The Relationship Between the Epistemologies of Ramon Lull

and Nicholas of Cusal

by Theodor Pindl-Büchel

One look into the library ofNicholas ofCusa makes impressively clear
the interest which the German cardinal had in the works ofRamon Lull.
Not less than ten manuscripts contain about 70 works of the great
Majorcan philosopher. No other author-not Aristotle, not Plato, not
Augustine-is so extraordinarily weIl represented in Cusanus's collection. 2
Not only the number of complete works of Lull, but also the marginal
annotations and extensive excerpts testify to Nicholas's interest. His
notes on and excerpts from Lull are far more elaborate than those of other
authors. Codex Cusanus 83 merits particular attention. In this manu-
script we find not only the excerpts from 26 works (edited by Eusebio
Colomer in 1961 3 ) but also very extensive excerpts from the Liber
contemplationis.4

IThis article is based on a paper read at the 23rd International Congress on

Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, Michigan, May 5-8, 1988. I am very grateful to
Prof. Charles H. Lohr (Raimundus-Lullus-Institut der Universität Freiburg im
Breisgau) for the correction of my English translation and for many valuable
suggestions.
2Cf. J. Marx, Verzeichnis der Handschriftensammlung des Hospitals zu Cues
(Trier, 1905); M. Honecker, "Lullus-Handschriften aus dem Besitz des Kardinal
Nikolaus von Cues," in Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft, 1st series,
vol. 6 (1937), 252-309.
3Cod. Cus. 83, f. 93r-l02r, ed. by E. Colomer, Nikolaus von Kues und Raimund
Llull (Berlin, 1961), 125-86.
4Cod. Cus. 83, f. 51r-60v. Cusanus made his extracts from this earliest (and still
unedited) work ofLull in Paris in the spring of 1428, as he notes at the beginning
ofhis excerpts (f. 51r). He used the manuscript Paris, B.N. lat. 3348A given to the
monks ofthe monastery ofVauvert 1298 by Lull himself. I am at present engaged
in editing these latter excerpts for the Heidelberg Academy. R. Haubst was able
to show that Cusanus made his excerpts from the Liber contemplationis not in
Kues (as Colomer assumed), but in Paris; cf. R. Haubst, "Der junge Cusanus war
im Jahre 1428 zu Handschriften-Studien in Paris;' Mitteilungen und Forschungen
der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 14 (1980): 198-205. Cf. also E. Colomer, "Zu dem Auf-

73
74 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

The researches ofEusebio Colomer and Charles Lohr5 have shown that
Cusanus's interest in Lull's works went much deeper than the mere
collecting and copying of manuscripts of his works. The remarkable
source analyses in the Heidelberg edition of Nicholas's sermons6 also
reveal that the Cardinal had-long before the publication of the De docta
ignorantia-taken up and developed crucial elements from Lull's thought:
the idea of an ars generalis ad omnes scientias, the view of creation as a
threefold image of the Creator, the understanding of philosophy and
theology as unified and culminating in the person of Christ as the finis
universi, and finally the political and religious effort to bring together, to
establish a concordantia between the three great cultures ofhis time. 7
Such ideas found a pIace in Nicholas's thought long before he became
acquainted with authorities like Pseudo-Dion.ysius and Proclus. In his
later works, of course, Nicholas preferred to cite these authors-perhaps
because of the authority they enjoyed in the fifteenth century, but more
likely as a precaution due to the actions taken against Ramon Lull by
Eymeric and Gerson. 8
It is of the greatest importance for the interpretation of Cusanus's
philosophy to realize the breadth and depth of Lull's influence on his
ideas. Nicholas was influenced by Ramon LUlll not only in individual
points of doctrine, but also in his basic conception of the philosophical
enterprise.
The fundamental idea behind the philosophies ofboth men can be found in
the attempt to overcome purely objective knowledge ofthings by taking into

satz von RudolfRaubst: 'Derjunge Cusanus war im Jahre 1428 zu Randschriften-

Studien in Paris'," Mitteilungen und Forschungen der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 15
(1982): 57-70. It is not possible, however, to extend this date to the other 26
excerpts (as Raubst and Colomer did), although the possibility cannot be excluded
that the 26 excerpts were made in Paris. Charles Lohr considers Padua as a
probable place oforigin; cf. C.R. Lohr, "Die Exzerptensammlung des Nikolaus von
Kues aus den Werken Ramon Lulls," Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und
Theologie 30 (1983): 40-64. Cf. my summary ofreseaJrch on "Nicholas ofCusa and
the Lullian tradition in Padua;' American Cusanus Society Newsletter, V.2 (1988),
Appendix I.
5Cf. Colomer, N.u. Kues und R. Llull; C. R. Lohr, "Ram6n Lull und Nikolaus von
Kues: Zu einem Strukturvergleich ihres Denkens;' 1'heologie und Philosophie 56
(1981): 218-31.
6Cr. Nicolai de Cusa, Opera omnia XVI.1, Sermones I (1430-1441), Fasc. 1: Serm.
I-IV, ed. by R. Raubst (Ramburg, 1970) (rev. by C. 11. Lohr, Theological Studies
32 (1971): 320-23).
7Even the innovative and unusual terminology Oike the terms for the Lullian
correlatives of action) which was so sharply criticized by Nicholas Eymeric and
John Gerson, was adopted by Cusanus. Cr. Colomer, N.u. Kues und R. Llull, 72f.
8Cf. A. Madre, Die theologische Polemik gegen Raimundus Lullus (Münster,
1973).
 WINTER 75

account the subjective conditions ofits possibility. For both Lull and Cusanus
being is defined by human knowing. But man hirnself is defined by the
absolute first principle which embraces and measures, comprehendit et
mensurat, all things. For both men, therefore, metaphysics and epistemology
have their origin in the simple, first principle of all being and knowing. In
the first principle, which is the beginning, middle, and end of all things, all
multiplicity finds its identity. For both men, knowledge ofthe first principle
is the condition of all knowledge. Because the first principle is one, science
according to Lull and Cusanus transcends the Scholastic division of knowl-
edge into theological and philosophical.
Using Cusanus's excerpts from Lull, especially those from the Liber
contemplationis, I will show how both thinkers deal with the problem of
knowledge in terms oftheir understanding ofthe first principle.

I. Via Negationis

God's infinity, "cui nec aliud nec nihil opponitur"

(Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, XIV)
For the idea of a grounding of human knowledge in the divine first
principle Nicholas was able to find a great deal ofmaterial in Lull's early
Liber contemplationis.
In this work Lull understands the first principle of all being and all
knowledge as an absolute maximum which comprehends and measures
all things. Nicholas's notes stress, first of all, the divine transcendence.
God's being is "of such dignity that all being is cornprehended in hirn."
And again: "Only you fill all, from you is all goodness."9 In God's goodness
"omnes bonitates terminantur."10
Since all the things which exist in the world belong to God, no one is
able to give hirn anything, "nullus tibi donare aliquid potest."ll These are
ideas of which Cusanus later made much use. In the De dato patris

9Deus cui proprium est semper hominibus misereri, qui tua mandata custodiunt.
tuum benedictum esse est tante dignitatis. quod quaecumque sunt in esse
comprehenduntur in eo. et hoc propter singularitatem eius quae caret principio et
fine/. et non est aliquid in esse quod sit deus praeter tee qui solus cares principio
et fine/ tante est nobilitas excellentie tue essentie, quod aliud esse consimile non
patitur. hinc tu solus omnia comples et a quo omnia bona (Cod. Cus. 83, f. 53r) (I
follow the spelling and interpunction ofthe manuscript).
lODeus qui propter tuorum bonorum largifluenciam verus fons esse cognosceris.
sicud calor qui est causa rebus calefactis est maior calefactis in quantitate caloris
sie est tua bonitas omnium bonitatum causa ac omnia bona ab ea procedunt quia
infinita est in qua omnes bonitates terminantur (Cod. Cus. 83, f. 56v).
IlTibi offero soli deo animam et corpus quia omnia quae in mundo sunt tua
sunt/nullus tibi donare aliquid potest (Cod. Cus. 83, f. 53v).
76 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

luminum, for example, he wrote that the creatures "have nothing from
themselves which they do not receive from the father of all, and therefore
they do not have the possibility of giving anything."12
Since human knowledge is always oscillating "between the beginning
and the end," between infinity and finitude, the divine singularity "which
is without beginning and end" surpasses man's comprehension.l 3 From
the Liber contemplationis Nicholas noted:
Even if there were as many hearts of men as there are grains of
sand on the shore or drops ofwater in the sea, they would not be
able to comprehend your eternity, because nothing can be
comprehended, which is without beginning- and end.l 4
In spite of God's transcendence, Lull also recognized the divine imma-
nence and implicitly defined the absolute maxiJnum as that principle cui
nihil resistit. 15 Cusanus echoes this idea in the JDe docta ignorantia when
he says: "Maximo esse nihil opponitur, quare :nec non esse nec minime
esse."16In the Ars inventiva 17 Lull made this idea more precise. Here God
is defined as infinite and eternal in each ofhis perfeetions, whereas finite
beings are described as representatives ofthe infinite God "whom neither
nothing nor anything at all can resist."18 This description seems to have

12Nam eorum, qui nihil a se habent, quod non reeeperunt ab omnium patre, non
esset donandi faeultas, eum nihil quod suum sit habeant (Nikolaus von Kues,
Philosophisch-theologische Schriften, ed. by L. Gabriel, 3 vols. (Vienna, 1964-67),
vol. 2, p. 652).
13Cf. the text of note 9 above.
140 deus quis de eternitate tua mirari deberet, eum de fine patris sui qui tarnen
prineipium habuit nihil eomprehendat. et si essent tot eorda hominum sieud
arena uel gutta aquae maris, tuam eternitatem eomprehendere non possent, quia
omnia eomprehenderentur inter prineipium et finen1 (Cod. Cus. 83, f. 52v). Cf.
also: Deus qui eorda fidelium per lueem tue elaritatis illuminas in tantum est
sublimis et exeellens tua maxima bonitas quod nee intelleetus nee raeio suffieiunt
ad pereipiendum eius ingentem altitudinem (Cod. Cus. 83, f. 56r).
15Cf. the Lullian text of the Liber contemplationis: Domine deus sieut est
proprium tue substantie quod sit una sine pari. sie est tibi proprium misereIj
illorum qui eonfidunt in tee quia postquam tu es uerissime unus solus deus. nemo
est qui resistat tibj ad miserendum eorum. qui tualn miserieordiam implorant
(Paris, B.N. lat. 3348A, f. 10r). I follow the spelling and interpunetion of the
manuseript.
16De docta ignorantia I. 6 (Nieolaus Cusanus, De docta ignorantia. Die belehrte
Unwissenheit: ed. and Germ. transl. by P. Wilpert, 3d ed. (Hamburg, 1979), 24).
17Cusanus possessed this work: Cod. Cus. 87, f. 3r-9Bv.
18(Deus) est ipsum id, quod est in omni perfeetione infinitum et aetemum, quem
singula entia, quantum possunt, aut in proposito aut in opposito repraesentant,
eui nee aliquid nee nihil resistere potest (Beati Raynlundi Lulli Opera, ed. by I.
Salzinger, vol. V (Mainz, 1729; repr. FrankfurtlMain, 1965), e. 8, p. 59).
 WINTER 77

prepared the way for Cusanus's idea of the N on-aliud. In the De venatione
sapientiae Nicholas wrote:
In an imperfeet way God may be called living as opposed to
non-living, and immortal as opposed to mortal. In a perfect way,
however, he may be called "Not-other," the One to whom neither
nothing nor anything at all is opposed, because nothing precedes
or defines hirn. 19
A look at the second distinction of the Liber contemplationis which
treats of God's infinity and man's finitude may help us to understand how
Lull conceived the way in which God can be infinitely transcendent and
at the same time immanent in the finite creatures.
Confronted with infinity, man is completely stupefied. For he is not able
to think something without an end. In trying to comprehend the infinite,
he is thrown back on his own finitude. Cusanus made the note: "Wanting
to comprehend your infinity my mind is diminished and returns as it were
to nothing."20 Man is not capable ofimagining infinity. Ifthere are things
in creation we know which exceed the mind's capacity of understanding,
how much more incomprehensible must the infinite God be?21
Wanting to exclude the idea that the divine infinity might be under-
stood quantitatively, Lull emphasized that infinity cannot be grasped in
any categorical, comparative sense. The notion of absolute infinity would
be contradictory, were it possible to reach it by way of a finite judgment.
The Liber contemplationis teIls us, in a passage copied out by Cusanus,
that the intellect would be "diminished" and "limited" in the very attempt
to go beyond its natural limits: "ideo tune quando nititur ultra suum
19Imperfeetiori igitur modo Deus nominatur animal eui non animal opponitur, et
immortalis eui mortale opponitur quam non aliud, eui nee aliud nee nihil
opponitur, eum etiam ipsum nihil praeeedat et definiat (Nikolaus von Kues,
Philosophisch-theologische Schriften, vol. 1, p. 66).
2°Et ideo est ita mirabile quod intelleetus humanus non potest eomprehendere.
quia quanto plus nititur eomprehendere tanto plus ebetatur et minus intelligit. et
in tantum ebetatur quod vix est in eo aliqua pars disereeionis intelleetiue et hoc
propter suam fragilitatem et debilitatem. et tuum esse infinitum et exeellentis-
simum (Cod. Cus. 83, f. 52r). Cf. the Lullian text: Quia tune domine deus infinite.
quando ego eogito uel diseerno tuam infinjtatem. intelleetus meus adeo dirnjnuj-
tur. quod uix est in eo aliqua pars disereeionis intelleetjue et hoc eontingit ei
propter hoc quod ipse est ualde fragilis et debilis nature quo ad intelligendum
tuum exeellentissimum esse. quod est infinitum (Paris, B.N. lat. 3348A, f. 5v-6r).
21Quando ego domine deus eogito uero modo tuum mjrabile esse. ego non miror
parum nee multum. si non possum attingere ad intelligendum ipsum. quia ego
non possum attingere ad eomprehendendum in intelleetu meo parujtatem athomj.
quae est adeo modice quantitatis quod nullo modo potest diminuj. nam si
intelleetus meus non est suffieiens ad eomprehendendum in se istud tale. qualiter
potest esse suffieiens quod intelligat magnitudjnem tue esseneie. et maxime eum
pars athomj sit finjta. et tua esseneia infinijta (Paris, B.N. lat. 3348A, f. 6r).
78 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

terminum ire diminuitur et debilitatur in virtute sua quia non est de sua
natura transire praefixum terminum suum."22
How then is it possible to understand the infinite at least in a way in
which our judgment is not false? Man must, above all, recognize the
limits of his reason. By becoming conscious of h.is finitude, man has in a
way already transcended his limits. A text copied by Cusanus teIls us that
the intellect will be "enlarged" to the extent that it is conscious ofits own
limits: "crescit autem racio et intellectus quando infra (sie) suum termi-
num inquirit."23
Nicholas of Cusa made detailed notes on. Lull's critical remarks
concerning human knowledge. He recognized the paradox of human
knowledge, the paradox that "quanto plus nititur comprehendere tanto
plus hebetatur et minus intelligit."24 Man's consciousness ofthe limits of
his thinking is, formally considered, a judgmerLt about a judgment. This
higher level of reflection leads to the insight thlat the absolutely infinite
can only be grasped by a judgment which transcends our natural
judgments. Knowledge based on this recognition may properly be called
a doeta ignorantia. 25 Cusanus excerpted many ofLull's statements about
man's lack of knowledge. He noted the limited nature of human knowl-
edge and he noted that, though my individlual knowledge is "omni
ignorantie et cecitate dedita;' human knowledge could transcend limita-
tions by recognizing its own fragility.26

22Cod. Cus. 83, f. 52r. Cf. the Lullian text: Unde quando intellectus noster uult
egredj ultra termjnum sibi a te praefinitum. tunc ipse dimjnuitur et debilitatur in
uirtute sua. ex eo quia non est de natura suj quod transeat termjnum sibi
praefixum (Paris, B.N. lat. 3348A, f. 6v).
23Cod. Cus. 83, f. 52r. Cf. the Lullian text: Sed quando intellectus noster et racio
quae est in nobis uult uidere et perquirere uero modo intra termjnum sibj
ljmitatum ea quae debet. tunc noster intellectus et racio crescit et multiplicatur
in suis uirtutibus (Paris, B.N. lat. 3348A, f. 6r).
24Cod. Cus. 83, f. 52r. Cf. also: Cum tu domine solus sis sine principio quando
aliquis contemplatur tuam eternitatem quantum es sine principio ipse remanet
totus stupefactus. vnde non mirum si tunc intellectus ebetatur cum ad intelligen-
dum eternitatem peruenire non possit (Cod. Cus. 83, f. 52v)
25Cf. eg., the following excerpt: ignosce domine quod sepe praesumebam scire
quae ignoraui et alios turpabam quod non sciebant quae eis erant impossibilia. et
sis benedictus. quod ignoranciam meam mihi patefecistiJ supple deus paucitatem
scientie nostre ut te contemplari iugiter valeamus (Cod. Cus. 83, f. 55v).
26Cod. Cus. 83, f. 55r.
 WINTER 79

11. Negatio Negationis

The infinite God "non potest non reperiri,
si recte quaeritur, qui ubique est"
(Nicholas of Cusa, De quaerendo Deo)
Lull approached God as the One who stands in opposition to all things
and is at the same time opposed to nothing. Were God not such, he would
be neither perfect nor infinite. No finite category is opposed to hirn. No
finite being can be without his being. God is the ontological ground of all
being and the epistemological horizon of all our utterances. He is the
place in which man finds hirnself. Lull wrote in the Liber contemplationis,
in a passage copied out by Cusanus: "It is easy for you, God, to open our
intellect in contemplating you, for you are infinite. Therefore, please, give
us grace, ut noster intellectus non sit captivatus intra modicum
terminum."27
God is present in all things in such way that all things are present in
hirn. But neither Lull nor Cusanus confused God with his creation.
Maintaining the incomparability ofthe infinite and the finite, Lull wrote
in the Liber contemplationis, as Cusanus noted: "0 domine omnis homo in
tua infinitate finitatus est ergo faciliter te quisque invenire potest/ et
quisque iustus in suo corde te inveniet cum sis ubique."28 Although
"omnes sensus et rationes et intellectus in tua excellenti immensitate et
infinitate deficiunt,"29 the man who searches in the right manner will be
able to find God and that in his totality, for he is "ubique totuS."30

27Cod. Cus., f. 53r; cf. the Lullian text: Vnde postquam tu domine es infinitus. et
nos sumus finitj in tee multum est facile omnibus iBis qui uolunt quaerere recto
itinere quod inuenjant te semper. quando te uoluerjnt inuenire. quia tu es ubique
totus. et nos sumus termjnatj et finjtati intra tuam infinjtatem (Paris B.N. lat.
3348A, f. 7r)
28Cod. Cus. 83, f. 52r.
29Cod. Cus. 83, f. 52r.
3°0 stulti qui deum ex vestra culpa perditis cum sit vbique totus, vbique inveniri
potest si recte quaeritur (Cod. Cus. 83, f. 52r). For the whole context cf. the Lullian
text: Et si sensus spirituales mee anime termjnantur intus breuem termjnum. et
opera quae ego fecj sunt modice quantitatis. quod erit meum iudicium. si tempus
uite mee fuerit breuis spacij et ego moriar sine bonis operibus? 0 gloriose domine
non est magnus labor alicuj quaerere te longe. quia tu es ualde prope nobis cum
sis intimior nobis quam nos nobis (the last sentence sterns from Augustine's
Confessiones 111,6). unde postquam tu domine es infinitus. et nos sumus finitj in
tee multum est facile omnibus iBis qui uolunt quaerere recto itinere quod
inuenjant te semper. quando te uolueIjnt inuenire. quia tu es ubique totus. et nos
sumus termjnatj et finjtati intra tuam infinjtatem. Ergo domine deus non oportet
iustos qui tibi seruiunt uoluere faciem suam de una parte ad aliam pro te
quaerendo, quando te uoluerint invenjre. quia postquam tu es ubique. ipsi
poterunt te invenjre in suis cordibus (Paris B.N. lat. 3348A, f. 7r).
80 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Nicholas seems to make use of these ideas in his De quaerendo Deo

when he writes that God "non potest non reperiri, si recte quaeritur, qui
ubique est. 31 From this point it is not a long \\lay to the statement in the
De non-aliud that God "in simplici simpliciter, composite vero intelligitur
in composito."32
From the fourth distinction of the Liber contemplationis on the divine
unity Cusanus made the note that God, containing and comprehending
all being, is not only necessarily infinite and eternal, but also one and
singular. He is a single, simple substance. The unity of the divine
substance cannot be comprehended by man beeause ofhis own composite
structure. God's unity is not only the opposite of our multiplicity, but
beyond unity and plurality. As Lull says, "there is no one who can resist
you, because you are truly one."33
The fundamental openness of the infinite to the finite, of unity to
multiplicity, does not imply that it is contradictory to God's unity to
predicate "virtutes;' "nobilitates," or "laudes" ofhim, ifthey do not imply
defect or indigence. His unity holds together the different statements
which we make ofhim. But it is not only not contradictory to God's unity
to predicate different attributes ofhim; it is also an obligation. God is the
giver of all being, the beginning, middle, and end of creation. In recog-
nizing this fact man not only judges rightly, he also acts correctly. Only
that man can truly be said to be just who is cOJnscious of his limitedness
and open to the infinite. This consciousness implies that such a man acts
correctly.
The connection oflogic and ethics is thus constitutive for both Lull and
Cusanus. As the first wrote in the Liber contemplationis: "The nearest
place, in which you are found, is the heart of the just man, and the
remotest place, in which you are not found, is the heart of the sinner."34

31Nikolaus von Kues, Philosophisch-theologische Schriften, vol. 2, p. 582.

32Ibid., vol. 1, p. 497.
33Cf. n. 15 above.
34Magis propinquus locus ubi tu inuenjris est cor hominis iustj. et remocior
locus ubi tu non invenjris est cor peccatoris (Paris B.N.lat. 3348A, f. 7r). Cf. the
following excerpts of Cusanus: 0 quantum longe distas deus a corde prauo,
beet peccator in te sit, sicud artificiatum in arte et dum mole peccatorum
praemitur, ad te nequit peruenire nisi purgetur et alleuietur, et virtutibus
ornetur/ deus consolator admoneas me peccatorem, et da mihi amoris feruorem
ut peccata dimittam, et si forte non ad tua monita aduerterem. infige saltem
memoriam tue passionis indelibiliter in corde meo. scio enim quod propter
tuam infinitam bonitatem maximam curam habes de tuis creaturis. 0 ego
miser qui semper finita dilexi plus quam te infinitum/ valde mirarer deus.
vnde in tarn paruo corde meo posset esse tantum magnum malum, nisi
considerarem quod hoc ideo est, quia te domine non cognoui pro infinito bono/
o benedictus deus qui tribuisti finito homini, tarn magnum bonum quod posset
 WINTER 81

From this openness ofthe finite to the infinite follows necessarily a new
conception ofman, a conception in which man sees himselfnot as a static
part of the universe, but rather as "a mixed thing"35 compounded of the
sensitive and the intellective worlds, striving for the infinite. He is a
microcosmos, not in the sense that he is exposed to the antagonistic
powers ofthe cosmos, but rather in the sense that he is creation's aim and
goal, because he is its grasping for the infinite.
Lull's seemingly tautological definition of man in his Logica nova as
"animal homificans"36 consciously rejects the ontological and conceptual
fixation ofman within a determined place in the universe. He places man
as a hypothesis or conjecture at the indefinite borderline between infinity
and finitude, able to become either, a "humana bestia" or "humanus
Deus," as Nicholas says in his own De coniecturis.

III. The Epistemology of Contraction

There is only one fixed given in the dialectic between the finite and the
infinite, the dialectic itself. Because God is always greater than the finite
mind can conceive and because his unity is a dynamic, Trinitarian unity,
man must renounce the attempt to comprehend God's essence as it is in
itself. Nicholas of Cusa's note from Lull's Liber contemplationis is:
"Sufficit homini scire te esse."37
Since the dynamic between the finite and the infinite never comes to
rest, a notional comprehension, not only of the infinite, but also of the
finite, is impossible. Lull uses the human soul as an example of this fact.
In the Liber contemplationis, in a passage copied out by Cusanus, he says:
o God! Even though we should know your essence, nevertheless
we are not able to comprehend your infinite virtues, for infinity
is above our intellect as oil on water. We are not able to

~eruenire ad gloriam tuam, quae est sine fine (Cod. Cus. 83, f. 52r-52v).
. 5Cusanus took up this definition of man from the Investigatio mixtionum
principiorum. His excerpts from this Lullian work are edited in Colomer, N. v.
Kues and R. Llull, 157-64. Cf. my edition ofthe text and the revised edition of
Cusanus's excerpts in Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina, vol. XVII (Tumhout:Brepols,
1989), op. 81.
36Cf. Logica nova-Die neue Logik, ed. by C. Lohr, transl. by W. Büchel and V.
Häsle (Hamburg, 1985), 22.
37Cod. Cus. 83, f. 55v. Cf. the Lullian text: Quia licet domine deus ego nesciam
tuam essenciam. nec sciam etiam quid sit esse meum. nec esse creaturarum.
sufficit mihi scire te esse. et scire me esse subditum tibi laude semper impendere
(Paris B.N. lat. 3348A, f. 19r).
82 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

comprehend, quid tua essentia in se sit. Which is not surprising,

because I do not even know my own SOlll in its essence, quid
scilicet sit. 38
This is true for man's knowledge of all things and not only for that of
spiritual reality since the divine unity is always implied in our thinking.
It was for this reason that Lull understood hUITlan knowledge as basically
conjectural (at least concerning his early writings, especially the Liber
contemplationis). The writings of Nicholas of C~usa, the De coniecturis for
example, reflect this understanding.
1. The structure of the act of knowledge
Although human knowledge is basically conjectural and cannot attain
the absolute precisely, man is able to see himself as a living mirror ofthe
infinite, an "image ofthe truth;' as Cusanus writes in De beryllo. Man is
not the absolute, but rather a "contracted" reflection ofthe absolute. But
because unity is necessarily adynamie, threefold unity, universal con-
traction as such cannot exist without a threefold structure. The con-
tracted unity ofthe universe cannot be "sine contrahibili, contrahente et
nexu."39
But the traces of the Trinity are found not only in the universe taken
as a whole. In the same way in which each ofGod's attributes reflects his
dynamic unity, so also each part of the universe is a trace of the Trinity
in its own contracted way. Following Lull, Cusanus understood the
process ofknowledge in analogy to the Trinity as a threefold structure. As
an image of the absolute man is not other than. "inteIligens, intelligibile
et intelligere."4o
Nicholas made detailed experts from Lull's late work De potentia,
obiecto et actu. 41 In this work Nicholas not only discovered the idea that
the structure ofhuman knowledge reflects the Trinity. He also learned, as
is clear from his notes, that the act of kno'wing is, like the inner-
trinitarian processions, the "proper" unfolding of an "intrinsic" power.
38Deus lieet tuam essentiam sciamus. tarnen virtutes infinitas tuas eomprehen-
dere nequimus/ infinitas enim super nostrum intelleetum est sieud oleum super
aquam. et sie quid tua essentia in se sit eomprehendere nequimus/ non mirum
quia meam propriam animam ignoro in sua essentia. quid scilieet sit (Cod. Cus.
83, f. 55r).
39De docta ignorantia, II. 7.
4°De docta ignorantia, I. 10.
41Written at Rome in 1296/97. Still unedited. A transeription made by M. Bauza
is at hand in the Raimundus-Lullus-Institut, Freibur!~/Breisgau. Bauza based his
transeription on the manuseript Rome, B.N. fondi minori 1832 (s. XVI), f.
519r-609v. A short form ofthe text is in the Electorium magnum, Paris, B.N. lat.
15450 and in the Breviculum ex Artibus Raimundi, Karlsruhe, St. Peter perg. 92,
cf. J. N. Hillgarth, Ramon Lull and Lullism in lf'ourteenth-Century France
(Oxford, 1971). The exeerpts of Nieholas are in Cod. Cus. 83, ed. Colomer, N.v.
Kues und R. Llull164-72.
 WINTER 83

Cusanus understood man as the living image of the divine knowing

which by knowing itself knows all other things. This idea is often found
in Nicholas's works. In his De {iliatione Dei, for example, he wrote: "Being
the intellectual living resemblance of God, the intellect knows all in
himself while knowing himself."42
In his De potentia, obiecto et actu Lull analyzed all activity-in analogy
to the divine processions ad intra and the divine creative activity ad
extra-into two principal types. He describes these types of action as
"proper" and "appropriated." The power, the object and the act of a
substance are called "proper" when they are intrinsic to the substance;
they are called "appropriated" when they are extrinsic to the substance
and not necessarily, but only contingently, the moments of its activity.
Thus burning is the proper act offire and intrinsic to it; the water that it
heats and the wood that it burns are extrinsic to it and are its "appropri-
ated," contingent objects. 43
Applied to the activity of knowledge, the power of knowing, the object
ofknowing, and the act ofknowing are understood as "proper" when ~he
intellect is, in reflecting on itself, an object to itself. But the act of
knowledge is not only a "proper;' "natural" process, which is "intrinsic" to
the knower. There is also a type ofknowledge in which the intellect turns
towards the external objects not "proper" to the knowing subject. Lull
spoke of this type of knowledge as "extrinsic" and "appropriated." When
thought turns to objects outside itself, its objects are "appropriated" to
it. 44

42Intellectus autem cum sit intellectualis viva Dei similitudo, omnia in se uno
cognoscit, dum se cognoscit (Gabriel, vol. 11, p. 640). Cf. also De venatione
sapientiae, Gabriel, vol. 1, p. 78.
43Actus proprius est substantialis, sicut ignire, qui est actus ignis et est de
essentia illius, et generare, quod est de essentia generantis et de essentia
materiae, de qua est generatus. Et actus appropriatus est accidentalis. Et hoc est,
quia transit in alienam speciem vel aliam, sicut substantia ignis, quae cum suo
calore aquam calefacit, et scriptor, qui cum sua penna litteram format, quam
scribit (Electorium magnum, Paris B.N. lat. 15450, fol. 99v).
44Potentia intellectiva se habet ad proprium intelligibile, sicut forma, quae se
habet ad suam propriam materiam, et se habet ad bonum intelligibile per
bonitatem et magnum per magnitudinem; et sie de aliis. Et ideo in bono
intelligibili se habet ad duo obiecta, videlicet ad intellectum et ad bonum. Et
intellectum est ei magis proprium obiectum quam bonum ... Sicut potentia
unum habet obiectum magis proprium quam aliud, habet in suo actu unam
naturam magis propriam quam aliam, videlicet unam naturam propriam et
aliam appropriatam (Electorium magnum, Paris B.N. lat. 15450, fol. 110v). Cf.
Cusanus's excerpt: Ad videndum sunt necesse species innatae, quae sunt de
propria obiecto et de appropriato et de propria actu et de appropriato, et
extrinsecum convertitur in intrinsecum, sicut in vegetativa dictum est (ed.
Colomer, op. cit. (above, n. 3), p. 170). The distinction between 'intrinsic' and
84 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

But the proper activity of finite things lives from appropriated objects,
like light from burning oi!. Lull teIls us extra:mental objects are assimi-
lated by the proper object, through the transformation of the extrinsic
into the proper. 45 The contact with an object acl extra serves to reveal the
constitutive activity of knowledge ad intra. lIere too Lull proceeded in
analogy to the divine activity-not ad intra, blut ad extra in creation. As
God in his activity ad extra creates real things, so man in his extrinsic
activity creates notional things. Nicholas noted from Lull's De ente reali
et rationis: "Creation is an ens reale, for the creator produces them, and at
the same time an ens rationis, for the human soul produces them."46
Lull recognized that quoad nos knowledge begins at the lowest degree
of sense perception, but maintained nevertheless that quoad se-prop-
erly-knowledge is self-reflection. Only from its highest degree is knowl-
edge ahle to perceive the conditions of its possibility. Adopting the
scholastic axiom, Nicholas of Cusa acknowledged the fact that "nihil
potest esse in intellectu, quod non prius fueJrit in sensu."47 But with
Ramon Lull he maintained nevertheless that "rlihil apprehendit intellec-
tus, quod in se ipso non reperit."48
2. The degrees of knowledge
Thus, according to Lull, in the act ofknowledge man hecomes conscious
not only of the constitutive function of his nlind with respect to the
knowledge of objects, but also of the fact that his knowing is itself a
reflection of absolute knowing. Through it mall is able to ascend from a
positive to a comparative degree ofknowledge toward a God who exists in
a superlative degree.
Lull never tired of trying to show the insllfficiency of Aristotelian
science. In his polemic against the Averroists he even maintained that the
Aristotelians confounded sense knowledge witrL reason. That he had an
inkling ofthe idea that it is not possible to comprehend intellectual things
with discursive, rational categories derived from sense knowledge is clear

'extrinsic' knowledge plays an important role in Cusanus's work and recalls

Lullian terminology. Cf. De venatione sapientiae, ed.. by Gabriel, vol. 1, p. 184;
Compendium, ed. by Gabriel, vol. 2, p. 720; De beryllo, ed. by Gabriel, vol. 3 p. 8;
De ludo globi, ed. by Gabriel, vol. 3, p. 336; De aequalitate, ed. by Gabriel, vol. 3,
pp. 366, 368, 370.
450biectum appropriatum est per accidens, et est illud extraneum proprinquum,
de quo vivit proprium per conversionem extranei in proprium, sicut lumen vivit
de oleo. Per quod patet, quod proprium appetit appropriatum, ut durare possit
cum suo proprio et se habere ad illud (Electorium magnum, Paris B.N.lat. 15450,
fol. 99v).
46Colomer, N.v. Kues und R. Llull, 185. Cf. De beryllo, 8.
47Idiota de mente, ed. Gabriel, vol. 3, p. 494.
48De venatione sapientiae, 134.
 WINTER 85

from an excerpt that Nicholas made from the Liber contemplationis:

"People who want to be subtle in intellectual things with the aid of
sensual knowledge blunt their mind and destroy its power and way of
knowing. 49 Lull also connected this idea with a notion which he developed
in his De ascensu et descensu intellectus. 5o Because it is solely in the first,
simple principle that truth and certainty can be found, the intellect must
seek to ascend from contingent multiplicity to the necessary One.
By rising above sense perception, imagination and reason, mind comes
to the realization that the oppositions which appear in thinking multi-
plicity are transcended in God. Mind knows God as a first principle
preceding all opposition and multiplicity. In descending from this insight,
mind sees its own truth as a representation of the absolute and its
reflection-thus constituted by the first principle-as penetrating all the
multiple forms it encounters in the world. Since the higher ontological
status of the absolute guarantees the higher, absolute certainty of
knowledge, it is necessary, as Lull wrote in his Lectura super artem
inventivam, "that the intellect ascend above inferior natures to an
understanding which is in accordance with the nature of the creator
himself."51
This does not mean that the intellect seeks an insight into the nature
ofthe creator. Lull separates strictly the levels ofknowledge. The intellect
is able to comprehend inferior natures in accordance with its own nature.
But to rise higher the intellect has to transcend itself. The intellect has to
transcend the essential characteristic of its knowing, reflection itself,
because man is never able completely to reflect the absolute. As Cusanus
would have said, there is no proportion between the infinite and the finite.
Nicholas noted the idea of an intellectual ascent toward the absolute in
his excerpts from Lull's Ars mystica and Metaphysica nova.5 2 He found
the same idea in the Liber contemplationis and in a marginal note he
shows that he related his excerpts to Lull's De ascensu et descensu
intellectus: "Pro isto nota librum de ascensu et descensu intellectus."53
Thus both Lull and Cusanus rejected the Aristotelian epistemology
with its one-dimensional conception of knowledge. Both Lull and Cusa-
nus postulated different types of knowledge for different types of reality.
49Hinc qui in intellectualibus sensualiter subtiles esse uolunt suum ebetant ualde
intellectum et destruunt virtutem et modum intelligendi. ratio huius est quia
subtilitas intellectualis est in anima et sensualis in sensibus (Cod. Cus. 83, f. 59v).
50Nicholas possessed this work, Cod. Cus. 83, f. 229r-273v.
51. .. ut intellectus ascendat supra naturas, quae sub eo existunt, et illas
intelligat secundum suam naturam, et quod mortificet suam naturam, et ascen-
dat ad intelligendum non secundum suam naturam, sed secundum naturam sui
creatoris (Beati Raymundi Lulli Opera), vol. V, p. 370.
52Ed. Colomer, N.v. Kues und R. Llull, 132-37.
53Cod. Cus. 83, f. 59v.
86 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

But although there is a high degree of agreement between the method of

Lull and that of Cusanus, there are significal1lt differences as weIl. The
idea of an intellectual ascent and descent was important for both
thinkers, but it was developed by them in diffi~rent ways. Whereas Lull
arrived through his ascent at an Ars, an encyclopedia of the sciences,
Nicholas emphasized the subjective power of tb.e intellect.
Influenced by the humanist conception ofma.:n, Cusanus kept clearly in
view the dialectic involved in the ascent and tlle descent of the intellect.
He connected the idea of ascent and descent with the Neoplatonically
colored scheme of an emanation of creatures from, and a reduction of
them to, God-especially as it appeared in Albert the Great's idea ofthe
exitus and reditus of the divine ideas. 54
Cusanus also distinguished not only de facto, but also terminologically
between the two higher degrees of knowledge as ratio and intellectus.
Both Lull and Cusanus recognized the role of sense perception; for both,
knowledge begins with the senses. Both maintained that the knowledge
of the senses and the imagination offers a basis only for probable
knowledge. Both recognized that it is therefore not possible to use sense
knowledge and reason (which in itsjudgments presupposes sense knowl-
edge as a model for all types ofknowledge). But (~usanus alone formulated
explicitly the necessity of a third, highest degree of intellectual knowl-
edge which constitutes the basis of the lower degrees of knowledge. For
Nicholas, intellectual knowledge alone is capable, not of comprehending,
but at least of apprehending, the absolute m,aximum. To attain this
maximum man must necessarily "spit out"-as Nicholas says in the De
docta ignorantia-sense-perception, imaginatioll, and reason to arrive at
the most simple knowledge ofthe intellect. 55
Whereas Lull began his philosophy of love at this point, since the will
is the only faculty of the soul capable of accom.plishing the will of God
without reflection, Cusanus postulated here a nlystical theology beyond
the principle of contradiction on which Aristote!lian science is based. In
the De visione Dei he maintained that man must seek truth beyond the

54Cf. M. Führer, "A Comparison of Nicholas of Cusa and Saint Albert the Great
on the Role of Intellect in the Triplicis Vita" (Paper presented to the American
,Cusanus Society at Univ. ofMichigan, 1987, 18pp).
.55Sed ipsum (maximum) super omnia illa est, ita quod illa, quae aut per sensum
aut imaginationem aut rationem cum materialibuB appendiciis attinguntur,
necessario evomere oporteat, ut ad simplicissimam et abstractissimam intelligen-
tiam perveniamus, ubi omnia sunt unum, ubi linea sit triangulus, circulus et
sphaera, ubi unitas sit trinitas et e converso, ubi aecidens sit substantia, ubi
corpus sit spiritus, motus sit quies et cetera huiusmodi (De docta ignorantia I. 10).
 WINTER 87

capacity of reason-at the very point where its impossibility is encoun-

tered. The more this impossibility is admitted, "tanto verius necessitas
relucet et minus velate adest et appropinquat."56
It was in the attempt to go beyond the Aristotelian epistemology that
Nicholas's originality lay. Lull was able to show the insufficiency of
Aristotelian science and its epistemology. He played an important role in
the development of a theory of subjectivity. But he did not really go
beyond the first principle of Aristotelian science-the principle of non-
contradiction. The elaboration of the doctrine of the coincidentia opposi-
torum as an attempt to overcome this principle remains the specific
historical achievement of Nicholas of Cusa.

Raimundus Lullus Institut,

University ofFreiburg, Germany

56Ed. by Gabriel, vol. 111, p. 133.