CONRADO P.

NAVARRO
vs. RUFINO G. PINEDA, et. al

G.R. No. L-18456. November 30, 1963 

 FACTS:

Rufino G. Pineda and his mother Juana

Gonzales borrowed from Conrado P. Navarro,

the sum of P2,500.00 payable in 6 months.

To secure the indebtedness, Rufino executed a

DEED OF REAL ESTATE

document captioned

and CHATTEL MORTGAGES

Real Estate Mortgage 
Juana hypothecated her parcel of

land

Chattel Mortgage
Pineda mortgaged his (1)  two-story

residential house erected on a lot

belonging to Atty. Castro, and (2)

one motor truck

After the mortgage debt became due and

payable and despite the grant of several

extensions, Pineda, et. al failed to pay their

obligations.

Navarro then filed a complaint to foreclose

the mortgage.
The lower court ruled in favor of Navarro

and ordered Pineda pay the debt and in

default of said payment, the properties

mentioned in the deed of real estate

mortgage and chattel mortgage be sold to

realize said mortgage debt.
Thereafter, Pineda went to the Supreme

Court to contest the said decision.

They argue that since only movables can

be the subject of a chattel mortgage then

the mortgage in question which is the

basis of the present action, cannot give

rise to an action for foreclosure.

Pineda, et. al contend that Article 415 of

the New Civil Code, in classifying a house

as immovable property, makes no

distinction whether the owner of the land

is or not the owner of the building.

The fact that the land belongs to another

is immaterial, it is enough that the house

adheres to the land

ISSUE:

WON, the two-story residential house indicated in

the Chattel Mortgage is an immovable or

movable property
RULING:
Pineda's two-story residential house indicated in

the Chattel Mortgage is treated as a movable

property by the parties.
The trial court did not predicate its decision

declaring the deed of chattel mortgage valid

solely on the ground that the house mortgaged

was erected on the land which belonged to a third

person, but also and principally on the doctrine of

estoppel.
 Doctrine of Estoppel
(Standard Oil Co. vs. Jaranillo)

Under certain conditions property may have a character

different from that imputed to it in Articles 415 and 416.

It is undeniable that the parties to a contract may  by

agreement, treat as personal property that which  by
nature would be real property.
 Doctrine of Estoppel
(Evangelista vs. Alto Surety)

The view that parties to a deed of chattel mortgagee may

agree to consider a house as personal property for the

purposes of said contract is good only insofar as the

contracting parties are concerned. It is based partly, upon the

principles of estoppel.
 Doctrine of Estoppel
(Evangelista vs. Albad)

In a case, a mortgage house built on a rented land, was held

to be a personal property, not only because the deed of

mortgage considered it as such, but also because it did not

form part of the land. The object placed on land by one who

has only a temporary right to the same, such as a lessee does

not become immobilized by attachment.

 Doctrine of Estoppel
(Evangelista vs. Albad)

Hence, if a house belonging to a person stands on a

rented land belonging to another person, it may be
mortgaged as a personal property is so stipulated in the
document of mortgage.
 Doctrine of Estoppel
(Ladera, et al. vs. C. N. Hodges)

It should be noted, however, that the principle is

predicated on statements by the owner declaring his
house to be a chattel, a conduct that may conceivably
estop him from subsequently claiming otherwise
 DOCTRINE

Although in some instances, a house of mixed materials has

been considered as a chattel between them, has been

recognized, it has been a constant criterion nevertheless

who are not parties to

that, with respect to third persons,

the contract, and specially in execution proceedings,

the house is considered as an immovable property.
IN THE CASE AT BAR

The house in question was treated as personal or movable

property, by the parties to the contract themselves.

In the deed of chattel mortgage, Pineda conveyed by way of

Chattel Mortgage my personal properties, a residential

house and a truck.

IN THE CASE AT BAR

The mortgagor himself grouped the house with the truck,

which is, inherently a movable property. The house which was

not even declared for taxation purposes was small and

made of light construction materials: G.I. sheets

roofing, sawali and wooden walls and wooden posts; built on

land belonging to another.

CONCLUSION
Under the doctrine of estoppel, parties may agree

that to treat an immovable property as a movable.

However, with respect to third persons, who are not

parties to the contract, and specially in execution

proceedings, the house is considered as an

immovable property.