Ottomans and Corsairs Final-Libre

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The Ottoman Empire and the Barbary Corsairs, 1450-1550:

A Relationship Examined.
“Battles on the sea are more dangerous and fierce than the battles by land, for on the
sea there is no recoiling nor fleeing, there is no remedy but to fight and to abide
fortune, and every man shows his prowess.”
- Jean Froissart, 14th Century Chronicler.1
Introduction:
Military histories of the Ottoman Empire written mostly by European scholars have a
tendency to emphasise Ottoman naval weakness which, revisionist historian Daniel
Goffman argues, can be attributed to a biased writing of history in Europe. Goffman
states that the contemporary Christian powers laid claim to any Ottoman maritime
success on behalf of Christian renegades (predominantly Greeks) in service to the
Ottoman fleet.2 However Islamic historiography contains no such negative image of an
era which was, in their history, filled with both land and sea victories suggesting that both
sides of the conflict have aimed to confirm the superiority of their respective cultures.
Andrew Hess highlights the problems of studying Ottoman naval power the first being
the fact that an Ottoman seaborne community came into being in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries is largely unknown. Secondly that sophisticated historical literature on
the Islamic world is rare which leads most writers to approach Middle Eastern history
only through questions related to European matters.3 More recent works have argued that
the Ottomans demonstrated a novel competence at sea which was due as much to their
own merits as the service of skilled Greek mariners or, more importantly a coalition with
1 Roger Crowley, Constantinople: The Last Great Siege, 1453, (London: Faber & Faber, 2006), p. 123
2 Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), p. 145
3 Andrew C. Hess, ‘The Evolution of the Ottoman Seabourne Empire in the Age of Oceanic Discoveries,
1453-1525’ The American Historical Review, 75, (1970), p. 1894
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the Barbary coast.4 However disainful Europeans were of Ottoman naval power even the
great maritime power of England feared them with King Henry urging peace with the
Turks in 15025 and they were to continue to be a perennial irritation to the English state
throughout the century even to the extent of royal orders being given that special prayers
be read in religious services for success against the Turks.6 David Starkey has claimed
‘Essentially, the Barbary corsairs were the naval arm of Islam engaged in Eternal War
with Christendom.’7 It is this claim that this study aims to address both in the light of the
corsairs contribution to Ottoman naval campaigns and viewing the conflict as a Holy
War.
Originating from the steppes of Central Asia the Ottomans had no tradition of naval
warfare8 and as an initially land based empire they had no initial need of one but as their
empire grew they came to face powerful maritime nations and the creation of permanent
naval forces became an essential part of the state formation process and a practical
necessity.9 Hess has also argued the commonly held notion that the Turks did not engage
willingly in maritime activity10 which supports historical consensus that the Ottomans
treated their navy as a trivial concern and thus engaged the Barbary corsairs as their navy.
The majority of this naval activity took place during the reign of Süleyman I known to his
own people as ‘The Lawgiver’ but more commonly known as ‘The Magnificent’, who
inherited the services of the Barbary corsairs from his father Selim. At the beginning of
Süleymen’s reign Ottoman naval force was not sufficient to press an attack on Christian
nations, therefore most Muslim sea power had to rest in the hands of the corsairs.11 Yet
the corsairs were not, as some historians think, the first or indeed the only Ottoman naval
Press, 2002), p. 145
5 Diary Entry by Sanuto 18 April 1502, C. S. P. Ven., Vol I, 1202-1509, p. 293
6 At Hampton Court 26 June 1542, Acts of the Privy Council, 1542-1547, p. 15
7 David J Starkey, ‘Pirates and Markets’ in C R Pennell (ed.) Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, (London:
New York Press, 2001), p. 109
8 Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans, (London: Viking, 1993) p. 65
9 Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe, (London,
Routledge, 1999), p. 95
10 Andrew C. Hess, ‘The Evolution of the Ottoman Seabourne Empire in the Age of Oceanic Discoveries,
1453-1525’ The American Historical Review, 75, (1970), p. 1895
11 Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History, (London: Longman, 1997), p. 89
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force, as this study will show charting the origins of Ottoman naval activity with those of
the corsairs and showing how they came together in the early sixteenth century. However
before an examination of the corsairs it is first prudent to explain what defines them as
corsairs as opposed to other genres of pirate. Anderson states that ‘In the Mediterranean
Sea, from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century the line between piracy,
privateering and trading was seldom easily discernible.’12 Likewise Peter Earle defines
the corsairs as privateers using the terms interchangeably13 which is not strictly accurate.
Upon closer examination the corsairs have several factors which distinguish them. While
it is true that both corsairs and privateers worked by license the former were usually only
active in wartime. The corsairs on the other hand operated constantly as participants of an
eternal, Holy War with no fixed duration.14 In addition privateers were usually employed
by a nation or government while these corsairs, as will be shown, operated with a degree
of autonomy and when in service sailed on behalf of not a nation but an empire and a
faith, an entirely different type of conflict.
Origins:
The origins of Ottoman maritime activity have deeper roots than the alliance with the
Barbary coast. From 1080 Turkish frontier warriors occupied large sections of the
Anatolian coast and began to construct war fleets with the aid of local shipwrights.15 Also
after the capture of Gallipoli in 1354 the straits dividing Asian and European territories
were a vital sea passage for the Ottomans.16 This all changed in the mid fifteenth century
when the assembly of a fleet allowed Mehmet to take Constantinople demonstrating
innovation and adaptability. Andrew Wheatcroft has argued that 'When need dictated,
12 John L. Anderson, ‘Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective in Maritime Predation.’in C R
Pennell (ed.) Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, (London: New York Press, 2001,) p. 90
13 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970), pp. 6-7
14 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970), p. 7
15 Andrew C. Hess, ‘The Evolution of the Ottoman Seabourne Empire in the Age of the Oceanic
Discoveries, 1453-1525’, The American Historical Review, 75, (1970), p. 1896
16 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: the structure of power, (Basingstoke, Macmillan 2nd ed
[1st 2002] 2009), p. 295
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they became a sea power’17 and it was during the second half of the fifteenth century with
the navies of Mehmet and Bayezid II18 that the Ottomans emerged as a maritime power.
Their initial campaign was executed for a specific purpose and there is no indication that
Mehmet saw his use of naval offensive in 1453 as a prelude to a more established
maritime sphere, the Sultan saw the strategic advantage of the Bosphorus if he wanted to
hold land securely on two continents. In addition dominating the Bosphorus meant he
could cut off grain and assistance to the Greek colonies in the Black Sea. In the Winter of
1451 Mehemt began his shipbuilding program while at the same time the image of a
castle began to form in his mind. Rumeli Hisari (the Throat Cutter) was completed on
31st August 1452 at the mouth of the Bosphorus and from there he commenced his
primary offensive.19 While maritime prowess was not the deciding factor in the capture of
Constantinople the successful siege did usher in a new era of maritime activity
necessitated by the provisioning of the capital also marking the start of use of the fleet as
an instrument of conquest.20 The gradual build up of supply bases from 1460 onwards
finally provided support to fleet operations in the Mediterranean21 and, as Gabor Agoston
has argued without the naval logistic support under Bayezid II later campaigns in Europe
and Iran would have been impossible. It was this recognition of the importance of the sea
that set the Ottomans apart from other Muslim Empires.22 This same perceptive
opportunism allowed Selim to accept the pirate Barbarossa’s23 submission in 1519 thus
extending the Ottoman realm and gaining crucial maritime prowess through the alliance.
It is worth noting here that ‘Barbarossa’ is a name applied exclusively by contemporary
Europeans and historians, to Muslims he is known as Kheir-el-Din or ’Defender of the
17 Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans, (London: Viking, 1993), p. 65

18 Colin Imber, Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996,) p.1
19 Roger Crowley, Constantinople: The Last Great Siege, 1453, (London: Faber & Faber, 2006,) pp. 52-61
20 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: the structure of power, (Basingstoke, Macmillan 2nd ed
[1st 2002] 2009,) p. 295
21 Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700, (London: University College London Press, 1999), p.
22
22 Gabor Agoston, ‘Ottoman Warfare in Europe 1453-1826’ in Jeremy Black (ed.) European Warfare
1453-1815, (London: Palgrave, 1999), p. 128
23 Note: Barbarossa younger of two brothers is initially known as Hizir or Heyreddin, known to Muslims
as Kheir-el Din (Defender of the Faith) becoming plain 'Barbarossa' after his brother's death.
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Faith.’24
The Barbary corsairs are something of an anomaly with the definition ‘Barbary’ being
problematic as corsairs from both the Atlantic and Mediterranean Coasts are classified as
‘Barbary’ in West European sources.25 However the geographical boundaries of this study
will focus on the North African coastline. In the regencies of Tripoli, Algiers and Tunis
the social images of the ‘great corsairs’ stand out in their celebrated status as founders of
the states with the Barbarossa brothers being made into local heroes.26
The brothers themselves were born on the island of Lesbos, straddling both the Christian
and the Muslim world. With a Janissary father and a Greek mother the brothers don’t
exactly seem to fit anywhere within their own society and, ironically, their commitment
to Islam was shaped by the Knights of St John. The eldest of the two brothers, Oruch was
captured by the Knights in an encounter which left another brother dead and spent two
years as a shackled slave and oarsmen on Rhodes before filing off his chains and
swimming away. Upon his escape and reunion with his younger brother Hizir they both
devoted themselves to Holy War in the name of Islam. Establishing themselves on the isle
of Djerba, just off the coast of modern Tunisia and were well placed to plunder traffic
between the North African and Italian coast.27 At this time Spain’s domestic policy of
ideological hegemony led them to expel and persecute Muslims and suspected Muslims
and in the process providing more material for the Barbary coast.28 The corsairs would
prowl the coastline evacuating Spanish Muslims and raiding Christian villages until most
of the European coasts lived in fear. The legends of their deeds spread with Oruch
worshipped as an Islamic Robin Hood rumoured to have preternatural powers. The
brothers consciously promoted these myths themselves and Hizir had a flair for the
dramatic. Upon raiding Minorca in 1514 he left a horse in the shore with a message
24 Ernle Bradford, The Shield and the Sword: The Knights of St John, (London: Hodder & Stoughton,
1972), p. 131
25 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970), p. 9
26 Goncal Lopez Nadal, ‘Corsairing as a Commercial System’, in C R Pennell (ed.)Bandits at Sea: A
Pirates Reader, (London: New York Press, 2001), p. 130
27 Roger Crowley, Empires of the Sea: The Final Battle for the Mediterranean, 1521-1580, (London: Faber
& Faber, 2008), pp. 33-34
Pennell (ed.) Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, (London: New York Press, 2001), p. 90
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pinned to its tail reading, ‘I am the thunderbolt of heaven. My vengeance will not be
assuaged until I have killed the last one of you and enslaved your women, your daughters
and your children.’29 However this reign of terror could not last and Charles V cemented
his ascension by capturing and killing Oruch. Upon the death of his brother Hizir carried
forward the Holy War and adopted the mantle of his older brother even to the extent of
dying his beard with hennae, yet not the extent of continuing Oruch’s dream of an
independent state.30 The exact motives of Barbarossa’s formal submissions to the sultans
are unclear but historian Roger Merriman has suggested that Hizir saw the inadequacy of
his own resources and thus cultivated an alliance with the Ottomans, he has further
suggested that this action proved Hizir’s superiority in statecraft over his older brother.31
Thereafter Oruch’s memory faded and Hizir became known solely as Barbarossa and
adopted the mantle of Kapudan Pasha, High Admiral of the Mediterranean fleet.
If there is one crucial difference between the initial Ottoman navy and the first corsairs
was that the Ottomans went to sea through a realisation of the necessity while for the
corsairs it was an initial ideological choice.
Administration and technology:
Whatever historians have had to say about the practical capability of the Ottoman navy
one point which has never been disputed is their prowess as administrators. The
Ottomans excelled at organising and directing the resources of their empire which was
where the strength of the fleet lay with transport being more of an issue than supply and
as it was unlikely that the Christian Mediterranean had infinite raw materials to pour into
their naval forces.32 Sultan Süleyman was highly displeased with naval performance as it
29 Roger Crowley, Empires of the Sea: The Final Battle for the Mediterranean, 1521-1580, (London:
Faber & Faber, 2008), pp. 35-36
Faber & Faber, 2008), p. 38
31 Roger Bigelow Merriman, Süleiman The Magnificent 1520-1566, (New York: Cooper Square
Publishing Inc, 1966), p. 208
32 The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificant, Archivum Ottomanicum VI: 1980 pp. 211-282 in Colin Imber
(ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996,) p. 9
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proved to him the Turks at sea were not nearly as formidable as the Turks on land the
problem being that his empire has the resources but no experience at being a maritime
commercial power33 prompting his promotion of Barbarossa to the position of Admiral.
The navy was the most expensive military undertaking for the empire34 yet historians
cannot seem to agree upon the financing method. Justin McCarthy argues that the naval
leaders were granted timars (an entitlement to land tax) which they used to finance their
ships and as need for navy increased whole provinces of the empire were given over as
timars to the navy35 yet Colin Imber sees the navy as a heavy burden on the Ottoman
exchequer but that there is too little evidence to calculate the cost of equipping and
manning a fleet.36 This is not strictly true as expense accounts are available for individual
campaigns such as Barbarossas campaign to recapture the fortress of Herceg Novi on the
Gulf of Kotor, expenses are shown to be 2,495,991 silver akçe, the coin of the realm, total
inclusive of gold coins taken in taxes from Western Europe and Hungary.37 However this
rate of expenditure could not long be maintained and the 1580s saw a debasement of
coinage in the culmination of a long period of overstraining the Empire’s economic
resources38, another factor contributing to the Sultan’s alliance with the Barbary coast.
The squadrons maintained by the Barbary corsairs were done so at their own expense, in
other words from the fruits of their plundering and joined forces with the imperial navy
Publishing Inc, 1966,) p. 211
34 Halil Inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Volume One: 1300-1600,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 93
36 ‘ The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificant, Archivum Ottomanicum VI: 1980 pp. 211-282’ in Colin Imber
(ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), p. 7
37 ‘ The Costs of Naval Warfare: The Accounts of Hayreddin Barbarossa’s Herceg Novi Campaign in
1539’in Colin Imber (ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), pp. 71-83
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during major expeditions.39

The matter of Ottoman naval technology however has achieved less historical consensus
with some historians seeing their ability to accommodate Mediterranean warfare by
adapting their vessels in the style of Christian vessels they captured, yet where this is
noted by historians it is also agreed that their progress was belated and lagging.
Svatopluk Soucek has cited this as a reason for Ottoman ineptitude at the siege of Crete.
However this policy does not necessarily apply to every naval venture, Dr Soucek does
argue that the Ottomans preparedness for battle gave them the strategic advantage over
their Christian opponents who often had to scramble to assemble a war fleet.40 In addition
Andrew Wheatcroft has argued that the ability to adapt to new technology and tactics was
especially evident in building their naval power.41 The galley was the standard vessel for
Mediterranean since the late Middle Ages and the Ottomans were no exception using
long, lean vessels one hundred foot in length and twelve foot in width with a raised prow
for boarding the enemy. Tactics were very similar to those used on land whereby after an
initial discharge of missiles the fighting men would attempt to storm the enemy galley. 42
These innovations have been attributed to the modernisation of the army and navy by
Bayezit,43 resulting in galleys which were low in the water to maximise and advance the
use of oars with a clearance above water of over two foot. These vessels could be sail
powered but the oars gave it punch and flex in battle with rowers arranged in a single tier
above decks. With the rowers exposed to battle this was a dangerous position explaining
why rowers were mainly Christian slaves and pressed men. However this low freeboard
made the galleys unseaworthy, especially in the treacherous waters of the Mediterranean
which confined the galleys to summer use with a preference for coast hugging.44 These
39 Halil Inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Volume One: 1300-1600,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 94
40 Svatopluk Soucek,’Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete’, Studia
Islamica, 98/99, (2004), pp.254, 238
41 Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans, (London: Viking, 1993), p. 65
Faber & Faber, 2008), p. 124
43 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, (London: Pheonix, 1994), p. 33
Faber & Faber, 2008), pp. 124-125
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short comings of galley technology determined the pattern of warfare, of limited season
and limited range.45 Dr Soucek highlighted that the Ottoman navy at Crete would have
benefited from a collateral merchant marine with the same armament as naval forces with
the ability to fight as well as trade,46 it is true that the tall merchant vessels displayed
Christian technological superiority at Constantinople. That is not to say that the Ottomans
made no progress at all in this area, during the fifteenth-century heavy, rounded ships
distinguishable as merchantmen appeared advancing to vessels with two to three masts.
These vessels were more manoeuvrable than the galleys and when armed with artillery
made effective men-of-war, such ships were the backbone of contemporary Atlantic
navies from whence the inspiration came. These round ships were divided into two
classifications, the artillery ships (top gemisi) and the horse ships (at gemisi) revealing
their functions to be primarily logistical. At the end of the fifteenth-century Sultan
Mehmed commanded vessels built at 3000 tons in imitation of the Genoese and
Venetians, unfortunately these sank upon launching with the combination of heavy
artillery and narrow decks causing them to capsize. Following this incident the armed
long galley remained the principal, and on occasion only type of warship in the fleet.47 It
is probably fair to say that on the Barbary coast the use of all and any captured prizes as
new war ships contributed to the superiority of corsair performance and with this early
windfall of technology it is hardly surprising that the corsairs were highly successful.
Naval Personnel:
So if all of this administration and technology was significant in the development of the
Ottoman navy just how does this relate to their relationship with the corsairs? Also what
of the men who made this huge naval machine work? Many of the oarsmen were
prisoners of war or criminals but these only gave a small amount of those required to man
(ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996,) pp. 5-6
46 Svatopluk Soucek,’Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete’, Studia
Islamica, 98/99, (2004), p. 256
(ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), pp. 1-4
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the fleet. Every 200 galleys needed at least 22,000 oarsmen and slaves48 and so to remedy
this the Sultan ordered every household tax unit to send an oarsmen into the navy in
exchange for being relieved of other tax burdens.49 For the slaves who went into galley
service extensive work has been done by Suraiya Faroqhi highlighting the high mortality
rates which created a constant demand for rowers. Indeed in the sixteenth century it
became common to sentence people to the galleys for misdeeds, on occasion illegally
kidnapping subjects and selling them into the naval arsenal. Given their backgrounds the
rowers had no reason to feel loyalty to the Sultan and would take any opportunity to
revolt or escape, especially as conditions were appalling with food hardly edible and the
code on the treatment of ‘infidel’ captives was underdeveloped.50 Throughout the naval
industry recruitment took place in a very similar style to the army with recruits coming
from the same social groups and often fighting in both services. It is an oddity to note that
except for Barbarossa’s pirates Ottoman sailors were not usually Muslim until very late in
the Empire’s history with the government relying largely on the Greeks within the
Empire.51 That said it was possible for an Ottoman sailor to become a career seamen and
many single young men enlisted as azabs (Arabic for bachelor) in the hopes of gaining an
appointment as a hassa reis or galley Captain. The Barbary coast was a ready supply of
Captains with experience of command at sea highlighting another way in which the
corsairs played a crucial role in the building of the Ottoman navy. The Naval Officer
Corps was a complicated machine with each detachment of sailors or armed fighters
operating under their own officers,52 this included the Sultan’s own Janissary Corps
serving as combat troops with azabs serving as marines, critical roles given the close
quarter nature of galley warfare.53 There was no body of Ottoman troops who served
exclusively at sea yet there was a corps of skippers and officers employed only by the
48 Gabor Agoston, ‘Ottoman Warfare in Europe 1453-1826’ in Jeremy Black (ed.) European Warfare 1453-
1815, (London: Palgrave, 1999), p. 128
50 Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 127-
129
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navy, including appointees from the Barbary coast showing that, while the Ottomans
were not themselves skilled sailors or sea commanders they did have the foresight to
appoint experienced commanders capable of training their fleet efficiently. In addition it
assisted the men serving as they gained an entire new skill set to add to the skills from
their other respective appointments, which could be many and varied as under the
Ottoman rule a rank in the armed forces often went hand in hand with a role in civilian
administration.54
However not all positions came with copious authority, there were several checks upon
the authority of the Admiral such as the fact that they were not always Commander-in-
Chief of naval expeditions and did not sit upon the Imperial Divan Council. Also unless
the Admiral was a Vizier he was not included in preliminary campaign discussions. The
authority of the Admiral did extend to being directly responsible for the troops in his own
property of Gallipoli and as Commander of the Fleet he was authorised to call up extra
troops when required. In addition his jurisdiction extended to all affairs in the
Mediterranean fleet and he could issue orders in the name of the Sultan. However for
more important decisions he was required to get the permission of the Grand Vizier.55
However Barbarossa was the exception to many of these rules ending his career as a
Fourth Vizier as recognition of services rendered. Upon his appointment as Admiral in
1533 Barbarossa wasted no time retaking Coron from Spain in 1534, ravaging the coasts
of Italy and occupied Tunis56, as long as Barbarossa led the fleet victory followed
victory.57 Further reforms included an intensive program of ship-building expansion and
introduced men of his own calibre into the Sultans ranks making the Ottomans the most
55 ‘The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificant, Archivum Ottomanicum VI: 1980 pp. 211-282’ in Colin Imber
57 Jason Goodwin, Lords of the Horizon: A History of the Ottoman Empire, (London: Vintage, 1998), p.
128
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efficient navy in the Mediterranean.58 Barbarossa’s success at Tunis was achieved through
an alliance with the Grand Vizier Ibrahim, the same man who had given approval for his
appointment to Admiral. With the Ottomans in Tunis Christendom was in very real
danger and Europe looked to the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V to solve it. Fighting on
this front lulled in 1536 as Charles was once again at war with Franics I of France and
Barbarossa was at the time resident in Constantinople. At this time there were rumours of
secret negotiations between Charles and Barbarossa with the corsair offering to change
sides, suggested motives include jealousy at the authority of Lufti Pasha, Seraskier of
Rumelia or possible anger at the execution of political ally Ibrahim. However such
rumoured negotiations were never successful as Charles himself never appeared to the
meetings thus offending Barbarossa.59 Despite the emphasis upon skilled training only
three Ottoman Admirals on record had any sea experience those being Barbarossa, Kiliç
Ali Pasha and Kiliç’s successor Uluç Hasan Pasha both of whom had been corsairs in
Algiers,60 it seemed that once the Sultan found a successful leader from among the
corsairs he decided to maintain the practice. The position was also held temporarily by
Mahmud Pasha who was dismissed as Grand Vizier in 1469-70 in order to command the
attack on Negroponte. For that one year it was the most important role in the Empire and
needed Mahmud’s abilities to fulfil it.61 However this was a temporary appointment and
the highest naval positions were still predominantly filled by ex-corsairs.
Unlikely Allies?:
At first glance the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary Corsairs
seems to be one of mutual gain. The corsairs, after the loss of their initial leader gained
1972,) p. 132
Publishing Inc, 1966), pp. 212-219
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some level of legitimacy in the service of the Empire while the Ottomans gained a strong
naval arm to protect their colonial and mercantile interests. Yet what is the true nature of
this relationship? What exactly did each participant gain or have to sacrifice? In order to
paint a clearer picture of the alliance it is worth examining the motives and practices of
both the corsairs and the Ottomans. The first factor to be examined is the alleged
autonomy of North Africa. The politics of the Barbary regencies were dominated by a
clash between two sorts of military men with differing motives. While some saw the main
purpose of the Barbary states as a haven for corsairs other believed in the expansion of
Turkish power into the African interior. Despite being initially ruled by a Pasha, very
likely one of the conquerors himself North Africa enjoyed much more autonomy than any
other Ottoman state from the very beginning. It was unlikely that the Pashas would
trouble themselves with an authority so far away as Istanbul while the second generation
of rulers were appointed for a triennial term of office and struggled to maintain their
authority depending heavily upon Janissaries recruited locally from the Levant and, by
the end of the fifteenth century the Janissaries ruled the Levant in place of the Pashas.
Peter Earle has argued that it was unlikely the Sultan was disturbed by the growing
autonomy of Barbary for, as long as it remained Turkish it was valuable to the Empire’s
defence as well as being a hindrance to their Christian enemies. That said the
participation of corsairs in naval action depended a great deal upon who the Ottomans
were fighting as the Barbary regencies had their own interests to consider. For example
Algiers had very little interest in going to war with France as French reprisals were a
closer threat than the likelihood of Turkish assistance. When the Ottomans were at war
with a naval power, predominantly Venice, Barbary and Turkey acted independently thus
states at peace with Turkey were not necessarily at peace with Barbary and visa versa. In
reality the only areas where the Barbary states had close links to the Sultan were in the
formal acceptance of him as their religious and political superior and the recruitment of
Janissaries.62 However this autonomy can be perceived in Ottoman naval practice as a
whole. Each flotilla in defence of the Empire operated under the command of an
independent Admiral (kapudan) or the local lords (sancak beys) in whose territory they
ran. Each was independent of the Grand Admiral except when they joined the main body
62 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970), pp. 24-27
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of the Imperial Fleet for large summer campaigns.63

Another aspect of the relationship that merits examination is the assumed ideological
camaraderie between the Barbary Coast and the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan used his
navy for the protection and regulation of trade, to control coastal areas and as a support
for imperial expansion. He also spent a great deal of time curtailing the activities of
corsairs, both Christian and Muslim in his waters64 where they potentially threatened his
political policy. While this may appear to be the Sultan invading the corsairs supposed
autonomy it was in fact very shrewd statesmanship. It is true that the corsairs, in the
words of Starkey ‘cruised against Christian shipping with the spiritual blessing of
Muhammed and the temporal authority of the Sultan’65 yet their zealousness seemed
beyond even the desire of His Imperial Majesty. The Ottomans operated a radical
religious tolerance policy within their realms with no forced conversions to Islam.
Christians were permitted to worship in segregated societies and would not suffer
persecution save for a slightly heavier tax burden and having to sacrifice boys from their
communities to be conscripted. Barbarossa on the other hand was an enemy of all
Christians66 and embarked upon more of an irrational extermination jihad as opposed to a
politically feasible war. As Peter Earle has stated ‘The definition of the corsairs enemies
was that they worshipped a different God.’67 In this respect the allies were incompatible
and potentially some measure of autonomy would be beneficial to both sides both for the
corsairs to pursue their extremist agendas and so that the mainstream Ottoman authorities
could distance themselves to a certain extent from the actions of the Barbary coast.
Motives for this extremism can be traced back to the roots of Oruch as a slave on Rhodes
but it is doubtful that one man’s grudge could survive to motivate an entire century or
more of piracy. More likely explanation is the memories and descendents of those
65 David J Starkey, ‘Pirates and Markets’ in C R Pennell (ed.) Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, (London:
New York Press, 2001), p. 109
1972), p. 131
67 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970), p.6
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Muslims rescued from Spain escaping the persecution of Queen Isabella and her
Inquisition. An alternative explanation is that it merely became traditional for the corsairs
to swear allegiance to Islam and that, after the first generation, it was merely a case of
paying lip service to the religion of their forefathers. More research would have to be
carried out to support this theory and in addition it would be useful to discover exactly
what type of Islam was being practised by the corsairs in North Africa, whether or not it
was the orthodox beliefs practised in Istanbul and the rest of the Empire or whether they
followed the unorthodox doctrine of Islam, which could be another explanation for their
zealousness. However such anomalies are not unusual in the studies of naval warfare at
this time. Despite the prominent religious tone of the conflict as Christian against
Muslimboth sides equally attacked wealthy targets such as the Venetians.68
So upon closer inspection how could two allies with so many dissenting political and
religious differences between them manage to maintain a loyal alliance? Aside from the
allegations of Barbarossa’s negotiations with Charles V the corsairs remained loyal allies
to the Ottoman state for several centuries. Perhaps the shared religious ideology, no
matter how modified was enough to hold them together, or perhaps it was something
more. The benefits the corsairs gained from the arrangement far outweighed the
sacrifices, alliance with the Ottomans gave them another avenue by which they could
carry Holy War to the enemy and with it a measure of legitimacy they had not previously
enjoyed. Also Muslim corsairs were well known for their cruelty with their brutality
forming part of the legend of Turkish cruelty69 suggesting that once a corsair joined the
brotherhood leaving it would not be so easy. In addition it would be easy for Barbarossa,
as leader of the corsairs to use his power and position to keep them loyal to the Ottomans.
Voluntary loyalty would be exactly what the Sultan required as, by his own decree corsair
participation in Ottoman warfare was strictly voluntary, he could ‘encourage’ the corsairs
to join his fleet but did not exercise any direct control over them.
Pennell (ed.) Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, (London: New York Press, 2001), p. 90
69 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970,) p. 10
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Conclusions:
In concluding this research it is necessary to re-examine allegations of Ottoman naval

incompetence. It is true that the Barbary alliance did raise the technical and tactical skill
of the Ottoman navy, in addition historians have viewed the fact that the Turks developed
none of their captured ports as naval bases as a weakness.70 However this can not be
taken as a strictly naval weakness. In addition it must be remembered that the Barbary
alliance was not formed until 1519 and prior to that sate the Ottomans had been involved
in several highly successful conflicts such as the Venetian wars of 1499 cited by Daniel
Goffman.71 In fact it can be seen that Christian Europe feared the Ottoman advance right
up to the Barbary alliance with rumours circulating in 1500 of a powerful Turkish armada
under Bayezit72 leading to a plea by the Venetian Ambassador in 1512 that Europeans
make universal peace with each other in order to unite against the Infidel.73
So can it be said that the contributions of the Barbary corsairs were indicative of a lack of
priority given by the Ottomans to their navy? Firstly it must be confirmed exactly what
those contributions were and they seem to be predominantly within the officer corps.
Technological skill in building and to a certain extent sailing the ships can also be
attributed to Christian participants and the manning of the fleet was drawn largely from
the army yet the training of the navy came from the corsairs appointed to officer roles
such as Admirals and Captains. In addition where the Admiral had little to no sea
experience he was advised not to take action without consulting with the more seasoned
commanders in his fleet.74 So was the corsairs contribution really so significant? With the
benefit of hindsight it has to be said that it was not overwhelmingly significant, one or
two corsairs appointed strategically to high ranking positions did make a difference
however. It is a sign of sophisticated political tactics on the part of the Ottomans that they
70 Svatopluk Soucek,'Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete’, Studia
Islamica, 98/99, (2004), p. 258
Press, 2002), p. 145
72 Diary Entry by Sanuto 8 May 1500, C. S. P. Ven., Vol I, 1202-1509, p. 287
73 Venetian Ambassador in Rome to Sanuto 21/22 June 1512, C. S. P. Ven., Vol II, 1509-1519, p. 67
16
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appointed the corsairs to train their own men and did not merely enlist corsairs directly as
their naval force thus avoiding an embarrassing military dependence. By extension was
the Barbary alliance a necessity or a convenience? The Ottomans were nothing if not
opportunists and the chance to gain maritime expertise in addition to expanding their
empire through the acquisition of a new vassal state, however loosely the term may be
applied was not to be turned down. Finally can it be said that some Sultans were more
negligent than others of their navy? From this research it can not really be seen that any
Sultan neglected his navy but merely utilised the Barbary alliance to maximise the
Empire’s naval potential with minimum cost or effort input save for a sophisticated
administration. To conclude revisionist interpretations of this topic such as those of
Goffman appear stronger under historical scrutiny than the more established stereotypes
of the Ottomans as a weak naval power.
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Appendix: Glossary of Turkish Naval and Administrative Terms
AKÇE: a silver coin, the chief unit of account in the Ottoman Empire, valued in the mid-
sixteenth century at fifty to sixty akçe to the gold ducat.
AT GEMİSİ: cavalry ship
AZAB:
1. an officer on a galley serving under a reis
2. an azab oarsman (kürekçi azab): an oarsmen from the annual levy
3. a member of the corps of azabs, provincial soldiers serving in garrisons or
fortresses
BEYLERBEYI: the governor of a berylerbeyik the highest rank in the provincial

government
HASSA: belonging to the Sultan; therefore employed or owned by the Ottoman state
KAPUDAN: a commander of a fleet, squadron, or detachment of ships

1. the Admiral of the Sea (kapidan-i derya): the title of the Grand Admiral of
the Mediterranean fleet
2. kapudan paşa: a title of the kapudan-i derya when he held the rank of
beylerbeyi
3. kapudan bey: a title of the kapudan-i derya when he held the rank of
sancak beyi
PASHA: social title commanding obedience and respect also used to refer to provincial
representatives of the Sultan
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REIS: a commander; in naval useage, the captain of a single vessel

1. hassa reis: the captain of a state owned vessel
2. captain with a detachment (bölüklü reis): a galley-captain commanding a
detachment of azabs
3. captain without a detachment (bölüksüz reis): a galley-captain not
commanding a detachment of azabs
4. müteferrika reis: perhaps a captain without a detachment, first in line for
appointment to the command of a detachment of azabs
5. volunteer captain (gönüllü reis): the captain of a privateer serving in the
imperial fleet
SANCAK: an administrative district governed by a sancak beyi, sub-division of a

beylerbeyik
SANCAK BEYİ: the governor of a sancak and commander of militia within it.
TIMAR: a fief with an annual value of less than 20,000 akçes whose revenues were held
in return for military service. These were of two kinds:
1. a tumar granted by a diploma issues in the Sultan's name.
2. A tumar granted directly by a beylerbeyi
TOP GEMSİ: artillery vessel
VIZIER:
1. a minister of the Sultan and member of the Imperial Divan
2. Grand Vizier: the chief vizier and deputy of the Sultan, Turkish vezir
Adapted from Colin Imber, Studies in Ottoman History and Law.
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Bibliography:
Black Jeremy, (ed.) European Warfare 1453-1815, London: Palgrave, 1999
Bradford, Ernle, The Shield and the Sword: The Knights of St John, London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1972
Crowley, Roger, Constantinople: The Last Great Siege, 1453, London: Faber & Faber,
2006
Crowley, Roger, Empires of the Sea: The Final Battle for the Mediterranean, 1521-1580,
London: Faber & Faber, 2008
Earle, Peter, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970
Faroqhi, Suraiya, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It, London: I. B. Tauris,
2004
Glete, Jan, Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of
Europe, London, Routledge, 1999
Goffman, Daniel, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002
Goodwin, Jason, Lords of the Horizon: A History of the Ottoman Empire, London:
Vintage, 1998
Hess, Andrew C., ‘The Evolution of the Ottoman Seabourne Empire in the Age of the
Oceanic Discoveries, 1453-1525’, The American Historical Review, 75, 1970, pp. 1892-
1919
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Imber, Colin, (ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996
Imber, Colin, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: the structure of power, Basingstoke,
Macmillan 2nd ed [1st 2002] 2009
Inalcik, Halil, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, London: Pheonix,
1994
Inalcik, Halil, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Volume One:
1300-1600, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994
McCarthy, Justin, The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History, London: Longman, 1997
Merriman, Roger Bigelow, Süleiman The Magnificent 1520-1566, New York: Cooper
Square Publishing Inc, 1966
Murphey, Rhoads, Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700, London: University College London

Press, 1999
Pennell, C. R., (ed.) Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, London: New York Press, 2001
Soucek, Svatopluk, 'Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and
Crete’, Studia Islamica, 98/99, 2004, pp. 219-261
Wheatcroft, Andrew, The Ottomans, London: Viking, 1993
21
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Primary Sources:
Acts of the Privy Council, 1542-1547
Calendars of State Papers Venetian, Volume I, 1202-1509
Calendar of State Papers Venetian, Volume II, 1509-1519
22
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23

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The Ottoman Empire and the Barbary Corsairs, 1450-1550:

17 Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans, (London: Viking, 1993), p. 65

Administration and technology:

during major expeditions.39

of the Imperial Fleet for large summer campaigns.63

In concluding this research it is necessary to re-examine allegations of Ottoman naval

Appendix: Glossary of Turkish Naval and Administrative Terms

AT GEMİSİ: cavalry ship

BEYLERBEYI: the governor of a berylerbeyik the highest rank in the provincial

KAPUDAN: a commander of a fleet, squadron, or detachment of ships

REIS: a commander; in naval useage, the captain of a single vessel

SANCAK: an administrative district governed by a sancak beyi, sub-division of a

TOP GEMSİ: artillery vessel

Adapted from Colin Imber, Studies in Ottoman History and Law.

Black Jeremy, (ed.) European Warfare 1453-1815, London: Palgrave, 1999

Murphey, Rhoads, Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700, London: University College London

Wheatcroft, Andrew, The Ottomans, London: Viking, 1993

Acts of the Privy Council, 1542-1547

Calendars of State Papers Venetian, Volume I, 1202-1509

Calendar of State Papers Venetian, Volume II, 1509-1519

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