Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World

Author(s): Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Source: Sociological Forum, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Mar., 2004), pp. 63-87
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Sociological Forum, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2004 (? 2004)

Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements

in the ContemporaryWorld1
Kiyoteru Tsutsui2

Studies on ethnic movements have largely overlooked the global dimensions

of ethnic social movements. Drawing on social movement theories and the
world culture approach, I argue that linkage to global civil society gives rise
to ethnic mobilization because it diffuses models of claim-making based on
human rights ideas, while intergovernmental networks suppress ethnic mo-
bilization as they enhance state power and authority. Tobit analyses on vio-
lent and nonviolent ethnic mobilizations show that, controlling for domestic
factors, linkage to global civil society raises the potential for ethnic social
movements, while intergovernmental networks do not have a strong impact
on ethnic mobilization.
KEY WORDS: ethnic mobilization; social movement; human rights;world polity; globalization.

INTRODUCTION

Recent empirical research has found a ubiquitous and steady increase

in the number of ethnic mobilizations in the five decades following World
War II (Gurr, 1993a). Figure 1 summarizes the rise of ethnic social move-
ments, both violent and nonviolent types, from 1945 to 1994.3 Many scholars
have attempted to understand this worldwide increase in ethnic social move-
ments. Focusing on the effects of internal social structural changes in modern

1An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1998 meeting of the American Sociological
Association in San Francisco.
2Department of Sociology, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, New York 11794; e-mail:
ktsutsui@notes.cc.sunysb.edu.
30ut of all the observed groups, 80.8% mobilized in nonviolent manners, and 41.6% engaged
in violent political mobilization in the most recent period, compared with 26.3% and 8.6%,
respectively, in the first observed period. Details of the data are discussed below.

63
0884-8971/04/0300-0063/0 ? 2004 Plenum Publishing Corporation

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64 Tsutsui

250

200 200 -Non-Violent

---- Violent

a 150

Z 100
..

50

1 I Y
50 ... -- -
Year

Fig. 1. Number of ethnic groups engaging in violent and nonviolent mobilizations

(1945-1994).

societies, they put forth some useful theoretical frameworks that account for
specific cases of ethnic mobilization (Gellner, 1983;Hechter, 1975; Newman,
1991; Nielsen, 1985; Olzak and Nagel, 1986). However, a framework that ad-
equately explains the global and ubiquitous increase in ethnic mobilizations
has yet to emerge. I argue that this is due to the tendency in the field to
focus primarily on national and local politics. Given the global nature of
the increase, it is curious that few studies have examined global processes
that might affect ethnic groups across the globe. Olzak and Tsutsui (1998)
is a notable exception to this. They examined how processes at the level of
the world system might influence local ethnic conflict and found that pe-
ripheral status in the world system and membership in intergovernmental
organizations decrease ethnic nonviolent protest, but that among periph-
eral countries intergovernmental organization memberships have a positive
effect on ethnic protest. While these findings provide new insight in the field,
their analysis is limited to the periods prior to the 1980s and does not exam-
ine the effects of linkage to global civil society, which I argue is an important
factor in contemporary ethnic politics.4
Building on their analysis, I examine how linkage to the intergovern-
mental world, which is still dominated by concerns for state sovereignty,
and ties with global civil society, which is the primary locus of international
human rights activities, might influence ethnic political mobilization in the

4In addition, their analysis is at the country level and therefore does not examine some important
group-specific characteristics that might influence ethnic mobilization.

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Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World 65

contemporary world. My core argument is that linkage to global civil society

gives rise to ethnic mobilization because it diffuses models of claim-making
based on human rights ideas. Intergovernmental networks, on the other
hand, are not expected to encourage ethnic mobilization, as they enhance
state power and authority more than they empower ethnic minorities.
Drawing on social movement theories and the world culture approach,
I formulate a theoretical framework for understanding the global processes
of contemporary ethnic mobilizations, and test its validity in statistical data
analyses. Controlling for other relevant factors, I analyze violent and non-
violent ethnic mobilizations separately, thus sorting out the conditions that
induce the different types of mobilization. I conclude by discussing the im-
plications of the cross-national analyses.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

Ethnic mobilization in this study refers to a collective action against the

state by a group of people who are perceived, by themselves or others, to
constitute a different category based on their shared origin and culture (Omi
and Winant, 1994; M. G. Smith, 1986; Yinger, 1976).5 It is worth noting that
strong ethnic solidarity is not a requirement for ethnic mobilization: it can
and does emerge in the process of collective action (Barth, 1969; Hobsbawm
and Ranger, 1992). Yet, studies on ethnic mobilization tend to focus on the
outcomes, assuming that elements of ethnicity existed prior to mobilization.
Ideally, a comprehensive study of ethnic mobilization should examine all the
potential ethnic groupings in the world and investigate when, where, and
why some of them engage in ethnic mobilization, while others remain latent
categories. However, such data are not available and will be very difficult to
collect cross-nationally. Thus, with the caution about ethnogenesis in mind,
the present study examines potential causes of mobilization by ethnic groups.

Theoretical Background

Studies of ethnic political mobilization have tended to focus on domes-

tic factors rather than international ones. This is not surprising, considering
that most works in the field are case studies and that even comparative
studies typically include only a handful of countries. These studies tend to
magnify internal social structural changes that seem most directly relevant to

5Since such action is usually directed at the government dominated by members of the majority
ethnic group, I use the terms "mobilization" and "social movement" interchangeably.

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66 Tsutsui

the emergence of ethnic mobilization. While the internal changes certainly

play important roles, these studies do not fully explain why countries with
various levels of development and different types of social structures expe-
rience much the same increase in ethnic mobilizations (Gurr, 1993a). The
global increase suggests that there is an underlying global process that can
be understood only by examining international dimensions of ethnic poli-
tics.6 I draw on social movement theories and the world culture approach to
develop a theoretical framework for examining the international processes.
Social movement theories have undergone an enormous growth and
elaboration in the last few decades (McAdam, 1982; McAdam et al., 1996;
Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978; Zald and McCarthy, 1987). As a result, various
approaches in the field have converged into three main analytical focuses:
political opportunities, resource mobilization, and framing (McAdam et al.,
1996). Using these frameworks, social movement research has produced
many insights into how social movements emerge and develop. However,
as McCarthy (1997) and McAdam (1998) point out, its traditional emphasis
on domestic politics has been a serious limitation in the field, preventing
examination of important factors that lie outside the national borders. In
response to this concern, some important contributions on international di-
mensions of social movements have emerged in the last few years. They have
examined international political opportunity structures (Imig and Tarrow,
1999; Marks and McAdam, 1996; McAdam, 1998), transnational flows of hu-
man and material resources for movements (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a; Smith
et al., 1997), and new patterns of framing that reflect sensitivity to global audi-
ences (Klandermans et al., 1999). Correspondingly, a few incipient attempts
to theorize global dynamics of contentious politics have appeared (Keck and
Sikkink, 1998b; McCarthy, 1997; Tarrow, 1998). The current study builds on
this emerging literature, as it examines global sources of political opportuni-
ties for ethnic social movements, transnational flows of human and material
resources that facilitate ethnic movements, and cognitive framing that takes
advantage of global discourses to legitimate ethnic mobilization.
The second line of theory I draw on, labeled the "world culture ap-
proach" or "world polity perspective," explores how global models and

6To be fair, social scientists have begun to recognize the importance of the international di-
mensions of ethnic politics in recent years. Their focal topics include when and how the inter-
national community should intervene in domestic ethnic disputes (Brown, 1993, 1996; Esman
and Telhami, 1995; Ryan, 1995), how, when, and why ethnic antagonisms spread across na-
tional borders (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Midlarsky, 1992), and how power struggles at the
international level might affect local ethnic politics (Clark, 1998; Nagel and Whorton, 1992).
These studies provide a great deal of new insight about contemporary ethnic mobilization that
points to a new direction in the field. However, few of these studies are concerned about ex-
plaining the global increase in ethnic mobilizations, and therefore theoretical tools to explain
the global increase have yet to emerge.

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Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World 67

norms influencelocal politics.Researchin this school shows that national

governmentsand other local actorstend to complywith the culturalnorms
and standardmodels of the internationalcommunityas they increasetheir
involvement in internationalactivities.Such compliance can be a result
of materialpressures,culturalinfluences,or both (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983). As a result, isomorphicpolitical and organizationalstructuresand
behaviorthat are in accordancewith internationalmodels emerge in dis-
parate local contexts (Finnemore,1996;Meyer, 1999;Meyer et al., 1997a;
PowellandDiMaggio,1991).Empiricalstudieshave documentedthe spread
of similarsocioculturalmodels in nationalwelfareprograms(Thomasand
Lauderdale,1988),waves of decolonization(Strang,1990),nationalschool
curricula(Meyer et al., 1992),growthof female enfranchisement(Ramirez
et al., 1997), and expansionof a world environmentalismregime (Meyer
et al., 1997b).Similarglobalprocessesseem to be at work in the global rise
of ethnicmobilization,and the worldcultureapproachprovidestheoretical
tools to examinethem.
The two theoreticaltraditionscomplementeach otherverywell to pro-
duce a theoretical frameworkthat explains the global-level processes of
contemporaryethnic mobilization.While the world culture approachex-
plicates the macroprocess by which global models influencelocal politics,
social movementtheorieselucidateactualmechanismsby whichglobalfac-
torscircumscribelocal socialmovements.7Yet these two lines of theoryhave
not had muchexchangewith each other.In this study,by combininganalyt-
ical tools from the two theoreticaltraditions,I wish to begin a constructive
dialoguebetween them.

InternationalLinkagesand EthnicMobilization

In thissection,usingthe two lines of theorydiscussedabove,I formulate

a theoreticalargumentthat the global expansionof humanrightsmodels in
the last severaldecadeshas facilitatedethnicsocialmovements,particularly
when ethnicgroupsare linked to global civil society.It is beyond the scope
of this studyto addressfullyhow humanrights,and ethnicminorityrightsin
particular,haveevolvedinto a key globalpoliticalissue.A generalconsensus
exists,however,concerningthe rise of an internationalhumanrightsregime
in the decadesfollowingWorldWarII-although the level of its influencein
each period is contested (Buergenthal,1997;Donnelly,1986).The interna-
tionalhumanrightsregimefirstbecamevisibleafterthe establishmentof the
United Nations,as evidencedby the U.N.Charterin 1945and the Universal

7This addresses one of the presumed weaknesses of the world culture approach, which is the
lack of explication of such actual mechanisms (Finnemore, 1996).

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68 Tsutsui

Declarationof HumanRightsin 1948.It grew significantlyin the following

few decades through such events as the completion of the International Bill
of Human Rights in 1966 and Amnesty International's winning of the Nobel
Prize in 1977. The end of the Cold War gave an additional thrust to this
development, and many organizations and activists operate to promote hu-
man rightstoday.Ethnicminorityrightshave been at the core of the human
rightsregime,alongwith women'srights,children'srights,and laborrights.8
To understand the impact of this global development on local actors,
including ethnic groups, it is important to note that governmental and non-
governmental actors have played different roles in the evolution of global
humanrights.Whileintergovernmentalnetworksactivelypromotedhuman
rightsin the immediatepost-WorldWarII period,nongovernmentalactors
have taken the initiativein much of the internationalhumanrights activ-
ity since then (Donnelly, 1998; Lauren, 1998; Mullerson, 1997; Weiss and
Gordenker, 1996; Wiseberg, 1992). Because nongovernmental actors are
less concerned about eroding state sovereignty, which global human rights
activitiesalmost inevitablydo, they are more active and effective in pro-
moting human rights ideas and pressuring human rights violators, which are
often governments.9In contrast,intergovernmentalnetworkstend to be in-
effective and inconsistent in dealing with human rights problems. They are
ineffective because governments tend to be apprehensive about intervening
in othercountries'internalaffairsfor fearit mightunderminethe sanctityof
state sovereigntyand invite criticismsfor theirown humanrightsproblems.
They are inconsistentbecause the balanceof power alwaysfactorsinto po-
liticaldecisions,and they rarelytake action againstpowerfulcountries.
Scholars in the world culture approach have also suggested the different
roles of governmental and nongovernmental actors as a general feature of
global politics. They argue that nongovernmental actors tend to take the
role of creators of global norms and standards, whereas governmental agents
enforcethose normsandstandardswhenthey becomewidelyaccepted(Boli

8For instance, the first two cases of global sanction authorized by the United Nations Security
Council concerned the oppression of ethnic groups, blacks in former Rhodesia in 1966 and
1968, and non-whites in South Africa in 1976. The first international machinery to implement
compliance with a human rights treaty was established for the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1965 (Lauren, 1998). It is important
not to conflate the different types of human rights. But for the arguments here, I will equate the
development of human rights in general with the development of ethnic minority rights. This
is not only to simplify the arguments but also to recognize the effects general human rights
discourses have on ethnic mobilization. For an excellent effort to disaggregate an "umbrella
concept" of human rights, see McCormick and Mitchell (1997).
9Growth in the number of human rights organizations attests to the increasing human rights
activities in global civil society: the number of international nongovernmental human rights
organizations grew from 41 in 1973 through 79 in 1983 to 168 in 1993 (Keck and Sikkink,
1998a:11).

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Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World 69

and Thomas, 1997; Jang and Luo, 2000; Meyer et al., 1997a). Some propose
that intergovernmental networks enhance the legitimacy of the state and
expand its power and authority over its citizens (Olzak and Tsutsui, 1998),
while international nongovernmental organizations create and diffuse global
models and standards to empower civil society (Boli and Thomas, 1999).
Building on these debates, I examine how governmental and nongovern-
mental actors influence ethnic social movements differently. Human rights is
a particularly pertinent issue for testing the different influences, given the di-
vergent roles these actors have played in its expansion. Not concerned about
undermining state sovereignty, nongovernmental actors have actively pro-
moted and diffused human rights models in global civil society. Governmen-
tal actors, on the other hand, have cautiously and reluctantly sanctioned what
have become widely accepted norms in the form of international treaties and
conventions. Even these international governmental instruments, however,
are largely symbolic, and their enforcement power has been limited, par-
ticularly without constant cooperation and pressuring by nongovernmental
actors.10The intergovernmental networks tend to be concerned more about
governments' interests than about the welfare of citizens and therefore work
to preserve state authority and power. Thus, I hypothesize that the more a
government engages in intergovernmental activities, the more it enhances
its legitimacy and authority, and therefore the more difficult it becomes
for its citizens, including ethnic minorities, to challenge the state in social
movements.
Linkages to global civil society, on the other hand, empower ethnic mi-
norities and encourage their political mobilization. First, ethnic minorities
with easy access to global civil society are more likely to use the "boomerang
process" that allows them to pressure their governments through the inter-
national community (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a). This is possible because the
world culture of human rights has created an international context in which
a poor human rights record can have serious political implications for rights-
violating governments. For instance, bad human rights records are often used
as a reason for excluding a country from powerful international organiza-
tions,11 and for halting financial support for a country from international
funding organizations (Mullerson, 1997).12In extreme cases, such as South

10Forexample, most human rights treaties only ask member states to submit reports on their
practices regarding human rights, and do not have any authority to rectify cases of human
rights violations (Donnelly, 1995).
11For example, human rights issues have been central to the debate surrounding Turkey's
bid for membership in the European Union and China's participation in the World Trade
Organization.
12United States and European countries most often take the initiative in halting economic aid
to countries that egregiously violate international human rights norms. The United States
has stopped financial aid to foreign countries on human rights grounds on more than 100

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70 Tsutsui

Africa and former Rhodesia, a country could face international sanctions

because of its internal human rights problems.13 The ultimate significance
of human rights issues in these international political processes is debatable,
as other political factors such as power balance and material concerns often
play more tangible roles.14Nevertheless, the increasing power of the human
rights language in the international political arena has undoubtedly rendered
many countries more sensitive to their human rights practices, thus making
them vulnerable to claims by ethnic minorities (Risse et al., 1999). As the
world culture approach would hold, ethnic minorities that have linkage to
global civil society are more likely to be aware of global political opportu-
nities and are more likely to take advantage of the new-found vulnerability
of the government in the era of global human rights.
If the government adopts accommodative policies in response to the
international pressure, granting ethnic groups more access to institutional
politics and more influence over policy debates, this would, according to
social movement theories, encourage further ethnic political mobilization.15
Furthermore, forceful repression of ethnic movements is less likely because
it can be condemned as a violation of basic human rights and prove costly for
the government's reputation in global politics. This new political opportunity
structure would increase the potential for political mobilization by ethnic
groups to the extent that they are connected to global civil society.
Second, linkages to global civil society provide ethnic groups with mobi-
lizational resources as well. As the literature on global dimensions of social
movements reports, transnational flows of mobilizational resources have
become an important factor in contemporary social movements (Keck and
Sikkink, 1998a; Loveman, 1998; Smith et al., 1997). Such resources reach lo-
cal actors, including ethnic groups, more easily if the country is connected to
global civil society. In an isolated country, ethnic groups will have difficulty
obtaining information on those international organizations that can assist
their movements. External actors will also find it difficult to support such
movements, as flows of human and material resources tend to be blocked by

occasions since the beginning of the Carter administration in 1977 (Stohl et al., 1989:201-
202). Tomasevski (1989) documents how powerful international organizations like the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund have begun to take human rights issues into
consideration in their funding decisions over the last several decades (Lauren, 1998:278).
13It is worth noting that external intervention in the domestic minority's problems dates back
to pre-World War II era, although its extent and frequency were much less in the period prior
to the emergence of the international human rights regime (Krasner and Froats, 1998).
14Because of these political factors, countries such as China have been rather unrelenting toward
criticisms from outside regarding their human rights practice. Yet, as they become increasingly
involved in international activities, they are becoming more attentive to these criticisms.
15Even if it does not directly affect an ethnic group, a policy addressing issues concerning other
disadvantaged categories of people such as women and children, or other ethnic groups in
the same country, might raise the awareness and expectations of the group.

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Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World 71

the government. Those resources include not only funds to mobilize people
but also strategic and ideological advice for mobilization (Keck and Sikkink,
1998a; McAdam and Rucht, 1993; Smith et al., 1997; Tarrow, 1998).
Third, as the world culture approach would predict, if a country is closely
involved in international affairs, its populations, including ethnic groups, are
more likely to be exposed to and be influenced by information from the
international community (Porta et al., 1999; Risse et al., 1999; Strang and
Meyer, 1993). Such information includes reports of social movements by
ethnic and other identity groups as well as general discourses on international
human rights. Such information facilitates mobilization because it provides
activists with clues as to how to effectively stage protests and what goals they
can legitimately pursue (Giugni, 1995; McAdam and Rucht, 1993). Since
international discourse commonly sets a higher standard of human rights
than is actually practiced in most countries, this awareness tends to raise the
potential for ethnic mobilization. International human rights discourse also
facilitates the framing efforts of leaders of ethnic political activity. They can
justify their claims and mobilize support by drawing on frames used in other
ethnic movements or by referring to international human rights documents.
Through these processes, linkages to global civil society raise the po-
tential for ethnic mobilization. Thus, I hypothesize that the more linkages a
country has to global civil society, the more likely is an ethnic group in the
country to mobilize.

Other Factors

To evaluate the effects of global linkages on ethnic mobilization prop-

erly, we must consider some additional factors. Modernization is an im-
portant factor that cannot be ignored in a study of ethnic mobilization.
Many scholars have examined how modernization causes social structural
changes that make ethnic politics salient (Anderson, 1991; Brubaker, 1996;
Calhoun, 1997; Gellner, 1983; Haas, 1997; Hobsbawm, 1992; A. D. Smith,
1986). These studies have since coalesced into two dominant approaches: the
internal colonialism and the competition model (Clark, 1998:1268;Nielsen,
1985:133). The two lines of theory differ on how modernization gives rise
to ethnic mobilization. The former emphasizes growing inequality between
the core and peripheral regions within a country as a result of industrializa-
tion (Clark, 1998; Hechter, 1975; Nielsen, 1985), which increases peripheral
ethnic minorities' disadvantages, while the latter focuses on the growing
mobility of populations as a result of urbanization, which intensifies com-
petition between formerly segregated groups (Barth, 1969; Belanger and
Pinard, 1991; Olzak, 1992; Olzak and Nagel, 1986). While this important

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72 Tsutsui

difference is not to be ignored, they agree on the core assertion that mod-
ernization and attendant internal social structural changes give rise to ethnic
mobilization.16
This modernization thesis has been widely accepted in the literature on
ethnic mobilization. However, new findings in the field suggest that while
modernization increases ethnic mobilization as a whole, it might actually de-
crease ethnic violence (Gurr, 1993b). Literature on social movements echoes
this point. It is accepted wisdom in the field that political opportunities avail-
able in a polity shape the form of social movements (McAdam et al., 1996;
Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). In political systems where the aggrieved can take
institutionalized routes such as nonviolent protest and lobbying to voice their
grievances, they are more likely to avoid violent activities. The greater its
level of modernization, the more likely a country is to have such institutional-
ized processes available. Furthermore, modern states usually monopolize the
control of military power and police force, which renders opposition activity
potentially costly. In such countries, the cost differential between violent and
nonviolent mobilization is so high that the latter is strongly encouraged.17
While open access to political institutions is a key to such tempering effects
on political mobilization, it is also important for activists to understand the
merits of nonviolent strategies. Modern societies tend to have more highly
educated populations and opinion leaders that recognize the merits of non-
violence (Williams, 1994:63).18Violent activities are costly in these settings
not only because of the physical danger to participants but also because they
risk alienating the movement from the general public. This political culture is
also a factor in reducing the level of violence of social movements. Therefore,
the more modernized a country, the less likely its ethnic groups are to re-
sort to violence. Combining the arguments above, I hypothesize that the
more modernized a country, the more likely are its ethnic groups to en-
gage in nonviolent mobilization, but the less likely they are to resort to
violence.
In addition to modernization, the literature on ethnic movements often
discusses such group-specific characteristics as (a) cultural distinctiveness,
(b) separatist tendency, (c) organizational cohesion, and (d) the degree of

16Severalscholarshave attemptedto reconcilethe two models and carriedout comparative

studiesto examinedifferentconditionsforwhichone ortheotheris moreapplicable(Belanger
andPinard,1991;BrownandBoswell,1997;Gurr,1993a,b;NagelandWhorton,1992;Nielsen,
1985;Ragin,1979).
thosewhopursueradicalgoalsoftenignorethiscost/benefitcalculusandengage
17Nevertheless,
in terrorist attacks and other violent actions.
18AsInglehartpointsout, social movementsin these countriesoften drawon postmaterialist
values,whichprioritizenoneconomicfactorssuch as sense of belongingand aestheticcon-
cernsas theirgoals (Inglehart,1977,1990).Thispostmaterialistsensitivitymightalso render
violence an unattractive option for ethnic groups.

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Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World 73

economicandpoliticaldisadvantagesas importantfactorsthat circumscribe

ethnic mobilization(Gurr,1993a;Williams,1994).

(a) Many observersargue that culturaldistinctivenesscontributesto

the developmentandmaintenanceof strongethnicidentities,which
increasethe likelihoodof ethnicmobilization.Thisperspectivepre-
supposesthat ethnicityis an extensionof kinshipties based on cul-
tural and racial similarities.Culturaldifferencesserve as markers
by whichindividualsmake in-group/out-groupdistinctions(Barth,
1969). Some scholarsconsiderthat these culturaldistinctionsand
attendant ethnocentrismare at the core of intergroupconflicts
(Henderson, 1997). This logic leads to a hypothesisthat the cul-
tural distinctivenessof a group increasesthe likelihood of ethnic
mobilization.
(b) Some studieshave identifiedthe existenceof a separatisttendency
as one of the importantvariablesfor predictingethnic mobiliza-
tion (Brown and Boswell, 1997;Gurr, 1993a,b).An ethnic group
with a historyof autonomyis more likely to have separatistgoals.
When the groupis concentratedin one geographicarea,the likeli-
hood furtherincreases.Suchgroupswith separatistgoalstend to be
more activein mobilizingefforts(BrownandBoswell, 1997).Thus,
I hypothesizethat an ethnic group with historicalautonomy and
geographicalconcentrationis more likely to mobilize.
(c) Organizationalmobilizingstructuresare importantin any social
movement staged in modern society (Zald and McCarthy,1987).
Hannan (1994) arguesthat as modernizationmakes most govern-
ments strongerand largerin scale, ethnicmovementsalso become
larger in scale and better orchestratedthroughstrong leadership
and highly coordinatedstructure.Tilly (1978, 1984) also discusses
how the growthof modernnation-statesinducedthe gradualemer-
gence of "nationalsocial movements,"which tend to be largerin
scale and more systematicin theiractivities.These argumentslead
to a hypothesis that the more cohesive and united the organiza-
tional structureof an ethnic group,and the largera grouprelative
to the size of the country'spopulation,the more likely it will be to
mobilize.
(d) Grievance theories emphasize how disadvantagesand ensuing
grievancesamonga groupof people lead to collectiveaction.These
theories were severely criticizedfor their inability to predict the
timingof mobilization,and have recededconsiderablyin the social
movementliteraturein favorof resourcemobilizationandpolitical
opportunitystructureapproaches:while grievancesare prevalent,

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74 Tsutsui

resources and opportunities arise at certain time to trigger social

movements. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that more dis-
advantaged groups are generally more likely to mobilize. While
grievance theories generally prove ineffective in dynamic analyses
of social movements, the analyses in this study are not longitudinal.
Thus, I use a simple hypothesis that relative disadvantages increase
the likelihood of mobilization.
I use these variables mainly to clarify the nonspurious effects of interna-
tional linkages. Thus, if domestic factors are the primary causes of ethnic mo-
bilization, international linkages will show little to no effect. These domestic
variables will not only help to clarify the effects of international linkages,
but may also shed some light on the accuracy of the prevailing arguments
about the causes of ethnic mobilization.

DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION

The data in the present analysis include group-level and country-level

variables. The Minorities at Risk data set provides all the group-level infor-
mation, including the two dependent variables (Minorities at Risk Project,
1996).19The data set comprises three phases: (1) coded data on 227 ethnic
groups from 1945 to 1989, (2) qualitative description of the history and main
characteristics of each ethnic group, and (3) coded data on 268 ethnic groups
updated to 1995.20 My analysis is on the phase-three data set, which has sev-
eral interesting new variables as well as an updated version of variables from
the phase-one data.
The other variables are at the country level, and I use them as measures
of structural conditions in which ethnic groups are embedded. I merged them
with the group-level variables by assigning each group values for the country
in which it resides. Thus, the unit of analysis is the ethnic group. Country-
level variables come from the World Tables of Economic and Social Indica-
tors (World Bank, 1984), and the Yearbook of International Organizations
(Union of International Associations, 1983).
Tables I and II summarize the operationalization of the dependent and
independent variables.

19The project used three criteria in the definition of an ethnic minority group. To be included
in the Minorities at Risk data set, a communal group must (1) have a population larger than
100,000 or 1% of the country, (2) reside in countries with a population exceeding 1 mil-
lion, and (3) be either (a) discriminated against, (b) disadvantaged from past discrimination,
(c) advantaged but challenged, or (d) mobilized (Minorities at Risk Project, 1996). Underlying
this definition of ethnic group is a certain level of cultural, historical, or ethnic distinctiveness.
20Some of the groups in the phase-one data were deleted and some new groups were added to
the phase-three data.

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Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World 75

Table I. Operationalization of Dependent Variables

Nonviolent Protest Index Violent Rebellion Index
0- None reported 0- None reported
1- Verbal opposition 1- Political banditry
2- Symbolic resistance 2- Campaigns of terrorism
3- Demonstration: participation < 10,000 3- Local rebellion
4- Demonstration: participation > 10,000 4- Small-scale guerrilla activity
5- Intermediate to large-scale guerrilla activity
6- Protracted civil war
Source: Minorities at Risk Project, 1996.
Note. Values for "Nonviolent Protest 1990-94" and "Violent Rebellion 1990-94" are assigned
(1) using the scale above and (2) based on the highest level of activity of protest/rebellion in
the 5-year period.

Table II. Operationalization of Independent Variables

Baseline model
Population proportion-Proportion of population of the minority group to that of the
country (Minorities at Risk Project, 1996)
Modernization-Composed from (1) logged GDP per capita in 1980; (2) percentage literacy
in 1980 = percentage of population (15 years of age and over) that is literate (able both to
read and write); (3) urbanization in 1980 = percentage of population that lives in cities of
50,000 or more population (World Bank, 1984)
Cultural distinctiveness-Sum of the indices of difference in language, custom, religion, and
race (Minorities at Risk Project, 1996)
Separatist tendency-Sum of the indices of regional concentration and loss of autonomy
(Minorities at Risk Project, 1996)
Increasing economic disadvantage-Change in the policy and practice of economic
discrimination (2 = substantial worsening; 1 = slight worsening; 0 = no change; -1 =
slight improvement; -2 = substantial improvement) (Minorities at Risk Project, 1996)
Political disadvantage-Composite index of political disadvantage ((i) political
discrimination: level of representation, public policy to restrict political participation,
social practice of deliberate exclusion; and (ii) political restrictions: freedom of
expression, free movement and place of residence, rights in judicial proceedings, political
organization, voting, recruitment to police and military, access to civil service, attainment
of high office) (Minorities at Risk Project, 1996)
Organizational cohesion-Unity and cohesion of organization; loose coalition to one or a
few dominant organizations (Minorities at Risk Project, 1996)
Nonviolent Protest 1970-1974--Based on the same coding scheme as the dependent
variable. Refer to Table I (Minorities at Risk Project, 1996)
Violent Rebellion 1970-1974--Based on the same coding scheme as the dependent variable.
Refer to Table I (Minorities at Risk Project, 1996)
International linkages
International governmental organization (IGO) membership, 1982 (Union of International
Associations, 1983)
International non-governmental organization (INGO) membership, 1982 (Union of
International Associations, 1983)
Note. Sources are in parentheses following items.

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76 Tsutsui

Dependent Variables

There are two dependentvariablesin my analyses:nonviolentprotest

and violent rebellion. The former refers to ethnic mobilization that does
not employ physicalforce;the latter refers to ethnic mobilizationwith the
use of physical force. Both variables are coded using the scales in Table I
and are based on the highest level of activity in each 5-year period.2' The
project used local newspapers in various countries in addition to Western
sources,thusminimizinga potentialbiastowardmore mobilizationin West-
ern countries.22Given the scope of the data collection, one should not ex-
pect the data set to be perfect, but many scholarsconsider it to be rea-
sonably good and use it in empiricalstudies on ethnic mobilization(Davis
and Moore, 1997; Fearon and Latin, 1997; Fox, 2000; Saideman and Ayers,
2000).
Although analyses of all the periods would be ideal, a lack of covariates
in the earlier periods precludes such analysis. In my analyses the dependent
variables are the records of the 1990-94 period. Since the project coded the
two types of mobilization separately, a group can be coded to have engaged
in both types of mobilization, only one of them, or neither.

Independent Variables

To capture the effect of the level of modernization, I created a mod-

ernizationfactor from three commonlyused measuresof modernization:
GDP per capita, literacy, and urbanization.23For all three variables, I use
the value in 1980 to control for the time they take to affect ethnic
groups.

21Thatis, if a group engages in verbal opposition in 1990, which should be coded as 1, demonstra-
tion of less than 10,000 participants in 1991 (3), demonstration of more than 10,000 participants
in 1992 (4), and no activity in 1993 and 1994 (0), the value of the nonviolent protest variable
for that group for the 5-year period from 1990 to 1994 should be 4.
22They coded the data separately for each of the six regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, North Africa and
the Middle East, and Western Democracies and Japan. Specialists for each region oversaw the
coding of information from scholarly and journalistic sources. Their efforts were so thorough
as to make the principal investigator claim that "we think that virtually all major protest
campaigns and rebellions by communal groups have been identified and taken into account
in the coding" (Gurr, 1993a:375).
23I did a factor analysis on (1) logged GDP per capita in 1980, (2) percentage literacy in 1980,
and (3) populations in cities of 50,000 or more people divided by 1000 in 1980. The eigenvalue
was 2.44 with factor loadings of 0.810, 0.788, and 0.842 respectively. I did not use such variables
as the level of civil liberties or a democracy scale because I included a variable that captures
the openness of the national political arena for ethnic groups. Thus, adding a civil liberties
variable to this model would generate a multicolinearity problem.

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Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World 77

As a measure of the size of an ethnic group I use the proportion of

the group population to the country's national population in the 1990s.24By
using the proportion rather than the actual size of population, I control for
each country's population size.
As a proxy for cultural distinctiveness, I use the sum of indices of cultural
differences measured along four dimensions: language, custom, religion, and
race. Each difference is quantified into an index in terms of how much an
ethnic group differs from the dominant group in a country. A higher value
indicates a higher level of distinctiveness.
Two indices measure the separatist tendency of ethnic groups: regional
concentration of a group and historical loss of autonomy. The underlying
assumption is that a group has a strong separatist tendency if it is geographi-
cally concentrated in one region and if it has experienced political autonomy
in its history. Both of these indices are for the 1990s. I use the sum of these
two indices as a proxy.
Economic disadvantage variables measure how much economic dis-
crimination an ethnic group faces because of historical marginality and
poverty, and how many public policies exist to improve the material well-
being of that group. The Minorities at Risk project coded this information
biannually in the 1990s. In evaluating the impact of economic disadvantages
on social movements, relative deprivation is usually more important than the
static differential between haves and have-nots. Ethnic groups tend to per-
ceive more discrimination when their economic situation worsens or when
a new public policy restricts their economic opportunity. Thus, I use a vari-
able that captures changes in economic disadvantages in the early 1990s,
which ranges from substantial worsening through no significant change to
substantial improvement.
To measure political disadvantages, I use indices that capture (1) po-
litical discrimination in terms of representation and participation in na-
tional politics, and (2) political restrictions on civil liberties. I did not use
changes in political disadvantages, because very few changes took place
in the observed period. I use the values of this variable in the 1990-91
period.
Organizational cohesion refers to how united and cohesive a group is.
For the measure, I use a group's position on a continuum ranging from a
loose coalition of several different organizations to one or a few dominant
organizations that attract allegiance from most members of the group. This
variable is for the 1990-91 period.

24Here, I follow the operationalization of group size in prior studies including those that use
Minorities at Risk data set (Fearon and Latin, 1997; Gurr 1993b; Yinger, 1986). Because the
data set excludes small ethnic groups, the relative size provides a better measure of group's
numerical strength vis-h-vis the state.

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78 Tsutsui

To control for a group's propensity to mobilize in a violent or nonviolent

manner, I use the level of mobilization of each group from 1970 to 1974.
For nonviolent mobilization in the 1990s, I use the measure of nonviolent
mobilization for the early 1970s, and for violent mobilization in the 1990s, I
use violent mobilization in the early 1970s.
I start with these nine variables in my statistical analyses. Relevant litera-
ture commonly treats them as causal variables, and their effects are relatively
well documented. Causal relations are generally clear, as the observation of
most of these variables precedes that of the dependent variables.25
Then I add international linkage variables to test the arguments about
involvement in intergovernmental networks and connection to global civil
society. I employ two commonly used measures, international governmental
organization (IGO) membership and international nongovernmental orga-
nization (INGO) membership, to capture the effects of international linkage.
Research in the world culture tradition often uses them to measure the in-
stitutional effect of global society on domestic activities (Boli and Thomas,
1999). Unlike most statistical analyses in this line of research, my analysis
makes a distinction between the two linkage measures. IGO membership is
a measure of country's involvement in intergovernmental networks, which is
expected to suppress ethnic mobilization. INGO membership, on the other
hand, is a measure of linkage to global civil society, which is hypothesized
to increase ethnic social movements.
Among the variables, modernization factor, IGO membership, and
INGO membership are country-level variables, and all other variables are
group-specific. Table III reports descriptive statistics of all the variables.

Method

A glance at the distribution of the two dependent variables suggests that

a Tobit analysis is appropriate for them. For both variables, a large number
of cases have values of 0, and others spread variably. In empirical terms,
this means that many groups reportedly did not mobilize at all, and others
mobilized with varying levels of intensity. Given the large number of zeroes,
it might be reasonable to suspect some variation among them. For example,
some groups may engage in a small-scale mobilization too minute to be

25Organizational cohesion is the only variable among them whose causal relationship with
ethnic mobilization needs some caution. It might result from ethnic mobilization rather than
the other way around, especially given that it is observed in the same period as the dependent
variables (1990s). Only a longitudinal analysis can clarify the causal relationship, which is
currently impossible with the Minorities at Risk data set. For the purpose of controlling for
the effect of organizational strength, however, using it in the baseline model does not cause
a serious problem.

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Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World 79

Table III. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables Used in the Analysis
Standard Valid
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean deviation number
Nonviolent protest in 1970-1974 0 4 1.48 1.66 223
Nonviolent protest in 1990-1994 0 4 2.31 1.40 265
Violent rebellion in 1970-1974 0 6 0.68 1.59 247
Violent rebellion in 1990-1994 0 6 1.54 2.15 267
Population proportion 0.0007 0.8501 0.12 0.14 268
Modernization -1.812 2.063 0.00 1.00 206
Cultural distinctiveness 0 11 5.90 2.56 251
Separatist tendency 0 7 3.26 1.72 268
Increasing economic disadvantage -2 2 -0.03 0.66 260
Political disadvantage 0 9 3.25 2.61 265
Organizational cohesion 0 7 3.23 2.15 268
IGO membership 7 87 46.13 16.01 239
INGO membership 15 2132 618.45 485.07 239

reported by news agencies and researchers. Yet we do not know anything

about the level of mobilization among those cases with zero value. Thus,
we should treat them as censored variables. For these types of dependent
variables, a Tobit analysis is the most appropriate method because it can
analyze the break between 0 and 1 as well as the variation among cases
larger than 1 in one model (Long, 1997). Therefore, I use the Tobit analysis
in this study.

RESULTS

Tables IV and V report the results of Tobit analyses. For both dependent
variables, I started with a baseline model (Model 1) that includes all the local
factors, and then added the international linkage variables in Model 2.
In all models the modernization variable shows a positive significant
effect on nonviolent mobilization and a negative significant effect on vi-
olent mobilization. These results support the hypothesis that modernized
countries encourage nonviolent movements and discourage violent ones.
As noted above, this is not simply due to the repressive effect of the co-
ercive power of modern states. It is also likely to reflect the cultural and
institutional aspects of modern society that make nonviolent movements
more cost-efficient. To test this point, I added a military-per-capita variable
in Model 2 of both of the tables (results are not reported). If the sheer violent
potential of modern states is the main reason for less violent mobilization in
those countries, this variable will have a negative effect on violent mobiliza-
tion. It was insignificant in both models, and the effect of the modernization
factor did not change in either of the models.

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80 Tsutsui

Table IV. Tobit Analysis of Nonviolent Ethnic Protest in 1990-1994

(N= 155)
Model 1 Model 2
Baseline model
Population proportion 0.932 1.801
Modernization 0.571** 0.298t
Cultural distinctiveness 0.075 0.088t
Separatist tendency 0.143* 0.142*
Increasing economic disadvantage 0.485** 0.432*
Political disadvantage 0.138** 0.150**
Organizational cohesion 0.205** 0.221**
Nonviolent protest in 1970s 0.205** 0.167*
International linkages
IGO membership 0.010
INGO membership 0.001t
Constant -0.256 -1.37*
Chi-square 65.3 73.7
Degrees of freedom 8 10
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; tp < 0.10, (two-tailed tests).

Among the group characteristics, cultural distinctiveness does not have

any significant effect. This result casts some doubt on the argument that
cultural differences fuel ethnic political activities. The separatist tendency
variable has a positive significant effect in all models, lending support to
the hypothesis that the existence of separatist tendency increases the po-
tential for ethnic mobilization. Both disadvantage variables have a positive
significant effect on nonviolent mobilization but have no significant effect on
violent mobilization. This suggests that grievances can push ethnic groups

Table V. Tobit Analysis of Violent Ethnic Rebellion in 1990-1994

(N = 176)
Model 1 Model 2
Baseline model
Population proportion 1.12 2.68
Modernization -1.13** -1.89**
Cultural distinctiveness -0.023 0.064
Separatist tendency 0.444* 0.480*
Increasing economic disadvantage -0.466 -0.566
Political disadvantage 0.082 0.108
Organizational cohesion 0.340* 0.349*
Violent rebellion in 1970s 0.505** 0.380*
International linkages
IGO Membership -0.023
INGO Membership 0.003**
Constant -3.49** -5.14**
Chi-square 48.3 58.1
Degrees of freedom 8 10
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, (two-tailed tests).

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Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World 81

to mobilization, but grievances alone are not enough to provoke violence.

The size of groups has a significant effect in only one model. This may be
due to the Minorities at Risk project's cutting criterion, which excludes very
small groups. Organizational cohesion has a positive significant effect in all
models, supporting the argument that in modern societies an ethnic group
with a tight organizational structure is more likely to mobilize.26 As ex-
pected, prior history of mobilization has a positive significant effect in all
models.
Among the international linkage variables, INGO membership shows a
positive significant effect on both violent and nonviolent mobilization. This
lends support to the hypothesis that linkages to global civil society increase
ethnic mobilization. IGO membership, on the other hand, has no significant
effect. Although the effect is negative in one of the models, the results do not
indicate strong support for the hypothesis that intergovernmental networks
suppress ethnic mobilization. Nevertheless, the different effects of interna-
tional governmental and nongovernmental memberships provide support
for the argument that the two international actors exert different effects on
ethnic politics. The results also suggest that human rights ideas are a key
factor in the rise of ethnic social movements; it is not global integration in
general, but linkage to global civil society, the primary locus of human rights
activities, that increases ethnic mobilizations.
It is also important to note that adding international linkage variables
reduces the significance of the coefficient for modernization in Table IV.
This shows that the analysis uncovers the importance of international di-
mensions of nonviolent ethnic mobilization that has been overlooked in the
past research. Moreover, INGO memberships have a positive significant
effect on violent mobilization, while the modernization variable has a neg-
ative significant effect on it. This also suggests that international linkages
have an impact on ethnic mobilization that is distinct from the effects of
modernization.
To summarize, nonviolent ethnic mobilization is likely to occur when a
group has a strong separatist tendency, economic and political disadvan-
tages, a larger size, organizational cohesion, a prior history of mobiliza-
tion, and when the country it resides in is more modernized and has more
INGO memberships. With regard to violent movements, modernization has a
negative significant effect, while separatist tendency, organizational cohe-
sion, prior history of violent mobilization, and INGO memberships have
positive significant effects. Thus, the analyses showed (1) that international
factors matter in contemporary ethnic social movements controlling for do-
mestic factors and (2) that linkage to global civil society raises the potential

26But the caution about causal relationships noted in footnote 24 should be born in mind.

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82 Tsutsui

for ethnic social movements, while intergovernmental networks do not have

a strong impact on ethnic mobilization.

CONCLUSION

This study proposed a theoretical framework for understanding the

global processes of contemporary ethnic mobilizations. The framework
builds on two lines of theory that have not had much exchange with each
other: the world culture approach and social movement theories. The for-
mer provides theoretical tools to explore how global human rights models
change the opportunity structures for ethnic groups through linkage to global
civil society, while the latter explains how the new social environment raises
the potential for ethnic mobilization. The main hypothesis drawn from the
theoretical discussion-linkages to global civil society increase ethnic mo-
bilization but involvement in intergovernmental networks decreases ethnic
social movements-was tested in the statistical analyses.
The first key finding of the analyses is that linkage to global civil society
has a significant effect after controlling for national- and group-level factors.
This shows that global-level processes, which have largely been overlooked
in the literature, influence ethnic mobilization in the contemporary world.
Given that nongovernmental linkages increase ethnic mobilization and that a
growing number of countries are integrated into global civil society, in which
human rights have become increasingly important, the increase in ethnic mo-
bilizations in the last few decades may be attributed to the global diffusion of
human rights. With more comprehensive longitudinal data and more care-
ful examination of the processes through which nongovernmental linkages
influence ethnic politics, the validity of this larger argument could be tested.
Second, linkage to intergovernmental networks does not have a signif-
icant effect, whereas nongovernmental ties do increase ethnic mobilization.
This indicates that international governmental and nongovernmental link-
ages have different effects on local politics, lending support to the argument
proposed by some world culture scholars. This finding also provides further
support for the impact of global human rights. If other elements of global
integration were relevant, both IGO and INGO linkages would have a sig-
nificant effect. Instead, I found that only ties to global civil society, where
concerns and activities for human rights are more intense than in the inter-
governmental world, have a positive significant effect.
These arguments about global factors are not intended to undermine
the importance of local factors. Ethnic grievances and deep-seated ethnic ha-
tred play a role, perhaps a much bigger role than global factors in the minds
of those most directly involved. However, exclusive focus on such elements
has failed to uncover an important global process: the effect of global human

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Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World 83

rights models on ethnic mobilization. The analyses have demonstrated the

importanceof examininginternationaldimensionsof ethnic mobilization.
Theoretically,the currentstudy underscoresthe benefit of a dialogue be-
tween social movement theories and the world culture approach.Social
movementtheories benefit from the theoreticaltools of the world culture
approach,as theyexpandtheirscope of analysisto globaldimensions.Mean-
while,the worldcultureapproachaddressessome of the main criticismsdi-
rected to it by specifyingthe mechanismsby whichglobal models produce
tangible local outcomes. Future research should explore these implications
of this study and further examine the global dimensions of ethnic social
movements.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to John W. Meyer for his thorough and insightful com-

ments throughoutthe developmentof this paper. Douglas McAdam and
Mark Granovetteralso providedvery helpful comments.This study also
benefitedfrom excellent commentsby Emilio J. Castilla,LynnEden, Kyra
Greene, Ann Hironaka, Hokyu Hwang, Yong Suk Jang, Hyojoung Kim,
Susan Olzak, Francisco Ramirez, Sidney Tarrow, Morris Zelditch, and the
members of the comparative workshop at Stanford University. I acknowl-
edge the generous support provided by National Science Foundation (#SES
0214168),the Bechtel Initiative,Institutefor InternationalStudies,Stanford
University (Principal Investigators: Francisco Ramirez and John Meyer),
and JapanSociety for the Promotionof Science.

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