow and children – No.

Ruling:

The widow and minor children of a deceased Chinese merchant resident and doing business in
the Philippine Islands at the time of his death are not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands
solely by reason of such relationship.

Issue 2: W/N the widow can, as merchant and successor to her husband, enter PH and bring
her children with her? – No.

Ruling:

It was not pleaded that applicant was a merchant, what appears is that her husband was, at
the time of his death, a resident Chinese merchant doing business in PH and died leaving
property and business.

Status of a Merchant is not a Transmissible Right. - The assumption of the appellant is that
the mere fact of the death of a merchant makes his wife and children also merchants, as it
leaves to them as heirs and next of kin a mercantile business as a part of their inheritance. We
do not believe that this necessarily follows.

But if it does, the fact remains that she is not a resident merchant. She is still outside of the
Philippine Islands and has never held the status of a resident merchant. She must, therefore,
establish her right to enter as a merchant in the first instance. This she did not do. She did not
present the section six certificate which is the only evidence upon which her right to enter can
be based.
 PAMPLONA v. MORETO

GR L-33187, 96 SCRA 775, March 31, 1980

Facts:

Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega, husband and wife, acquired adjacent lots No. 1495,
4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Estate, containing 781, 544 and 1,021 sq m respectively.

More than 6 years after Monica’s death, Flaviano executed a deed of sale covering lot no. 1495
for P900 which contained the description as having an area of 781 sq m and covered by
certificate of title 14570 in favor of spouses Pamplona without the consent of his co-heirs and
without any liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The spouses Pamplona constructed their
house on the eastern part thereof. In 1956, Flaviano died intestate.

And in 1961, the heirs of Flaviano demanded the sps Pamplona to vacate the premises where
they had their house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot as the
same belongs to the conjugal partnership. The spouses Pamplona refused to vacate, hence this
suit.

Issue: W/N petitioners (sps Pamplona) are entitled to the full ownership of the property in
litigation, or only one-half of the same. – Yes, entitled to FULL ownership.

Ruling:

There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July 30, 1952 from
Flaviano Moreto, his wife Monica Maniega had already been dead six years before, Monica
having died on May 6, 1946. Hence, the conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto
and Monica Maniega had already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code). The records
show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled and divided by the
heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190.
Neither was there an extra-judicial partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the
deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly,
the estate became the property of a community between the surviving husband, Flaviano
Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership.

A co-owner has the right to sell his portion of the coowned property. Flaviano Moreto had
the legal right to more than 781 sq m of the communal estate, a title which he could dispose,
alienate in favor of vendee-petitioners. The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the
moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries
over which the fences were to be erected without objection, protest or complaint by the other
co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and
possession, a factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was
created.

Heirs are obliged to deliver land sold by their parents to the vendee thereof. Article 776 of
the New Civil Code provides that, “the inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.” And under Article 1311, par 1
of the same code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano took effect between
the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein.

Estoppel by laches. The heirs are estopped from assailing the reality of the sale of conjugal
estate made by their widowed father where for years they and the vendees have been neighbors
each believing that the area occupied by the vendees was the one so sold and the heirs had not
questioned the sale made by their father of the area in question.

*Additional (in case Ma’am decides to ask): Here there was a mutual error between Flaviano
Moreto and sps Pamplona in the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed
recited that the lot sold is lot 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a portion of
lot 1496. The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners
for more than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been resurveyed by
private land surveyor Daniel Aranas and has been discovered to actually fall within lot 1496
instead of 1495. Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer
Certificate of Title in their name based on the relocation survey.
 GAYON v. GAYON

GR L- 28394, November 26, 1970

Facts:

On July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and
Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a
deed whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land
located in the province of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon, subject to redemption
within five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption had not
been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors,
despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita
Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to
plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced thereon
improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property up to
1967.

In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on
January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that the sale to Pedro Gayon is
fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers; that neither she
nor her deceased husband had ever executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff’s
favor".

A motion to dismiss was later on filed by Mrs. Gayon purporting that she has nothing to do
with the land subject of plaintiff’s complaint which was granted but reversed in a motion for
reconsideration.

In her opposition to the motion for reconsideration of the plaintiff, Mrs. Gayon alleged, inter
alia, that the "heirs cannot represent the dead defendant, unless there is a declaration of
heirship."

Issue: Whether or not the heirs can represent only when there is a declaration of heirship? –
No.

Ruling:

To begin with, it is not true that Mrs. Gayon "has nothing to do with the land subject of
plaintiff’s complaint." As the widow of Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his compulsory heirs and
has, accordingly, an interest in the property in question. Inasmuch, however, as succession
takes place, by operation of law, "from the moment of the death of the decedent” and (t)he
inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death," it follows that if his heirs were included as defendants in this case,
they would be sued, not as "representatives" of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot
interest in the property in question, even if the precise extent of their interest may still be
undetermined and they have derived it from the decedent. Hence, they may be sued without a
previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent.