A New Concept of Airport Security Screening
Yesna 0. Yildiz, Douglas Q. Abraham, Karen Panetta, and Sos Agaian
Abstract- Airport security measures serve to protect the
traveling public, crew and aircraft. . According to the TSA, over
600 million passengers travel on commercial airlines and more
than 700 million pieces of luggage are screened each year [2].
With such a large number of people traveling, airports and
aircraft have become natural targets for terrorists. We propose a
new concept of airport security screening measures that connects
all airport security screening equipment for passengers and their
belongings together from the onset of their check-in. Utilizing
historical and profiling passenger information and the global
security threat level to adapt and optimize the screening level and
process for each screening device, it will streamline all check-in
activities while drastically improving the overall quality of
screening.
Index Terms-Airport security, EDS, passenger profiling
I. INTRODUCTION
According to a report released by the U.S. Secretary of
Transportation, aviation delays will grow without any
significant reform, as the number of passengers carried by
U.S. commercial air carriers is on track to hit the one billion
mark by 2015 [1]. Aviation delays could result from airport
screening operations from the growing number of travelers,
and the risk of reduced screening quality could become a
serious hazard as screening lanes become more and more
congested.
We propose a new concept of airport security screening
measures that connects all airport security screening
equipment for passengers and their belongings together from
the onset of their check-in. Utilizing historical and profiling
passenger information and the global security threat level to
adapt and optimize the screening level and process for each
screening device, it will streamline all check-in activities
while drastically improving the overall quality of screening
while reducing overall operational costs..
We propose to use Explosive Detection Systems (EDS or
Auto-EDS) for checked baggage and for carry on baggage
screening, and mitigate their relatively high False Alarm Rates
(FAR) with passenger profiling and historical data, so as to
significantly reduce the FAR and search time delays from
what they are presently. This measure will also reduce the
Transportation Security Officer (TSO) staffing requirements
while improving screening quality and streamlining
throughput.
We propose to use intelligent metal detectors at the
checkpoint, which only allows passengers through one at a
time, and entry into the detector is only possible with a ticket
and validation and verification from the profiling database.
978-1-4244- 1978-4/08/$25.00 02008 IEEE
The intelligent detector will also have localization metrics
which can be compared to the passenger profile to allow
passengers with prosthetic limbs and the like to travel through
while still maintaining absolute security. In effect, the metal
detectors can now be unmanned by TSA personnel only
needing slight supervision thus providing for less TSO staffing
and higher passenger throughputs.
Other ancillary screening equipment such as puffers, face
recognition systems, trace, etc. can also be integrated into this
global security concept. All equipment will be linked to a
centralized database that contains historical travel and
background information for each passenger. The database will
then determine the detection sensitivity levels for the
screening equipment based upon his/her profile and the overall
global threat level. Passenger's unknown to the database will
receive the strictest screening criteria which is significantly
more aggressive than today's currently implemented
standards.
Passengers will tag their belongings through positive means
of identification which is generated during the check-in
process, either at the counter or at a kiosk. The screening
equipment will recognize this identification, consult the
central database, and adjust the screening level for that
passenger's item accordingly.
The proposed concept of airport security screening
measures will reduce the passenger delay at the more than 700
checkpoints operated by the TSA, in addition to saving
significant operational costs as well as increasing the overall
security to the traveling public.
This paper is divided into the following sections: Section II
gives background information about current airport security
measures, Section III states the problem and Section IV
proposes solution and Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Current Processes
Airport security measures serve to protect the traveling
public, crew and aircraft. According to the TSA, over 600
million passengers travel on commercial airlines and more
than 700 million pieces of luggage are screened each year [2].
With such a large number of people traveling, airports and
aircraft have become natural targets for terrorists. September
11 attacks and several terrorist plans uncovered recently have
contributed to the increasing concern for the traveling public.
Currently, airport security in the US is comprised of several
layers. During check-in, passengers have to provide
identification and answer questions about the contents of their
bags. Once checked in, they go through metal detectors and
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their carry-on baggage goes through mainly conventional X-
ray equipment. Their checked baggage goes through
Explosive Detection Systems before boarding the flight.
Passengers are limited in the amount if liquids/gels they can
bring into the aircraft. All these layers of security try to
accomplish screening for identification, metals, prohibited
items and explosives of various forms. Below is a review of
the most common current airport security technologies. This
review does not include all screening modalities out there
today.
B. Current Technologies Metal Detectors
All passengers must go through walk-through metal
detectors at the entrance to the security checkpoints. These
devices have various sensitivity settings and can alarm at
anything from belt buckles to guns. These sensitivity settings
are fixed for each passenger. They need a Transportation
Security Officer (TSO) to operate. The TSO checks the
detection result which is a beep or light in the case of metal
detected. He also checks the passenger ticket to verify if the
passenger is a selectee. The selectees and those passengers
that fail the detection including passengers with prosthetic
limbs are diverted to the 'wand area' shown in Fig. 1
C. Current Technologies Conventional X-ray scanners
All carry-on baggage goes through X-ray scanners at the
checkpoint. These scanners are called TRX for TIP Ready X-
ray where TIP is software that checks the vigilance of
screeners. These scanners may use a dual energy to
differentiate organic and inorganic materials in bags/bins.
However, these systems take projection readings of the
contents of a bag/bin and produce 2-D images. Therefore, the
operators cannot see through or under objects. The passengers
remove their 3-1-I's and laptops from their bags. Since
Improvised Explosive Devices could be built using laptops as
housing, these are scanned separately to better see the
internals. TRX scanners cannot reliably detect explosives [3].
If there is a non-discernible object or a prohibited item in a
bag/bin, the TSO will call for a manual search and/or trace to
check for explosive residue.
D. Current Technologies Explosive Detection Systems
All checked luggage goes through Explosive Detection
Systems (EDS) before being uploaded to the aircraft. The
EDS devices use computed axial tomography (CAT), much
like medical scanners. Unlike conventional X-ray systems, the
device displays objects in three dimensions. The technology is
intended to enhance safety by providing explosive detection
techniques that are beyond the capability of conventional X-
ray systems. Whereas the conventional X-ray systems take
readings of passenger bags at several angles, the Auto-EDS
o F
II
and 3-D image sets for detecting the presence of explosives is
then performed automatically by Auto-EDS. The results are
then forwarded to human screeners for final review and
resolution. The final determination as to whether the luggage
contains an explosive and needs to be searched manually is
performed by trained TSA screeners following an approved
TSA protocol. The TSA protocol has the screeners visually
inspect the projection images and the renderings of the
automated explosive results from detection to determine if the
luggage needs to be suspected and consequently searched.

_
TRX

TR)

TRX
WAND

A
A

WAND AREA

WAND ARIEA

A
AREA

Fig. 1 Example checkpoint

uD

uD

u
B

=:D B

>B

8B

The above figure shows a typical checkpoint for large

1

airports. At the entry to the checkpoint, there is one or more

TSOs labeled F. This TSO checks passengers for their tickets
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EC
LU
CD
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2

Ld

and valid identification. This TSO will indicate on the ticket if

the passenger is a selectee or not. Selectee passengers are
wanded down in the 'wand area' by the TSO labeled D and all
of their carry-ons must be manually searched by the TSO
labeled B. There is one entry to the security checkpoint. The
figure shows the current metal detectors manned by a TSO
A
H
m
v

devices revolve around the passenger bags or bins, producing
hundreds of images from all angles that are then reconstructed
to form several 2-D and 3-D images of the contents of a bag or
bin. The 2-D images produced are the projection images much
like the conventional X-ray scanners and axial images of the
bag/bin. The axial images are compiled to produce the 3-D
volumetric images. Extensive data manipulation of the 2-D
labeled E. TSOs labeled A screen the passenger cary-ons
using the TRX systems. TSOs labeled C return the bins. TRX
systems usually do not have Bin Return Systems, so the bins
used by passengers to place their laptops and 3-1-Is have to be
manually returned. In this example, there are 22 TSOs not
including the manager to operate 6 lanes. This number could
be more or less depending on the size of the airport, the time

445
of the day and year.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The TSA operates about 781 checkpoints across the US
with about 43,000 TSOs nationwide for both carry-on and
checked baggage [2]. The average TSO compensation is about
$70K per year [4]. This comes out to 3 billion dollars spent in
screening compensation alone. With all the current layers of
security and 3 billion dollars spent per year, there is still great
room for improvement. Each year, undercover TSA agents
attempt to get forbidden items through the security check
points. In 2006, they succeed more than 60% of the time in
several major airports [5].
The quality of screening could be improved significantly by
checking for explosives and prohibited items automatically
using the Auto-EDS devices at the security checkpoints.
However, these devices have large FARs making their use
impractical at the checkpoint. Each false alarm requires
manual search increasing staffing needs and operational costs.
The throughput or passenger and bag flow through the
airports could also be improved. Currently, passengers have to
remove their shoes, remove their laptops and 3-1-Is and place
them in bins which slow the passenger flow.
The problem this paper tries to resolve is how to provide
new screening solutions for the TSA that clearly have lower
operational costs than what they have today, and which also
provide an improved quality of screening and throughput with
inherent migration paths that meet the ever increasing future
screening needs of the TSA.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The problem stated above could be solved by combining
various approaches. The operational costs could be reduced by
designing new screening technologies that reduce staff either
at checkpoints or for checked bags while maintaining the
current screening standards.
Another part of the solution is to improve screening quality.
Reducing the FAR of the Auto-EDS devices would enable
their usage at the security checkpoints which would
significantly improve the screening quality.
Yet another component in the solution is improving the
screening process flow i.e. passenger flow for checkpoints and
bag flow for checked luggage. This section will present each
of these approaches to arrive at the final solution.
A. Dynamic Thresholds for all screening modalities
All travelers within the traveling public can be represented
with an associated risk factor R(p,t), which is a function of the
probability factor P(t) or in other words, P(t) is the degree to
which that passenger may or may not have an intention or
intentions to sabotage, injure or otherwise cause harm to
innocent members of the traveling public.
R(p,t) = f(p,P(t)) (1)
Where P(t) is the passenger probability of intentional
endangerment at a given time, and R(p,t) is the passenger
related risk factor for that same time period.
446
This risk factor when derived as we will see, can then be
used to modify the screening quality thresholds T, for all of
the screening modalities in which that passenger or their
belongings engages with at the airport, mainly their checked
baggage, their carryon baggage and their bodily person as a
whole.
T(p,t,m) = f(R(p,t),m)
(2)
Where T(p,t,m) is the modality threshold and m is the
screening modality
The impetus for modifying screening quality versus the
associated risk factor, is to provide for an even higher quality
threshold or degree of screening than what exists today, while
at the same time reducing the already too high operating costs
associated with manual searching of false alarm bags output
from today's current high quality screening equipment which
has too high, meaning double digit, false alarm rates and
which are already implemented across all of the larger
airports. This significant reduction in false alarm rate comes
about because low risk passengers do not require the same
screening ethics as high risk passengers do because their
probability of intentional endangerment is essentially zero.
Statistical randomizations increasing screening quality are also
employed to ensure that even low risk passengers do not
represent risk.
The current TSA screening requirements for baggage
machines, mainly EDS for checked and auto-EDS or TRX for
carry-on are flat, meaning that they see or detect above certain
mass thresholds with certain associated probabilities of detect
and certain false alarm rates. The TSA has set strict and
classified criteria for all three of these variables, and multiple
sets of these criteria exist to cover the many types of
explosives being tested and the various machine modalities.
The test as to whether a modality meets the TSA criteria is
black and white, meaning its pass or fail. Only three
companies to date have passed this strict TSA certification
standard for EDS.
A significant amount of time and money is spent both by
the TSL, the lab where the TSA tests the new explosives
detection equipment, and the manufacturers of the equipment
in getting a new device to pass the TSA current certification
standards or in getting an old device to pass new certification
standards. Some manufacturers can never get their equipment
to pass the standards even after a significant amount time and
cost investments, yet they come close to this absolute bar. In
today's environment, when the TSA needs or wants to change
screening thresholds, a significant time delay is associated
with this change and even then some manufactures may not
meet these new screening requirements set by the TSA.
Modifying screening quality thresholds is new paradigm to
the way that new screening equipment and old currently used
screening equipment would be certified as the passing criteria
would not be as black and white as it once was. Taking into
account passenger risk means that multiple or dynamic
thresholds now apply and take the place of the once fixed ones
allowing for more competition from other manufacturers and
more competitive products and thus lower cost products for
the TSA.
 The TSA has instituted an official national threat awareness
program which has been instituted at all airports within the
United States, and is currently used today. This program
incorporates five threat levels, and uses a color spectrum
ranging from red, which represents the highest threat alert
status, to blue which represents the lowest threat level status,
and is used to aid in nationally controlling aviation
transportation safety for the traveling public. The TSA has the
ability to change the national threat level in essentially no time
at all throughout the nation's airports, but the EDS equipment
fails to track the TSA needs necessary for higher quality
screening during these high risk times because of the current
flat threshold implementation across EDS equipment.
Using the concept of dynamic threshold screening now
allows this national traveling security factor N, to be
integrated into the dynamic threshold factor making it possible
for the TSA to change not only the awareness at airports, but
also the actual screening quality.
Tn(N,p,t,m) = f(N(t),R(p,t),m) (3)
Where Tn(N,p,t,m) is the modality specific threshold as a
function of national security level and associated passenger
risk factor.
Finally, a randomized pseudo deterministic variable d(p,t)
specific for each passenger at the current time in the database
is added to ensure that all passengers, especially low risk ones,
still engage with high quality screening at known intervals to
ensure that the lowest possible risk is maintained for the
traveling public.
Tf(N,p,t,m) = Tn(N,p,t,m) + d(p,t) (4)
The probability of endangerment P(t) at the current time t is
determined for each passenger through profiling. The
background of a passenger, how often they fly, the time of
ticket purchase all contribute to the risk and probability
associated with each passenger. A centralized database will
contain all the historical travel and background information
for each passenger. Based on the time of year, and the national
security level this system will calculate the thresholds for each
of the screening modalities for each passenger. All screening
equipment will be linked to this database. Passenger's
unknown to the database will receive the strictest screening
criteria which is significantly more aggressive than today's
standards.
B. Auto-EDSfor checkpoints
The decision to manually search a bag is determined by the
ability to resolve potential threats in bags/bins. The Auto-
EDS devices display 3-D volumetric images, projection
images and slices of a bag/bin. Having a 3-D image versus a
2-D image where objects are superposed significantly
increases the operators' ability to resolve potential threats.
The TRX systems do not possess the same degree of
automatic explosive detection capabilities that EDS systems
do. Therefore, the operators need to search for objects in
bags/bins that could be parts of Improvised Explosive
447
Devices. They also need to search for objects that could be
prohibited items like guns, knives, etc.
The Auto-EDS devices also have automatic search for
prohibited items. Examining the bag/bin and the results of the
automatic detection, the TSO is the final review to decide if a
bag /bin needs to be searched. However, having the automatic
detection results for both explosives and prohibited items
significantly improves the screening quality and enhances
safety.
The link to the centralized database will allow the system to
know the passengers and dynamically adjust its detection
sensitivity levels. This will significantly reduce the FARs.
Each percent of FAR reduction is about 25 million dollars
savings to the TSA [4]. The reduction in FAR will make the
Auto-EDS devices a viable option the for carry-on screening.
These devices come with a Bin Return System which will
reduce TSA staffing requirements.
C. Smart Metal Detectors
The purpose ofthe smart metal detector is to reduce staffing
requirements and improve the overall checkpoint flow through
process. It behaves as a gate to the screening lanes that checks
the passengers for metals and verifies their ticket or badge to
enter the checkpoint. If the passenger ticket indicates that s/he
is a selectee or the detector has found the passenger to be
suspect, then the gate to the 'wand' area opens up giving
access to only this area. If the passenger ticket indicates that
s/he is not a selectee and the detector does not register metal
or explosives in the shoes, then the gate to the reclamation
area opens up and directs the passenger to the carry-on
screening equipment.
The device will have segmented detection with intelligent
registration. Along with its connection to the centralized
database, this will allow the device to recognize and mitigate
passengers with prosthetic limbs and the like. Since it checks
the passenger ticket and diverts the passenger to the correct
area, it needs no TSO to operate representing significant
operational costs to the TSA. Having integral EDS shoe
screening allows passengers to keep their shoes on
significantly increasing the checkpoint throughput and
organization of the flowing passengers.
 congested. With such a large number of people traveling,
airports and aircraft have become natural targets for terrorists.
September 11 attacks and several terrorist plans uncovered
WAND AREA D B
have contributed to the increasing concern for the traveling
public.
Currently, airport security in the US is comprised of several
layers. All these layers of security try to accomplish screening
, A for identification, metals, prohibited items and explosives of
various forms. With all the current layers of security and 3
billion dollars spent per year, there is still great room for
~ A improvement. Each year, undercover TSA agents attempt to
get forbidden items through the security check points. In 2006,
they succeed more than 60% of the time in several major
airports [5].
VAND AREA B
This paper offers a solution with new screening solutions
w
F for the TSA that clearly have lower operational costs than
what they have today, and which also provide an improved
A
quality of screening and throughput with inherent migration
paths that meet the ever increasing future screening needs of
the TSA.
A The proposed solution is composed of knowing the
EDS traveling public through passenger profiling, linking all
security screening equipment to a centralized database, using
Auto-EDS devices for carry-on baggage screening and smart
WAND AREA D B metal detectors for passenger screening. All screening
modalities will have dynamic detection sensitivity settings that
EDS
will depend on the passenger, time of year and national
security level.
:A The proposed concept of airport security screening
measures will reduce the passenger delay at the more than 700
Fig. 2 New checkpoint
checkpoints operated by the TSA, in addition to saving
The above figure shows an example checkpoint with tt ie significant operational costs as well as increasing the overall
proposed solution. With the smart metal detectors, the TSZnC), security to the traveling public.
labeled E in Fig. 1 are removed since the smart metal det ectors
REFERENCES
do not need to be manned. The TSOs labeled C in Fig. 1 vxho
manually returned the bins are also removed since the Auito- [1] FAA Air Traffic Organization, "2005 Annual Performance Report"
[2] www.tsa. gov
EDS devices have Bin Return Systems. The number of T SOs [3] S. Ohr "Bomb detector technology tops X-ray's effectiveness", EE
labeled B is reduced since there will be less manual searc,h Times, 01/07/1995
necessary using the Auto-EDS with dynamic detection le vels [4] D. Abraham, Analogic Corporation Internal Memo
that rely on passenger profiling. [5] The USA Today, October 18,2007
The number of TSOs in Fig. 2 is 13 not including the [6]
[7] www.faa.gov
manager. Compared to Fig. 1 which represents current
checkpoints, this is about 40% reduction in staffing. The smart
metal detector and Bin Return System alone is responsiblle for
about 30% reduction. This reduction could potentially saive the
TSA about 1 billion dollars in compensation besides the
improved screening quality, higher throughput and an
organized flow.

V. CONCLUSION
According to a report released by the U.S. Secretary of
Transportation, aviation delays will grow without any
significant reform, as the number of passengers carried by
U.S. commercial air carriers is on track to hit the one billion
mark by 2015 [1]. Aviation delays could result from airport
screening operations from the growing number of travelers,
and the risk of reduced screening quality could become a
serious hazard as screening lanes become more and more

448