FAILURE OF THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION TO SHED MUCH LIGHT ON THE BLACK BOX

What is the contribution of cognitive psychology to our understanding of the shape of psychophysical
functions? For instance, what can cognitive‐process research tell us about the S‐shaped value function
supposed by prospect theory (i.e., a shape that is concave for gains and convex for losses; Kahneman &
Tversky, 2000)? As presupposed in this question, the goal of cognitive psychology is to illuminate the
black box between stimulus input and behavioural output—the neglect of which was considered the
main weakness of behaviourism. So what has cognitive research revealed about black boxes in
psychophysics? What cognitive processes can explain why and how a negatively accelerated function
renders 200 € less than two times 100 €? Or, why is the (negative) value function for losses steeper than
the (positive) value function for gains?

Frankly speaking, cognitive research has hardly anything to say about mechanisms that translate
objective into subjective quantities. To be sure, the steeper function for losses than for gains has been
called “loss aversion,” or neuro‐psychologists and neuro‐economists have mapped loss experiences onto
specific brain regions. However, neither relabeling a function shape as “loss aversion” nor locating it in
brain anatomy illuminates the black box.

This is not to say that there has been no fruitful research on prospect theory's subjective value function.
On the contrary, cognitive decision research has revealed a lot about time discounting (the decline of
value with delay time; Doyle, 2013), the impact of psychological distance (Sagristano, Trope, &
Liberman, 2002), scope insensitivity (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001), or preference reversals due to verbal
reframing of decision options (McKenzie & Nelson, 2003). The degree of precision and sophistication in
this research can be impressive; for instance, time discounting may be shown to obey a hyperbolic
function (Doyle, 2013). However, notably, the knowledge generated in cognitive decision research is
again functional knowledge derived from the controlled manipulation of different types of stimuli, task
instructions or environmental influences that trigger affective states. When cognitive decision research
is doubtlessly productive, it typically helps to refine the functions relating preferences to environmental
stimuli and circumstances but rarely provides cogent evidence for one specific algorithm. Moreover,
intrapsychic constructs, such as “loss aversion,” turn out on closer inspection to reflect functional
relationships in the environment, such as the unequal distribution of monetary losses (right‐skewed)
versus gains (left‐skewed) in the environment (Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006).