Supreme Court of the Philippines

647 Phil. 216

EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076, October 12, 2010
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE
ALBERTO L. LERMA, RESPONDENT.

[A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2077]

ATTY. LOURDES A. ONA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ALBERTO L.

LERMA, RESPONDENT.

[A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2078]

JOSE MARI L. DUARTE, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ALBERTO L.

LERMA, RESPONDENT.

[A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2079]

RET. GENERAL MELITON D. GOYENA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE

ALBERTO L. LERMA, RESPONDENT.

[A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2080]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE

ALBERTO L. LERMA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Five (5) administrative cases were filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
against Judge Alberto L. Lerma (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
256, Muntinlupa City, for violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, for making
untruthful statements in his certificates of service, for gross ignorance of the law and/or gross
negligence, for delay in rendering an order, for abusing judicial authority and discretion, and for
serious irregularity.

In a memorandum[1] dated September 24, 2007, embodying the report and recommendation of
the OCA, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (Court Administrator Lock) referred
to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice Puno) the five administrative cases filed
against respondent judge, to wit: a) Administrative Matter No. 98-6-179-RTC (Re: Request for
transfer of arraignment/trial of Criminal Case No. 3639-R); b) OCA IPI No. 07-2644-RTJ ([Ret.] General
Meliton D. Goyena v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma); c) OCA IPI No. 07-2643-RTJ (Jose Mari L. Duarte v.
Judge Alberto L. Lerma); d) OCA IPI No. 07-2639-RTJ (Atty. Lourdes A. Ona v. Judge Alberto L.
Lerma); and e) OCA IPI No. 07-2654-RTJ (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma).

Per resolution[2] of the Supreme Court En Banc dated September 25, 2007, the foregoing cases
were respectively redocketed as regular administrative cases, as follows: A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2076,
RTJ-07-2079, RTJ-07-2078, RTJ-07-2077, and RTJ-07-2080.

Thereafter, the cases were referred to an Investigating Justice[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) for
investigation and recommendation.

We shall discuss the cases individually, taking into account their peculiar factual surroundings
and the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice.

a.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076

On November 27, 1995, Ruperto Pizarro y Bruno (accused) was charged with Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 in an information filed with the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales,
Pangasinan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 3639-R.[4] Since accused was already detained at
the Quezon City Jail due to the pendency of another criminal case (Criminal Case No. Q-95-
64130-31) filed against him. The court ordered that all notices of hearings and proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 3639-R be forwarded to the Jail Warden of the Quezon City Jail.[5]
Subsequently, in a letter dated March 25, 1998,[6] Officer-in-Charge/City Warden Arnold
Buenacosa of the Quezon City Jail informed Judge Teodorico Alfonzo B. Bauzon (Judge
Bauzon), RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan, that accused was transferred to the Bureau of
Corrections in Muntinlupa City on March 21, 1998 in compliance with the commitment order
and decision in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64130-31 of the RTC, Branch 82, Quezon City.

The Supreme Court, in a resolution[7] dated June 30, 1998, directed (1) the Clerk of Court of the
RTC, Branch 53, Rosales, Pangasinan, to forward the records of Criminal Case No. 3639-R to
the Executive Judge, RTC, Muntinlupa City, for appropriate action; (2) the Executive Judge,
RTC, Muntinlupa City, to raffle the case among the judges to arraign the accused and
consequently take his testimony; and (3) the Clerk of Court, RTC, Muntinlupa City, to return the
records to the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales, Pangasinan, for the continuation of the proceedings.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution, Criminal Case No. 3639-R[8] was raffled to RTC,
Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, presided by respondent judge. Accused was arraigned on
September 29, 1998. Thereafter, respondent judge proceeded to receive the evidence for the
prosecution. On February 7, 2003, the prosecution formally offered its exhibits, but the firearm
subject of the information was not included in the formal offer. On June 27, 2005, the accused,
through Atty. Abelardo D. Tomas of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), filed a motion for leave of
court to file demurrer to prosecution's evidence.[9] Respondent judge granted the said motion on July 26,
2005.[10] On November 8, 2005, Atty. Rodney Magbanua of the PAO filed a demurrer to
prosecution's evidence,[11] contending that, without the subject firearm, the prosecution failed to
prove an essential element of the offense. On February 28, 2007, respondent judge issued an
order, granting the demurrer to prosecution's evidence and dismissing the case for insufficiency
of evidence.[12]

In a memorandum[13] dated September 24, 2007, the OCA charged respondent judge with
exceeding his authority under the Supreme Court resolution dated June 30, 1998 in A.M. No.
98-6-179-RTC. According to the OCA, the authority given to respondent judge under the
resolution was clearly limited to the arraignment of the accused and the taking of his testimony;
it did not authorize respondent judge to decide the merits of the case. The OCA contended that
the act of respondent judge constituted violation of a Supreme Court directive, a less serious
offense, under Section 9(4), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court.

In his comment dated November 16, 2007, respondent judge asserted that there was neither a
conscious nor a deliberate intent on his part to disobey any directive of the Supreme Court
when he granted the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused in Criminal Case No. 3639-R.
He claimed that, through inadvertence, he was not able to recall the limits of the referral made
to him, and stressed that he ruled on the merits of the case in a way not tainted with fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption. He emphasized that he acted on the demurrer to evidence because of
the inadequacy of the evidence for the prosecution and because of the failure of the latter to
object to the demurrer. He maintained that it would have been wrong for him to add to the
penalty already being served by the accused when there was no evidence to warrant the
detention of the latter for the unproved offense.[14]

Under Section 9(4), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, failure to obey the Court's resolution is a
less serious offense that carries a penalty of suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

The Investigating Justice recommends that a fine of P15,000.00 be imposed upon respondent,
based on the following findings:

In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. The place where the
crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. Thus, a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
committed outside the limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.[15]

The demurrer to evidence filed by the accused cited the accusatory portion of the information
which charged him with unlawful possession of a caliber .30 U.S. carbine with two magazines
and twenty-five (25) rounds of ammunition. The information clearly stated that the accused
possessed the carbine, magazines, and ammunitions in Barangay Cabalaongan Sur, Municipality
of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan. Had respondent judge exercised a moderate degree of
caution before resolving the demurrer to evidence, a mere perusal of the records would have
reminded him that his court was only authorized to arraign the accused, to receive the evidence
in the said case, and to return the records of the case to the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales,
Pangasinan for continuation of the proceedings. In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently
to ascertain the facts.[16]

Respondent judge was found wanting in the diligence required of him. We agree with the
Investigating Justice in finding respondent judge guilty of violating a Supreme Court directive,
and impose upon him a fine of P15,000.00.

b.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080

In a letter[17] dated August 28, 2007, Godofredo R. Galindez, Jr., (Godofredo), president of the
Alabang Country Club, Inc. (Alabang Country Club), in response to the letter dated August 21,
2007 of Court Administrator Lock, stated that respondent judge played golf at the Alabang
Country Club on the following dates and tee-off time:

Date Tee off-time

April 8, 2000 12:00 P.M.
July 21, 2000 1:08 P.M.
August 4, 2000 1:20 P.M.
November 28, 2000 10:00 A.M.
May 17, 2001 3:05 P.M.
September 29, 2001 12:56 P.M.
March 5, 2002 1:00 P.M.
June 19, 2002 7:12 A.M.
February 12, 2004 1:35 P.M.
February 28, 2005 10:41 A.M.

With the exception of May 17, 2001, during which respondent judge allegedly played nine (9)
holes of golf, Godofredo stated in his letter that the former played eighteen (18) holes of golf on
all the aforestated dates.

In another letter[18] dated September 3, 2007, Hirofumi Hotta (Hirofumi), operations manager of
TAT Filipinas Golf Club (Tat Filipinas), in answer to an inquiry made by Court Administrator
Lock, stated that respondent judge visited the said golf club and appeared to have played golf
there on the following dates - all Thursdays - and time:

Date Time
April 14, 2005 1:30 P.M.
April 28, 2005 1:30 P.M.
August 18, 2005 1:30 P.M.
 August 25, 2005 1:30 P.M.
November 17, 2005 1:30 P.M.
November 24, 2005 1:30 P.M.
December 15, 2005 1:30 P.M.
January 26, 2006 1:30 P.M.
February 9, 2006 1:30 P.M.
March 2, 2006 1:30 P.M.
March 23, 2006 1:30 P.M.
April 6, 2006 1:30 P.M.
April 27, 2006 1:30 P.M.
June 15, 2006 1:30 P.M.
December 14, 2006 1:30 P.M.

According to the OCA, its records in the Office of the Administrative Services show that
respondent judge did not declare his absences on July 21, 2000, August 4, 2000, March 5, 2002,
February 12, 2004, and February 28, 2005, during which he reportedly played golf at the Alabang
Country Club. Further, in a certification[19] dated September 5, 2007, Hermogena F. Bayani
(Hermogena), Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Leave Division, OCA, stated that
respondent judge did not file any application for a leave of absence on all the dates mentioned
by Hirofumi in his letter dated September 3, 2007. These constituted violations of Supreme
Court Memorandum Order dated November 19, 1973, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated
January 15, 1999, and Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988.[20]

The OCA asserted that on the days that respondent judge played golf, he was lost to the
judiciary for half the working/session hours on those days, positing that this is not merely
truancy but also dishonesty and falsification of certificates of service.

Respondent judge, in his comment, countered that contrary to the allegations of the OCA, he
only played golf thrice in 2000, once in 2001, twice in 2002, six (6) times in 2005, and five (5)
times in 2006 - a total of eighteen (18) times in six years, or at the average of three (3) times a
year. He argued that his playing golf 18 times in six years, or thrice a year, could not be
reasonably characterized as habitual to the extent that it jeopardized the discharge of his
functions as a judge. He alleged that since he shared his courtroom with the other judges in
Muntinlupa, he only played golf on days when no other place was available for him to carry out
his official functions. Likewise, he explained that, in 1996, his physician advised him to exercise
more vigorously after he was diagnosed with diabetes and hypertension. Respondent judge also
stressed that he had never missed a day in hearing cases pending in his sala.[21]

In the hearing conducted by the Investigating Justice on December 4, 2007, the OCA presented
Godofredo, Hirofumi, and Sheila Aquino as witnesses.

Godofredo testified that the dates and time when respondent judge played golf at the Alabang
Country Club, as mentioned in his letter, are based on the logbook entries made by the starter in
the country club. A starter, explained Godofredo, is a person who records in the logbook the
names of the individuals who play in the golf course. The starter may be the player himself or a
member who brings in guests to play golf.

On cross-examination, Godofredo admitted that he is not the custodian of the logbook; that he
is neither the starter nor the person who wrote the entries in the logbook; and that he does not
recognize in whose handwriting the entries were made.

Hirofumi, the operations manager of TAT Filipinas, testified that Aquino, the front desk
receptionist in the golf club, made the listing of the respective dates and time when respondent
judge played at TAT Filipinas based on the data stored in their office computer.

Aquino, who had been employed by the company for fifteen (15) years, and had been working
as its front desk receptionist for six (6) years, testified that she saw respondent judge sign the
registered member forms at the golf club prior to playing golf.

The Investigating Justice found as insufficient the evidence that the OCA presented to show
that respondent judge played golf at the Alabang Country Club on the dates alleged, but found
substantial evidence that respondent judge played golf at TAT Filipinas on the dates and time
indicated in Hirofumi's letter dated September 3, 2007.

The testimony of Aquino, along with the certification issued by Hermogena, that respondent
judge did not file any leave of absence on the dates indicated in Hirofumi's letter, indubitably
established that respondent judge violated Supreme Court Memorandum Order dated
November 19, 1973, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, and
Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988.

Supreme Court Memorandum Order dated November 19, 1973 provides for the observance by
judges, among other officials and employees in the judiciary, of a five-day forty-hour week
schedule which shall be from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and from 12:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. from
Mondays to Fridays.

Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, and making untruthful statements in
the certificate of service are considered less serious charges under Section 9, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court. Under Section 11(B) of Rule 140, these acts may be punished by suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three
(3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

On the basis of the foregoing findings, we adopt the recommendation of the Investigating
Justice that, in this administrative case, a fine of P15,000.00 be imposed upon respondent judge.

c.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077

On January 24, 1995, the RTC, Branch 142, Makati City, rendered a decision in Civil Case No.
90-659, entitled Alexander Van Twest v. Gloria A. Anacleto and/or International Corporate
Bank, ordering defendant bank (Interbank) or its successors-in-interest to release in favor of
plaintiff Alexander Van Twest (Van Twest) the entire proceeds of Interbank Foreign Currency
Trust Deposit (FCTD) No. 39156 in the amount of Deutsch Mark (DM) 260,000.00, including
accrued interest and other earnings. The decision also directed defendant Gloria Anacleto to
return to plaintiff the sum of DM 9,777.37 with interest thereon. The court ordered the
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff P500,000.00 as moral damages, P250,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P200,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.[22] However, even
before the decision was rendered, Van Twest had disappeared and was believed to have been
kidnapped and killed.[23]

Subsequently, Atty. Ernesto V. Perez (Atty. Perez), representing Van Twest, filed a Motion for
Execution of Decision. In the motion, Atty. Perez informed the RTC of Makati City that, on
October 30, 2006, the RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, with respondent judge presiding,
granted the petition to appoint the former as administrator of the properties or estate of
absentee Van Twest in Special Proceeding No. 97-045, entitled In the Matter of the Petition to
Appoint an Administrator for the Estate of Absentee Alexander Van Twest a.k.a. Eugene Alexander Van
West.[24] On January 27, 2007, the RTC Branch 142, Makati City, granted the motion for
execution.[25]

Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) filed a Manifestation and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated
May 23, 2007 in Special Proceeding No. 97-045, praying that the exercise by Atty. Perez of
powers as administrator of absentee Van Twest be held in abeyance until the said manifestation
and motion is heard. Because respondent judge was on official leave at the time of the filing of
the Manifestation and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion, Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo, pairing judge of RTC
Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, acted on the same, and, in an order dated May 28, 2007, granted
Union Bank's urgent ex-parte motion.

Union Bank thereafter filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution/Garnishment in Civil Case No. 90-659, citing, in support thereof, the order dated May
28, 2007 issued by Judge Aguinaldo in Special Proceeding No. 97-045.

On June 1, 2007, Atty. Perez filed with the Muntinlupa RTC an Omnibus Motion: 1) To Lift or Set
Aside Pairing Judge's Order of May 28, 2007 for having been issued without jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion and/or violation of due process of law; 2) To Cite Union Bank of the Philippines' counsel for Indirect
Contempt.

At the hearing of the omnibus motion on June 6, 2007, respondent judge ordered Atty. Lourdes
A. Ona (Atty. Ona), counsel for Union Bank, to file her Opposition and/or Comment to the
said Motion within 10 days. Atty. Perez was given the same period from receipt of the
Opposition and/or Comment to file his Reply thereto, if necessary, and thereafter, the matter
would be deemed submitted for resolution.

On the same day, however, respondent judge issued another order bearing the same date, ruling
that the bank had not shown any legal basis to set aside the court's decision of October 30,
2006, or to suspend the Letters of Administration issued to Atty. Perez pursuant thereto. The
order then concluded that Atty. Perez may exercise all the powers granted to him as
Administrator of the absentee Van Twest until further orders of the court.
In a letter dated July 23, 2007, addressed to the OCA, complainant alleged that respondent
judge's issuance of the second order dated June 6, 2007 was irregular, in light of the following:
1) At the hearing held on June 6, 2007, the omnibus motion filed by Atty. Perez was deemed
submitted for resolution only after the complainant shall have filed her comment/opposition
thereto or until the 10-day period shall have expired; 2) The issuance of the second order dated
June 6, 2007 was secretly railroaded to give Atty. Perez a ground to oppose Union Bank's Urgent
Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishment filed with the RTC, Branch 142,
Makati City, in time for its hearing originally set on June 8, 2007; 3) Even the staff of
respondent judge did not become aware of the second June 6, 2007 order until much later, since
respondent judge never furnished complainant with a copy thereof until the latter made inquiries
regarding the same; and 4) The contents of the second order dated June 6, 2007 contradicted
the first order and rendered the pending incident moot and academic.

Respondent judge, in his comment, denied the charge and argued that the same should be
dismissed. The complainant, according to respondent judge, should instead be meted
disciplinary penalties as a member of the bar.

Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Investigating Justice, the Court finds that the
actions of respondent judge constitute gross negligence and/or gross ignorance of the law.

We have repeatedly held that to warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law, it must be
shown that the error is "so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith."[26] Gross
negligence refers to negligence characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It is
the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their
own property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of
duty is flagrant and palpable.[27]

In the instant case, the issuance by respondent of divergent orders raises serious questions of
impropriety that taint respondent judge's credibility, probity, and integrity. Coupled with the
clandestine issuance of the second order -- where the Union Bank counsel and even the judge's
own staff were left completely in the dark -- the action of respondent judge gives rise to an
inference of bad faith. Indeed, we have ample reason to believe -- as Atty. Ona posits -- that the
secretly-issued second order was really intended to give Atty. Perez the ammunition to oppose
Union Bank's Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishment which was to
be heard by the RTC of Makati City. Under the circumstances, the breach committed by
respondent can be characterized as flagrant and palpable.

This action of respondent judge violates Section 8 of Rule 140, and carries the penalty of
dismissal from the service or suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not
exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

For this violation, we impose upon respondent judge the penalty of dismissal from the service,
with forfeiture of all benefits, except earned leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.

d) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078

Jose Mari L. Duarte (complainant) is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 2003-433, entitled
"Eugene T. Mateo v. The Board of Governors of Ayala Alabang Village Association: Paolo V. Castano,
Constantino A. Marcaida, Ruben P. Baes, Eric Yutuc, Roberto Santiago, Beatriz "Bettina" H. Pou,
Edilberto Uichanco, Salvador S. Arceo, Jr., Benjamin Narciso, Guy L. Romualdez, and Jose Mari L.
Duarte," for Declaration of the General Membership Meeting and Election of the Ayala Alabang
Village Association (AAVA) as void ab initio, with prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Status Quo Order. Eugene T.
Mateo filed the case on July 29, 2003 with the RTC, Muntinlupa City, and it was eventually
raffled to the RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, presided over by respondent judge.[28]

On August 15, 2003, defendants Salvador S. Arceo, Jr. (Arceo) and Benjamin Narciso (Narciso)
filed their answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaims, while all the other defendants filed
a motion to dismiss. In moving for the dismissal of the case, all defendants invoked the trial court's
lack of jurisdiction over the case and plaintiff's lack of cause of action. On September 2, 2003,
plaintiff filed his opposition to motion to dismiss with motion to declare defendants in default. In an order
dated September 12, 2003, respondent judge denied defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiff's
motion to declare defendants in default, and set for hearing plaintiff's application for the
issuance of a TRO. Respondent judge eventually denied the prayer of plaintiff for the issuance
of a TRO on September 26, 2003.

On November 25, 2003, respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, declaring the
AAVA's general membership meeting held on June 15, 2003 void ab initio, and ordering that
the status quo of the board's composition prior to the proceedings of June 15, 2003 be
maintained. The respondent judge also enjoined defendants Arceo, Narciso, Guy L. Romualdez
(Romualdez) and Jose Mari L. Duarte from further exercising the functions of the office they
respectively hold. He directed the holding of another election of the AAVA board, and ordered
the defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P100,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees. The respondent judge dismissed the defendants' counterclaim.

The aggrieved complainant, together with all the other defendants, appealed to the CA from the
above-cited decision. On December 10, 2003, plaintiff filed with the RTC a petition to direct
defendants to show cause why they should not be cited and thereafter punished for indirect contempt of
court (petition for indirect contempt) for their alleged defiance of respondent judge's decision
dated November 25, 2003, as shown by their continued performance of duties as governors of
Ayala Alabang Village, despite receipt of a copy of the said decision.

On July 1, 2004, respondent judge issued an order declaring complainant, Arceo and
Romualdez, guilty of indirect contempt, and ordering each of them to pay a fine in the amount
of P30,000.00.

Unperturbed, complainant and his co-defendants Arceo and Romualdez moved for
reconsideration of the July 1, 2004 order. On September 24, 2004, respondent judge granted
their motion for reconsideration, and reversed and set aside his order dated July 1, 2004.

On June 29, 2007, the Special Sixteenth Division of the CA issued a resolution, ruling that the
lower court should have dismissed the plaintiff-appellee's Complaint for Declaration of the General
Membership Meeting and Election of the AAVA as void ab initio with prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction and/or TRO and Status Quo Order because it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board that has jurisdiction over the dispute.

On August 23, 2007, Mateo filed a complaint with the Supreme Court, contending that
respondent judge did not have the judicial authority to hear and decide the issues involved in
Civil Case No. 2003-433 for want of jurisdiction. According to complainant, this was brought
to the attention of respondent judge, but the latter, being grossly ignorant of existing laws and
rules, if not completely insolent of the same, and with grave abuse of discretion, took
cognizance of the case.

In his comment, respondent judge argued that the error he allegedly committed could be
corrected by an available judicial remedy. He maintained that if he erroneously assumed
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2003-433, the proper recourse available to complainant was not
an administrative complaint, but a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Investigating Justice recommended that the instant administrative case against respondent
judge be dismissed. This Court takes the opposite view.

It is true that to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision,
order, or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing
law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty,
or corruption.[29]

However, when the law is so elementary -- and the matter of jurisdiction is an elementary
principle that judges should be knowledgeable of -- not to be aware of it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules. They are expected to keep abreast of our laws and the changes
therein as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. They owe it to the public to be
legally knowledgeable, for ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judicial
competence requires no less. It is a truism that the life chosen by a judge as a dispenser of
justice is demanding. By virtue of the delicate position which he occupies in society, he is duty
bound to be the embodiment of competence and integrity.[30]

On the matter of the order finding complainant guilty of indirect contempt, we also find the
action of respondent judge sadly wanting. Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides:

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. - Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu
proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal
charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall
be docketed, heard and

decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.[31]

The Rules are unequivocal. Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways:
(1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings. The procedural requirements are mandatory considering
that contempt proceedings against a person are treated as criminal in nature.[32] Conviction
cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings.[33]

The records do not indicate that complainant was afforded an opportunity to rebut the charges
against him. Respondent judge should have conducted a hearing in order to provide
complainant the opportunity to adduce before the court documentary or testimonial evidence in
his behalf. The hearing also allows the court a more thorough evaluation of the circumstances
surrounding the case, including the chance to observe the accused present his side in open court
and subject his defense to interrogation from the complainants or from the court itself.[34]

It must be remembered that the power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly with
caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the
constitutional rights of the individual.[35] In this respect, respondent judge failed to measure up
to the standards demanded of member of the judiciary.

As already mentioned above, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge under Section 8(9), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, and a respondent found guilty of
serious charge may be punished by: a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; b) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6)
months; or c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In this case, we find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and impose upon
him a fine of P40,000.00.

e.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079

On January 19, 2006, Bennie Cuason (Cuason) was charged before the RTC, Muntinlupa City,
with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, for defrauding
Brigadier General Meliton D. Goyena (Gen. Goyena) (Ret.) by convincing the latter to invest,
entrust, and/or deliver the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) on the promise
that the former would return the investment with interest, plus two (2) Condominium
Certificates of Title over residential units on the 20th floor at Tower B of Diamond Bay Towers
Condominium, with a total value of Nine Million Five Hundred Ninety-Two Thousand Pesos
(P9,592,000.00). Gen. Goyena gave the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) to the
accused and received two (2) condominium certificates of title with numbers 6893 and 6894.
After verification, complainant found that the condominium units were non-existent, or had not
yet been constructed.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-179 and was raffled to RTC, Branch 204,
Muntinlupa City, presided over by Judge Juanita T. Guerrero (Judge Guerrero).

On February 14, 2006, accused Cuason, through counsel, filed with the RTC an entry of appearance
with a plea to determine whether or not probable cause exists for the purpose of issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Complainant, also through counsel, subsequently filed a Motion to deny the application for judicial
determination of probable cause and to cite accused in contempt of this Honorable Court on the ground of forum
shopping. On April 4, 2006, accused Cuason filed his comment and/or opposition thereto, and on
April 10, 2006, accused Cuason filed a supplemental comment and/or opposition to the motion.

With the designation of RTC, Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, as a special court for drug cases on
May 2, 2006, the case was re-raffled to the sala of respondent judge. After hearing the respective
arguments of the parties, respondent judge issued an omnibus order dated September 4, 2006,
dismissing Criminal Case No. 06-179. The pertinent portions of the omnibus order read as
follows:

On this first issue, this Court, after a careful scrutiny of the arguments and evidence of both
parties, believes that there was payment already made as to the principal obligation as admitted
by the complainant in his affidavit dated September 20, 2005 (page 3, par. 17) and what is being
left is the payment of interest which, under the premises, is in [the] form of condominium
certificates. So also, while the complainant questions the authenticity of those certificates as well
as the existence of [the] condominium units subject thereof, accused, indubitably, was able to
satisfy this Court as to the authenticity of the questioned certificates and the existence of the
units by showing proofs to that effect.

On September 6, 2006, Gen. Goyena filed with the RTC a very urgent manifestation with motion for
the court to conduct ocular inspection, and on September 22, 2006, he filed an omnibus motion for
reconsideration, ocular inspection and inhibition, anchored on the following grounds: 1) as correctly
found by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, the two (2) condominium units
used in partly settling the liabilities of the accused to the private complainant do not exist - a fact
that should have been established by now, if only the court allowed the ocular inspection prayed
for; 2) the court overlooked the pronouncement in the very case it has relied on, that "Allado
and Salonga constitute exceptions to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar
circumstances are clearly shown to exist"; and 3) the order dismissing the case was improperly or
irregularly issued.

On September 18, 2006, complainant filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Supreme Court
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, charging respondent judge with abuse of judicial authority
and discretion, serious irregularity, and gross ignorance of the law, allegedly shown by the latter's
act of willfully and knowingly reversing the well-grounded finding of probable cause made by
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City.

Thereafter, respondent judge issued an order dated October 4, 2006, inhibiting himself from
sitting in Criminal Case No. 06-179, and directing that the records of the case be forwarded to
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Muntinlupa City, for appropriate re-raffling. The
case was eventually re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 206, Muntinlupa City, presided over by Judge
Patricia Manalastas-de Leon (Judge Manalastas-De Leon).

In his memorandum dated September 24, 2007, Court Administrator Lock found ample basis to
charge respondent judge with delay in rendering an order and for abuse of judicial discretion and
authority

The OCA stated that Criminal Case No. 06-179 was assigned to respondent judge on May 2,
2006, a fact which the latter did not dispute. More than a month later, or on June 19, 2006,
respondent judge set accused Cuason's motion to determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the
purpose of the issuance of a warrant of arrest and complainant's motion to deny application for judicial
determination of probable cause and to cite accused in contempt of this Honorable Court on the ground of forum
shopping for hearing on July 17, 2006. It must be stressed that accused Cuason and complainant
filed their respective motions on February 14, 2006 and on March 22, 2006, or while the case
was still pending in the sala of Judge Guerrero. After hearing the said motions on July 17, 2006,
it took another forty-eight (48) days for respondent judge to issue the omnibus order dated
September 4, 2006, dismissing the case for lack of probable cause.

In his comment dated November 23, 2007, respondent judge insists that the charge filed against
him should be dismissed.

This Court finds that respondent judge's delay in the determination of probable cause clearly
runs counter to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when
the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rules. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.

While respondent judge could not have ascertained the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of an arrest warrant against Cuason within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information - Criminal Case No. 06-179 having been re-raffled to his sala only on
May 2, 2006 - prudence demanded that respondent judge should have determined the existence
of probable cause within ten (10) days from July 17, 2006, the date he heard the respective
arguments of the parties. This interpretation is in keeping with the provisions of Section 6, Rule
112.

By allowing forty-eight (48) days to lapse before issuing the two-page omnibus order dated
September 4, 2006, respondent judge should be held liable for undue delay in rendering an
order, which is classified as a less serious charge under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.

Furthermore, the Court agrees with the OCA that the respondent judge is guilty of abuse of
judicial discretion and authority.

The information in Criminal Case No. 06-179 clearly accuses Cuason of falsely pretending that
he can return the investment of complainant by paying cash and two (2) condominium units
when in fact these units do not exist or have not yet been constructed. The issue therefore boils
down to whether or not the condominium units exist, and the incontrovertible proof of this are
the condominium units themselves. The logical thing to do would have been to order the
conduct of an ocular inspection. Instead of an ocular inspection, respondent relied on the
certificate of registration, the development permit, the license to sell, the building permit, and
the Condominium Certificate of Title ― on the basis of which the judge ordered the dismissal
of the case. It may be that an ocular inspection was premature at the time the respondent
dismissed the case because at that time the case was not yet set for the presentation of evidence
of the parties. Nevertheless, it now appears that the pieces of evidence relied upon by the
respondent do not fully support his conclusion.

Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "evidence must have such a relation to
the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence." "Relevancy is, therefore,
determinable by the rules of logic and human experience...Relevant evidence is any class of
evidence which has `rational probative value' to the issue in controversy."[36] Logic and human
experience teach us that the documents relied upon by respondent do not constitute the best
evidence to prove the existence or non-existence of the condominium units. To repeat, the best
evidence would have been adduced by an ocular inspection of the units themselves.

Judge Lerma should also have exercised caution in determining the existence of probable cause.
At the very least, he should have asked the prosecutor to present additional evidence, in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or, in the
alternative, to show cause why the case should not be dismissed instead of precipitately ordering
the dismissal of the case. The circumstances required the exercise of caution considering that
the case involved estafa in the considerable amount of P20 Million for which the complainant
paid P129,970.00 in docket fees before the Office of the City Prosecutor and later P167,114.60
as docket fee for the filing of the Information before the RTC.

For this particular violation, we find respondent judge guilty and impose upon him a fine of
P21,000.00.
As an unflattering footnote to these administrative offenses, the OCA, upon the authority of the
Chief Justice, conducted a judicial audit from August 21-30, 2007 of the RTC, Branch 256,
Muntinlupa. The initial result of the audit revealed that Judge Lerma failed to decide 30 civil
cases and 11 criminal cases within the 90-day reglementary period. It also appears that 101 civil
cases and 137 criminal cases remained unacted despite the lapse of a considerable period.

Judge Lerma had previously been sanctioned by this Court. In a resolution dated September 13,
2003 in A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799, entitled Ma. Cristina Olondriz Pertierra v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma,
this Court found him liable for conduct unbecoming a judge and imposed upon him the penalty
of reprimand. In that case, Judge Lerma was found having lunch with a lawyer who has a
pending case in his sala.

The totality of all these findings underscore the fact that respondent judge's actions served to
erode the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. He has been remiss in the fulfillment of
the duty imposed on all members of the bench in order to avoid any impression of impropriety
to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.

To reiterate, officers of the court have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed evenly and
fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to be honest and
impartial in the dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are circumspect
and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the public. When they fail to do so, such acts cast
doubt upon their integrity and ultimately on the judiciary in general.[37] "Courts will only succeed
in their task and mission if the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent
and independent, honest and dedicated." [38]

Respondent judge failed to live up to the judiciary's exacting standards, and this Court will not
withhold penalty when called for to uphold the people's faith in the Judiciary.[39]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court RULES, as follows:

1) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076, Judge Alberto Lerma is found GUILTY of violating a Supreme
Court directive, and we impose upon him a FINE in the total amount of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00);

2) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080, Judge Alberto Lerma is FINED in the total amount
of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) for violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars, and for making untruthful statements in his certificate of service;

3) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077, Judge Alberto Lerma is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and
punished with the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits,
except earned leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality.

4) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078, we find Judge Alberto Lerma GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law, and impose upon him a FINE of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00); and
5) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079, we find Judge Alberto Lerma GUILTY of grave abuse of
authority and undue delay in rendering an order, and impose upon him a FINE of TWENTY-
ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00).

This Decision is final and immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Mendoza, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Carpio and Abad, JJ., on official Leave.
Carpio Morales, J., certify that J. Morales voted to concur with the ponencia:
Velasco, Jr., and Perez, JJ., no part.
Peralta, J., on Leave.

[1] Rollo (RTJ-07-2076), pp. 9-22.

[2] Id. at 38-39.

[3] Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid of the CA.

[4] Rollo (RTJ-07-2076), p. 41.

[5] Id. at 53.

[6] Id. at 99.

[7] Id. at 8.

[8] Docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-464 in the RTC of Muntinlupa.

[9] Rollo (RTJ-07-2076), p. 339.

[10] Id. at 346.

[11] Id. at 357-359.

[12] Id. at 386-387.

[13] Supra note 1.

[14] Rollo (RTJ-07-2076), pp. 393-396.

[15] Macasaet v. People, G.R. No. 156747, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 255, 271.

[16] Santos v. How, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1946, January 26, 2007, 513 SCRA 25.

[17] Rollo (RTJ-07-2080), p. 31.

[18] Id. at 33.

[19] Id. at 35.

[20] Id. at 60.

[21] Id. at 66-68.

[22] Folder of Exhibits, pp. 20-21.

[23] Rollo (RTJ-07-2077), p. 83.

[24] Folder of Exhibits, p. 83.

[25] See Folder of Exhibits, p. 43.

[26] Joaquin v. Madrid, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1856, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 567, 578.

[27] Brucal v. Hon. Desierto, 501 Phil. 453, 465-466 (2005).

[28] Rollo (RTJ-07-2078), pp. 1-2.

The Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Judge
[29]

Pamintuan, 485 Phil. 473, 489 (2004).

[30] Espino v. Hon. Salubre, 405 Phil. 331 (2001).

[31] Emphasis supplied.

[32] Atty. Cañas v. Judge Castigador, 401 Phil. 618, 630 (2000).

[33] Soriano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128938, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 1, 8.

[34] Aquino v. Ng, G.R. No. 155631, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 277.

[35] Ruiz v. Judge How, 459 Phil. 728 (2003).

[36] Florenz Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 6th Rev. Ed., p. 436.

[37] Procedure adopted by Judge Liangco Re: Raffle of Cases, 391 Phil. 666 (2000).
[38] Ernesto L. Pineda, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1999 ed.), p. 367.

Jabao v. Judge Bonilla, 372 Phil. 823, 835 (1999), citing Sadik v. Casar, 266 SCRA 1
[39]

(1997); Ortigas & Co, Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco, 277 SCRA 342 (1997).