Part IV

PART IV
SETTLEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES
A. W O R K S C O M M IT T E E S
T he W orks C om niittee w as intro d u ced into In d ia , fo r th e first tim e,

b y th e In d u strial D isp u tes A ct, 1947 to try to p ro m o te g o o d in d u stria l
relations an d to reconcile differences betw een the w orkers and th e m anage
m ent. Section 3 authorises th e “ a p p ro p ria te g o v ern m en t” to req u ire any
em ployer having a h u n d re d or m o re -wcrlcers to set u p such a com m ittee.
Such com m ittee is to consist o f an equ al n u m b er o f representatives o f
lab o u r a n d m anagem ent. W here th e a p p ro p riate governm ent is the
C entral G overnm ent, th e worlcers’ representatives are to b e elected in
such a m anner th a t all categories, g roups, an d classes o f w orkm en engag
ed in various sections, shops, o r d epartm ents get representation^; the
representatives to be n o m in ated by the C om pany sim ilarly are to be
selected in accordance w ith th e rules^, and m u st be officials in direct
to u c h w ith or associated w ith th e w orking o f th e establishment.®
N O R T H B R O O K JU T E C O M PA N Y v. T H E IR W O R K M E N
Suprem e Court, (1960) I L .L .J. 580
[The com pany p ro p o sed to in tro d u ce a ra tio n alisatio n schem e, to

which th e u nion did n o t agree. T h e W orks C om m ittee m et in extra
ordinary session and considered an d accepted th e com pany’s p ro posal.
The com pany gave notice under section 9A o f th e A ct o f changes in
service conditions to correspond w ith th e scheme as th u s accepted.
1. Rule 39, Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957.

2. Rules 38 to 57 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957.
3. Rule 40, Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957.
WORKS COMMITTEES 225
T h e u n io n raised an in d u strial dispute. T h ereafter th e com pany

im plem ented the scheme. T he w orkers refused to do the ad d itio n al w ork
it required . T he co m pany declared a lock-out. F o u r days la ter, a settle
m ent w as reached betw een the u n io n an d th e com pany coucerning the
ratio n alisa tio n schem e. T he p arties co u ld n o t agree, how ever, concern
ing th e p ay m en t o f wages fo r th e lo ck -p u t period. T his d isp u te was
referred fo r adju d icatio n . T h e in d u strial trib u n a l held th a t th e com pany
im plem enting tn e ra tio n a lisa tio n schem e in reliance on th e decision o f
the W o rk s C o m m ittee, w hile a dispute was p ending was in contravention
o f section 33 o f th e A ct. H ence, th e lock-out declared by the com pany
was illegal. T he w orkers m ust b e p a id w ages fo r th a t period. T he
com pan y app lied fo r and o btained special leave from the Suprem e
Court,. E xcerpts fro m th e ju d g m en t o f the C o u rt, delivered by D as
G u p ta, J. follow :]
L ang u ag e used by th e legislature m akes it clear th a t the W orks

C om m ittee was n o t intended to su p p lan t o r supersede the unions for the
purpose o f collective bargaining; they are n o t authorised to consider
real or su b stan tial changes in the con d itio n s o f service; th e ir task is only
to sm o o th aw ay frictio n th a t m ight arise betw een th e w orkm en an d the
m anag em en t in day to day w o rk . By no stretch o f im agination can it
be said th a t the duties an d functions o f the W orks Com m ittee included
th e decision on such a n im p o rta n t m a tte r as th e alterations in th e condi
tions o f service b y ratio n alisatio n . T o p ro m o te m easures for securing
a n d preserving am ity a n d good relatio n s betw een th e em ployer a n d w ork
m en is th e ir real fu n ctio n an d to th a t end they are authorised to com
m ent u p o n m atters o f th eir com m on concern o r interest and endeavour
to com pose any m aterial differences o f o p in io n in respect o f such
m atters. T h e questio n o f in tro d u ctio n o f a ratio nalisation schem e m ay
b e said to be a m a tte r o f com m on interest betw een the em ployers and
w orkm en; b u t th e d u ty an d au th o rity o f th e w orks com m ittee could n o t
extend to an y th in g m o re th a n m aking com m ents thereu p o n and to endea
v o u r to com pose an y m aterial difference o f opinion in respect o f such
m atters. N either “ com m ents” n o r th e “ en d eav o ur” could be held to
extend to deciding th e question o n w hich differences have arisen o r are
likely (to arise) one w ay o r th e other. I t was rig h tly pointed out b y the
L abour A p p ellate T rib u n a l in Kem p & Co. L id . v. Their W orkm en
(1955) I L L J 48 a t 53 th a t ;
[T]he w orks com m ittees are n o rm ally concerned w ith problem s

arising in th e d ay to day w orking o f th e concern a n d th e fu nctions
o f th e w orks com m ittees are to ascertain th e grievances o f the e m p lo
yees a n d w hen occasion arises to arriv e a t som e agreem ent also.
B u t th e fu n ctio n a n d the responsibility o f th e w orks com m m ittees
226 LABOUR LAW AND LABOUR RELATIONS
as their very n o m en clatu re indicates can n o t go bey o n d recom m en

datio n and as such they are m ore or less bodies w ho in th e iirst
instance endeavour to com pose the differences an d th e final decision
rests with the u n io n as a whole.
The fact th a t th e vyorkmen’s representatives on th e w orks com m ittee

agreed to the in tro d u ctio n o f th e ra tio n a lisa tio n schem e therefore, is in
no w ay binding o n th e w orkm en or their union. (T he a p p eal was,
accordingly dism issed.)
N O TES
]. C onsider th e follow ing recom m endations ■oF the N a tio n al

C om m ission o n Laboxir :
W e consider th a t th e effectiveness of these com m ittees will depend

on th e follow ing factors :
(a) a m ore responsive attitu d e on the p a rt o f m anagem ent;
(b) adequate su p p o rt from unions;
(c) p ro p er ap p reciatio n o f th e scope a n d functions o f th e w orks
com m ittees;
(d) w hole-hearted im plem entation o f the recom m endations o f the
w orks com m ittees; an d
(e) pro p er co o rd in atio n o f th e functions o f th e m u ltip le b ip a rtite
in stitu tio n s at th e p la n t level now in vogue.
Even at th e risk o f repeating th e obvious, we m ention a vital p o int

w hich requires to be recognised. It is the creatio n o f an atm os
p here o f tru st o n b o th sides. U n io n s should feel th a t m anagem ent
is n o t side-tracking th e elfective u n io n th ro u g h a w orks com m ittee.
M anagem ent should equally realise th a t som e o f th eir k now n p re ro
gatives are m eant to be p arted with. Basic to th e success o f such
u n it level com m ittees is u n io n recognition. W here a recognised
u n io n exists, as u n d er th e B IR A ct, an d it h as accepted th e responsi
b ility of the arran g em en t, jo in t com m ittees have a b e tter show ing.
W e take th is as a pointer to o u r recom m endations.
W e have recom m ended elsewhere com pulsory recognition o f unions

in establishm ents em ploying 100 o r m ore w orkers and in u n its above
a stipulated capital investm ent. T he sam e stip u latio n a b o u t size
should apply to fo rm atio n o f w orks com m ittees u n d er new arrange
m ent. The m ain chaiige th a t we recom m end— a n d in o u r view is a
fundam ental one-is in regard to representation o f th e w orkers’ side
WORKS COMMITTEES 111
on th e w orks com m ittee. T h e recognised union sh o u ld be given

th e rig h t to n o m in ate all w orker m em bers o n this body. W ith
u n io n reco g n itio n ob lig ato ry , th is w ould elim inate th e m o st im por
t a n t cause o f conflict an d an tip ath y betw een unions a n d w orks
com m ittees. O th e r hurdles such as (a) a p a th y o f the m anagem ent;
(b) vagueness reg ard in g th e exact scope o f its functions; (c) in ade
q u a te im plem entation o f u n an im o u s co nclusions, will all fall in
th e ir p ro p e r place. T aking th e suggestions o f th e IL C regarding
th e scope an d fu n ctio n s o f w orks com m ittees, already refered to , as
a gu id e, division o f functions betw een th e recognised u n io n an d th e
w orks com m ittee should be a m atter o f agreem ent betw een th e
em ployer an d th e recognised u n io n . See R eport o f the N ational
Com m ission on Labour p. 343 (1969),
2. In B om bay Gas Company v. Their W orkm en, (1950) L .L J . 705

(I.T .), th e U n io n dem anded th a t the rig h t o f officials o f th e U n io n to
atten d th e m eetings o f th e W orks C om m ittee in a n advisory capacity be
recognized, an d th a t the agenda an d m inutes o f the m eetings be sent to
th e U n io n . This was an analogy to a provision in the Bombay Industrial
R elations A ct respecting jo in t com m ittees w hich provides th a t “ a re
presentative o f th e registered trad e u n io n m ay a tten d any m eeting o f the
jo in t com m ittee to advise the m em bers representing the em ployees.” The
In d ustrial T rib u n a l, B om bay, held th a t th e circum stances un d er w hich
jo in t com m ittees w ere form ed w ere different from those relatin g to
fo rm atio n o f W orks C om m ittees. T h e T rib u n a l p o in ted o u t th a t rule 48
(a t present 54) o f th e C entral R ules provides th a t the W orks C om m ittee
shall have th e rig h t to co o p t in a consultative capacity persons em ployed
in the estab lish m en t having p a rtic u la r or special know ledge o f a m a tte r
under discussion. B u t it nevertheless rejected th e dem and o f th e U n io n
to p artic ip a te in th e m eetings o f th e W orks C om m ittees and to receive
the agenda and m in u tes as a m a tte r o f right.
3. In E lgin M ills Co. L td . v. Su ti M ills M azdoor Union, Kanpur,

(1951) I L .L .J. 184 (L .A .T .) P a n n a L ai, a clerk in the M ill, was dism is
sed. T h e U n io n raised an in d u strial dispute. A B oard o f C onciliation,
established fo r th e d ispute, dism issed th e U n io n ’s application on the
ground th a t P a n n a L a i h a d n o t in th e first instance ap proached the
W orks C om m ittee. T h e U n io n appealed. T h e Indu strial C o u rt held
th a t th ere w as no b a r to the entertain m en t o f th e dispute by the B oard
o f C onciliation. T he T ribunal ord ered th e rein statem ent o f P a n n a Lai.
T he C o m p an y appealed. T he L ab o u r A ppellate T rib u n al held th a t th e
subject o f “ em p lo y m en t o r non-em ploym ent” w hich w ould include the
case o f dism issal was n o t w ithin the province o f th e W orks C om m ittee,
an d th a t th e b a r im posed by th e B o ard o f C onciliation could be valid
228 LABOUR LAW AND LABOUR, RELATIONS
only if consideration o f the dispute fell within th e province o f the W orks

Com m ittee. The appeal was dismissed.
4. In M e ta l B o x Company o f India v. Their W orkm en, (1952)

I L .L J . 822 (L .A .T .), th e W o rk s C om m ittee h ad accepted an offer o f
m anagem ent to declare a bonus fo r the year 1949-1950 o f 17 per cent
o f basic wages to th e daily ra te d w orkm en and o f 15 p er cent to the
m onthly rated w orkm en. I n A pril 1950 an o th er agreem ent was reached
between the m anagem ent an d th e W orks C om m ittee regarding certain
other m atters, including a gratuity scheme. In July 1950, th e N atio n al
Engineering W orkers’ U nion m ade certain dem ands, w hich were referred
to the Industrial T rib u n al. The T rib u n al p o in ted out th a t m em bers o f
the W orks C om m ittee m ust be regarded as representatives o f th e w ork
m en an d so m ore intim ately in to u ch with their interest an d desires th an
the union which includes m em bers o f other com panies. The T ribunal
held th a t the settlem ent arrived a t betw een the W orks C om m ittee and the
m anagem ent was entered into by a body representing the w orkm en.
T he C om pany appealed. T he L a b o u r A ppellate T rib u n al affirmed. It
discussed the duties o f the W orks C om m ittee a n d p o in ted out th a t there
is no subject w hich th e W orks C om m ittee can n o t consider, a n d further,
th a t agreed solutions betw een th e W orks C om m ittee and th e m anagem ent
are always entitled to great weight a n d should n o t be readily disturbed,
particularly in m atters like clsssification, grades, a n d scales o f pay which
are peculiarly w ithin the know ledge o f the m em bers o f th e W orks
C om m ittee.
B. C O N C IL IA T IO N
In In d ia, th o u g h th e accent is on com pulsory adjudication, the

Industrial D isputes A ct provides fo r other m odes o f settlem ent also.
These include conciliation, usually b y a conciliation officer b u t possibly
by a b o ard o f several conciliators. C onciliators either b rin g th e con
tending p arties to a conference table or try a t least to bridge th e barriers
to com m unication between them . They try to rem ove th e sources o f
tension and friction an d to help the parties to find com m on areas o f
agreem ent. They have no pow er to decide, b u t by gaining th e parties’
confidence in the conciliators’ fairness and im p artiality they strive to find
solutions th e p arties m ay be unable to find for them selves.
This technique has w orked well in m any in dustrialised countries. It

is said to have w orked particularly w ell in Sweden, where the contending
parties meet in a spirit o f determ ination to agree, an d where they consi
der failure to agree alm ost a disgrace.^
1. See P omander, Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in A ustralia OS (1959),

CONCILIATION 229
In In d ia, u n fo rtu n a te ly , conciliation h a s h a d no such rem arkable

success. T his m ay be prim arily because a failu re o f conciliation is likely
to lead to ad ju d ic a tio n b y a trib u n al, o r a reference to som e o th er agen
cies u n d er th e A ct^^ K now ing th is, th e p arties do n o t feel com pulsion
to agree a t th e conciliation stage. W h a t sh ould b e the en d o f their
dispute they th in k o f as its beginning.
A b o a rd o f con ciliatio n has been tu rn ed to where the issues were

especially com plex. Except as specifically n o ted hereafter a b o ard o f
conciliatio n acts in m uch the sam e w ay as does a single conciliation
officer.
e a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent m ay ap p o in t individual conciliation

officers, jtem porarily or perm anently, eith er for a specified in d u stry or for
a specified a re a .V -'A b o ard , on th e o th e r h an d , has to be ap p o in ted
ad hoc fo r a p a rtic u la r dispute. Such a b o a rd consists o f a chairm an
and tw o o r fo u r o th e r m em bers. T he ch airm an m ust be an independent
person; th e m em bers represent th e parties in equal num bers and are
usually ap p o in ted o n a p a rty ’s recom m endation.*
A co n ciliatio n officer m ust investigate an d try to settle a dispute

"w henever a d isp u te " exists or is appreh en d ed in a public-u tility service
and a notice o f strik e or lock-out h as been given. In other cases he has
discretion on w h eth er to act o r n o t^5 -,-^ h en he acts, h e m u st do so
expeditiously an d ta k e all steps p gssible to induce a settlem ent. I f the
dispute involves a notice o f strike o r lo c k -o u t in a public-utility service,
rules specifically req u ire the co n ciliato r to interview th e em ployer and
the w orkm en in his effort to induce a settlement.® P ro bably h e should
do so in every case, so fa r as possible. A n d in every case in which he
decides to act, h e h a s to notify th e p arties o f th e date on which he will
h o ld th e proceedings.'^
H e can m eet th e representatives o f th e p arties jo in tly or separately.®

T his, like m ost o f h is decisions, is a p o in t req u iring the u tm ost in ta c t
and ju d g m en t. I f he wins the p a rtie s ’ confidencc they will often reveal
to him in p riv ate sessions, and in confidence, concessions th e y w ould
n o t d a re to m e n tio n in th e presence o f th e o th e r side. A rm ed w ith such
2. Section 12(5) o f the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

3. Section 4.
4. Section 5.
5. Section 12.
6. Rules 9 and 10 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957.
7. Ibid.
8. Rule 11,
230 LABOUR LAW A N P LABOUR RELATIONS
in form atio n from b o th sides lie can som etim es p ro p o se later, in a jo in t

m eeting, com prom ises co ntaining such private concessions, as if they
were th e conciliator’s ow n independent suggestions.
R eports o f successful settlem ent, o r o f failure, have to be sent by

the conciliation o f f ic e r ^ 'o r a board)^® to th e a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent.
A rep o rt o f a settlem eiit m u st co n tain a m em orandum o f the settlem ent
signed by the parties. A re p o rt o f a failure m u st set fo rth th e steps
taken an d the pro b ab le reasons fo r th e failure. (A b o ard is required,
in addition, to give its findings o n fact and its recom m endations fo r th e
determ ination o f th e dispute). I t m ust be n o ted th a t conciliators can
only send a report; th ey have n o au th o rity to pass a final order.^^
T h e conciliation officer’s rep o rt m u st be sent w ith in tw o w eeks o f the

beginning o f th e conciliation proceedings; a b o a rd ’s re p o rt, w ithin two^
m o n th s ^ T he ap p ro p riate governm ent can extend these tim es, o r can
" s E o rte ^ h e m .’-’^ A failure to send a re p o rt w ithin th e prescribed tim e does
n o t invalidate the proceedings.^^
C onciliation proceedings com m ence when th e conciliation officer re

ceives a notice o f strike or lo ck -o u t (o r w hen the a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent
referes th e dispute to a board). In o th er cases they com m ence, presum ably,
from th e date th e conciliation officer holds proceedings. T he proceedings
conclude on the signing o f a m em orandum o f settlem ent, by th e p arties,
o r (in th e all-too-frequent event o f failure) o n the receipt o f th e con
ciliato r’s failure re p o rt b y th e a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent. T hey also
conclude o n reference o f th e d ispute to a court, la b o u r co u rt, trib u n a l,
or n a tio n a l trib u n a l d u rin g th e pendency o f th e conciliation p ro ceedings.^
A conciliation officer can, o n n otice, enter an d inspect th e prem ises

o f the business, q uestion individuals, a n d o b tain documents.^® (A b o a rd ’s
9. Section 12.
10. Sectioa 13.
11. Sasmusa Sugar Works Ltd. v. iSM/e o/5/7wf, A.I.R. 1955 Patna 49; [1954-5517
F J .R . 56.
12. Sections 12 and 13.
13. Andheri Marol Kurla BusService v.State o f Bombay, (1959) II L.L.J. 236,*
[1959-60] 16F.J.R. 172;A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 841; State o f Bihar v. Kirpa Shankar
Jaiswal, (1961)1 L.L.J. 334; A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 340.
14. Section 20.
15. Section 11 and Rule 23.
CONCILIATION 231
pow ers o f investigation are even b ro ad er, sim ilar to those o f a co u rt;“
th e b o a rd ’s proceedings are judicial.)
O n receipt o f a failure rep o rt, th e a p p ro p ria te G o vern m en t m a y , i f

statisfied th a t th ere is a case req u irin g fu rth e r action refer th e d isp u te to
a board, la b o u r co u rt, trib u n a l, o r n a tio n a l trib u n al. I f it decides n o t to
m ake an y such reference, it m ust reco rd a n d com m unicate to th e parties
th e reasons t h e r e f o r ^ ' (O n a failure re p o rt by a b o ard , the a p p ro p ria te
G o v ern m en t need th u s record a n d com m unicate its reasons fo r n o n
action only w hen th e dispute relates to a p u b lic-u tility service.)^®
A settlem ent arriv ed at in the course o f conciliation proceedings is

binding o n all the p arties to th e dispute a n d o th e r persons p ro p e rly sum
m oned to ap p ear as p arties to th e conciliation, including th e heirs,
successors o r assigns o f any em ployer, and all em ployees at th e date o f
th e dispute an d th o se subsequently em ployed. A settlem ent arrived at
w itho u t th e co ncurrence o f the conciliation officer (o r board) o r n o t
appro v ed b y him (o r by th e b o ard ) is binding on the p a rtie s to the
settlem ent only.^®
D u rin g th e pendency o f conciliation proceedings th e em ployer can

n o t alter co n d itio n s o f service prevailing ju s t before th e com m encem ent
o f the proceedings, to th e w orkm ens’ prejudice, w ithout th e express
perm ission o f th e au th o rity concerned.^"
D u rin g th e pendency o f conciliation proceedings in a dispute in a

public-utility service, o r before a b o a rd in any d i s p u t e , a strike o r lock
ou t is p ro h ib ited . A strike o r lock-out is also p rohibited for seven days
after th e conclusion o f conciliation proceedings.®® A ny strike o r lock-out
in co n trav en tio n o f these rules is punishable.®® These rules, while
obviouly useful fo r keeping the p eace, strongly colour th e concih'ation
process. W ith o u t th em conciliation m ight be sim ple assistance to free
collective b argaining. W ith them con ciliatio n m eans th a t governm ent has
already intervened to b a n the use o f th e w eapons which m ake collective
bargaining effective.
Section 11.
Section 12.
Section 13.
Sections 18(3) and 18(1).
Section 33.
Sections 22 and 23(a).
Section 23.
Sections 24 and 26.
C. V O LU N TA RY A R B IT R A T IO N
The In d ustrial D ispute A ct, as noted above under conciliation, seeks

to secure an d ensure in d u strial peace, m ainly through com pulsory ad ju d i
cation. T herefore it predicates th e o p eratio n of its scheme o f settlem ent
on com pulsory state-intervention as final arbiter.
A som ew hat sim ilar schem e o f settlem ent operating in A u stralia was
severely criticized, as early as 1929, by a B ritish Econom ic C om m ission
in th a t it tended to consolidate th e contesting parties into tw o opposing
camps.^ T h e I.L .O . gave renew ed em phasis to such criticism . In 1951
it recom m ended voluntary a rb itratio n as a better m ode o f settlement.*
These and sim ilar criticisms m ay have had some influence upon Indian
opinion.
In order, perhaps, to help give effect to this preference section lOA

was added to th e Act by th e am endm ent o f 1956. T hat section says th a t
at any tim e before a reference o f a dispute under section 10, the dis
putants m ay, by a w ritten agreem ent, refer th e dispute to arb itratio n .
They m any specify their ow n arb itrato r. (H e can, b u t need n o t be, th e
presiding officer o f a lab o u r co u rt or trib u n al.) O r they m ay select a
b o ard o f arbitratio n , w ith provision for appointm ent o f an im partial
chairm an, i f needed.
The w ritten agreem ent setting forth the issue or issues to be a rb itra ted
m ust be sent to th e conciliation officer and to the appropriate G overn
m ent. T h a t G overnm ent m ay, in cases where the signatories to th e
w ritten agreem ent represent th e m ajority o f each party, w ithin one m o n th
issue a notification th a t other em ployers and w orkers concerned will be
given an o p p o rtu n ity to present th eir case, also, in the arbitration.®
cases w here such a notification has been issued, th e a p p ro p ria te

G overnm ent can prohibit the continuance o f strike or lock-out w hich was
in existence a t th e tim e o f th e reference.^^,-'And in such cases th e arb itral
aw ard is binding on the parties an d also o n all the others properly
summoned.® In cases where n o notification has been issued to others.
1. See R.F. Ruafamji, The Law o f Industrial Disputes o f India 484-85 (2d ed. 1964).
2. International Labour Organization Conventions and Recommendations 804
(1919-1966).
3. Section 10-A(3A), This sub-sectioti was added by the Industrial Disputes
^ (Amendment) Act, 36 of 1964.
4. Section I0-A(4A), also added in 1964.
•S. Section 18(3).
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION 233
the aw ard becom es b in d in g upon the p arties who signed the agreem ent
and upon th em only.®
D u rin g th e pendency o f a rb itra tio n proceedings th e em ployer is

enjoined fro m alterin g th e conditions o f service to th e prejudice o f th e
w orkers.’ B u t th e special provision fo r adju d ication on w hether service
conditions have been th u s changed is n o t applicable to proceedings before
an arbitrator® except w hen a notification u nder section 10A(3A) has
been issued.
E N G IN E E R IN G M A Z D O O R SA B H A v H IN D CY C LES L T D .
Suprem e Court, (1962) II L .L .J. 760
(This decision involved three appeals from th e aw ards o f tw o a rb i

tra to rs a p p o in te d u n d e r section 10-A o f the In d u stria l D isputes A ct.
Engineering M a z d o o r S abha appealed from tw o o f these aw ards;
D irect T e a T rad in g C o m p an y , from th e th ird . T he C o u rt h ad to decide
a prelim in ary o bjection, th a t a rb itra to rs ap p o in ted by th e parties were
n o t trib u n als, and th a t therefore n o appeal could lie under article 136
against th e ir aw ards. T h e respondents m aintained th a t such an a p p eal
was n o t p ro p e r. T h e ju d g m en t o f th e C o u rt, delivered by G ajendra-
gadkar, J. follow s O
A rticle 1 3 6 (1 )...provides th a t n o tw ith stan ding anything in this

chapter, th e Suprem e C o u rt m ay, in its discretion g ra n t special leave to
appeal fro m an y ju d g m e n t, decree, d eterm in atio n , sentence o r o rd e r in
any cause o r m a tte r p assed o r m ade by a n y C o u rt o r trib u n al in the
territory o f In d ia. I t is significant th a t w hereas A rts. 133(1) and 134(1)
provide fo r appeals to th is C o u rt ag ain st ju d g m en ts, decress o r iinal
orders p assed by th e H igh C ourts, n o such lim ita tio n is prescribed by
A rt. 136(1). A ll c o u rts and all trib u n a ls in th e te rrito ry o f In dia except
those in Cl. (2) (co n stitu ted by a law relatin g to th e A rm ed Forces) are
subject to th e app ellate ju risd ictio n o f th is C o u rt u n d er A rt. 136(1). It
is also clear th a t w hereas the appellate ju risd ictio n o f the c o u rt u n d er
A rt. 133(1) can be in v o k ed only against final orders n o such lim itatio n
is im posed by A rt. 136(1). In other w ords, the ap p ellate ju risd ictio n o f
this co u rt u n d e r th is la tte r provision can be exercised even against a n
in terlo cu to ry o rd e r o r decision. Causes o r m atters covered by A rt, 136(1)
are all causes a n d m atters th a t are b ro u g h t fo r ad ju d icatio n before courts
or trib u n a ls. The sweep o f th is p rovision is th u s very w ide. I t is true
6. Section 18(2).
7. Section 33.
8. Section 3 3A.
th a t in exercising its pow ers und er this article, this C o u rt in its discretion
refuses to entertain applications fo r special leave w here it ap pears to the
C o iu t th a t interference w ith th e o rd ers sought to be appealed against
m ay n o t be necessary in the interest o f justice. B ut the lim itatio n s thus
introduced, in practice, are th e lim itations im posed by the C o u rt itself
in its discretion. They are n o t prescribed by A rt. 136(1).
F o r invoking A rt. 136(1) tw o conditions m ust be satisfied. The

p roposed appeal m ust be from any judgm ent, decree, d eterm ination,
sentence or order, that is to say, it m ust n o t be against a purely executive
o r adm inistrative order. I f th e d eterm in atio n or o rd e r giving rise to the
appeal is a judicial o r quasi-judicial determ ination or order, th e first
condition is satisfied. T he second condition im posed by the article is
th a t th e said determ ination or o rd er m ust have been m ade o r passed by
any co u rt o r tribunal in the territo ry o f India. C ourts o f law established
by the State decide cases b ro u g h t before them judicially a n d the decisions
th u s recorded by them fall obviously und er the category o f ju d icial
decisions. A dm inistrative o r executive bodies, on the o ther h a n d , are
often called upon to reach decisions in several m atters in a purely
adm inistrative or executive m an n er an d these decisions fall clearly u n d er
th e category o f adm inistrative or executive orders. Even judges have in
certain m atters to act adm inistratively, w hile adm inistrative o r executive
authorities m ay have to act quasi-judicially in dealing w ith som e m atters
entrusted to their ju risdiction. W here an au th o rity is required to act
judicially either by an express provision o f th e statu te u n d er w hich it
acts o r b y necessary im plication o f th e said statute, th e decisions o f such
an. au th o rity generally a m o u n t to quasi-judicial decisions. W here, h o w
ever, th e executive or adm inistrative bodies are n o t required to act
judicially an d are com petent to deal w ith issues referred to them ad m inis
tratively, th eir conclusions cannot be treated as quasi-judicial conclusions.
N o d o u b t even while acting adm inistratively, th e authorities m u st a c t
bo n a fide, but th a t is different from saying th a t they m u st act judicially.
B earing in m ind this b road distinction between acts o r orders w hich are
ju d icial or quasi judicial on th e one h a n d and adm inistrative o r executive
acts on the o th er there is no diflBculty in hold in g th a t th e decisions o f th e
arb itra to rs to whom industrial disputes are voluntarily referred u n d er
Section 10-A of the A ct are quasi-judicial decisions, a n d they a m o u n t
to determ inations o r orders under A rt. 136(1). T h e p o sitio n is n o t
seriously disputed before us. W h a t is in dispute betw een th e p artie s is
n o t the character o f the decisions against which the appeals have been
filed, b u t it is the character o f th e au th o rity which decided the disputes.
T he respondents contended th a t the arb itrato rs w hose aw ards a re
challenged, are not tribunals, whereas th e appellants contend th a t th ey
are.
A rticle 136(1) refers to a trib u n al in co n trad istin ctio n to a C ourt.

T he expression “ a C o u rt” in th e tech n ical sense is a trib u n al constituted
by the S tate as a p a rt o f th e ordinary hierarchy o f C ourts w hich are invest
ed w ith th e S tates’ in h eren t ju d icial pow ers. T he trib u n al, as distinguish
ed from th e C o u rt, exercises judicial pow ers and decides m atters bro u g h t
before it ju d ic ia lly o r quasi-judicially, b u t it does n o t constitute a C ourt
in the tech n ical sense. T he trib u n al, according to the dictionary m ean
ing, is a seat o f ju stice; and in th e discharge o f its functions, it shares
some o f th e ch aracteristics o f the C ourt. A dom estic trib u n al ap p ointed
in d ep artm en tal proceedings, for instance, or in stituted by an in d u strial
em ployer, can n o t claim to be a trib u n a l und er A rt. 136(1), Purely
adm in istrativ e trib u n a ls are also outside the scope o f the said article.
The trib u n a ls w hich a re contem plated b y A rt. 136(1) arc clothed w ith
som e o f th e pow ers o f th e C ourts. T hey can com pel witnesses to ap p ear,
they can adm inister o a th s, they are required to follow certain rules o f
procedure, th e proceedings before them are req u ired to com ply w ith rules
o f n a tu ra l justice, they m ay not be b o u n d by th e strict and technical
rules o f evidence, b u t, nevertheless they m ust decide on evidence adduced
before th em ; they m ay n o t be b o u n d by o th er technical rules o f law ,
b u t th e ir decisions m u st, nevertheless, be consistent w ith the general
principles o f law. In o th e r w ords they have to act judicially an d reach
th eir decisions in an objective m an n er a n d they ca n n o t proceed purely
adm inistratively or base th e ir conclusions o n subjective tests o r incli
nations. T he p ro ced u ral rules w hich regulate th e proceedings before the
tribunals a n d th e pow ers conferred on them in dealing with m atters
bro u g h t b efo re th em are som etim es described as the “ trappings o f a
C o u rt” a n d in determ ining th e q u estio n as to w hether a p articu lar body
o r au th o rity is a trib u n a l o r n o t, som etim es a ro u g h and ready test is
applied b y enquiring w hether th e said body or au th o rity is clothed with
the trap p in g s o f a C o u rt.
' T his questio n (w hether an in d u strial trib u n a l com es under A rt. 136(1))
was considered by th is C o u rt in th e Bharat B a n k L td ., D elhi v.
Employees^ p j the B h a r a t.£ a a k ,X td . (1950 1 L .L .J. 921). The m ajo rity
decision o f th is C o u rt was th a t th e functions a n d duties o f the in d u stria l
trib u n a l a re very m uch like those o f a b o d y discharging judicial functions
and so, th o u g h th e trib u n a l is n o t a C o u rt, it is nevertheless a trib u n a l
fo r th e p u rp o ses o f A rt. 136. In o th e r w ords th e m ajo rity decision,
w hich in a sense was ep o ch m ak in g , h e ld th a t th e ap p ellate ju risd ictio n
o f this C o u rt u n d er A rt. 136 can be invoked in p ro p e r cases against
aw ards a n d o th e r orders m ade by in d u stria l trib u n a ls -under th e A ct.
In discussing the q u estio n as to th e ch aracter o f th e industrial trib u n a l
functioning u n d er th e A ct, M ah ajan , J ., observed th a t th e condition
precedent fo r bringing a trib u n a l \yithin th e am bit o f A rt. 136, is th a t it
should be constituted by the State a n d he added th a t a trib u n al w ould

be outside the am bit o f A rt. 136, if it is n o t invested w ith any p a rt o f
the judicial functioTis o f th e State b u t discharges purely adm inistrative
o r executive duties. In the opinion o f the learned Judge tribunals which
are found invested w ith certain functions o f the C o u rt o f Justice a n d have
some o f its trappings also w ould fall w ithin the am bit o f A rt. 136 and
would be subject to th e appellate co n tro l o f this C o u rt whenever it is
found necessary to exercise th a t co n tro l in the interest o f justice.
I t is now necessary to exam ine the scheme o f th e relevant provisions

of th e A ct bearing o n th e v o luntary reference to the a rb itra to r, the
pow ers o f th e said a rb itra to r and the procedure which he is req u ired to
follow.
Section lO-A under which v o luntary reference has been m ad e in
b o th th e cases was added to the A ct by A ct 36 o f 1956, It reads as
follow s :
(T he C o u rt quoted sectioa 10-A as it then stood.*)
C onsequent upon the ad d itio n o f th e section several changes were m ade in

the o th e r provisions o f th e A ct. Section 2(b) which defines an aw ard was
am ended by the addition o f the w ords “ it includes an arb itratio n aw ard
m ade und er Section lOA” . T he inclusion of th e arb itratio n aw ard w ith
in the m eaning o f Section 2(b) has led to the application o f Ss. 17, 17-A,
18(2), 19(3), 21, 29, 30, 33-C a n d 36-A to the a rb itratio n aw ard.
U n d er Section 17(2) a n a rb itratio n aw ard when published under
Section 17(1) shall be final an d shall n o t be called in q u estion by any
C ourt in any m anner w hatsoever. Section 17A provides th a t th e a rb i
tratio n agreem ent shall becom e enforceable on the expiry o f th irty days
from th e date of its publication und er Section 17, and u n der Section 18(2)
it is binding on th e parties to the agreem ent who referred the dispute to
arb itra tio n , under Section 19(3) it shall, subject to th e provisions o f
Section 10 (sic) rem ain in operation for a period of one year p ro v id ed
th a t th e ap propriate G overnm ent m ay reduce the said perio d and iix such
other p erio d as it thinks fit; provided further th a t the said period m ay
also be extended as prescribed u nder th e said proviso. T he other
sub-sections o f Section 19 would also apply to the arb itratio n aw ard.
Section 21 which requires certain m atters to be k ep t confidential is
applicable, an d so Section 30 w hich provides for a penalty fo r the
contravention o f Section 21 also applies. Section 29 which provides for
penalty fo r breach o f an aw ard can be invoked in respect o f a n arb itra tio n
aw ard. Section 33C which provides fo r a speedy rem edy fo r the recovery
It was amended by Act No. 36 of 1964, section 6, by adding sections 10-A (1-A)
(3-A), and C4-A). Eds.
o f m oney from an em ployer is applicable; an d S. 36A can also be invoked

fo r the in te rp re ta tio n o f a n y provision o f the a rb itra tio n aw ard. In o th er
w ords, since an a rb itra tio n aw ard has been included in the definition o f
th e w o rd “ aw a rd ” these consequential changes have m ade the respective
provisions o f th e A ct applicable to an a rb itra tio n aw ard.
O n th e o th er h a n d , th ere are certain o th er provisions w hich do n o t

ap p ly to a n a rb itra tio n aw ard. Sections 23 and 24 w hich p ro h ib it strikes
a n d lo c k o u ts, are in ap p licab le to th e proceedings before the a rb itra to r to
w hom a reference is m ade u nder Section lO-A, a n d th a t shows th a t th e
A ct h a s tre a te d th e a rb itra tio n aw ard a n d th e p rio r proceedings in relation
to it as stan d in g o n a different basis fro m an aw ard and th e p rio r proceed
ings before the in d u stria l trib u n a l o r la b o u r courts.* Section 20 w hich
deals w ith th e com m encem ent an d conclusion o f proceedings provides
inter alia b y sub-section (2) th a t proceedings before an a rb itra to r un d er
Section 10-A shall be deem ed to have com m enced on the date o f the
reference o f the d isp u te for a rb itra tio n an d to have concluded o n the
d ate o n w hich th e aw ard becom es enforceable u n d er Section 17-A . I t w ill
be noticed th a t ju s t as in th e csae o f proceedings before th e In d u strial
T rib u n a l co m m encem ent o f proceedings is m ark ed by the reference under
Section 10, so th e com m encem ent o f th e proceedings before th e arbi
tra to r is sta rte d b y th e reference m ad e by th e parties them selves, and
th a t m ean s th e com m encem ent o f th e proceedings takes place even before
th e ap p ro p ria te G o v ern m en t has entered on th e scene a n d has ta k e n any
actio n in p u rsu an ce o f th e provisions o f Sec. 10-A
R ules have been fram ed by th e C en tral G overnm ent a n d som e o f

th e S tate G o v ern m en ts und er Section 38(2) (aa)** and these rules m ake
provisions fo r th e fo rm o f a rb itra tio n agreem ent, th e place a n d tim e o f
hearing , th e pow er o f th e a rb itra to r to ta k e evidence, the m a n n e r in
w hich th e sum m ons sh o u ld be served, th e pow ers o f th e a rb itra to rs to
proceed exparte, i f necessary, an d th e pow er to correct m istakes in the
aw ard a n d such o th e r m atters. Som e o f these rules (as for instance.
C en tra l rules 7, 8, 13. 15, 16 and 18 to 28) seem to m ake distinction
betw een a n a rb itra to r an d the o th e r au th o rities u n d er the A ct, w hereas
rules fra m e d by som e o f th e States (for instance, th e rules fram ed by th e
M ad ras S ta te 31, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 & 42) seem to tre a t th e a rb itra to r
o n th e sam e b asis as th e o th er a p p ro p ria te authorities under th e A ct.
T h a t, sh o rtly sta te d , is th e p o sitio n o f th e relevant provisions o f th e
Since this decision sections 22(2) (bb), 23(c) and 24(1) (ii) have apparantly been
amended so as to include awards on a sim ilar footing. See Act No, 36 o f 1964,
section 11. Eds.
Amended by Act No. 36 of 1964, section 20. Eds.
238 LABOUR LAV/ ANO LABOUR RELATIONS
Statut e and the rules fram ed thereunder. I t is in the light o f these p ro

visions th a t we m ust now consider th e character o f the a rb itra to r w ho
enters upon arb itration proceedings as a result o f the reference m ade to
him under Sec. 10-A.
The argum ent is th a t against an aw ard p ronounced by an a rb i

trato r appointed under Section lO-A a w rit o f certiorari w ould lie u n d er
A rt. 226; so the arb itrato r should be deemed to be a trib u n al even fo r
th e purposes o f A rt, 136. In o u r opinion this argum ent is n o t well
founded. A rticle 226 under which a w rit o f certiorari can be issued in
an appropriate case, is, in a sense, w ider th an A rt. 136 because the pow er
conferred on the High C ourts to issue certain writs is n o t conditioned
or lim ited b y the requirem ent th a t the said writs can be issued only
against th e orders o f courts or tribunals. U n d er A rt, 226(1), an a p p ro
priate w rit can be issued to any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases any G overnm ent, w ithin the territories prescribed.
Therefore, even if th e arb itrato r app o in ted under Section 10-A is n o t a
tribunal und er A rt. 136 in a p ro p er case, a w rit m ay lie against his
aw ard under A rt. 226; th a t is why th e argum ent th a t a w rit m ay lie
against an aw ard made by such an arb itrato r does n o t m alerially assist
the appellant’s case th at th e a rb itra to r in question is a trib u n al under
A rt. 136.
I t m ay be conceded th a t having regard to several provisions c o n tain

ed in the Act and the rules fram ed thereunder, an a rb itra to r ap pointed
under Section 10-A cannot be treated as exactly sim ilar to a priv ate
arb itrato r to whom a dispute has been referred under an a rb itra tio n
agreem ent under the A rbitratio n Act. The arb itrato r un d er Section 10-A
is clothed w ith certain pow ers. His procedure is regulated by certain
rules an d the award pronounced by him is given by statu to ry provisions
a certain validity and a binding character fo r a specified period. H aving
regard to those provisions, it may p erhaps be possible to describe such
an arb itrato r as in a loose sense, a statutory arbitrator. B ut the fact th a t
the a rb itra to r under Section 10-A is n o t exactly in the sam e position as a
private arbitrato r, does n o t m ean th a t he is a tribunal u n d e r A ct. 136,
Even if som e o f the trappings o f a C o u rt are present in his case, he lacks
th e basic, th e essential an d th e fundam ental requisite in th a t b e h a lf
because he is not invested w ith the State’s inherent judicial pow er. As
we will presently point out, he is appointed by th e parties an d pow er to
decide the dispute between the parties w ho appoint him is derived by
him from the agreement o f the parties an d from no other source. T he
fact th a t his appointm ent once m ade by the parties is recognised by
Section 10-A and after his appointm ent he is clothed w ith certain pow ers
and bas th u s, n o doubt, some of the trappings o f a C ourt, does n o t m ean
th a t th e p o w er o f ad ju d icatio n which he is exercising is derived fro m th e

State, a n d so th e m ain test which th is C o u rt has evolved in determ ining
th e q u estio n a b o u t th e character o f an ad ju d ication body is n o t satisfied.
His p o sitio n , th u s, m ay be said to be higher th an th a t o f a private
a rb itra to r a n d lo w er th a n th a t o f a tribxinal.
T h a t takes us to the construction o f Section 10-A. S. 10-A enables the

em ployer a n d th e w orkm en to refer th e ir dispute to arb itratio n by a w ritten
agreem ent before such a dispute h as been referred to the la b o u r co u rt
o r trib u n al o r n a tio n a l trib u n a l u n d er Section 10. M r. Sule (for th e
ap p ellan ts) co n ten d s— and it is n o d o u b t an ingenious argum ent—th a t
th e last clause o f Section 10-A (1) m eans th a t a fte r th e w ritten agreem ent
is entered in to by th e p arties, the reference shall be m ade to th e person
nam ed b y th e agreem ent but it shall be m ade b y th e a p p ro p riate
G o v ern m en t.
W e d o n o t th in k th a t th e section is capable o f this construction.

T he la st clause (o f Section lO -A (l)) which says th a t th e reference shall be
to such p e rso n o r p erso n s, gram m atically m u st m ean th a t after th e w ritten
agreem ent is en tered in to specifying th e p erso n o r persons, the reference
shall b e to such p erso n or persons, W e do n o t th in k th a t on th e w ords
as th ey sta n d , it is possible to in tro d u ce the G o v ernm ent at an y stage o f
th e o p e ra tio n o f S ection lO -A (l). T h e said p rovision deals w ith w hat
th e p a rtie s can d o an d provides th a t i f th e p a rtie s agree and reduce th eir
agreem ent to w riting, a reference shall be to th e person or persons
nam ed b y such w riting. T h e fact th a t the p arties can agree to refer th e ir
dispute to th e la b o u r co u rt, trib u n a l o r n a tio n a l tribunal m akes no
difference to th e co n stru ctio n o f th e provision. It is clear th a t w hen
Section 10-A(4) p rovides th a t the a rb itra to r shall investigate the dispute,
it m erely asks th e a rb itra to r to exercise th e pow ers which have been
conferred o n him b y agreem ent o f th e p arties u n d er Section lO -A (l).
There is n o d o u b t th a t th e a p p ro p ria te G overn m ent plays som e p a rt in
these a rb itra tio n proceedings, it p u b lish es th e agreem ent; it requires th e
a rb itra tio n aw ard to b e subm itted to it; th e n it publishes the aw ard , an d
in th a t sense som e o f th e features w hich characterize the proceedings
before th e in d u strial trib u n a l b efore a n aw ard is pro n o u n ced a n d w hich
chracterize th e subsequent steps to b e ta k e n in respect o f such an aw ard,
a re co m m o n to th e proceedings before th e a rb itra to r a n d the aw ard th a t
h e m ay m ak e. B u t th e sim ilarity o f these features ca n n o t disguise th e
fac t th a t th e in itia l an d th e in h eren t p o w er to adjudicate upon th e dis
p u te is derived by th e a rb itra to r fro m th e p a rtie s’ agreem ent, w hereas
it is derived b y th e in d u strial trib u n a l from the statu to ry provisions
them selves. In th is connection, th e p rovisions o f Section 10(2) m a y be
taken in to c o n sid e ra tio n . T his clause deals w ith a case where th e parties
to ail industrial dispute apply in th e prescribed m anner fo r a reference

o f their dispute to an ap p ro p riate a u th o rity , an d it pro v id es th a t the
appropriate G overnm ent, if satisfied th a t the persons applying represent
the m ajority o f each p arty , shall m ak e th e reference accordingly. U nlike
cases falling u nder Section 10(1) w here in th e absence o f an agreem ent
between th e parties it is in th e discretion o f the a p p ro p riate G o v ern m en t
to refer o r n o t to refer an y industrial dispute for adju d icatio n , u n d er
Section 10(2) i f there is an agreem ent betw een the parties, th e a p p ro
priate G overnm ent has to refer the dispute fo r adjudication. B ut the
significant fact is th at th e reference h a s to be m ade by the a p p ro p ria te
G overnm ent and n o t by th e p arties, w hereas u n der Section 10-A. the
reference is by the p a rtie s....
Section 18(2)* is also helpful in this m atter. It provides th a t

an a rb itratio n award w hich has becom e enforceable shall be b inding on
th e parties to th e agreem ent w ho referred th e dispute to a rb itra tio n . It
will be noticed th a t this provision m entions the parties w ho have
referred th e dispute to a rb itra tio n an d th a t the act o f reference is n o t the
act o f the appropriate G overnm ent, b u t th e act o f the parties them selves.
Section 10-A(5) m ay also be considered in this connection. I f th e

reference to arb itratio n under Section lO -A (l) had been m ade by th e
ap p ro p riate G overnm ent then the legislature could have easily used
appro p riate language, assim ilating th e a rb itra to r to th e p o sitio n o f an
industrial trib u n al; and in th a t case it w ould not liave been neccssary to
provide th a t the A rb itratio n A ct will n o t apply to arb itratio n s u n d er th is
section. T he provisions o f Section 10-A(5) suggest th a t th e proceedings
contem plated by Section 10-A are a rb itratio n proceedings to w hich, b u t
fo r Sub-Sec. (5), th e A rb itra tio n A ct w ould have applied.
On b eh alf o f th e appellants, reliance has been placed on a recent

decision o f th e B om bay H igh C o u rt in the case o f A ir Corporations
Em ployees' Union v. D .V . Vyas (1962-—1 L .L .J. 31). In th a t case, th e
B om bay H ig h C o u rt held th a t an a rb itra to r functioning u n d er S. 10-A
is subject to th e judicial superintendence o f th e H igh C o u rt un d er A rt. 227
o f the C onstitution and, therefore, the H igh C ourt can en te rtain a n
application fo r a writ o f certiorari in respect of th e o rd ers passed b y
th e arbitrator. It was no d o u b t urged before the H igh C o u rt th a t th e
arb itra to r in question w as n o t am enable to the ju risd ictio n o f th e H igh
C ourt under A rt. 227 because he was a private an d n o t a sta tu to ry
arb itra to r; but th e C o u rt rejected the said contention and h eld th a t th e
proceedings before the a rb itra to r appointed u n d er Section 10-A h a d alt
Amended by Act No, 36 of 1964, section 9. Eds.

the essential a ttrib u te s o f a sta tu to ry a rb itra tio n ■under Section 10 o f the

A ct. F r o m th e ju d g m e n t, it does n o t a p p e a r th a t th e question a b o u t the
co n stru ctio n o f Section 10-A was argued before the H igh C o u rt o r its
a tten tio n w as d raw n to the obvious differences betw een the provisions
o f Sections 10-A an d 10. Besides, th e atte n tio n o f th e H igh C o u rt was
ap p are n tly n o t draw n to th e tests laid dow n by th is C o u rt in dealing w ith
the question as to w hen a n adjudicating body o r auth o rity can be deem ed
to be a trib u n a l u n d e r A rt. 136. L ike A rt. 136, A rt. 227 also refers to
C ourts an d trib u n a ls an d w hat we have said a b o u t the character o f th e
a rb itra to r ap p o in ted u n d e r Section lO-A by reference to the requirem ents
o f A rt. 136 m ay p rim a facie apply to th e requirem ents o f A rt. 227.
T hat, how ever, is a m a tte r w ith which we a re n o t directly concerned in
th e p re se n t appeals.
M r. Sule (for th e ap p ellan ts) m ade a stro n g plea before us th a t if

the a rb itra to r ap p o in ted u n d er Section 10-A was n o t treated as a trib u n a l,
it w ould le a d to u n reaso n ab le consequences. H e em phasized th a t th e
policy o f th e leg islatu re in enacting Section 10-A was to encourage
in d u strial em ployers an d em ployees to avoid bitterness by referring their
disputes v o lu n tarily to th e a rb itra to rs o f th e ir own choice b u t th is lau d
able object w o u ld be defeated if it is realized b y th e parties th a t once
reference is m ad e u n d e r Section 10-A , th e proceedings before th e arb i
tra to r are n o t subject to th e scrutiny o f this C o u rt u n der A rt. 136. It
is extrem ely an o m alo u s, says M r. Sule, th a t parties aggrieved by an
aw ard m ad e by such an a rb itra to r sh o u ld be d enied the p rotection o f the
relevant p rovisions o f th e A rb itratio n A ct as well as th e p ro tection o f the
appellate ju risd ictio n o f th is C ourt u n d e r A rt. 136. T here is som e force
in this c o n ten tio n . I t app ears th a t in enacting Section 10-A th e legis
lature p ro b a b ly did n o t realize th a t th e p o sitio n o f an arb itra to r contem
plated th e re in w o u ld becom e an o m alo u s, in view o f th e fa ct th a t he was
n o t assim ilated to th e status o f an in d u stria l trib u n a l an d was ta k e n out
o f the pro v isio n s o f th e In d ia n A rb itra tio n A ct. T h a t how ever, is a
m atte r fo r th e leg islatu re to consider.
In th e resu lt, the prelim inary o b jection raised b y the respondents in

the appeals before us m ust be u p h eld a n d th e appeals dism issed on the
ground th a t th ey are in co m p eten t u n d er A rt. 136.
PROBLEM
B efore an a rb itra to r A , to w hom an in d u strial dispute h a s been

referred u n d e r an agreem ent betw een a n em ployer E and a trad e u n io n U
in accordance w ith th e provisions o f Section 10-A o f th e Indu strial
D isputes A ct, it is co n te n d e d by U th a t he (the a rb itra to r A ) is bound
by the norm s o f industrial ad ju d icatio n established by in d u strial trib u n a ls.

H igh C ourts and the Suprem e C o u rt. A agrees with the n o rm s b u t Peels th a t
the technical application o f th e n o rm w ould n o t be ju s t in the circum s
tances o f the case. In o rd er to ascertain the legal position he consults
you. Advise him o n w hether he is bound by th e established n orm s in
the sam e way as trib u n als o r n o t. C an he give his decision w ithout
m entioning any principle o r n o rm an d w ithout assigning any reason o r
basis to su p p o rt it? S h o u ld he do so?
NOTES
1. In United S a lt W orks and Industries L td . v. Their W orkm en

(1961) 2 L .L .J. 93 (S.C.) the sam e judge, G ajen d ragadkar, J., h ad earlier
decided an appeal under A rt. 136 from th e aw ard o f a vo lu n tary a rb itra
tor. H e did not m ention th a t case in his judgm ent in th is one.
2. T he K erala H igh C ourt, in A .T .K .M . E m ployees' Union v.

M usaliar Industries {Private) L td . (1962) 2. L .L .J. 317, held th e H igh
C ourt incom petent to exercise its w rit jurisdiction u n d er A rts. 226 and
227 against the aw ard o f a v o lu n tary arb itrato r. B ut the sam e H igh
C ourt subsequently reversed its p o sitio n in K oni— v . Standard Tile and
Clayworks {Private) L td . (1964) I L .L .J. 102, a n d held th a t a w rit m ay
lie under A rt. 226 against such aw ard. In doing so the H ig h C o u rt
considered itself bound by th e relevant observations o f th e Suprem e C ourt
in the Engineering M azdoor Sabha case.
Q U E S T IO N S
1. Is a lower c o u rt bou n d by th e obiter dicta o f the Suprem e

C ourt?
2. I f th e A ct h a d been am ended when th e Engineering M azdoor

Sabha case was decided, as it was am ended in 1964, w ould the
decision have been different?
v/ G U JA R A T STEEL TU BES LT D v
G U JA R A T STEEL TU BES M A Z D O O R SA BH A
Supreme Court, (1980) I L .L .J. 137
[C ertain workmen w ent on strike in connection w ith a dispute

relating to non-im pleraentation o f the recom m endations o f W age B oard,
bonus fo r 1971 an d wages for th e }ock-out period. A dispute betw een
m anagem ent and w orkm en concerning th e term ination o f 32 w o rk m en
was pending adjudication before a n in d u strial trib u n a l a t th e tim e of
strike, T he strike was alleged to be illegal and in breach o f settlement-
between th e m anag em en t and w o A m en o f A ugust 4, 1972. C onsequently,

the m anag em en t gave a n otice th a t unless th e strikers resum e th e ir duties
w ithin tw o days, th e m anagem ent w ould n o t be u n d er any o b lig atio n to
h o nour th e term s o f th e said settlem ent. O n failure, th e m a n ag em en t
issued a n o th e r n o tice th a t unless th e strikers resum e th eir duties by a
specified d a te th e m an ag em en t w ould term in a te th eir services and fill
th eir places by new w orkm en. B ut, again strikers d id n o t p a y heed
to this a n d did n o t resum e th e ir duties by th e specified date. T h ereu p o n ,
the m an ag em en t b y a public notice in tim ated th e strikers th a t unless
th ey resum e th e ir duties by a specified date, th ey w ould be tre a te d as
n o t in terested in resum ing w ork a n d o n failure to rep o rt to d u ty
on the specified d ate, discharged all th e 853 strikers and offered them
one m o n th ’s w ages in lieu o f notice. In this process the factory rem ained
closed fo r over fo u r m o n th s an d th e re a fter th e w o rk recom m enced w ith
th e help o f new recru its. B ut, once again th e m anagem ent m ade th e so
so-called “ fin a l” offer calling all th e strikers to rejoin their duties by a
specified d a te lest th e rem aining vacancies w ould be filled by fresh
recruits. B u t, by th e tim e th e S ab h a agreed th e m anagem ent c u t dow n
the n u m b er to be recruited to 250. H ow ever, o u t o f 853 discharged
strikers 419 resu m ed th e ir duties, w ith o u t b reak in service. O n in ter
vention o f L a b o u r C om m issioner th e dispute regarding 15 other discharged
strikers w as settled a n d a reference to th e a rb itra to r was m ade regarding
400 discharged w orkm en u n d er section 10-A o f th e A ct. T he a rb itra to r
held th a t, (i) th e strike was illegal; (ii) p a rtic ip a tio n in an illegal strike
constitu ted m isco n d u ct an d (iii) m an ag em en t’s o rd er o f term in atio n was
justified. T h e H ig h C o u rt o n being m oved u n d er article 226 o f the
C o n stitu tio n quashed th e a rb itra to r’s aw ard an d directed reinstatem ent.
A gainst th is o rd er a n appeal was preferred to th e Suprem e C ourt.
Excerpts fro m th e m ajo rity ju d g m en t o f K rish n a Iy e r J. and m in o rity
ju d g m en t o f K o sh al J. follow : ]
Per K rish n a Iy e r J . : (o n b e h a lf o f h im self and D .A . D esai J.) ;

Once we assum e th a t th e ju risd ictio n o f th e a rb itra to r to enquire in to th e
alleged m isco n d u ct was exercised, was th e re an y gro u n d under A rticle 226
o f the C o n stitu tio n to dem olish th a t hold in g ? Every w rong order c a n n o t
be rig h ted m erely becau se it is w rong. I t can be quashed only if it is
v itiated b y th e fu n d am en tal flaws of, gross m iscarriage o f justice, absence
o f legal evidence, perverse m isreading o f facts, serious errors o f law on
the face o f th e ord er, ju risd ictio n al failu re an d th e like.
W hile th e rem edy u n d e r A rticle 226 is e x trao rd in ary an d is o f A nglo-

Saxon vintage, it is n o t a carb o n copy o f E nglish processes. A rticle 226
is a sparing surgery b u t th e lan cet o perates w here injustice suppurates.
W hile tra d itio n a l re stra in ts lik e availability o f a lte rta tiv e rem edy hold
back th e C ourt and judicial pow er sh o u ld n o t ord in arily ru sh in where

the other tw o branches fear to tre a d , ju d icial d aring is n o t d au n te d where
glaring injustice dem ands even affirm ative actio n . The wide w ords o f
A rt. 226 are designed for service o f th e lowly n um bers in th e ir grievances
if th e subject belongs to th e C o u rt’s province and th e rem edy is a p p ro
priate to th e judicial process. T here is a n ative hue a b o u t A rt. 226,
w ithout being anglophilic or anglophobic in attitu d e . Viewed from
this ju risp ru d en tial perspective, we have to be cautious b o th in n o t over
stepping as if A rt. 226 were as large as an ap peal an d n o t failing to
intervene where a grave a rro r has crep t in. M oreover, we sit here in
appeal over the H igh C o u rt’s ju d g m en t. A nd an ap pellate po w er in ter
feres n o t when the o rd er appealed is n o t rig ht b u t only w hen it is
clearly w rong. The difference is real, th o u g h fine...
W e m ay dilate a little m ore o n A rt. 226 vis-a-vis aw ards o f

A rb itrato rs. T he first lim b o f the argum ent is th a t w hen th e re is a
voluntary jo in t subm ission o f a n in d u strial dispute to an A rb itra to r
nam ed by them u nder S. lOA o f th e In d ustrial D isputes A ct, he does
n o t function as a T ribunal an d is n o t am enable to the ju risd ictio n o f
th a t C o u rt under A rt. 227 o r u n d er A rt. 226. W ith o u t fu rth er
elaboration this co n ten tio n can be negatived o n a decision o f th is C o u rt
in Rohtas Industries L td . and another v. Rohtds Industries S ta ff Union and
others, (1976) 3 S.C.R . 12. This C o u rt observed th a t as the A rb itra to r
u n der S. lOA has the p ow er to b in d even those who are n o t parties to the
reference o r agreem ent an d th e w hole exercise under S. lOA as well as the
source o f th e force o f th e aw ard o n publicatio n derived from th e statute,
it is legitim ate to regard such an A rb itra to r now as p a rt o f the in fra
structure o f th e soverign’s dispensation o f justice, th u s falling w ithin the
rainbo w o f statu to ry T rib u n als am enable to judicial review. T he second
lim b o f th e argum ent was th a t a w rit o f certiorari could n o t be issued to
correct errors o f facts. In this connection after affirm ing th e ra tio in
Engineering M azdoor Sabha v. H in d Cycle L td ., (1963) Supp. 1 S.C .R .
625, th is C o u rt observes th a t w hat is im p o rta n t is a question o f law
arising on th e face o f th e facts fo u n d an d its reso lu tio n exfacie or sub
silentio. T h e A rb itrato r m ay n o t state th e law as such; even then such
acute silence confers n o greater o r sub tler im m unity on th e aw ard th a n
plain speech. W e do n o t dilate o n this p a rt o f the arg u m en t as we are
satisfied th a t be the te st th e deeply em bedded rules to is s w certiorari or
th e tra d itio n a l grounds to set aside an a rb itra tio n aw ard, “ th in p a rtitio n
do th eir bounds divide” o n th e facts a n d circum stances o f th e present
case. Broadly stated, th e principle o f law is th a t th e ju risd ictio n o f the
H igh C o u rt under A rt. 226 o f the C o n stitu tio n is lim ited to h o lding
th e judicial or quasi-judicial T ribunals o r adm inistrative bodies exercising
th e quasi-judicial powers w ithin th e leading strings o f legality a n d to see
VOLUNTARV ARBITRATION 245
t h a t th e y do n o t exceed their sta tu to ry ju risd ictio n a n d correctly

adm inister th e law la id dow n by th e statu te u n d e r w hich they act. So
long as th e h ierarch y o f officers a n d ap pellate au th o rities created by the
statu te fu n ctio n w ith in th e ir am bit th e m an n er in w hich they d o so can
be no g ro u n d fo r interferen ce. T he pow ers o f ju d icial supervision o f the
H igh C o u rt u n d er A rticle 227 o f th e C o n stitu tio n (as it th en stood) are
n o t greater th a n th o se u n d e r A rt. 226 a n d it m u st be lim ited to seeing
th a t a T rib u n a l fun ctio n s w ithin th e lim its o f its a u th o rity (see Nagendra
N a th B ora a n d another v . The Commissioner o f H ills Division and Appeals,
A ssam a n d others, (1958) S.C .R . 1240). This led to a p ro p o sitio n th a t
in exercising ju risd ic tio n u n d e r A rt. 226 th e H igh C o u rt is n o t con
stitu te d a C o u rt o f app eal over th e decision o f au th orities, adm inistrative
o r quasi-judicial. A dequacy o r suflaciency o f evidence is n o t its m eat.
I t is n o t th e fu n ctio n o f a H igh C o u rt in a p etitio n fo r a w rit u n d e r A rt.
226 to review th e evidence an d to arrive a t an independent finding on th e
evidence. (See S ta te o f Andhra Pradesh v. S . Sree Rama Rao, (1964) 3
S.C .R . 25 a t 33.) A C o n stitu tio n B ench o f this C o u rt in P .H . K a lyani v.
M is A ir France, C alcutta, (1964) 2 S .C .R . 104, succinctly set o u t the
lim its o f th e ju risd ic tio n o f th e H igh C o u rt in dealing with a w rit p etition.
I t was said th a t in o rd e r to ju stify a w rit o f certiorari it m ust be show n
th a t an o rd e r suffers fro m a n e rro r a p p a re n t on th e face o f th e record.
It was fu rth e r p o in te d o u t th a t i f th e finding o f fact is m ade b y th e
im pugned o rd e r a n d i t is shown th a t it suffers fro m an e rro r o f law
an d n o t o f fact, a w rit und er A rt. 226 w ould issue, and, while so saying
th e decision in N agendra N ath B ora's case was affirm ed. F ollow ing th e
afo rem en tio n ed decision, th e G u ja ra t H ig h C o u rt in Navinchandra
Shakerchand Shah v. M anager, Ahm edabad Co-op. D epartm ent Stores L td .,
(1978) 19 G .L .R . 108 a t 140, observed th a t th e am ended A rt. 226 w ould
enable th e H igh C o u rt to interfere w ith an aw ard o f th e in d u strial
A dju d icato r if th a t is based o n a com plete m isconception o f law o r it is
based o n n o evidence or th a t n o reaso n ab le m a n w ould com e to th e
conclusion to w hich th e A rb itra to r h a s arriv ed ....
T h e m o re serious questio n is w h eth er th e arbitrator h a d th e penti-

tu d e o f p o w er to re-exam ine th e punishm ent im posed by th e m anagem ent,
even i f h e disagreed w ith its severity. I n th is case th e A rb itra to r
expressed h im se lf as co n cu rrin g w ith th e pun ish m ent. B ut if h e h a d
disagreed, as th e H ig h C o u rt in his place,, did, could h e have interfered ?
A rm ed w ith th e language o f S. 11 A , w hich confers w ide original pow er
to the T rib u n a l to re-fix th e “ sentence” , Sri Sen argued th a t an
A rb itra to r was unco v ered b y this new section. So even if he w ould, he
co u ld n o t. A n d , in th is case i f he could, he w ould n o t. T h ere th e
m atte r en d ed , was th e argum ent. W e disagree. Even if he could, he
w ould n o t, true; b u t th a t did n o t preclude, th e H igh C o u rt from review
ing the order in exercise o f its ex trao rd in ary c o n stitu tio n al pow er.
M oreover, S. I IA did clothe th e A rb itra to r w ith sim ilar pow er as
T ribunals, despite the d o u b t created by th e abstruse absence o f specific
m ention o f “ arb itrato r” in S. 11 A . T he position needs closer ex am ination
and turns o n in terp retatio n al’lim ita tio n s....
Section 11A was in tro d u ced in p u rp o rted im plem entation o f the
I.L.C. recom m endation w hich expressly referred, inter alia to A rb itrato rs.
T he statem ent of objects an d reasons w hich illum ines the w ords o f the
legislative tex t when it is half-lit, even if it cannot directly supplem ent
the Section, does speak o f th e I.L .O . recom m endations an d , in term s o f
T ribunals an d A rb itrato rs. W hen it cam e to d rafting S. I l A the w o rd
“ A rb itra to r” was m issing. W as this o f deliberate legislative design to
deprive A rb itra to rs, w ho discharge identical functions as T rib u n als u n d e r
the In d u strial D isputes A ct, o f som e v ital pow ers w hich vested in th e ir
T ribu n al b rethren ? F o r w h at m ystic purp o se could such distin ctio n b e ?
Functionally, T ribunals and A rb itrato rs belong to th e sam e b ro o d . T h e
entire scheme, from its I.L .O . genesis, th ro u g h the objects and reasons,
fits in only w ith A rb itrato rs being covered by S. I I A , unless P arliam en t
cheated itself and th e n a tio n by proclaim ing a great p u rp o se essential
to industrial justice and, fo r no rhym e o r reason a n d w ittingly, o r
unw ittingly, w ithdraw ing one v ital w ord. Every reaso n fo r clothing
T ribunals w ith S. I I A pow ers applies a fo rtio ri to A rbitrato rs. T h en
why om it ? C ould it be a syncopic om ission which did n o t afiect th e
sem antics because a T rib u n al, in its w ider co n n o tatio n , em braced every
adjudicatory organ, including an A rb itra to r ? A n econom y o f w ords is a
legislative risk before a judiciary accustom ed to the A nglo-Saxon
m eticulousness in drafting. W e m ay easily see m eaning b y one cons
tru ctio n . A “ trib u n al” is m erely a seat o f justice or a ju d icial body w ith
ju risd ictio n to render justice. I f an A rb itra to r fulfils this fu n c tio n al
ro le— ao d he does—how can he be excluded from th e scope o f th e
expression ? A caste d isticntion betw een C ourts, T ribunals, A rb itra to rs
a n d others, is functionally fallacious and, in o ur context, stem s fro m
confusion. T he Section m akes only a hierarchical, n o t fu n ctio n al, diffe
rence b y speaking of T ribunals an d N atio n al T ribunals. So we see n o
ground to tru n cate th e n a tu ra l m eaning o f “ trib u n al” on th e supposed
in ten t o f Parliam eiit to om it irratio n ally th e category o f ad ju d icato ry
organs know n as A rbitrato rs. T o cut dow n is to cripple and th e a rt
o f interpretation m akes w hole, n o t m utilates, furthers th e expressed
purp o se, n o t ham pers by narrow literality.
Section 2(r) defines T rib u n al th u s :
“ T rib u n al” means a n In d u strial T ribunal constituted u n der S. 7A
and includes an In d u strial T rib u n al constituted before th e 10th day
o f M arch, 1957, und er this A ct :
Prim a-facie it is a different category from A rb itra to rs b u t all statu to ry

definitions a re subject to contex tu al changes. I t is perfectly open to the
C o u rt to give th e n a tu ra l m eaning to a w ord defined in the A ct i f the
context in w hich it app ears suggests a d ep artu re from th e definition
because th e n th ere is som ething rep u g n an t in th e subject or context.
T h e n w h a t is th e natxiral m eaning o f th e expression “ T ritb u n a l” ? A

“ T rib u n a l” literally m eans a seat o f justice. M ay be, justice is dispensed
by a q u asi-ju d cial b o d y , an A rb itra to r, a com m ission, a court o r o ther
ad ju d ic a to ry o rg an created by th e S tate. A ll these are T ribunals a n d
n a tu ra lly th e im p o rt o f th e w ord em braces an a rb itra tio n T ribunal.
S tro u d ’s Ju d icial D ictio n ary (Vol. 4p. 3093) speaks o f “ T rib u n a l” in
th e w ider sense an d quo tes Fry. T.J. in D aw king v. R okeby (L .R . 8 Q.B.
255, affirm ed, L .R . 7 H .L . 7-44) ;
“ I accep t th a t, w ith this qualification th a t I do n o t like th e w ord

‘t r i b u n a l . T h e w ord is, am biguous, because it has n o t like
“ C o u r t” any ascertainable m eaning in E nglish Law ” (R oyal
Acquariutn v. B arkinson. (1892) 1 Q.B. 431, cited C ourt).
T here is a reference to th e B ish o p ’s com m ission o f enquiry as a

judicial T rib u n a l a n d , significantly, specific m en tion has been m ade in
these term s.
“ D isp u tes betw een em ployers a n d em ployees are referred to such

T rib u n als as th e C ivil Service A rb itra tio n T rib u n al, N atio n a l A rb i
tra tio n T rib u n a l a n d the In d u strial D isp u tes T rib u n al” . (S tro u d ’s
Judicial D ic tio n a ry p . 3094).
We have h ard ly any d o u b t th a t “ T rib u n a l” simpliciterh&& a sweeping

signification a n d does n o t exclude “ A rb itra to r” .
H ere we com e u p o n a fu n d am en tal dilem m a o f interpretative

technology vis-a-vis th e jdicative faculty. W h a t are th e lim its o f sta tu to ry
co n stru ctio n ? D oes creativ ity in th is ju risp ru d e n tia l area p erm it travel
into sem an tic engineering as substitu te fo r verbalism ? It is increasingly
Im p o rta n t fo r developing countries, w here legislative transform ation o f
th e econom ic o rd er is an u rg en t item o n th e n a tio n a l agenda, to have the
judiciary p la y a m eaningful role in th e c o n stitu tio n al revolution w ith o u t
ferrettin g o u t flaws in th e draftsm an, once th e object an d effect are plain.
Judges m ay n o t be to o “ an g lo p h o n ic” lest th e system fail.
It is edifying to recall from R o b e rt Stevens’ L aw an d Poiitics o f the

H ouse o f L o rd s as a ju d icial b o d y ;
“ M o reo v er, M acm illan who began to specialize in the increasingly
freq u en t ta x ap p eals, continued to develop this highly artificial
approach. In Inla n d Revenue Commissioners v. A yrshire Em ployers

M u tu a l Insurance Association, (1946) I A ll. E .R . 637, w hen P a rlia
m ent h a d clearly in tended to m ak e th e an n u al surpluses o f m u tu a l
insurance com panies subject to tax , M acm illan fo u n d a particularly
form alistic argum ent to show th a t this h ad n o t been th e effect o f
S. 31 o f th e Fin an ce A ct o f 1933. H e was th e n h ap p ily able to
announce : ‘The L egislature h as plainly missed fire’, ibid 641. O ft
his decision L ord D iplock was la te r to say th a t “ if, as in this case,
the C o u rts can identify th e ta rg e t o f P arliam entaty legislation th e ir
p ro p er function is to see th a t it is h it : n o t m erely to record th a t it
has been missed. H ere is judicial legislation at its w o rst.” S ir K en n eth
D iplock, T he C ourts as Legislators, 10.
W e w ould rath er ad o p t L o rd D ip lo ck ’s th o u g h t and have th e C o u rt h elp

hit th e legislative target, w ithin lim its, th a n sigh relief th a t the legislative
fire has m issed the b u ll’s eye. O f course, the social p h ilosophy o f th e
C onstitution has, as ru le d by this C o u rt in several cases, a ro le in
interpretative enlightenm ent and ju d icial value vision.
W e m ay reinforce this liberal rule o f statutory construction, being

a m atter o f im portance in th e daily w ork o f the C ourt, by reference even
to R om an Law from Justinian days dow n to the A m erican Suprem e
C ourt. “ N o t all special cases can be co ntained in the laws and resolutions
o f the Senate” , said the R o m an Ju rist Jullianus, “ b u t w here their m eaning
is m anifest in- some case, th e one w ho exercises ju risd ictio n m u st ap p ly
the provision analogously and in th is way adm inister ju stic e.” Ju risp ru
dence—T he Philosophy an d m ethod o f th e law by E d g a r B odenheim er
p. 474. P rof. B odenheim er h as explained th a t Civil Law does n o t regard
w ords as th e sole basis o f law b u t allows it to be m odified by p urpose.
Celsus ad ded th e follow ing ad m o n itio n to these general principles o f
interpretation: “ T he law s should b e liberally iaterp reted , in o rd er th a t
th eir in ten t be preserved” , ibid p. 474.
“ Sam uel T horne has show n th a t, during certain periods o f E nglish

m edieval history, th e p o sitio n o f th e C om m on Law tow ards the con»
struction o f statutes was sim ilar to the general attitu d e o f th e R o m an an d
Civil Law. Statutes were frequently extended to situations n o t expressly
covered b y th em .” Jurisprudence— The philosophy an d m e th o d o f th e
law by E dgar Bodenheim er p. 414.
Plow den pointed out th a t “ when the w ords o f a sta tu te enact one
thing, they enact all o th er things w hich are in the lik e degree.” Ib id
p. 415. Plow den dem onstrated th a t a statu to ry rem edy a t th a t tim e
was deem ed to be merely illustrative o f oth er analogous cases th a t
deserved td be governed b y the same principle.
“ O u r law (like a ll others) consists o f tw o p a rts, viz., o f b o d y an d

soul, th e le tte r o f th e law is th e body o f th e law, an d th e sense a n d reason
o f the law is th e soul o f th e law .... A nd it often happens th a t w hen you
know th e le tte r, y o u know n o t the sense, for som etim es the sense is m ore
confined a n d c o n tracted th a n the letter, and som etim es it is m o re large
a n d extensive” . Ibid p p . 115-116.
P rof. B od en h eim er states th a t th e A m erican tre n d is to w ards a

p u rp o se-o rien ted ra th e r th a n a plain m eaning rule in its rigid orthodosey.
In U nited S a te s v. Am erican Trucking A ssociation, the U .S. Suprem e
C o u rt w ro te :
“ W h en th e p la in m eaning has led to ab su rd o r futile re su lts....th is
C o u rt h as lo o k ed bey o n d th e w ords to th e p u rpose o f th e A ct.
F re q u e n tly , how ever, even w hen th e p la in m eaning did n o t pro d u ce
ab su rd results b u t m erely an u n reaso n ab le one “ plainly a t variance
w ith th e policy o f th e legislation as a w hole” this C o u rt has follow ed
th a t p u rp o se ra th e r th a n th e literal w ords. W hen aid to co n stru c
tio n o f th e m ean in g o f w ords, as used in th e statu te, is available,
there can certainly be n o “ ru le o f law ” w hich forbids its use,
how ever clear th e w ords m a y b e on “ superficial exam ination.”
In th e p resen t case, as th e n a rra tio n o f th e facts unfolded, th e

reference o f th e dispute was to an A rb itra to r. H e reinvestigated and
reassessed th e evidence b earin g o n th e g u ilt o f th e discharged w orkm en
after giving a n o p p o rtu n ity to b o th sides to adduce evidence th ereon.
A dm ittedly, he h a d th is pow er. B u t h a d he th e follow -up pow er, i f h e
held th e m en g uilty o f punitive m isconduct, to rew eigh the q u a n tu m o f
punish m en t having re g a rd to th e degree o f culp ab ility ? T his ju risd ictio n
he enjoys if S. 11A includes “ a rb itra to rs” . T his, irt tu rn , flows fro m o u r
inference as to w hether th e w o rd “ T rib u n a l” tak es in an ad ju d icato ry
organ like th e A rb itra to r. It is p la in th a t the expression “ a rb itra to r” is
n o t expressly m en tio n ed in S. 11 A. N evertheless, if th e m eaning o f the
w ord “ T rib u n a l” is w ider ra th e r th a n n arro w er, it will em brace A rb itra to r
as well. T h a t is how th e dynam ics o f in te rp re ta tio n are, in one sense,
decisive o f th e fate o f th e p resen t appeal.
C o m p etin g in terp retativ e angles h av e contended for Judicial accep

tance. E nglish preferen ce a p a rt, In d ia n socio-legal co n d itio n s m u st decide
th e choice in each situ a tio n . Som etim es Judges are p ro n e to castigate
creative in te rp re ta tio n in preference to petrified literality b y stating th a t
Judges d eclare th e law a n d can n o t m ak e law . T h e reply to this frozen
faith is best b o rn e o u t b y L o rd R adcliffe’s b lu n t w ords :
“ T here was never a m ore sterile co n tro v ersy th a n th a t u p o n the
questio n w h eth er a Ju d g e m akes law . O f course he does. H ow can
he help it ? Judicial Law is always a re in te rp re tatio n o f principles in

th e light o f new co m binations o f facts....(J)udges do n o t reverse
principles, once well established, b u t they d o m odify them , extend
them , re stric t them a n d even deny th eir ap p lication to th e com bi
n a tio n in h a n d .” R o b e rt Stevens-Law and P olitics, T h e H ouse o f
L ords as a Judicial B ody, 1800— 1976 p . 447.
L o rd D evlia in his “ Sam ples o f L aw m aking” , agreed th a t Judges

are fashioners o f law , if n o t creato rs out o f m aterial supplied to them
and w ent o n to observe :
“ I f the H ouse o f L ords did n o t tre a t itself as bound by its own

decisions, it m ight d o its ow n lopp in g and p ru n in g ....a n d perhaps
even a little grafting, instead o f leaving all th a t to th e L egislature.
B ut it could n o t greatly alter the shape o f the tre e ” . D evlin-Sam ples
o f Law -m aking p . 116.
E ven so em inent a Judge as L o rd R eid leaned to th e view th a t the

law should be developed since it was n o t static and, in this lim ited sense,
Judges are law -m akers although this view prevented “ technical m inded
Judges (from pressing) precedents to th e ir logical conclusions” . Judge
as Law M ak er p . 28-470 (Stevens). O n th e whole, a ju s t an d h u m a n ist
interpretative technique, m eaning perm ittin g , is the best. W e do n o t
m ean to conclude th a t Judges can ta k e liberties w ith language ad libitum
and it is w holesom e to be cautious as L o rd R eid in Shaw v. D .P .F .,
(1962) A .C . 220,275, w arned : “ W here P arliam ent fears to tre a d it is
n o t fo r the C ourts to ru sh in .”
W e are persuaded th a t there is m uch to learn fro m L o rd D e n n in g ’s

consistent refrain ab o u t th e inevitable creative elem ent in th e ju d icial
process in th e interpretative area. W e perm it ourselves a quote from
L o rd D enning because Shri A .K . Sen did draw o u r a tte n tio n to straig h te
ning th e creases as perm issible b u t n o t stitching th e cloth, m ak in g a
critical reference to th e controversial activism o f w hich L o rd D en n in g
was a leading light :
“ T he tru th is th a t th e law is uncertain. It does n o t cover all the

situ atio n s th a t m ay arise. T im e an d again practitioners a n d Judges
are faced w ith new situations where th e decision m ay go either w ay.
N o one can tell w hat th e law is u n til the C ourts decide it. T he
Judges do every day m ake law, th o u g h it is alm ost heresy to say so.
I f the tru th is recogniscd then wc m ay hope to escape fro m th e dead
h and o f th e past an d consciously m o u ld new principles to m eet the
needs o f th e present.”
'M r. Justice M ath ew in Kesavananda Bhartj's case, (1973) Supp.

S.C .R . p . 1, referred w ith approval-and so do w e-to the observations o f
Justice H o lm es : Sources an d Techniques o f th e Law “ Jurisp ru d en ce” by
E dgar B odenheim er.
“ I recognize w ith o u t h esitatio n th a t Judges do an d m ust legislate,

b u t th e y can d o so only interstitially; they are confined fro m m o lar
to m o lecu lar m o tio n s .”
A rth u r Selw yn M iller writes, “ Som e have called it (the Suprem e

C ourt), th e highest legislative ch am ber in th e n a tio n . A lthough th ere is
no qu estio n th a t th e C o u rt can and does malse law , and does so
routinely. . . .” A rth u r Selwyn M iller, T h e Suprem e C ourt, M yth and
R eality, p. 133.
A ssum ing the above ap proach to be too creatively novel fo r tra d i

tionalism , let us ap p ro a c h th e sam e p ro b lem fro m a conventional angle
au th en ticated by case-law . T h e q uestion o f co n stru ctio n o f S. I I A was
argued a t length, as to w hether an om ission o f any reference to A rb it
ra to r ap p o in te d under S. lOA in S. I I A w o u ld suggest th a t th e A rb itra to r
un der S. lOA, n o tw ith stan d in g the term s o f reference, w ould n o t enjoy
the pow er conferred o n all conceivable in d u strial adjudicators im der
S. 11 A. It was said, a fte r referring to th e objects a n d reasons in respect
o f th e b ill which w as m oved to en act S. 11A in th e Ind u strial D isputes
A ct, th a t w hile the I.L .O . had indicated th a t an A rb itra to r selected by
the p arties fo r ad ju d icatio n o f in d u strial disputes m u st be invested w ith
pow er by a p p ro p ria te legislation as fo u n d in S. I I A , the P arliam en t,
while en actin g the section in its w isdom , did n o t include the A rb itra to r
even th o u g h o th e r a d ju d icato rs o f in d u strial d isputes have been conferred
such pow er an d , th erefo re, it is a case o f causus omissus. R eliance was
placed o n G ladstone v. Bower, (1963) A ll. E .R . 353, where th e question
arose w hether a reference to a tenancy fro m year to year in S. 2(1) o f th e
A gricultural H oldings A ct, 1948 w ould also cover a ten an cy fo r 18 m onths
w hich co u ld be te rm in a te d at th e end o f th e first year. The subm ission
was th a t even th o u g h n o n otice was necessary a t com m on law because th e
tenancy w o u ld a u to m atically term in ate a t th e expiry o f th e specified p erio d
o f ten an cy , th e ten an cy to o k effect as ten an cy from year to year by virtue
o f S. 2(1) o f th e A ct so th a t it contin u ed u n til te rm in ate d by notice to
q u it an d , th erefo re, th e lan d -lo rd w as n o t entitled to possession w ith o u t
notice. I t w as fu rth e r co n tended th a t i f a ten ancy from year to year
was to get th e p ro tectio n o f th e A ct it is inconceivable th a t tenancy for a
longer d u ra tio n w ould n o t qualify fo r th a t p ro te c tio n . C o u rt o f A ppeal
negatived th is co n ten tio n holding th a t this is a case sim ply o f c m su s
omissus a n d th e A ct is defective. T he C o u rt fu rth er h e ld th a t if it w ere ever
perm issible for th e C o u rt to re p a ir a defective A ct o f P a rliam e n t, the

C ourt w ould be very glad to do so in th is case so fa r as th e C o u rt could.
The C o u rt will always allow th e in ten tio n o f a sta tu te to override the
defects of wording b u t th e C o u rt’s ability to do so is lim ited b y the
recognised canons o f in te rp re ta tio n . T h e C o u rt m ay, fo r exam ple, prefer
an alternative con stru ctio n w hich is less w ell-fitted to th e w ords b u t
better fitted to th e in ten tio n o f th e A ct. B ut here, fo r th e reasons given
by th e learned Judge, th ere is n o alternative co n struction; it is sim ply a
case o f som ething being overlooked. T h e C o u rt ca n n o t legislate fo r a
causus omissus. T o do so w ould be to usurp the function o f th e Legis
lature (see M agor and S t. M ello n s R ural D istrict Council v, Newport
Corporation (1952) A .C . 189. W here th e S tatu te’s m eaning is clear and
explicit, w ords can n o t be in terp o lated . Even w here th e m eaning o f the
S tatute is clear and sensible, eith er w ith or w ith out the om itted w ord,
in terp o la tio n is im proper, since th e p rim a ry source o f the legislative
in ten t is in the language o f th e S tatu te (see C raw ford’s “ C o n stru ctio n o f
S tatutes” , 1940 E d n ., p . 269 ex tracted in S. Narayanasw am y v. G.
Panneerselvam, A .I.R . 1972 S.C. 2284 a t 2290 p a ra 20). U n d o u b ted ly ,
the C o u rt can n o t p u t in to th e A ct w ords which are n o t expressed, and
which can n o t reasonably be im plied o n any recognised p rinciples o f
construction. T h at w ould be a w ork o f legislation, n o t o f co n stru ctio n ,
an d outside the province o f the C o u rt {see Kamalaranjan v. Secretary o f
S ta te , A .I.R . 1938 P.C. 281 a t 283). Sim ilarly, w here th e w ords o f the
S tatu te are clear it w ould n o t b e open to the C o u rt in o rd e r to o b ta in a
desired resu lt either to om it o r ad d to th e w ords o f th e S tatute. T his is
n o t th e function of the C o u rt charged w ith a duty o f co n stru ctio n . T his
app ro ach has, however, undergone a sea change as expressed by D enning,
L .J. in. Seaford Court E states Ltd. v. Asher, (1949) 2 All. E .R . 155 a t 164,
wherein he observed as u n d e r :
“ W hen a defect appears a Judge c a n n o t simply fold his hands an d

blam e th e draftsm an. H e m u st set to w ork on th e constructive task
o f finding th e intention o f P a rlia m e n t....... a n d th e n h e m ust su pple
m ent th e w ritten w ords so as to give ‘force a n d life’ to th e
intention o f L egislature....... A Judge, should ask him self the
question how, if th e m akers o f the A c t h a d them selves com e across
th is ru ck in the texture o f it, they w ould have straig h ten ed it o u t ?
H e m u st then do as they w ould have done. A Judge m ust n o t alter
th e m aterial o f w hich th e A ct is w oven, b u t he can a n d should iro n
o u t th e creases.”
A pproved in State o f Bihar and another v. Dr. A sis K um ar M ukherjee

and others, (1975) 2 S.C .R . 894 a t 902. T h e old order changeth, yielding
place to new.
T his lo n g excursion lias becom e im p o rta n t because, once in a while

social legislation w hich requires sharing o f social philosophy betw een the
P arliam en t a n d th e Judiciary m eets w ith its W aterloo in the higher C ourts
because th e tru e ro le o f in terp retatio n shifts from Judge to Judge, W e
are clearly o f th e view th a t sta tu to ry construction which fulfils the
m andate o f th e S tatu te m ust find favour w ith the Judges, except w here the
w ords a n d th e context rebel against such flexibility. W e w ould p refer to
be liberal ra th e r th a n lexical w hen reading th e m eaning o f in d u strial
legislation w hich develops fro m day to day in the grow ing eco n o m y o f
India. T h e necessary conclusion fro m this discussion is th a t the expres
sion “ trib u n a l” includes in th e sta tu to ry setting, an A rb itra to r also.
C o n tem p o ran eo u s para-legislative m aterial m ay legitim ately be consulted
w hen a w o rd o f w ider im p o rt an d o f m arginal obscurity needs to be
interpreted. So view ed, we are n o t in a “ so u n d -p ro o f system ” a n d the
L L .O . reco m m en d atio n accepted by In d ia a n d th e objects and reasons o f
th e am ending A ct leave n o d o u b t a b o u t th e sense, policy an d pu rp o se.
T herefore, S. 11A app lies to the A rb itra to r in th e present case a n d he
has the p o w er to exam ine w hether th e p u n ish m en t im posed in the in sta n t
case is excessive. So h a s the H igh C o u rt, if th e aw ard suffers from a
fundam en tal flaw.
A stxidy o f th e lengthy aw ard discloses n o m ention o f S. 11 A , and

presum ably, th e a u th o rity was unm in d fu l o f th a t provision while render
ing the v erd ict. In a lim ited sense, even p rio r to S. 11 A , there w as juris
diction fo r a L ab o u r T rib u n a l, including a n A rb itra to r, to go in to the
punitive asp ect o f th e M anag em en t’s order. T his C o u rt has, in a catena
o f cases, held th a t a m ala fid e p u n ish m en t is b a d in law an d w hen the
p u n ish m en t is grotesquely condign o r perversely harsh o r glaringly
d iscrim in ato ry , an easy inference o f b a d faith , u n fa ir la b o u r practice or
victim isation arises. T h e w ider pow er to exam ine o r prescribe the correct
punish m en t belongs to th e T rib u n a l/A rb itra to r even un d er S. 11 if no
en quiry (o r a defective enquiry w hich is b ad , an d , therefore, ca n be
equ ated w ith a “ n o e n q u iry ” situ atio n ), h a s been held by th e m anage
m ent. F o r th en , th ere is no ex tan t o rd e r o f guilt o r punishm ent a n d the
T rib u n a l determ in es it afresh. In such a virgin situ atio n b o th culpability
an d qualification o f p u n ish m en t are w ithin th e jurisdiction o f the
T rib u n a l/A rb itra to r. T h e p resent is such a case.
Volleys o f rullings fro m b o th sides were fired d u ring argum ents, the
ta rg e t being th e lim ited area o f th e T rib u n a l’s pow er to overturn the
q u a n tu m o f p u n ish m en t aw arded by th e m anagem ent. W e do n o t th ink
it necessary to re-g u rg itate all th a t h as been said by this C ourt u p to now,
since it is sufficient to b rin g o u t the co rrect law in th e lig h t o f the leading
citations. I t is inco n tro v ertib le th a t w here, as here, no enquiry has been
held by th e m anagem ent, th e entire subject is at large an d b o th guilt an d

punishm ent, in equal m easure m ay b e determ ined, w ithout in h ib itio n o f
jurisdiction, by the T ribunal.
Lastly, as rightly urged by counsel fo r th e Sabha, an A rb itra to r h a s

all th e powers th e term s o f reference, to which b o th sides are party^
confer. H ere, adm ittedly, th e reference is very widely w orded and
includes th e n atu re of the p unishm ent. T he law and the facts do n o t
call fo r fu rth er elaboration an d we h o ld th a t, in any view, th e A rb itra to r
had th e au th o rity to investigate into th e p ro p riety of th e discharge a n d
the veracity o f th e m isconduct. Even if S. 11A is n o t applicable, an
A rb itra to r under S. lOA is b o und to act in the spirit o f the legislation
un d er which he is to fim ction. A com m ercial A rb itra to r w ho derives
his jurisd ictio n from th e term s o f reference w ill by necessary im p licatio n ,
be bound to decide according to law an d , when one says “ according to
law ” , it only m eans existing law an d th e law laid down by th e Suprem e
C o u rt being th e law o f the la n d , an A rb itra to r under S. lOA will have to
decide keeping in view the spirit o f S. 11A (see Union o f India v. B w igo
S te el Furniture P vt. L td., (1967) 1 S.C .R . 324). The jurisdictional hurdles
being thus cleared, we may h an d le the basic facts and the divergences
betw een th e A rb itra to r and th e H igh C o u rt before m oulding the final
relief....
P e r E o sh al J . : I now tu r n to th e in terp retation o f sub-s. (2) o f

S. I I A o f the 1947 Act. It is a well settled canon o f in te rp re ta tio n o f
statutes th a t th e language used b y th e L egislature m ust be regarded as
the only source o f its intention, unless such language is am biguous, in
w hich situ atio n the pream ble o f the A ct, th e statem ent o f objects and
reasons for bringing it o n th e sta tu te b o o k an d th e p u rpose und erly in g
th e legislation m ay be tak en in to consideration for ascertaining such
intention. T h a t th e purpose o f th e legislation is to fulfil a socio-econom ic
need, or th e express object underlying, it, does n o t come in to the pictu re
till an am biguity is detected in th e language a n d the C o u rt m ust steer
clear o f th e tem p tatio n to m o u ld th e w ritten w ord according to its ow n
concept o f w hat should have been enacted. T h a t is how I propose to
approach th e exercise in h a n d ....
Section 2 o f th e Act specifically lays dow n th a t unless th ere is any

th in g repugnant in th e subject o r context, th e expressions defined therein
w ould have th e m eanings a ttrib u te d to them . T h roughout th e A ct, th e re
fore, while “ a rb itra to r” would include an um pire, a “ T rib u n a l” w ould
n o t include an A rb itra to r b u t w ould m ean only an Indu strial T rib u n al
constituted u n d er the A ct, unless the context m akes it necessary to give
the w ord a different connotation. In sub-s. (1) o f S. 11, it is conceded.
voluntary a r b it r a t io n 255
th e w ord “ T rib u n a l” h as been used in accordance w ith the definition

ap p earin g in cl. (r) o f S. 2 because an A rb itra to r is separately m entioned
in th a t sub-section. In sub-ss. (2) a n d (3) o f th a t section a B o ard , a
L ab o u r C o u rt, a T rib u n a l an d a N a tio n a l T rib u n al have been invested
w ith c e rta in pow ers. W ould a T rib u n a l as contem plated by sub-ss. (2)
an d (3) th e n include an A rb itra to r ? M y reply to the question is an
em p h atic “ n o .” It is w ell-settled th a t if a term or expression is used in
a p a rtic u la r piece o f legislation in one sense at o n e place, th e sam e sense
w ill pervade th e en tire legislation w herever th e term is used unless an
in ten tio n to th e c o n tra ry is expressed. H ere th e w ord “ T rib u n a l” has
been used in th ree sub-sections o f th e sam e section a n d no reason a t all is
fath o m ab le for th e p ro p o sitio n th a t it m eans one th ing in sub-s. (1) an d
som ething different in sub-ss. (2) a n d (3). It m ay also be m entioned
here th a t in all the th re e sub-sections the w ord “ T rib u n al” has a capital
‘T ’ w hich is also p a rt o f th e expression “ T rib u n a l” as occurring in
cl. (r) o f S. 2 a n d th u s connotes a p r o p e rn o u n ra th e r th a n the generic
w ord ‘T rib u n a l” as em bracing all in stitu tio n s adjudicating u p o n rights o f
co n ten d in g p arties. A th ird an d p e rh a p s a clinching reaso n fo r this
in te rp re ta tio n is av ailable in th e use o f th e expression “ N a tio n a l T rib u n a l”
along w ith th e w o rd “ T rib u n a l” in all th e th ree sub-sections which
m ilitates ag ain st th e arg u m en t th a t th e w ord “ T rib u n a l” as used in
sub-ss. (2) an d (3) m eans an in stitu tio n o f th a t type. I f th e w ord
‘T r ib u n a l” as used in sub-ss. (2) an d (3) m eans such an institution, th e n
th e use o f th e expression “ N a tio n a l T rib u n a l” w ould b e re d u n d a n t an d
redundancy is n o t one o f th e qualities easily attrib u tab le to a legislative
p rodu ct. I n th a t case, in fact, oth er w ords used in the tw o sub-sections
la st m entioned, nam ely, “ C o u rt” an d “ L a b o u r C o u rt” w ould also becom e
red u n d an t. In this view o f th e m a tte r, th e w ord “ T rib u n al” as used in
all the first th ree sub-sections o f S. 11 m ust be h eld to have been used in
the sense o f the definition occurring in cl. (r) o f S. 2.
Section 11A is ju s t th e next succeeding section and therein a p a rt o f

th e arran g em en t a d o p te d is th e sam e as in sub-ss. (2) a n d (3) o f S. 11 so
th a t pow ers are con ferred by it on a “ L a b o u r C o u rt, T rib u n al or N atio n al
T rib u n a l” w hich arran g em en t is rep eated in th e section thrice over.
T h a t th e w o rd “ T rib u n a l” as used in S. I I A has th e same m eaning as it
carries in th e th ree sub-sections o f S. 11 is obvious and I need n o t repeat
the reasons in th a t behalf; for, they a re practically the sam e as have been
•set out b y m e in re la tio n to S. 11.
In m y opinion th e language em ployed in S. I lA suffers from no

am biguity w hatever a n d is capable only o f one m eaning, i.e., th a t the
w ord “ T rib u n a l” occurring therein is used in th e sense o f th e definition
given in cl. (r) o f S. 2. I t is thus n o t perm issible fo r th is C ourt to take
the statem enl o f objects and reasons or the purpose underlying the-
enactm ent into consideration w hile interpreting S. 11 A.
I m ay m ention here, how ever, th a t a perusal o f th e statem ent o f

objects and reasons form ing th e b ackground to th e enactm ent o f
S. IIA. leads m e to the sam e conclusion. In th a t statem ent a reference
was specially m ade to T rib u n als as well as A rb itrators in term s o f the
recom m endations of the In te rn a tio n a l L ab o u r O rganisation. B ut in
spite o f th a t th e word “ A rb itra to r” is conspicuous by its absence from
the section. W h a t is th e reaso n for th e omission ? W as it consci
ously an d deliberately m ade or was it due to carelessness on the p a rt
of th e draftsm en and a consequent failure on th e p a rt o f th e Legislature ?
In m y opinion th e C ourt w ould step beyond the field o f in terp retatio n
and enter u p o n the area o f legislation if it resorts to guess w ork (how
ever intelligently the sam e m ay be carried out) and attrib u tes the om is
sion to th e la tte r cause in a situation like th is which postulates th a t the
pointed atten tio n o f the L egislature was draw n to th e desirability o f
clothing an A rb itra to r with th e same pow ers as were sought to be co n
ferred on certain Courts and T ribunals by S. 1 lA and it did n o t accept
the recom m endation. I w ould ho ld , in th e circum stances, th a t th e
om ission was deliberately m ad e...
I need n o t go into the o th er aspects o f the case. In view o f m y

findings—
(b) ...th a t th e A rb itrato r could n o t excercise the pow ers conferred

on a T ribunal und er S. I I A o f th e 1947 Act an d could n o t,
th erefore, interfere w ith th e punishm ent aw arded by the
m anagem ent to th e w orkm en (even if the discharge could be
regarded a punishm ent)....
D. A D JU D IC A T IO N
There is a well-known adm onition th a t w ar is to o im p o rtan t to b e

left to th e generals. In sim ilar vein, industrial disputes are th o ught by
m any to be to o im portant to be left to the parties. This is th e prevalent
view of the centres of pow er in In d ia today.
In the U n ited K ingdom an d th e U n ited States, (but n o t in A ustralia,,

and m uch less on the C ontinent o f Europe) a different th eo ry and system
prevail. This is know n as collective bargaining. U nder it the w orkm en
through th e ir representatives b argain w ith the employers for agreem ents
determ ining th e term s an d conditions o f em ploym ent. Inasm uch a s
industrialization came to a large extent from the western countries, it is.
ADJUDICATION 257
n a tu ra l th a t ever since In d ependence th e In d ia n policy-m akers have paid

lip service a t least to th e virtues o f collective bargaining. I t was a tra d i
tio n al featu re o f la b o u r relations in w estern countries, and such relations
cam e to In d ia w ith in d u strialisatio n .
B u t in practice th e In d ian g overnm ent has retained ultim ate control

over term s an d co n d itio n s o f em ploym ent, th ro u g h , com pulsory adjudi
cation as th e last reso rt.
T h e necessity fo r m ain tain in g in d u strial peace during the em ergency

o f the S eco n d W old W a r b ro u g h t to In d ia th e first experience in com
p ulsory ad ju d icatio n . R ule 81A o f the-D efence o f In d ia R ules contained
these provisions. T h e In d u strial D isp u tes A ct, 1947, passed long after
th e rep eal o f th a t R u le , em bodied m uch o f its co n ten t as n o rm al legis
lation. T h e first step , u n d er th e A ct, is conciliation. If the C onciliation
Officer (o r B oard o f C onciliation) fails to -b ring a bout a settlem ent an d
ifTfie^parties~3^ o . t - a g r e i l o a rb itra tio n , then th e ap p ro p riate G o v ern
m ent (th e C e n tra l in som e industries; a s ta tT g o v S rim e n lln others) "inay
reler th e eiitif e '^ s p u te , o r p a rtic u la r issues, to ad ju d icatio n ,
^ ■ ^ f h e system o f com pulsory ad ju d icatio n o f la b o u r disputes is

regulated b y G o vernm ent. W hen t he G o v ern m en t is o f opinion th a t any
in d u sfrifl dispute, exists o r j s appreh ended it m ay, a t any tim eS refer th e
d i s p u t ^ o r c o n c ih a tio i^ o r in q u iry or_a.djudication. ~ ~
Sec. 10(1). R eference o f disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals—

“ (W here th e a p p ro p ria te G ov ern m en t is o f o p in io n th a t any in d u stria l
dispute exists or is apprehended, it m ay a t any tim e), by order in w riting—
(a) refer the dispute to a B oard fo r p ro m o tin g a settlem ent thereof;

or
(b) re fe r an y m a tte r app earin g to be connected with o r relevant to

th e d isp u te to a C o u rt fo r enquiry; o r
(c) refer the dispute o r any m a tte r ap p earin g to b e connected w ith,

or relev an t to th e dispute, i f it relates to any m atte r specified in
th e Second Schedule, to a L a b o u r C o u rt fo r adjudication; or
(d) refer th e dispute o r any m a tte r ap p earin g to b e connected w ith,

o r relev an t to th e d ispute, w hether it relates to a n y m atte r
specified in th e Second Schedule o r th e T h ird Schedule, to a
T rib u n a l fo r adjud icatio n ;
See Western India M atch Co. Ltd. v. Western India Match Company Workers’
t/nion,(1970)2L ,L .J. 256.
P rovided th a t where th e dispute relates to any m atter specified in the

T hird Schedule an d is not likely to affect m o re th a n one h u n d re d w orkm en,
th e ap p ro p riate G overnm ent m ay, if it so th in k s fit, m ake th e reference
to a L ab o u r C o u rt under clause (c).
(G overnm ent enjoys a w ide discretion in m aking th e reference— an

adm inistrative a c t^ The discretion is, how ever, narro w er in case o f
disputes in p u b lic utility services served w ith strike notice).
(Provided fu rth er that) w here th e dispute relates to a pu b lic u tility

service and a notice u n d er Section 22 h as been given, th e a p p ro p riate
G overnm ent shall, unless it considers th a t th e notice has been frivolously
or vexatiously given or th a t it w ould b e inexpedient so to d o , m ake a
reference u n d er th is sub-section n o tw ith stan d in g th a t any o ther proceed
ings under th is A ct in respect o f the d isp u te m ay have com m enced” .
(The trib u n a l has to confine its adju d icatio n to the p o in ts and m atters
incidental th ereto , if the sam e are specified b y the G overnm ent).
Sec. 10(4)—“ W here in an o rd er referring an industrial dispute to (a

L abou r C o u rt, T ribunal o r N a tio n a l T rib u n al) under th is Section o r in a
subsequent o rd e r, the ap p ro p riate G o v ern m en t h as specified th e p o in ts o f
dispute fo r adjudication, (the L ab o u r C o u rt o r the T rib u n al or the
N a tio n a l T rib u n a l as th e case m ay be) shall confine its adjudication to
th o se p oints an d m atters incidental th e re to ” .
(The reference can also be m ade by the G overnm ent a t th e instance o f

the parties to th e dispute).
Sec. 10{2)—“ W here th e p arties to an industrial dispute apply in the

prescribed m an n er, w hether jo in tly or separately, for a reference o f the
dispute to a B oard, C ourt (L ab o u r C ourt, T ribunal or N a tio n a l T rib u n al),
th e ap p ro p riate G overnm ent, if satisfied th a t the persons applying repre**
sent th e m ajo rity o f each p arty , shall m ake th e reference accordingly” .
(The G overnm ent can ad d p arties to its o rder o f reference) :
Sec. /0 ( J )~ W h e re a dispute concerning any establishm ent or esta

blishm ents h as been, or is to b e, referred to a (L abour C o u rt, T rib u n al or
N a tio n a l T ribunal) under this Section a n d th e ap p ropriate G o vernm ent
is o f opinion, w hether on an application m ade to it in this b e h a lf o r
otherw ise, th a t th e dispute is o f such a n a tu re th a t any o th e r establish
m ent, group o r class o f establishm ents o f a sim ilar n atu re is likely to be
2. As to the scope of discretion see infra.

ADJUDICATION 259
interested in , or affected by, such d ispute, th e a p p ro p riate G o v ern m en t

m ay, a t th e tim e o f m aking th e reference or a t any tim e th ereafter, b u t
before th e subm ission o f the aw ard , include in th a t reference such
establish m en t, g ro u p or class o f establishm ents, w hether or n o t a t the
tim e o f such inclusion any dispute exists o r is apprehended in th a t
establish m en t, group o r class o f establish m en ts.”
(Besides th e G o v ern m en t can refer certain disputes to a N a tio n a l

T rib u n a l).
Sec. 10-1 (1-A)— “ W here th e C en tral G overn m ent is o f opinion th a t

any in d u stria l d isp u te exists or is ap p reh en d ed an d the dispute involves
any q u estio n o f n a tio n a l im p o rtan ce o r is o f such a n a tu re th a t in d u strial
establishm ents situ ated in m ore th a n one State a re likely to be interested
in, or affected by, such dispute, a n d th a t th e dispute should be adjudicated
by a N a tio n a l T rib u n a l, th en , th e C e n tra l G o v ern m en t m ay, w hether o r
n o t it is th e a p p ro p ria te G o v ern m en t in re la tio n to th a t dispute, at any
tim e, b y o rd e r in w ritin g , refer th e d ispute or an y m a tte r appearing to be
connected w ith , o r relevant to , th e dispute w hether it relates to any
m atter specified in th e S econd Schedule o r th e T h ird Schedule, to a
N atio n a l T rib u n a l fo r a d ju d ic a tio n .”
T h e A c t envisages th ree kinds o f courts ; la b o u r courts, in d u stria l

trib u n a ls an d n a tio n a l in d u strial trib u n als.
A la b o \ir c o u rt c a n b e co n stitu ted by an a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent

a n d it can decide certain specified disputes o f a m inor an d com m on
nature. I t can also decide disputes in reg ard to certain specified m atters
o f greater im p o rta n c e w hen th e n u m b er o f w orkm en affected is n o t m ore
th a n one h u n d re d a n d when th e a p p ro p ria te g o v ernm ent thinks fit.®
A n in d u stria l trib u n a l can be co n stitu ted by an ap p ro p riate G o v ern

m ent a n d it can n ow decide an y in d u strial dispute referred to it.'*
A n a tio n a l in d u stria l trib u n al can be constituted by the C entral

G overn m en t, w hether it h ap p en s to be th e a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent o r
n o t, a n d c a n decide disputes o f n a tio n a l im p ortance and those w hich
involve in d u stria l estab lish m en ts situ ated in m ore th a n one state.®
W hen a case is referred to a n a tio n a l in d u stria l trib u n a l, any

proceedings p en d in g b efo re th e o th e r tw o k in d s o f courts involving any
issue so referred to th e n a tio n a l trib u n a l are au to m atically tran sferred to
3. Sections 7 and 10(1); 2nd and 3rd schedules.

4. Section 7A,
5. Section 7B.
the natio n al tribunal. P en d in g ad ju d icatio n by the n atio n a l trib u n al, no

governm ent can refer an y m a tte r relatin g to the pending proceedings to
any other court.'*
E ach o f these adjudicating bodies consists o f one ad ju d ic ato r only.
Judicial experience p rio r to a p p o in tm e n t is a requirem ent for a p p o in t
m ent to each; though the periods an d n a tu re s o f the ju d icial offices to be
held vary from one to th e o th er. T o advise an in d u strial trib u n a l o r a
n atio n al in d u strial trib u n al, tw o assessors can be ap p o in ted by th e
ap p ro p riate G overnm ent, o r b y th e C en tral G overnm ent, respectively.’
E ach o f these adjudicating bodies depends for jurisd ictio n on a

reference. W here th e p oints o f dispute are specified in th e reference to
it, it m ust confine its a tte n tio n to these p oints, and m atters incidental
thereto.® I t cannot decide an issue n o t referred to it.*' T he adjudicating
body h ears th e p a rtie s’ claim s, ta k e s evidence and m akes its aw ard. Its
procedures a n d practices are sim ilar to those o f a c o u rt o f law. T he
proced u ral technicalities o f th e In d ian Evidence A ct do n o t apply to
these bodies. But in m atters o f p ro o f o f docum ents a n d claim s o f
privilege, th e courts hold th a t th e adjudicating body has to a d o p t rules
sim ilar to those o f a co u rt o f law .’^®
W hile a co u rt o f law m u st decide in accordance w ith applicable law ,

there is frequently n o applicable law fo r a la b o u r dispute. Suppose, fo r
exam ple, th a t th e w orkers an d th e ir u n io n w ant a tw enty p er cent wage
increase. T h e em ployers refuse to g ra n t m o re th an te n per cent. T he
trib u n al has to decide. W here can it tu r n fo r applicable law? O bviously,
none exists. T h e m aintenance o f in d u strial peace is its m ain concern; th e
adjud icatin g body strives to achieve th is, a n d m ust m ake its law as it
goes. A duty is cast on it to dispose o f all m atters referred to it expedi
tiously, an d to subm it its aw ards.^’^
In m ost citations, a n ap p ro p riate G overnm ent exercises discretion

w hether o r n o t to refer an existing dispute o r one th a t is to be ap p re
hended.^^
6, Section 10(6).
7. Section 7, 7A and 7B.
8. Section 10(4).
9. U .P. Electric Supply Co, Ltd. v. Workers o f Messers. S.M. Choudhaiy, A IR 1960
S.C. 818; (1960) I L.L.J. 808.
10. Petald Turkey Red Dyeing Works Ltd. v. Dyes and Chemical Workers' Union, (I960)
I L.L.J. 548 (SC); Reserve Bank o f India V. Central Oovernment Industrial Tribunal,
Delhi, (1959) I L.L.J. 539 (Punjab); [1959-60] IS FJR 297 (Punjab).
11. Section 15.
12. Section 10(1).
ADJUDICATION 261
O n a failu re o f conciliation proceedings, it can either m ake a

reference o r refuse to m ake one. In the la tte r case it has to re c o rd its
reasons fo r its refusal to refer.*-® I t m u st always refer a dispute, how ever,
whenever p erso n s represen tin g th e m ajo rity o f each p a rty to th a t dispute
apply fo r such reference in th e p rescribed manner.^* I t m u st alm ost
always refer any d isp u te th a t concerns a public-u tility service. O nly when
the gov ern m en t considers th a t in such a dispute a notice under section 22
regarding strik es a n d lo ck -o u ts was given frivolously, m ay it decline to
m ake a referen ce.’-® A reference m ade by an ap p ro p riate G overnm ent can
be quashed in w rit proceedings if th e g overnm ent was act-uated by m ala
fides in m a k in g th e reference.^®
W hen th e a p p ro p ria te G overn m en t is satisfied th a t a dispute is o f

such n a tu re th a t a n y o th e r establishm ent o r establishm ents are likely to
be affected o r interested, it can add th e m as p arties to the dispute, and
m ay do so a t any tim e before th e award.^^
T he a p p ro p ria te G o v ern m en t can n o t m odify or cancel a reference,

b u t it can tra n sfe r th e case to an o th er adju d icating body.^®
■^'"^‘A dindicatio n seeks to settle disp-utes b e tte r a n d m ore justly th a n

striltes c o u ld settle th e m , an d w ith o u t th e losses th a t strikes bring to w ork
m en, em ployers, and public. T herefore the A ct tries to lim it strikes; at
the sam e tim e it also tries to im pose som e re stra in ts on lock-outs a n d on
changes by em ployers o f w orking co n d itio n s during an adjudication. The
a p p ro p ria te G o v ern m en t can p ro h ib it th e co n tin u atio n o f a strike o r a
lock-o u t, a fte r having m ad e reference o f th a t d isp u te ....’-®
U nless som e o th e r effective d a te is specified, a n aw ard, a fte r being

published w ith in th irty days, becom es enforceable after a n o th er th irty
days.^'® ^
B u t^ f th e at)prot>riate G overnm ent'.is a p a rty to th e case, it can reject

th e aw ard “ o n 'puBHc" grounds affecting n a tio n a l econom y o r social
ju stice” . T h e C en tral G overnm ent m ay, on sim ilar grounds, reject the
13. Section 12(5).

14. Section 10(2).
15. Section 10(1).
16. British India Corporation Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, A IR 1957 SC 354.
17. Section 10(5).
18. Section 33B.
19. Section 10(3); Workmen v. Express Newspapers Ltd. A IR 1961 Mad. 331.
20. Section 1 7 ,17A.
aw ard o f a national trib u n a l, and m ay do so even th o u g h the C entral

G overnm ent is n o t a p a rty to the case. A fter an ord er p o stp o n in g the
aw ard’s effectiveness, on th ese gro u n d s, th e aw ard can th en be rejected o r
modified by the ap p ro p riate G o v ern m en t w ithin ninety days fro m the
aw ard’s publication. T h is action th e n h as to be placed before th e a p p ro
priate Legislature; and such aw ard becom es enforceable in its original
form in fifteen days unless th e L egislature acts. W hen the a p p ro p ria te
G overnm ent does n o t m odify or reject th e aw ard it becom es enforceable
ninety days after publication.-^
The effective p eriod o f a n aw ard can be changed by the a p p ro p ria te

G overnm ent, w ithin certain specified Jimits.^'^
Subject to the foregoing, a n aw ard is binding on all th e p arties to

th e industrial dispute, including all p a rtie s properly b ro u g h t in to th e
proceedings, and their representatives.^® A violation o f any provision
o f an aw ard can be treated as an offence a n d can be punished accordingly.^*
STA TE O F M A D R A S v. C .P. S A R A T H Y
A .L R . 1953 S.C. 53
[Sarathy, th e m anager o f P ra b h a t T alkies, M adras, was charged w ith

a crim inal offence under Sections 27 a n d 29 o f th e Indu strial D isputes A ct
fo r instigating a lock-out a n d disobeying an aw ard o f an industrial trib u n a l.
South In d ian C inem a E m ployees’ A ssociation, a registered trad e u n io n
whose m em bers are w orkers in various cinem a com panies including
P rab h at, h a d presented w ritten dem ands to th e L a b o u r C om m issioner,
ap poin ted as conciliation officer, fo r b etter wages, dearness allow ance,
and bonus, a n d a better grievance procedure. H e invited th e parties to
discuss certain m inim um term s which he suggested. T he m anagers o f
P ra b h a t a n d five other cinem as accepted th o se term s; b u t th e m anagers
o f other cinem as refused. T he E m ployees’ A ssociation, dissatisfied, to ld
the C om m issioner th a t they w ould strike in one week. A t th e en d o f
th e week he reported a failure o f co n ciliation, and on the sam e day th e
G overnm ent o f M adras referred th e d isp u te in th e follow ing w ords ;
“ W hereas an industrial dispute h a s arisen between th e w orkers a n d

the m anagem ent o f the cinem a talkies in th e M adras city in respect o f
certain m a tte r.... T he G overner o f M ad ras hereby co nstitutes an
21. Section 17A.

22. Section 19.
23. Section 18.
24. Section 29.
ADJUDICATION 263
in d u stria l trib u n a l a n d directs th a t th e said industrial dispute be referred

to tlie trib u n a l for ad ju d ic a tio n ” . T he T ribunal notified the tw enty-four
cinem a com panies th a t they should file statem ents o f position w ith it
an d ap p ear b efore it. I t fra m e d tw enty-tw o issues, including : “ (3) Is
there a d isp u te betw een th e m anagem ents o f th e city theatres a n d th eir
respective em ployees ju stifying the reference by th e G overnm ent to th e
Ind u strial T rib u n a l fo r adjudication? W h eth er such an objection is
tenable in law ?”
P ra b h a t an d som e o th e r cinem as claim ed th a t there was no dispute

betw een th e ir em ployees an d themselves. B u t th e T ribunal ruled “ th a t
even if som e o f th e th eatres have g o t a staff contented with th e ir lo t
there is a su b stan tial d isp u te in th e in d u stry taken as a w hole” . I t
refused acco rd in g ly to d ro p any cinem as as parties.
The T rib u n al m ad e its aw ard o n th e m erits, setting term s higher

th a n those w hich th e C om m issioner h a d set. T he G overnm ent confirm ed
thC 'aw ard tw o m o n th s later, and d elcared it b inding for one year.
S arathy , m an ag er o f P ra b h a t, refused to com ply, and was crim inally
charged as n o te d above.
H e raised a p relim in ary objection to th e ju risd ictio n o f th e M agist

rate in th e crim inal p ro ceed in g : th a t th e aw ard was void because o f the
lack o f a d isp u te p erm ittin g a valid reference. T h e M agistrate overruled
this objection. U n d e r A rticle 226 o f th e C o n stitu tio n Sarathy w ent to
the H igh C o u rt o f M a d ra s fo r a w rit o f certiorari to quash th e crim inal
proceedings. T h a t C o u rt’s Division Bench upheld the objection, and
quashed th e proceedings. T h e State o f M a d ra s b ro u g h t th is appeal to
the Suprem e C o u rt.
The ju d g m en t o f th e C o u rt, delivered by P ata n ja li Sastry, C .J.,

follow s ;]
[D ealing w ith the m ain contention] On b e h a lf o f th e appellant, the

A dvocate G en eral o f M ad ras urged th a t th e question w hether there
existed an in d u strial dispute when th e G overn m ent m ade th e reference
now und er co n sid eratio n was an issue o f fact w hich th e H igh C o u rt ought
n o t to h av e fo u n d in th e negative a t th is p relim in ary stage before
evidence w as reco rd ed b y th e tria l C o u rt. H e subm itted, how ever, th a t,
on the facts already ap p earin g o n th e reco rd , th ere could be n o reason
able d o u b t th a t an in d u stria l dispute d id exist a t th e relevant tim e. W e
are inclined to agree. The ten dem ands set fo rth in th e L ab o u r
C om m issioner’s le tte r...w h ic h were n o t agreed to by th e m anagem ents o f
the 24 cin em a th eatres in M ad ras clearly co n stituted industrial disputes
w ithin the m eaning o f th e A c t,.,.
[Q uoting from the ju d g m en t o f the M ad ras H igh C ourt]
“ N or is it correct to say th a t th e disputes, if an y , w hich m ig h t have

existed betw een th e w orkm en of th e p etitio n er’s cinem a and th e p etitioner
him self h a d n o t been settled by th e p e titio n e r’s ready and wiHing accep
tance o f term s suggested by th e C om m issioner” .... T he learned judges
(of the H igh C ourt) ap p ear to have assum ed th a t th e disputes referred
to a T rib u n al u nder S. 10(I)(c)....m ust, in o rd er th a t the resulting aw ard
m ay be binding on any p articu lar industrial establishm ent and its
employees, have actually arisen betw een them . “ A nalysing the o rd er o f
reference o f the M ad ras G overnm ent now u n d er co n sid eratio n ” , the
learned judges observe,
“ I t is obvious th a t there is n o m ention o f th e existence o f any

dispute between th e p etitio n er (the first resp o ndent herein) an d his
w o rk m en ..,. In fa c t there was no dispute to be referred to a
T rib u n al so fa r as this p etitioner is concerned, If, therefore, th e re
was no ju risdiction to m ake any reference, it follow s th a t th e whole
reference and the aw ard are b o th invalid an d n o t b in ding on th e
p etitio n er” .
This view gives n o effect to th e w ords “ or is a p p reh e n d ed ” in

Section 10(1). In the p resen t case, th e G overnm ent referred “ a n in d u s
tria l dispute betw een th e w orkers an d th e m anagem ent o f cinem a ta lk ies
in M ad ras city in respect o f certain m a tte rs” . A s pointed o u t in th e
L a b o u r C om m issioner’s le tte r to th e G overnm ent, th e re w ere 24 cinem a
com panies in M adras, an d the A ssociation, w hich as a duly registered
trad e u n io n , represented th e ir employees, p u t forw ard th e dem ands on
beh alf o f th e employees o f all the cinem a houses in th e city. Fifteen
o u t o f 43 w orkers o f th e “ P ra b h a t T alk ies” were adm ittedly m em bers o f
th e A ssociation which th u s figured as one o f the p a rties o f the dispxite.
In th a t situ atio n , th e G overnm ent m ay have th o u g h t, w ith o u t a close
exam ination o f th e co nditions in each individual establishm ent th a t
disputes w hich affected th e w orkm en collectively existed in the cinem a
industry in th e city a n d th a t, even if such disputes h ad n o t actually
arisen in th e p articular establishm ent, th ey could, having reg ard to th e ir
collective n atu re, well be apprehended as im m inent in respect o f th a t
establishm ent also. It is n o t denied th a t notices were sent by th e T rib u
nal to all th e 24 com panies an d they all filed w ritten statem ents o f th e ir
case in answ er to th e dem ands m ade by th e association on b e h a lf o f th e
employees. In these circum stances it is idle to claim th a t th e G overn
m ent had no jurisdiction to m ake th e reference and th a t th e aw ard was
n o t binding on the resp o n d en t’s organisation. The la tte r was clearly
b o u n d b y th e aw ard u n d e r Section 18 o f th e A c t....
ADJUDICATION 265
[The S uprem e C o u rt reversed th e H igh C o u rt decision h o ld in g th a t

the reference was in co m p eten t because o f vagueness,]
T his is, how ever, n o t to say th a t th e G overnm ent will be justified in

m aking th e reference under Section 10(1) w ith o u t satisfying itself on the
facts an d circum stances b ro u g h t to its notice th a t an industrial dispute
exists o r is appreh en d ed in relation to an establishm ent or a definite
group o f estab lish m en ts engaged in a p a rtic u la r industry. I t is also
desirable th a t th e G o v ern m en t should, w henever possible, indicate the
n atu re o f th e dispute in th e order o f reference. B ut it m u st be rem em ber
ed th a t in m ak in g a reference u nder Section 10(1) th e G overnm ent is
doing a n a d m in istrativ e act an d th e fact th a t it has to form an opinion
as to th e factu al existence o f an in d u strial dispute as a prelim inary step
to the discharge o f its function does n o t m ak e it any the less ad m in is
trative in ch aracter. T h e C o u rt, ca n n o t therefore, canvass th e o rd e r o f
reference closely to see i f there was an y m aterial before the G overnm ent
to su p p o rt its co nclusion, as (if) it was a ju d icial or quasi-judicial
d eterm in atio n . N o d o u b t, it will be o pen to a p a rty seeking to im pugn
the resulting aw ard to show th a t w h at was referred by the G overnm ent
was n o t an in d u strial d isp u te w ithin th e m eaning o f the A ct, an d th a t,
therefore, th e trib u n a l h a d no ju risd ictio n to m ake th e aw ard. B u t if the
dispute was a n in d u stria l d isp u te defined in th e A ct, its factual existence
and th e expediency o f m aking a reference in th e circum stances o f a
particu lar case are m a tte rs entirely fo r th e G o v ernm ent to decide up o n ,
and it will n o t be com petent fo r the C o u rt to h o ld th e reference b ad a n d
quash th e proceedings fo r w ant o f ju risd ictio n m erely because there was,
in its o p in io n no m a te ria l before th e G ov ern m en t o n w hich it w ould have
com e to an affirm ative conclusion on th o se m atters.' T he observations
in som e o f th e decisions in M ad ras d o n o t a p p e a r to have k e p t this
distinctio n in view.
M orever, it m ay n o t always be possible fo r th e G overnm ent, o n the

m aterial p laced before it, to p articu larise th e dispute in its o rd e r o f
reference, fo r situ atio n s m ight conceivably arise w here th e public interest
requires th a t a strike o r a lock-out either existing o r im m inent, should
be ended o r averted w ith o u t delay, w hich und er th e schem e o f th e A ct,
could be d o n e after th e d ispute giving rise to i t h as been referred t o a
B oard o r a T rib u n a l (V ide ss. 10(3) a n d 23). In such cases, the G overn
m ent m u st h av e th e p o w er, in o rd er to m ain ta in in d u strial peace a n d
p ro d u ctio n , to set in m o tio n th e m achinery o f settlem ent w ith its sanc
tions and p ro h ib itio n s w ith o u t stopping to enquire w h at specific p o in ts
the co n ten d in g p arties are quarrelling ab o u t, a n d it w ould seriously
d etract fro m th e usefulness o f th e sta tu to ry m achinery to construe
Section 10(1) as denying such pow er to th e G overnm ent. W e find nothing
in th e language o f th a t p rovision to com pel such co n stru ctio n . The

G overnm ent m ust, o f course, have sufficient know ledge o f the n atu re o f
the dispute to be satisfied th a t it is a n in d u strial dispute w ithin the
m eaning o f the A ct, as for instance, th a t it relates to retren ch m en t or
reinstatem ent. B ut bey o n d this no obligation can be held to lie on the
G overnm ent to ascertain particulars o f the disputes before m ak in g a
reference u nder Section 10(1) or to specify them in th e order.
T his conclusion derives fu rth er su p p o rt from Cl. (a) Section 10(1)

which provides in th e sam e language fo r th e reference o f the d isp u te to
a B oard fo r prom oting a settlem ent. A B o ard is p a rt o f the conciliation
m achinery provided b y th e A ct, and it ca n n o t be said th a t it is necessary
to specify th e dispute in referring it to such a body w hich only m ediates
betw een th e parties w ho m ust o f course, know w hat they are disputing
about. I f a reference w ith o u t particularising th e dispute is b eyond cavil
under Cl. (a) why should it be incom petent und er Cl. (c)? N o d o u b t
th e T rib u n al adjudicates w hereas the B oard only m ediates. B ut the
adjud icatio n by the T rib u n al is only an alternative fo rm o f settlem en t o f
th e disputes on a fair an d ju s t basis having re g ard to th e prevailing
conditions in th e ind u stry and is b y n o m eans analogous to w h at an
a rb itra to r has to do in determ ining o rd in a ry civil disputes according to
th e legal rig h ts o f th e parties. Indeed, th is n o tio n th a t a reference to a
T ribu n al und er the A ct m ust specify th e p articular disputes ap p ears to
have been derived from th e analogy o f an ordinary arb itratio n . F o r
instance, in ‘R am ayya P a n tu lu v. K u tty an d R ao (Engineers) L td .’
1949-1 M ad. L .J. 231, it is observed :
“ th a t if a dispute is to be referred to a T ribunal th e n a tu re o f th e

d isp u te m ust be set o u t ju s t as it w ould if a reference were m ade to
an a rb itra to r in a civil dispute. T he T rib u n al like any o ther
a rb itra to r can give a n aw ard o n a reference only if th e p o in ts o f
reference are clearly placed before it ” .
T h e analogy is som ew hat m isleading. T he scope o f ad judication by

T rib u n a l und er th e A ct is m u ch w id e r...a n d it w ould involve no h ard sh ip
if th e reference also is m ade in w ider terras p rovided, o f course, th e
dispute is one o f th e k in d described in Section 2(k) an d th e parties
betw een w hom such dispute h as actually arisen o r is ap p reh en d ed in th e
view o f th e G overnm ent are indicated either individually o r collectively
w ith reasonable clearness. T he rules fram ed under th e A ct provide for
th e T ribunal calling for statem ents o f th eir respective cases fro m th e
parties and th e dispute w ould thus get crystallised before th e trib u n a l
proceeds to m ake its aw ard. O n th e o th er h and, it is significant th a t
there is n o procedure provided in th e A ct o r in the rules fo r th e G overn-
ADJUDICATION 267
m eiit ascertain in g th e p articu lars o f th e diispute from th e p artie s before

referring th em to a trib u n a l under Section 10(1). . . .
In th e resu lt we set aside th e o rd e r o f th e H igh C ourt (quashing the

crim inal p roceedings against the first respondent) and dismiss th e first
resp o n d e n t’s p etitio n .
[A p p eal allow ed.]
S T A T E O F B O M B A Y v. K .F . K R IS H N A N
(1960) 2 L .L .J. 592— A .I.R . 1960 S.C. 1223
[The w orkm en o f F iresto n e T yre a n d R u b b er C om pany o f In d ia L td.

(R espondents) m ade certain dem ands to th e C om pany inter-alia in respect
o f the p a y m e n t o f a bon u s (unconditional) fo r financial year ended
O ctober 31, 1953. O nly tw o dem ands w ere ad m itted to conciliation
viz. classification o f certain em ployees and bonus fo r the year 1952-53.
T he conciliation p ro v ed infructious a n d th e failure re p o rt was subm itted
as req u ired u n d e r Section 12 (4) o f th e In d u stria l D esputes Act.
A fter considering th e failure re p o rt, th e S tate o f B om bay (A ppellant)

decided n o t to refer th e dispute fo r in d u strial adjudication. T h e order
o f refusal to m ak e reference com m unicated to th e respondent w as “ for
the reason th a t th e w orkm en reso rted to go slow during th e year
1952-53.”
T he B om bay H ig h C o u rt, m oved u nder A rticle 226 o f th e C o n stitu

tio n by th e resp o n d en ts, h eld th a t S. 12(5) in substance im posed an
obligation o n th e G o v ern m en t to refer th e dispute provided it was satis
fied th a t a case for reference h a d been m ade. T h e H igh C o u rt concluded
th a t th e re a so n given b y th e G o v ern m en t fo r refusing to m ake reference
was so ex traneous th a t th e w orkm en w ere e n titled to a w rit o f m andam us
against th e G o v ern m en t. T h e D ivision B ench o f th e sam e H igh C o u rt
consisting o f C hagla C .J. an d D esai J . agreed w ith th e above view. T he
parties cam e to Suprem e C o u rt a fte r o b tain ing a certificate fro m the
H igh C o u rt. E xcerpts from th e ju d g m en t delivered by G ajendragadkar
J. follow :]
I t is tru e th a t S. 12(5) provides th a t th e a p p ro p riate G overnm ent

m ay m ake su ch reference an d in th a t sense it m ay b e perm issible to say
th a t a p o w er to m ake reference is conferred o n th e ap p ro p riate G overn
m ent by S. 12 (5). T h e H ig h C o u rt w as ap p a re n tly inclined to ta k e the
view th a t in cases fallin g u n d e r Section 12(5) reference can be m ade only
u n d er S. 12 (5) independently o f Section 10 (1). I n o u r opinion th a t is
n o t th e effect o f th e provisions o f S. 12(5). I f it is held th a t in cases

falling u n d er S. 12 (5) reference can a n d should b e m ade only under
S. 12 (5), it w ould lead to very an am o lo u s consequences. . . .
T herefore, it would n o t be reasonable to hold th a t S. 12 (5) by itself

and independently o f S. 10(1) confers pow er on the a p p ro p ria te G o v ern
m ent to m ake a reference.
T he next p o in t to consider is w hether, w hile th e a p p ro p ria te

G o vern m en t acts under S. 12 (5), it is b o u n d to base its decision . . . on
a consideration o f th e re p o rt m ade b y th e conciliation officer under
S. 12 (4). T h e te n o r o f th e H igh C o u rt’s judgm ent m ay seem to suggest
th a t th e only m aterial o n w hich th e conclusions o f th e ap p ro p ria te
G overn m en t under S. 12 (5) should be b ased is the said re p o rt. T h e re is
no d o u b t th a t having regard to th e background furnished by th e earlier
provisions o f S. 12 the ap p ro p riate G overn m en t w ould n a tu ra lly consider
th e re p o rt very carefully an d tre a t it as furnishing th e relev an t m aterial
which w o u ld enable it to decide w hether a case fo r reference has been
m ade or n o t; b u t the w ords o f S. 12 (5) d o n o t suggest th a t th e rep o rt
is the only m aterial o n w hich th e G o v ern m en t m ust base its conclusion.
I t w ould be open to th e G ov ern m en t to consider o th e r relevant facts
w hich m ay com e to its know ledge or w hich m ay be b ro u g h t to its
notice, and it is in the light o f all these relevant facts th a t it has to
com e to its decision w hether a reference should be m ad e or n o t. T he
pro b lem w hich th e G overnm ent h as to consider w hile acting u n der
Section 12 (5) (a) is w hether there is a case for reference. T his expression
m eans th a t G overnm ent m u st first consider w hether a prim a facie case
fo r reference has been m ade o n th e m erits. I f th e G o v ern m en t
com es to th e conclusion th a t a p rim a facie case fo r reference has been
m ade, th e n it w ould be o p en t o th e G overnm ent also to consider
w hether th ere are any o th er relevant o r m aterial facts w hich w ould
justify its refu sal to m ake a reference. T h e question as to w h eth er a case
fo r reference has been m ade out can be answ ered in the lig h t o f a ll the
relevant circum stances w hich w ould have a bearing on th e m erits o f a
case as well as on the incidental q u estio n as to w h eth er a reference
sh o u ld nevertheless b e m ade o r not. A discretion to consider a ll relevant
facts w hich is conferred o n the G overn m en t by S. 10 (1) could b e excer-
cised by th e G overnm ent even in dealing w ith cases u n d e r S. 12 (5)
provided, o f course, the said discretion is excercised bonafide, its final
decision is b ased on a consideration o f relev an t facts a n d circum stances
a n d th e second p art o f S. 12 (5) is com plied with. . . .
T he question which arises a t th is stage is w hether th e w ord ‘m a y ’

used in th e context m eans ‘shall’ o r w hether it m eans n o th in g m o re
th an ‘m ay’ which indicates th a t th e discretion is in th e G o v ern m en t
ADJUDICATION 269
either to refer o r n o t to refer...T h e controversy betw een th e parties as to

th e co n stru c tio n o f S. 12 (5) is how ever, only o f academ ic im p o rta n c e .. . .
It is com m o n g ro u n d th a t a w rit fo r m an d am us w ould lie against

the G o v ern m en t if th e o rd e r passed b y it und er S. 10 (1) is fo r in stan ce
c o n tra ry to th e provisions o f Section 10 (1) (a) to (d) in the m a tte r o f
selecting th e a p p ro p ria te au th o rity ; it is also com m on g round th a t in
refusing to m ak e a reference under S. 12 (5) if G overnm ent does n o t,
record an d co m m unicate to th e p arties concerned its reasons therefor a
w rit o f m ad am u s w o u ld lie. The o rd e r passed by the G overnm ent under
Section 12 (5) m ay be an ad m inistrative o rd er an d the reasons recorded
by it m ay n o t be ju sticiab le in th e sense th a t th e ir propriety, adequacy o r
satisfacto ry c h aracter m ay n o t be o pen to ju d icial scrutiny; in th a t sense
it w ould b e correct to say th a t th e C o u rt h earin g a p e titio n for m an d a
m us is n o t sittin g in appeal over th e decision o f the G overnm ent;
nevertheless i f th e C o u rt is satisfied th a t the reasons given by the G o v ern
m ent fo r refusing to m ak e a reference are extraneous a n d n o t germ ane
th en th e C o u rt can issue, a n d w ould b e justified in issuing a w rit o f
m andam u s even in respect o f such an ad m inistrative order. A fter an
ela b o ra te a rg u m e n t o n th e construction o f S. 12(5) was addressed to us
it becam e clear th a t o n this p a rt o f th e case th e re was no serious dispute
betw een th e p arties, T h a t is why we th in k th e controversy as to the
co n stru c tio n o f S. 12(5) is o f no m ore th a n academ ic im portance.
T h a t ta k e s us to th e real p o in t o f d isp u te betw een th e p a rtie s, and

th a t is w h eth er th e reaso n given by th e a p p e lla n t in th e present case for
refusing to m ak e a reference is germ ane o r n o t . . . . W e have already seen
th a t th e o n ly reaso n given by th e a p p ellan t is th a t th e w orkm en
resorted to go-slow d u rin g th e year 1952-53. I t w ould appear prim a
facie fro m th e com m u n icatio n ad dressed by th e a p p e lla n t to th e re sp o n
dents th a t th is was th e only reason w hich w eighed w ith th e G overnm ent
in declining to refer th e dispute u nder Section 12(5)....
T h is C o u rt has alw ays expressed its d isap p ro v al o f breaches o f law

eith er b y the em ployer o r by th e em ployees, a n d h as em phasised th a t while
th e em ployees m ay be en titled to ag itate fo r th e ir legitim ate claim s, it
w ould b e w holly w ro n g o n th e ir p a rt to ta k e recourse to any action w hich
is p ro h ib ite d by th e stan d in g orders o r statu tes o r which shows wilful
lack o f discipline or a concerted sp irit o f n o n-co o p eratio n w ith the
em ployer. E ven so th e q uestion still rem ains w hether the bare a n d bald
reason given in th e o rd e r passed by th e ap p e lla n t ca n b e sustained as
being g erm ane or relev an t to th e issue b etw een th e parties. T hough
•considerations o f expediency can n o t be excluded w hen G overnm ent
considers w hether o r n o t it sh o u ld exercise its po w er to m ake a reference.
it ■would n o t be open to th e G o v ern m en t to in tro d u ce and rely u p o n

wholly irrelevant o r extran eo u s considerations u n d e r the guise o f
expediency. I t m ay, fo r instance, be open to the G o v e rn m en t in consi
dering th e question of expediency to enquire w hether th e dispute raises
a claim w hich is very stale or w hich is opposed to th e provisions o f the
A ct, o r is inconsistent w ith an y agreem ent betw een th e p a rtie s, an d if the
G overnm ent com es to th e conclusion th a t th e dispute suffers from
infirm ities o f this ch aracter, it m ay refuse to m ake th e reference. B ut
even in dealing with th e question as to w hether it w ould be expedient
or n o t to m ak e th e reference G o v ern m en t m ust n o t act in a punitive
spirit h u t m u st consider (.he questio n fairly an d reaso n ab ly a n d ta k e into
account only relevant facts and circu m stan ces. . . .
It the present case i t is signiticant th a t th e com pany has v o lu n tarily

p aid th ree m o n th s’ bonus fo r th e relevant year n o tw ith stan d in g th e fact
th a t th e w orkm en h a d ad o p ted go-slow tactics during th e year, and th e
report o f th e conciliator w ould show p rim a facie th a t he th o u g h t th a t th e
respondents’ claim was n o t a t all frivolous. The reasons com m unicated
by the G overnm ent do n o t sh o w 'th a t th e G overnm ent was influenced by
any oth er consideration in refusing to m ak e th e reference . . . [I]n reg ard
to the claim fo r bonus, i f the resp o n d en ts are able to show th a t th e profits
earned by th e com pany durin g th e relevant year com pared to th e profits
earned during the preceding years justified th e ir d em and fo r a d d itio n a l
b onus it w ould plainly b e a punitive actio n to refuse to refer such a
dispute solely o n th e gro u n d o f th eir m isconduct. . . .
[A p p eal dism issed.]
STA TE O F B IH A R v. D . N . G A N G U L Y
Supreme Court, { \9 5 i) 2 L .L .J. 634
A .I.R . 1958 S.C. 1018
[T he G overnm ent o f B ihar referred a n industrial dispute betw een th e

m anagem ent o f B ata Shoe C om pany L td . D ighaghat, (P atn a ) a n d th e ir
31 w orkm en under S. 7 read w ith S. 10 (1) o f the In d u stria l D isp u te s
A ct. T h e dispute related to the dism issal o f w orkers an d fo r its
adjudication an industrial trib u n a l w ith M r. A li H a sa n as th e sole
m em ber was constituted. A fter th ree m o n th s a sim ilar in d u strial d isp u te
betw een th e sam e co. and its 29 o th er w orkm en was referred by th e
sam e G overnm ent to th e sam e trib u n a l. W hile th e proceedings in
respect o f the tw o references h a d m ade som e progress, the G o v ern m en t
o f Bihar issued a th ird notification by w hich it p u rp o rted to supersede
th e tw o notifications and m a d e th e reference in th e follow ing term s ;—
ADJUDICATION 271
“ W h e th e r th e dism issal o f th e 60 w orkm en . . . . was justified or

unjustified; an d to w h at relief, i f an y , those w orkm en are e n title d ” .
O n receipt o f th is notification, th e tribuna] cancelled the hearing o f

tw o p rio r references a n d directed th a t the files o f th e said references
should be closed.
T h e n o tificatio n was challenged before P a tn a H igh C o u rt w hich
ru led o u t th a t th e G o v ern m en t o f B ih a r h a d no pow er o r a u th o rity to
supersede th e earlier notifications. A gainst this decision th e G overnm ent
o f B ihar ap p ealed to th e Suprem e C o u rt. E xcerpts from the ju d g m en t
are given b e lo w :]
It is conceded b y D r. B annerjee th a t th e A ct does n o t expressly

confer a n y p o w er on th e ap p ro p riate g overnm ent to cancel o r supersede
a reference m ade u n d e r S. 10 (1) o f th e A ct. H e, how ever, argues th a t
the pow er to cancel o r supersede such a reference m u st be held to be
im plied, a n d in su p p o rt o f his argum ent, he relies on th e provisions o f
Sec. 21 o f th e G en eral C lauses A ct, 1897 (X o f 1897). Section 21 p ro
vides th a t
“ W h ere, by any C e n tra l A ct o r R eg u latio n , a pow er to issue
notifications, orders, rules, or bye-law s is conferred, th e n th a t pow er
includes a p o w er, excercisable in th e lik e m an n er and subject to th e like
sanctio n a n d c o n d itio n s (if any), to ad d to , am end, vary or rescind any
notifications, orders, ru les, or bye-laws so issued.”
I t is w ell settled th a t th e section em bodies a rule o f co n struction

a n d the q u estio n w hether or n o t it applies to th e provisions o f a p artic u lar
statute w o u ld d ep en d o n th e subject-m atter, context, an d th e effect o f
th e relevant p rovisions o f th e said s ta tu te ....W e m ust, therefore, proceed
to exam ine th e relev an t provisions o f th e A ct itself.
It is clear th a t th e policy o f th e A c t is to secure a n d preserve good

relations betw een th e em ployers a n d th e ir w orkm en and to m a in ta in
industrial peace a n d h arm o n y . I t is w ith th is object th a t S. 3 o f th e A ct
contem p lates th e estab lish m en t o f th e W o rk s C om m ittees whose d u ty it is
to p ro m o te m easures fo r securing an d p reserving am ity a n d good relatio n s
between th e em ployers an d the w orkm en. I f th e W orks C om m ittee i$
unable to settle th e disputes arising betw een th e em ployer and his w ork
m en, co n ciliatio n officers an d th e b o a rd s o f conciliation offer assistance
to th e p a rtie s to settle th e ir disputes. Sections 3,4,5,12 and 13 refer to
the w orking o f th is m ach in ery contem p lated b y th e A ct, I t is only where
the co n ciliatio n m achinery fails to b rin g a b o u t settlem ent betw een the
p arties th a t th e A c t contem plates com pulsory adjudication o f the
industrial d isp u tes b y la b o u r courts a n d trib u n als as the last alternative.
T he a p p ro p ria te governm ent is auth o rised to constitute la b o u r courts and
tribunals und er the subject to th e provisions o f Section 7 an d S ection 7-A

respectively. It is in resp ect o f th e com pulsory ad ju d icatio n th a t u n d er
Sec. 10, th e ap p ro p riate governm ent is given w ide discretion to decide
w hether or n o t the dispute betw een th e em ployer a n d his em ployees should
be referred to th e b o ard , co u rt o r trib u n a l. . . . The co n d itio n precedent
for th e reference to th e in d u strial trib u n al is th a t th e a p p ro p ria te
governm ent m ust be satisfied th a t a n in d u strial dispute exists or
is apprehended. I t is n o t in every case where th e parties allege the
existence o f an in d u strial dispute th a t a reference w ould be m a d e u n d er
Sec. 10 (1); it is only w here th e test o f subjective satisfactio n o f the
ap p ro p riate governm ent is satisfied th a t th e reference can be m ade. T h u s
it is clear th a t th e ap p ro p riate governm ent is given a n im p o rta n t voice
in the m a tte r of perm ittin g in d u strial disputes to seek a d ju d ica tio n by
reference to th e industrial trib u n al. B u t once an o rd e r in w riting is
m ade by th e ap p ro p riate governm ent referring an in d u stria l d isp u te to
the trib u n a l fo r adjudication u n d er Sec. 10 (1), proceedings before th e
trib u n a l are deemed to have com m enced and they are deem ed to have
concluded on the day on w hich the aw ard m ade by th e trib u n a l becom es
enforceable under Sec. 17 A. T h is is th e effect o f S. 20 (3) o f th e A ct.
This provision shows th a t after th e dispute is referred to the trib u n a l,
during the continuance o f th e reference proceedings, it is th e trib u n al
w hich is seized o f th e dispute an d w hich can exercise ju risd ic tio n in
respect o f it. T h e a p p ro p ria te g overnm ent can a c t in respect o f a
reference pending adjudication b efore a trib u n al only u n d er Section
10 (5) o f th e A ct, w hich authorises it to ad d o th er parties to the p en d in g
dispute subject to the conditions m entioned in th e said provision. It
w ould th erefo re be reaso n ab le to h o ld th a t except for cases falling u n d e r
Section 10 (5) th e ap p ro p riate governm ent stands outside th e reference
proceedings w hich are u n d er th e co n tro l a n d ju risdiction o f th e trib u n a l
itself. E ven after the aw ard is m ade it is obligatory o n th e a p p ro p ria te
governm ent und er Sec. 17 (1) to p ublish th e said aw ard w ithin a period
o f th irty days from th e d ate o f its receipt by the ap p ro p ria te governm ent.
Sub-section (2) o f Sec. 17 says th a t subject to th e provisions o f Sec. 17A,
th e aw ard published under sub-sec. (1) o f Section 17 shall be final a n d
shall n o t be called in question by any c o u rt in any m an n er w hatsoever.
Section 19 (3) provides th a t an aw ard shall, subject to th e o th e r p ro
visions o f Section 19, rem ain in operation fo r a period o f one year fro m
th e date on which it becom es enforceable u n d e r S. 17A. I t is tru e th a t
Ss. 17A an d 19 confer on th e a p p ro p ria te governm ent pow ers to m odify
th e provisions o f the aw ard o r lim it th e p eriod o f its o p e ratio n b u t it is
unnecessary to refer to these provisions in detail. The schem e o f the
provisions in C hapters III an d IV o f th e A ct w ould thus a p p e a r to be to
leave the reference proceedings exclusively w ithin the ju risd ictio n o f th e
tribunals constituted u n d er th e A ct a n d to m ake the aw ard s o f such
ADJUDICATION 273
trib u n als bin d in g betw een th e p arties, subject to the special pow ers
conferred o n the a p p ro p ria te governm ent u n d e r Ss. 17A and 19. T he
ap p ro p ria te g o v ern m en t u n d o u b ted ly has the initiative in the m atte r.
It is only w here it m ak es a n order in w riting referring an in d u strial
dispute to th e ad ju d icatio n o f th e trib u n a l th a t th e reference proceedings
can com m ence; b u t th e schem e o f th e relevant provisions w ould p rim a
facie seem to be in co n sisten t w ith an y po w er in th e a p p ro p riate g o v ern
m ent to cancel th e reference m ade u n d er Sec. 10 (1).
[The Suprem e C o u rt concluded th a t th e existence o f pow er to cancel
a reference w ould be inconsistent w ith proviso to S. 10 an d th e policy
underlying th e pro v isio n s o f S. 12 (5) a n d o f S. 10 (3) read with Sec. 33.
T he C o u rt also rejected th e arg u m en t th a t cancellation o f reference w ould
be necessary in o rd e r to give effect to th e am icable settlem ent o f the
dispute reach ed by th e p arties p ending proceedings before the in d u strial
trib u n al.]
....A p a r t from th e se provisions o f th e A ct, on general principles
it seems ra th e r difficult to accept th e arg u m en t th a t the a p p ro p ria te
governm ent sh o u ld have an im plied p ow er to cancel its own order m ade
u n der S. 10 (1). I f o n th e rep resen tatio n m ade by th e em ployer o r his
w orkm en th e a p p ro p ria te g overnm ent considers the m a tte r fully and
reaches th e conclusion th a t an industrial d isp u te exists o r is apprehended
and th e n m ak es th e reference und er S. 10 (1), th e re appears to b e no
reason o r p rin c ip le to su p p o rt th e co n ten tio n th a t it has an im plied
pow er to cancel its o rd e r a n d p u t an end to the reference proceedings
initiated b y itself. In dealing w ith th is question it is im p o rtan t t o bear
in m in d th a t pow er to cancel its o rd er m ad e u n d e r S. 10 (1), w hich the
ap p ellan t claim s, is an ab so lu te pow er; it is n o t as if th e pow er to cancel
implies th e o b lig atio n to m ake a n o th e r reference in respect o f th e dispute
in question; it is n o t as if the excercise o f the pow er is subject to the
conditio n th a t reasons fo r cancellation o f th e o rd er should b e set out.
If th e p o w er claim ed by th e ap p ellan t is conceded to th e ap p ro p riate
governm ent it w ould be o pen to th e a p p ro p ria te governm ent to term in ate
the proceedings b efo re th e trib u n a l at an y stage and n o t to refer the
industrial d isp u te to a n y o th er industrial trib u n a l a t all. The discretion
given to th e a p p ro p ria te governm ent u n d er S. 10 (1) in th e m a tte r o f
referring in d u stria l disp u tes to in d u strial trib u n a ls is very wide; b u t it
seems th e p ow er to cancel w hich is claim ed is w ider still; a n d it is claim ed
by im p licatio n on th e stren g th o f S. 21 o f the G eneral Clauses Act. W e
have n o h esitatio n in hold in g th a t th e ru le o f construction enunciated
by S. 21 o f th e G en eral C lauses A ct in so far as it refers to the pow er o f
rescinding o r cancelling th e original o rd er can n o t be invoked in respect
o f th e p ro v isio n s o f S. 10 (J) o f the In d u stria l D isputes A ct,
(A ppeals dism issed.)
274 labour law and labour r e l a t io n s
D E L H I C L O T H AM D G E N E R A L M IL L S C O M PA N Y L T D . v
T H E IR W O R K M E N
Supreme Court, (1967), I L .L J . 423
[The G overnm ent referred a dispute between th e m anagem ent an d

th e ir v/orkm en to th e indxistrial trib u n a l for adjudication. T h e term s
o f reference were as follow s :
“ (1) W h eth er in calculating the b o n u s table for th e accounting year

ending 30 June 1965, th e allocations separately m ade by th e
D elh i C loth and G eneral M ills C om pany, L td ., tow ards the
capital an d reserves o f th e D elhi C loth M ills a n d S w atan tra
B h arat M ills, th e tw o im its o f th e com pany is fair and re a so n
able 1 If n o t w h at directions are necessary in this reg ard ?
(2) W hether the w orkm en o f these m ills are entitled to b o nus at a
ra te higher th a n 6 p er cent o f th e wages for th e accounting year
ending 30 June 1965 ? I f so, w h at directions are necessary in
th is regard ?
(3) W hether the strike at th e D elhi C loth M ills a n d th e lo ck -o u t
declared by the m anagem ent o n 24 F ebru ary 1966 are justified
a n d legal and w hether the w orkm en are entitled to wages fo r
th e period o f the lo ck -o u t ?
(4) W h eth er th e ‘sit-dow n’ strike a t th e S w atantra B h ara t M ills
fro m 23 F eb ru ary 1966 is justified and legal an d w hether th e
w orkm en are entitled to wages d u rin g the period o f th e strike ?”
The m anagem ent contended before th e tribunal th a t issues (1), (3)

a n d (4) be decided as prelim inary issues. T h e w orkm en, o n the o th er
han d contended th a t th ere were no strikes in the mills. T he trib u n a l
overruled th e m anagem ent’s contention on issue (1) and h e ld th a t it w as
open to th e parties to adduce evidence in th a t regard. B u t th e trib u n a l
accepted th e w orkm en’s plea an d held th a t it was th e duty o f th e trib u n a l
to decide th e factum o f strike. T he w rit p etitio n filed against the o rd er
o f th e trib u n a l in th e H ig h C o u rt an d an appeal u n d er A rticle 133(1)
against the o rd er of the H igh C o u rt were dism issed. T he m an agem ent
th en filed an appeal by special leave. Excerpts from th e ju d g m en t o f
M itter J. follow :]
U n d er Section 10(1) (d) o f th e A ct, it is open to th e a p p ro p ria te

G overn m en t w hen it is o f opinion th a t a n y industrial dispute exists to
m ake an order in w riting referring
“ th e dispute or any m a tte r appearing to be connected w ith, or

relevant to th e d isp u te ...to a trib u n a l fo r ad ju d icatio n .”
ADJUDICATION 275
U n d er Section 10(4)
“ w here in an o rd e r referring an in d u strial dispute to a la b o u r court,

trib u n a l or n a tio n a l trib u n a l u n d er this section o r in a subsequent
order, th e a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent|has specified th e points o f dispute
for ad ju d icatio n , th e lab o u r co u rt o r th e trib u n a l or the n atio n a l
trib u n a l, as th e case m ay be, shall confine its adjudication to those
p o in ts an d m a tte rs incidental th e re to .”
F ro m th e above it therefore app ears th a t “ while it is open to th e

a p p ro p ria te G o v e rn m e n t to refer th e dispute o r an y m atter ap p earin g
to be connected therew ith for ad ju d icatio n , th e trib u n al m ust confine
its adjudication to the p o in ts o f dispute referred a n d m atters indidental
thereto. In o th er w ords, th e trib u n a l is n o t free to enlarge th e scope
o f th e d isp u te referred to it b u t m ust confine its atten tio n to the points
specilically m entioned and an y th in g w hich is incidental thereto. T he
w ord “ in cid en tal” m eans according to W ebster’s N ew W orld D ictionary :
“ h a p p en in g o r liicely to h ap p en as a result o f o r in connexion w ith

som eth in g m o re im p o rta n t; being a n incident; casual; hence, secon
dary o r m in o r, b u t usually associated.”
“ S om ething in cid en tal to a dispute” m ust therefore m ean som ething

h appening as a re su lt o f o r in connexion w ith th e dispute or associated
w ith th e dispute. T he dispute is th e fu n d am en tal th in g while som ething
incidental th e re to is a n adjunct to it. Som ething incidental, therefore,
cannot c u t a t th e root, o f th e m ain th in g to which it is an adjunct. In
the light o f th e above, it w ould ap p ear th a t issue (3) was fram ed o n th e
basis th a t th e re w as a strik e an d there was a lock-out an d it was fo r th e
industrial trib u n a l to exam ine the facts an d circum stances leading to the
strike an d th e lo ck -o u t an d to come to a decision as to w hether one o r
the other o r b o th w ere justified. O n th e issue as fram ed it w ould n o t
be open to th e w orkm en to question th e existence o f the strike, o r, to
the m anagem ent to d eny the declaration o f a lock-out. T he parties were
to be allow ed to lead evidence to show th a t th e strike was n o t justified
or th a t th e lo ck -o u t w as im proper. Issue (3) h a s also a sub-issue, nam ely,
if th e lo ck -o u t was n o t legal, w hether th e w orkm en were entitled to wages
fo r the p e rio d o f th e lock-out. Sim ilarly, issue (4) proceeds on th e basis
th a t th ere was a sit-dow n strike in th e S w atan tra B harat M ills o n
23 F eb ru ary 1966 a n d th e question referred was as to th e p ro p riety o r
legality o f th e sam e. I t was n o t fo r any o f th e unions to contend on th e
issues as fram ed th a t th e re w as no sit-dow n strike. O n th e ir success on
the plea o f ju stificatio n o f th e sit-dow n strik e depended their claim to
wages fo r th e p erio d o f th e strike. . .
O n th e order o f reference, it w as n o t com petent to th e w orkm en to

conten d before the trib u n a l th a t th ere was no strike a t all; equally, it
was n o t open to the m anagem ent to argue th at th ere was no lo ck -o u t
declared by it. T he p arties w ould be allow ed by th e ir respective sta te
m ent o f cases to place before th e trib u n a l such facts an d co n ten tio n s as
w ould explain th eir condxict o r th e ir stan d , but they could n o t be allow ed
to argue th a t th e order o f reference was w rongly w orded and th a t the
very basis o f th e order o f reference was open to challenge. T h e eases
discussed go to show th a t it is open to th e parties to show th a t the
dispute referred was n o t an industrial dispute at all a n d it is certain ly
open to th em to bring o u t before th e trib u n a l the ram ifications o f the
dispute. B u t they cannot b e allow ed to challenge th e very basis o f th e
issue set fo rth in the order o f referen ce....
...I n o u r opinion, th e tribunal m u st, in any event, lo o k to th e p lea d

ings o f th e parties to find out th e exact n a tu re o f the d isp u te, because in
m ost cases th e order o f reference is so cryptic th a t it is im possible to
cull o u t th erefro m th e various p oints a b o u t which the parties were at
variance leading to the tro u b le . In th is case, the order o f reference w as
based o n the rep o rt o f th e conciliation officer an d it was certainly open
to the m anagem ent to show th a t th e dispute w hich had been referred
was n o t an in d u strial dispute a t all so as to a ttract ju risd ic tio n u n d e r the
Indu strial D isp u te Act. B ut th e p arties c a n n o t be allow ed to go a stage
fu rth e r an d contend th a t th e fo u n d atio n o f th e dispute m entioned in the
order o f reference was non -ex isten t a n d th a t th e true dispute w as som e
th in g else. U n d er Section 10(4) o f th e A ct it is n o t com petent to the
trib u n a l to en tertain such a question.
In o u r o pinion, th erefore, th e trib u n a l h ad to exam ine issues (3) an d

(4) o n the basis th a t there w as a strike a t th e D elhi C loth M ills u n it and
a sit-dow n strik e at S w atan tra B h a ra t M ills and th a t th e re was a lo ck -o u t
declared w ith regard to the form er as stated in the th ird term o f reference.
I t was fo r th e trib u n al to exam ine th e evidence only on th e question as
to w hether th e strikes were justified a n d legal. I t then h a d to com e to its
decision as to w hether th e w orkm en were entitled to th e wages fo r th e
period o f th e lock-out in th e D elhi C lo th M ills an d for th e p erio d o f the
sit-dow n strike a t the Sw atan tra B h a ra t M ills...
In o u r view, therefore, th e p arties were n o t b o u n d by agreem ent

w ith regard to issue (1) an d th e trib u n a l w ill have to ta k e evidence to
come to a finding on th a t issue.
I n the result, th e prelim inary objection o f th e m an agem ent with

reg ard to issues (3) and (4) succeeds w hile it fails on issue (I).
ADJUDICATION 211
S IN D H U R E S E T T L E M E N T C O R P O R A T IO N v.
IN D U S T R IA L T R IB U N A L
A .I.R . 1968 S.C. 529
[The G o v e rn m e n t referred th e follow ing dispute to th e in d u stria l

trib u n a l fo r reference ;
D e m a n d N o. 1 : Shri R.S. A m bw aney should be reinstated in th e

service o f M /s. Sindhu R esettlem en t C o rp o ra tio n L td ., an d he
should be p aid his wages from 21 F eb ru ary , 1958.
T he trib u n a l g ra n te d rein statem en t w ith b a c k wages. A gainst this

finding o f th e trib u n a l the m anagem ent preferred an appeal by special
leave to th e S uprem e C o u rt. E xcerpts from the ju d g m en t o f B hargava
J., follow :]
T he second g ro u n d urged on b e h a lf o f the ap p ellan t is th a t in this

ease, no d isp u te relatin g to rein statem en t was actu ally raised eith er by-
re sp o n d en t N o . 2 o r resp o n d en t N o . 3 b efo re th e reference was m ad e to
th e Indu strial T rib u n a l by th e G overnm ent o f G u ja ra t and, consequently,
th a t reference itse lf w as w ithout ju risd ictio n . W hen M r. A .K . Sen,
counsel fo r th e ap p ellan t, raised th is g ro u n d , it was urged by M r. G opala-
k rishnan o n b e h a lf o f th e resp o n d en t th a t th is g ro u n d was being tak en
for the first tim e in th is C o u rt an d h a d n o t been raised a t any earlier
stage, so th a t it sh o u ld n o t b e allow ed to be tak en in th is C ourt. I t how
ever, ap p ears th a t th e question o f ju risd ictio n o f the State G overnm ent
to refer th e d em an d fo r reinstatem ent fo r ad ju d ication to the T rib u n al
was specifically u rg ed in th e H igh C o u rt an d th e H igh C ourt actually
dealt w ith it in its ju d g m e n t, dism issing th e p etitio n filed on b e h a lf o f the
appellant. T h e H ig h C o u rt clearly m en tio n s th a t th e counsel fo r the
appellan t co n te n d e d th a t th e In d u strial T rib u n a l h a d n o ju risd ictio n as
th e question referred to it and w h ich it was called u p o n to adjudicate
relating to re in sta te m e n t o f resp o n d en t N o . 3 in th e service o f th e C o rp o
ra tio n w ould n o t fall w ithin th e scope o f item 3 in the Second Schedule
to th e In d u s tria l D isp u tes A ct, 1947. I t was fu rth e r urged th a t since th e
th ird re sp o n d e n t w as n eith er discharged n o r dism issed by th e appellant,
the question o f relief o f reinstatem ent w ould n o t arise u n d e r th a t item
and, th e re being n o item u n d er w hich th e d em an d w ould fall, th e State
G overnm en t h a d n o ju risd ic tio n to refer such a dem and for adjudication
to th e T rib u n a l. T h ese p o in ts urged b efo re th e H igh C o u rt w ould cover
th e g ro u n d n o w urged b y M r, Sen b efo re us. I t is tru e th a t the fo rm in
w hich it was urged b efore th e H igh C o u rt was slightly different. There,
the p o in t ra ise d was th a t a d em an d for rein statem ent, when th ere had
been retre n c h m en t only a n d n o discharge or dism issal, could n o t b e held
to co n stitu te an industrial dispute. O n th e facts o f th e case as they

appeared from the m aterial before th e T rib u n al, it is now urged th a t, in
fact, th e dem an d , which was being pressed w ith the m an ag em en t by b o th
th e respondents, was in respect o f retrenchm ent co m p ensation and n o t
reinstatem ent. The dem and for rein statem en t seems to have been given
u p , because th e respondents realised th a t th e services o f resp o n d en t N o . 3
h a d n o t been term inated by discharge o r dism issal, b u t by I'etrenchm ent
only, and th a t retren ch m en t n o t being th e result o f any u n fa ir la b o u r
practice or victim isation, resp o n d en t N o . 3 could only claim retren ch m en t
com pensation. In the evidence given before the T rib u n a l, th e re were
included tw o letters w ritten by the tw o respondents con tain in g th e d em and
for retrenchm ent com pensation. W e have already referred to one o f these
letters which w as sent o n 7th M arch, 1958 by resp o n d en t N o . 3 to th e
A dm inistrative OlEcer o f th e ap p ellan t. The other letter was sen t on
10th July, 1958 by th e G eneral Secretary o f respondent N o . 2 in which
again it was stated th a t Sindhu H o tc h ie f h a d paid retren ch m en t dues to
respo n d en t N o. 3 in respect o f th e services he had rendered in th a t
C om pany, b u t th e appellant C o rp o ratio n was responsible fo r his re tre n ch
m ent dues for th e service w hich h ad been ren d ered by re sp o n d en t N o . 3
in the ap p ellan t C o rp o ratio n . T he p ra y e r was th at, as the ap p e lla n t h a d
refused him re-em ploym ent, arran g em en t should be m ad e to p a y his
retrenchm ent dues according to Section 2 5 -F o f th e In d u strial D isp u tes
A ct, 1947. T hus, b o th th e respondents, in th eir claim s p u t fo rw ard
before th e m anagem ent o f th e ap p ellan t, requested fo r pay m en t o f
retrenchm ent com pensation a n d did n o t raise any dispute fo r rein state
m ent. Since n o such dispute a b o u t rein statem en t was raised by eith er o f
th e respondents before th e m anagem ent o f th e appellant, it is clear th a t
th e State G overnm ent was n o t com petent to refer a question o f reinstate-
n len t as an industrial dispute fo r ad ju d icatio n by th e T rib u n al. T he
dispute tb a t th e S tate G overnm ent could have referred com petently was
th e dispute relating to paym ent o f retrenchm ent com pensation b y th e
appellan t to respondent N o . 3 w hich h a d been refused. N o d o u b t, th e
o rd er o f th e State G overn m en t m aking th e reference m en tio n s th a t th e
G overnm ent h a d considered th e re p o rt sub m itted by th e C o nciliation
Officer u n d er sub section (4) o f Section 12 o f the In d u stria l D isputes
, A ct, in respect o f th e dispute betw een th e a p p ellan t a n d w orkm en em
ployed u n d er it, over th e dem an d m entioned in th e Schedule appended
to th a t order; an d , in th e Schedule, th e G overnm ent m en tio n ed th a t the
dispute was th a t o f reinstatem ent o f re sp o n d en t N o. 3 in th e service o f
the ap p ellan t and p aym ent o f his w ages fro m 21st F eb ru ary , 1958. It
w as urged by M r. G opalak rish n an o n b eh alf o f th e respondents th a t this
C o u rt cannot exam ine w hether th e G o vernm ent, in form ing its opinion
th a t an in d u strial dispute exists, came to its view correctly o r incorrectly
o n th e m aterial before it. T his p ro p o sitio n is, no doubt, correct; b u t th e
ADJUDICATION 279
aspect th a t is being exam ined is entirely different. I t m ay be th a t th e

C o n ciliatio n Officer re p o rte d to th e G o v ern m en t th a t a n in d u stria l d is
p u te did exist re la tin g to the rein statem en t o f respondent N o . 3 and
paym en t o f wages to h im from 21st F e b ru a ry , 1958, bxit w hen th e dispute
cam e u p fo r ad ju d icatio n before the T rib u n al, th e evidence pro d u ced
clearly show ed th a t n o such dispute h a d ever been raised by eith er res
p o n d en t w ith the m anag em en t o f th e ap p ellan t. I f no dispute a t all was
raised b y th e resp o n d en ts w ith th e m anagem ent, any request sent by
them to th e G o v ern m en t w ould only be a dem and by them an d n o t an
in d u strial d ispute betw een th em an d th e ir em ployer. A n in d u strial d isp u te,
as defined, m u st b e a d isp u te betw een em ployers an d em ployers, em plo
yers a n d w o rk m en , a n d w orkm en a n d w orkm en. A m ere d em and to a
G overnm ent, w ith o u t a dispute being raised b y th e w orkm en w ith th eir
em ployer, c a n n o t becom e a n in d u strial d isp u te. C onsequently, th e
m aterial b efo re th e T rib u n a l clearly show ed th a t n o such in d u strial dis
p ute, a s w as p u rp o rte d to be referred by th e S tate G overnm ent to the
trib u n al, h a d ever existed betw een th e ap p ellan t C o rp o ratio n a n d the
respondents an d th e S ta te G o v ern m en t, in m aking a reference, obviously
com m itted a n e rro r in basing its o p in io n o n m ate ria l w hich w as n o t
relevant to th e fo rm atio n o f opinion. T h e G o v erm ent h a d to com e to
an opin io n th a t a n in d u stria l dispute d id exist a n d th a t opinion could
only be fo rm e d o n the basis th a t th ere was a d ispute betw een the appel
lan t and th e re sp o n d e n ts relating to reinstatem ent. Such m aterial could
n o t possibly exist w hen, as early as M a rc h a n d July, 1958, respondent
N o. 3 a n d re sp o n d e n t N o . 2 respectively h a d confined th eir dem ands to
the m anagem ent to retrenchm ent co m p en satio n only an d d id n o t m ake
any dem an d fo r reinstatem ent. On these facts, it is clear th a t the
reference m ad e by th e G overn m en t was n o t com petent. T he only reference
th a t th e G o v e rn m e n t could have m ad e h a d to be related to pay m en t o f
retrench m en t co m p en satio n which was th e only subject-m atter o f dispute
betw een th e a p p e lla n t a n d th e respondents. . . .
[A ppeal allow ed.]
S H A M B U N A T H G O Y A L v. B A N K O F B A R O D A
Suprem e Court, (1978) I.L .L .J. 484
A .I.R . 1978 S.C . 1088
[For th e facts o f th e case see P a rt I I I D . E xcerpts from th e judgm ent

o f D esai J., relatin g to section 10 o f th e In d u stria l D isputes A ct, 1947
follow :]
....U n d o u b te d ly , it is for th e G overn m en t t o b e satisfied a b o u t

existence o f th e dispute a n d th e G overnm ent does ap p e ar to be satisfied.
How ever, it w ould b e open to th e p a rty im pugning th e reference th a t
280 L^BOUR LAW AND LABOUR RELATIONS
there was no m aterial before th e G overnm ent, and it w ould b e open to

the T rib u n al to exam ine the questio n , b u t th a t does n o t m ean th a t it
can sit in appeal over th e decision o f th e G overnm ent and com e to a
conclusion that there was no m aterial before the G overnm ent.
In this case the T ribunal com pletely m isdirected itself w hen it

observed th a t no dem and was m ade by th e w orkm an claim ing reinstate
m ent after dismissal. W hen th e in q u iry was held, it is an adm itted
position, th a t the w orkm an appeared an d claimed reinstatem ent. A fter
his dism issal he preferred an appeal to th e A ppellate forum and contended
th a t th e order o f dism issal was w rong, u n supported by evidence and in
any event he should be reinstated in service. . . .
T here is further a fact th a t w hen the U n io n approached th e

C onciliation Officer th e M anagem ent appeared and contested the claim
fo r reinstatem ent. T here is th u s unim peachable evidence th a t th e
concerned w orkm an persistently dem anded reinstatem ent. I f in this
background the G overnm ent cam e to the conclusion th a t there exists a
dispute concerning w orkm an S.N . G oyal and it was an industrial dispute
because there was dem and fo r reinstatem ent and a reference was m ade,
such reference could h ard ly be rejected on the ground th a t there was no
dem and an d th e industrial dispute did n o t come in to existence. T here
fore, the T ribunal was in e rro r in rejecting the reference on th e ground
th a t th e reference was incom petent.
[A ppeal allow ed.]
W E ST E R N IN D IA M A T C H C O M PA N Y LTD
V, W E S T E R N IN D IA M A T C H C O M P A N Y W O R K E R S ’ U N IO N .
Supreme Court, (1970) 2 L .L .J. 256
A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 1205
[T h e C om pany appo in ted certain person as a forem an an d a fte r

having extended his p ro b atio n from tim e to tim e term in ated his services-
during his probatio n ary period. T he G overnm ent o f U tta r Pradesh
declined to m ake a reference for adjudication when a dispute was espoused
by th e w orkers’ union. O n th e said refusal the w orkm an filed a w rit
petitio n in the High C o u rt which was dismissed on th e g round th a t th e
decision o f the State G overnm ent to refer or not to refer a dispute for
adjudication was a m atter fo r its discretion. Subsequently after six years
on th e further representation m ade by the union, the G overnm ent
referred the same dispute for adjudication. T he L ab o u r C o u rt rejected
th e reference on the gro u n d th a t there was no in d u strial dispute. T h e
ADJUDICATION 281
w rit p etitio n filed by th e w o rkers’ u n io n in the H igh C o u rt ag ain st the

order o f th e L a b o u r C o u rt was allow ed a n d an appeal against the said
order filed b y th e co m p an y in th e H igh C o u rt was dism issed. The
com pany th e n a p p ealed to the Suprem e C o u rt by special leave. T w o
questions, inter alia, arose for d eterm in atio n ; (i) D o th e w ords “ a t any
tim e” in S. 4 (k) o f th e U .P. In d u strial D isputes A ct, 1947 (w hich is in
p ara m ateria w ith section 10 o f the In d u stria l D isputes A ct, 1947) have
any lim itatio n s o r can the G overnm ent refer a dispute fo r ad ju d icatio n
after th e lapse o f a b o u t six years, as in this case, after the accrual o f th e
cause o f th e dispute ? (ii) In w hat circum stances can the G overnm ent
refer such dispute for adjudication after it has once refused to d o so ?
E xcerpts from th e ju d g m en t delivered by Shelat J ., follow : ]
F ro m th e w ords used in Sec. 4-k o f the A ct th ere can be n o d o u b t

th a t th e legislature h a s left th e questio n o f m ak ing o r refusing to m ake
a reference fo r ad ju d icatio n to the discretion o f th e G overnm ent. B ut
the d iscretio n is n eith er unfettered n o r ab ritra ry for th e section clearly
provides th a t th ere m u st exist an in d u strial d isp u te as deiined by th e A ct
or such a dispute m u st be apprehended -when th e G overnm ent decides
to refer it fo r a d ju d icatio n ....T h erefo re, th e expression “ a t any tim e” ,
though seem ingly w ith o u t any lim its, is governed by th e context in which
it appears. O rd in arily th e question o f m aking a reference w ould arise
after con ciliatio n proceedings have been gone th ro u g h and th e con
ciliation officer has m ad e a failure re p o rt. B ut th e G o v ern m en t need
n o t w ait u n til such a p ro ced u re has b een com pleted. In an urg en t case,
it can “ a t any tim e” , i.e., even when such proceedings have n o t begun
or are still pen d in g , decide to refer th e dispute fo r adjudication. T he
expression “ a t any tim e ” th u s takes in such cases as where the G overn
m ent decides to m a k e a reference w ith o u t w aiting for conciliation
proceedings to begin o r to be com p leted ..., In the State o f M ad ras v.
C.P. S a ra th y ....(A .I.R . 1953 S.C. 53 at p . 57), th is C o u rt held o n con
struction o f S. 10 (I) o f th e C entral A c t th a t the function o f th e a p p ro
p riate G o v ern m en t th ereu n d er is an adm in istrativ e function. I t w as so
held presu m ab ly because the G overnm ent c a n n o t go into the m erits o f
the dispute, its fu n ctio n being only to refer such a dispute fo r adjudica
tio n so th a t th e in d u strial relatio n s betw een th e em ployer an d his
em ployees m ay n o t co n tin u e to rem ain d istu rb ed and the dispute m ay
be resolved th ro u g h a ju d icial process as speedily as possible. In the
light o f th e n a tu re o f th e function o f th e G overnm ent and th e object for
which th e pow er is conferred on it, it w ould b e difficult to ho ld th a t
once th e G o v ern m en t h a s refused to refer, it c a n n o t change its m in d on
a reco n sid eratio n o f th e m atter eith er because new facts have com e to
light or because it h a d m isunderstood the existing facts or fo r any
other relev an t con sid eratio n an d decide to m ake th e reference....
In fact, when the G overn m en t refuses to m ake a reference it does

n o t exercise its p o w e r....a n d it is only w hen it decides to refer th a t it
exercises its pow er. C onsequently, th e pow er to refer ca n n o t be siad
to have been exhausted when i1 has declined to m ak e a reference a t an
earlier stage. T here is th u s a considerable body o f ju d icial o p in io n
according to which so long as an industsial dispute exists o r is a p p re
hended an d th e G overnm ent is o f th e o p in io n th a t it is so, the fact th a t
it h a d earlier refused to exercise its pow er does n o t preclude it from
exercising it a t a later stage. In this view, the mere fact th a t th ere has
been a lapse o f tim e o r th a t a p arty to the dispute w as, by th e earlier
refusal, led to believe th a t th ere w ould be no reference an d acts u p o n
such belief, does n o t affect th e ju risd ictio n o f th e G o vernm ent to m ake
the reference....
It is tru e th a t where a G overn m en t reconsiders its previous decision

an d decides to m ake th e reference, such a decision m ig h t cause in co n
venience to th e em ployer because the em ployer in th e m eantim e m ight
have acted on th e belief th a t there w o u ld be n o proceedings by way o f
ad ju d icatio n o f the dispute betw een him and his w orkm en. Such a
consideration w ould, we should th in k , be taken in to account by the
G overnm ent whenever, in exercise o f its discretion, it decides to reo p en
its previous decision as also th e tim e w hich has lapsed betw een its earlier
decision a n d th e date when it decides to reconsider it. These are m atters
which th e G overnm ent w ould have to ta k e into account while deciding
w hether it should reopen its form er decision in th e in terest o f justice a n d
in d u strial peace b u t have n o th in g to d o w ith its ju risd ic tio n u n d er
Section 4 -K o f th e Act. W h eth er th e intervening p e rio d m ay b e sh o rt
or lon g w ould necessarily depend u p o n th e facts and circum stances o f
each case, an d therefore, in construing th e expression “ at any tim e ” in
Section 4-K it w ould be im possible to lay dow n any lim its to it.
In th e present case th o u g h nearly four years had gone by since th e

earlier decision n o t to m ake th e reference, i f th e G overnm ent was satisfied
th a t its earlier decision h a d been arrived a t on a m isap p reh en sio n o f
facts, a n d therefore, required its reco n sid eratio n , neither its decision to
do so n o r its determ ination to m ake th e reference can be challenged o n
the ground o f w ant o f pow er.
[A ppeal dism issed.]
[ N o te : This decision has been follow ed by the Suprem e C o u rt in

its subsequent judgm ent in Avon Services Production A gencies (P .) L td . v.
Industrial Tribunal, Haryana, A .I.R . 1979 S.c. 170. Eds. ]
ADJUDICATION 283
JA IP U R U D Y O G L T D . v.
CEM EN T W ORKS KARAM CHART SA NGH
Suprem e Court, (1972) I L .L J . 437
A .I.R . 1972 S.C. 1352
[ E x cerp ts from th e judgm ent o f M ittev J. follow ; ]
The re c o rd does n o t show w hat i f an y o th e r steps were taken by th e

parties w hen th e C e n tra l G overn m en t m ade an o rd er o f reference un d er
Section 10 (1) (d) o f th e Indu strial D isp u tes A ct reading :
“ W h e th e r th e ac tio n o f the m anagem ent o f the Ja ip u r U dyog L im ited,

P .O . P h a llo d i q u a rry , S aw aim ad h o p u r in term in atin g the services o f
B h ish am V erm a, incline driver, w ith effect from 9 th July, 1968, o n
gro u n d s o f su p e ra n n u a tio n was legal an d justified ? I f n o t, to w hat
relief is he e n titled ?”
Before th e T rib u n a l, the resp o n d en t U n io n filed a statem ent o f claim

w herein a fte r reciting th e action ta k e n by th e a p p ellan t an d the represen
tatio n m ad e by the w o rk m an it was stated th a t th e q u arry and the cem ent
factory w ere u n d er o n e an d th e sam e m anagem ent an d there was com plete
iinancial in teg rality betw een th e activities o f th e com pany a t b o th the
places. I t was also said th a t w orkm en co u ld be tran sferred fro m one
place to a n o th e r an d th a t as a re su lt o f th e settlem ent m entioned, th e
com pany could n o t retire any w orkm an before he attained th e age o f
58 years. T h e settlem ent was said to ap p ly to th e w orkm en em ployed
a t b o th th e places. T h e U n io n fu rth e r su b m itted th a t th e com pany
could n o t insist o n tw o sets o f cond itio n s o f service covering different
sections o f th e sam e w orkm en in th e sam e establishm ent, th a t th e age o f
retirem en t w as n o t a subject m entioned in th e Schedule to th e Indu strial
E m ploym ent (S tanding O rders) A ct a n d as such no Standing O rder could
be certified on this to p ic .
In its rep ly to th e above, th e co m pany to o k th e stand th a t the

settlem ent arrived at in respect o f th e cem ent w orks K arm ach ari
Sangh Saw ai M a d h o p u r was n o t ipso facto applicable to the q u arry
in as m uch as th e p ro p e r au th o rity u n d e r th e In d u stria l D isputes A ct
1947 in respect o f th e cem ent w orks was th e G overnm ent o f R ajasthan
w hereas th e a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent in resp ect o f th e quarries w as the
G o v ern m en t o f In d ia. I t was said fu rth e r th a t in pursuance o f the
settlem ent arrived a t in 1966 th e Standing O rders were am ended b y the
Certifying Officer o f th e G overn m en t o f R a ja sth an as a result w h ereof
the age o f su p e ra n n u a tio n in th e w orks a t Sawai M ad h o p u r was raised
to 58. T h is how ever did n o t alter o r m odify th e position prevailing
284 LABOUR LAW AND LABOUR RHLATIONS
in th e quarries which were governed by a separate set tif orders certified

by the C ertifying Officer o f th e G overnm ent o f India.
The T rib u n al to o k th e view th a t the cem ent factory and the quarries
were tw o units of the sam e establishm ent and th at consequently there
should be a uniform set o f rules for th e w orkm en o f the com pany as a
whole an d it was im m aterial th a t in th e case o f one u n it the S tanding
O rders had to be certified by th e C ertifying Officer o f the G overnm ent
o f India a n d in th e other by th e officer appointed by th e G o v ern m en t
o f R ajasth an . T he T ribunal was fu rth e r o f the view th a t the clause as
to superan n u atio n could n o t be provided in th e Standing O rders un d er
the relevant A ct and certification could n o t a ttach enforceability to th em
even on th e gro u n d th at the w orkers did n o t challenge such provision
before th e Certifying Officer. In the resu lt th e T ribunal h eld th a t there
could n o t be a lower age lim it o f superan n u ation for w orkm en a t the
P hallodi q u arry specially in view o f th e fact th a t w orkm en were a d m it
tedly tran sferab le from one place to th e other. As a consequence o f the
above finding, the T ribunal quashed th e order and directed th e rein sta te
m ent of th e ■workman w ith full b ack wages.
On b eh alf o f th e com pany th e first conten tio n raised by M r. Setalvad

was th a t th e T rib u n al had gone w rong in construing the o rd e r o f reference
to include a dispute as to w h eth er it w as o pen to the co m p an y to have
tw o sets o f S tanding O rders providing fo r different ages o f su p e ran n u a
tio n . M r. Setalvad argued th a t in view o f th e correspondence term in a
tin g w ith th e representation by the U n io n to the conciliation Officer, it
was ab u n d an tly clear th a t th e dispute betw een the parties was w hether
o r n o t th e com pany was justified in com ing to th e con clu sio n th a t th e
w ork m an conccrned h a d reached the age o f 55 on A pril, 3, 1968 an d as
such was to be su perannuated in term s o f the Standing O rders .,.
In o u r view, if the T rib u n al had ta k e n care to exam ine w hat was the
dispute betw een the parties w hen th e G overnm ent m ad e th e o rd er o f
reference it w ould have had no difficulty in realising th at n o dispute was
raised either b y th e w orkm an o r the U n io n th a t the age o f su p e ran n u a
tio n governing the w orkm an was n o t 55 years. It was certain ly o p e n to
th e w orkm an to contend th a t his age o f su p erannuation sh o u ld be fixed
a t 58 an d n o t 55 years an d i t w ould have been equally op en to th e U n io n
to raise th e p o in t in their representation to th e C onciliation OfiScer. I f
th a t h a d been done, the G overnm ent o f R ajasth an could have pro p erly
m ade a reference o f a dispute betw een th e p arties regarding th e co rrec t
age o f superan n u atio n and th e ad ju d icatio n o f the dispute reg ard in g the
su p eran n u atio n o f th e w orkm an concerned on th a t basis. N o th in g was
how ever show n to us, a p a rt from th e docum ents already referred to , to
ADJUDICATION 285
enable us to find thfit an y question h a d been raised before the G o v ern

m ent o f R a ja sth a n re la tin g to the age o f su p eran n u atio n o f th e w orkm en
at the q u a rrie s o r th a t there was any basis fo r apprehension o f such a
dispute an d it was therefo re n o t open to th e T rib u n al to enlarge the
am bit o f th e dispute betw een th e p arties by reference to the difference in
the age o f su p e ra n n u a tio n und er the tw o sets o f Standing O rders...,
R elying o n [S indhii R esettlem ent C o rp o ratio n L td ., v. In d u strial

T rib u n al o f G u ja ra t (1968—1 L .L .J. 834; (1968) 1 S .C .R . 515] the above
decision M r. Setalvad argued th a t in o rd er th a t a reference can be con
strued to em b race a p a rtic u la r dispute it m ust be show n th a t a dem and
had been m ade by th e w orkm an a n d n o t accepted by the em ployers so
as to give rise to a d isp u te which in th e view o f the G overnm ent required
adjudicatio n . M r. R a m a m u rty on b e h a lf o f th e respondents drew our
atte n tio n to th e provisions o f S. 10 (1) o f th e In d u strial D isputes A ct and
in p a rtic u la r to clauses (c) and (d) thereof. H e argued th a t it was open
to th e a p p ro p ria te G o v ern m en t in an a p p ro p ria te case to refer a dispute
along w ith any m a tte r app earin g to be connected w ith o r relevant to the
dispute an d n o objection could be tak en to th e aw ard o f a T rib u n a l
where th e T rib u n al h a d n o t transgressed th e lim its o f els. (c) and (d) o f
S. 10 (1) o f th e Act, It was fu rth er contended th a t th e p ro p er age o f
superan n u atio n ap p licab le to th e com pany as a w hole was so intim ately
connected w ith or relevant to th e dispute which actually arose betw een
the parties p rio r to th e o rd e r o f reference as to lead us (o hold th a t the
T rib u n a l h a d n o t gone b ey o n d its ju risd ictio n in construing th e o rd er o f
referen ce....o f a w o rk m an like B hisham V erm a. In our view, th e finding
o f the T rib u n a l th a t th e C om pany could n o t fix a low er age lim it o f
su p eran n u atio n for w o rk m en a t th e q u arries w ent beyond th e scope o f
reference w hich had to b e gathered from th e circum stances preceding the
G overn m en t O rder. T h e T rib u n al never addressed itself to th e p o in t of
view o f th e w o rk m an th a t his p ro p e r age was only 50 and n o t 55; nor
did it com e to a finding th a t th e tru e age o f th e w orkm an being 50 years
in 1968 th e re w as n o q u estio n o f his su p e ra n n u a tio n in th a t y ear....
In th e resu lt we h o ld th a t th e aw ard o f th e T rib u n a l was incom petent

as the d isp u te w hich it sought to ad judicate u p o n was n o t th e one
referred. T he aw ard w ill threfore be set aside, but, in the circum stances
o f th e case, we m ak e n o order as to costs.
A V O N SE R V IC E S P R O D U C T IO N A G E N C IE S (P) L T D . v.
IN D U S T R IA L T R IB U N A L , H A R Y A N A
Suprem e Court, (1979) 1 L .L .J. 1
[ The m an ag em en t w hich decided to close dow n the painting section

d u e to u n a v o id ab le circum stances served notices o n tw o o f its w orkm en
who were em ployed therein, an d asked them to collect th eir dues un d er

S. 25 F F F o f the In d u strial D isputes A ct, 1947. T h ereu p o n the tra d e
union of the workmen raised a dem and saying th at the te rm in a tio n o f
service was illegal and th a t th e w orkm en should be rein stated w ith full
b ack wages from th e date o f term ination. O n 19th F ebruary, 1972 th e
G overnm ent refused to refer the dispute on th e ground th a t there was no
w ork for p ainting in th e factory where these tw o w orkm en were w orking.
Subsequently o n 23rd N ovem ber, 1972 th e G overnm ent referred the
dispute w hether th e retrenchm ent o f the w orkm en was justified and if
n ot, to w hat relief they are entitled, to th e In dustrial T ribunal. The
T ribunal found th e retrenchm ent to be invalid and unjustified an d
directed reinstatem ent o f the w orkm en w ith full b ack vi'ages. T he
m anagem ent, thereupon filed a w rit p etitio n u nder article 226 in th e
H igh C ourt o f P unjab and F laryana w hich was dismissed in limine. T he
m anagem ent then preferred a special leave to appeal in th e Suprem e
C ourt. Excerpts from th e judgm ent o f th e C ourt, delivered by D esai,
J., follow : ]
....[ T h e ] learned counsel for the ap p ellan t....su b m itted th a t the

G overnm ent having declined to m ake a reference under S. 10 (I) o f th e
Act in respect o f term ination o f service o f respondents 3 and 4 as per its
o r d e r dated 19th February, 1972....the G overnm ent was n o t com petent
o r had no pow er o r au thority to m ake a reference in respect o f the sam e
dispute unless th e G overnm ent m ust have com e u p with some fresh o r
additional m aterial w hich, w hen th e validity of the reference was
challenged, m u st be disclosed or it m ust appear on the face o f the
reference itself....
Section 10 (1) o f the A ct confers pow er on the ap p ro p riate G overn

m ent to refer at any tim e any industrial dispute w hich exists o r is
apprehended to th e authorities m entioned in the section fo r adjudication.
T he opinion w hich the appro p riate G overnm ent is required to form
before referring th e dispute to th e appropriate authority is a b o u t th e
existence o f a dispute o r even i f the dispute has n o t arisen, it is appre
hended as im m inent and requires resolution in the interest o f in d u strial
peace and harm ony. Section 10 (1) confers a discretionary pow er a n d
this discretionary power can be exercised o n being satisfied th a t an in d u s
trial dispute exists or is apprehended. T here m ust be som e m aterial before
th e G overnm ent on th e basis o f w hich it form s an opinion th a t an
industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. The power conferred on the
appro p riate G ovt, is an adm inistrative pow er and th e action o f th e
G overnm ent in m aking th e reference is an adm inistrative act. T he
form ation o f an opinion as to the factual existence o f an industrial
disp u telas'a prelim inary step to the discharge o f its function does n o t
ADJUDICATION 287
m ake it any the less adm inistrative in character. T h u s, the ju risdictional

fiicts on w hich the ap p ro p riate G overnm ent m ay act are the fo rm ation
o f a n opin io n th a t an in d u strial dispute exists or is apprehended w hich
undoubtedly is a subjective one, the next step o f m aking reference is an
adm inistrative act. T h e adequacy or sufficiency o f th e m aterial on w hich
the opin io n was form ed is beyond th e pale o f ju d icial scrutiny. I f the
action of th e G overnm ent in m aking th e reference is im pugned by a
party it w ould be open to such a p a rty to show th a t w hat was referred
was n o t an in d u strial dispute and th at th e T rib u n al had no jurisd ictio n
to m ake th e aw ard b u t if the dispute was an in d u strial dispute, its factual
existence an d th e expediency o f m aking a reference in the circum stances
o f a p articu lar case are m atters entirely fo r G overnm ent to decide u p o n ,
and it will n o t be com petent for the C o u rt to hold th e reference bad and
quash th e proceedings fo r w ant o f ju risd ic tio n m erely because there was,
in its opin io n , no subsequent m aterial before G overnm ent on w hich it
could have com e to a n affirmative conclusion o n those m atters (see
S ta te o f M adras v. C,P. Sarathy), (]9 5 3 ‘1 L .L .J., 174)....
Section 10 (1) enables the ap p ro p riate G overnm ent to m ake reference

o f an in d u strial dispute which exists o f o r is apprehended at any tim e
to one o f th e a u th o ritie s m entioned in th e section. H ow and in w hat
m anner o r th ro u g h w hat m achinery th e G overnm ent is apprised o f th e
dispute is h a rd ly relevant. Section 12 casts a duty upon the conciliation
officer to h o ld conciliation proceedings in respect o f th e industrial dispute
th at exists o r is apprehended. It is m an d ato ry for the conciliation officer
to so hold th e conciliatio n proceedings where dispute relates to a pu b lic
utility service an d a strike notice h as been served tinder S. 22. T he
conciliation officer m ust try to prom ote a settlem ent betw een the parties
and w hether he succeeds in bringing th e parties to a settlem ent o r fails
in his attem p t, he m ust subm it a re p o rt to th e ap p ro p riate G overnm ent,
but this procedure for p ro m o tin g settlem ent can n o t com e in the w ay o f
the ap p ro p riate G overnm ent m aking a reference even before such a
rep o rt is received. T h e only requirem ent for taking action un d er
S. 10 (1) is th a t th ere m u st be some m aterial before the G overnm ent
which will enable the ap p ro p riate G overnm ent to fo rm an opinion th a t
an in d u strial dispute exists or is apprehended. This is an adm inistrative
function o f th e G ov ern m en t as th e expression is u nderstood in c o n tra
distinction to ju d icial o r quasi-judicial function. M erely because the
G overnm ent rejects a request fo r a reference o r declines to m ake a
reference, it can n o t be said th a t the in d u strial dispute h as ceased to
exist, n o r could it be said to be a review o f any judicial or quasi
judicial o rd er or determ ination. T he in d u strial dispute m ay nonethe
less continue to rem ain in existence an d if at a subsequent stage the
app ro p riate G overnm ent is satisfied th a t in the interest o f industrial
peace and for prom oting in d u strial harm ony it is desirable to m ake a
reference, the appropriate G overnm ent does n o t lack pow er to do so
under S. 10 (I), not is it precluded from m aking the reference on th e
only ground th a t on an earlier occasion it had declined to m ake th e
reference. The expression “ a t any tim e” in S. 10 (1) w ill clearly negative
the contention th a t once the G overnm ent declines to m ake a reference
the power to make a reference under S. 10 (I) in respect o f the same
dispute gets exhausted, Such a construction would denude a very vital
power conferred on the G overnm ent in th e interest o f industrial peace
and harm ony and it need n o t be w hittled down by interpretative process.
In Western India M atch Co. L td., v . W estern Indian M atch Co. W orkers
Union and others, (1970-11 L .L .J. 256); (1970) 3 S.C .R . 370, an identical
contention was raised in respect .of a reference m ade under S. 4 (k) o f the
U .P. Industrial D isputes A ct which is in Pari M ateria w ith S. 10 (1) o f
the Act. Negativing this contention this C o u rt observed as under ;
In the light o f the nature o f th e function o f the G overnm ent and

the object for which the pow er is conferred on it, it w ould be
difficult to hold th a t once th e G overnm ent has refused to refer, it
cannot change its m ind on a reconsideration o f the m atter either
because new facts have come to light or because it had m isunder
stood the existing facts o r for any o th er relevant consideration and
decide to m ake the reference. B ut w here it reconsiders its earlier
decision it can make th e reference only if the dispute is an indus
trial one and either exists at th a t stage or is apprehended and the
reference it makes m ust be w ith regard to th a t and no other
industrial dispute.
It follows th a t the G overnm ent does n o t lack the pow er to m ake th e

reference in respect o f the same industrial dispute which it once declined
to refer. B ut it was urged th a t the ratio o f the decision w ould show th a t
the G overnm ent must have some fresh m aterial m ade available to it,
subsequent to its refusal to m ake a reference for the form ation o f a
fresh opinion, for m aking the reference. It is n o t absolutely necessary
th a t there ought to be some fresh m aterial before the G overnm ent fo r
reconsideration o f its earlier decision. T he G overnm ent m ay reconsider
its decision on account of some new facts b rought to its notice or for any
other relevant consideration and such other relevant consideration m ay
include the threat to industrial peace by the continued existence o f the
industrial dispute without any attem pt a t resolving it and th a t a reference
would at least bring th e parties to the talking table. A refusal o f the
appropriate G overnm ent to m ake a reference is n o t indicative o f an
exercise o f pow er under S. 10 (1), th e exercise o f the pow er w ould be a
positive act of m aking a reference. T herefore, when th e G overnm ent
ADJUDICATION 289
declines to m ake a reference the source o f pow er is neither dried up n o r

exhausted. It only indicates th a t th e G o v ern m en t fo r th e tim e being
refused to exercise the pow er b u t th a t does n o t d enude the power. The
pow er to m ake the reference rem ains in tact and can be exercised if the
m aterial and relevant considerations for exercise o f pow er are available;
they being th e continued existence o f th e dispute and th e wisdom of
referring it, in the larger interest o f industrial peace and harm ony.
Refusal to m ake the reference does n o t ta n ta m o u n t to saying th a t the
dispute, if it a t all existed, stands resolved. On the contrary the refusal
to m ake a reference, n o t com pelling th e p arties to com e to a talk in g
table or before a quasi-judical T rib u n al would further accentuate the
feelings an d a th reat to direct action m ay becom e im m inent an d the
G overnm ent m ay as well reconsider th e decision and m ake th e reference.
It is, therefore, n o t possible to accept the subm ission that i f the
G overnm ent h a d on an earlier occasion declined to m ake a reference
unless it be shown th a t there was som e fresh o r additional m aterial
before th e G overnm ent the second reference w ould be incom petent.
It has n o t been shown th a t the dispute h ad ceased to exist and the very
existence o f th e dispute enables the G overnm ent to exercise the pow er
under S. lO (I) an d it has been rightly exercised. The view which we are
taking is in accord w ith th e desision o f this C o u rt in Binny Ltd. v . Their
W orkm en and others, {1972-1'L.L.J. 47); (1972) 3 S.C .R . 518, w herein
it was fo u n d th a t th e G overnm ent h a d declined to m ake a reference o f
the dispute o n tw o previous occasions on the basis o f which it was
contended th a t th e reference was invalid. T he co n ten tio n was negatived
observing th a t th e m ere fact th a t on tw o previous occasions the G overn
m ent had taken the view th a t no reference was called for does not entitle
the C ourt to conclude th a t there could be no cause for a reference at a
later date.
A lternatively, it was contended th a t even if th e ap p ro p riate G overn

m ent has pow er to m ak e a reference after having once declined to m ake
the reference, it can only refer th a t industrial dispute which it had
once declined to refer an d no other dispute and th a t in this case the
G ovt, h as referred an entirely different dispute th a n the one raised by
th e n n io n an d th a t in respect o f th e referred dispute th e dem and having
n o t been m ade from th e em ployer there w as n o such dispute in existence
and, therefore, th e reference was invalid. T he contention in the form in
which it is now canvassed, was n o t raised before the In d ustrial T ribunal
an d even before th e H ig h C ourt. H ow ever, as we find no substance in
the contention we w ould not reject it on th e technical ground th a t it was
n o t raised before the In d u strial T ribunal or the H igh C ourt.
W ESTERN IN D IA A U T O M O B IL E A SSO CIA TIO N v.

IN D U ST R IA L T R IB U N A L , BOMBAY
Federal Court, (1949) L .L J . 245
[ F o r the facts of the case see Part III C. Excerpts relating to

adjudication from th e judgm ent o f M ahajan J. follow : ]
A djudication does not, in our opinion, m ean adjudication according

to the strict law o f m aster and servant. The aw ard o f the trib u n al m ay
contain provisions for settlem ent o f a dispute which lio co urt could
order if it was bound by ordinary law, but th e tribunal is n o t fettered in
any way by these lim itations. In Volume I of “ L abour D isputes an d
Collective B argaining” by Ludwig Teller, it is said a t page 536 th a t
industrial arb itratio n may involve the extention of an existing agreem ent
or the m aking o f a new one, or in general the creation of new obligation
or m odification o f old ones, while commercial arbitration generally
concerns itself with interpretation o f existing obligations relating to
existing agreements.
B H A R A T B A N K LTD . v. T H E IR EM PLOYEES
Supreme Court, (1950) L .L .J. 921
[T h e q^iestion was w hether under article 136 the Suprem e C ourt

h ad ju risdiction to entertain an appeal by special leave against the aw ard
of th e industrial tribunal, Excerpts from th e judgm ents follow : ]
Kania C .J. : [T]he functions an d duties o f the Industrial T rib u n al

aie very m uch like those o f a body discharging judicial functions,
althougli it is n o t a court. The rules fram ed by the T ribunal require
evidence to be tak en and witnesses to be examined, cross-exam ined
and re-examined. The Act constituting the T ribunal im poses penalties
fo r incorrect statem ents made before the T ribunal. W hile the pow ers
o f the Industrial Tribunal in some respects are different from those o f
an ordinary civil court and it has jurisdiction an d powers to give reliefs
which a civil court adm inistering the law o f the land (for instance, ordering
th e reinstatem ent o f a workm an) does n o t possess in the discharge o f
its duties it is essentially w orking as a judicial body. The fact th a t its
determ ination has to be followed by an order o f the G overnm ent w hich
m akes the aw ard binding, or th a t in cases where G overnm ent is a p arty
the legislature is perm itted to revise the decision, or th at the G overnm ent
is em powered to fix the period o f the operation o f the aw ard do n o t, to
m y m ind, alter the nature and character o f th e functions o f the T rib u n al.
H aving considered all the provisions o f the A ct it seems to m e clear th a t
ADJUDICATION 291
the T rib u n al is discharging fim ctions very n e a r th o se o f a court, a lth o u g h

it is not a co u rt in th e technical sense o f the w ord. . . .
In m y opinion th e w ording o f A rticle 136 is w ide enough to give

jurisdictio n to th e c o u rt to entertain a n application fo r leave to a p p e al,
although it is obvious th a t having reg ard to the n a tu re o f th e fun ctio n s
o f the T rib u n a l, this co u rt will be very re lu c ta n t to entertain su ch a n
application. . . .
Fazl A ll J . : C an we then say th a t an in d u strial trib u n a l does n o t

fall w ithin th e scope o f article 136 ? I f we go by a m ere label, the answ er
m ust be in th e affirm ative. B ut we have to lo o k fu rth e r a n d see w hat
are th e m ain functio n s o f the tribim al and how it proceeds to discharge
those functions. T his is necessary because I tak e it to be im plied th a t
before an appeal can lie to this court from a trib u n a l it m ust perform
some k in d o f judicial function and p a rta k e to som e extent o f the
character o f a court. . . .
[T] he industrial trib u n al has, to use a w ell-know n expression, “ all

the trap p in g s o f a c o u rt” an d perform s functions which cannot b u t be
regarded as judicial. This is evident from th e rules by w hich th e
proceedings before th e trib u n al are regulated. I t appears th a t th e
proceeding before it com m ences on an ap p licatio n w hich in m any respects
is in the n a tu re o f a p lain t. It has th e sam e pow ers as are vested in a
civil court under the C o d e o f Civil Procedure w'hen trying a su it, in.
respect o f discovery, inspection, granting ad jo u rn m en t, reception o f
evidence ta k e n on affidavit enforcing th e attendance o f witnesses,
com pelling th e p ro d u ctio n o f docum ents, issuing com m issions etc. I t is
to be deemed to be a civil cou rt w ithin th e m eaning o f sections 480 an d
482 o f the C rim inal P rocedure Code, 1898. I t m ay adm it and call for
evidence a t any stage o f the proceeding and has the pow er to adm inister
oaths. T he parties appearing before it have th e rig h t o f exam ination,
cross-exam ination an d re-exam ination an d o f addressing it after all
evidence h a s been called. A party m ay also be represented by a legal
practitioner with its perm ission.
T he m a tte r does n o t re st there, T he m ain function o f this trib u n al

is to adjudicate on in d u strial disputes w hich im plies th a t there m u st be
tw o o r m o re parties before it w ith conflicting cases, and th a t it has also
to arrive a t a conclusion as to how th e dispute is to be ended. P rim a-
fa c ie th erefore, a trib u n al like this cannot be excluded from the scope
o r article 136. . . .
I t is to be n o ted th a t under section 15 o f th e In d u strial D isputes

A ct, 1947, in cases w here th e ap p ro p riate G overnm ent is n o t a p arty to
th e dispute, all th a t the G overnm ent has to do on receiving the aw ard o f

the tribunal is to declare it to be binding an d to state fro m w h at date
and for w hat period it will be binding. Section 15 is m an d ato ry and. it
provides ;
“ O n receipt o f such aw ard, the ap p ro p riate G overnm ent shall by

order in w riting declare th e aw ard to be binding. . . . ”
Thus the G overnm ent can n o t alter, or cancel, or add to the aw ard,
b u t the award m ust be declared to be binding as it is. In substance, . . .
the adjudication of the tribunal am ounts to a final determ ination o f th e
disput which binds the parties as well as the G overnm ent.
[T] he A ct itself makes a distinction between cases in which the

G overnm ent is a party and those in which th e G overnm ent is not a party.
T he proviso relates to a very special type o f case and as at present
advised I do n o t wish to express any opinion as to w hether an appeal
lies to this C o u rt or n o t in such a case, b u t in my judgm ent, where the
G overnm ent has only to declare th e aw ard to be binding an appeal shall
lie.
I t is necessary here to say a few w ords as to the scope o f the appeal.

A s was pointed out by this co u rt in Priiam Singh v. The State, the pow er
tinder article 136 of th e C on stitu tio n being a special pow er is to be
exercised only in special cases. The rule so laid dow n is bou n d to
restrict the scope o f the appeal in practice in alm ost all the cases which
fall under article 136. B ut in some cases a lim itation will be im posed
o n th e scope o f the appeal by the very n atu re o f the case and o f the
trib u n a l from w hich an appeal is sought to be brought, and a case under
the Industrial D isputes A ct seems to be an exam ple o f such a case. . . .
The last gro u n d urged is th a t the aw ard has been signed by only
tw o m em bers o f th e tribunal though it originally consisted o f three
persons and though the entire hearing o f the dispute had tak en place
before all the three persons. This objection does not appear to me to be
fatal to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, because under section 8 o f the
A ct it is not obligatory on the G overnm ent to appoint a new m em ber to
fill a vacancy if one of the m em bers ceases to be available at any tim e
during th e proceedings. U nder th a t section, if th e C hairm an ceases to
be available, th e G overnm ent m ust appoint his successor, w hereas if a
m em ber cases to be available th e G overnm ent m ay or m ay n o t ap p o in t
any one to fill his place. In the present case, our attention was draw n
to some correspondence which shows th a t one o f th e m em bers was called
u p o n to act as a m em ber o f another trib u n al a n d the aw ard in question
ADJUDICATION 293
was pronouuced after inform ing the G overnm ent o f the procedure which
the C hairm an and the rem aining m em ber intended to adopt.
In the view I have ta k e n , this appeal m ust fail, and I would accor
dingly dism iss it w ith costs.
M ah ajan J . ; T h e language em ployed in ,..a rtic le (136) is very

wide and is o f a com prehensive character. Pow ers given are o f an over
riding nature. T he article com mences w ith th e w ords “ N otw ithstanding
any thing in this C h a p te r” . These w ords indicate th a t th e intention
o f the C on stitu tio n was to disregard in ex trao rd in ary cases th e lim itations
contained in the previous article on this c o u rt’s pow er to en tertain
appeals. These articles dealt w ith th e right o f app eal against final
decisions o f H igh C ourts w ithin the territo ry o f India. A rticle 136,
however, overrides th a t qualification an d em pow ers this court to g ra n t
special leave even in case where th e ju d g m en t has n o t been given by a
H igh C o u rt b u t has been given by any co u rt in th e te rrito ry of India;
in other w ords, it contem plates g ran t o f special leave in cases where a
co urt su bordinate to a H ig h C ourt has passed or m ade any order and
th e situ atio n dem ands th a t th e order should be quashed o r reversed
even w ith o u t having recourse to the usual procedure provided by law in
the natu re o f an appeal, etc. The w ord “ o rd e r” in article 136 h a s n o t
been qualified by th e w o rd “ final” . I t is clear, therefore, th a t the pow er
to grant special leave u n d er this article against an o rd er o f a court could
b e exercised w ith respect to interlocutory orders also. A nother new feature
introduced in article 136 is th e pow er given to g rant special leave against
orders and d eterm inations, etc. of any tribunal in th e te rrito ry of In d ia.
This word d id n o t find p lace in th e Judicial C o m m ittee’s Act, where the
phrase used was “ a c o u rt o f justice” . I t is th e in troduction o f this new
expression in article 136 th a t has led to considerable argum ent as to its
scope. A nother expression th a t did n o t find place in the Judicial
Com m ittee A ct b u t h as been introduced in A rticle 136 is the w ord
“ determ in atio n ” .... In construing the A rticles o f th e C onstitution it has
always to be rem em bered th a t Ind ia has been co n stituted into a sovereign
dem ocratic republic in order to ensure justice to all its citizens. In
other w ords, the fo u n d atio n s o f this rep u b lic have been laid on th e
bedrock o f justice. T o safeguard these foundations so th a t they m ay
n o t be underm ined by injustice occurring anyw here this court has been
co n stitu ted ....
It is now convenient to consider w hether a trib u n al constituted

under the In d u stria l D isputes Act, 1947, exercises all or any o f the
functions o f a c o u rt o f justice and w hether it discharges them according
to law or w hether it can act as it likes in its deliberations and is guided
by its own notions of right and wrong. T he phrase “ industrial disp u te”
has been defined in section 2 clause (k), o f th e A ct....
Such a dispute concerns th e rights o f em ployers and em ployees. Its

decision affects th e terras o f a contract o f service or th e conditions o f
employm ent. N o t only may th e pecuniary liability o f an em ployer be
considerably affected by the adjudication o f such dispute b u t it m ay
even result in the im position of punishm ents on him. It m ay adversely
affect the employees as well. A djudication o f such a dispute affects
valuable rights. The dispute an d its results can always be tran slated in
term s o f money. The point for decision in the dispute usually is how
m uch money has to pass out o f the pocket of the em ployer to the
pocket o f the employee in one form or an o th er and as to w hat extent
the right o f freedom o f contract stands modified to bring about
industrial peace. Power to adjudicate on such a dispute is given by
section 7 o f th e statute to an Industrial T ribunal and a duty is cast on
it to adjudicate it in accordance with the provisions o f the A c t. T he
words italicized clearly im ply th a t th e dispute has to be adjudicated
in accordance w ith the provisions o f the Act, it follows th a t the trib u n al
has to adhere to law, though th a t law m ay be different fro m the law th a t
an ordinary co u rt of justice adm inisters. It is notew orthy th a t the
tribunal is to consit o f experienced judicial officers and its aw ard is
defined as a determ ination o f th e dispute. T he expression “ ad ju d icatio n ”
implies th a t the tribunal is to act as a judge of th e dispute, in other
words, it sits as a court o f justice and does n o t occupy the chair o f an
adm inistrator. It is pertinent to p o in t o u t th a t the trib u n al is n o t given
any executive or adm instrative powers. In section 38 of th e A ct pow er
is given to m ak e rules for the purpose o f giving effect to the provisions
o f the Act. Such rules can provide iu respect o f matters w hich concern
th e powers and procedure o f tribunals including /u le s as to th e sum
m oning o f witnesses, the production of docum ents relevant to the subject
m atter and as to appearance o f legal practitioners in proceedings under
this Act. R ule 3 o f these rules p ro \id es th a t any application for th e
reference of an industrial dispute to a trib u n al shall be m ade iu fo rm (A )
and shall be accom panied by a statem ent setting forth, inter alia, th e
nam e o f the parties to the dispute and the specific m atters o f dispute.
I t is in a sense in th e nature o f a plaint in a suit. In rule 13 pow er is
given to adm inister oaths. R ule 14 provides as follows :
“ A tribunal m ay accept, adm it or call for evidence at any stage o f

the proceedings before it and in such m anner as it m ay th in k fit.”
Rule 17 provides th a t at its first sitting th e tribunal is to call upon

th e parties to state their case. In rule 19 provision has been m ade fo r
ADJUDICATION 295
proceedings ex parte. R ule 21 provides th a t in addition to the pow ers

conferred by sub-section 3 section 11 o f th e Act, a trib u n al shall have
the sam e pow ers as are vested in a civil court under the Code o f Civil
procedure w hen try in g a suit, in respect o f th e follow ing m atters, nam ely,
(a) discovery and inspection; (b) granting o f adjournm ent; (c) reception
o f evidence tak en on affidavit; and th a t the trib u n al m ay sum m on and
exam ine siio motu any person whose evidence appears to it to be m aterial.
It further says th a t th e trib u n al shall be deemed to be a civil court w ithin
the m eaning o f sections 480 and 482 o f the Code o f Crim inal Procedure,
1898. R ule 21 says th a t the representatives o f th e parties appearing
before a trib u n a l, shall have the right o f exam ination, cross-exam ination
and re-exam ination an d o f addressing th e court or tribunal when all
evidence has been called. In rule 30 it is provided th a t a p arty to a
reference m ay be represented by a legal p ractitio n er w ith the perm ission
o f the trib u n al and subject to such conditions as the trib u n al m ay im pose.
In section 1 1 (3) it is laid dow n th a t a trib u n al shall have the same pow ers
as are vested in a civil co u rt under th e Code o f Civil Procedure when
trying a suit, in respect o f th e following m atters, nam ely, (a) enforcing the
attendance o f any p erso n an d exam ining him on oath; (b) com pelling the
production o f docum ents and m aterial objects; (c) issuing com m issions fo r
th e exam ination o f w itnesses; (d) in respect o f such o th er m atters as m ay
be prescribed; an d every inquiry or investigation by a trib u n a l shall be
deem ed to be a judicial proceeding w ithin th e m eaning o f section 193 and
228 o f the In d ian Penal Code. It is difficult to conceive in view o f these
provisions th a t th e In d u strial T rib u n al perform s any functions other th a n
th a t o f a judicial nature. The tribunal h as certainly th e first three requisites
and characteristics o f a c o u rt as defined above. It has certainly a consider
able elem ent o f th e fo u rth also inasm uch as th e trib u n al cannot take any
adm inistrative action, th e character o f which is determ ined by its ow n
choice. It has to m ak e th e adjudication in accordance w ith the p ro
visions o f th e A ct as laid dow n in Section 7. I t consists o f persons who
are qualified to be or have been judges. I t is its duty to adjudicate on a
serious d isp u te betw een em ployers and em ployees as affecting their rig h t
o f freedom o f contract a n d it can im pose liabilities o f a pecuniary n a tu re
and disobedience o f h s aw ard is m ade punishable. The powers exercis
able by a trib u n a l o f th e n ature were considered in a judgm ent o f the
F ederal C o u rt o f In d ia in Western India A utom obile Association v.
Industrial Tribunal, B om bay { m 9 )'P .C .V i. 321 = (1 9 4 9 L .L .J., 249) and
i t was observed th a t such a tribunal can do w hat no co u rt can, nam ely
a d d to or a lte r th e term s o f conditions o f the co n tract o f service. The
trib u n a l having been en tru sted w ith th e duty o f adjudicating a dispute o f
a peculiar ch aracter, it is for this reason th a t it is arm ed with the extra
o rd in ary pow ers. T hese powers, however, are derived from the statute.
These are th e rules o f th e gam e an d it h a s to decide according to these
rules. Tlie pow ers conferred have th e san ctio n o f law b eh in d it a n d are
not exercisable by reason o f any discretion vested in th e m em bers o f th e
tribunal. T he adjudication o f the d ispute has to be in accordance w ith
evidence legally adduced and the p arties have a rig h t to be heard a n d
being represented by a legal p ractitio n er. R ig h t to exam ine and cross-
examine witnesses has been given to th e parties an d finally they can
address the trib u n al when evidence is closed. T he w hole p ro c ed u re
adopted by th e A ct and th e rules is m odelled on th e C ode o f the C ivil
P rocedure. In m y opinion, therefore, th e In d ustrial T rib u n al has all th e
necessary attrib u tes o f a co u rt o f justice. It has n o o th er fu n ctio n except
th a t o f adjudicating o n a dispute. It is n o d oubt tru e th a t by reaso n o f
the n atu re o f th e dispute th a t they have to adjudicate th e law gives th e m
w ider pow ers th a n are possessed by o rd in ary co u rts o f law , b u t pow ers
o f such a n a tu re do n o t affect th e question th a t they are exercising ju d ic ia l
pow ers....T hey niay rightly be described as quasi-judicial bodies because
th ey are out o f the hierarchy o f th e o rdinary ju d icial system b u t th a t
circum stance can n o t aflect th e question o f th e ir being w ithin the a m b it
o f article 136....
F o r th e reasons given above I am o f th e o p in io n th a t th e w o rd

“ trib u n a l” in article 136 h as to be co n stru ed liberally an d n o t in any
narrow sense and an in d u strial trib u n a l in as m uch as it discharges
functions o f a ju d icial n atu re in accordance with law comes w ithin th e
am b it o f the article and from its d eterm in atio n an app licatio n fo r special
leave is com petent.
M u k h erjea J , : In settling th e disputes between th e em ployers a n d

th e w orkm en, th e function o f th e trib u n al is n o t confined to a d m in istratio n
o f justice in accordance w ith law. It can confer rights a n d privileges o n
either p a rty which it considers reasonable and p roper, th o u g h they m ay
n o t be w ithin th e term s o f an y existing agreem ent. It has n o t m erely to
interp ret o r give effect to the co n tractu al rights and obligations o f th e
parties. It can create new rights an d obligations betw een th em w hich it
considers essential for keeping in d u strial peace. A n in d u stria l d isp u te
as has been said on m any occasions is noth in g b u t a tria l o f stren g th
between th e em ployers on th e one h a n d and th e w o rk m en ’s o rg a n i
zatio n on th e other and th e in d u strial trib u n al has g o t to arriv e a t
some equitable arrangem ent fo r averting strikes a n d lo ck-outs w hich
im pede production o f goods a n d the in d u strial developm ent o f th e
country. T he trib u n al is n o t b o u n d b y th e rigid rules o f law. T he
process it em ploys is ra th e r an extended form o f th e process o f
collective bargaining and is m ore a k in to adm inistrative th a n to ju d ic ia l
function....
ADJUDICATION 297
W e now com e to th e other q uestion as to w hether an a p p e a l c o u ld

be taken to this c o u rt again st an aw ard o f an In d u stria l T rib u n a l by
special leave u n d er A rticle 136 o f the C o n stitu tio n ....
The article is w orded in the w idest term s possible. It vests in the

Suprem e C o u rt a p len ary ju risd ictio n in th e m a tte r o f entertaining a n d
hearing ap peals by g ra n tin g o f special leave against any k in d o f ju d g m en t,
decree or o rd er m ade b y an y co u rt o r trib u n a l in any cause or m a tte r
and th e p o w ers could be exercised in spite o f and overriding the specific
provisions fo r ap p eal c o n ta in e d in th e p rev io u s articles. T he controversy
so far as th e p resen t case is concerned m ain ly centres ro u n d the in te r
p retatio n to be p u t u p o n tw o w ords, nam ely, “ d ete rm in a tio n ” an d
“ trib u n al” u sed in th e article. D o es th e w o rd “ trib u n a l” m ean a ju d ic ia l
trib u n al o n ly a n d is th e expression “ d e te rm in a tio n ” restricted to w hat is
know n as “ ju d icial d e te rm in a tio n ” ?
...T h e w ord “ d e te rm in a tio n ” m ean s an d signifies the ending o f a

controversy or litig atio n by th e decision o f a Judge o r A rb itra to r. It
can n o t be said th a t it is restricted exclusively to proceedings in co u rt.
Likewise, th e dictionary m eaning o f th e w o rd “ trib u n a l” is “ co u rt o f
ju stic e’’ o r “ seat o f a J u d g e ” . By "J u d g e ” w e m ean som e a u th o rity by
which contested m a tte rs are decided betw een riv al parties. H ere again,
it is not p o ssib le to say th a t th e expression is applicable only to a
reg u lar c o u rt o f law. I f th e trib u n a l is a full-fledged ju d icial trib u n a l,
it is n o t disp u ted th a t its decisions w ould be p ro p e r su b ject-m atter o f
appeal u n d e r A rticle 136 o f th e C o n stitu tio n . T he q u estion is w hether
this article includes w ith in its scope th e d e te rm in a tio n s o f quasi-judicial
tribunals as well.
O u r view is th a t o rd in arily we sh o u ld n o t p u t an y restricted in te r

p re ta tio n u p o n th e p la in w ords o f an article in th e C o n stitu tio n a n d
thereby lim it o u r pow ers o f g ran tin g special leave fo r appeals, which th e
C onstitu tio n for best o f reasons did n o t choose to fe tte r o r circum scribe
in any way. A t th e sam e tim e, we m ust ad m it th a t som e so rt o f restricted
in te rp re ta tio n m ay be u n av o id ab le in view o f th e c o n te x t in which p a rti
cular w ords appear; a n d certain restrictio n s m ay b e im plicit in the very
p u rpose fo r w hich A rticle 136 h as been fram ed. A rticle 136 em pow ers
us in OUT discretio n to h e a r appeals from p ro n o u n cem en ts o f a ll inferior
courts and trib u n a ls. W ith reg ard to law co u rts no difficulty arises. A s
reg ard s trib u n als w hich a re n o t co u rts in th e p ro p e r sense o f the expression,
it m ay n o t be p ro p er, in o u r opinion, to la y d o w n a h a rd a n d fast rule
th a t n o appeals co u ld , o n an y account, be allow ed ag ainst d etrm inations
o f such trib u n a ls. T h ere are num ero u s varieties o f th ese adjudicating
bodies, w hose structures v ary greatly in c h a ra c ter a n d com position a n d
SO do th e pow ers and fu nctions w hich they exercise. T h e best thing

to do w ould b e to exam ine each ty p e o f cases as it arises and if we find
th at w ith regard to d eterm inations em anating from certain trib u n als it is
n o t possible fo r us to exercise fully and effectively the pow ers o f an
appellate co u rt, such d eterm inations m ust be held to lie outside the
purview o f A rticle 136 o f the C o n stitu tio n .
T his disability in th e m atter o f exercising o u r powers as an app ellate

co u rt m ight arise from the fact th a t the rules an d principles by which we
ordin arily judge the soundness o r otherw ise o f judicial decisions a re n o t
capable o f being applied to th e d eterm in atio n s o f certain adm inistrative
trib u n als, It m ig h t also arise from the fact th a t the law u n d er w hich th e
trib u n al functions prevents us from m aking any effective ord er which
w ovld be binding an d operative o f its own force w ithout the in tervention
o f som e o th er pow er o r authority; o r there m ay be som e k in d o f con
tingency attach ed to it.
In o u r o pinion, these difliculties do co n fro n t us in the entertain in g o r

hearing o f an appeal against th e decision o f a n industrial trib u n a l..,.
The result is th a t the p relim inary objection succeeds a n d th e appeal

fails and is dism issed with costs.
L IF E IN S U R A N C E C O R P O R A T IO N O F IN D IA v.
D .J. B A H A D U R
Supreme Court, (1981) 1 L .L .J. 1
[On 25th Septem ber, 1975, th e P ay m en t o f Bonus (A m endm ent)

O rdinance, 1975 was prom ulgated b y th e P resident o f In d ia a n d was
subsequently replaced by th e P ay m en t o f B onus (A m endm ent) A ct, 1976
which was b ro u g h t in to force w ith effect from th e date last m entioned.
T his am ending law considerably curtailed th e rights o f em ployees o f
industrial undertakings to bonus, b u t was in applicable to the C o rp o ratio n
by virtue o f th e provisions o f S. 32 o f th e Paym ent o f B onus A ct.
How ever, th e p ay m en t o f bonus for the year 1975-76 to the em ployees
o f th e C o rp o ratio n was stopped u n d er instructions from the C e n tra l
G overnm ent, whose action in th a t b e h a lf was challenged by th e em ployees
th ro u g h a petitio n under A rt. 226 o f th e C o n stitu tio n o f In d ia in th e H igh
C o u rt o f C alcutta, a single Judge o f w hich issued a w rit o f mandam us
directing th e C o rp o ratio n to act in accordance w ith the term s o f th e
settlem ent d ated th e 24th Jan u ary , 1974. T he C o rp o ratio n preferred a
L etters P aten t A ppeal against the decision o f th e learned single Judge
and th at appeal was pending disposal w hen the C entral L egislature
ADJUDICATION 299
p ro m ulg ated th e Life In su ra n c e C o rp o ra tio n (M odification o f S ettlem ent)

A ct, 1976 (fo r sh o rt, th e 1976 A ct), S, 3 o f which laid dow n :
“ N o tw ith stan d in g an y th in g c o n tain ed in th e In d u strial D isp u tes

Act, 1947, th e p ro v isio n s o f each o f th e settlem ents, in so far as th ey
relate to th e p ay m en t o f an annual cash b o n u s to every Class I I I an d
Class IV em ployees o f th e C o rp o ra tio n at th e ra te o f fifteen p e rc en t
o f his an n u a l salary, shall n o t have any force o r effect and shall
n o t be deem ed to have any force or effect on and fro m 1st d a y o f
A pril, 1975.”
T h e 1976 A c t w as enacted on 29th M a y , 1976 a n d was challenged

by the w o rk m en in th is C o u rt w hich, on the 21st o f F ebruary, 1978,
declared it to b e void as offending A rt. 31 (2) o f th e C o n stitu tio n o f In d ia
th ro u g h a ju d g m e n t w hich is rep o rted as M a dan M ohan P athak v. Union
(1978) 3 S .C .R . 334, an d directed th e C o rp o ra tio n to fo rb e a r
from im plem en tin g th e 1976 A ct and to p ay to its Class III a n d Class IV
em ployees b o n u s for th e years 1-4-1975 to 31-3-1976 an d 1-4-1976 to
31-3-1977 in acco rd an ce w ith the te rm s o f sub-cl. (ii) o f cl. 8 o f each
settlem ent.
O n th e 3rd M arch , 1978, th e C o rp o ra tio n issued to its w orkm en a

notice u n d e r sub-s. (2) o f S. 19 o f th e In d u stria l D isputes A c t declaring
its in ten tio n to te rm in a te th e settlem ents o n th e expiry o f a period o f
tw o m o n th s fro m th e d ate th e notice was served. T h e n o tice, how ever,
m entioned in express term s th a t acco rd in g to th e C o rp o ratio n n o
such n otice was really necessary fo r te rm in a tio n o f th e settlem ents. O n
th e sam e date, a n o th e r n otice was issued by the C o rp o ra tio n u n d e r
S. 9A o f th e I.D . A c t statin g th a t it in ten d ed to effect a change in
accordance w ith the c o n te n ts o f th e aiinexure to th e notice, as from th e
1st June, 1978, in the co n d itio n s o f service o f its w orkm en. Sim ultaiieo-
usly an am en d m en t o n th e sam e lines was m ad e in th e 1957 O rd er
(w hich was restricted in its ap p licatio n to tran sfe rred em ployees
only) by th e su b stitu tio n o f a new clause fo r th e th e n existing
cl. 9 in pursxiance o f th e provisions o f sub-s. (2) o f S. 11 o f th e L .I .C .
Act. I t was th e issuance o f th e tw o notices by th e C o rp o ra tio n on the
3 rd M a rc h , 1978, u n d e r Ss. 19(2) a n d 9 A o f th e In d u stria l D isp u tes A ct,
respectively a n d th e a c tio n tak en by th e C en tral G o v ern m en t on the
26th M ay, 1978, by m ak in g new provisions in re g a rd to th e pay m en t o f
b o n u s to th e C orp o ratio n .’s em ployees th a t fu rn ish ed tlie cause o f action
fo r the la tte r to p etitio n to th e A llah ab ad H ig h C o u rt under A rt. 226 o f
th e C o n stitu tio n o f In d ia. A gainst th e o rd er o f A lla h ab a d H igh C o u rt
th e C o rp o ra tio n filed a n a p p eal to th e S uprem e C o u rt. T he relevane
excerpts fro m th e ju d g m en ts follow : ]
Per Krishna Iyer, J. :
....In 1976, the Life lusiiratice C o rp o ra tio n (M odification o f Settle

m ent) A ct, 1976 (fo r short, th e 1976 A ct) was enacted to abolish the
efficacy o f th e rig h t to bonus u n d er th e tw o settlem enis o f 1974 b u t the
challenge to its constitutionality was u p h eld . W hen the p arliam en ta ry
burial o f bonus was stultified by ju d icial resu rrection, o ther m easures to
efFectuate the sam e purpose were resorted to , b o th under th e L .I.C . A ct
an d th e I.D . A ct. These m oves proved to be essays in futility because
th e H igh C o u rt h eld th a t bonus was still payable, th a t th e I.D . A ct
prevailed over th e L .I.C . A ct in th e area o f industrial relations, the
form er being a special law, and th a t th e steps tak en b o th by th e C o r
p o ra tio n and th e C entral G o v ern m en t u n d er the L .I.C . A ct a n d
R egulations as w ell as under th e I.D . A ct were o f legal inconsequence.
A gainst this ju d g m en t th e C o rp o ratio n has com e up in ap peal an d the
questions raised are o f great m om en t an d o f serious p o rte n t. I f law
allows adm inistrative negation o f bonus, Judges are n o t to reaso n why;
b u t w hether law does allow nullification o f an in d u stria l settlem en t is
fo r Judges to decide, n o t for th e A d m in istratio n to say, why n o t 7 ....I
p ro p o se to confine the discussion to th e decisive issues. F ir s t o f all, we
have to investigate w hether th e tw o settlem ents o f Ja n u a ry 24, 1974 a n d
F ebruary 6, 1974, arrived at in p u rsu an ce o f th e provisions o f S. 18 re ad
w ith S. 2 (p) o f th e I.D . A ct, have cu rren t validity, h aving reg ard to th e
n otice given by th e M anagem ent u n d er S. 19 (2) o f the I.D . A ct te rm i
nating the settlem ents and u n d e r S. 9A o f its in ten tio n to vary th e
conditions o f service bearing o n b onus. In case the settlem ents do n o t
survive the notices, th e claim to b onus, perishes an d n o th in g m ore
rem ains to be decided. B ut in case I h o ld th a t despite the in ten tio n to
change th e service conditions xmder S. 9A and d e te rm in a tio n un d er
S. 19 (2), th e term s o f the settlem ents co n tin u e to operate u n til su b stitu ted
b y a new contract arrived at b y m utual settlem ent or by an award, th e
fu rth e r issue opens as to w hether a settlem ent under th e I.D . A ct c an n o t
be operative since the L .I.C . A ct contains provisions vesting po w er in
th e C o rp o ratio n an d the C entral G overnm ent to fix th e term s an d co n
ditions o f service o f the C o rp o ratio n em ployees and th a t p o w er h as
been exercised to extinguish th e b onus claim . T he qu estio n will th ro w
open fo r consideration which sta tu te prevails— the I.D . A ct o r th e L .I.C ,
A ct—when there is an a p p a re n t conflict betw een the tw o. T he problem
o f th e prevalence of a special statu te as again st a general sta tu te an d th e
determ in atio n o f which, in a given situ atio n , is the special statu te, w ill
engage m y atten tio n at th e a p p ro p ria te stage. In th e event o f ray h o ld in g
th a t th e I.D . A ct prevails, as against th e L .I.C . A ct, in the given situ atio n ,
the fate o f the steps tak en by th e C o rp o ra tio n a n d th e C entral G o v ern m en t
u nder th e L.I.C . Act and the R egulations fram ed th e re u n d er will be
ADJUDICATION 301
sealed. O f course, if th e holding is th a t the I.D . A ct c a n n o t o p erate as

against th e L .L C . A ct an d the R e g u latio n s fram e d th ereu n d er, v;ben
dealing w ith th e term s an d co n d itio n s o f service o f th e em ployees o f the
C o rp o ra tio n , I m ay h av e to venture in to the controversy a b o u t how
effectual a re th e m easu res tak en by th e tw o sta tu to ry authorities, i.e. th e
C o rp o ra tio n a n d th e C en tral G o v ern m en t, u n d er th e provisions o f th e
L I .C . A ct and the R eg u la tio n s....
The I.D . A ct deals w ith in d u strial disp u tes, provides for conciliation,
ad ju d icatio n a n d settlem en ts, a n d regulates th e rights o f parties a n d th e
enforcem ent o f aw ards an d settlem ents. W h en a reference is m ade o f a
dispute u n d er S. 10 o r S. lOA the legal process springs in to action. U n d e r
S. 16 an a w a rd is m ade a fte r a regular h earin g if a c o n c ih atio n under S. 12
does not ripen in to a settlem en t and a failure re p o rt is received. T he aw ard
is pu b lish ed u n d e r S. 17 (1) an d acquires finality b y virtue o f S. 17 (2)
unless u n d e r S. 17A (1) th e a p p ro p ria te G o v ern m en t declares th a t the
aw ard shall n o t be enforceab le. Section 17A (4) w hich is o f significance
reads thus :
“ (4) S ubject to th e p rovisions o f sub-s. (1) an d sub-s. (3) regarding

the en fo rceab ility o f a n aw ard, th e aw ard sh all com e into o p eratio n
w ith effect fro m such d a te as m ay be specified th erein , b u t where n o
date is so specified it shall co m e in to o p eratio n on th e date w hen
the a w a rd b ecom es enforceable u n d e r sub-section (1) o r sub-s. (3),
as th e case m ay b e .”
I t is obvious fro m S- 18 th a t a settlem ent, like an aw ard , is also binding.

"What I em p h asise is th a t a n aw ard, ad ju d icato ry o r a rb itra l, an d a
settlem ent d u rin g co n ciliatio n o r by agreem en t shall be binding because
o f sta tu to ry san ctio n . Section 19 relates to th e p erio d o f o p eratio n o f
settlem ents an d aw ard s a n d h ere also it is clear th a t b o th settlem ents
a n d aw ards, as is ev id en t from a reading o f S. 19 (2) an d (6), stan d o n
the sam e fo o tin g ....
I t will be a p p a re n t th a t the I.D . A c t su b stan tially equates an aw ard

w ith a settlem ent, fro m th e p o in t o f view o f th e ir legal force. N o dis
tinction in re g a rd to th e n a tu re an d p e rio d o f th e ir effect can b e discerned,
especially w hen we re a d S. 19 an d (6 )....T h e aw ard o r settlem ent u n d e r
the I.D , A c t replaces th e earlier c o n tra c t o f service an d is given p len ary
effect as betw een th e p a rtie s. I t is n o t a case o f th e earlier c o n tra ct
being k ep t u n d e r suspended an im atio n b u t suffering supersession. O nce
th e earlier c o n tra c t is extinguished a n d fresh c o n d itio n s o f service are
created by th e aw ard or th e settlem ent, th e in ev itable consequence is th a t
even th o u g h the period o f o peration an d th e span o f binding force expire,
on the notice to term inate the c o n tra c t being given, the said c o n trac t
continues to govern the relations betw een the p arties until new agreem ent
by way o f settlem ent or sta tu to ry c o n tract by the force o f an aw ard
takes its place. I f notice had n o t been given, th e d o o r fo r raising an
industrial dispute and fresh co nditions o f service w ould n o t have been
legally open. W ith action u nder S. 9A , S. 19 (2) or (6), th d o o r is a ja r
fo r disputes being raised and resolved. T his, in short, is th e legal effect
n o t th e leth al effect o f in v itation to in d u strial trial o f stren g th with no
c o n tra c t o f service o r reversion to an obsolete and long ago “ d ea d ”
co n tract o f service....[T ] he settlem ent und er th e I.D . A ct does n o t suffer
death m erely because o f the notice issued u n d er S. 19 (2). A ll th a t is
done is a notice “ intim ating its in ten tio n to term inate the a w a rd .” T h e
aw ard even if it ceases to be operative qua aw ard continues qua co n tract.
Therefore, if th e I.D . A ct regulates th e ju ra l relations betw een th e L .I.C .
an d its em ployees— an “ i f ” we will presently scan-then th e rights u n d er
th e settlem ents o f 1974 rem ain u n til replaced by a la te r “ aw ard o r
settlem en t” ....
T h e next logical question th en is as to w hether the I.D . A c t is a

general legislation pushed o u t o f its province because o f th e L .I.C , A ct,
a special legislation in relation to th e C o rp o ra tio n em ployees. Im m e d ia
tely, we are co n fro n ted w ith th e q uestion as to w hether th e L .I.C . A ct is
a special legislation or a general legislation because th e legal m axim
generalia specialibtis non derogant is ordin arily attracted w here th ere is a
conflict betw een a special a n d a general statu te and an arg u m en t o f
im plied repeal is ra ise d ....
In determ ining w hether a statu te is a special o r a general one, th e

focus m ust be o n the principle subject m a tte r plus the p a rtic u la r p e r
spective. F o r certain purposes, a n A ct m ay be general an d for certain
o ther purposes it m ay be special a n d we c a n n o t blur d istinctions w hen
dealing w ith finer p o in ts o f law. In law , we have a cosm os o f relativity,
n o t absolutes~~so to o in life. T he I.D . A ct is a special sta tu te devoted
w holly to investigation and settlem ent o f in d u strial disputes w hich p ro
vides definitionally fo r th e n atu re o f industrial disputes com ing w ithin
its am bit. I t creates'an in fra-structure for investigation in to solution o f
an d adjudication u p o n industrial disputes. It also provides th e necessary
m achinery for enforcem ent o f aw ards an d settlem ents. F ro m a lp h a to
om ega th e I.D . A ct has one special m ission—th e resolution o f in d u stria l
disputes through specialised agencies according to specialised procedures
an d w ith special reference to th e w eaker categories o f em ployees com ing
w ithin the definition o f w orkm en. T herefore, w ith reference to in d u strial
disputes between em ployers and w orkm en, th e I.D . A ct is a special
statu te, and th e L .I.C , A ct does n o t speak a t a ll w ith specific reference to
ADJUDICATION 303
w orkm en. On th e o th e r Inm d, its pow ers relate to th e g eaeral aspects o f

n a tio n a lisa tio n o f m an ag em en t when p riv ate businesses are n ationalised
and a p lu rality o f p ro b lem s w hich, incid en tally , iuvolve tran sfer o f service
o f existing em ployees o f insurers. T h e w orkm en qua w o rk m an a n d
industrial d isp u tes betw een v/orkm en and th e em ployer as such, are
beyond the o rb it o f and have n o specific o r special place in th e schem e o f
the L .I.C . A ct. A nd w henever there was a dispute betw een w orkm en
and m an ag em en t th e L D . A ct m echanism was resorted to.
W h at are we co n fro n te d w ith in th e p resent case, so th a t I m ay

determ ine as betw een th e tw o enactm ents w hich is th e special ? T he
only subject w hich h a s led to this litig atio n and w hich is th e b o n e o f
con ten tio n betw een th e p arties is an industrial dispute between the Corpo
ration and its workm en qua workmen. I f we refuse to be obfuscated by
legal a b ra c a d a b ra an d see plainly w hat is so obvious, th e conclusion th a t
flows, in th e w ake o f th e study I have m ade, is th a t vis-a-vis “ industrial
disputes” a t th e te rm in a tio n o f the settlem en t as betw een th e w orkm en
a n d the C o rp o ra tio n th e I.D . A ct is a special legislation a n d the L .I.C .
A ct a general legislation. Likewise, w hen c o m p en satio n on n atio n a lisa
tion is the q u estio n , th e L .I.C . A ct is th e special statu te. A n ap p licatio n
o f the generalia m axim as expounded b y E nglish text-books a n d decisions
leaves us in n o d o u b t th a t th e L D , A c t being special law , prevails over
th e L .I.C , A c t w hich is b u t general lav/,,,.
W hatever b e th e pow ers o f re g u la tio n o f conditions o f service,

including p a y m e n t or n o n -p ay m en t o f b onus enjoyed by the em ployees
o f th e C o rp o ra tio n u n d e r th e L .I.C . A ct, subject to th e directives o f th e
C entral G o vernm ent, th e y stem from a gen eral A ct a n d c a n n o t su p p lan t,
subvert or su b stitu te th e special legislation w hich specifically deals w ith
industrial disputes betw een w orkm en a n d th e ir em ployers. The H igh
C o u rt was rig h t in its co nclusion an d I affirm its ju d g m en t. I, therefore,
direct the C o rp o ra tio n to fulfil its o b lig atio n s in term s o f the 1974 settle
m ents and s ta rt n eg o tiatio n s, like a m odel em ployer, fo r a fa ir settlem ent
o f th e c o n d itio n s o f service betw een itse lf an d its em ployees having
realistic a n d equitable reg ard to th e prevailing co n d itio n s o f life,
principles o f in d u stria l justice an d th e directives underlying P a rt IV o f
th e C o n s titu tio n ....
P e r P a th a k , J , ;
I have re a d w ith g re a t respect th e se p a ra te ju d g m en ts p f m y b ro th er

K rish n a Iy er a n d m y b ro th e r K o sh al b u t in view o f th e im p o rtan ce o f
th e questions raised I p ro p o se to d eliv er a sep arate ju d g m e n t....In my
o p in io n , it is difficult to resist th e conclusion th a t th e In d u stria l D isputes
A ct is a special law and m ust prevail over th e C o rp o ratio n A ct, a general

law, for the purpose o f protecting the sanctity o f tran sactio n s concluded
under the form er en actm en t.,..
P e r Koshal, J . :
[T]he w rit o f mandamus m entioned in th e opening p a ra g ra p h o f th is
judgm ent was issued by th e H igh C o u rt to th e C o rp o ra tio n on w hose
b eh a lf th e first fo u r o f those conclusions have been im pugned before us
and I proceed to exam ine th e sam e in th e light o f argum ents advanced a t
length by learned counsel fo r th e parties an d fo r the Class II em ployees
o f th e C o rp o ratio n who were p erm itted to intervene in th e appeal
before us.
F o r convenience o f exam ination, conclusion 1 m ay be sp lit up in to

tw o pro p o sitio n s :
(a) T h e I.D . A ct is a special law because it deals w ith ad ju d icatio n

a n d settlem ent o f m atters in a d ispute between a n em ployer an d
his w orkm en while th e L .I.C . A ct is a general law.
(b) T he I.D . A ct, being a special law, would override a general law
like th e L .I.C . Act.
N ow in relatio n to p ro p o sitio n (a) it can not be gainsaid th a t the

I.D . A ct deals w ith th e adjudication o r settlem ent o f disputes betw een a n
em ployer an d his w orkm en and w ould, therefore, be a special law vis-a-
vis an o th er statu te which covers a larger fie ld an d m ay thus be considered
“ general” as com pared to it. I t can n o t, however, be regarded as a
special law in relatio n to all o th er laws irrespective o f th e subject-m atter
dealt w ith b y them . In fact a law m ay be special w hen considered in
relatio n to an o th er piece o f legislation b u t o n ly a general one vis-a-vis
still another. A n example will help illu strate the p oint. A la w govern
ing m atters pertaining to m edical ed u catio n would be a special law in
relation to a statute em bracing education o f all kinds b u t m u st b e
regarded as a general law when preference over it is claim ed fo r w h at I
m ay call a m ere special law, such as an A ct dealing w ith only one aspect
o f m edical education say, instru ctio n in th e field o f surgery. A n d even
this “ m ore special” law m ay becom e general if there is a conflict betw een
it and an o th er operating in a still n arro w er field, e.g., th o ra c ic surgery.
“ Special” an d “ general” used in this co n tex t are relative term s and it is
the content o f one statute as compared to the other th a t will determ ine
w hich o f th e tw o is to be regarded as special in re la tio n to th e other*
Viewed in this lig h t p roposition (a) ca n n o t sta n d scrutiny. T he I.D . A ct
w ould no d o u b t be a special A ct in relatio n to a law w hich m akes p ro v i
sion for m atters w ider th a n b u t inclusive o f those covered by it, such as
ADJUDICATION 305
the In d ia n C o n tra c t A ct as th a t is a law relating to contracts generally

(including th o se betw een an in d u strial em ployer a n d his w orkm en), b u t
it w ould lose th a t categ o risatio n and m u st be regarded as a general law
w hen its riv a l is show n to operate in a field n arro w er th a n its own. A n d
such a riv a l is th a t p a r t o f th e L .I.C . A ct w hich deals w ith co n d itio n s o f
service o f th e em ployees o f th e L .I .C .~ a single in d u strial u n d e rta k in g
(o f a special type) as opposed to all o th ers o f its k in d w hich fall w ith in
the am b it o f th e I.D . A ct. W here the co m p etitio n is betw een these tw o
A cts, th erefo re, th e L .I.C . A ct m u st be reg ard ed as a special law a n d (in
co m p ariso n th ereto ) th e I.D . A ct as a general law.
P ro p o sitio n (b) is equally in su p p o rta b le even if th e I.D . A ct is

regarded a s a special law in co m p ariso n to th e L .I.C . A ct. T h e H igh C o u rt
appears to have som ehow trie d to a p p ly the m axim geu em lia specialibus
non derogant to the situ a tio n w ith w hich it w as concerned. B ut does th a t
m axim le a d to th e p ro p o sitio n under d iscussion ?
The g en eral ru le to be follow ed in th e case o f a conflict betwtsen tw o

statutes is th a t th e la tte r ab rogates th e earlier one {Leges Posteriores
priores contrarias abrogant). T o this gen eral rule th ere is a wej] know n
exception, nam ely, generalia specialibus non derogant (general things do
n o t dero g ate fro m special things), th e im plications o f w hich a re th u s
stated succinctly by E a rl Jo w itt in ‘T h e D ic tio n a ry o f E nglish L aw ’ :
T hus a specific en actm en t is n o t affected by a subsequent general

en actm ent unless th e earlier en actm en t is in consistent w ith th e later
en actm en t o r unless th ere is som e express reference in th e late r
en actm en t to th e earlier en actm en t in eith er o f w hich cases th e
m axim leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant applies.
In oth er w ords a p rio r special law w ould yield to a la te r general law , if

eith er o f th e follow ing tw o conditions is satisfied ;
(i) T h e tw o are in co n sisten t w ith each other.

(ii) T h ere is som e express reference in th e la te r to the earlier e n a c t
m en t.
I f either o f these c o n d itio n s is fulfilled th e later law , eyen though general

will p re v a il....
W e n o w ta k e u p fo r consideration th e C o u rt’s conclusion IV w hich

is based o n th e in te rp re ta tio n o f S. 19 o f th e L D . A ct by th is C o u rt in
South Indian B a n k L td. v. A .R . Chacko (su p ra )....
In so fa r as th e explicit language o f th e section is concerned there

is n o am biguity involved. T he difficulty arises reg ard in g the p e rio d
(hereinafter called the 3rd period) subsequent to the date o n w hich th e

said span o f tw o m onths expires in eith er case, because th e I.D . A ct is
silent a b o u t it a n d is th a t difficulty w hich th is C o u rt resolved in C hacko’s
case. The p arties before the C o u rt in th a t case were th e S outh In d ia n
B an k Ltd. and one o f its clerks n am ed A .R . C hacko w ho h a d been
p ro m o ted as an acco u n tan t w ith effect from th e 13th Ju ly , 1959 a n d
claim ed certain allow ances fo r periods subsequent to th a t d ate in terras
o f w h at is called th e Sastry aw ard. O n b e h a lf o f the B ank reliance w as
placed on S. 4 o f the In d u strial D isp u tes (Banking C om panies) D ecision
A ct, 1955 which runs t h u s :
N o tw ith stan d in g anything contained in th e In dustrial D isputes A c t,

1947, o r the Industrial D isputes (A ppellate T ribunal) A ct, 1950 the
aw ard as now modified by th e decision o f the L a b o u r A p p ellate
T rib u n a l in th e m anner referred to in S. 3 shall rem ain in fo rce u n til
M arch 31, 1959.
A n d a co n ten tio n was raised th a t th e non-obstante clause c o n tain ed in

th is section m ade th e provisions o f S. 19(6) o f th e I.D . A ct inapplicable
to the Sastry aw ard w hich, therefore, becam e dead for all purp o ses after
th e 31st M arch, 1959. R epelling th e co n ten tio n this C o u rt observed :
T he effect o f S. 4 o f the In d u strial D isputes (Banking C om panies)

D ecision A ct is th a t th e aw ard ceased to be in force after M arch
31, 1959. T h a t, however, has noth in g to do with the q u estion as to
the p eriod for whicn it will rem ain b in d in g on the parties th ereafter.
T h e provision in S. 19(6) as regards th e p erio d fo r w hich th e aw ard
shall continue to be binding o n the parties is n o t in any way efTected
by S. 4 o f th e Ind u strial D isputes (B anking C om panies) D ecision
A ct, 1955.
The C o u rt th e n proceeded to consider specifically th e situ atio n th a t

w o u ld o b tain in th e 3rd period in relatio n to an aw ard and held :
Q uite a p a rt from th is, however, it ap p ears to us th a t even i f a n

aw ard h as ceased to be in o p eratio n o r in force and has ceased to be
binding o n the parties under th e provisions o f S. 19(6) it will co n tin u e
to have its effect as a co n tract betw een th e p arties th a t h as been m ade
by in d u strial adjudication in place o f the old contract. So lo n g as
the award rem ains in o p eratio n u n d er S, 19(3), S. 23(c) stands in
th e way o f any strike by th e w orkm en a n d lo ck o u t by th e em ployer
in respect of any m atter covered b y th e aw ard. A gain, so lo n g as
th e aw ard is binding on a p a rty , b reach o f any o f its te rm s w ill
m ake the p arty liable to penalty u n d er S. 29 o f the A ct, to im p riso n
m e n t which m ay extend to six m o n th s o r w ith fine o r w ith b o th .
ADJUDICATION 307
A fter th e p e rio d o f its o p e ra tio n an d also th e period fo r w hich the

aw ard is bin d in g have elapsed S. 23 an d S. 29 can have n o operation,
We c a n , how ever, see n o th in g in th e schem e o f th e In d u stria l
D isp u tes A c t to ju stify a conclusion th a t m erely because these special
provisions as regards p ro h ib itio n o f strikes a n d lock-outs a n d o f
penalities fo r b reach o f aw ard cease to be effective the new c o n tra c t
as em b o d ied in th e aw ard should also cease to b e effective. O n the
c o n tra ry , th e very p u rp o se for which in d u stria l ad ju d icatio n ha s been
given th e p ecu liar au th o rity an d rig h t o f m aking new c o n tra cts
betw een em ployers a n d w orkm en m akes it reasonable to th in k th a t
even th o u g h th e p erio d o f o p e ra tio n o f th e aw ard an d the p erio d
for w hich it rem ain s binding on th e p arties— in respect o f b o th o f
w hich special pro v isio n s have been m ade under S. 23 and 29 respec-
tively-m ay expire, th e new co n tract w ould co n tin u e to govern the
relatio n s betw een th e p arties till it is displaced by another contract.
The o b je c tio n th a t n o such benefit as claim ed could accrue to th e
re sp o n d e n t after M a rc h 31, 1959 m u st, th erefo re, be rejected.
(em phasis supplied).
I t is th e u n d erlin ed p o rtio n o f th is p a ra g ra p h w hich im pelled th e

H igh C o u rt to com e to th e conclusion th a t even a n o tice under S. 19(6)
o f th e I.D . A ct w o u ld n o t term in ate a settlem en t (w hich, according to
th e H igh C o u rt, stan d s o n the sam e fo o tin g as a n aw ard) an d , in fa c t is
in distin g u ish ab le th e re fro m fo r th e p u rp o se o f S. 19 b u t w ould have the
effect of m erely p aving th e w ay o f fresh n eg o tiatio n s resulting u ltim ately
in a new settlem en t— a conclusion w hich h as been seriously challenged
on b e h a lf o f th e C o rp o ra tio n w ith th e subm ission th a t C hacko’s case has
no ap p lic a tio n w hatsoever to th e p resen t controversy in as m uch as th e
special law com prised o f Ss. 11 an d 49 o f the L .I.C . A ct fully covers th e
situation in th e 3rd p e rio d follow ing th e expiry o f the 1974 settlem ents.
T he subm ission is w ell based. In C hacko’s case th is C o u rt w as dealing
w ith the p rovisions o f th e I.D , A ct a lo n e w hen it m ad e th e observations
last extracted a n d was n o t concerned w ith a situ atio n w hich w ould cover
th e 3rd p erio d in re la tio n to an aw ard (o r fo r th a t m a tte r a settlem ent) in
accord an ce w ith a specific m an d ate fro m P arliam en t. T he only av ailable
course fo r filling th e v o id created by th e Sastry aw ard was a c o n tin u atio n
o f its te rm s till they w ere replaced by som ething else legally enforceable
w hich, in th e circum stances before C o u rt, could only be a n o th e r c o n tra c t
(in th e sh ap e o f an aw ard o r a settlem ent), th ere being no leg al pro v isio n
requiring th e void to b e filed otherw ise. In th e present case th e law
intervenes to indicate h ow th e void w hich o b tain s th e 3rd perio d sh a ll be
filled a n d , if it has been so filled, th e re is n o q u estio n o f its being filled
in th e m an n er in d icated in Chacko’s case wherein as ahready p o in ted o u t,
308 L^BOUR LAW AND LABOUR RELATIONS
no such law was available. T he observations in th a t case m ust thus be

tak e n to m ean th a t th e expired aw ard w ould continue to govern the p a rt
till it is displaced by an o th er c o n tract or by a relationship otherwise
substituted f o r it in accordance with law ....
In th e resu lt appeal N o. 2275 o f 1978 succeeds a n d is accepted. T he

im pugned ju d g m en t is set aside an d th e p etitio n u n d e r A rt. 226 o f th e
C o n stitu tio n o f In d ia decided thereby is dism issed along w ith tran sfer
case N o. 1 o f 1979.
G R IN D L A Y S B A N K L T D . v. C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T
IN D U S T R IA L T R IB U N A L
A .I.R . 1981 S.C . 606
[The G overnm ent o f In d ia referred to th e C en tral G o v ern m en t

In d u stria l T rib u n al a dispute betw een G rindlays B ank L td. and its
w orkm en fo r adjudication. T he trib u n a l fixed M ay 28, 1976 fo r p e r
em p to ry hearing o f the reference b u t th e h earing was adjo u rn ed fro m tim e
to tim e o n one pretext or the other. E ventually, the hearing o f th e
reference was fixed fo r D ecem ber 9, 1976. B u t on the said d ate th e
E m ployees A ssociation appearing o n b e h a lf o f respondents n o s 5 to 17
sought an adjo u rn m en t on th e g ro u n d th a t th e G eneral Secretary o f th e
A ssociation h ad to perform sh rad h h a cerem ony o f his fath e r w ho died
o n N ovem ber 25, 1976, H ow ever, th e T rib u n a l refused to g ra n t any
fu rth e r ad jo u rn m en t an d proceeded to m ake an ex parte aw ard. I t held
on the basis o f the statem ent o f th e M an ag er th a t respondents n o s 5 to 17
w ere em ployed as drivers by th e officers o f th e B ank and were n o t th e
em ployees o f th e B ank, an d were, th erefo re, n o t entitled to th e benefits
enjoyed by th e drivers em ployed by th e B ank. On Ja n u a ry 19, 1977,
respon d en t no. 3 (acting on b eh alf o f respondents nos. 5 to 17) m oved
a n ap p licatio n before the T rib u n al for setting aside its ex parte o rd er o f
D ecem ber 9, 1976 on th e g round th a t they were prevented by sufficient
cause from appearing on the said date. T he T rib u n al accepted th e plea
o f the respondents and accordingly set aside the ex parte o rd er o f
D ecem ber 9, 1976. T he B ank w ent by a w rit to the C alc u tta H ig h
C ourt. T h e H ig h C o u rt refused to interfere. The B ank then ap p ealed
to th e Suprem e C o u rt by special leave. E xerpts from the ju d g m en t o f
th e C o u rt, delivered by Sen J. follow :]
....T w o questions arise in the appeal, nam ely, (1) w hether th e

T rib u n a l h a d any ju risdiction to set aside th e e x p arte aw ard, p articu larly
w hen it was based on evidence ? an d (2) w hether th e T rib u n a l becam e
fu n c tu s officio on th e expiry o f 30 days from th e date o f publication o f
th e e x p a rte aw ard under S. 17, b y re a so n o f sub-s. (3) o f S. 20 a n d ,
ADJUDICATION 309
therefo re, h ad n o ju risd ic tio n to set aside th e aw ard a n d the C en tral

G o v ern m en t alone h a d th e pow er u n d e r su b —s. (1) o f S. 17-A to set it
aside.
....W e are o f th e o p in io n th a t the T rib u n a l h a d th e pow er to pass

the im pngned order if it th o u g h t fit in th e in te re st o f justice. I t is tru e
th a t th ere is n o express provision in th e A ct o r th e rules fram ed th e re
u n der giving th e T rib u n a l ju risd ictio n to do so. B u t it is a well k now n
rule o f sta tu to ry c o n stru c tio n th a t a T rib u n a l o r body should b e co n
sidered to be endow ed w ith such an cillary o r in cidental pow ers as are
necessary to discharge its functions effectively fo r th e purposes o f doing
justice betw een th e p arties. In a case o f this n a tu re , we are o f th e view
th a t the T rib u n a l sh o u ld be considered as invested w ith such incidental
o r ancillary pow ers unless th ere is any in d icatio n in th e statute to the
contrary . W e do n o t find any such s ta tu to ry p ro h ib itio n . O n th e o ther
h an d , th e re are in d icatio n s to the co n trary .
Sub-section (1) o f S. I I o f the A ct, as su b stitu ted by S. 9 o f the

In d u strial D isp u tes (A m en d m en t & M iscellaneous P rovisions) A ct, 1956,
is in these term s :
11. (1) Subject to any rules th a t m ay be m ad e in th is behalf, an

a rb itra to r, a B o ard , C o u rt, L a b o u r C o u rt, T rib u n al o r N atio n al
T rib u n a l sh all follow such p ro ced u re as th e a rb itra to r o r o th er
au th o rity co n cerned m ay th in k fit.
T he w ords ‘shall follow such procedure as th e a rb itra to r o r o th er a u th o

rity m ay th in k fit’ a re o f th e w idest am p litu d e an d confer am ple p ow er
u p o n th e T rib u n a l a n d o th er au th o rities to devise such procedure as the
ju stice o f th e case dem ands. U n d er els. (a) to (c) o f sub-sec. (3) o f S. 11,
th e T rib u n a l a n d o th e r au th o rities have th e sam e pow ers as are vested in
civil co u rts u n d e r th e C o d e o f Civil P ro ced u re, 1908, o f (a) enforcing th e
attend an ce o f a n y p e rso n an d exam ining him on o ath , (b) com pelling the
p ro d u ctio n o f d o cu m en ts an d m a te ria l objects, a n d (c) issuing com
m issions fo r th e exam in atio n o f witnesses. U n d e r cl. (d) th e re o f th e
T rib u n al o r such o th e r autho rities have also th e sam e pow ers as are
vested in civil c o u rts u n d e r th e Code o f C ivil p ro cedure, 1908 in respect
o f such o th e r m a tte rs as m ay be p rescribed. A lth o u g h th e T rib u n al o r
o ther au th o rities specified in S. 11 a re n o t co u rts b u t they have the
trap p in g s o f a co u rt, an d th ey exercise quasi-ju d icial functions.
T he o bject o f giving such w ide p ow ers is to m itigate th e rig o u r o f

th e tech n icalities o f th e law , fo r achieving th e object o f effective investi
g atio n a n d settlem en t o f in d u strial disputes, a n d th u s assuring industrial
peace and harm ony. The discretion th u s conferred on these au th o rities

to determ ine th e procedure as they m ay th in k fit, howe-ver, is subject to
the rules m ade by th e ‘ap p ro p riate G o v ern m en t’ in th is behalf. P a rt-Ill
o f the In d ustrial D isputes (C entral) R ules, 1957 m akes rules in th is
behalf. Rules 9 to 30 are th e relevant rules regulating procedure. S tate
G overnm ents to o have m ade their own corresponding rules. E xcept to
the extent specified in sub-sec. 3 o f S.' 11 o f th e Act and the rules fram ed
thereunder, th e provisions of th e C ode o f Civil P rocedure, 1908 are n o t
applicable to proceedings befor the au thorities m entioned in sub-sec. (1).
T he provisions o f th e Evidence A ct, in their strict sense, likew ise do n o t
apply to proceedings before th e authorities. N evertheless, all these
authorities being quasi-judicial in n atu re objectively detex-mining m atters
referred to th em , have to exercise their discretion in a ju d icial m an n er,
w itho u t caprice, and according to th e general principles o f law and rules
o f n atu ral ju stice....
W hen sub-sec. (1) o f S. 11 expressly and in clear term s confers

pow er u p o n th e T ribunal to regulate its own procedure, it m ust necessarily
be endow ed w ith all pow ers w hich bring a b o u t a n ad ju d ica tio n o f an
existing industrial dispute, after affording all the parties an o p p o rtu n ity
o f a hearing. W e are inclined to th e view th a t w here a p a rty is prevented
from appearing a t the hearing due to a sufficient cause, an d is faced w ith
an ex parte aw ard, it is as if th e p a rty is visited w ith an aw ard w ithout
a notice o f th e proceedings. I t is needless to stress tha,t where th e
T ribunal proceeds to m ake an aw ard w ith o u t notice to a p arty , th e aw ard
is nothing but a nullity. In such circum stances, the T rib u n al has n o t
only the pow er b u t also th e duty to set aside the ex p a rte aw ard an d to
direct th e m atter to be h eard afresh.
T he language o f B-. 22 unequivocally m akes th e ju risd ictio n o f th e

T ribunal to render an ex parte aw ard, co n d itio n al upon th e fulfilm ent o f
its requirem ents. I f there is n o sufficient cause for th e absence o f a
p arty , the T rib u n al undoubtedly has ju risd ictio n to proceed e x parte.
B ut if there was sufficient cause shown which prevented a p a rty fro m
appearing, th e n under th e term s o f R . 22, T rib u nal will have had no
jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it m u st necessarily have pow er
to set aside the ex parte aw ard. In other w ords, th ere is pow er to
proceed ex parte, b u t this pow er is subject to th e fulfilm ent o f th e condi
tio n laid down in R. 22, The pow er to proceed ex parte u n d er R , 22
carried w ith it th e power to enqiure w hether or n o t there was sufficient
cause for th e absence o f a party a t the hearing.
U nder R . 24 (b) a T ribunal o r other body has the pow ers o f a Civil
C o u rt under O. XVII of th e C ode o f Civil Procedure, re latin g to th e
ADJUDICATION 311
grant o f ad jo iirn m en ts. U n d er O. X V II, R . 1, a civil court h a s th e

discretion to g ra n t or refuse an ad jo u rn m en t. W here it refuses to a d jo u rn
th e hearin g o f a suit, it m ay proceed eith er u n d er O. X V II R . 2 or R . 3.
"When it decides to p ro ceed und er O. X V II, R . 2, it m ay proceed to
dispose o f th e suit in o n e o f th e m odes d irected in th a t b e h alf by O. IX ,
o r to m a k e such o th e r o rd e r as it th in k s fit. As a necessary co ro llary ,
when the T rib u n a l o r o th e r b o d y refuses to a d jo u rn th e hearing, it m ay
proceed e x p a rte. In a case in which th e T rib u n al o r o ther body m akes
an ex p a r te award, th e provisions o f O. IX , R ule 13 o f th e C ode are
clearly attra c te d . I t logically follows th a t th e T rib u n a l was com petent
to en te rta in a n ap p licatio n to set aside an ex p a rte aw ard.
W e a re u nable to appreciate the co n ten tio n th a t m erely because th e

ex parte aw ard was based o n the statem en t o f th e m anager o f th e
app ellan t, th e o rd er settin g aside the e x p a rte aw ard , in fact, am ounts to
rev iew ....T h e q uestion w h eth er a p a rty m u st b e h eard before it is p ro
ceeded ag ain st is one o f procedure an d n o t o f pow er in th e sense in
w hich th e w ords are used in S. 11. T h e answ er to th e question is, th e re
fore, to be fo u n d in snb-s. Cl) o f S. 11 a n d n o t in sub-s. (3) o f S. 11.
F u rth e rm o re , different considerations arise o n review. T he expression
‘review ’ is used in tw o distin ct senses, nam ely, (1) a p ro cedural review
w hich is eith er in h e re n t o r im plied in a C o u rt or T rib u n a l to set aside a
palp ab ly erro n eo u s o rd e r passed u n d er a m is-apprehension by it, an d
(2) a review on m erits w hen th e error sought to be corrected is one o f
law and is a p p a ren t o n the face o f th e record. I t is in the latte r sense
the C o u rt in N arshi T h a kersh i's case h e ld th a t no review lies on m erits
unless a s ta tu te specifically provides fo r it, obviously w hen a review is
sought due to a p ro c e d u ra l defect, th e in ad v erten t e rro r co m m itted by
th e T rib u n a l m u st b e co rrected ex debito ju stitia e to prevent the abuse
o f its process, a n d such pow er inheres in every C o u rt o r T ribunal.
T h e c o n te n tio n th a t th e T rib u n al h a d becom e fu n c tu s officio and,

therefo re, h a d n o ju risd ic tio n to set aside th e e x p a rte aw ard an d th a t th e
C en tral G o v ern m en t alo n e could set it aside, does n o t com m end to us.
Sub-section (3) o f S. 20 o f th e A ct provides th a t th e proceedings before
th e T rib u n a l w ould b e deem ed to c o n tin u e till th e d a te on w hich th e
aw ard becom es enforeceable u nder S, 17-A. U n d e r S. 17-A o f the A ct,
an aw ard becom es enfo rceab le on th e expiry o f 30 days from th e d ate o f
its p u b licatio n u n d er S. 17. T he proceedings w ith re g ard to a reference
u n der S. 10 o f th e A c t, are, therefore, n o t deem ed to be concluded u n til
th e expiry o f 30 days fro m th e pub licatio n o f th e aw ard. T ill th en th e
T rib u n a l re ta in s ju risd ic tio n over th e dispute referred to it for adjudica
tio n an d u p to th a t d a te it has th e p o w er to en te rta in an application in
co n n e c tio n w ith such disp u te. T h a t stage is n o t reached till th e aw ard
becom es enforceable under S. 17-A. In th e in stan t case, th e T rib u n a l

m ade the ex parte aw ard o n D ecem ber 9 ,1 9 7 6 . T h at aw ard was published
by the C entral G overnm ent in the G azette o f Ind ia dated D ecem ber 25,
1976. The ap p licatio n fo r setting aside th e e x a w a r d was filed b y
respondent N o, 3 acting on b e h a lf o f respondents N os. 5 to 17 o n
Ja n u a ry 19, 1977, i.e., before, th e expiry o f 30 days o f its p u b lica tio n a n d
was therefore, rightly en tertain ed by th e T rib u n al. I t h ad ju risd ic tio n
to en tertain it an d decide it on m erits. I t was, how ever, u rg ed th a t on
A p ril 12, 1977 th e date on w hich th e im pugned ord er was passed, th e
T rib u n al h ad in any event becom e fu n c tu s officio we ca n n o t accede to
this argum ent. T he ju risd ictio n o f th e T rib u n a l had to be seen on th e
date o f th e application m ade to it an d n o t th e date o n w hich it passed
the im pugned order. T here is no finality attached to a n e x p a rte aw a rd
becuase it is always subject to its being set aside o n sufficient cause being
show n. T he T ribunal had th e pow er to d eal with an ap p licatio n p ro p e rly
m ade before it for setting aside th e ex pa rte aw ard an d p ass su itab le
orders.
The resu lt, th erefore, is th a t the ap p eal m ust fail a n d is dism issed
w ith costs th ro u g h o u t.
(A ppeal dism issed).
G U JA R A T ST E E L T U B E S L T D v. G U JA R A T S T E E L T U B E S
M A Z D O O R SA B H A
A .I.R . 1980 S.C. 1896
[F o r th e facts o f the case see und er V olu n tary A rb itratio n ]
P e r K rishna Iyer, J . ! ....T h e w ide w ords o f A rticle 226 are designed

for service o f th e lowly n u m b ers in th e ir grievances if th e subject belongs
to the c o u rt’s province an d th e rem edy is a p p ro p ria te to the ju d icial
process. T h ere is a native h u e a b o u t A rticle 226, w ith o u t being anglo-
philic or auglophobic in attitu d e. Viewed fro m th is ju risp ru d e n tia l
perspective, we have to be cautious b o th in n o t overstepping as if A rtic le
226 w ere as large as an appeal an d n o t failing to intervene w here a grave
error h as crept in. M oreover, we sit here in appeal over th e H igh C o u rt’s
judgm ent. A nd an appellate pow er interferes n o t w hen th e o rd e r
appealed is n o t right b u t only w hen it is clearly w rong. T he difference
is real, th o u g h fine....
W e m ay dilate a little m o re on A rt. 226 vis-a-vis aw ards o f a rb itra

tors. T he first lim b o f th e argum ent is th a t when th e re is a v o lu n tary
jo in t subm ission o f an in d u strial dispute to a n a rb itra to r nam ed by th e m
APJUDICATION 313
u n d er S. 10 A o f the In d u stria l D isputes A ct, he does n o t function as a

T rib u n al a n d is n o t am en ab le to the ju risd ic tio n o f th a t C o u rt u n d er
A rticle 227 o r u n d er A rticle 226. W ith o u t fu rth e r e la b o ra tio n this
co n ten tio n can be negatived on a decision o f th is C o u rt in R o h ta s
Industries L td v. R o h tas Ind u stries Staff U n io n ,....(A .I.R . 1976 SC 425).
This C o u rt observed th a t as the a rb itra to r u n d er S. lOA h a s the
pow er to b in d even th o se w ho are n o t p a rtie s to the reference or
agreem ent and the w hole exercise u n d er S. lOA as well as th e source o f
the force o f th e aw ard o n p u b licatio n derived fro m the statu te, it is
legitim ate to regard such an a rb itra to r now as p a rt o f th e in fra-stru ctu re
o f the sovereign’s d isp en satio n o f justice, th u s falling w ithin th e ra in b o w
o f sta tu to ry trib u n a ls am en ab le to ju d ic ia l review.
The second lim b o f th e arg u m en t w as th a t a w rit o f certio rari could

n o t be issued to c o rrect erro rs o f facts. I n th is connection after affirm ing
th e ra tio in E ngineering M a z d o o r S ab h a v. H in d cycle L td ........ (A .I.R .
1963 SC 874) this C o u rt observes th a t w h a t is im p o rta n t is a question o f
law arising o n the face o f th e facts fo u n d a n d its reso lu tio n exfacie or
sub silentio. T h e A rb itra to r m ay n o t state th e law as such; even th e n such
acute silence confers n o g reater or su b tler im m u nity o n th e aw ard th a n
plain speech. W e do n o t d ilate o n this p a r t o f the arg u m en t as we are
satisfied th a t b e th e test the deeply em bedded rules to issue certio rari o r
th e tra d itio n a l g ro u n d s to set aside an a rb itra tio n aw ard, 'th in p a rtitio n
d o th e ir b o u n d s d iv id e’ on th e facts a nd circum stances o f the p re sen t
case. B ro ad ly stated , th e p rin cip le o f law is th a t th e jurisd ictio n o f th e
H igh C o u rt u n d e r A rticle 226 o f th e C o n stitu tio n is lim ited to h o ld in g
th e judicial o r quasi-judicial trib u n als o r adm in istrative bodies exercis
ing the quasi-judicial pow ers w ithin th e leading strings o f legality a n d to
see th a t th e y do n o t exceed th e ir sta tu to ry ju risd ic tio n an d correctly
adm inister th e law la id dow n by th e sta tu te u n d er which they act. So
long a s th e h ierarch y o f officers an d ap p ellate au th orities created b y the
statu te fu n ctio n w ith in th e ir am b it th e m a n n e r in w hich th e y do so can
be no g ro u n d fo r in terference. T he p o w e r o f ju d icial supervision o f the
H igh C o u rt u n d e r A rticle 227 o f th e C o n stitu tio n (as it th en stood) are
n o t greater th a n th o se u n d e r A rticle 226 a n d it m ust be lim ited to seeing
th a t a trib u n a l fun ctio n s w ithin the lim its o f its a u th o rity (see N agendra
"Nath B o ra v. Comnvr. o f H ills D ivision & A ppeals, A ssam , (1958) S .C .R .
1240)... T h is led to a p ro p o sitio n th a t in exercising ju risd ic tio n u n d er
A rticle 226 th e H igh C o u rt is n o t c o n stitu ted a C o u rt o f ap peal over th e
decision o f au th o rities, adm in istrativ e o r quasi-judicial. A dequacy or
sufficiency o f evidence is n o t its m eat. I t is n o t the fu n c tio n o f a H ig h
C o u rt in a p etitio n for a w rit u nder A rt. 226 to review th e evidence and
to arrive a t an in d ep en d en t finding on th e evidence. (See S tate o f A n d h ra
Pradesh v. S. Sree R a m a R a o , (1964) 3 S.C .R . 25 a t 3 3 )...A C o n stitution
Bench o f this C ourt in P.H . K alyani v. M /s. A ir France, C alcutta, (1964)

2 S.C.R. 1 0 4 ; ...succinctly set o u t the lim its o f the ju risd ic tio n o f th e
H igh C o u rt in dealing w ith a w rit petition. It was said th a t in o rd e r to
justify a w rit o f certiorari it m ust be shown th a t an o rd er suffers fro m an
e rro r ap p aren t on the face o f th e record. I t was fu rth er p o in te d o u t th a t
if the finding o f fact is m ade by th e im pugned order a n d it is show n
th at it suffers from an erro r o f law an d n o t o f fact, a w rit u n d er A rticle
226 w ould issue, and, while so saying th e decision in N a g e n d ra N a th
B o ra ’s case was affirmed. F ollow ing th e aforem entioned decision, the
G u ja ra t H igh C o u rt in N av in ch an d ra v. M anager, A h m ed ab ad C o- op.
D ep artm en t Stores L td., (1978) 19 G uj. L R 108 a t p. 140, observed th a t
the am ended A rticle 226 w ould enable th e H igh C ourt to interfere with
an A w ard o f the industrial a d ju d icato r i f th at is based on a com pJete
m isconception of law or it is based on no evidence or th a t no reasonable
m an w ould com e to the conclusion to which th e a rb itra to r has
arrived ....
P e r K oshal, J . : ...1 h o ld a diiTerent opin io n in re la tio n to three

im p o rta n t findings arrived at by him (K rish n a Iyer, J.), n a m e ly .... (c)
th at the H igh C o u rt acted w ithin th e fo u r corners o f its ju risd ictio n
u n d er A rticle 227 o f the C o n stitu tio n o f In d ia while in terferin g w ith the
finding o f th e a rb itra to r th a t th e w orkm en were correctly punished with
dismissal if the orders o f discharge could be construed as su c h ....
T he last p o in t o n w hich I differ w ith the finding o f m y learned

brother relates to th e exercise by th e H igh C ourt o f its pow ers u n d er
A rticle 227 o f th e C o n stitu tio n o f In d ia . As p o in ted o u t b y him th e
H igh C ourt, while discharging its functions as envisaged by th a t article,
does n o t sit as a co u rt o f app eal over th e aw ard o f th e a rb itra to r b u t
exercises lim ited jurisdiction w hich extends only to seeing th a t th e a rb i
tra to r has functioned w ithin the scope o f his legal a u th o rity . T his
pro p o sitio n finds full su p p o rt from N a g e n d ra N ath B ora v. C om m r. o f
H ills D ivision an d A ppeals, A ssam (1958) S C R 1240, ...P .H . K aly an i
V . M /s. A ir F ran ce, C alcu tta, (1964) 2 SC R 104, ...S tate o f A n d h ra
Pradesh v. S. Sree R am a R a o , (1964) 3 SC R 2 5 ...a n d N a v in c h a n d ra

S hakerchand Shah v. M anager, A h m ed ab ad C o-operative D e p a rtm e n t
Stores L td ., (1978) 19 G uj. L R 108, all o f w hich have been discussed a t
length by h im an d require no fu rth e r co nsideration a t m y h a n d s. In
th is view o f th e m atter, it w as n o t o p en to th e H igh C o u rt to re-vise th e
punish m en t (if th e discharge is regarded as such) m eted o u t by th e
M anag em en t to th e delinquent w orkm en a n d left in ta c t b y th e a rb itra to r
w hose au th o rity in doing so h as n o t been shown to have been exercised
beyond th e lim its o f his jurisdiction.
ADJUDICATION 315
...I n view o f m y fin d in g s....(c).. th e H igh C o u rt exceeded th e lim its

o f its jurisdictioQ in in terferin g w ith th e said p iinishm eiit p u rp o rtin g to
act in th e exercise o f its pow ers u n d er A rticle 227 o f the C o n stitu tio n o f
India, th e ju d g m e n t o f th e H igh C o u rt m u st be reversed an d the o rd er
o f th e a rb itra to r resto red .
T A T A C O N S U L T IN G E N G IN E E R S v. IT S W O R K M E N
Suprem e Court, (1981) 2 L .L J . 146; A .I.R . 1981 S.C. 1088
[O n a reference o f a dispute relatin g to revision o f wage scales and

dearness allo w an ce th e T rib u n al gave its aw ard o n D ecem ber 20, 1978.
Two days la te r i.e., o n D ecem ber 22, 1978 th e E m ployees’ U n io n m ade
an a p p lic a tio n u n d e r R u le 31 o f th e In d u s tria l D isputes (Bom bay) R ules
1957 seeking a c o rrectio n w hich it claim ed h a d crep t into the aw ard.
The ap p lic a tio n , in ter a lia provided : “ In th e said aw ard, yo u r H o n o u r
has observed, a t th e en d o f p a ra 22, “ In view o f th e increase th a t is being
allow ed in th e basic p a y , I do n o t p ro p o se to revise th e existing schem e
o f “ D earness A llow ance.” F u rth e r, it ap p e a rs th a t th e T rib u n al intended
to g ran t th e increase o f R s. 150 to each d ra ftsm a n an d R s. ICO t o all
o th e r w o rk m en in th eir basic p ay. H ow ever, this is n o t clearly m entioned
anyw here in th e aw ard d u e to accidental slip o r o m issio n .” O n this
ap p licatio n , th e ad v o cate fo r the em ployer co m p an y m ade the follow ing
endorsem ent :
“ S u b m itted to w hatever th is H o n ’ble T rib u n al desires to d o ” .
The T rib u n a l m ade an o rd e r on the sam e day in th e follow ing term s :
“ T h ere can be n o d o u b t a flat increase o f R s. 150/- to each o f th e

em ployees in th e categ o ry o f D ra ftsm e n an d o f Rs. 100 to each
em ployee in th e o th e r categories h a s b een g ran ted u n d er my aw ard.
The sam e h as been m ade clear in p a ra g ra p h N o . 23, b u t it ap p e ars
th a t th e w ords “ to each em ployee” a fte r th e figures “ Rs. 150/-”
were o m itted . Sim ilarly, the sam e w o rd s “ to each em ployee” a fte r
th e figure “ 100” w ere om itted. "When th e a w a rd is sent fo r p u b li
catio n , a necessary corrig en d u m be m ad e in th e aw ard a n d th e
afo resaid w ords a fte r th e figures R s. 1 5 0 /- and R s. 100/- be added.
I t m ay be m en tio n ed th a t only fro m th a t p o in t o f view viz. to g ra n t
fla t increase o f Rs. 1 5 0 /-an d o f R s. 100/- to th e em ployees in th e
categ o ry o f D ra ftsm e n an d th e o th e r categories respectively th a t a
b u rd en statem en t w as called fo r from th e co m pany an d the sam e was
subm itted . . . T h e fitm ent has also to be done only a fte r th e flat
increase is ad ded to th e p resen t basic salary o f each em ployee. I
do not th in k th a t any problem w ould arise for in te rp re ta tio n o f the

aw ard. Since the aw ard h as been already signed, I d o n o t th in k
anyth in g fu rth er can be add ed to th is a w ard .”
A gainst the aforesaid findings th e m an ag em en t appealed by special leave

to the Suprem e C o u rt. E xcerpts from th e m ajority and m in o rity ju d g
m ents o f th e C o u rt follow ;]
P e r O . C hinnappa Reddy, J . (on b e h a lf o f V .R . K rishna Iy er J., a n d

him self) (M ajo rity view) •.
. . . . The application b efo re the T rib u n a l was filed u n der R ule 31 o f

the B om bay In d ustrial D isputes R ules, 1957 which is as follow s :
A B o ard , C ourt, L a b o u r C ourt, T rib u n a l o r A rb itra to r m ay, at any

tim e, suo m o tu or on an ap p licatio n m ad e by any o f th e p a rties
concerned, m ay correct an y clerical m istake or e rro r arising from a n
accidental slip o r om ission in any proceedings, re p o rt, aw a rd o r as
th e case m ay be, decision.
The om ission o f th e w ords to each em ployee first afte r th e figure R s. 150/-

and again after th e figure Rs. 100/- w as clearly' an accidental slip or
om ission w hich th e T ribunal was e n titled to correct. W e are u n ab le to
see how it can be held to be otherw ise. W e are n o t im pressed w ith th e
subm ission o f th e learned counsel fo r th e C om pany th a t th e co rrig en d u m
was in effect a fresh aw ard. ..
Per a.S. P a th a k , J . (M inority view) :
. . . . T he challenge em bodied in th e second co n ten tio n a g ain st the

am endm ent o f th e aw ard is m ore serious. I t is urged th a t th e am en d m en t
results in th e inclusion o f a flat increase o f R s. 150/- to each w o rk m an in
th e case o f D rau g h tsm an an d R s. 100/- to each w orkm an in th e case o f
o th er categories, a result w holly u n w arran ted , it is said, by th e in te n t o f
th e original aw ard an d , therefore, falling b ey o n d the ju risd ic tio n o f th e
T ribun al. In m aking th e ap p licatio n o f 22nd D ecem ber, 1978, th e U n io n
invoked th e ju risd ictio n o f th e T rib u n al u n d e r R ule 31 o f the In d u stria l
D isputes (Bombay) R ules 1957. . . .
T h e jurisdiction given to th e T rib u n a l by R ule 31 is closely circum s

cribed. I t is only a clerical m istake or e rro r which can be co rrected, an d
the clerical m istake o r e rro r m ust arise from an accidental slip o r
om ission in th e aw ard. A n accidental slip or om ission im plies th a t
som ething was intended and c o n tra ry to th a t in ten tio n w h at should n o t
have been included has been included or w h at should have been included
ADJUDICATION 317
has been o m itte d . I t m u st be a m istake or e rro r a m en a b le to clerical

co rrectio n only. I t m u st n o t be a m istak e o r e rro r w hich calls fo r re c ti
fication b y m o d ification o f th e conscioxjs a d ju d ica tio n on the issues
involved.
Is th e in s ta n t case one w here th e am en d m en t m ad e by th e T rib u n a l

in th e o rig in al aw ard can be said to co rrect a m ere clerical m istak e o r
erro r arising fro m a n accidental slip o r o m ission ? T o answ er the
questio n , it is necessary to exam ine th e basis o f th e aw ard a n d the in te n t
which flows fro m th a t basis. . . .
I t seem s th a t the T rib u n a l was b etray ed b y a cu rio u s co n fusion in

accepting th e p lea o f th e U n io n th a t a flat increase to th e pay o f each
w orkm an w as in ten d ed in the original wage and, consequently, it fell
into th e e rro r o f am en d in g th e aw ard. T h e evidence co n tain ed in th e
aw ard th ro u g h o u t p rovides in co n tro v ertib le p r o o f th a t this flat increase
was never o rig in a lly in ten d ed in th e aw ard. T h e am en d m en t has resulted
in the T rib u n a l m ak in g , as it were, a su p p lem en tary aw ard, w hereby a
fu rth e r re lie f is being g ra n te d beyond th a t g ra n te d in th e original aw ard .
T he o rig in al aw ard was com pleted an d signed by th e T rib u n al, a n d it
ca n n o t be reopened n o w except for th e lim ited p u rp o se o f R ule 31. In
travelling o u tsid e an d b ey o n d th e term s o f th e o rig in al aw ard, the
T rib u n al h as c o m m itte d a ju risd ictio n al erro r. O u r a tte n tio n has been
d raw n to w h a t p u rp o rts to be a n en d o rsem en t by th e counsel fo r the
a p p ellan t o n th e a p p lic a tio n d ated 22nd D ecem ber, 1978 filed b y th e
U n io n b efo re th e T rib u n a l to th e effect th a t th e ap p ella n t w ould su b m it
to w hatever th e T rib u n a l decided, a n d it is urged th a t th e a p p e lla n t is
bou n d by th e o rd e r m ad e o n th e a p p licatio n . I t is an accepted principle
th a t co n sen t by a p a rty c a n n o t confer ju risd ic tio n o n a co u rt. W h a t is
w ithout ju risd ic tio n w ill rem ain so. In th e circum stances th e o rd e r o f
22nd D ecem ber, 1978 is in v alid so fa r as it am ends p a ra g ra p h 23 o f the
original aw ard . T he corrigendum am en d in g th e aw ard in consequence
is liable t o be q u ash ed . T h e second co n te n tio n o f th e a p p e lla n t is
en titled to succeed.
[A ppeals dism issed by m ajority],
W O R K M E N O F H IN D U S T A N L E V E R L T D . v.
M A N A G E M E N T O F H IN D U S T A N L E V E R L T D .
Suprem e Court, (1984) 1 L .L J . 388
[E xcerpts fro m th e ju d g m en t o f D esai J. follow :]
Even i f th e tech n ical p rin cip le o f res Judicata is im p o rte d in the field
o f in d u strial a d ju d ic a tio n , th e issue a b o u t th e existence o f a n agreem ent
was substantially and directly in issue betw een th e p artie s in th e e arlie r

proceedings and was decided in th e affirm ative th a t th ere exists such an
agreem ent....T o th a t extent, one can say th a t unless change o f circum
stances are established, the issue w ould be res judicata. B u t we consider it
inappro p riate to usher in th is technical concept o f res Judicata pervading
the field o f civil justice in to the field o f in d u strial a rb itra tio n ... [0 ]n e can
safely say th a t principle an alo g o u s to res judicata can be availed o f to
scuttle an y a tte m p t at raising in d u strial disputes repeatedJy in defiance o f
operative settlem ents and aw ards. B ut th is highly technical concept o f
civil justice m ay be kept in precise confined Hinits in the field o f in d u strial
arb itratio n which m ust as far as possible be k ep t free fro m such tech n i
calities w hich th w art resolution o f in d u strial d isp u te s....T h e concept o f
com pulsory adjudication o f industrial disputes was statu to rily ushered in
with a view to providing a forum, atid com pelling th e p artie s t o re so rt to
the form for a rb itratio n so as to avoid c o n fro n ta tio n a n d d islo catio n in
industry. A developing co u n try like In d ia can ill-afford d islocation in
industrial p roduction. Peace an d h arm o n y in indu stry a n d u n in te rru p te d
p ro d uctio n being the dem ands o f the tim e, it was considered wise to arm
the G overnm ent w ith pow er to com pel th e p arties to re so rt to a rb itra tio n
an d as a necessary corollary to avoid c o n fro n ta tio n and tria l o f stren g th ,
which were considered w asteful from n a tio n a l and p u blic in terest p o in t
o f view. A w elfare state can ill-alford to look askance a t in d u stria l
unrest an d in d u strial d isp u te s..,.
U n d o u b ted ly , it is true th a t th ere can be no estoppel ag ain st th e

law o f th e lan d . I f a p arty is estopped by doing a th ing w hich it is u n d e r
a legal disability to perform or forb earin g to do som ething w hich it is his
duty to do , the result w ould be an enlargem ent o f the c o n tra c tu a l o r
other rights allow ed by law or th e ir a lte ra tio n , T he co u rt enforces th e
perform ance o f statu to ry d u ty an d declines to interfere fo r the assistance
o f persons w ho seek its aid to relieve them against the express sta tu to ry
p ro v isio n ....In in d u strial ad ju d icatio n , issues are o f tw o ty p es :
(i) those referred by th e G o v ern m en t fo r ad ju d icatio n a n d set o u t

in the o rder o f reference an d (ii) incid en tal issues w hich are som etim es
th e issues o f law o r issues o f m ixed law a n d fact. T he T rib u n a l m ay as
w ell fram e prelim inary issues i f th e p o in t o n w hich th e p a rtie s a re a t
variance, as reflected in the p relim inary issue, w ould go to the r o o t o f the
m atter. B u t th e T rib u n al can n o t travel beyond th e pleadings an d
arrogate to itself th e power to raise issues which th e p arties to th e
reference are precluded, or p ro h ib ite d from raising to w it if the em ployer
does n o t question the status o f th e w orkm en, th e T rib u n a l ca n n o t s m
maiu raise the issue and proceed to ad ju d icate u p o n th e sam e a n d th ro w
o u t the reference on th e sole g round th a t th e concerned w o rk m an was n o t
ADJUDICATION 319
a w ork m an w ith in th e m eaning o f th e expression o f th e A ct. A n d it is

n o t oblig ato ry u p o n th e em ployer necessarily to raise th e c o n te n tio n th a t
the co n cerned w o rk m an w as n o t a w o rk in a n w ithin th e m eaning o f th e
expression u n d e r the A ct. T herefore, th e T rib u n a l w as w holly in e rro r
in h o ld in g th a t if th e co ntention o f th e u n io n were to prevail, th e well
laid rule o f no esto p p el again st a statu te w ould be violated.
W O R K M E N O F W IL L IA M S O N M A G O R A N D CO. L T D ., v.
W IL L IA M S O N M A G O R & CO. L T D . •
A .L R . 1982 S.C . 78
T he m an ag em en t p ro m o te d u pgraded certain em ployees superseding

th e legal claim s o f o th e r senior em ployees w ith o u t follow ing any n o rm
or rule. T h e dispute reg ard in g p ro m o tio n o f ju n io r clerks o f th e g eneral
grade to special grade in preference to senior clerks o f th e sam e grade
was referred for ad ju d icatio n . The trib u n a l held th a t pro m o tio n s o f th e
persons w ere unjustified as ju n io r p erso n s were given p ro m o tio n s su p e r
seding th e claim s o f a n u m b er o f senior w orkm en w ith o u t any ju stification.
H ow ever, it refused to g ra n t any relief to th e w orkm en since no sta n d a rd
o r norm s w ere fo rm u la te d fo r p ro m o tio n by th e m an agem ent. A ggrieved
by this o rd e r th e w o rk m en ap p ealed by special leave to th e Suprem e
C ourt. E x c e rp ts from th e ju d g m en t o f B ah aru l Islam J. follow ;1
. . . T h e T rib u n a l h a s categorically fo u n d , “ f am co n stra in ed to

observe th a t n o m aterial h as been p laced b efore me n o r it h as been
claim ed in evidence th a t the m an ag em en t fo u n d th a t these peo p le were
m ore efficient a n d c o m p eten t th a n th e re s t o f th e w orkm en. In th e
premises, I am b o u n d to h o ld th a t I cannot j u s tify the promotion o f the
said persons nam ed in the two references an d dispose o f th e first issue
accordingly” (em p h asis added). B ut to o u r am azem ent, it failed to pass
any con seq u en tial o rd e r, an d instead h eld , “ I c a n n o t give any re lie f to
these w orkm en when th eir positive case is th a t there is no sta n d a rd or
norm s for giving p ro m o tio n .” In o th e r w ords, a lth o u g h th e T rib u n al
categorically held th a t th e actions o f th e m a n ag em en t w ere unjustified, it
expressed its in ab ility to give any relief to th e w orkm en in th e case. W e
do n o t th in k th a t th e T rib u n a l sh o u ld be so pow erless. T h e industrial
trib u n a ls a re in te n d e d to adjudicate in d u strial disputes betw een the
m anagem ent an d th e w o rk m en , settle th e m , a n d p ass effective aw ards in
such a w ay th a t in d u stria l peace betw een th e em ployers a n d the em ployees
may be m a in ta in e d so t h a t th ere can b e m o re p ro d u c tio n to benefit all
concerned. F o r th e above purpose, th e in d u strial trib u n a ls, as fa r as
practicab le, sh o u ld n o t b e con strain ed b y th e fo rm al rules o f law an d
sh o u ld av o id inability to arrive at an effective aw ard to m eet ju stice in a
p a rtic u la r dispute. The T rib u n a l, in th e in sta n t case,in view o f its

findings, first o f all should h av e d eclared th a t th e p ro m o tio n s o f th e
aforesaid fifteen persons were illegal an d unjustified, th e ir p ro m o tio n
being th e resu lt o f a rb itrary actio n o f th e m an ag em ent w hich w as n o th in g
b u t n n fa ir la b o u r practice, an d th e p ro m o tio n s in question sh o u ld ha-ve
been cancelled. T h e T rib u n al also, in o u r o p in ion, in co n su lta tio n w ith
th e m anagem ent an d th e u n io n ; should have fram ed n o rm s/ru le s o f
p ro m o tio n s a n d directed th e m an ag em en t to give p ro m o tio n s/
u p g rad atio n s in accordance w ith those n o rm s/rules.
W e do n o t agree w ith the claim o f th e u n io n th a t p ro m o tio n s o r

Tipgradations sh o u ld be on th e basis o f seniority alone. T h e N a tio n a l
In d u stria l T rib u n a l in its aw ard gave th e follow ing w holesom e direc
tions :—
“ I give th e general fo rm u la w hich h as been accepted by m an y

concerns, nam ely, all th in g s being eq u al, seniority shall c o u n t fo r
pro m o tio n . I f th e senior p erso n has been overlooked in th e qu estio n
o f p ro m o tio n , he is a t lib erty to ask th e concern fo r re aso n w hy h e
has been overlooked, in w hich case th e concern shall give him th e
reasons p ro v id ed th a t it does n o t expose th e concern o r th e officer
giving any reaso n s to any civil o r crim inal proceedings” .
T he m anagem ent has failed to follow th is d irectio n in th e case in h an d .

A lth o u g h we agree th a t p ro m o tio n /u p g ra d a tio n is a m anagerial fu n ctio n ,
it m u st n o t b e o n th e subjective satisfactio n of th e m anagem ent b u t m u st
be on som e objective criteria. . . .
(A ppeals allow ed).
S T R S IL K L T D ., v. G O V E R N M E N T O F A N D H R A P R A D E S H
A .L R . 1964 S.C. 160
[T he G overn m en t o f A n d h ra P rad esh h a d referred certain disputes

betw een m anagem ent o f Sirsilk L td. and its w orkm en to a n in d u stria l
trib u n a l fo r adjudication. T h e T rib u n a l h a d given its aw ard a n d sen t
it to the G overnm ent for p u b licatio n . B efore th e G overnm ent p u b lish e d
it, th e p arties h a d com e to a settlem ent o n th e referred issues a n d th e re
fore asked th e G overn m en t n o t to p u b lish th e aw ard. T he G o v e rn m en t
asserted its in ab ility to w ithhold th e p u b licatio n , in view o f th e m a n d a to ry
provisions o f section 17 o f th e In d u stria l D isp u tes A ct, 1947. T h e re u p o n ,
th e parties filed a w rit p etitio n in th e H ig h C o u rt o f A n d h ra P rad e sh
prayin g th a t th e G overnm ent b e directed n o t to publish the aw ard . T he
H ig h C o u rt held th a t the provisions o f section 17 were m a n d a to ry ,
ADJUDICATION 321
and th a t th e G o v e rn m e n t co u ld n o t w ith h o ld p u b licatio n . T he p arties

th en ap p ealed to th e Suprem e C o u rt. E xcerpts fro m th e ju d g m e n t o f
W anchoo J ., follow :]
...S e c tio n 17 (1) lays dow n th a t every aw ard shall w ithin a p e rio d
o f th irty d ays from th e d a te o f its receipt by th e a p p ro p ria te governm ent
be published in such m an n er as th e a p p ro p ria te governm ent th in k s fit.
The use o f th e w ord “ sh all” is a p o in te r to S. 17 (1) being m an d a to ry ,
th o u g h u n d o u b te d ly in c ertain circum stances th e w ord “ sh all” used in a
statute m ay b e equal to th e w ord “ m a y ” . In th e present case, how ever it
seems to u s th a t w hen th e w ord “ sh a ll” was' used in S. 17 (1) th e in te n
tion was to give a m a n d a te to G overn m en t to p u b lish th e aw ard w ithin
the tim e fixed th erein . T h is is enforced b y th e fact th a t sub-s (2) o f S. 17
provides th a t “ th e aw a rd published u n d e r sub-s (1) shall be final and
shall n o t be called in q u estio n by any c o u rt in any m a n n e r w hatsoever” .
Obviously w hen th e legislature intended th e aw ard on p u b lic atio n to be
final, it co u ld n o t have in ten d ed th a t th e G o v ern m en t concerned h a d the
pow er to w ith h o ld p u b lic a tio n o f th e aw ard. F u rth e r S. 17A show s
th a t w hatever p ow er th e G overn m en t h as in th e m a tte r o f an a w a rd is
specifically p ro v id ed in th a t section, w hich allow s th e G o v ern m en t in
certain circu m stan ces to declare th a t th e aw ard shall n o t becom e enforce
able on th e expiry o f th irty days from th e d ate o f its pu b licatio n , w hich
u n der S. 17-A is th e d a te o f th e enfo rceab ility o f the aw ard. Section
17-A also envisages th a t th e aw ard m ust be published th o u g h the
G overn m en t m ay d eclare in certain contingencies th a t it m ay n o t be
enforceable. S ub-section (2) o f S. 17-A also gives pow er to G o v ern m en t
to m ake an o rd er rejecting or m odifying th e aw ard w ithin n inety days
from the d a te o f its p u b licatio n . It is clear th e re fo re reading S. 17 an d
S. 17-A to g e th e r th a t th e in te n tio n b eh in d S. 17 (1) is th a t a duty is cast
on gov ern m en t to p u b lish th e aw ard w ith in th irty days o f its receipt and
th e pro v isio n fo r its p u b lic a tio n is m a n d a to ry an d n o t m erely d irectory.
....W h e re th erefo re p arties to a n in d u stria l disp u te have reached a

settlem ent w hich is b in d in g u n d er S. 18 (1), th e dispute betw een them
really com es to a n end. In such a case it is u rg ed th a t the settlem ent
arrived a t betw een th e p a rtie s should be respected an d in d u stria l peace
should n o t b e allo w ed to be d istu rb e d by th e p u b lica tio n o f the aw ard
w hich m ig h t b e different from th e settlem ent. T h ere is no d o u b t th a t
a settlem en t o f th e d isp u te betw een th e p a rtie s them selves is to b e p re
ferred w here it can be arriv ed a t to in d u stria l a d ju d icatio n , as the settle
m en t is lik ely to lead to m o re la stin g peace th a n a n aw ard a i t is a rriv ed
at b y th e free will o f th e parties a n d is a p o in te r to th e re being g o o d
will betw een th e m . E ven th o u g h this m ay be so , we have still to reconcile
th e m a n d a to ry c h a ra c te r o f th e p ro v isio n co n ta in ed in S. 17 (1) fo r the
publication of th e award to th e equally m an d atory c h a rac ter o f the

binding natu re o f the settlem ent arrived a t betw een the parties as provided
in S. 18 (1). O rdinarily there should be no difficulty a b o u t the m atter,
fo r if a settlem ent has been arrived a t between the p arties w hile th e
dispute is pending before the trib u n a l, th e p arties would file th e settle
m ent before the tribunal a n d th e trib u n a l would m ake the aw ard in
accordance w ith th e settlem ent. In State o f B ihar v. D .N . G anguly,
1959 SCR 1 1 9 1 : (A IR 1958 SC 1018) dealing with an a rg u m e n t u rg ed
before this C o u rt th a t where a settlem ent has been arrived a t betw een th e
parties w hile an industrial d isp u te is pending before a trib u n al, th e only
rem edy for giving effect to such a settlem ent w ould be to cancel the
reference, this C o u rt observed th a t though th e A ct did n o t c o n tain any
provision specifically au th o risin g the in d u strial trib u n al, to record a
com prom ise and pass an aw ard in its term s corresponding to the p ro
visions o f O. X X in , R. 3 o f th e Code o f Civil P rocedure, it w ould be
very u n reaso n ab le to assume th a t the in d u strial tribunal w ould insist
upon dealing w ith the dispute on th e m erits even after it is inform ed th a t
th e dispute h as been am icably settled betw een th e parties, and th ere can
b e no d o u b t th a t if a dispute before a trib u n a l is am icably settled, the
trib u n a l w ould im m ediately agree to m ake an aw ard in term s o f the
settlem ent betw een the parties. In th a t case this C ourt d ea lt w ith w hat
w ould happen if a settlem ent w as arrived a t w hile the m atter w as pending
before the trib u n a l. The difficulty arises in the present case because the
proceedings before th e trib u n a l h a d com e to an end, and th e trib u n a l h a d
sent its aw ard to G overnm ent before th e settlem ent was arrived a t on
O ctober 1, 1957. T here is no p rovision in th e A ct dealing w ith such a
situ atio n ju s t as th e re was n o provision in the A ct dealing w ith the
situ atio n w hich arose where th e p arties cam e to an agreem ent w hile th e
dispute was pending before th e trib u n al. T his C o u rt held in G a n g u ly ’s
case 1959 S C R 1191 ; (A IR 1958 SC 1018) th a t in such a situ atio n th e
settlem ent o r com prom ise would have to be filed befor the trib u n a l and
th e trib u n al w ould m ake a n aw ard th ereu p o n in accordance w ith th e
settlem ent. Difficulty how ever arises w hen th e m atter has gone beyond
th e purview o f th e trib u n al as in th e p resent case. T h a t difficulty in o u r
o p in io n has to be resolved in order to avoid possible conflict betw een
S. 1 8 (1 ) which m a k e s-th e settlem ent arrived at bettw een th e p a rtie s
otherw ise th a n in the course o f conciliation proceeding b in d in g on the
parties and th e term s o f an aw ard w hich are binding u n d er S. 18 (2) on
p u b licatio n an d which m ay n o t be th e sam e as th e term s o f th e settlem ent
b in d in g under S. 18 (1). The only way in o u r view to resolve th e possible
conflict which w ould arise betw een a settlem ent which is b in d in g u n d e r
S. 18(1) and an aw ard which m ay becom e binding under S. 18 (3) on
p u b licatio n is to w ithhold th e p u b lic a tio n o f th e aw ard once th e
G overnm ent has been inform ed jo in tly by th e parties th a t a settlem ent
ADJUDICATION 323
binding u n d e r S. 18 (1) has been arriv ed a t. I t is true th a t S. 17 (1) is

m an d ato ry a n d o rd in arily th e G o v ern m en t h as to pu b lish an aw ard sent
to it by th e trib u n a l; b u t where a situ a tio n like the one in the present
case arises v/hich m ay lead to a conflict betw een a settlem ent u n d er
S. 18 (1) a n d an aw ard binding u n d e r S. 18 (3) o n p u b lic atio n , the
only so lu tio n is to w ith h o ld th e aw ard from p u b licatio n . T his w ould
n o t in o u r o p in io n in any w ay affect th e m a n d ato ry n atu re o f th e p ro
vision in S. 17 (1), fo r th e G o v ern m en t w ould o rd in arily have to p u b lish
the aw ard b u t fo r th e special situation arising in such cases.
The m a tte r m ay be looked a t in an o th e r way. The reference to the

trib u n a l is fo r th e p u rp o se o f resolving th e d isp u te th a t m ay have arisen
betw een em ployers an d th e ir w orkm en. W here a settlem ent is arriv ed a t
betw een th e p arties to a dispute before th e trib u n al a fte r the aw ard has
been su b m itted to G o v ern m en t b u t b efore its pu b licatio n , th ere is in
fact no d isp u te left to b e resolved by th e p u b lic a tio n o f the aw ard. In
such a case, th e aw ard se n t to G o v ern m en t m ay very well be considered
to have b ecom e in fru ctu o u s an d so th e G o v ern m en t should refrain from
publishing such an aw ard because no dispute rem ains to be resolved by
it....
W e are th erefo re o f o p in io n th a t th o u g h S. 17 (1) is m a n d ato ry

and the G o v e rn m e n t is b o u n d to p u b lish th e aw ard received by it from
an in d u strial trib u n a l, th e situ a tio n arisin g in a case like th e present is o f
an exceptional n a tu re a n d requires reco n cih atio n betw een S. 18 (1) and
S. 18 (3), a n d in such a situ atio n th e o n ly w ay to reconcile th e tw o p ro
visions is to w ith h o ld th e p u b licatio n o f th e aw ard, as a binding settle
m en t has alread y com e in to force in o rd er to avoid possible conflict
betw een a b in d in g settlem ent u n d er S. 18 (1) a n d a b inding aw ard u n d er
S. 18 (3). In such a situ a tio n we are o f o p in io n th a t th e G o v ern m en t
o u g h t n o t to p u b lish th e aw ard u n d er S. 17 ( I ) a n d in cases w here
G overn m en t is going to p u b lish it, it c a n be d irected n o t to p u blish the
aw ard in view o f th e binding settlem ent arrived a t betw een the parties
u n d er S. 18 (1) w ith respect to th e very m a tte rs w hich were the subject
m atte r o f a d ju d ic a tio n u n d er th e aw ard ....
(A ppeals allow ed.)
R E M IN G T O N R A N D O F IN D IA L T D ., v. T H E W O R K M E N
A .I.R . 1968 S .C . 224
[ The aw a rd was m ad e b y th e In d u stria l T rib u n a l, A lleppey, 6a

O ctober 5, 1966. It was r.eceived by th e a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent on
O ctober 14, 1966. B u t it w as p u b lish ed in th e K e rala G azette on
N ovem ber 15, 1966. A g ain st th is aw ard th e m an agem ent appealed to
th e Suprem e C o u rt, inter alia on th e g round th a t the aw ard was in o p e ra

tive an d unenforceable as it w as published a fte r the expiry o f th e p erio d
fixed by section 17 (1) o f the In d u stria l D isp u tes A ct, 1947. E xcerpts
from the ju d g m en t o f M itter J. follow : ]
,,,I t was observed b y S ubbarao, J. (as he then was) speaking for th e
m ajority o f th e C o u rt [ in S ta te o f U ttar Pradesh v. Babu R am Upadhya,
(1961) 2 SC R 679 a t p. 7 1 0 ...] th a t :
“ F o r ascertaining the re a l in ten tio n o f the L egislature th e C o u rt

m ay consider, in te r alia, th e n a tu re and th e design o f the statu te, an d
th e consequences which w ould follow from construing it one w ay or th e
other, the im pact o f other provisions w hereby th e necessity o f com plying
with th e p rovisions in question is avoided, th e circum stances, nam ely,
th a t th e statu te provides for a contingency o f th e non-com pliance w ith
th e provisions, th e fact th a t th e non-com pliance w ith the p ro v iso n s is or
is n o t visited by some penalty , the serious o r trivial consequences th a t
flow th erefro m , a n d , above all, w hether the object o f the legishition will
b e defeated o r fu rth e re d .”
K eeping th e above principles in m ind, we cannot b u t h o ld th a t a

provision as to tim e in S. 17 (1) is m erely d irectory and n o t m an d ato ry .
S. 17 (1) m akes it obligatory on th e G overn m ent to publish th e aw ard.
T he lim it o f tim e has been fixed as show ing th a t the publication o f th e
aw ard ought n o t to be held up . B ut the fixation o f the perio d o f 30 days
m entioned therein does n o t m ean th a t the p iiblication beyond th a t tim e
will ren d er th e aw ard invalid. I t is n o t difficult to thinic o f circum stances
w hen th e publicatio n o f th e aw ard w ithin th irty days m ay n o t be possible.
F o r instance, th ere m ay be a strike in the press o r th ere m ay be any
o th er good an d sufficient cause by reason o f w hich the p u b lica tio n could
n o t be m ade w ithin thirty days. I f we were to hold th a t th e aw ard
w ould therefore be rendered in v ah d , it w ould be attaching u n d u e im p o r
tance to a p rovision not in the m in d o f th e legislature. It is well know n
th a t it very often takes a long p erio d o f tim e fo r th e reference to be
concluded an d the aw ard to be made. I f th e aw ard becom es invalid
m erely o n th e ground o f publication after th rity days, it m ig h t e n tail a
fresh reference w ith needless h arassm ent to th e parties. T he non p u b li
catio n o f th e aw ard w ithin the p erio d o f th irty days does n o t entail an y
penalty and th is is an o th er consideration w hich h as to be k e p t in m ind.
W h a t was said in th e earlier passage from th e ju d g m en t in S ir silk L ld. v.
Govt, o f Andhra Pradesh] (1964) 2 SC R 448 at 4 5 2 .,,.(su p ra ) m erely
shows th a t it was n o t open to G overnm ent to w ithhold p u b lic a tio n b u t
this C o u rt never m eant to lay dow n th a t the period o f tim e fixed fo r
publicatio n was m andatory.
(A ppeal dism issed.)
ADJUDICATION 325
A S S O C IA T E D EL E C T R IC A L IN D U S T R IE S (IN D IA )
P R IV A T E L T D ., C A L C U T T A v. ITS W O R K M E N
A .L R . 1967 S.C . 284.
[A d isp u te arose o v er the q uestion o f b onus betw een A ssociated

Electrical Industries (In d ia) P vt. L td. an d its w orkm en. T he G o v e rn
m ent referred th e d isp u te to th e F ifth In d u stria l T rib u n al. T h ereafter
the reference in q u estio n was w ithdraw n an d was referred to the Second
In d u strial T rib u n a l. L a te r th e dispute was also w ithdraw n from the
Second In d u stria l T rib u n a l an d referred to th e F o u rth Industrial T rib u n al
w hich u ltim ately d irected th e m an ag em en t to pay a n additional b o n u s
to its w ork m en . A g ain st th is o rd er th e m an ag em ent preferred an appeal
by special leave to th e Suprem e C o u rt. E xcerpts from the ju d g m en t
o f G aje n d ra g a d k ar J. follow :]
...T h e o rd ers o f tra n sfe r have been m ad e u n d e r S. 33B o f th e

Industrial D isp u tes A ct, 1947. T his section h as been enacted in 1956
an d it p rovides in te r alia th a t th e a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent m a y by
ord er in w ritin g a n d fo r reasons to be stated th erein w ithdraw any
proceedings u n d e r th is A c t, pending b efore an in d u stria l trib u n a l and
transfer it fo r disposal to an o th er in d u stria l trib u n a l. T he argum ent
is th a t th o u g h th e a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent was co m p eten t to tra n sfe r
the proceedings it c o u ld exercise its po w er only after com plying w ith
th e req u irem en ts o f S. 33B, and one o f th e req uirem ents o f th e said
section is th a t b efore m aking th e o rd e r o f tran sfer th e a p p ro p ria te
G o v ern m en t m u st re c o rd reasons fo r th e sam e. W hen we tu rn to th e
orders b y w hich th e reference was w ithdraw n fro m one in d u stria l
trib u n a l a n d tra n sfe rre d to a n o th e r, we find th a t there is no reason
m entioned in an y of th em . A ll th a t th e ord ers p u rp o rt to say is th a t
it is expedient to w ith d raw th e reference from one trib u n a l an d tra n sfer
it to an o th er. In o u r o p in io n , the said b a re statem en t m ade in the
orders by w hich th e proceedings a re w ithdraw n fro m one trib u n a l an d
transferred to an o th e r does n o t a m o u n t to a statem en t o f reasons as
required b y S. 33B (1). It is q u ite clear th a t th e requirem ent a b o u t the
statem ent o f th e reason m u st be com plied w ith b o th in substance and
in letter. T o say th a t it is expedient to w ithdraw a case fro m one
trib u n al a n d tra n sfe r it to an o th e r rep eated ly on th ree occasions in
respect o f th e sam e proceedings is n o t to give an y reason as req u ired by
th e section. N o rm a lly , w hen a n in d u stria l d isp u te is referred to an
industrial C o u rt or trib u n a l, it sh o u ld be trie d b efore th e said C o u rt or
trib u n al, a n d so the p ow er o f tran sfer can be exercised only fo r suflScient
reasons. I n th e circum stances o f th is case w e are n o t p re p are d to h o ld
th a t any reaso n s have been stated as req u ired by th e section, and so th e
orders o f tra n sfe r c a n n o t b e h eld to b e justified u n d e r S. 33 B (l). In
view o f this infirm ity in the ord ers it is conceded th a t the decision o f th is
C o u rt in Bengal Chem ical an d P h arm aceu tical W orks L td . v. T h eir
Employees, A IR 1959 SC 633, w ould n o t assist the respondents.
T here is an o th er objection to th e validity o f the present proceedings

before the F o u rth Industrial T rib u n al. M r. Sanyal has fairly conceded
th a t since the definition o f the w o rd “ trib u n a l” prescribed by S. 2 (r) o f
th e A ct was am ended so as to include an in d u strial trib u n a l co n stitu te d
before M arch 10, 1957, it m ay be assum ed th a t the orders passed by th e
G overnm ent subsequent to M arch 10, 1957, could a ttract th e provisions
o f S. 33B; b u t he argued th at w hen the first o rd er was passed by w hich
th e proceedings pending before th e F ifth In d u strial T ribunal were with-
drav/n on M arch 9, 1957, the position w ould b e different. O n th a t d a te
th e definition o f th e word “ trib u n a l” h ad n o t been am ended, a n d so it
would be an ad d itio n al infirm ity in th e p resent proceedings before th e
F o u rth Ind u strial T ribunal. T he effect o f the am endm ent in th e defi
nition o f th e trib u n a l considered in the light o f the provisions o f S. 33B
has been discussed by this C o u rt in the case o f th e Bengal C hem ical an d
Pharm aceutical W orks L td. A IR 1959 SC 633, where it h a s been
observed th a t in respect o f proceedings p en d in g in a trib u n a l co n stitu ted
before M arch 10,1957, the G overn m en t has th e power to tran sfer them
from th a t d ate (10-3-1957) to an y o th e r T rib u n al. T he im pugned tra n s
fer in th e present case took place o n M arch 9, 1957, and so w ould n o t
b e pro tected b y th e definition in question. In th a t case th e w ithdraw al
o f th e proceedings and their tra n sfe r w ould becom e invalid as h as been
held by this C o u rt in State o f B ih ar V. D .N . G anguly, 1959 S C R 1191;
(A IR 1958 S C 1 0 1 8 ).
In the resu lt the objection raised by th e ap p ellan t as to the validity

o f the p resent procediugs m ust be affirm ed an d th e aw ard passed by th e
F o u rth Indusitrial T ribunal m u st b e set aside. As a result o f th is o rd er
th e dispute w hich was originally referred to th e F ifth In d u strial T rib u n a l
b y the notification issued on Septem ber 21, 1956, would be revived and
th e present m a tte r would be sent to th e said trib u n a l fo r disposal in
accordance w ith law. There will be n o o rd er as to costs.
(A ppeal allow ed.)
P R A D IP PO R T T R U S T v. T H E IR W O R K M E N
A .I.R , 1977 S.C. 36
[The G overnm ent referred a dispute betw een P rad ip P o r t T ru st

(hereinafter called the m anagem ent) an d its em ployee, by P ra d ip Shra-
m ik C ongress (hereinafter called th e unio n ) w ith regard to th e te rm in a
tio n o f the services o f th e la tte r to th e In d u strial T rib u n al (C entral).
ADJUDICATION 327
T he u n io n a p p e a re d b efo re th e trib u n a l th ro u g h its A dvisor and G eneral

Secretary. T h e m anagem ent sought to b e represented before th e trib u
n a l th ro u g h an ad v o cate w ho was th e legal c o n su lta n t o f th e T ru st.
The u n io n refu sed to give th e ir co n sen t to his rep resen tatio n by an
advocate u n d e r section 36 (4). T he objection v/as upheld by th e
tribunal. T he trib u n a l fu rth e r held th a t “ m erely by execution o f a
pow er o f a tto rn e y , th e restrictions attach ed to a legal p ra ctitio n er
contained in sub-section (4) o f section 36 c a n n o t be circum scribed.”
T he m an ag em en t th e n filed an app eal by special leave before th e
Suprem e C o u rt. E x cerp ts from th e ju d g m e n t o f G osw am i J., follow ;]
The q u e stio n th a t arises fo r co n sid eratio n will turn on the in te r

p re tatio n o f Section 36 o f the A ct w hich m ay be q u oted :
36 (1). A w o rk m an w ho is a p a rty t o d ispute shall be entitled to

be represented in an y proceeding u n d er this A ct by—■
(a) an y m em ber o f th e executive o r other oifice-bearer o f a regis

tered trad e u nion o f w hich he is a m em ber;
(b) any m em ber o f th e executive or o th er office-bearer o f a fede

ratio n o f tra d e u n io n s to w hich the tra d e u n io n referred to in clause
(a) is affiliated ;
(c) w here th e w o rk e r is n o t a m em b er o f any trade u n io n , by any

m em ber o f th e executive o r other office-bearer o f any tra d e u n io n
connected w ith , or b y any other w o rk m an em ployed in th e in d ustry in
w hich th e w o rk e r is em ployed and a u th o rised in such m an n er as m ay
be prescribed.
(2) A n em ployer w ho is a p a rty to a d ispute shall be en titled to

be represen ted in an y proceeding u n d er th is A ct b y—
(a) a n officer o f an association o f em ployers o f w hich h e is a

m em ber ;
(b) a n officer o f a fed eratio n o f associations o f em ployers to w hich

th e asso ciatio n referred to in clause (a) is affiliated ;
(c) w here the em ployer is n o t a m em ber o f any association o f

em ployers, by an officer o f any association o f em ployers connected with,
o r by any o th e r em p lo y er engaged in th e in d u stry in which the em ployer
is engaged a n d a u th o rise d in such m a n n e r as m ay b e prescribed.
(3) N o p a rty to a dispute shall be e n titled to be represented by a

legal p ra c titio n e r in any conciliation proceedings u n d er this A ct o r in
any proceedings b efo re a C o u rt,
(4) In any proceeding before a L a b o u r C o u rt, T rib u n al o r N a tio n a l

T ribun al, a party to a dispute m ay be rep resented by a leg al p ra c titio n e r
with the consent o f th e other p arties to th e proceeding an d w ith th e leave
of th e L ab o u r C o u rt, T rib u n a l O f N a tio n a l T rib u n al, as th e case n\ay
be....
N eith er th e A ct n o r Sec.36 provides fo r ap pearance o f th e p artie s

themselves w hen they are individuals o r com panies o r co rp o ra tio n s.
The T rib u n als a n d th e L ab o u r C o u rts being quasi-judicial au th o ritie s
dealing with rights affecting th e p arties can n o t adjudicate th e ir disputes
in absence o f the parties. It is, therefore, incum bent u p o n th e T rib u
nals and L a b o u r C ourts to afford reasonable o p p o rtu n ity to th e p artie s
to appear before th em a n d h e a r th em w hile adjudicating in d u stria l
disputes. T his position is in d isp u tab le. Section 36, th erefo re, is n o t
exhaustive in th e sense th a t besides th e persons specified th e re in there
can n o t be an y o th e r lawful m o d e o f ap p earance o f the p a rties as su ch ....
T he p arties, however, will have to conform to the c o n d itio n s laid

dow n in Section 36(4) in the m a tte r o f representation b y legal p ra c ti
tioners. B oth th e consent o f th e opposite p a rty and th e leave o f th e
T rib u n al will have to be secured to enable a p arty to seek re p re sen tatio n
before the T rib u n al th ro u g h a legal p ractitio n er qua legal p ra ctitio n e r.
This is th e clear significance o f Section 36 (4) o f the Act.
If, how ever, a legal p ractitio n er is appoined as a n officer o f a

com pany o r co rp o ratio n an d is in th e ir pay and u n d er th e ir co n tro l
and is n o t a practising advocate th e fact th a t he w as earlier a legal
practitio n er o r h as a legal degree will n o t stan d in th e w ay o f th e com
pany or the c o rp o ratio n being represented by him . Sim ilarly if a legal
practitio n e r is an officer o f an association o f em ployers o r o f a fede
ra tio n o f sucb associations, th e re is noth in g in Section 36(4) to p rev en t
him from appearing before th e T rib u n al u n d e r the provisions o f Section
36(2) o f th e A ct. A gain an office bearer o f a tra d e u n io n o r a
m em ber o f its executive, even though h e is a legal p ra c titio n e r,
will be entitled to represent th e w orkm en b efore the T rib u n a l u n d e r
Section 36(1) in th e form er capacity. T he legal p ra c titio n e r in th e
above tw o cases will appear in th e capacity o f an officer o f th e
association in th e case of a n em ployer an d in the capacity o f an office
bearer of th e u n io n in th e case o f w orkm en a n d n o t in th e capacity o f
a legal p ractitio n er. The fact th a t a p erso n is a legal p ra c titio n e r w ill
n o t affect th e position if the qualifications specified in Section 36(1) a n d
Section 36(2) are fulfilled by him .
ADJUDICATION 329
It m u st b e m ad e clear th a t th ere is n o scope fo r enquiry by th e

T rib u n al in to th e m otive fo r ap p o in tm en t o f such legal p ra ctitio n e rs as
office b earers o f th e tra d e unions o r as officers o f th e em ployers associ
ations. W h en law p ro v id es fo r a req u isite q ualification fo r exercising
a rig h t, fulfilm ent o f th e qualification in a given case w ill entitle th e p a rty
to be rep resen ted before th e T rib m ial b y su ch a p e rso n w ith th a t qualifica
tio n . H ow a n d u n d er w h at circum stances these qualifications have been
obtained w ill n o t be relev an t m atters fo r co n sid eratio n by the T rib u n a l
in considering an ap p lic a tio n for re p re se n ta tio n u n d er Section 36 (1)
and Section 36(2) o f th e A ct. Once th e qualifications un d er S ection
36(1) and Section 36(2) o f th e A ct are fulfilled p rio r to appearance
before T rib u n a ls, th e re is no need u nder th e law to pursue the m a tter in
order to find o u t w h e th e r th e ap p o in tm en ts are in circum vention o f
Section 36(4) o f th e A ct. M otive o f th e ap p o in tm en t cannot be m ade
an issue b efo re th e T rib u n a l....
The S o licito r G en eral contends th a t “ a n d ” in S ection 36(4) sh o u ld

be read as “ o r ” in w hich case refusal to co n sen t b y a p a rty w ould n o t be
decisive in th e m a tter. T h e T rib u n al will th en be able to decide in
each case b y a p a rty w o u ld n o t be decisive in th e m a tter. T he T rib u n a l
w ill th en b e able to decide in each case by exercising its judicial discre
tio n w hether leave, in a given case, sh o u ld be given to a p a rty to be re p re
sented by a law yer n o tw ith stan d in g th e o bjection o f th e o th e r p arty .
I t is p o in ted o u t by th e S o licito r G eneral th a t g reat hard sh ip w ill be
caused to p u b lic c o rp o ra tio n s if th e U n io n is given a ca rte blanche to
finally decide a b o u t th e m a tte r o f rep resen tatio n by refusing to accord
its consent to re p re se n ta tio n o f th e em ployer th ro u g h a legal p ra c titio
ner. I t is p o in te d o u t th a t public co rp o ra tio n s, a n d even G o v e rn
m ent ru n n in g a tra n s p o rt org an isatio n lik e th e S tate tra n sp o rt, c an n o t
be expected to b e m em bers o f any em ployer’s association. In th e ir
case Section 36(2) w ill b e o f n o avail. T o d en y th e m legal represen
tatio n w ould b e ta n ta m o u n t to denial o f reaso n ab le o p p o rtu n ity to
represent th e ir cases b efo re th e T rib u n al. It is su b m itted th a t since
such injustice o r h a rd sh ip can n o t be in te n d e d b y law the final w ord w ith
regard to re p re se n ta tio n b y legal p ractitio n ers before th e T rib u n al sfhould
rest w ith th e T rib u n a l an d th is will be effectively im plem ented i f th e
w ord “ an d ” in section 36(4) is read as “ o r” . T h is, it is said, w ill also
achieve th e o b je c t o f th e A c t in having a fa ir a d ju d ic atio n o f disputes.
W e h av e given an x io u s con sid eratio n to th e above subm ission. I t

is tru e th a t “ a n d ” in a p a rtic u la r context an d in view o f th e object a n d
p u rp o se o f a p a rtic u la r legislation m ay be re a d as “ o r” to give eiiect
to th e in te n t o f the legislature. H ow ever, h aving reg ard to the h isto ry
o f the p resen t legislation, recognition b y la w o f th e unequal strength o f
330 LABOUR LAW ANB LABOUR RELAHONS
the parties in adjudication proceedings before a T rib u n al, in te n tio n o f

the law being to discourage rep resen tatio n by legal p ra ctitio n ers as such,
and th e need for expeditious disposal o f cases, wc are un ab le to h o ld
th a t “ an d ” in Section 36 (4) can be read as “ o r” ,
C onsent o f the opposite p a rty is n o t an idle alternative b u t a ru lin g

factor in Section 36(4). T he q uestion o f hard ship, p o in te d o u t by the
Solicitor G eneral, is a m atter fo r th e legislature to deal w ith and it is
no t for the courts to invoke th e th eo ry o f injustice a n d o th e r conse
quences to choose a rath er strained in terp retatio n when th e language o f
Section 36 is clear and unam biguous.
Besides, it is also urged by th e a p p ellan t th a t u n d er Section 30 o f

the A dvocates A ct, 1961, every advocate shall be entitled “ as o f rig h t”
to practise in all courts an d before any trib u n al (Section 30 (i) a n d (ii).
This right conferred upon th e advocates by a later law will be p ro p erly
safeguarded by reading th e w ord “ a n d ” as “ o r” in Sec. 36 (4), says
counsel. W e do not fail to see som e difference in language in Section
30 (ii) from th e provision in Section 14 (l)(b ) o f the In d ia n B ar C o u n
cils A ct, 1926, relating to th e rig h t o f advocates to appear before courts
and tribunals. F o r exam ple, u n d er Section 14(l)(b) o f th e B ar C ouncils
A ct, an advocate shall be entitled as o f rig h t to practise save as otherw ise
provided b y o r und er any o th er law in any c o u rt (other th a n H igh C o u rt)
and trib u n al. T here is, how ever, no reference to “ any o th e r la w ” in
Section 30(ii) o f the A dvocates Act. T his need n o t detain us. W e
are inform ed th a t Section 30 h as n o t yet com e into force. Even o th e r
wise, we are n o t to be tram m elled by Section 30 o f the A dvocates A ct
fo r m ore th a n one reason. F irst, th e In d u strial D isputes A ct is a spe
cial piece o f legislation w ith th e avowed aim o f lab o u r w elfare and
represen tatio n before adjudicatory authorities therein has been specifi
cally provided for with a clear object in view. This special A ct will
prevail over the A dvocates A ct which is a general piece o f legislation
w ith regard to th e subject-m atter o f appearance o f law yers before all
co u rts, trib u u als an d other authorities. T he In d u strial D isp u tes A c t is
concerned with representation by legal practitioners u n d er c ertain co n
dition s only before the au thorities m entioned under the A c t....
Second, the m atter is n o t to be viewed fro m the p o in t o f view o f legal

practitioners b u t from th a t o f th e em ployer an d w orkm en w ho are the
prin cip al contestants in an industrial d ispute. I t is only w hen a p a rty
engages a legal practitioner as such th a t th e la tte r is e n ab le d to en ter
appearance before courts or tribunals. H ere, u nder the A ct, the restrictio n
is upon a p a rty as such and th e occasion to consider th e rig h t o f th e
legal p ractitio n er may n o t arise .,,.
ADJUDICATION 331
A law yer, s i i Y i p l i c i t e r ca n n o t appear before an la d u stria l T ribunal

w ithout th e con sen t o f the opposite p arty and leave o f the T rib u n al
m erely by v irtu e o f a pow er o f attorney executed by a p arty . A law yer
can ap p ear before the T ribunal in the capacity o f an office bearer o f a
registered tra d e u nion o r an oiBcer o f associations o f em ployers a n d no
consent o f th e o th er side and leave o f th e T ribunal will, th e n , be
necessary.
NOTE
C onsider th e follow ing recom m endations o f the N ational C om m i

ssion on L a b o u r ;
The p resen t arrangem ent for appo in tin g ad hoc industrial tribunals
should be discontinued. A n Ind u strial R elations C om m ission (IR C ) on
a perm anent basis sh o u ld be set up a t th e C entre an d one in each State
for settling ‘in te re st’ disputes. T he IR C will be an authority indepen
d en t o f th e executive.
T he N a tio n a l In d u stria l R elations C om m ission should be appointed

by the C e n tra l G overnm ent for industries fo r which th a t G overnm ent
is th e ap p ro p riate a u th o rity . T he N a tio n a l IR C w ould deal w ith such
disputes w hich involve questions o f n atio n al im portance or w hich are
likely to affect or in terest establishm ents situated in m ore th a n one
State. Its scope sh o u ld be broad ly th e same as th a t o f N atio n al T ri
bunals u n d er th e In d u stria l D isputes A ct, 1947.
Each S tate should have an In d u strial R elations Com m ission for

settlem ent o f d isputes fo r which th e State G overnm ent is the ap p ro
p ria te auth o rity .
The m a in fu nctions o f the N a tio n a l/S ta te IR C s will be (a) adjudi

cation in in d u strial d isputes, (b) conciliation, and (c) certification o f
u nions as rep resen tativ e unions.
T he C om m ission should be constitu ted w ith a person having pres

cribed ju d icial qualifications an d experience as its P resident and an equal
num ber o f ju d icial an d non-judicial m em bers; th e non-judicial m em bers
need not have qualifications to h o ld ju d icial p o sts, b u t should be o th er
wise em inent in the field o f industry, la b o u r o r m anagem ent. Judicial
m em bers o f th e N a tio n a l In d u strial R elations Com m ission, including
its President, should b e ap p o in ted fro m am ong persons w ho are eligible
fo r ap p o in tm en t as judges o f a H igh C o u rt.
332 LABOUR law and labour r e l a t io n s
The C onciliatioti W ing o f th e C om m ission will consist o f co n ciliatio n

officers w ith th e prescribed qualifications a n d status. T here w ill b e
persons w ith o r w ithout ju d icial qualifications in the cad re o f concilia
tors. Those who have ju d icial qualifications w ould be eligible for
appoin tm en t as ju d icial m em bers o f th e C om m ission a fte r th ey acq u ire
the necessary experience an d expertise. O thers could aspire for raem -
hership in th e non-judicial wing.
The fu nctions relating to certification o f unions will vest w ith a

separate w ing o f the N atio n al/S tate IR C .
T he C om m ission m ay provide a rb itra to rs fro m am o n g st its

m em bers/officers in case p arties agree to avail o f such services. T he
C om m ission m ay perm it its m em bers to serve as C h airm an o f C e n tra l/
S tate W age B oards/C om m ittees, if chosen b y the a p p ro p ria te G overn
m ent fo r such appointm ent.
A fter negotiations have failed a n d before notice of strik e/lo ck -o u t is

served, th e parties m ay agree to v o lu n tary a rb itratio n a n d th e C o m m i
ssion will help th e parties in choosing a m utually acceptable a rb itra to r.
A lternatively, either party m ay, durin g th e period covered by th e said
notice, ap p ro ach th e C om m ission for nam ing a conciliator w ith in the
C om m ission to help them in arriving a t a settlem ent.
In essential industries/services, w hen collective b a rg ain in g fails an d

w hen th e p arties to the dispute do n o t agree to arb itra tio n , either p a rty
shall notify th e IRC with a copy to th e ap p ro p riate G o v ern m en t, o f
th e failu ie o f negotiations w hereupon th e IR C shall adjudicate u p o n th e
dispute and its aw ard shall be final an d b in d in g upon the p arties.
I n th e case o f non-essential industries/services follow ing th e failure

o f negotiations a n d refusal b y th e p arties to avail o f volu n tary a rb itra
tio n , th e IR C after th e receipt o f n otice o f direct actio n (b u t du rin g
th e notice period) may offer to th e p arties its good offices fo r settlem ent.
A fter th e expiry o f th e notice perio d , if no settlem ent is reached, th e
parties will be free to reso rt to direct action. If direct actio n continues
fo r 30 days, it will be incum bent o n th e IR C to intervene a n d arran g e
fo r settlem ent o f th e dispute.
W hen a strike or lock-out com m ences, th e ap p ro p riate G o v ern m en t

m ay m ove th e Com m ission to call for th e term in atio n o f th e strik e/lo ck
o u t o n the g ro u n d th a t its co ntinuance m ay affect th e security o f th e
State, n atio n al econom y o r public o rd er an d if after hearing th e G o v ern
m en t and the parties concerned th e C om m ission is so satisfi,ed, it m ay,
fo r reasons to be recorded, call o n th e p arties to term inate th e strik e/
ADJUDICATION 333
lock-ou t a n d file th e ir statem en ts before it. T h e reu p o n th e C om m ission

shall ad ju d icate on th e dispute.
I t sh o u ld b e p ossible to arrange tra n sfe r o f cases fro m the N a tio n a l

IR C to th e S tate IR C a n d vice versa u n d er certain conditions.
(a) T h e C o m m issio n w ill have pow ers to decide to pay or w ithhold

paym ents fo r th e strik e /lo c k -o u t p e rio d im der certain circum stances,
(b) I f during th e p en d en cy o f th e strik e or th ereafter, th e em ployer
dism isses o r discharges an em ployee because h e h a s ta k e n p a rt in such
strike, it w o u ld a m o u n t to u n fa ir la b o u r practice, an d on p r o o f o f such
practice, th e em ployee w ill be entitled to rein statem en t w ith back w ages.
A ll collective agreem ents should be registered w ith th e IR C .
A n a w a rd m ade b y the IR C in resp ect o f a d isp u te raised by the

recognised u n io n sh o u ld b e binding o n all w orkers in th e establishm ent(s)
and th e em ployer(s).
(a) S ta n d in g L a b o u r C o u rts sh o u ld be c o n stitu ted in each State.

T he stren g th a n d lo c a tio n o f such courts w ill be decided by th e a p p ro
p riate G o v ern m en t, (b) M em bers o f th e L a b o u r C o u rt w ill be a p p o in
te d by G o v e rn m e n t o n th e reco m m en d atio n s o f th e H igh C o u rt.
G eneraly, th e G o v e rn m e n t should be able to choose from a p an el given
b y th e H ig h C o u rt in th e o rd er in w hich th e nam es are recom m ended.
(a) L a b o u r C o u rts will deal w ith d isputes relating t o rights and

obligatio n s, in te rp re ta tio n an d im p le m e n ta tio n o f aw ards an d claim s
arising o u t o f rig h ts a n d o b ligations u n d er th e relevant provisions o f
law o r agreem ents as w ell as disputes in reg ard to u n fa ir lab o u r practices
an d th e like, (b) L a b o u r C o u rts w ill th u s be th e C o u rts w here all
d isputes specified above w ill be trie d a n d th e ir decisions implem.ented.
Proceedings in stitu te d b y p arties asking fo r th e enforcem ent o f rig h ts
falling u n d e r th e afo resaid categories will be en tertain e d in th a t behalf.
A p p ro p ria te pow ers e n ab lin g th em to execute such claim s sh o u ld be
conferred o n th em .
A pp eals over th e decisions o f th e L a b o u r C o u rt in certain clearly

defined m atters m ay lie w ith th e H igh C o u rt w ithin w hose ju risd ictio n /
a rea th e C o u rt is located.
See R eport o f the N atio n a l Com m ission on Labour p p . xxiv-xxv.

(1969).
334 LABOUR LAW AND LABOUR RELATrONS
Payment o f full wages to w o rk m an p ending proceedings in higher

courts.
Section 17B of the In d u strial D isputes (A m en d m en t) A ct, 1982
provides ; W here in any case, a L a b o u r C o u rt, T rib u n a l o r N a tio n a l
T ribunal b y its aw ard directs rein statem ent o f a n y w o rk m a n and
the em ployer prefers an y proceedings against such aw ard in a H igh
C o u rt o r the Suprem e C o u rt, th e em ployer shall be liable to pay
such w o rk m an , d uring th e period o f pendency o f such proceedings
in the H igh C o urt or th e Suprem e C o u rt, full wages last d raw n by
him , inclusive o f any m ain ten an ce allow ance adm issible to him
und er any ru le if the w o rk m an h a d n o t been em ployed in any
establishm ent during such p erio d and an affidavit by such w o rk m an
had been filed to th a t effect in such C o u rt :
P rovided th a t where it is proved to th e satisfaction o f the H igh
C ourt o r th e Supreme C o u rt th a t such w orkm an had been em ployed
an d h a d been receiving ad eq u ate rem u n eratio n d u rin g any such
period or p a rt th ereo f, th e C o u rt sh all order th a t no wages shall
be payable under this section for such p erio d o r p a r t, as th e case
m ay be.
H E B E R T SO N S L T D . v. T H E IR W O R K M E N
Supreme Court, (1977) L ab . I. C. 162
[Excerpts from the ju d g m en t o f G osw am i J. follow :]

O n O ctober 18, 1973, th e co m pany entered into a m e m o ra n d u m o f
settlem ent w ith th e Bom bay G eneral K am g ar Sabha w hich was in subs
titu tio n o f th e aw ard which was pending appeal before th is C o u rt.
C opies o f th is settlem ent were forw arded to th e Secretary to th e G o v ern
m ent o f M ah a ra sh tra , In d u stries and L a b o u r D ep artm en t, th e C om m i
ssioner o f L a b o u r, the D ep u ty C om m issioner o f L abour, a n d th e C o n
ciliation Officer. K is com m on ground th a t th is is a settlem e n t u n d er
Sec. 18(1) o f th e In d ustrial D isputes A ct.
T he 3rd resp o n d en t applied to this C o u rt to be su b stitu ted in place
o f th e 2 nd respondent and th e o th er union. The 2nd resp o n d en t alone
resisted the application claim ing th a t it h ad still th e allegiance o f 50
w orkm en o f th e com pany. T his C o u rt allow ed the B o m b ay G en eral
K am g ar Sabha to be added as th e 3rd respondent.
W hen th e m atter w ent b ack , i t ap p ears th a t resp o n d en t N o .2 did
n o t lead any evidence before the T rib u n a l...T h e T rib u n al a fte r h earin g
th e parties in due course reco rd ed its findings on S eptem ber 9, 1975
a n d forw arded the sam e to th is C o u rt. T h e findings o f th e T rib u n a l
recorded are as follow s ;
ADJUDICATION 335
“ (1) R e sp o n d e n t 2 th e M u m b ai M a z d o o r Sablia has been able to

prove th a t th e D isp u te d Settlem ent is n o t valid an d binding on its
m em bers.
(2) T h e D isp u ted S ettlem en t is incom plete to th e extent m entioned
above.
(3) T h e schem e o f D .A . provided fo r in th e D isp u ted Settlem ent in
so far as it affects w o rk m en a t o r ju st abo v e th e subsistence level
is n o t fa ir, ju s t a n d reasonable.
(4) T h e re s t o f th e D isp u te d Settlem ent is fair, ju st and re a so n a b le .”
T h at is h o w this a p p e a l has com e up fo r h earing before u s....
W hen a recognised u n io n negotiates w ith an em ployer the w orkers

as individuals do n o t com e in to th e p ictu re. It is n o t necessary th a t
each in d iv id u al w o rk er sh o u ld know th e im p lications o f th e settlem ent
since a recognised u n io n , which is expected to p ro te c t the legitim ate
interests o f la b o u r, enters into a settlem ent in th e best interests o f
lab o u r. T h is w o u ld be the n o rm al ru le. W e c an n o t alto g eth er rule
o u t exceptional cases w here there m ay be allegations o f m a la fides, fra u d
o r even c o rru p tio n o r o th e r inducem ents. N o th in g o f th a t k in d has
been suggested ag ain st th e P resident o f the 3rd respondent in this case.
T h a t being th e p o sitio n , p rim a facie, this is a settlem ent in the course o f
collective b a rg a in in g a n d , therefore, is e n titled to due w eight an d
co n sid e ra tio n ....
Besides, th e settlem en t has to be considered in th e light o f the

conditions t h a t w ere in force a t the tim e o f the reference. It will n o t
be correct to ju d g e th e settlem ent m erely in th e light o f th e aw ard w hich
was pending appeal before this C o u rt. So fa r as th e parties are con
cerned there w ill alw ays be u n certain ty w ith reg ard to the resu lt o f th e
litigatio n in a c o u rt proceeding. W h en , th erefo re, negotiations tak e
place w hich h av e ro be encouraged, p a rtic u la rly betw een la b o u r and
em ployer in th e interest o f general peace a n d w ell-being, th ere is always
give an d ta k e . H aving re g a rd to th e n a tu re o f th e d isp u te, w hich was
raised as b ack as 1968, th e very fact o f th e existence o f a litigation w ith
regard to th e sam e m a tte r w hich was b o u n d to ta k e som e tim e m u st
have influenced b o th th e p arties to com e to som e settlem ent. The
settlem ent h a s to be ta k e n as a pack ag e deal a n d w hen la b o u r has
gained in th e m a tte r o f wages and if th e re is som e reduction in th e
m atte r o f d earness allow ance so far as th e aw ard is concerned, it ca n n o t
be said th a t th e settlem en t as a w hole is u n fa ir a n d u n ju s t...
T h e q u e stio n o f ad ju d icatio n has to be distinguished fro m a v o luntary

settlem ent. I t is tru e th a t this C o u rt h a s la id d o w n certain principles
w ith reg ard to th e fixation o f dearness allow ance a n d it m ay be even
show n th at if the ap peal is h eard the said principles have been correctly
follow ed in th e aw ard. T h a t, how ever, will be no answ er to th e p a rlie s
agreeing to a lesser am o u n t u n d e r certain given circum stances. By th e
settlem ent, la b o u r has scored in som e o th e r aspects and will save all
unnecessary expenses in uncertain litig atio n . T he settlem en t, th e re
fore can n o t be ju d g ed o n the to u ch sto n e o f the principles w hich are laid
dow n by this C o u rt for adjudication.
T here m ay be several facto rs th a t m ay influence parties to com e to

a settlem ent as a p h ased endeavour in th e course o f collective b a rg a in
ing. O nce cord iality is established betw een th e em ployer a n d la b o u r
m arriving a t a settlem ent w hich operates w ell fo r th e p e rio d th a t
it is in force, th ere is always a lik elih o o d o f fu rth e r advances in th e
shape o f im proved em olum ents by volu n tary settlem ent avoiding friction
an d unh ealth y litigation. This is th e quintessence o f settlem ent w hich
co u rts an d trib u n a ls should endeavour to encourage. It is in th a t spirit
th e settlem ent h as to be jud g ed an d n o t by th e y ard stick ad o p ted in
scrutinising a n aw ard in adjud icatio n . T h e T rib u n al fell in to a n e rro r
in invoking th e principles th a t sh o u ld govern in adjudicating a disp u te
regarding dearness allow ance in jud g in g w hether th e settlem ent w as ju s t
a n d fa ir....
I t is n o t possible to scan th e settlem ent in b its and pieces a n d h o ld

som e p arts g o o d and acceptable and others bad. U nless it can be
dem onstrated th a t th e objectionable p o rtio n is such th a t it com pletely
outw eighs all th e oth er advantages gained th e C ourt w ill b e slow to
h o ld a settlem ent as u n fair an d u njust. T h e settlem ent has to b e accep
te d or rejected as a whole a n d we are u n ab le to reject it as a w hole as
u n fair o r un ju st. Even before th is C o u rt th e 3rd respondent rep resen
tin g adm ittedly th e large m ajo rity o f th e w orkm en has sto o d by th is
settlem ent a n d th a t is a strong fa c to r w hich it is difficult to ignore.
A s stated elsewhere in th e ju d g m en t, we c a n n o t also be oblivious o f th e
fact th a t all w orkm en o f th e com pany have accepted th e settlem ent.
Besides, the p erio d o f settlem ent has since expired an d we are in fo rm e d
th a t th e em ployer an d the 3rd resp o n d en t are negotiating a n o th e r settle
m e n t w ith fu rth e r im provem ents. T hese factors, a p a rt fro m w h at h a s
b een stated above, an d th e need for in d u stria l peace an d h a rm o n y w hen
a u n io n backed by a large m ajority o f w orkm en has accepted a settlem ent
in th e course o f collective bargaining have im pelled us n o t to interfere
w ith th is settlem ent.
T h a t being th e position, we u p h o ld th e settlem ent as fa ir and ju s t

a n d order th a t the aw ard o f th e T rib u n a l shall be substituted by th e
settlem ent d ated O ctober 18, 1973. T he said settlem ent sh all be th e
su b stitu ted a w a rd ....
ADJUDICATION 337
T H E JH A G R A K H A N C O L L IE R IE S (P) L T D . v.
G .C . A G R A W A L , A .I.R . 1975 S.C. 171
[The J h a g ra k h a a C ollieries (P) L td . ow ned th ree collieries in

M ad h y a P rad esh . It em ployed over 4,200 w orkm en. T hree tra d e
u n io n s w ere fu n ctio n in g a t th e collieries viz., (1) M ad h y a P radesh K o y la
M azd o o r P a n c h a y a t (“ P a n c h a y a t”) (2) A zad K oyla S hram ik S ab h a
(Sabha) a n d (3) M a d h y a Pradesh C olliery W o rk e rs’ F ed eratio n .
(“ F e d e ra tio n ” ).
T he C e n tra l W age B oard for C o al M in in g In d u stry recom m ended
the p a y m e n t o f V ariab le D earness A llow ance, (V .D .A .) co rrelated
to th e co st o f living index prevailing fro m tim e to tim e. T he com p an y
accepted these reco m m en d atio n s. T h e u nions o f w orkers o p eratin g
in th e co m p a n y d em an d ed V .D .A . a t th e ra te o f R s. 1.47 p e r day
whereas th e c o m p an y refused to p a y m o re th a n R s. 1.11 per day.
T h ereu p o n th e F e d e ra tio n applied, u n d e r S. 33C (2) o f the I.D . A c t
to th e C e n tra l L a b o u r C o u rt cu m -In d u strial T rib u n a l Ja b a lp u r, fo r
determ in atio n o f th e ir claim . A n otice o f strike w as also served o n
th e com pany. M r. B. D . Sharm a, A ssistan t L a b o u r C om m issioner
acting u n d e r section 22 read w ith section 12 (1) o f th e In d u stria l
D isputes A ct, 1947 h eld conciliation proceedings in th e course o f w hich
besides o th e r m atters, th e m a tte r re la tin g to V .D .A . was settled
an d sent a copy o f th e settlem ent to the G o v ern m en t as req u ired
u n der section 12(3) o f th e A ct. S ubsequently, th e com pany filed a
supplem en try statem en t su b m ittin g th a t in view o f th e said settlem ent,
th e a p p lic a tio n filed b y th e “ F ederation.” u n d er section 33-C (2) o f th e
A ct h a d b eco m e in fru ctu o u s. T h e L a b o u r C o u rt fram ed th e ad d itio n a l
issue, nam ely; “ w hether th e claim stan d s settled by reaso n o f settlem en t
d ated 22-10.69, if any ?” A prelim inary issue w as raised by th e w orkers
in th e L a b o u r C o u rt th a t th e settlem ent w as n o t in accordance w ith th e
provisions o f th e A c t because th e conciliatio n officer was n o t duly
appoin ted . T h is p lea w as accepted b y th e L ab o u r C o u rt. A ccordingly
th e L a b o u r C o u rt h e ld th a t th e settlem en t d id a o t p u t an e n d to th e
dispute b e fo re th e L a b o u r C o u rt. T h e co m pany th e n m oved a w rit
p etitio n u n d e r A rts. 226 a n d 227 o f th e C o n stitu tio n w hich w as dism issed
by th e H ig h C o u rt. T h e re u p o n th e co m p an y appealed to th e Suprem e
C o u rt b y special leave. The m ain c o n te n tio n o f th e appellants w as :
“ (a)ssuraing th a t th e settlem ent in q u estio n w as n o t a settlem ent in th e
course o f co n c ilia tio n proceedings an d b in d in g u n d e r S. 18 (3) o f th e
A ct, i t was still a settlem en t binding o n th e w o rk m e n ........w hen 99 p e r
cent o f th e to ta l w o rk m e n h a d accepted th e term s o f the settlem ent, in
cluding V .D .A .” S a rk a ria J ., w ho delivered th e ju d g m en t o f th e
C o u rt rejected th e c o n ten tio n . E xcerpts fro m his ju d g m en t foUow :]
........Section 2 (p) o f th e A ct defines settlem ent to m ean—
“ a settlem ent arrived a t in the course o f conciliation proceedings

and includes a w ritten agreem ent betw een th e em ployer an d w orkm en
arrived at otherv/ise than in th e course o f conciliation proceedings w here
such agreem ent has been signed by the p arties th ereto in such m an n er as
m ay be prescribed and a copy th ereo f has been sent to (an officer a u th o
rised in this b eh alf by) the a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent and the co n ciliation
officer.”
A n analysis o f the above definition w ould show th a t it contem
plates only tw o k in d s o f settlem ents : (i) A settlem ent arrived a t in th e
course o f conciliation proceedings u n d er th e A ct and (ii) a w ritten
agreem ent betw een the em ployer a n d th e w orkm en arrived a t otherw ise
th a n in the course o f conciliation proceedings. B ut a w ritten agreem ent
o f the la tte r kind in order to fall w ithin th e definition m ust satisfy tw o
m ore conditio n s, nam ely ; (a) it m u st have been signed by th e parties
thereto in the prescribed m an n er, and (b) a copy th e re o f m ust have
been sent to th e authorities indicated in S. 2 (p).
T h e eifect o f a settlem ent o f the first k in d is indicated in sub-sec.

(3) and th a t o f th e second in sub-section (1) o f S. 18 o f the Act.
[The C o u rt, then reproduced section 18.]
...I t is clear from a p eru sal o f Section 18, th a t a settlem ent arrived
a t in th e course o f conciliation proceedings is binding not only on the
actual parties to th e in d u strial d isp u te b u t also o n th e heirs, successors
o r assigns o f th e em ployer on th e one h a n d , a n d all the w orkm en in the
establishm ent, p resent or future, o n th e o th er. In extending th e o p eratio n
o f such a settlem ent beyond th e parties th ereto , sub-section (3 ) o f the Sec
tio n d eparts from th e ordinary law o f c o n tra c t and gives effect to the
principle o f collective bargaining. T hus, had M r. B.D . S h a rm a been a
duly ap p o in ted C onciliation Officer, th e settlem ent arrived a t in the
conciliation proceedings, duly conducted by him under S. 12, w ould
have been binding on the entire body of th e w o rk e rs,.,a n d others w ho
are m em bers of the Sabha.
Since th e finding of the H igh C o u rt to th e effect th a t th e settlem ent

betw een th e P an ch ay at and th e m anagem ent c a n n o t be deem ed to be
settlem ent arrived at in the course o f conciliation proceedings u n d e r th e
A ct, now stands unassailed, th e aforesaid sub-section (3) c a n n o t be
invoked to m ake it binding on R espondents 4 to 173. T he question
rem ains : C an it be enforced against these R espondents by virtu e o f sub
section (1) o f the Section ? T h is fu rth e r n arro w s dow n in to th e issue :
were these respondents parties an d signatories to th e agreem ent betw een
th e m anagem ent a n d the P an ch ay at ? T he answ er to th is q u estion is
undoubtedly in the negative...
ADJUDICATION 339
W e have already noticed th a t according to the schem e o f Section 18,

read with Seel ion 2(d) an agreem ent, m ade otherw ise th a n in the course
o f conciliation p roceedings, to be a settlem ent w ithin the m eaning o f the
Act m ust be a w ritten agreem ent signed in th e m an n er prescribed by the
R ules fi-amed u n d er th e A ct. As rightly p o in ted o u t by Mr. R araa-
m urthy , le a rn e d C ounsel fo r th e R espondents an im plied agreem ent by
acquiescence, o r co n d u ct such as acceptance o f a benefit u n der an agree
m ent to w hich the w o rk er acquiescing o r accepting the benefit was n o t a
p a rt^ , being o u tsid e th e purview o f th e A ct, is n o t binding on such a
w orker e ith e r u n d er sub-section (1) o r u nder sub-section (3) o f S. 18.
It follow s, therefo re, th a t even if 99 per cent o f the w orkers have
im pliedly accepted th e agreem ent arrived a t on O ctober 22, 1969, by
draw ing V .D .A ., u n d e r it, it will n o t— w hatever its eflect u n d e r the
general law p u t an en d to th e dispute b efore th e L ab o u r C o u rt and m ake
it functus officio u n d er th e A c t...
NOTES
1. In W orkm en o f D elhi Cloth General M ills L td . v. The M anage

m ent o f D elh i Cloth and General M ills, L td ., A IR 1970 S.C. 1851 the
Suprem e C o u rt, th ro u g h D u a J ., observed a t p . 1856 :
W e d o n o t th in k th e M anag em en t a n d th e U n io n can w hen a

dispute is referred to th e C onciliation Officer, claim absolute free
dom o f c o n tra c t to arrive a t a settlem ent in all respects binding on
all w o rk m en , to w hich n o objection w hatsoever can ever be raised by
the w o rk m en feeling aggrieved. T h e question o f a valid and b in ding
settlem ent in such circum stances is, in o u r o p inion, governed by the
sta tu te a n d th e rules m ade th e re u n d e r.... [W ]e d o n o t th in k th a t
section 18(1) vests in th e M anag em en t an d the U nion unfettered
freedom to settle th e dispute as th ey please a n d clothes it w ith a
binding effect on all w orkm en o r even on all m em ber w orkm en o f
the U n io n . T h e settlem en t h a s to b e in com pliance w ith the
sta tu to ry provisions.
2. I n B rooke B o n d India L td . W orkm en (1981) 2 L . h J . 184 the

question aro se w hether th e office-bearers o f a tra d e u n ion can sign an
agreem ent w ith o u t th ere being specific au th o risatio n to do so eith er in
the c o n stitu tio n o f th e u n io n o r in th e resolution ad o p ted by the union.
T he Suprem e C o u rt answ ered it in th e negative a n d observed ;
It c a n n o t be d isp u ted th a t unless th e office bearers who signed

the agreem ent were authorised by th e executive com m ittee o f the
union to en ter into a settlem ent o r the co n stitu tio n o f th e u n io n

co n tain ed a provision th a t one o r m o re o f its m em bers w ould be
com petent to settle a dispute w ith the m anagem ent, n o agreem ent
betw een any office b earer o f th e u nion an d th e m an ag em en t can be
called a settlem ent as defined in S. 2 (p).
T he C o u rt affirm ed th e follow ing observ atio n s m ade by th e D elh i H igh
C o u rt in H industan Housing F actory L td . v. H industan H ousing Factory
E m ployees' Union (1969) L ab. I C. 1450 :
...T h e language o f S. 18(1^ clearly show s th a t the settlem ent will be
binding only “ on th e p arties to ag reem en t.” The definition o f
“ settlem en t” in S. 2(p) o f th e A ct also states th a t “ se ttle m e n t”
m eans a settlem ent arrived at “ betw een th e em ployer a n d th e w o rk
m en .” So, norm ally in o rd er th a t a settlem ent betw een th e em ployer
a n d the w orkm en m ay be binding on them , it has to b e arrived at
by agreem ent between th e em ployer a n d the w orkm en. W here
the w orkm en are represented by a recognised u n io n , th e settelem ent
m ay be arriv ed at betw een th e em ployer a n d the u nion. I f th e re is a
recognised union o f the w orkm en an d th e co n stitution o f th e im ion
provides th a t any o f its office-bearers can e n te r into a settlem en t w ith
th e M anagem ent on b eh alf o f th e u n io n and its m em bers a settle
m ent m ay be arrived at betw een th e em ployer and such officebearer
o r bearers. But, where th e co n stitu tio n does n o t so p rovide specifi
cally, th e office-bearer or b earers w ho w ish to enter in to a settle
m en t w ith th e em ployer should have th e necessary a u th o risa tio n by
th e executive com m ittee o f th e u n io n o r by the w o rk m en ....
A nd held th a t “ where a settlem ent is alleged to have been arrived at
betw een an em ployer an d one o r m ore office-bearers o f th e u n io n , a n d
th e auth o rity o f th e office-bearers w ho signed th e M em orandum o f settle
m ent to enter in to th e settlem ent is challenged or disputed, th e said
a u th o rity or au th o risatio n o f the office-bearers who signed th e M em c^
ra n d u m of settlem ent has to be established as a fact, and it is n o t enough
if the em ployer m erely p oints o u t an d relies upon th e fact th a t th e
M em o ran d u m o f settlem ent w as signed b y one or m ore o f th e office
bearers o f th e u n io n ” .
In our opinion the above extract from th e judgm ent o f th e D elhi
H ig h C o u rt states correctly th e law o n th e p o in t.
S H U K L A M A N SETA IN D U S T R IE S PV T. L T D . v.
THE W ORKM EN
A IR 1977 S.C . 2246
[The m anagem ent arrived a t a settlem ent w ith their w orkm en on
Ju ly 6, 1970 which was to rem ain in force fo r th re e years i.e. till 5 th July
1973. O a M ay 6, 1973, th e w orkm en th ro u g h th e ir union gave no tice
ADJUDICATION 341
to the em ployer term in atin g th e settlem ent after the expiry o f the period
o f two m o n th s fro m th e d a te o f notice. T hereafter th e w orkm en raised
some dem ands on 1st A u g u st 1973 an d th e State G overnm ent referred
th e dispute to th e In d u stria l tribunal. T h e em ployer, to o k the stan d
before the T rib u n a l th a t th e reference was incom petent and invalid as th ere
was n o legal a n d valid te rm in a tio n o f th e settlem ent in accordance w ith
clause (2) o f Section 19. This prelim in ary o b jection being over-ruled
b y the trib u n a l, th e em ployer cam e to Suprem e C o u rt by special leave.
E xcerpts fro m th e ju d g em en t o f the C o u rt delivered dy G osw am i J.
follow :]
T he sh o rt b u t im p o rta n t question w hich arises for decision in this

appeal by special leave tu rn s on th e in te rp re ta tio n o f Section 19(2) o f
th e In d u strial D isp u tes A c t, 1947 (briefly th e A ct). D oes law req u ire
th a t notice o f te rm in a tio n under Sec. 19(2) h as to be given only after the
date o f expiry o f a settlem ent ? T hat is th e q uestion. W e are inform ed
th a t there is n o direct a u th o rity o f this C o u rt o n this p o in t....
[The C o u rt th en rep roduced sections 19 and 2(p)]. There is no

dispute th a t th e settlem ent in question com es w ithin the purview o f
Section 2(p) o f th e A ct.
U n d er th e provisions o f Section 19(2) it is clear th a t a settlem ent

shall b e b in d in g fo r such p erio d as is agreed u p o n b y th e parties a n d if
there is no p e rio d m en tio n ed in th e agreem ent, fo r a perio d o f six m onths
from th e d ate o n w hich th e settlem ent is signed by th e parties. W ith
regard to th e p erio d o f o peration o f th e settlem ent, Section 19(2)
confers a sta tu to ry c o n tin u ity o f the settlem ent even after the expiry o f
th e period agreed u p o n u n til the expiry o f tw o m onths from the date on
which a w ritten n otice o f th e in ten tio n to term in ate the settlem ent is
given by one p a rty to th e other. It is, therefo re, clear th a t w hen a period
is fixed in a settlem en t th e settlem ent rem ains in op eratio n fo r th e entire
p eriod and also th ereafter until one or th e o ther p a rty gives w ritten
intim atio n o f th e in te n tio n to term inate th e settlem ent and u n til expiry
o f two m o n th s fro m th e d ate o f such in tim atio n .
T he object o f th e above provision u n d e r Section 19(2) is to ensure

th a t once a settlem ent is arrived a t th ere prevails peace, accord a n d
cordiality b etw een th e p a rtie s during th e p e rio d agreed u p o n and if th e
settlem ent does n o t require to be altered fo r som e reason o r the o th er
th e sam e clim ate prevails by extension o f th e settlem ent by operation o f
law . Section 19 is n o t a d ead end freezing all m anner o f aspirations o f
la b o u r or even, m ay be, som etim es, h a rd sh ip suffered b y the em ployer
o n account o f a settlem ent. T here is an o p tio n given to either p a rty
to term inate th e settlem ent by a w ritten in tim ation after the expiry o f
tw o moiUhs from the date o f such notice. T his is in a cc o rd w ith the

policy o f settlem ent o f industrial d isputes which is the p rin cip al object
underlying the provisions o f the Act.
Settlem ents between em ployers an d w orkm en, if n o t duly te rm i

n ated, will operate as inviolable conditions o f service o f w orkm en. Such
settlem ents are only step-ups in la b o u r’s progressive ascent to th e goal
o f th e ir u ltim ate ideal, nam ely, a living w age with re alisatio n o f o ther
aspirations including p artn ersh ip with em ployer. How so o n th a t goal
will be reached will depend xipon so m any factors and o th e r im p o n d era
bles in th e process o f the n a tio n ’s achievem ent, w ith co -o p e ratio n from
all sectors, public and priv ate, but each p a rty being alw ays alive to the
larger n atio n al interest w hich includes th riv in g o f the in d u stry o f w hich
lab o u r is an integral part.
T he policy o f the Act is to b an ag itatio n s over the m a tte rs covered

by a settlem ent or by an aw ard d u rin g th e period specified u n d e r
Section 19(2) an d Section 19(6) respectively. To avoid u n c erta in ty and
speculation Section 19 prescribes term in u s ad qu o a n d a te rm in u s ad
quem . I f in a settlem ent th ere is no tim e lim it agreed u p o n betw een the
parties th e p erio d o f o p eratio n is a space o f six m onths fro m th e d a te o f
signing o f th e settlem ent an d will also last u n til the expiry o f tw o m o n th s
from the date o f receipt o f th e notice o f term in ation o f th e settlem ent.
If the period is fixed it com m ences from the d ate as specified in th e settle
m ent and will theoretically end as agreed u p o n b u t shall co n tin u e to
operate under the law u n til th e expiry o f th e requisite perio d o f tw o
m onths by a clear w ritten notice.
A n aw ard u n d er Section 19 (3) o f th e A ct has a lo n g er perio d o f

op eratio n , to sta rt w ith, nam ely, one year from the d ate o f th e com
m encem ent o f th e aw ard, w hich is on th e expiry o f 30 days from the
date o f p u b licatio n o f the aw ard by the a p p ro p ria te G o v ernm ent. A s in
the case o f a settlem ent so also under Section 19(6) the aw ard continues
to operate governing the conditions o f service until the expiry o f tw o
m onth s from th e date of receipt o f notice o f term in atio n o f th e aw ard .
U n d e r th e tw o provisos to sub-section (3) o f Section 19 G o v e rn m e n t has
the option to reduce o r extend th e p e rio d o f operation o f a n aw ard. T h is
will b e, how ever, always subject to sub-section (5) o f Sec. 19.
N otice u nder Section 19(2) o r und er Section 19(6) is only for inti
m atio n of an in ten tio n to term in ate a settlem ent or a n aw ard respec
tively. There is no legal im pedim ent to give advance in tim a tio n o f the
aforesaid in ten tio n provided th e contractual o r statutory p e rio d o f settle
m ent is n o t thereby affected or c u rtailed ....
ADJUDICATION 343
I t is only i f a notice u n d er Section 19(2) o r 19(6) expires w ithin the

perio d o f o p e ra tio n o f th e aw ard o r settlem ent, s-uch a notice w ill be
invalid u nder th e law . In th a t even the settlem ent o r the aw ard will
continue to be in o p e ra tio n an d any reference by G overnm ent o f a,
dispute d u rin g th e p erio d o f settlem ent o r an aw ard w ithout the sam e
being te rm in a te d u nder th e law will be invalid.
In the in s ta n t case th e n otice u n d er Section 19(2) was given in tim at

ing the in te n tio n o f th e w orkers to term in ate th e aw ard o n a date w hen
th e agreed p e rio d w ould also expire. T o rep eat, th ere is no legal b a r to
give advance in tim a tio n a b o u t th e in te n tio n to te rm in ate th e settlem ent
o n th e ex p iry o f th e agreed p erio d an d to sta rt n egotiation fo r a m o re
favourable settlem en t im m ediately th ereafter. T h e only condition th a t
has to be fulfilled by such a notice is th a t th e p erio d o f tw o m onths from
the d ate o f n o tice m ust en d on th e expiry o f the settlem ent an d n o t
before it. In a given case it m ay b e even advantageous to the parties
who d o n o t w an t to c o n tin u e th e settlem ent to strike a new bargain w ith
o u t loss o f tim e so th a t unnecessary bickerings and resu ltan t in d u strial
unrest do n o t tak e place. In an in d u strial m a tter we are n o t prep ared
to subject a n o tice u n d e r Section 19(2) t o th e irksom e vagaries o r ty ran n y
o f technicalities o f a n o tice u n d er Section 106 o f the T ran sfer o f P ro p e rty
A c t.,..
W O R K M E N O F -B A L M E R L A W R JE A N D C O ., LTD . v.
B A L M E R L A W R IE A N D C O ., L T D .
Suprem e Court, (1964) I L .L J . 380
[A n in d u stria l dispute arose betw een th e co m p an y and its em ployees

over grades an d scales o f p a y , an d som e o th er m atters. The G overnm ent
o f W est B engal referred th e dispute to th e in d u stria l trib u n al. T h e
trib u n a l rejected the claim for a gen eral increase in the scales o f p ay ,
on the g ro u n d th a t the em ployees did n o t prove any m aterial change in
th e relev an t circum stances. T h e grades h a d b een fixed by a n aw ard in
1949, a revision had been m ade in 1952, an d a n o th e r in 1955. T hese
revisions m odified th e m axim um wages p a y a b le to th e em ployees in th e
different g rad es, b u t did n o t change th e m inim um . T h e trib u n a l m ad e
a n ad hoc a d d itio n o f R s. 10 to m inim um m o n th ly wage in each grade.
T h e w orkers a rg u ed th a t they w ere entitled to a general revision because
in th e m ean tim e fo u r com parable concerns in the region h a d revised
th eir w age-scale by agreem ent. T he trib u n a l rejected this plea. T he
em ployees th e n ap pealed to th e S uprem e C o u rt b y special leave. T h e
relev an t excerpts from th e ju d g m en t o f G a je n d rag a d k ar J., in regard to
res judicata fo llo w ;]
While dealing w ith th e question a b o u t th e revision o f w age-scales, it

is necessary to rem em ber th a t th e technical co n sid erations o f res ju d ica ta
should n o t be allow ed to h a m p e r the discretion o f in d u strial adju d icatio n .
It is u n d o u b ted ly true th a t wage scales a re devised a n d w age-slructures
constructed as m atters o f long-term policy, an d so, in d u stria l ad ju d ica
tion would n atu rally be relu c ta n t to interfere w ith th e w age-structures
w ithout ju stification or in a light-h earted m an n er. W hen a w age-struc-
ture is fram ed, all relevant factors are ta k e n in to account a n d norm ally
it should rem ain in o p eratio n for a fairly long p erio d ; b u t it w ould be
unreasonable to introduce consid eratio n s o f res jud icata as such, because
for various reasons which constitute th e special ch aracteristics o f in d u s
tria l adjudication th e said technical considerations w ould b e inadm issi
ble. As th e L ab o u r A ppeallate T rib u n a l itself h as observed, th e
principle o f g rad u al advance tow ards th e living wage, w hich in d u strial
ad judicatio n can never ignore, itself co n stitu tes such a special featu re o f
in d u strial adjudication th a t it renders th e ap p licatio n o f the technical
rule o f res judicata singularly in ap p ro p riate. I f the p ay in g capacity o f
the em ployer increases or th e cost o f living shows an u p w a rd tre n d , o r
there are other anom alies, m istakes o r erro rs in the a w a rd fixing wage-
structure, o r th e re has been a rise in th e w age-structure in co m p arab le
industries in th e region, in d u strial em ployees w ould be ju stified in m ak
ing a claim fo r th e re-exam ination o f th e w age-structure a n d if such a
claim is referred for in d u strial ad ju d icatio n , th e a d ju d ic ato r w ould n o t
norm ally be justified in rejecting it solely on th e g ro u n d s th a t enough
tim e has n o t passed after th e m aking o f th e aw ard, or th a t m a terial
change in relevant circum stances h as n o t been proved. It is, o f course
n o t possible to lay dow n any h a rd a n d fast rule in th e m a tte r. T he
question as to revision m u st be exam ined o n the m erits in each in dividual
case th a t is b ro u g h t before an ad ju d icato r fo r his adjudication.
Besides, it is necessary to em phasise th a t in dealing w ith th e co m p a

rable ch aracter o f industrial undertakings, industrial ad ju d ic a tio n does
n o t usually rely on oral evidence alone. T h is q u estion is considered in
the light o f m aterial facts and circum stances w hich are generally proved
by docum entary evidence. W h a t is th e to tal capital invested by th e
concern, w hat is th e extent of its business, w hat is the o rd e r o f th e profits
m ade by the concern, w hat are th e dividends p a id , how m an y em ployees
are em ployed by th e concern, w hat is its standing in th e in d u stry to
which it belongs, these an d other m atters have to b e exam ined b y in dus
tria l adjudication in derterm ining the q uestion as to w h eth er one concern
is com parable w ith an o th er in the m a tte r o f fixing w ages. N ow , it is
obvious th a t these questions can n o t b e decided m erely o n th e interested
testim ony either o f the w orkm en, o r o f th e em ployer a n d his witnesses.
U nfortunately, the trib u n al h a s lo st sight o f this im p o rta n t feature.
ADJUDICATION 345
T herefore, we are satisfied th a t the trib u n a l w as in e rro r in refusing to

consider th e m erits o f th e a p p ellan ts’ claim in reg ard to th e m odification
and increase in th e w age-scales.
The re su lt is, th e aw ard rejecting th e a p p e lla n ts’ claim fo r m odifica

tion and revision o f wage-scales is set aside an d th e m a tte r is sent b a c k
to th e trib u n a l fo r d isp o sal o f this issue in acco rd ance w ith law. P arties
w ould be a t lib erty to lead ad d itio n al evidence in su p p o rt o f their respec
tive cases. T h e o rd er m ade by th e trib u n a l giving ad hoc increase o f
R s. 10 in th e in itia l salaries fixed for different grades is confirm ed. T he
o th er d irectio n s given b y th e aw ard in respect o f th e o th er claim s m ade
by th e a p p e lla n ts are also confirm ed. H av in g reg ard to the fa c t th a t
the app ellan ts have succeeded in respect o f th e re tirem en t age a n d th a t
an order o f rem an d h as been passed b y us in th e ir favour fo r a reconsi
deratio n o f th e ir claim as to revision o f th e w age-scales, we direct th a t
th e resp o n d e n t should p a y th e ap p ellan ts th e ir costs in th is C ourt.
B U R N A N D C O . L T D . v. T H E IR W O R K M E N
Suprem e Court, (1957) 1 L .L .J. 226
[In 1950, th e G o v e rn m e n t o f W est B engal referred a dispute over

w age scales betw een th e ap p ellan t co m p an y an d its w orkm en to a tr i
b u n al, M r. P a lit. H e gave an aw ard o n 12 Ju n e 1950. A fter one year,
an d on 12 Ju ly , 1951, th e em ployees’ u n io n gave no tice o f te rm in a tio n
o f th e aw ard u n d e r S ection 19 (6), a n d dem an d ed higher wages. T his
new dispute w as referred to an o th er trib u n a l, M r. B anerji, on 16 D ecem
b er 1952. M r. B anerji h e ld th a t th ere w as n o change o f circum stances
w arran tin g in terference w ith th e P a lit aw ard. O n appeal, the L a b o u r
A ppellate T rib u n a l reversed th e holding o f M r. B anerji a n d gave a n o th e r
aw ard. U n d e r special leave th e u n io n a n d th e c o m p an y appealed to
th e Suprem e C o u rt, o n dififerent issues. E xcerpts fro m th e ju d g m en t o f
V en k a ta ra m a A y y ar J ., reg ard in g p rin cip le o f res ju d ica ta follow ;]
I t is arg u ed fo r th e ap p e lla n t c o m p an y th a t th e A ppellate T rib u n a l

w as in e rro r in b ru sh in g aside th e aw ard o f S ri P a lit a n d in deciding the
m atte r afresh, as i f it aro se for th e first tim e fo r d eterm in atio n , th a t
w hen once a d isp u te is referred to a trib u n a l an d th a t results in an a d
ju d ic atio n , t h a t m u st b e ta k e n as b in d in g o n th e p a rtie s th ereto , unless
th ere was a change o f circum stances, a n d as n o n e such h a d been alleged
o r pro v ed , th e aw ard o f Sri P a lit sh o u ld h av e been accepted as indeed
it was by S ri B anerji, a n d th e decisions in th e A rm y a n d N avy Stores,
L td ., B om bay v. T h e ir w orkm en (1951-11 L .L .J. 31), a n d F o rd M o to r
C om pany o f In d ia , L td . v. T heir w orkm en (1951-11 L .L .J. 231) were cited
in supp o rt o f this contention. In th e in sta n t case, tiie L a b o u r A ppellate

T ribunal dism issed this argum ent w tih th e observation th a t th a t was “ a
rule o f prudence and n o t o f law .” If the T rib u n al m e an t b y this o b ser
vation th a t th e statute does n o t e n a c t th a t an aw ard sh o u ld n o t be
reopened except on th e g ro u n d o f change of circum stances, th a t
w ould be quite correct. B u t th a t is n o t decisive o f the q u e stio n , because
there is no provision in th e statu te prescribing when an d u n d er w h at
circum stances a n aw ard co u ld be reopened. Section 19 (4) a u th o
rises the G o v ern m en t to m ove th e trib u n a l for shortening th e perio d
during w hich the aw ard w ould operate, if “ there has been a m aterial
change in the circum stances on w hich it w as b ased.” B u t th is h as refe
rence to th e period o f one y ear fixed und er Section 19 (3) and if th a t
indicates anything, it is th at th a t would be th e proper g ro u n d on w hich
the aw ard could be reopened und er Section 19 (6), and th a t is w hat th e
learned A ttorney-G eneral contends. B ut we propose to consider the
question on th e footing th a t there is n o th in g in the sta tu te to indicate
the grounds on which an aw ard could be reopened. W h a t th e n is the
position ? A re we to hold th a t an aw ard given on a m atter in controversy
between the parties after full hearing ceases to have any force if either
o f them repudiates it under Section 19 (6), an d th a t the trib u n a l has no
option , when th e m atter is again referred to it for ad ju d icatio n , b u t to
proceed to try it de novo, traverse the entire ground once again, and
come to a fresh decision. T h a t w ould be co n trary to the w ell-recognised
principle th a t a decision once rendered by a com petent a u th o rity on a
m atte r in issue betw een the p arties after a full enquiry should n o t be
perm itted to be re-agitated. It is on this principle th a t th e rule o f res
jW rca/a enacted in Section 11 o f the Civil Procedure C ode is based.
T h a t section is, no doubt, in term s in applicable to the present m atter,
b u t th e principle underlying it, expressed in th e m axim interest rei publi-
cae-ut sit fin is litium is founded on sound public policy and is o f
universal application. (Vide B ro o m ’s Legal M axim s, 10th E d n ., p. 218).
“ T he rule o f res judicata is d ictated ,” observed Sir L aw rence Jen k in s,
C .J. in Sheoparsan Singh v. R am n an d an P rasad Singh (1916) IL R
43 Gal. 694 “ by a w isdom w hich is for all tim e.” A n d there are
g ood reasons why this principle should be applicable to decisions o f
in d u strial trib u n a ls also. L egislation regulating the re la tio n betw een
cap ital an d lab o u r has tw o objects in view. It seeks to ensure
to th e w orkm en who have n o t th e capacity to tre a t w ith c a p ita l on eq u al
term s, fair retu rn s for their lab o u r. I t also seeks to prevent disputes b et
ween em ployer a n d em ployees, so th a t p ro d u ctio n m ight n o t be adversely
affected an d the larger interests o f the society m ight not suffer. N ow , if
we are to h o ld th a t an adjudication loses its force w hen it is r e p u d i a t
ed u n d er Section 19 (6^ and th a t th e w hole controversy is a t large, th en
the result would be that far from reconciling them selves to th e aw ard
ADJUDICATION 347
and settling dow n to w ork it, either p a rty will tre a t it as a m ere stage in
the pro secu tio n o f a pro lo n g ed struggle, and fa r from bringing in d u strial
peace, th e aw ards w o u ld tu rn out to be b u t truces giving th e parties
b reathing tim e b efo re resum ing hostile actio n w ith renew ed vigour. O n
the oth er h a n d , if we are to-regard th e m as intended to have long term
operatio n an d a t the sam e time hold th a t they are liable to be m odified by
change in th e circum stances on which they were b ased, b o th the purposes
o f the legislatu re w ould be served. T h a t is th e view tak en by the trib u
nals, them selves in th e A rm y and N av y Stores, L td . B om bay v. T h eir
w orkm en (1951-11 L .L .J. 31), and F o rd M o to r C om pany o f In dia, L td.
V. T heir w o rk m en (1951-11 L .L .J . 2 3 l), an d we are o f opinion th a t they
lay down the correct p rin cip le, an d th a t th ere w ere no grounds fo r th e
A ppellate T rib u n a l fo r n o t follow ing th em .
L IF E IN S U R A N C E C O R P O R A T IO N O F IN D IA v. D .J. B A H A D U R
[1981] 1 S .C .R . 1083
[The w orkm en in pursu an ce o f settlem ents o f 1959, 1963, 1970 and 1972
betw een th e C o rp o ra tio n an d its em ployees w ere getting bonus. A s a
result o f a d isp u te in re g a rd to th e co n d itio n s o f service o f the em ployees
tw o settlem en ts were arriv ed a t betw een L .I.C . and its em ployees on the
24th Ja n u a ry , 1974 an d 6 th F e b ru a ry , 1974 in pursuance o f section 18
read w ith sectio n 2(p) o f th e In d u stria l D isp u tes A ct, 1947. O n 29th M ay
1976, the L ife In su ran ce C o rp o ra tio n (M o d ification o f Settlem ent) A ct,
1976 was enacted to ab o lish the efficacy o f th e rig h t o f bonus u n d er th e
tw o settlem ents o f 1974. B u t th e Suprem e C o u rt in M adan M ohan
Pathak v. Union o f In d ia [1978] 3 S .C .R . 334 declared it to be void as
offending A rtic le 31(2) o f the C o n stitu tio n a n d directed th e C o rp o ratio n
to pay th e b o n u s to class III an d IV em ployees as p e r 1974 settlem ent.
T hereupon th e C o rp o ra tio n on 3rd M arch 1978 issued to its w orkm en
a notice u n d e r section 19(2) o f th e In d u stria l D isputes A ct, 1947 de
claring its in te n tio n to te rm in a te th e settlem en t o n th e expiry o f th e
perio d o f tw o m o n th s follow ed by n otice u n d e r section 9A o f the I.D .A .
O n M ay 2 6 , 1978 th e C e n tra l G o v ern m en t issued a notification u n d er
section 44 o f th e Life In su ran ce C o rp o ra tio n A ct, nullifying and term i
n atin g th e settlem ent o f 1974. T he em ployees o f th e C o rp o ratio n
successfully challenged th e v alidity o f th e tw o notices issued by the
G overn m en t in the A lla h a b a d H igh C o u rt u n der A rticle 226 o f the
C on stitu tio n . T h e re u p o n th e C o rp o ra tio n filed an appeal before the
Suprem e C o u rt. W hile K rish n a Iyer, J. an d P a th a k , J. w rote seperately
th e m ajo rity ju d g m e n t, K o sh a l, J. gave th e dissenting opinion. E xcerpts
fro m th e ju d g m en ts p ertain in g to section 19 o f In d u stria l D isputes A ct
follow :]
P e r V .R . K rishna Iy er, J . :
Section 19 relates to th e p erio d o f o p eratio n o f settlem ents a n d

awards and here also it is clear th a t b o th settlem ents a n d aw ards, as is
evident from a reading o f s. 19(2) an d (6), stan d on the sam e footing.
Section 19 has a key ro le to play in th e life and d e ath o f aw ards

and settlem ents and so we m ay read th e text here to enable closer
com m en t....
The core q uestion th a t first falls fo r co nsideration is as to w hether

the Settlem ents o f 1974 are still in force. T here are th re e stages o r
phases w ith different legal effects in the life o f an aw ard or settlem ent.
T here is a specific period co n tractu ally o r sta tu to rily fixed as th e p erio d
o f operation. T hereafter, th e aw ard o r settlem ent does n o t becom e non
est b u t continues to be binding. T his is the second c h a p te r o f legal
efBcacy b u t qualitatively different as we will presently show . T h en
com es the la st phase. I f n otice o f in te n tio n to term inate is given u n d e r
s. 19 (2) or 19 (6) then the th ird stage opens where th e aw ard o r th e
settlem ent does survive a n d is in force betw een th e p arties as a c o n tra c t
which has superseded th e earlier c o n tra c t an d subsists u n til a new aw ard
o r negotiated settlem ent takes its place. L ike N a tu re , L aw ab h o rs a
vacuum an d even o n the notice o f te rm in a tio n u nder s. 19 (2) o r (6) th e
sequence and consequence c a n n o t be ju s t void b u t a co n tin u an c e o f th e
earlier term s, b u t w ith liberty to b o th sides to raise d isp u tes, neg o tiate
settlem ents or seek a reference an d aw ard. U n til such a new co n tra c t
o r aw ard replaces th e previous one, th e fo rm er settlem ent or aw ard will
regulate th e relations betw een th e p arties....
T h e law is lucid an d the justice m anifest on term in a tio n notice o r

notice o f change the award o r settlem ent does n o t perish b u t survives to
b in d u n til reincarnation, in any m odified form , in a fresh reg u latio n o f
conditions o f service by a settlem ent o r a w a rd ....
Once th e earlier contract is extinguished and fresh co n d itio n s o f

service are created by the aw ard or th e settlem ent, the inevitable conse
quence is th a t even though th e p erio d o f o p eratio n and th e sp a n o f b in d
in g force expire, on th e notice to term in ate th e contract being given, th e
said c o n tract continues to govern the relatio n s betw een th e p arties u n til
a new agreem ent by way o f settlem ent o r sta tu to ry c o n trac t by th e fo rce
o f an aw ard takes its place. I f notice h a d n o t been given, th e d o o r fo r
raisin g an industrial dispute an d fresh cond itions o f service w o u ld n o t
have been legally open, W ith action u n d er s. 9A, s. 19 (2) o r (6), the
d o o r is ajar for disputes being raised an d reso lv ed..,.
ADJUDICATION 349
T h e c ru cial question w hich dem ands an answ er before we settle the

issue is as to w hether th e L IC A ct is a special statute a n d the ID A c t a
general statu te so th a t th e la tte r pro ianto repeals o r prevails over the
earlier o n e ..,.
T h e decisive p o in t is as to w hether th e ID A ct can be displaced or

dism issed a s a gen eral sta tu te . I f it can b e an d if the L IC A ct is a
special statu te th e p ro p o sitio n contended fo r h y th e ap p ellan t th a t the
settlem ent d ep en d in g fo r its sustenance o n th e ID A ct can n o t h o ld good
ag ainst s. 11 a n d s. 49 o f th e L IC Act, re a d w ith Reg. 58 th e re u n d e r....
In determ in in g w h eth er a statu te is a special o r a general one, the

focus m ust b e o n the p rin cip al subject m a tte r plus th e p articu lar p e r
spective. F o r certain pu rp o ses, an A c t m ay be general and fo r certain
o th er p u rposes it m ay be special and we c a n n o t b lu r distinctions w hen
dealing w ith finer p o in ts o f law. In law , we have a cosm os o f relativity,
n o t absolutes— so to o in life. The ID A ct is a special statute devoted
w holly to in v estig atio n a n d settlem ent o f in d u stria l disputes w hich p ro
vides definitionally fo r th e n atu re o f in d u strial disputes com ing w ithin
its am bit. I t creates an in frastru ctu re fo r investigation in to , solution o f
a n d ad ju d ic a tio n upon in d u stria l disputes. It also provides the necessary
m achinery fo r en fo rcem en t o f aw ards a n d settlem ents. F ro m a lp h a to
om ega th e ID A ct h a s one special m ission— th e reso lu tio n o f in d u strial
disputes th ro u g h specialised agencies according to specialised procedures
a n d w ith special reference to th e w eaker categories o f em ployees com ing
w ithin the definition o f w orkm en. T h erefo re, w ith reference to in d u strial
disputes, betw een em ployers an d w o rk m en , th e ID A ct is a special
statu te, an d th e L IC A ct does n o t speak a t all w ith specific reference to
w orkm en. O n th e o th e r h a n d , its pow ers relate to th e general aspects
o f n a tio n a liz a tio n , o f m anag em en t w hen p riv ate businesses are n a tio n a
lised an d a p lu ra lity o f pro b lem s w hich, incidentally, involve tran sfer o f
service o f existing em ployees o f insurers. T h e w orkm en qua w orkm en
a n d in d u strial disputes betw een w o rk m en a n d th e em ployer as such,
a re bey o n d th e o rb it o f and have no specific o r special place in th e
schem e o f th e L IC A ct. A n d w henever th ere w as a dispute betw een
w orkm en a n d m an ag em en t the ID A ct m echanism w as resorted to.
W hat a re we co n fro n ted w ith in th e p re sen t case, so th a t I m ay

d eterm ine a s betw een th e tw o enactm ents w hich is th e special 7 T he only
subject w hich h a s led to th is litig atio n a n d w hich is th e b o n e o f co n ten
tio n betw een th e p arties is a n in d u strial d isp u te betw een th e C o rp o ra tio n
a n d its w o rk m en qua w o rk m en . I f we refuse to b e obfuscated by legal
ab ra ca d ab ra a n d see p la in ly w hat is so obvious, th e conclusion th a t flows,
in the w ake o f study I h av e m ade, is th a t vis a vis 'in d u strial d isputes’
at the term in atio n of the settlem ent as betw een the w o rk m en and the
C o rp o ratio n the ID A ct is a special legislation and the L IC A ct a general
legislation. Likewise, when com pen satio n on n a tio n a lisa tio n is the
question, th e L IC A ct is th e special statu te. A n a p p lic atio n o f th e
g en era lia maxim, as expounded by English text-books and decisions leaves
us in no d o u b t th a t th e ID A ct being special law , prevalis over the LIC
A ct w hich is b u t general law ....
P e r P a th a k , J . :
It is desirable to appreciate w hat is a settlem ent as u n d e rsto o d in

the In d u stria l D isp u tes Act. In essence, it is a c o n trac t betw een th e
em ployer and the w orkm en prescribing new term s and co n d itio n s o f
service. These constitue a variation o f existing term s a n d conditions.
As soon as th e settlem ent is concluded a n d becomes o perative, the
co n tract em bodied in it takes effect and th e existing terms a n d co n ditions
o f th e w orkm en are m odified accordingly. U nless there is som ething to
th e co n trary in a p articu lar te rm o r co n d itio n of th e settlem ent th e
em bodied co n tract endures indefinitely, contin u in g to govern th e relation
betw een the p arties in the future, subject o f course to subsequent a lte ra
tio n th ro u g h a fresh settlem ent, aw ard o r valid legislation. I have said
th a t th e tra n sa c tio n is a co n tra c t. B u t it is also so m ething m ore.
C onceptually, it is a “ settlem ent” . It concludes or “ settles” a dispute.
D ifferences w hich h ad arisen an d w ere threaten ing in d u strial peace a n d
harm o n y stan d resolved in term s o f a new co n tract. In o rd er th a t th e
new co n tract be afforded a chance o f being eifectively w orked o u t, a
m an d a te obliging th e parties to unreservedly com ply with it fo r a p erio d
o f tim e is desirable. It was m ad e “ binding” by th e sta tu te fo r such
period. Section 1 9 (2 ) was e n a c te d ....[T ]h e settlem ent, w as req u ired by
law to b in d th e parties for the tim e prescribed. Im m ediate re ag itatio n
in respect o f m atters covered by the settlem ent was banned. S ection
23 (c) p ro h ib ited strikes b y th e w orkm en in breach o f the c o n tra c t a n d
lo ck o u ts by th e em ployer in respect o f such m atters. A breach o f an y
term w as m ade punishable by s. 29. C ertainty in industrial relatio n s is
essential to industry, and a p eriod o f such certainty is ensured by
s. 19 (2). O n the expiry o f th e p e rio d prescribed in th e sub-section, th e
conceptual quality o f th e tran sactio n as a “ settlem ent” com es to an end.
T he b a n lifts. The parties are n o longer b o u n d to m aintain th e in d u strial
status quo in respect o f m atters covered by th e settlem ent. T h a y are a t
liberty to seek an alteration o f th e co n tra c t. B ut u n til altered, th e
c o n tra c t continues to govern th e relations betw een the parties in resp ect
o f the term s and. conditions o f service.
T he position seems com parable with w h at happens in th e case o f an
aw ard. Section 19 (3) and s, 19 (6) con tain sim ilar provisions. In th e
ADJUDICATION 351
case o f an a w a rd th is C o u rt has laid dow n in South Indian B ank L im ite d

V. A .R . Chacko th a t a fte r the period o f o p eratio n o f an aw ard has
expired, th e aw ard does n o t cease to be effective. It continues to be
binding on th e p arties, b y v irtu e o f S. 19 (6), until notice has been given
by one o f th e p arties o f the in ten tio n to te rm in a te it a n d tw o m o n th s have
elapsed fro m th e d ate o f such notice. T hereafter, “ it w ill continue to
have its effect as a c o n tra c t betw een th e parties th a t has been m ad e by
industrial a d ju d ic a tio n in place o f th e old c o n tra c t........, th e very p u rp o se
fo r w hich in d u strial ad ju dicatio n has been given th e peculiar a u th o rity
and right o f m aking new contracts betw een em ployers and w orkm en
m akes it reaso n ab le to th in k th a t even tho u g h the period o f operation
o f the aw ard a n d the p erio d fo r w hich it rem ains binding on the parties
m ay elapse—in respect o f b o th o f w hich special provisions have been
m ade u nder ss 23 a n d 29 respectively—m ay expire, th e new co ntract
w ould continue to govern the relations betw een th e parties till it is
displaced by a n o th e r c o n tra c t....”
P e r K oshal, J . :
[I]t cann ot be gain-said th a t the I.D . Act deals w ith th e adjudication

o r settlem ent o f disputes between an em ployer a n d his w orkm en and
w ould, therefore, be a special law 718-3-718 a n o th e r statu te which co ven
a larger fie ld a n d m ay th u s be considered “ g en eral” as com pared to it.
It cannot, how ever, be regarded as a special law in relation to all o ther
laws irrespective o f the subject-m atter d ealt w ith by them . In fact a law
m ay be special when considered in relation to an o th er piece o f legislation
b u t only a g en eral one vis-a-vis still a n o th e r....
“ Special a n d “ g en eral” used in this context are relative term s an d it

is the co ntent o f one statu te as compared to the other th a t will determ ine
which o f th e tw o it to be regarded as special in relatio n to the other.
Viewed in th is lig h t p ro p o sitio n (a) can n o t stan d scrutiny. T he I.D . A ct
w ould no d o u b t be a special A ct in relatio n to a law w hich makes p ro
vision for m a tte rs w ider th a n b u t inclusive o f those coyered by it, such
as the Ind ian C o n tra c t A ct as th a t is a law relating to contracts generally
(including th o se betw een a n ind ustrial em ployer and his w orkm en), b u t
it w ould lose th a t categorisation and m u st be reg arded as a general law
w hen its rival is show n to o perate in a field narrow er th a n its own. A nd
such a rival is th a t p a rt o f the L .I.C . A ct which deals w ith conditions o f
service o f th e em ployees o f the L .I.C .— a single ind ustrial undertaking
{of a special ty pe) as oppo sed to all others o f its k in d w hich fall w ithin
th e am b it o f th e I.D , Act. W here the com p etition is betw een these tw o
Acts, therefore, th e L .I.C . A ct m ust be regarded as a special law and (in
com parison thereto ) the I.D . A ct as a general law ....
In the present case the law intervenes to indicate how th e void w hich
obtains in th e 3rd p eriod shall b e filled an d , if it h as been so filled, th e re
is n o question o f its being filled in th e m a n n e r indicated iu C h a c W s case
wherein, as already pointed o u t, n o such law was available. T he ob ser
vations in th a t case m ust th u s be tak en to m ean th a t th e expired aw ard
w ould continue to govern th e p arties till it is displaced b y a n o th e r
co n tract o r by a relationship otherw ise substitu ted for it in accordance
with law ....
[/\]n o lh e r aspect o f th e sam e d istin ctio n ...co n sists o f th e circum

stance th a t w hile in Chacko's case th e em ployer was th e S outh
In d ia n B ank L td — a n o n -sta tu to ry b an k in g co m pany— th e em ployer
before us now is th e creation o f th e L .I.C . A ct itself an d th erefore a
statu to ry c o rp o ra tio n ....
NOTE
In th s R e p m t o f the N atio n a l Com m ission on Labour (1969) pages

225-226, it has been observed th a t “ The S tate G overnm ents have generally
recognised th e n eed for a change in wage policy. T he relativ e em phasis
w hich according to them is now in fav o u r o f la b o u r should be m odified
an d th e in terest of consum ers sh o u ld also be tak en in to a c c o u n t...
to brin g a b o u t a fair d istrib u tio n o f incom e a n d w ealth...... in d u strial
wages should n o t be o u t o f alignm ent w ith (a) p er cap ita n a tio n a l incom e,
(b) wages earn ed in the agriculture/cottage industries, (c) th e general level
o f earnings o f th e self-em ployed, an d (d) levels o f p ro d u c tiv ity ....”
T h e N a tio n a l L ab o u r C om m ission an d th e term s o f reference to

B hoothalingam C om m ittee have p o in ted o u t th e necessity o f a n a tio n al
policy of incom e, wages an d prices. W h eth er th e salaries p aid to the
petitioners are low o r high is n o t to be considered in th e v acuum or
absolutely. I t is to be considered in th e context o f the p e r c ap ita incom e
in th e co u n try an d th e average m o n th ly earnings o f th e em ployees in
other in d u stries....
T he d isto rtio n in th e n a tio n a l econom y referred to b y th e F in an ce

M inister in th e L o k S abha D ebates a n d b y the term s o f reference to
B hoothalingam C om m ittee vividly b ro u g h t o u t the unjustifiable disparities
in th e m onthly earnings o f th e em ployees o f th e C o rp o ra tio n as com pared
w ith m uch lesser earnings o f em ployees in th e o th er industries. T his was
an intolerable situation. T h e P arliam en t a n d th e G o v ern m en t w ere
n a tu ra lly concerned. I t is entirely in th e d o m ain o f public policy fo r the
P arliam en t a n d the G overnm ent to try to m odify these disparities. In
doing so it w ould be n a tu ra l th a t th e persons enjoying th e highest
m onth ly earnings should b e m ad e to lose p a rt o f th e m a n d p ersons
ADJUDICATION 353
suffering in th e low est m ontW ii earnings g ro u p s should be helped to raise

th e ir earn in g s....
M easures to reduce such d isp arities is to achieve th e very object o f

th e C o n stitu tio n and th e p h ilo so p h y u n d erly in g it. I t is a step to w ard s
egalitarian society. T h e N a tio n a l C om m ission o n la b o u r in its re p o rt
has also stressed the fact th a t th e interests o f the policy holders also
m ust be considered. Since th e beneiit o f th e increased business o f th e
C o rp o ra tio n h a s gone d isp ro p o rtio n a te ly to th e enhanced p ay m e n t o f
rem uneratio n to its em ployees as com p ared to th e enhancem ent o f bo nus
payable to th e policy h o ld ers, th e policy w hich is form ulated by the
P arliam en t a n d th e G o v ern m en t in this respect is n o t only unim peachable
b u t is positively p raisew o rth y ....
Since th e rig h t to receive bonus was n o t p ro p e rty the question o f its

acquisition by th e C o rp o ra tio n c o n tra ry to A rticle 31 (2) o f the C o n stitu
tio n does n o t arise. T he decision o f th e Suprem e C o u rt in M a d a n
M o h an P a th a k ’s case (supra) related to th e Class I II em ployees w hose
bonus was a term o f th e settlem ent arrived at u n d er section 18 o f the
In d u strial D isp u tes A ct. T h a t settlem ent was n o t like an o rd in ary
co n tract. "While th e c o n tra c t o f service in respect o f th e rem u n eratio n
betw een th e p etitio n ers an d th e C o rp o ra tio n co u ld be varied to the
disadvantage o f th e p eiitio n er b y th e C o rp o ra tio n a n d the G overnm ent
in exercise o f th e pow ers given to th e m by regulation 58 an d section
11 (2) o f th e A c t respectively, th e settlem ent betw een th e C o rp o ratio n
an d th e C lass I I I em ployees could n o t be varied. I t could o n ly be
term in ated in accordance w ith section 19 o f th e Indu strial D isputes A ct.
T his was w hy th e rig h t to bonus under th e settlem ent was regarded as
p ro p erty by th e Suprem e C o u rt an d A rticle 31 (2) was held to have been
contravened w h en the b o n u s to Class I I I em ployees w as ap p ro p riate d by
th e C o rp o ra tio n w ith o u t p aym ent of co m p en sation. T his decision has
n o ap p licatio n to C lass I Officers, th e c o n tra c t o f w hose rem u n e ratio n is
variable u n lik e th e settlem en t betw een th e C o rp o ra tio n a n d th e Class ITT
em ployees. T h is v ariab le c o n tra c t was v aried validly by th e C o rp o ratio n
an d hence A rtic le 31 (2) vi?as n o t attracted . [See C .N . Sharm a v. L .I.C ,
525 I.L .R . 1 (D el.) (1979) p e r D esh p an d e C.J.1
G R IE V A N C E P R O C E D U R E
P ro m p t redressal o f ind iv id u al grievances is essential fo r sustaining

g o o d la b o u r— m an ag em en t relations, a n d p ro m o tin g efBciency a t th e
p la n t level. A bsence o f m achinery fo r it leads to sm all grievances
developing in to collective disputes. T h e ty p e o f grievances we have in
m ind are those arising out o f co m p lain ts alTectiog one o r m ore individual
w orkers in respect o f th e ir con d itio n s o f w ork an d n o t disputes over
m atters o f general applicability to all. Till the en actm en t o f the In d u s
trial E m ploym ent (S tanding O rders) A ct 1946, the settlem en t o f day-to
day grievances o f w orkers did n o t receive m uch a tte n tio n in o u r legis
lative fram ew ork. The A ct has, how ever, lim ited applicability; it applies
only to those establishm ents em ploying hundred or m o re w orkers a n d
does not provide for b ip a rtite discussion or for p ro m p t redressal o f
grievances. W elfare officers ap p o in ted und er the F a cto ries A ct, 1948
are generally given th e task o f dealing w ith individual co m plaints o f
w orkers. Individual disputes relating to discharge, dism issal an d re tren ch
m ent can now be taken u p for relief u n d e r th e In d u strial D isp u tes A ct,
1947, after th e am endm ent to it in 1965.
But w hatever be the legal provision, bipartite arran g em en ts fo r

redressal o f grievances do exist over w ide areas o f organised em ploym ent,
though in unorganised sectors, lack o f procedure an d even lack o f fairness
in dealing w ith grievances is still the rule. Even in som e cases w here
the A ct is applicable, its im plem entation is rep o rted to be defective.
Instances were b ro u gh t to o u r n otice w here Standing O rders to be ad o p
ted in public sector units could n o t be settled because n e ith e r th e em p lo
yer n o r th e authorities had a clear idea as to who should certify them .
U nder th e Factories A ct, 1948, th e S tale G overnm ent h av e fram ed rules
requiring la b o u r welfare officers to ensure settlem ent o f grievances, b u t
this provision has not been h elp fu l because o f the d u a l ro le o f these
officers.
T he C ode o f D iscipline, am ong o th er things, lays dow n th a t the

m anagem ent and unions will establish, upon a m utually agreed basis, a
grievance procedure w hich will ensure speedy and fu ll investigation
leading to settlem ent. T he guiding principles, which w ere evolved u n der
the C ode for th is purpose, a n d the M odel G rievance P ro ced u re fo r
ad o ptio n by th e parties were settled in a trip a rtite com m ittee in 1958.
The principles and procedure are in co n fo rm ity w ith practices follow ed
in established units an d cover item s required by the law a n d even m ore.
T he proposed m achinery h as been m ade sim ple and ex peditious w ithin
the co nstraints which all such procedures a re subject to . Officers in th e
m anagem ent hierarchy, to be a p p ro ach ed by the w orkers a t diflerent
steps in th e procedure, have been specified. H ere also, as in th e case o f
efforts to p ro m o te the JM C s, full latitu d e is given to the p a rtie s to com e
together a n d m odify the procedure o n an agreed basis to su it the
requirem ents o f a particu lar unit.
The M odel Grievance P roced u re has successive tim e-bound steps,

each leading to the next in case o f lack o f satisfaction. U n d e r th e p ro -
ADJUDICATION 355
cedurc, an aggrieved em ployee w ould first p resen t his grievenance verbally

to a designated officer w ho w ould give a reply w ithin 48 hours. In case
the w orker is dissatisfied w ith th e decision o r fails to get an answ er w ithin
the stipulated tim e , he w ould, personally o r accom panied by his d e p a rt
m ental represen tativ e, present his grievance to th e head o f th e d e p a rt
m ent. I f th e d e p a rtm e n ta l head fails to give a decision w ithin three days
or if his d ecision is u n sa tisfa c to ry , th e aggrieved w orkers can seek relief
th ro u g h th e ‘G rievance C o m m ittee’ consisting o f nom inees o f m anagem ent
and w orkers. T his C o m m ittee would co m m unicate its recom m endations
to the m anager w ithin seven days o f th e grievance reaching if. I f the
reco m m en d atio n is n o t m ad e w ithin the stipulated tim e, reasons th erefo r
w ould be re co rd ed , a n d in case unan im o u s recom m endations are n o t
possible, th e relev an t p ap ers w ould be placed before the m anager for
decision. T h e m an ag er is expected to co m m u n icate his decision to the
w orkers w ithin three days. T he w orker w ould have a right to appeal to
the higher au th o rities fo r revision o f th e m an ag er’s decision. A ll such
appeals have to b e decided w ithin a week o f the w ork ers’ p etition. T he
w orker, if he so desires, could tak e a u n io n official w ith him for discussion
w ith the a p p e lla te a u th o rity . In case o f failu re to settle th e grievance
even at th is stage, th e unio n an d th e m anagem ent m ay refer it to
voluntary a rb itra tio n w ith in a week of receipt o f the m anagem ent’s final
decision.
A ll the steps in th e above procedure m ay n o t be used if the co m p lain t

is against th e d esignated officer a t the low est level o r in th e case o f any
grievance arisin g o u t o f dism issal or discharge o f a w orker. In the fo rm er
case, the w o rk er m ay skip th e first step and ap p ro ach th e next au th o rity ;
in the la tte r, th e appeal m ay be m ad e to th e dism issing a u th o rity o r any
higher a u th o rity designated by th e m anagem ent, w ithin a week from the
date o f dism issal o r discharge. T h ough th e grievance m achinery could
be availed o f b y an aggrieved w orker on. receipt o f an o rd er causing the
grievance, th e w o rk er’s ap p ro ach to the m achinery ipso fa c to does n o t
a ttra c t a sta y in the im p lem en tatio n o f th e orders o f m anagem ent. In
several in d u strial establishm ents, arrangem ents for a form al processing
o f w orkers’ grievances exist, b u t they d o n o t q u ite conform to the m odel
described above. I t is also n o t kn o w n to w h a t extent th e w orkers w ere
consulted in fram ing th e existing procedures. In all such cases, one has
to see w hat w o rk s in a given establishm ent; w hether th e pro ced u re in
o p eratio n h as a ll th e elem ents o f w hat co u ld be considered th e m odel is
an o th er m atter.
In the evidence b efore us, there is unanim ity on the need fo r a

statu to ry b ack in g for th e fo rm u la tio n o f an effective grievance procedure
w hich should be sim ple, flexible, less cum b ro u s, and m o re o r less on th e
lines o f the present M odel G rievance P ro ced u re. It should be tim e-b o u n d
and have a lim ited num ber o f steps, say, a p p ro a c h to th e supervisor, th en
to the d epartm ental head, a n d th ereafter a reference to th e ‘G rievance
C om m ittee’ consisting o f m anagem ent an d union representatives. It
should be m ade applicable to only those u n its which em ploy m ore th an
100 w orkers. Evidence also suggests th a t settlem ent o f a n individual
grievance should be p ro m p t an d quick in giving relief to th e w orker, as
it is n a tu ra l th a t d u rin g the p erio d o f suspense before getting th e decision
a w ork er ca n n o t w hole-heartedly devote his energies to w ork.
A grievance procedure, w hether fo rm al o r in fo rm al, sta tu to ry o r

voluntary, has to ensure th a t it gives a sense o f (i) satisfactio n to th e
individual w orker, (ii) reasonable exercise o f au thority to th e m anager
and (iii) p articip atio n to u nions. T h e in tro d u ctio n o f u n io n s in the
procedure is necessary, because ultim ately th e union will be answ erable
to m em bers. I t is also im p o rta n t th a t an y procedure, to b e effective,
should be sim ple and have a provision fo r a t least one ap p eal.
In view o f the varying size and n a tu re o f u nits, it m ay n o t be

desirable to be to o rigid a b o u t a stan d ard ised p ro ced u re. Som e
inform ality in the a p p ro ach m ay be req u ired in case o f sm all u n its, say
units em ploying less than 100 w orkers, because in them i t is easier b o th
for th e m anagem ent an d w orkers to have close contacts a n d p ersonal
approach. I t w ould, th erefore, be m ore a p p ro p riate to confine in tro d u c
tio n o f a fo rm a l procedure to units em ploying 100 or m o re w orkers. T he
In d ustrial E m ploym ent (S tanding O rders) A ct, 1946 sh o u ld have
provisions defining a grievance an d laying dow n a procedure fo r effecting
its settlem ent.
A basic ingredient of th e p rocedure sh o u ld be th a t th e to ta l Humber

o f steps involved should be lim ited; n o t m ore th a n fo u r are generally
envisaged even in th e largest units. A grievance pro ced u re sh o u ld
n o rm ally p ro v id e for three s te p s :
(a) ap p ro ach to the im m ediate superior;
(b) ap p eal to the departm ental head /m an ag er; and
(c) ap peal to the bipartite grievance com m ittee rep resenting m a n a
gem ent and the recognised union.
The constitution o f th e C om m ittee should have a p ro v isio n th a t in

case a u nanim ous decision is n o t possible, th e unsettled grievance m ay be
referred to an arb itrato r. A t the earlier stages, a w orker sh o u ld be free to
be presented by a co-w orker an d later b y an officer o f th e u n io n i f one
exists,
[See Report o f the N ational Commission on Labour pp. 347-49 (1969).]

ADJUDICATION 357
R E F E R E N C E O F C E R T A IN IN D IV ID U A L D IS P U T E S T O
G R IE V A N C E S E T T L E M E N T A U T H O R IT IE S
Section 9 C o f th e In d u strial D isp u tes (A m endm ent) A ct, 1982

w hich p rovides for reference o f certain indiv id u al disputes to G rievance
Settlem ent A u th o ritie s provides :
1. T h e em p lo y er in relatio n to every in d u strial establishm ent in

w hich fifty o r m o re w orkm en are em ployed or have been em ployed on
any day in th e preceding tw elve m o n th s, shall p ro vide for, in accordance
w ith th e rules m ade in th a t b e h a lf u n d e r th is A ct, a G rievance Settlem ent
A u th o rity fo r th e settlem ent o f in d u stria l disputes connected w ith an
individual w o rk m a n em ployed in th e establishm ent.
2. W here a n in d u stria l dispute co n n ected w ith an individual w ork

m an arises in an estab lish m en t referred to in sub-section (1), a w o rk m an
o r any tra d e u n io n o f w o rk m en o f w hich such w o rk m an is a m em ber,
refer, in such m an n er as m ay be prescribed such d isp u te to th e G rievance
Settlem ent A u th o rity p ro v id ed fo r by th e em ployer u n d er th a t sub-sec
tio n fo r settlem en t.
3. T h e G rievance S ettlem ent A u th o rity referred to in sub-sec

tio n (1) shall fo llo w such p rocedure a n d com plete its proceedings w ithin
such perio d as m a y be prescribed.
(4) N o reference sh a ll be m ade u n d e r C h a p ter I I I w ith respect to

any dispute referred to in this section unless such dispute has been
referred to th e G rievance Settlem ent A u th o rity concerned a n d the deci
sion o f th e G riev an ce S ettlem en t A u th o rity is n o t acceptable to an y o f
th e parties to th e dispute.
Code o f D iscipline
T he discipline to observe th e ‘rules o f th e gam e’ is an attitu d e o f

m ind an d requires, a p a rt from legislative sanctions, persuasion o n a
m o ral p lane. A tte m p ts b y pub lic a u th o ritie s to ap peal to finer senti
m ents an d to aro u se responsive attitu d e s are n o t unknow n. In our
context, c e rta in developm ents in th e y ears b efore th e Second Five Y ear
P lan , such as in ad eq u acy o f G overn m en tal m achinery fo r im plem enta
tio n , instances o f n o n -observance o f aw ards on th e side o f som e em p lo
yers, and in d iscip lin e am o n g w orkers, a ll c o n trib u te d to th e follow ing
statem ent in th e Second P la n :
“ W hile th e observance o f stricter discipline, b o th , o n the p a rt o f

la b o u r and m an ag em en t, is a m atter w hich c a n n o t be im posed by legis
latio n it h a s to b e achieved by organisatio n s o f em ployers and w orkers
by evolving suitable sanctions on th e ir o w n —som e steps, legislative o r

otherwise in case o f rank indiscipline req u ire to be th o u g h t o f ” .
The G overnm ent w hich wtis form ed in 1957 shifted th e em phasis

from legislation to v o lu n tary arrangem ents. T here w as clearly a need
for bringing hom e to the p a rtie s—G ov ern m en t, em ployers an d w orkers—
an awareness o f their o bligations u n d er la b o u r law s, as also to create
in them a n a ttitu d e o f w illing acceptance o f their responsibiJities a n d a
readiness to discharge them . It was in th is context th a t th e q u estion of
discipline in industry was discussed in the In d ian L a b o u r Conferences
and the C ode o f D iscipline, th e C ode lay in g dow n the rig h ts and o b liga
tions on all sides cam e to be form ally announced in Ju n e, 1958. In has
been accepted since by all industries in th e private secto r, except th e
bankin g an d the new spaper industries. T h e Code has also been accepted
by aU com panies an d co rp o ratio n s in the pub lic sector except th e p o rts
and docks, defence un dertakings and railw ays, in all o f w hich difficulties
arose because o f the provision in th e C ode allow ing reco g n itio n o f one
union only.
The C ode enjoins on p arties to refrain from tak in g u n ilate ra l action

in connection with any in d u strial m atter, to utilise the existing m achinery
for settlem ent o f disputes w ith th e u tm o st expedition, a n d to ab ju re
strikes and lock-outs w ith o u t n o tice an d w ith o ut exploring all avenues
o f settlem ent. It also discourages recourse to litigation a n d recom m ends
th a t disputes n o t m utually settled should be resolved th ro u g h voluntary
arb itratio n . T he em ployers are required to recognise th e m ajo rity union
in an establishm ent or industry an d set up a m utually agreed grievance
procedure. T h e w orkers arc n o t to re so rt to go-slow , cocrcion and
intim idation etc. U nfair la b o u r practices are to be given u p , w hether
on th e p a rt o f em ployers o r w orkers. B oth em ployers and un io n s are
required to tak e ap p ro p riate action a g ain st their officers a n d m em bers
fo u n d indulging in action against th e spirit o f the Code. T h e message
o f th e C ode gradually spread to organisatio n s other th a n those re p re
sented a t th e In d ia n L ab o u r C onference. T o som e extent, the official
pronouncem ents about th e Code also helped. Thus, in th e early years,
it was considered w orth giving the C ode a serious tria l. Its w orking
cam e u p fo r discussion in every trip a rtite forum as also in th e A n n u a l
R ep o rts o f th e M inistry o f L ab o u r a n d E m ploym ent. I t so o n becam e
an in stru m en t to which credit/d iscred it w as given for in d u stria l p ea ce/
conflict an d was perhaps conveniently used by em ployers a n d w orkers
to p o in t o u t th e shortcom ings o f th e o th e r side.
To m easure the success o r otherw ise o f th e C ode m erely w ith refe

rence to industrial peace, as has been attem pted in certain circles,
ADJUDICATION 359
appears to be in a p p ro p ria te . Peace or conflict is a com plex o f various

factors. T o state only o n e o f them w ould n o t be en o u g h in ju d g in g the
op eratio n o f th e C ode in its p ro p e r perspective. T o eulogise the C ode
fo r favo u rab le tren d s in in d u stria l relations or to condem n it as u n w o rk
able when th e la b o u r situ a tio n is difficult, is u n w arran ted . F actors like
m utual co n su ltatio n at different levels, developm ent o f sanctions—th o u g h
lim ited in th e ir o p e ra tio n — against m erabers/afB liates w ithin th e central
organisatio n s, occasional recognition g ra n te d to un io n s, and even less
occasional w ith d raw al o f cases iu th e law c o u rts w hich irk ed one side or
th e other, w ere exercising a w holesom e influence on industrial peace.
A t the sam e tim e , in flatio n ary price tren d s, the state o f unem ploym ent
and other irrita tio n s in th e econom ic system , as indeed th e unfav o u rab le
a ttitu d e o f som e em p lo y ers’ an d w o rkers’ organisations, h ad a n adverse
effect on in d u stria l h arm o n y , p articu larly in th e last few years. These
latter, acco rd in g to th e evidence before us, indicate a m easure o f failu re
o f all parties to ad h ere to tiie spirit o f th e Code.
It c a n n o t be denied th a t in th e early years, th e C ode focussed the

atten tio n o f th e parties p ro m in en tly on th eir obligations u n d er the v a ri
ous lab o u r laws an d en jo in ed on them a stric te r observance o f these and
other o b lig atio n s associated w ith w ork in an in d u strial environm ent.
T he fact th a t th e p a rtie s g o t tog eth er a n d openly accepted the need for
stricter adherence to c e rta in basic p ro p o sitio n s was in itself an achieve
m ent. W hen breach es w ere enq u ired into a n d openly discussed in
trip artite com m ittees or re p o rte d upon publicly, th e very process o f dis
cussions p ro d u c e d a restrain in g and sobering effect on th e parties, an d
instances o f gross v io latio n s o f law s an d rep u d iatio n o f responsibilities
declined. H ow ever, w ith th e passage o f tim e, th e attitu d e to th e C ode
changed an d no special a tte n tio n is now being paid to it. T he question
therefore is w h eth er th e C ode should b e revived.
The evidence before us suggests th a t the C ode has had a lim ited
success as also a lim ited use. The C o d e began acquiring ru st a n d the
p arties were n o n e to o eager to tak e it off; th ey developed an a ttitu d e of
indifference. A m o n g th e facto rs m en tio n ed as responsible for this are :
(i) the absence o f a genuine desire fo r an d lim ited su p p o rt to , self
im posed v o lu n ta ry re stra in ts on th e p a rt o f em p lo y ers’ an d w orkers’
organisatio n s, (ii) th e w orsening econom ic situ atio n which eroded the
real wage o f w orkers, (iii) th e inability o f som e em ployers to im plem ent
th e ir o b lig atio n s, (iv) a d isarray am ong la b o u r representatives d u e to
rivalries, (v) conflict betw een th e C ode a n d the Law , an d above all
(vi) the st'ate o f discipline in the body po litic. As reg ard s the future o f
th e C ode, th e evidence is overw helm ingly in fav o ur o f giving a legal form
to its im p o rta n t p rovisions regarding reco g n itio n o f unions, grievance
procedure, unfair labour practices, an d th e like. O ur conclusion, th e re

fore, is while th a t p art o f th e C ode w hich enjoins stricter observance o f
obligations an d responsibilities und er the various la b o u r laws m ay be
left to the norm al process o f im plem entation an d enforcem ent by th e
labour adm inistration m achinery, som e others need to be form alised
under law. T hese are ;
(1) R ecognition o f a union as bargaining agents;
(2) Setting up o f a grievance m achinery in an un d ertak in g ;
(3) P roh ib itio n of strike/lock-out w ithout notice;
(4) Penalties for unfair lab o u r practices; and
(5) P rovision o f voluntary a rb itratio n .
W ith the rem oval of these provisions from th e C ode to give them a
legal form , the Code will have n o useful function to perfo rm .
[See R eport o f the N ational Commission on Labour, pp. 345-47 (1969).]

Part IV - Settlement of Industrial Disputes (224-360) PDF

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SETTLEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES

T he W orks C om niittee w as intro d u ced into In d ia , fo r th e first tim e,

[The com pany p ro p o sed to in tro d u ce a ra tio n alisatio n schem e, to

1. Rule 39, Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957.

T h e u n io n raised an in d u strial dispute. T h ereafter th e com pany

L ang u ag e used by th e legislature m akes it clear th a t the W orks

[T]he w orks com m ittees are n o rm ally concerned w ith problem s

as their very n o m en clatu re indicates can n o t go bey o n d recom m en­

The fact th a t th e vyorkmen’s representatives on th e w orks com m ittee

]. C onsider th e follow ing recom m endations ■oF the N a tio n al

W e consider th a t th e effectiveness of these com m ittees will depend

Even at th e risk o f repeating th e obvious, we m ention a vital p o int

W e have recom m ended elsewhere com pulsory recognition o f unions

on th e w orks com m ittee. T h e recognised union sh o u ld be given

2. In B om bay Gas Company v. Their W orkm en, (1950) L .L J . 705

3. In E lgin M ills Co. L td . v. Su ti M ills M azdoor Union, Kanpur,

only if consideration o f the dispute fell within th e province o f the W orks

4. In M e ta l B o x Company o f India v. Their W orkm en, (1952)

In In d ia, th o u g h th e accent is on com pulsory adjudication, the

This technique has w orked well in m any in dustrialised countries. It

1. See P omander, Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in A ustralia OS (1959),

In In d ia, u n fo rtu n a te ly , conciliation h a s h a d no such rem arkable

A b o a rd o f con ciliatio n has been tu rn ed to where the issues were

e a p p ro p ria te G overnm ent m ay ap p o in t individual conciliation

A co n ciliatio n officer m ust investigate an d try to settle a dispute

H e can m eet th e representatives o f th e p arties jo in tly or separately.®

2. Section 12(5) o f the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

in form atio n from b o th sides lie can som etim es p ro p o se later, in a jo in t

R eports o f successful settlem ent, o r o f failure, have to be sent by

T h e conciliation officer’s rep o rt m u st be sent w ith in tw o w eeks o f the

C onciliation proceedings com m ence when th e conciliation officer re­

A conciliation officer can, o n n otice, enter an d inspect th e prem ises

O n receipt o f a failure rep o rt, th e a p p ro p ria te G o vern m en t m a y , i f

A settlem ent arriv ed at in the course o f conciliation proceedings is

D u rin g th e pendency o f conciliation proceedings th e em ployer can ­

D u rin g th e pendency o f conciliation proceedings in a dispute in a

The In d ustrial D ispute A ct, as noted above under conciliation, seeks

In order, perhaps, to help give effect to this preference section lOA

cases w here such a notification has been issued, th e a p p ro p ria te

D u rin g th e pendency o f a rb itra tio n proceedings th e em ployer is

(This decision involved three appeals from th e aw ards o f tw o a rb i­

A rticle 1 3 6 (1 )...provides th a t n o tw ith stan ding anything in this

F o r invoking A rt. 136(1) tw o conditions m ust be satisfied. The

A rticle 136(1) refers to a trib u n al in co n trad istin ctio n to a C ourt.

should be constituted by the State a n d he added th a t a trib u n al w ould

I t is now necessary to exam ine the scheme o f th e relevant provisions

C onsequent upon the ad d itio n o f th e section several changes were m ade in

o f m oney from an em ployer is applicable; an d S. 36A can also be invoked

O n th e o th er h a n d , th ere are certain o th er provisions w hich do n o t

R ules have been fram ed by th e C en tral G overnm ent a n d som e o f

Statut e and the rules fram ed thereunder. I t is in the light o f these p ro ­

The argum ent is th a t against an aw ard p ronounced by an a rb i­

I t m ay be conceded th a t having regard to several provisions c o n tain ­

th a t th e p o w er o f ad ju d icatio n which he is exercising is derived fro m th e

T h a t takes us to the construction o f Section 10-A. S. 10-A enables the

W e d o n o t th in k th a t th e section is capable o f this construction.

to ail industrial dispute apply in th e prescribed m anner fo r a reference

Section 18(2)* is also helpful in this m atter. It provides th a t

Section 10-A(5) m ay also be considered in this connection. I f th e

On b eh alf o f th e appellants, reliance has been placed on a recent

Amended by Act No, 36 of 1964, section 9. Eds.

the essential a ttrib u te s o f a sta tu to ry a rb itra tio n ■under Section 10 o f the

as their very n o m en clatu re indicates can n o t go bey o n d recom m en

C onciliation proceedings com m ence when th e conciliation officer re

D u rin g th e pendency o f conciliation proceedings th e em ployer can

(This decision involved three appeals from th e aw ards o f tw o a rb i

Statut e and the rules fram ed thereunder. I t is in the light o f these p ro

The argum ent is th a t against an aw ard p ronounced by an a rb i

I t m ay be conceded th a t having regard to several provisions c o n tain

C o m p etin g in terp retativ e angles h av e contended for Judicial accep

A ssum ing the above ap proach to be too creatively novel fo r tra d i

Section 2 o f th e Act specifically lays dow n th a t unless th ere is any