RECALL
There is a failure of elections when the venue for
GARCIA v. COMELEC
Section 70 of the LGC, which provides for the
initiation of the recall process, cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional for allowing the recall of
local government officials through a preparatory
recall assembly. Recall is a mode of removal of a
public officer by the people before the end of
his/her term of office. Although recall is a power
reserved to the people to be exercised by the
registered voters, the LGC provided for a second
mode of initiating the recall process through a
preparatory recall assembly. There is nothing in the
Constitution that will remotely suggest that the
people have the sole and exclusive right to decide
on whether to initiate a recall 146 proceeding.
Notice to all members of the PRA is a mandatory
requirement. Loss of confidence as a ground for
recall is a political question.
CLAUDIO v. COMELEC
The 1-year ban (from assumption and next
election) refers to the holding of the recall election,
not the convening of the PRA
GO v. BAYRON
Held: COMELEC is mandated to shoulder all
expenses relative to recall elections. The 2014
General Appropriations Act provide the line item
appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its
constitutional mandate of conducting recall
elections. There is no need for supplemental
legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct
recall election for 2014.
FAILURE OF ELECTIONS, POSTPONEMENT AND
SPECIAL ELECTIONS
SISON v. COMELEC
The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is only
limited to the issues enumerated under Section 243
of the OEC, and the enumeration therein is
restrictive and exclusive.
SOLIVA v. COMELEC
counting was transferred without notice to or
conformity of the candidates and watchers and
where canvassing was done without their presence.
Even though casting took place, the irregularities
that marred the counting and canvassing must
result in a failure to elect.
AMPATUAN v. COMELEC
A pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as
an action for annulment of election results, or
failure of elections. Therefore, while the COMELEC
is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an
examination of the election returns on their face
and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind
them and investigate election irregularities,
COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations
of fraud, terrorism, violence, and other analogous
causes in actions for annulment of election results
or for declaration of failure of elections. Thus,
COMELEC, in the case of actions for annulment of
election results or declaration of failure of elections,
may conduct technical examination of election
documents and compare and analyze voters’
signatures and thumbprints in order to determine
whether or not the elections had indeed been free,
honest and clean. The fact that a candidate
proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the
COMELEC of its authority to annul any canvass and
illegal proclamation.
ELECTION ADJUDICATION SYSTEM
JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC
the power to decide all questions affecting
elections, such power is not without limitation. It
does not extend to contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution
vests the resolution of these contests solely upon
the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or
the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court
has already settled the question of 72 when the
jurisdiction of COMELEC ends and when that of the
HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional
candidate following the election divests COMELEC
of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET.
1

LOKIN v. COMELEC
Held: An election protest proposes to oust the
winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates,
based on the grounds of electoral frauds and
irregularities, to determine who between them has
actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast
and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed
by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding
elections. While a special civil action for quo
warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the
State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate, to
unseat the ineligible person from the office, it is not
to install another in his/her place. Any voter may
initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a
contest where the parties strive for supremacy
because the losing candidate will not be seated
even if the winning candidate may be unseated.
PIMENTEL v. COMELEC
Held: Pre-proclamation controversies refer to
matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appearance of election returns
and certificates of canvass. In the elections for
President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives, pre-proclamation
cases on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns or certificates of canvass are still
prohibited. However, the following are recognized
exceptions, namely :(1) correction of manifest
errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or
proceedings of the BOC; and (3) determination of
the authenticity and due execution of certificates of
canvass as provided in Section 30 of R.A. No. 7166,
as amended by R.A. No. 9369.
TAN v. COMELEC
Instances when COMELEC may declare a failure of
election:
1. Election is not held
2. Election is suspended
3. The election results in a failure to elect
No rule or law prohibits simultaneous
prosecution
For one, there is no law or rule prohibiting the
simultaneous prosecution or adjudication of pre-
proclamation controversies and elections protests.
Allowing the simultaneous prosecution scenario
may be explained by the fact that pre-proclamation
controversies and election protests differ in terms of
the issues involved and the evidence admissible in
each case95 and the objective each seeks to
achieve. Moreover, the Court, under certain
circumstances, even encourages the reinforcement
of a pre-proclamation suit with an election protest.
As we held in Matalam v. Commission on
Elections:96
The Court agonized over its inability to fully look into
the election irregularities alleged by petitioner, due
to the very limited scope of pre-proclamation
controversy. Thus, the Court reminds lawyers
handling election cases to make a careful choice of
remedies. Where it becomes apparent that a pre-
proclamation suit is inadequate, they should
immediately choose another timely remedy, like a
petition to annul the election results or to declare a
failure of elections or even an election protest, so
that election irregularities may be fully ventilated
and properly adjudicated by the competent
tribunal.97
Speedy disposition paramount
For another, simultaneous adjudications offer more
practical features than piecemeal adjudications in
expediting the resolution of cases. We must stress
the importance of speedy disposition of election
cases because a late decision, such as one that
comes out when the term of office in dispute is
about to expire, is a veritable useless scrap of
paper. We reiterate what we said in Espidol v.
COMELEC:
It bears reiterating x x x that the COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation
illegally made. The fact that a candidate illegally
proclaimed has assumed office is not a bar to the
exercise of such power. It is also true that as a
general rule, the proper remedy after the
proclamation of the winning candidate for the
position contested would be to file a regular election
protest or quo warranto. This rule, however, admits
of exceptions and one of those is where the
proclamation was null and void. In such a case, i.e.,
where the proclamation is null and void, the
proclaimed candidate’s assumption of office cannot
deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such
proclamation a nullity.
A resolution or decision of the COMELEC is
considered complete and validly rendered or
issued when there is concurrence by the required
majority of the Commissioners.
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LLOREN v. COMELEC
Held: Under Section 8, of Rule 14 of the Rules in
9 
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, an aggrieved party may
appeal the decision of the trial court to the
COMELEC within five days after promulgation by
filing a notice of appeal in the trial court that
rendered the decision, serving a copy of the notice
of appeal on the adverse counsel or on the adverse
party if the party is not represented by counsel.
Section 9, of Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-
10 
15-SC prescribes for that purpose an appeal fee of
₱ 1,000.00 to be paid to the trial court rendering the
decision simultaneously with the filing of the notice
of appeal.
It should be stressed, however, that the Rules in
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC did not supersede the appeal
fee prescribed by the COMELEC under its own
rules of procedure. As a result, "the requirement of
two appeal fees by two different jurisdictions caused
a confusion in the implementation by the COMELEC
of its procedural rules on the payment of appeal
fees necessary for the perfection of appeals." To11 
remove the confusion, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8486, effective on July 24,
12  aside the challenged order granting the motion for
2008, whereby the COMELEC clarified the rules on
13  execution pending appeal and writ of execution
the payment of the two appeal fees by allowing the
appellant to pay the COMELEC’s appeal fee of ₱
3,200.00 at the COMELEC’s Cash Division through
the ECAD or by postal money order payable to the
COMELEC within a period of 15 days from the time
of the filing of the notice of appeal in the trial court
Section 12. Summary dismissal of election
contests. — The court shall summarily dismiss,
motu proprio, an election protest, counter-protest or
petition for quo warranto on any of the following
grounds:
(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as
required under Section 10;
(c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed
in these Rules;
(d) The filing fee is not paid within the period for
filing the election protest or petition for quo
warranto; and
(e) In a protest case where cash deposit is required,
the deposit is not paid within five (5) days from the
filing of the protest.
RELAMPAGOS v. CUMBA
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where
it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction? 
Held: The Court in concluding that the aforesaid
last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. 697 has not
been repealed by the Omnibus Election Code, held
that the COMELEC has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 
Hence, the trial court acted with palpable and
whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the
petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal
and in issuing the writ of execution. Any motion for
execution pending appeal must be filed before the
period for the perfection of the appeal. Since the
motion for execution pending appeal was filed only
on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the
appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act
thereon. 
COMELEC has jurisdiction, hence, it correctly set
issued by the trial court.
GUEVARRA v. COMELEC
Issue: whether the Commission on Elections has
the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt
proceedings against petitioner with a view to
imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary
penalty in connection with the publication of an
article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957
which, according to the charge, tended to interfere
with and influence said Commission in the
adjudication of a controversy then pending
determination and to degrade and undermine the
function of the Commission and its members in the
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections.
Held: No. Because the acquisition of ballot boxes
which is the main issue in this case is a ministerial
duty and the power to punish for contempt can only
be exercised if it was using its judicial powers.
CAWASA v. COMELEC
The pre-conditions for declaring a failure of
election are: (1) that no voting has been held in any
precinct or precincts because of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes and (2) that the votes not cast therein are
3
sufficient to affect the results of the elections. The
concurrence of these two circumstances justifies
the calling of special elections. 29 Here, the Comelec
found that the special elections were vitiated by
fraud due to the illegal transfer of the polling places
and the appointment of military personnel as
members of the BEI. Inevitably, the Comelec could
not ascertain who voted during the special
elections. The circumstances were such that the
entire electoral process was not worthy of faith and
credit, hence, in practical effect no election was
held.
The appointment of military personnel as members
of the BEI is a grave electoral irregularity. A special
election may also be ordered by the COMELEC
when the transfer of the polling place was made in
blatant disregard of COMELEC Resolution No. 4360
specifying the polling places and also Sections 153
and 154 of the OEC. Changes may be initiated by
written petition of the majority of the voters of the
polling place or agreement of all the political
parties or by resolution of the COMELEC after
notice and hearing.
A prayer to annul election results, as in the instant
case, and a prayer to declare failure of elections
based on allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence or
analogous causes, are actually of the same nature
and the Election Code denominates them similarly.
The COMELEC may exercise the power to annul
election results or declare a failure of election motu
proprio or upon a verified petition. The hearing of
the case shall be summary in nature. A formal trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process – it is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their respective sides of the controversy
and to present evidence on which a fair decision
can be based. In fine, a trial is not at all
indispensable to satisfy the demands of due
process.
DUMARPA v. COMELEC
Held: COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, in
the exercise of its plenary powers in the conduct of
elections enshrined in the Constitution and statute.
Thus, it brooks no argument that the COMELEC's
broad power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall,carries with it all necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.
 In the performance of its duties, the Commission
must be given a considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it
was created - to promote free, orderly, and honest
elections. The choice of means taken by the
Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly
illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion,
should not be interfered with.
APPEALS AND OTHER ELECTION ISSUES
Dumayas v. COMELEC
Issue: In view of the retirement of Commissioners
Gorospe and Guiani before the date of the
promulgation of the assailed resolution on March 2,
2000, should said resolution be deemed null and
void for being violative of Article IX-A, Section 7 of
the 1987 Constitution?
Held: Unless the withdrawal of the votes would
materially affect the result insofar as votes for or
against a party is concerned, we find no reason for
declaring the decision a nullity. In the present case,
with the cancellation of the votes of retired
Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining
votes among the four incumbent commissioners at
the time of the resolution’s promulgation would still
be 3 to 1 in favor of respondent. Noteworthy, these
remaining Commissioners still constituted a quorum.
In our view, the defect cited by petitioner does not
affect the substance or validity of respondent
Commission’s disposition of the controversy.
Issue: Should respondent Bernal, who was named
as petitioner in the quo warranto proceedings
commenced before the regular court, be deemed to
have abandoned the motions he had filed with
respondent Commission?
Held: As a general rule, the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy
or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed,
thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to
inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee
or the validity of his proclamation. The reason for
this rule is that once the competent tribunal has
acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto, all questions relative
thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and
not in another proceeding, so as to prevent
confusion and conflict of authority.9
4
Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It
admits of certain exceptions, as where: (a) the
board of canvassers was improperly constituted;
(b) quo warranto was not the proper remedy;
(c) what was filed was not really a petition for quo
warranto or an election protest but a petition to
annul a proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo
warranto petition or an election protest was
expressly made without prejudice to the pre-
proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam;
and (e) the proclamation was null and void.
Issue: Did the COMELEC err in ordering the
inclusion of the contested election returns in the
canvassing of ballots?
Held: Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact
by the COMELEC, or any other administrative
agency exercising particular expertise in its field of
endeavor, are binding on this Court. In a pre-
18  because there was a valid CoC filed by Mr. Roger.
proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers
and the COMELEC are not required to look beyond
or behind the election returns which are on their
face regular and authentic. Where a party seeks to
raise issues the resolution of which would
necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of
election returns which are prima facie regular, the
proper remedy is a regular election protest, not a
pre-proclamation controversy.
Miranda v Abaya
Held: While there is no dispute as to whether or not
a nominee of a registered or accredited political
party may substitute for a candidate of the same
party who had been disqualified for any cause, this
does not include those cases where the certificate
of candidacy of the person to be substituted had
been denied due course and cancelled under
Section 78 of the Code.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law
enumerated the occasions where a candidate may
be validly substituted, there is no mention of the
case where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and cancellation
of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing
rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter
case, much in the same way that a nuisance
candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied
due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted.
If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they
could have so easily and conveniently included
those persons whose certificates of candidacy have
been denied due course and/or cancelled under the
provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
More importantly, under the express provisions of
Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but
only "an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party" may be substituted.
In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840,
November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that
"a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid
candidacy" A person without a valid certificate of
candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in
much the same way as any person who has not
filed any certificate of candidacy at all cannot, by
any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
LUNA v. COMELEC
Issue: Whether Luna can validly substitute Hans
roger who was underage when he filed his Coc for
Vice-Mayor.
Held: Yes. As per Section 77 OEC, Hans roger
withdrew from the race. The substitution was valid
On the other hand, if there was a proceeding done
to resolve if there was material misrepresentation
on the part of Roger in filing his CoC, and it was
found out that there was material
misrepresentation, then the CoC can be denied due
course and there will be no valid substitution.
But in this case, no proceedings conducted. Under
Sec. 76, COMELEC only has a ministerial duty to
receive the CoC and on its face there was no
deficiency or false misrepresentation, then the
filing was valid.
CERAFICA v. COMELEC
Held: In declaring that Kimberly, being under age,
could not be considered to have filed a valid COC
and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia,
we find that the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion.
Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance
candidates  and its power to deny due course to or
18
cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec has the ministerial duty
to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. 19
5
In Cipriano v. Comelec,  we ruled that the Comelec
20
has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to
COCs. We emphasized that the duty of the
Comelec to give due course to COCs filed in due
form is ministerial in character, and that whilethe
Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs,
it may not go into matters not appearing on their
face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the Comelec.
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881) provides for the procedure of substitution of
candidates, to wit:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another. – If after
the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy,
an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for
any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified
by, the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute
candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for
the office affected in accordance with the preceding
sections not later than mid-day of election day of the
election.
Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B. P. Blg.
881, not just any person, but only "an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political
party" may be substituted.  In the case at bar,
21
Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal
Party;  thus, she can be validly substituted.
22
The next question then is whether Olivia complied
with all of the requirements for a valid substitution;
we answer in the affirmative. First, there was a valid
withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last day for
the filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs to and is
certified to by the same political party to which
Kimberly belongs;  and third, Olivia filed her COC
23
not later than mid-day of election day.
The cancellation of COC is a quasi-judicial process,
and accordingly must be heard by COMELEC in
Division and En Banc on appeal.
Loreto Go v. COMELEC
Issue: petitioner seeks to nullify the resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en
banc declaring her disqualified to run for the office
of governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte,
because she filed certificates of candidacy for both
positions and the withdrawal of her certificate of
candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty
eight minutes from the deadline
Held: The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the
election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1
March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the
requirement of the law.14 We hold that petitioner's
withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor
of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal
purposes, and left in full force her certificate of
candidacy for governor.
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that
the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the
same office where the certificate of candidacy to be
withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly
with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of
the regional election director concerned, the office
of the provincial election supervisor of the province
to which the municipality involved belongs, or the
office of the municipal election officer of the said
municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November
2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before
the election officer of the place where the certificate
of candidacy was filed,16 such requirement is merely
directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not
mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative
resolution can not contradict, much less amend or
repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the
law.17 Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of
withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with
the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to
effectively withdraw such candidacy.
DIVINAGRACIA v COMELEC
Held: if the appellant had already paid the amount
of P1,000.00 before the Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or
lower courts within the five-day period, pursuant
to Section 9, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in
Election Contests Before the Courts Involving
Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials
(Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 07-4-
15) and his Appeal was given due course by the
Court, said appellant is required to pay the
Comelec appeal fee of P3,200.00 at the
Commission's Cash Division through the
Electoral Contests Adjudication Department
(ECAD) or by postal money order payable to
the Commission on Elections through ECAD,
within a period of fifteen days (15) from the
time of the filing of the Notice of Appeal with
the lower court. If no payment is made within
the prescribed period, the appeal shall be
dismissed pursuant to Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which
provides:
6
Sec. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. The
appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either
party or at the instance of the Commission on any
of the following grounds:

(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct

appeal fee; x x x

2. That if the appellant failed to pay the

P1,000.00-appeal fee with the lower court within
the five (5) day period as prescribed by the
Supreme Court New Rules of Procedure but the
case was nonetheless elevated to the
Commission, the appeal shall be dismissed
outright by the Commission, in accordance with
the aforestated Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.

SANTOS v. COMELEC
Held: Between the determination by the trial court
of who of the candidates won the elections and the
finding of the BOC as to whom to proclaim, it is the
court’s decision that should prevail.
The following constitute good reasons to allow
execution pending appeal and a combination of two
or more of them will suffice to allow execution
pending appeal:
[a] public interest involved or will of the electorate;
[b] the shortness of the remaining portion of the
term of the contested office; and
[c] length of time that the election contest has been
pending. Shortness of the remaining period alone is
a ground for execution pending appeal.
This is the case where a decision of the trial court
was rendered after almost one year of trial.

NAVAROSA v. COMELEC
Held: If protestee did not raise the issue during the
trial of the election protest and where s/he even
filed a counter-protest, protestee is precluded from
questioning the incomplete payment of the filing
fee. Estoppel has set in. Moreover, when more than
1/3 of the term of the mayor had lapsed, there is
good reason to allow execution pending appeal.