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What makes them follow the rules? Empirical evidence from turtle egg
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Marine Policy 37 (2013) 270–277

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Marine Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

What makes them follow the rules? Empirical evidence from turtle
egg harvesters in Costa Rica
Róger Madrigal-Ballestero a,n, Achim Schlüter b, Maria Claudia Lopez c
a
Environment for Development Center (EfD), CATIE., 7170, Turrialba, Cartago, Costa Rica
b
Leibniz Center for Marine Tropical Ecology (ZMT) & School of Humanities and Social Sciences Jacobs University, Fahrenheitstrasse 6, D-28359 Bremen, Germany
c
Facultad de Estudios Ambientales y Rurales, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Trans4#42-00-piso 8, Bogotá, Colombia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This paper presents an empirical analysis of the factors that determine individual compliance with a
Received 4 February 2012 locally devised set of rules for harvesting and selling marine turtle eggs, as well as for protecting the
Received in revised form turtles and their hatchlings. Individuals who violate the rules receive a monetary penalty, which
7 May 2012
implies a reduction in the income from sale of eggs. While some individuals do not have income
Accepted 8 May 2012
reductions due to infractions, others have reductions of up to 40% of the total income. Using written
Available online 22 June 2012
records of deductions due to sanctions between May 2008 and May 2010 and information from a
Keywords: survey of 108 local turtle egg harvesters, the paper presents the results of econometric analyses of
Monitoring factors that influence the amount of fines received by individuals. The results suggest that individual
Sanctioning
dependence on the income from sale of eggs, perceptions of rules and their legitimacy, and
Compliance
demographic factors such as age and gender are all important factors explaining rule breaking
Institutions
Collective action behavior. The findings also highlight new threats to the long-term survival of local institutions
Olive ridley responsible for protection of marine turtles and their sustainable consumptive use.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction and local communities, is an alternative institutional arrange-

Many people in coastal areas of less developed countries
depend directly or indirectly on marine turtles. The direct con-
sumption of marine turtles (mainly meat, eggs, and shells) and
their non-consumptive uses (mainly eco-tourism) provide impor-
tant economic and cultural benefits.1 Beyond these, marine
turtles are considered as a flagship species for conservation
because of their importance for the health of marine ecosystems
as well as the existence value attached to them [1,2]. From a
conservationist standpoint, many countries have implemented
top-down approaches, based on legal prohibition of the consump-
tion of turtles and their eggs. However such policies are only
partially effective, particularly because of the difficulty of exclud-
ing people from the turtle’s habitat, the scarcity of information
about resource dynamics and limited government budgets for
enforcement [1,3]. In response to these limitations, there is
increasing interest in co-management approaches. Co-manage-
ment, understood as a shared enterprise between the government
n
Corresponding author. Tel.: þ506 2558 2406; fax: þ 506 2558 2054.
E-mail addresses: rmadriga@catie.ac.cr (R. Madrigal-Ballestero),
achim.schlueter@zmt-bremen.de (A. Schlüter),
mlopez@javeriana.edu.co (M. Claudia Lopez).
1 2
A study conducted in nine sites estimates that gross revenue from con-
sumptive use ranges from US$ 158 to US$ 1701,328 per year per case study with
an average of US$ 581,815 per year [1].
ment for turtle conservation that promotes the participation of
local actors, in collaboration with government authorities, in
defining and implementing regulations for the sustainable use
of turtles [3].
The Ostional National Wildlife Refuge (ONWR), located in the
Pacific coast of Costa Rica, is one of the largest olive ridley turtle
(Lepidochelys olivacea) nesting beaches in the world. Following
considerable conflicts between local people and the Costa Rican
government, permission to harvest turtle eggs was granted to a
community organization known as the ‘‘Association for an Inte-
grated Development in Ostional’’ (ADIO, by its Spanish acronym).2
This local organization has to comply with harvesting thresholds;
these are determined by central government, which also monitors
compliance. Most inhabitants of Ostional village are members of
ADIO, which has sufficient autonomy to devise and enforce rules
for the protection of turtles and to regulate the harvesting
and sale of eggs, among other activities. However, the individual
degree of compliance with these rules varies, despite the fact that
a system of monetary sanctions is in place and well enforced. The
main objective of this study is to determine the extent to which
economic incentives, individual characteristics and normative
This organization was originally constituted for the purpose of designing and
implementing development projects within the community, such as roads, schools
and other public infrastructure.

0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.05.009
 Author's personal copy
R. Madrigal-Ballestero et al. / Marine Policy 37 (2013) 270–277
motivations explain this variability in compliance. Learning about
how these factors influence individual decisions whether or not to
obey the rules can help researchers and managers understand
how the local institutions, i.e., rules in use, are working and how
compliance might be increased over time.
The conditions under which communities can devise their own
institutions to manage different common-pool resources have
been extensively analyzed [4–6]. This literature highlights the
importance of monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms as key
determinants of successful management [4–7,19]. However, more
empirical evidence is needed to better comprehend why some
local harvesters are more prone than others to break the rules.
Nevertheless, empirical efforts to disentangle the drivers of
individual compliance are constrained by the low probability of
detecting culprits, corruption among those responsible for mon-
itoring and the poor reliability of ex-post surveys [8,9]. As an
alternative, this paper analyzes written records of individual rule
violations by legal turtle egg harvesters in Ostional. The rules in
question oblige individuals to take part in collective egg harvest-
ing and packing activities, and in actions to maintain the nesting
beach, and protect the hatchlings. Monetary sanctions, in the
form of fines deducted from individual incomes from egg sales,
are applied to those who do not obey the rules.
Results of this study indicate that, in some cases, rule com-
pliance depends on the extent to which an individual is econom-
ically dependent on the income generated by the legal sale of
eggs. Other factors that positively explain adherence to rules
include an individual’s perception of rule legitimacy and social
interaction. Some demographic characteristics, i.e., age and gen-
der, were also found to be relevant: As age increases, the
tendency of individuals to obey some rules increases as well.
In some cases, being a woman is a good predictor of compliance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents an overview of the case study. Section three reviews the
theoretical background that frames the research. Section four
describes the empirical strategy of the study. Section five presents
the results and discussion; and section six summarizes the
conclusions.
Overview of the case study
Ostional is a small beach village located within the boundaries
of the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge (ONWR), Costa Rica, a
protected area created in 1983 that covers 468 ha. of terrestrial
ecosystems and 8000 ha. of marine ecosystems. The population of
Ostional is approximately 458 inhabitants [10] 3 and according to
Costa Rican governmental statistics it belongs to a region with
very low levels of social and economic development, in compar-
ison to the rest of the country [11].
In the 70 s and early 80 s, the extraction of turtle eggs in
ONWR was officially prohibited. Since the government had
limited monitoring capacity, for most of the time turtles were
treated as a de facto open-access resource, with massive illegal
harvesting by people from outside communities [12]. However,
violent conflicts also occurred between the community and
the State. In 1987, after a long process of negotiation between
the government and Ostional villagers, Law No. 7064 established
the basis for a co-management agreement.4 This new institutional
arrangement allowed ADIO to harvest olive ridley turtle eggs
3
56% are men and 46% women. 31% of the total population is below 15 years
old [10].
4
This institutional arrangement is supported by some other legal instru-
ments, such as the Wildlife Conservation Law (1984); and several Executive
Decrees of the Costa Rican government. For details see [10,13].
271
under certain conditions defined and monitored by the Costa
Rican government. In return, ADIO members agree to carry out
protection activities with the support of governmental agencies.
Hundreds of thousands of turtles lay their eggs on the beach at
ONWR, and nesting takes place simultaneously over several days
in a natural periodical phenomenon known locally as ‘‘arribada’’.5
The density of turtles along the beach and the frequency of arrival
are so high that eggs laid by the first turtles to arrive are often
destroyed by other turtles arriving later.6 The high likelihood of
egg destruction in the first few days is one of the most important
arguments justifying the agreement that allows ADIO members to
harvest eggs during the first 48 h of an ‘‘arribada’’ [14]. Hereafter
the harvesting that takes place during one ‘‘arribada’’ is referred
to as a campaign.
Despite the relatively successful co-management model cur-
rently in place in Ostional, sudden and unprecedented external
disturbances are reducing the motivation of local people to comply
with locally devised rules and hence threaten the long term
survival of ADIO [15]. Regional economic growth is opening up
new employment possibilities for local people and at the same
time reduces incentives to be a member of ADIO. The decreased
demand for eggs at the national level is further reducing economic
incentives for sustainable management of the resource.
Sanctions and distribution of benefits
Each ADIO member receiving a share of the monetary benefits
of eggs sales must have been an Ostional resident since 1987
(when the harvesting project started) or be a direct descendant
(more than 15 years old) of one of them. From the total income of
eggs sold (approximately US$ 400,000 per year during last three
years), 30% is used to pay administrative and commercialization
costs, and for investments in public infrastructure (roads, bridges,
schools, among others) and other social projects. The remaining
70% is equally distributed among all ADIO members, without any
consideration of the number of eggs harvested by each individual.
However, the final individual payment can differ following
deductions for non-compliance with ADIO’s rules. Thus, the
individual revenues for beneficiaries per harvesting campaign
are calculated as follows:
Incomeij ¼ ð0:70  egg salesj =NÞ2sanctionsi ð1Þ
where N is the number of ADIO members, sanctions i include all
those fines imposed to individual i and, j is the corresponding
harvesting campaign.
Table 1 Presents a summary of sanctions imposed for non-
compliance of three of the most important activities ADIO
members must perform: (a) harvesting and packing eggs,
(b) maintenance of the nesting habitat and (c) protection of
hatchlings. All rules are well known by the villagers and sanctions
vary according to the severity of the offense. For example, the
monetary penalty for arriving late increases the later the person
arrives, but is lower than the fine imposed if the member does not
show up at all.
The information included in Table 1 also highlights the fact
that some project activities, such as protection of hatchlings, are
undertaken only by women, creating high disparities in terms of
labor provision according to gender. Women need to devote time
5
‘‘Arrival’’ might be the closest English translation.
6
According to scientific data collected since 1987, the number of ‘‘arribadas’’
per year varies from 7 to 16, with an average of 10.8. Some ‘‘arribadas’’ can last up
to 10 day. During the dry season, a few thousand turtles arrive to lay their eggs on
each kilometer of beach; however, during the rainy season, the number can be
more than 100 thousand per km. [14]. Up to 5000 nests (100 eggs per nest on
average) are harvested in some of the biggest campaigns [16].
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272 R. Madrigal-Ballestero et al. / Marine Policy 37 (2013) 270–277

Table 1
Locally devised labor obligations and sanctions for non-compliance.

Activity Description Labor requirements per person Monitoring Sanctioning

Harvesting and Groups of men and women detect nests and Varies depending on the size of the Easy Unjustified absence: US$ 8 plus no share of
packing eggs harvest them. Afterwards the groups clean the ‘‘arribada’’ and the season. A person detection of benefits from the corresponding harvesting
eggs and pack them in small bags for sale has to do 120–150 h of work per year infractors campaign. Unjustified lateness: income
deduction proportional to delay
Maintenance Men and women remove trash, wood and 2 h per month on average, usually on Easy Unjustified absence: US$ 8 Unjustified
of the habitat bushes from the beach. This helps to increase Saturdays detection of lateness: income deduction proportional to
for nesting the nesting area and facilitate the movement of infractors delay
nesting turtles and their hatchlings
Protection of Only women have to take part. They protect the 6 h of labor are required daily during Easy Unjustified absence: US$ 8 Unjustified
hatchlings hatchlings from predators (vultures, dogs) on peak periods. On average each woman detection of lateness: income deduction proportional to
their way from the nest to the ocean dedicates 180–200 h of work to this infractors delay
activity each year

to the protection of hatchlings but this does not exempt them
from the other duties. On average, women need to work at least
twice as long as men to receive the same share of the benefits.7
In addition to the rules listed in Table 1, a further regulation
stipulates that a member who fails to attend three activities in a
row (harvesting and packing, maintenance of the beach, protec-
tion of hatchlings) or is absent on six accumulated occasions
during a year, will be excluded permanently from ADIO.
Coordination of collective action activities and rule enforcement
All activities are undertaken in groups of 10–15 people and
organized by the executive committee of ADIO. The leader of each
group is responsible for enforcement of the rules. These leaders
are supervised by two general coordinators who allocate groups
to specific tasks, provide general guidelines for the day and solve
any problems that arise during the work session. The group
leaders keep a record of the people who show up on time, those
absent and the time of arrival of those who arrive late. This
information is verified by one of the general coordinators, leaving
little opportunity for individuals to skip their duties for the day
without receiving a penalty. Additionally, as rule compliance is
easily observable by every member who is present, there is a high
degree of social control, which precludes asymmetrical treatment
of members.
Theoretical background
Different factors like the characteristics of the resource, users’
attributes, and the governance structure affect the capacity of
people to solve collective action problems in common-pool
resource settings [5,6].8 With reference to governance structure,
there is an understanding that ‘‘effective enforcement’’, including
appropriate mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning, is one of
the most important conditions for effective conservation of
common-pool resources [4,6,7,17–19]. Empirical and experimen-
tal evidence shows that local resource users typically invest
substantial time and effort in monitoring each other closely and
imposing sanctions on those who do not conform to the rules
[4,7,19,20]. A core puzzle related to monitoring and sanctioning is
to understand why some individuals tend to follow the rules
7
This gender inequality is difficult to understand from an outsider’s perspec-
tive; however, the issue is a complex one, and outside the scope of this paper. It is
worth noting the comment of the current president of the ADIO – a woman – that
the project and ADIO membership were seen as a revolution from a female
perspective when they were initiated, since they gave women an independent
income for the very first time.
8
Common pool resources are natural or man made resources with low
exclusivity and high rivarly in consumption. Turtle eggs have these attributes.
more than others. Scholars have addressed this issue from
different perspectives.
An early explanation of individual rule compliance from an
economic perspective was Becker’s [21] ‘economics of crime
paradigm’. According to this approach, an individual compares
the expected net benefits of compliance and non-compliance.
Thus, a person follows a rule if the expected utility of doing so
exceeds what can be obtained by breaking the rule. The empirical
validity of the economics of crime paradigm as sole explanation
for rule compliance has been contested [9,22]. The main argu-
ment against it is that in some cases high rates of compliance
occur even when sanctions are mild and the probability of
detection low. In this regard, normative models argue that
incentives to abide by the law might reflect the perceived
legitimacy of rule-making bodies, or arise from moral, social
and cultural influences [23].
Social norms are one of the core alternative explanations used
to explain compliance. These norms are shared understandings
about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden [24].
Thus, one could argue that, in addition to the deterrence effect of
monetary sanctions, social norms developed by villagers in
Ostional influence their compliance behavior. Norms based on
trust and reciprocity would tend to foster cooperative attitudes
within the village and therefore motivate participation in the
collective activities. These norms could be particularly important
for incentivizing participation in actions aimed at protecting the
turtles’ habitat and their hatchlings. This relates to Agrawal’s [25]
concept of ‘‘environmentality’’, based on the argument that the
experience of monitoring and protecting a natural resource may
convert harvesters into ‘‘environmental subjects’’ with a sense of
responsibility towards the protection of natural resources.
On the other hand, which social norms are learned varies from
one group to another and with exposure to different types of
social exchange. Further, individuals might adapt their social
norms in light of their experience of interaction with others
[26]. Social interactions are defined as situations where the
propensity of an agent to behave in some way varies according
the actions of a reference group, such as an individual’s family,
friends or peers [27]. This suggests that in some circumstances,
members of a group tend to behave similarly, leading to situa-
tions where peer interactions stigmatize law-abiding behavior
[28].
However, economic and psychological literature – referring to
the ‘crowding out’ effect – also suggests that some of these
intrinsic motivations (and others like warm glow, altruism, civic
duty) influencing behavior might be reduced when price incen-
tives are introduced [29–31]. It is argued that establishing a
payment for an activity might change an individual’s perception
of it, leading ultimately to reduced motivation to perform the
activity [29,31]. In other words, when goodwill is transformed
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R. Madrigal-Ballestero et al. / Marine Policy 37 (2013) 270–277
into a market-like interaction, people are less willing to commit
time and resources to the activities concerned [31]. Reeson and
Tisdell [30] found two reasons for this response: First, the
individual’s sense of autonomy matters; that is, people derive
more satisfaction if they perceive that a task is done for their own
reasons, rather than in response to control by an external party.
Second, it is argued that when a monetary reward is offered, this
could introduce an element of confusion into people’s perception
of the activity; people might be unclear whether the activity is
performed as a ‘‘good deed’’ or because of the reward.9
Complementing the importance of sense of autonomy, the
perception of rule legitimacy is one the most important factors
used in theoretical and empirical studies to explain compliance
[9,22,32,33]. One important dimension of legitimacy is procedural
justice, defined as the perception of fairness in the way rules are
designed and applied. Ideally procedures should also be in place
that offer individuals some control over rule making processes
[32,34]. Similarly, Ostrom [4] found that one of the design
principles that characterize successful locally devised institutions
for managing common pool resources is that those affected by
rules should participate in their design. Empirical and experi-
mental evidence suggests that regulations imposed by an external
agent may fail or be less effective than was hoped for [4,35,36].
Such regulations may crowd out resource users’ intrinsic motiva-
tion to comply with the measures concerned [29–31,37].
Few studies have analyzed the role of demographic character-
istics, such as age and gender, in the study of rule breaking
behavior by harvesters of natural resources. In field experiments,
Velez and Lopez [38] demonstrate that in an indigenous commu-
nity of the Colombian Amazon, older adults are more compliant
with external regulations for natural resource extraction.
The authors conclude that lifelong experience teaches older
members of the community that following the rules positively
affects the sustainability of the natural resources that serve as a
basis for their livelihoods.
The work done by Agarwal [8] on gender contributes to a
better understanding of how this factor affects rule compliance.
The author analyzed different forest communities in Nepal and
India, and argues that both women and men are in favor of
conservation and regeneration of forests. However, gender differ-
ences in rule compliance stem from different understandings by
men and women of their role and responsibilities, and differences
in the nature and intensity of their dependence on the resource.
Thus, the gendered nature of stakes in resources is related to the
gender division of labor. Differences in the nature of violations
(unauthorized extraction of different products) might also arise
from this division of labor. In forests studied by Agarwal [8],
timber extraction falls mainly in the men’s domain and firewood
typically in the women’s. However, the former is banned in all
communities and considered a major offense. For this reason,
there are more reports of rule violations by men than by women.
Empirical strategy
Data
Several sources of data were used for the analysis. Written
records provided details of deductions due to sanctions (those
listed in Table 1) from incomes received by ADIO members during
9
The desire for approval from others might be influential as well. Performing
an altruistic activity without reward can be easily identified as pro-social behavior
by others. However, if a monetary reward is in place, it is not clear to others
whether the motivation for such behavior is altruism or the desire to receive the
reward [30].
273
20 harvesting periods from May 2008 to May 2010. This data set
should provide more reliable information about rule compliance
than other methods that use inferences based on single observa-
tions or ex-post information given by people in response to
surveys. In general, asking people about rule violations can be
biased due to an unwillingness to openly admit infractions, poor
memory recall, stereotypes, among other factors [8,9].
Written records on rule violations are not exempt from
potential problems. Some violations can go unreported; penalties
may be waived when ties of family or friendship exist between
monitor and infractor, or on compassionate grounds [8,39].
However, such problems are due to the existence of corruption,
difficulties in detecting infractions, or low levels of monitoring.
In Ostional, as described above, monitoring is very effective and,
there was no evidence of corruption or selective enforcement.
Therefore, there is a high likelihood that the data set on rule
violations reflects real behavior.
The second source of information for the analysis is an
individual survey of 108 active ADIO members that aimed capture
information on the livelihoods of the villagers, their perception of
different aspects of their relationship with turtles, and other
factors that might affect their compliance with ADIO rules. Results
of the survey were matched with the dataset on rule violations.
Thus a merged database was created containing information on
rule compliance by 108 ADIO members and on their livelihoods,
perceptions and other relevant personal characteristics.
Two well trained interviewers were responsible for carrying
out the survey. In addition, field assistants spent significant
time in Ostional (they lived with a local family) and the main
authors visited the site frequently during the period April 2009 to
February 2011. Thus, the two sources of data described
above were complemented with information from participant
observation, unstructured but extensive interviews and focus
groups, in order to better understand the daily lives of the
residents and their reasons for compliance and non-compliance
with ADIO rules.
Econometric estimations
Given the longitudinal nature of data on sanctions, panel data
estimations would be useful. However, the lack of time-depen-
dent explicative variables precluded this possibility and the data
was analyzed by running four cross-sectional Tobit models.10
The difference among the different models is the specification of
the dependent variable. The same explanatory variables were
used in all models and are related to the theoretical considerations
discussed above. They were grouped into economic attributes,
legitimacy, social norms, and demographic characteristics. All these
variables are listed in Table 2.
The first estimation, total model, defines average aggregate
income reduction of individuals due to total infractions (TOTALD)
as the dependent variable, in order to provide a broad perspective
of individual rule compliance.11 The other models analyze
10
A Tobit model is recommended to deal with corner solution models [40].
The dependent variables were roughly continuous over positive values but also
contained observations equal to zero. However, this attribute it is not due to
censoring or truncation of data. The dependent variables selected provide more
information than simple dichotomous variables on compliance or variables that
count the number of infractions but without considering the severity of the fault.
11
Due to some missing data, infractions were not calculated as the sum of
monetary values of income deductions. The average was calculated as a dependent
variable, i.e., based on the total value of monetary sanctions imposed on an
individual divided by the number of harvesting campaigns for which records exist.
The same procedure was applied for all models listed in Table 3. All dependent
variables are measured as the value of deductions in local currency, the colon
(500 colones are approximately equivalent to one US dollar).
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274 R. Madrigal-Ballestero et al. / Marine Policy 37 (2013) 270–277

Table 2
Description of variables.

Variables Description Mean SDd Min Max

Dependent variables
TOTALD Average income reduction due to aggregated rule infractions 2741 3433 0 15,900
HARVESD Average income reduction due to harvesting infractions 1560 3052 0 14,647
MAINTD Average income reduction due to maintenance infractions 887 883 0 4000
HATCHD Average income reduction due to hatchlings infractions 293 512 0 2545
Economic attributes
DEPEND Eggs sold by ADIO is the only source of individual income (Y ¼ 1; N¼ 0) .34 .47 0 1
Legitimacy
IMPOSED Sanctions were designed without community participation 1.53 1.09 1 4
(1¼ Strongly disagree, y 4¼ Strongly agree)
Social norms
PARTIC Have participated in other collective action (different than the .30 .46 0 1
harvesting project) last year (Y ¼1; N ¼ 0)
MEMBERS % of household members in ADIO .67 .29 .16 1
RESPONS Ostional community responsible for protecting turtles (Y¼ 1; N ¼0) .66 .47 0 1
Demographic attributes
GENDER Gender (W ¼ 1; M¼ 0) .54 .50 0 1
AGE Age of respondent 34.80 14.11 15 70

influences on compliance behavior for each rule listed in Table 1.
The harvesting model analyzes individual compliance related to
harvesting and packing of eggs. Thus, the dependent variable in
this case is the average income reduction of individuals due to
non compliance with these activities (HARVESD). Similarly, the
dependent variable for the maintenance model is the average
income reduction of individuals due to violations of this rule
(MAINTD). The hatchlings model analyzes rule compliance in the
case of the protection of hatchlings. As mentioned before, men are
excluded from these labor intensive obligations; in this case the
dependent variable measures the average income reduction of
individual women due to non fulfillment of these obligations
(HATCHD).
Table 2 presents the different independent variables used in
these regressions. The selection of these variables relies heavily
on the arguments described in the theoretical section as potential
drivers of compliance. The variable related to economic incentives
(DEPEND) measures an individual’s dependence on ADIO income.
It was expected that, for those ADIO members with few outside
opportunities (low opportunity costs), financial dependence on
the egg harvesting project would generate high incentives to
comply with the existent set of rules. In other words, the decision
to adhere or not to the rules would depend on the relative
opportunity costs.
The legitimacy variable (IMPOSED) aims to capture the percep-
tion of community participation in devising the rules. It was
expected that those ADIO members who perceived that the rule
making process enabled the participation of community members
(i.e., had a positive perception of procedural justice) would be more
likely to follow the rules that emerged from the process.
In relation to the effect of social norms on rule compliance,
different indicators would have a positive impact on compliance.
In this regard the variable PARTIC measures the existence of
cooperative norms (based on trust and reciprocity) due to the
participation in different collective action activities within the
community. Unlike ADIO’s activities, these are voluntary and no
monetary payment is involved. The variable MEMBERS measures
the percentage of ADIO members within the household. The inten-
tion is to explore the effect of the family’s participation in ADIO on
individual compliance. It was expected that increased family parti-
cipation would lead to an increased sense of belonging and feeling of
responsibility towards ADIO, and that these in turn would promote
the development of norms motivating compliant behavior.
The variable RESPONS indicates if an individual believes
that Ostional community is responsible for protecting the turtles.
This might suggest the existence of normative incentives for the
protection of turtles or what [25] calls ‘‘environmentality’’. If this
sense of responsibility exists, one could expect this to be reflected
in increased compliance, in particular in activities such as main-
tenance of turtle habitat and protection of hatchlings.
In relation to gender, it was expected that, using the aggregate
measure, men would have lower total sanctions than women
simply because the unequal distribution of labor in the overall
project means that women have more opportunities to get
caught. However, when rules for harvesting and maintenance
were analyzed independently, results showing different degrees
of compliance would support Agarwal’s hypothesis that compli-
ance rates depend on the different understandings of gender roles
and responsibilities.
The final variable analyzed was age of ADIO members. Due to
some initial observations and open interviews it was expected
that younger villagers would tend to comply with rules less that
older people. This might be mainly due to differences in sense of
ownership and responsibility towards ADIO.
Results and discussion
A descriptive analysis of the written records about individual
penalties reveals little variability in terms of general compliance
among the different activities. Results show that 38% of people
never broke the rules for harvesting and packing, while 32% of
villagers and 38% of women have no infractions for maintenance
of the beach and protection of hatchlings, respectively. The
aggregate monetary penalties represent a 7% average reduction
in total individual income from the sale of eggs. However, the
individual variability is relatively high: there are villagers with no
recorded sanctions during the period (17% of total) and others
received aggregate sanctions (income reductions) up to nearly
40% of the expected payments. The following analysis examines
the factors that might be affecting this variability in individual
behavior Table 3 shows the results obtained from the analysis of
the econometric models, which as explained above, differ in the
selection of dependent variable.
All models found statistical evidence, at least to the 10% level
of significance, in to support the idea that rule adherence is
associated with the dependence of individuals on the income
from the sale of eggs (DEPEND). ADIO members who depend
exclusively on the income from egg sales have lower aggregate
income deductions (on average 2630 colones less than those who
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R. Madrigal-Ballestero et al. / Marine Policy 37 (2013) 270–277 275

Table 3 that crowds out intrinsic motivations to adhere to the rules.12

Results of Tobit analysis of factors affecting compliance with different types of rule Now individuals have the chance to pay for non-compliance,
(values in Costa Rican colones).
instead of assuming the moral obligation to reciprocate others’
Variables Total Harvesting Maintenance Hatchlings commitment.
model model model model Some other internalized norms could reflect a shared respon-
sibility towards the protection of turtles (RESPONS). As explained
Economic attributes above, the close, lifelong experience of many villagers with the
DEPEND  2630***  2235**  465.3*  370.9*
Legitimacy
turtles might be expected to lead to a feeling of responsibility for
IMPOSED 822.3** 973.5** 74.91 204.1** their protection, and to increased compliance with habitat main-
Social norms tenance and hatchling protection rules. However, results do not
PARTIC  821.7  572.2  422.4*  159.9 provide support for this hypothesis. It might be that the char-
MEMBERS  2956**  2796**  497.0  626.7
acteristics of the ‘‘arribada’’ generate a sense of abundance that
RESPONS 292.3 310.8  152.1 189.6
Demographic affects people’s perceptions of the effect of their actions on the
characteristics survival of turtles: they might consider that the effect of their
GENDER 149.0  721.9  493.2** actions on survival rates is negligible. In fact, only 25% of villagers
AGE  45.03*  90.32***  6.610  19.34** surveyed believed that the survival of turtles is in danger in the
Constant 5406*** 4789*** 1761*** 1159**
Observations 102 102 102 58
near future. This does not necessarily mean that local villagers do
Prob 4chi2 0.0005 0.0008 0.0040 0.0226 not care about the turtles. It may simply be that they see
compliance with the particular rules under discussion as a duty
nnn
p o0.01. towards ADIO, and not as an environmental act that demonstrates
nn
p o0.05.
their commitment to turtle protection.
n
p o 0.1.
The nature of social interactions might also influence the
development of social norms [26]. The family is one important
do not depend exclusively on ADIO), as shown in total model), and reference group and location of social exchange that might affect
lower deductions due to infractions in harvesting, habitat main- the attitude of individuals towards rule compliance. For the total
tenance and hatchling protection (on average 2235; 465 and 370 and harvesting models, a higher the proportion of ADIO members
colones less, respectively). This supports the hypothesis that within the family (MEMBERS) was reflected in a lower individual
people with a relatively high dependence on ADIO income, who propensity to break the rules. One possible explanation for this
therefore receive more severe punishments in relative terms result is that pressure exerted by family members on individuals
when they break a rule, are less likely to do so. This might with deviant behavior (rule breaking) is higher in families with
suggest that for individuals with higher opportunity costs (less higher proportion of ADIO members. It can be argued that as this
dependence on income from ADIO), the monetary penalties are an proportion increases the sense of family duty with ADIO also
insufficient incentive. Further, some people may be able to design tends to increase, thus reinforcing the individual motivation to
general livelihood strategies that include paying the penalties comply. Thus, deviating from what is considered ‘‘the right thing’’
once in a while (up to six times per year), and accepting a lower by the family might generate a moral cost to the rule violator.
aggregate payment from egg sales, in order to dedicate their time Analysis of demographic characteristics produced some inter-
to alternative income generating activities that compensate for esting results. In relation to gender the results did not provide
the forgone ADIO income. This of course is only one possible support for the hypothesis that the overall compliance of men
explanation of why some people regularly break the rules; others would be higher than women simply because the unequal
are considered below. distribution of labor implies more opportunities for women to
The data also reveal that rule compliance is positively deter- get caught. When rules were analyzed separately the results were
mined by perceptions of procedural justice (IMPOSED). These more clear to suggest that women tend to comply more than men.
subjective evaluations of community participation in rule design In the case of rules related to maintenance, women’s compliance
are significant (p o0.05) in explaining the behavior of villagers, was statistically higher (p o0.05) than that of men, even though
both in terms of overall compliance with rules (total model) and in this case the probability of getting caught is equal for men and
compliance with rules related to harvesting (harvesting model) women, because for this specific duty both need to provide the
and hatchling protection (hatchlings model). Similarly to Ostrom same amount of work. This suggests that aspects of the local
[4], this result suggests that the process of rule design must culture that influence how household responsibilities are divided
incorporate those affected by the rules that emerge from this between women and men might affect the type and intensity of
procedure in order to increase rule compliance. This participation rule violations. For instance, it is socially acceptable and seen as
might increase the likelihood that rules are better fitted to local positive that women are in charge of unpaid housework such as
circumstances and would reflect a mutual consent among villa- cleaning, preparing food and taking care of children, even in cases
gers that positively affects rule adherence. where women have a full time paid job. It is seen as their role and
In relation to social norms, results show that the voluntary duty. The activities involved in beach maintenance include
participation in other non-paid collective action activities removing some heavy objects, but most of the tasks consist in
(PARTIC) helps to explain increased compliance with habitat using broomsticks or clearing up twigs garbage from the beach.
maintenance rules, but not in the other cases. This evidence Men remove the heavy things in a relatively short time, and then
suggests that some individuals might have pro-social behavioral have to spend time helping women with their broomsticks and
norms that motivate them to fulfill their obligations in some removing small trash items. In the interviews and focus groups,
activities where sanctions for non-compliance are mild. However,
the relative weakness of this effect in all models is intriguing. One
12
possible explanation is related to the crowding out effect dis- This argument is similar to that of Gneezy and Rustichini [41]. Using a field
cussed in a previous section. The monetization of non-compliance experiment they found that after introducing a fine on parents that arrived late to
pick up their children at a day-care centre, the number of late-coming parents
might have altered individual attitudes towards participating in increased significantly. They argued that the fine was less effective in sustaining
collective activities. In other words, voluntary goodwill to coop- an implicit contract of cooperation than a moral obligation or internalized norms
erate has been transformed into a market-like interaction [31] of trust and reciprocity.
 Author's personal copy
276 R. Madrigal-Ballestero et al. / Marine Policy 37 (2013) 270–277
many women complained that men negatively stigmatize this
because it is perceived as ‘‘women’s work’’, similar to housework.
Some men expressed similar views; further suggesting that some
men prefer to pay the penalty once in a while than showing up
the day they have to perform tasks considered ‘‘boring’’, ‘‘not
important’’, ‘‘for women’’ or that compete with other income
generating activities.
Additionally, as Agarwal [8] points out, women and men tend
to have different social interactions, expressed in networks
grounded on different types of social norms and market linkages.
Market-based interactions fall generally within the male domain.
Women may be more dependent on localized networks and
everyday forms of cooperation, due to their more restricted
sources of income and physical mobility; these would increase
their costs of non cooperation. In this scenario, women have more
incentives to sustain these networks through friendships, small
acts of cooperation and mutual aid. In many of the interviews,
women stated that the egg harvesting project provides them with
many benefits, in addition to a significant monetary income; non-
monetary benefits include self-esteem, empowerment and eco-
nomic independence.13 This suggests that women recognize that
this flow of benefits depends on the permanence or success of the
project, which is perceived as intrinsically linked to their com-
pliance with existing rules.
Finally, age seems to positively affect compliance with rules.
This variable (AGE) was significant for all models except habitat
maintenance. One explanation for this result might be that older
people are the ones who invested, some decades ago, a lot of time
and effort into getting the government’s approval to harvest turtle
eggs and in designing the set of rules currently in force.14 People
who participated directly in crafting the rules would likely
develop a sense of ownership and responsibility and be more
motivated to comply with them. This further reinforces previous
arguments about the importance of procedural justice, since this
perception is likely to be reinforced if rules are designed with the
participation of those who will be affected by them. One frequent
complaint of most ADIO board members, key informants and
participants in focus groups was that young people lacked
motivation to participate in ADIO activities. They argued that
they do not appreciate how costly the negotiation of the project
was and how important it has been for the development of the
community. They also recognized that younger generations are
influenced by other external factors (role models, expectations
about future work in urban centers, among others) that stigma-
tize adherence to ADIO rules.
Conclusions
Analysis of the reasons why some individuals are more prone
to break the rules than others reveals some of the challenges that
local people and policy makers must overcome in order to achieve
conservation goals and to let local marine resource management
institutions endure over time. If the opportunity cost of partici-
pating in community based projects dramatically increases due to
better outside employment options – which is an observable
13
31% of women depend exclusively on ADIO incomes.
14
Age is highly and positively correlated to the number of years living in
Ostional (0.84) which reinforces the idea of the development of a sense of
ownership among people who have always lived in the community. The correla-
tion between age and dependency on ADIO incomes is relatively low (  0.025).
This result might seems counterintuitive; it is explained by the fact that people
more than 70 years old, who presumably depend exclusively on ADIO incomes due
to physical limitations, are excluded from the analysis. It is worth to mention that
these retired people receive a pension from ADIO, but have no need provide any
labor.
phenomenon in Ostional, – people may elect to opt out of ADIO.
However, it is also important to consider other motivations of
human behavior, such as social interactions, perceptions of
legitimacy as well as gender and age perspectives.
As Frey and Oberholzer-Gee [29] observe, local institutions can
have the potential to crowd out intrinsically motivated behaviors.
The monetization of resource management activities undertaken by
ADIO could have the effect of taking decisions about whether or not
to comply with the rules out the moral realm. Thus people no longer
feel a moral obligation towards the protection of the turtles and an
individual can easily pay to avoid having to comply with conserva-
tion duties if more important obligations arise. The decision is
transported to a market-like impersonal exchange setting [31].
However, as noted by Gneezy and Rustichini [41], the removal of
such external incentives promoted by ADIO would not guarantee
that the immediate reestablishment of original intrinsic motivations.
The results demonstrate that the perception of local users (those
affected by the rules) of rule legitimacy is an important factor that
increases rule compliance. Thus, the active involvement of local users
in the design and implementation of rules is a key driver of
compliance. This suggests that governmental policies need to take
account of local users’ preferences (generating real opportunities for
having a voice and vote) in order to reduce conflicts and excessive
costs in the enforcement of marine conservation strategies.
Findings on the influence of age and gender on rule compli-
ance contribute to the relatively scarce literature about demo-
graphic factors that affect individual rule compliance. The finding
that compliance with existent rules tends to decrease among
younger people suggests that the harvesting project may face
serious problems of labor availability in the near future. How to
motivate newer generations to participate in the project is one of
the main challenges ADIO and central government have to
respond to, in order to ensure continuation of the current co-
management administration. This problem is further aggravated
by the fact that rising opportunity costs (due to the increased
availability of alternative paid work) significantly increase the
costs of participating in community-based protection of turtles.
The relatively high compliance rates of women found for
some activities deserve special attention and further research.
The provision of non-monetary benefits, such as self esteem,
empowerment and self-determination might be important factors
that help explain rule compliance by women; they also as key
components of the overall social contribution of the project.
However, doubts must exist about the extent to which the egg
harvesting project can continue to rely on women’s labor, since
women also now have more outside opportunities than before.
Future studies could help account for other arenas of rule
compliance in Ostional. For example, the factors that affect the
decision to break the rules that ban harvesting outside the
authorized periods could be different to those analyzed in this
paper. Finally, given that the current system in Ostional is
strongly organized around sanctions for non compliance, it would
be interesting to analyze the potential of incorporating a system
of rewards, to promote greater commitment and increased rule
compliance.
Acknowledgments
We want to express our sincere gratitude to Rodrigo Morera
for his support to this research. We acknowledge the cooperation
of the executive committee of ADIO to provide all the data we
needed. Special thanks for the hospitality and time provided to us
by Ostional villagers. Rosario Uribe and Alejandra Castro provided
excellent assistance for the field work. Jorge Dresdner provided
useful insights to an earlier draft of this paper. We would like to
 Author's personal copy
R. Madrigal-Ballestero et al. / Marine Policy 37 (2013) 270–277
acknowledge financial support from the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) through the Environ-
ment for Development Initiative (EfD) of the Department of
Economics, University of Gothenburg. The Leibniz Center for
Tropical Marine Ecology (ZMT) also provided economic support
for this research.
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