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Veteran Fed. Party v. Comelec, G.R.

136781, October 06, 2000

Composition, Qualification and Term of Office

Facts: On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26,
1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12)parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system.
38 defeated parties and organizations promptly filed suit in the COMELEC, pleading for their own proclamations.
Hence, COMELEC ordered the proclamation of the 38 parties. Such move filled up the 52 seats allotted for the
party-list reps. Aggrieved, the proclaimed parties asked the SC to annul the COMELEC action and instead to
proclaim additional seats, so that each of them would have three party-list reps.

Issue: 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the time?

2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Ruling: 1) No. the 20 % is merely a ceiling. Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a
policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit
them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat.
Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives.

2) Yes. Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means
having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-
representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate
the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

3) All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." A party that wins at least six percent of the total
votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one
that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only.
Bagon Bayani v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

Composition, Qualification and Term of Office

Facts: With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral
parties, organizations and political parties. The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or
accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others.

'Party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections.

Issue: Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.

Ruling: The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

1. Who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and

2. Who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. Who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole.

"Proportional representation" refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as


exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,"labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the marginalized or underrepresented." In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it
that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the
party-list system, Filipino-style. The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear:
"to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x
x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied
according to its express terms.
Aquino v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)

Composition, Qualification and Term of Office

Facts: On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that
the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the
1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995
elections. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC).

Issue: 1) Whether petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City
after receiving the highest votes cast being held

2) Whether or not the next candidate obtaining the highest number of votes is named the legible winner after the
petitioner's ineligibility

Ruling: 1) He must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. The Constitution
requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a resident of the district in which
he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the elections. Residence, for election law
purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

2) To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified candidates in the
May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological and
psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The result suggested by private respondent would lead not
only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec but also to a massive
disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they believed could be
validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover,
would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended the campaign would not have
automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our
judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially
changed.
Marcos vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300 (1995)

Composition, Qualification and Term of Office

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995 providing the following
information in item no. 8: 4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY


PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's
one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations
made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of
one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Ruling: Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is
the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a
person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it
is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.

In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
Torayno vs. Comelec, G.R. 137329, August 09, 2000

Composition, Qualification and Term of Office

Facts: During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed provincial governor of
Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In his Certificate of Candidacy
dated March 12, 1995, his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.

On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in
Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which
he claimed 20 years of residence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city,
stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street,
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.

Issue: Whether respondent newly elected Mayor is disqualified

Ruling: Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which provides for the qualifications of local
elective officials, as follows:

"SEC. 39. Qualifications.-(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality or province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect."

No. In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing in
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the
three terms (1988-1998 that he was governor of the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he also
registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente
Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to fun for public office
therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of residence.

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