Top 10 Insights from Spark Consumption Desk
Top 10 Insights from Spark Consumption Desk
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SPARK CONSUMPTION DESK
10 Years, Top 10 Learnings
In one of the most acclaimed movies of our times – The Dark Knight, there is a legendary dialogue by Harvey Dent – “You either die a hero or live SPARK CONSUMPTION
long enough to see yourself become the villain”. The philosophy is applicable to many fields, but in our opinion, it resonates most with the world 23 July 2020
of investing. Come August, as SPARK CONSUMPTION DESK reaches the milestone of a decade of its existence, we ask the same question to
ourselves, on how to survive long enough and yet not turn into a villain.
Honestly, just in the sheer mood of reflection (and bugged by WFH) we started scribbling our top observations/learnings of the last decade as a 400
team. As a lot of these learnings have come from our clients, hence in the spirit of sharing, it is fair that the same, if documented, should be
shared back with the clients at large. 300
And as Jim Collins [Good to Great fame] says that for an academician or a teacher, his/her experiences are utter waste, if they can’t be shared with 200
the world at large. The same applies to relatively lowly learnings of SELL side analysts as well.
100
1. Personal Biases should be kept Personal – The worst part of being a consumer analyst is that everyone & their uncles will have opinions on
your sector and hence you’ll have to overcome a plethora of PERSONAL BIASES. And the most dangerous of all will be your own. Initially, we 0
missed many good stocks (footwear, FMCG etc.) because the consumer in us couldn’t align with the brand. But Indian consumer is way more Mar-10 Mar-14 Mar-18
plural and complicated to be fully defined by an analyst stuffed in his AC cubicle. Hence, looking at the aggregate number is the best way to
overcome the bias. BTW, on this point, a consumer analyst envies his Pharma counterpart the most, because it is easier for a layman to argue NSEFMCG NSECON
with a consumer analyst on Horlicks than a pharma analyst on Hydroxychloroquine. NIFTY
2. IPOs + Financial investor exits = Premature deliveries – As they say, IPO = It’s Perhaps Over-priced. Though we can’t generalize, but can
safely state from experience that in IPOs. one needs to bring his/her best analytical foot forward. The game isn’t designed fairly, and
information asymmetry can be perilous, mainly because of the limited cyclical history of the business. Though in the last decade, we have had
blockbuster IPOs in the sector like Avenue Supermart, V-Mart, etc., but as far as the total count goes, the scale is very much tilted in favour of
disappointing results. As per our read, the most unsuccessful consumption IPOs in the last decade were great developing stories but sub-scale
businesses. And pre-mature IPOs burdened the weak model further with heavy expectations.
3. Growth is a ‘Gangajal’ for most Corporate Governance Sins – Perhaps not true for other sectors, but largely true for consumption. The huge
gulf between a bad management and a visionary management can be bridged with maximum of 3-4 quarters of consistent growth and good RESEARCH ANALYSTS
guidance. Similarly, the journey works backwards as well. In consumption, market sensitivity to Corporate Governance concerns like Pledge
shares, Inter Corporate Deposits, Related Party transactions, etc. get active only during a bad growth phase and is forgotten during a good TEJASH SHAH
phase. Sometimes even a quarter of robust growth is good enough to jump the CG hump. Obviously, integrity violation of reported financials tejash@[Link]
is beyond any redemption. But for lower degree Corporate Governance issues – Growth is a time-tested vaccine. +91 22 6176 6802
4. Have Faith on your thesis and doubt your Faith – The worst phase of an analyst (or any practicing investor) is to stop questioning his/her MADHAV PVR
investment thesis. In the VUCA world, where business cycles are getting compressed and disrupted on a regular basis, having doubts on your madhav@[Link]
thesis helps to refine the thesis further. Hence, we frequently resort to our favourite INVERT THINKING framework, it has helped us to avoid +91 44 4344 0060
many (not all) mistakes. But, still sometimes we get carried away. SANTOSHKUMAR
santoshkumar@[Link]
+91 44 6660 3037
find SPARK RESEARCH on Bloomberg [RESP SPAK <go>] | FACTSET | REFINITIV EIKON Page 2
Spark Consumption Desk | 10 YEARS, TOP 10 LEARNINGS
5. Channel Check is a necessary Condition but not a Sufficient One – Philip Fisher popularised the tool of ‘Scuttlebutt’ AKA ‘Channel Checks’. It is a very powerful tool to neutralise
the management bias and get a 360* feedback on the business. But then channel checks can be one of the many tools but not the only one. Interestingly, both our top picks
(Paints, LOG, Footwear stock turnaround etc.) and top blunders (mainly in small cap retail) had a fair contribution of channel checks. Hence, it is a tool to be used with extra
sophistication. In our experience, sometimes two brothers in the same shop will have different outlooks on the same business. So, one needs to develop a robust filter to
separate biases from facts. If done rightly, Channel checks can be a fabulous tool to evaluate customer loyalty. And yes, channel checks should be avoided for Quarterly previews,
a very low strike rate.
6. All things being equal, back the most articulate management – Articulation of business strategy is an art and a rare one. And it can have a huge bearing on P/E a stock will
command. Let us elaborate with an example. Around 2014, 2 FMCG companies took price cuts in the same quarter. – in respective earning calls, one called it a “PRICE CUT” and
the other “Democratisation of Prices”. The former was accused of lack of pricing power, while the later was praised for reaching out to the mass consumers. On a serious note,
better articulation also signifies management’s clarity of thought, ability to think through complicated business problems and ability to write problem statements correctly. So no
doubt, execution is the key, but better articulation helps.
7. Wealth Destruction vs Value Destruction – The last 5 years of the decade have taught us this better than before. Though leverage is not a big concern for the sector, in some
cases, promoters’ ambitious bets in the personal domain weighed heavily on the listed companies. Hence, a lot of wealth destruction happened without much value destruction
in the business. Similarly, led by value migration, wealth destruction can start way before visible value destruction begins. Viz. TV Broadcasters, GT only oriented fashion brands,
newspapers, etc. As we look ahead, we see many such value migration led possible disruptions in the offing in the consumption space (Perhaps a separate note on that later).
8. Every price demands a narrative, sometimes “We don’t know” is the best one to offer – So, this one is our favourite. Throughout the last decade, a 10%+ monthly fall in a
particular paint company stock fuels the narrative that there is some turbulence in promoters’ families and at every 52-week high, it becomes a world class professionally
managed company. Similarly, in a packaged foods company, at every 10%+ correction, “CEO is resigning” becomes the favorite narrative to offer. We have learnt that, even at
the risk of sounding uninformed to clients, many times “I don’t know” is the best and honest answer one can offer.
9. Spreadsheets are overrated, Framework under rated – The initial urge to capture every moving part of the business in MS excel is tempting. But with experience the limitations
of the same starts surfacing. In our experience, our best ideas came from a comprehensive sector framework rather than the precision in forecasting next year’s EPS.
Spreadsheet is an imperative analytical tool to aid the process but relying solely on models to generate insights can generate faulty outcomes.
10. Corporate access, a double-edged sword – Meeting management is imperative, and can't be underemphasised. Especially in India, where the pilot is as important, if not more,
than the plane, at no point Management access can be underplayed. But purely from an objectivity angle, an overreach of the same has proved to be counterproductive. And
again, in our limited experience, we have realized that, most managements’ (there are exceptions) long term outlook is also vulnerable to get colored by current business
momentum. So like channel checks, we have learnt to utilize corporate access also with a lot of caution. Interestingly, on hindsight, we can assign our biggest mistakes to
corporate access overdose. At some passive level, it clouds thinking. Our best calls have come where we have restricted access largely to earning calls only.
Finally, it seems, the odds of winning in stock markets are not necessarily directly proportional to the years spent in markets. Market has humbled us more than often in the last
10 years and we don’t expect it to change materially in the coming 10 years. The only endeavor from our side will be not to repeat the causes of getting humbled.
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Spark Consumption Desk | 10 YEARS, TOP 10 LEARNINGS
Nifty FMCG Index outperformed broader market (NIFTY Index) by 2x over the last 10 years
FMCG 22%; CONSUMPTION 16%; NIFTY 10% FMCG 10%; CONSUMPTION 8%; NIFTY 5%
450
Continuation of
BJP government in FMCG
16%
May-19 10-yr CAGR*
400 Implementation of Currently at
GST in Jun-17 ~4% below
Rural slowdown peak level
impacting FMCG
350
Demonetisation performance
announcement in
Nov-16
CONSUMPTION
12%
300 10-yr CAGR*
BJP government
formed in May-14
Currently at
~8% below
250 peak level
NIFTY 8%
200 10-yr CAGR*
Currently at
~12% below
150 peak level
Source: Bloomberg, Spark Capital Research; *5-yr & 10-yr CAGR until 17th July 2020; NSECON refers to Nifty Consumption Index which includes Auto & other boarder consumption sectors
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Spark Consumption Desk | 10 YEARS, TOP 10 LEARNINGS
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Spark Consumption Desk | 10 YEARS, TOP 10 LEARNINGS
25%
23%
8%
8%
6% 5% 5%
3%
BRIT HUVR NEST MRCO DABUR ZYWL ITC JYL HMN BAJAJCON NIFTY BRGR PIDI APNT KNPL
Performance (10-yr CAGR) of Discretionary coverage; Smaller retail names (KHDM, KEKC) are the underperformers Stocks which got significantly impacted due to recent COVID-led
disruptions since Feb’20; 10-yr performance CAGR as of 31st Dec 2019
41% 40% 28%
34%
30%
23% 22% 20% 19%
10%
6% 6% 8%
0% 2%
16% 16%
ABFRL LOG RLXF VMART PAG BATA JUBI TTAN TRENT VIP ITFL KEKC WONH KHDM NIFTY 13%
9%
-51%
BATA VIP ITFL WONH NIFTY
Source: Bloomberg, Spark Capital Research; Note: 10-yr CAGR until 17th July 2020 & CAGR performance of BAJAJCON, ITFL, KHDM, VMART, WONH since respective listing
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Spark Consumption Desk | 10 YEARS, TOP 10 LEARNINGS
BUY Stock expected to provide positive returns of >15% over a 1-year horizon REDUCE Stock expected to provide returns of <5% – -10% over a 1-year horizon
Absolute Rating
Interpretation
ADD Stock expected to provide positive returns of >5% – <15% over a 1-year horizon SELL Stock expected to fall >10% over a 1-year horizon
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