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Executive Summary 4
The evolution of CVC is the history of boom and bust cycles. Corporations typically enter the corporate
venture capital market after the independent sector showed signs of success. All too often, however,
corporations overbuilt capacity without carefully thinking out the implications. This strategy invariably leads
to retrenchment. As a result, we have been in the fourth cycle since 2000 globally.
CVC investment has grown globally and is very attractive for new entrants. On the other hand, the CVC life
span is not very long. CVCs are increasing its presence in venture capital investment, with 25% of the entire
VC space. CVC's focus goes to invest in later-stage and mature startups. 60% of CVCs make ten or fewer
investments in their whole life span. Banking and insurance is the most attracted industry to establish a CVC
unit. IT and software industry is the second one.
After reviewing numerous CVC cases and academic research, we suggest four critical success factors for
CVCs.
Starting an independent venture capital has its challenges. Corporate venture capital may have less difficulty
in some areas. However, there are problems for a CVC in identifying and sticking with long-term objectives,
developing collaborative governance, and mutual value-adding terms between the startup and the parent
company. This challenge is the main reason for the short life span of most CVCs. They should not imitate an
independent VC's investment focus and operational processes. Otherwise, encountering negative
consequences of CVC cycles is inevitable. In our CVC foundation approach, we suggest four design circles;
Design Circle 1 - Objectives: A robust strategic focus with necessary financial objectives
Design Circle 2 - Structure: An aligned structure to the objectives
Design Circle 3 - Operation: An operation design that makes collaboration, synergy, and due
diligence process effective
Design Circle 4 - Performance: A performance monitoring that allows improving short term
performance in a long term horizon
Support Lone Innovators: Industrial revolutions happened thanks to breakthrough innovations in high-impact
commercial areas. The first industrial revolution, the 18th, and beginning of the 19th century, emerged with
the steam engine and textile production inventions. In this period, wealthy business people or financial
institutions supported or recruited skilled engineering inventors. The second industrial revolution, the 19th
century, proliferated electricity, steel production, and oil usage, and the risk capital notion had improved. For
example, Thomas Edison, the pioneer of the incandescent light bulb, conducted early-stage experiments with
capital from some of the leading financiers, including J.P. Morgan. This period was the era of "lone
inventors."
Build Corporate Labs: In 1942, for the first time, the term "creative destruction" has been used by Joseph
Schumpeter to identify the evolutionary process of continuous innovation. After World War II, mainly in the
US, the third industrial revolution created electronics, telecommunications, and computers. Innovation leaders
were corporate R&D houses like IBM, Bell Laboratories, Xerox Parc, and DuPont. They leveraged market
dominance and invested a cascade of cash into their labs and research teams. This period was the era of
"corporate labs." They nurtured a continuous product development pipeline. Some authors called this
innovation process a "Linear Model."1 All in the same company, one does research, research then leads to
development, development to production, production to marketing.
Exhibit 1
Key milestones in corporate innovation
1880s-1940s
Talented engineer entrepreneurs supported by wealthy people and companies
Support Lone Innovators
1940s-1970s
Deep-pocket corporate innovators in a linear innovation model
Build Corporate Labs
1970s-1980s
Triumph of the venture capital industry and the birth of technology startups
Inspire from VC
1980s-1990s New tools inspired by startups like corporate venturing and corporate entrepreneurship
Develop New Tools
1990s-2010s Inevitable disruption by startups, the collaboration between the corporation and Startup
Open The Innovation 2.0 with new tools of open innovation
After 2010s The most valuable companies are tech startups of yesterday. They exploit their market
Leverage Business Platforms dominance and financial power in every corner of disruption
Source : Startup Intellect Analysis, Harvard Business Review (2012) New Corporate Garage, Michael A.Cusumano (2019)The Business
Platforms
With modern venture capital, risk capital has become a structured organization, process, a "hits" business
where exceptional payoffs from a few investments in an extensive portfolio of startup companies compensate
for the vast majority that yields mediocre returns or fail; this is called "long tail" payoffs. This success impelled
corporate executives to question their R&D approach and triggered corporate venture capital funds' birth.
Develop New Tools: In 1985, Peter F. Drucker wrote the "Innovation and Entrepreneurship" book and
defined existing businesses and new ventures as two key innovation areas. He suggested keeping innovation
efforts separate and outside of ongoing managerial business and nurture an "entrepreneurial management"
approach for large corporations. His emphasis included communication upward, advising to groom
corporate entrepreneurs with the proper support from senior management. In 1986, against the Linear
Model, an alternative one was suggested by Stephen J.Kline, "Chain Linked Model." He asserted that
innovation emerges from the interaction of multiple parties. Unlike a linear one, it has complex links and
feedback relationships between firms, markets, science, and technology systems where a single party does
not fully control the process.
New approaches to corporate innovation had emerged in the early 1980s. One of them was corporate
venturing. It was an activity that seeks to generate new businesses for the corporation in which it resides by
establishing external or internal corporate ventures3. Another one was corporate entrepreneurship, where
intrapreneurs take the initiative in the organization. According to Gifford Pinchot, writer of the
"Intraprenuering" in 1985, intrapreneurs are any of the "dreamers who do." Those who take hands-on
responsibility for creating innovation of any kind within an organization. They may be the creators or
inventors but are always the dreamers who figure out how to turn an idea into a profitable reality.4
Open The Innovation: In 2003, as depicted in Exhibit 2, Henry Chesbrough explained the old school
innovation as "closed innovation" and why it failed. Corporations needed to do more than utilizing internal
resources and capabilities. They have to collaborate with universities, startups, public companies, and other
corporations. Since its first publication, many industries have closely engaged the open innovation concept,
from pharmaceutical to manufacturing.
Source : Henry Chesbrough (2013) Open Innovation, The New Imperative For Creating and Profiting From Technology
After the 1990s, as we explained in our previous insight report5, technology startups evolved into a new form,
Startup 2.0. This trend triggered new disruption threats, investment, and collaboration opportunities like
corporate accelerators and many new open innovation practices. Intel's interaction with its ecosystem and
Lucent's New Venture Group are pioneer examples of open innovation.
Leverage Business Platforms: Today, the largest corporate companies are not from oil, banking, or retail.
They are yesterday's technology startups. Google, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Tencent are pretty different
from old-school corporate companies. Michael A.Cusumano calls those companies "business platforms."
"These industry platforms function at the level of an industry (or ecosystem). They bring
together individuals and organizations so they can innovate or interact in ways not
otherwise possible, with the potential for nonlinear increases in utility and value."
In 2019, Amazon spent $22 Billion on R&D, which is more than many countries' total R&D spending. Those
platforms have unfair advantages in many ways, and they are entering adjacent industries and distant ones
like mobility, banking, and telecommunication. Incumbent companies in those industries do not have
disruption threats from startups and formidable business platforms.
R&D and Innovation Labs: Internal organizational unit develops and tests business models, value
propositions. Nevertheless, open innovation dominates; internal scientific research is still carried out by
industries like pharmaceuticals, electronics, and business platforms.
Internal Corporate Venturing and Intrapreneurship: Innovation initiatives leverage internal capabilities by
nurturing corporate entrepreneurship culture, processes, and governance.
Open Innovation: A synergy between internal and ecosystem player's capabilities. There are inbound
practices; IP in-licensing, idea&startup competitions, supplier innovation awards, freelance expert
involvement, outbound practices, selling a market-ready product, IP out-licensing, participation in
standardization (public standards), donations to commons or non-profits.
External Corporate Venturing: Investing, supporting, collaborating, creating financial and strategic benefits,
synergies with startups, corporate companies, partners, and competitors.
Exhibit 3
Taxonomy of Corporate Innovation for Startup Intellect
R&D and
Innovation Lab Inside Out
Corporate
Entrepreneurship
and Intrapreneurship
Internal Corporate
Corporate
Venturing and Open Innovation Outside In
Innovation
Intrapreneurship
New Business
Development
Venturing Alliances
(Non-Equity Alliances, Transformational
Corporate Incubator Corporate Venture
Direct Minority Arrangements
and Accelerators Capital Investments, Joint (Acquisitions, Spin-offs)
Ventures)
Source : Startup Intellect Approach, Philipp Dauderstadt (2013) Success Factors in Strategic Corporate Venturing
The adjustment of venture capital funds is often relatively slow and uneven, leading
to substantial and persistent imbalances. Moreover, when the quantity provided does
react, the shift may "overshoot" the ideal amount and lead to further problems.
This cyclicality impacts CVC funds. Corporations typically enter the corporate venture capital market after
the independent sector showed signs of success. All too often, however, corporations overbuilt capacity
without carefully thinking out the implications. This strategy invariably leads to retrenchment. In our opinion,
for more than two decades, we are in the fourth cycle of boom globally.
The first wave: Traditional venture capital funds fueled the appetite of corporations. They began establishing
divisions that emulated venture capitalists. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, more than 25 percent of
the Fortune 500 firms set up such programs.
Large corporations financed new firms already receiving venture capital from independent venture capital
organizations at one end of the spectrum. At the other end of the spectrum, companies sought to promote
new ventures internally. These programs encouraged the companies' product engineers and scientists to forge
ahead with their innovations and provide financial, legal, and marketing support.
In 1973, the market for new public offerings, the primary avenue through which venture capitalists exit
successful investments, dried up as small technology stocks experienced inferior returns. As a result, returns of
independent venture funds shrank, and commitments to the independent venture capital sector fell. In
addition, corporations, in light of the declining market, began scaling back their venturing initiatives. As a
result, a typical corporate venture program that started in the late 1960s was dissolved after just four years.
The second wave: The independent venture industry's prospects brightened again in the late 1970s and early
1980s with the aforementioned innovations, like personal, computer, hardware, and software. Two regulatory
changes dramatically impacted venture capital commitments in the US, the top capital gains tax rate
reduction and eased pension investment restrictions. As a result, the flow of funding into the venture capital
industry grew, and the number of active venture organizations proliferated.
Corporate venturing increased shortly after that. By 1986 corporate funds managed $2 billion, or nearly 12
percent of the total venture capital pool. Whereas the earlier wave of corporate venturing aimed at a broad
range of investment opportunities, high-tech and pharmaceutical companies now led the charge.
6 Paul A.Gompers (2002) Corporations and the Financing of Innovation:The Corporate Venturing Experience, Startup Intellect
Analysis
7 Josh Lerner (2003) Boom and Bust in the Venture Capital Industry and the Impact on Innovation
The third wave: The venture capital industry expanded once again in the late 1990s, fueled chiefly by
telecommunications and internet-related companies' apparent successes. As rates of return on venture capital
investments rose, corporations once again became attracted to corporate venturing. These organizations
began exploring other ways to access new ideas, including joint ventures, acquisitions, and university-based
collaborations. Corporate venture programs allowed corporations to capitalize on these relationships.
The rapid internet diffusion and its power to either enhance or cannibalize "bricks-and-mortar" businesses
intensified this interest. Corporations everywhere realized that e-commerce presented both an opportunity
and a threat.
However, valuations and deal volume had inflated for independent and corporate venture capital in 1999
and 2000. The dot-com market crash ended the third bust period in corporate venture capital as well.
Corporate companies wrote down $9.5B venture-related losses alone in the second quarter of 2001.
The fourth wave: In 2014, corporate venture capital reached back pre-dot-com crash investment level($16B).
Recovery had taken more than a decade with many new entrants. Qualcomm has started its venture capital
arm in 2000. In 2007, Microsoft Ventures invested $240M for 1.6% share of Facebook for $15B valuation
with current valuation of $800B. In 2008, Google established Google Ventures. Today along with those
names, Salesforce, Intel Capital are among the most active corporate venture capital companies. Most
active CVCs are technology companies that are familiar with technology business, investing. They are looking
for strategic benefits of investments relating to their software, hardware, and other technology domains.
Currently, an upward trend is still going on. According to Pitchbook, CVC investment reached $55B in 2019,
and Covid19 does not seem to make a significant impact. In Q2 2020, the investment size is slightly larger
than in Q2 2019.
CVC history predicts a highly likely retrenchment relating to the fourth bust period globally, only we don't
know when.
While investment growth keeps surging, CVCs increase their presence in the venture capital investment with
%25 of the entire space. CVC's focus goes to invest in later-stage and mature startups. More than half of the
deals are later stage. According to CB Insights, the average CVC deal size is half larger than independent
VC deals.
Exhibit 4
North America leads the CVC penetration globally, and they are more active than other regions. Also, there are
many new entrants to the CVC market in the last five years that shows the corporate appetite.
Regional Distribution of CVCs
57%
Age Breakdown Brackets of CVCs
Total # of CVCs : 787
43%
43%
29%
23% 24% 22%
19%
11%
8% 6% 7%
2.1% 1.6% 0.7% 3%
0.7% 0.3% 0.1%
North Europe Asia South Ocenia Africa 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 30>
America America Number of Years Since Foundation of CVC
Share in # of CVC Share in # of Investment
Global CVC investment grew faster than the VC ecosystem and did not have a significant hit from Covid19. Also,
for capital size, the majority of the interest is the later stage, the majority is the early stage in terms of deal count.
Global CVC Investment ($B) and CVC CVC Investments Breakdown Based on
Participation in VC Ecosystem Deal Stage
As demonstrated in Exhibit 5, more than 60% of CVCs make ten or fewer investments in their entire life span.
That means the majority of the CVCs do not have the intention to cultivate a crowded investment portfolio.
Intel, Google Ventures, and Softbank are the most exit recorded CVC funds. Intel has 403, Google Ventures
152, and Softbank 98.
Large CVCs dominate the investment environment. For example, 12 CVCs, who have 50 or more exits, count
around 33% of the total number of exits of more than 700 CVC funds.
Exhibit 5
The majority of CVC goes up to five investments, while Intel Capital and Wayra are the most actives ones. Also, the
banking and insurance industry is very interested in set up a CVC by IT&Software.
The main reason for the shorter life span of CVCs is the difficulty of avoiding the business's cyclicality.
Although he focused on internal corporate venturing, Stanford University Professor Burgelman manifests
cyclicality in his study too. According to him, there are two indicators to determine the locus of a cycle.
Prospect of the mainstream business: Whether the mainstream business is sufficient to meet the
company's profitable growth objectives or not.
Status of uncommitted resources: Whether the company has uncommitted financial resources
assigned to corporate venturing.
Also, there are four forces to determine the length corporate venturing cycle.
Annual budgeting and three-year rolling budgets: Budgeting may contribute to the cycle by
establishing a one to three-year time horizon, which puts perverse pressures on ventures to "grow big
fast."
Risk of staying too long for executives: Ventures need ten to twelve years before the investment
return. However, staying in business for a long time for an executive carries severe career risks if the
venture becomes unsuccessful. As a result, they may consider staying that long unattractive.
The career path of executives: Frequent changes in the executive sponsor were detrimental to the
commercial success of disruptive innovation and corporate venturing.
Measuring the managerial performance: Without an effective process to measure organizational
performance in terms of clearly established milestones, executives may focus on achieving short-term
results at the expense of building the necessary infrastructure for long-term development.
8 Gary Dushnitsky (2011) Riding The Next Wave of Corporate Venture Capital
Although CVCs may retain a cyclicality and shorter life span, it does not make sense to claim its investment
performance "dumb," as Fred Wilson quoted. According to multiple research, as in Exhibit 5, CVC
investments perform well if their strategic focus is intense. Financial objectives leverage company expertise,
contacts, and reputation to achieve financial returns from an investment portfolio. The strategic direction of a
CVC contains the below categories;
Exhibit 6 covers three examples of a research study that supports the strength of CVC's strategic focus.
Exhibit 6
Influential profiles in academic faculty have exercised extensive studies for corporate venture capital
performance. The main result is to suggest strategic aspects rather than financial and taking the CVC as
complementary for the larger context of corporate innovation activities
CVC is CVC investing should not be studied merely as an asset class with the public and private equity
complementary markets. The strategic dimensions of CVC deserve more attention to the broader context of corporate
to overall innovation activities. CVC investment can complement the other corporate innovation initiatives,
innovation effects that are not measured in the analysis of the financial returns of CVC portfolio investment.***
process
Sources *Paul A.Gompers (1998) The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success
**Gary Dushnitsky (2006) When Corporate Venture Capital Investment Creates Value
***Henry Chesbrough (2004) Corporate Venture Capital In The Context of Corporate Innovation
That observation does not assert that all financially focused CVCs fail. On the contrary, financially focused
CVCs are more successful than strategic focus CVCs in some research studies. In our opinion, the critical
aspect here is to have a clarified objective and construct an aligned organizational structure and operational
process. Carrying both goals in a vague environment create complication due to the requirements of both
sides.
Internal structures and management systems used by corporate venture capital unit is a function of their
strategic role, and their performance is higher when these interior elements are aligned. Financial objectives
require a more autonomous CVC structure, which simulates an independent venture capital fund. On the
other hand, strategic goals need a more integrated corporate venture capital unit in leveraging corporate
resources and capabilities. As some CVCs may prefer a balanced approach between strategic and financial
objectives, the structure should be accordingly.
Exhibit 7
The objectives of CVC should be aligned with the structure and operational design. Integration requires
a structured approach to collaborating with the parent company. VC alike approach entails more
autonomy with a limited degree of integration.
Strategy and Structure Alignment Relationship
Parent Integrated
Investment Logic Criteria VC Alike CVC
CVC
Fewer, managed A few big wins
Portfolio approach
Mainly Dependent
Let's say there are two term sheets on a founder's table, one from a CVC and the other is from an
independent VC. Whom does a startup prefer? Apart from providing investment, what is the difference
between the perceived benefits of corporate venture capital and independent venture capital?
The main difference in CVCs' perceived benefits is their expertise in the industry, technology, customer,
distribution channels, and partnerships. As a result, they provide more excellent value in delivering value for
building commercial capacity, credibility, and corporate resources access. However, independent VCs are
experts in sensing the market potential, advising on product and value proposition strategy, endorsing other
VCs' networks, and supporting key positions. Exhibit 8 demonstrates the difference in value add between
independent VCs and CVCs.
Exhibit 8
Independent venture capitalists are strong in endorsement, strategy, and product value add, managing
key parameters of startup growth. CVCs provide value vertically in industry and technology domains.
• Strategy/ Product Advising on pivot, iterate and value Sharing distribution channels insight,
proposition building commercial capacity
• Team Develop HR process and recruiting Develop HR process
key employees
• Customer/Partnerships Help to understand the market Help to build commercial credibility
better and develop partners and access to distribution channels
• Syndicate Syndicate with other VCs Syndicate with other CVCs
Endorse, network and support
• Raise Additional Finance Building a finance function
for other rounds of investment
Support in managing the
• Industry Support R&D and technological support
growth
Advisory next round finance and
• Exit Advisory acquisition options
acquisition options
Source : Startup Intellect Analysis, Markku Maula (2006) Corporate Venture Capitalists and Independent Venture Capitalists: What do They
Know, Who do They Know, and Should Entrepreneurs Care, Leslie Pratch (2005) Value-Added Investing: A Framework for Early Stage
Venture Capital Firms
As depicted above, there are overlapping aspects in value add between independent VC and CVCs. Their
incentives are tied to their objectives. Independent VCs look for pure financial goals, whereas CVC's focus
might be strategic, and they have dependencies on their parent company. Startups and CVCs should prefer
a complementary relationship. When there is a lack of collaboration, the right side of the below seesaw is
unhealthy, and principal-agent problems frequently emerge between the CVC and the startup. Here are
some examples of principle agent problems;
Startup as an agent in adverse selection: Startups may not disclose some of CVCs' critical
information and intentions during due diligence and negotiation.
In avoiding the principal-agent problems, the best strategy is to develop a situation where both sides win. For
example, a higher term sheet valuation for a startup or a better deal term for a CVC should always be a
question mark in this kind of problematic relationship. Another essential point is a collaborative approach
between the CVC, business, technology teams, and startups. In Exhibit 9, we develop a framework for
assessing the CVC deal's attractiveness for the startup.
Exhibit 9
Selecting a CVC term sheet is more viable if there are synergy and learning potential for a startup. Both a
CVC and a startup should be interested in an investment relationship if the right side of the seesaw is strong.
Otherwise, a startup and independent VC relationship will be more viable for both the startup and the CVC
Corporate companies need to design four circles in harmony as depicted in Exhibit 10;
Exhibit 10
In our approach, there are four circles in the foundation of corporate venture capital
Objectives
Corporate Venture Capital Foundation Approach
Strategic and financial objectives to
focus benefit of the corporate
Performance innovation positioning
Operation Structure
The configuration is where and how
Structure to build of CVC. Locus of
opportunities, collaboration with
parent
Objectives
Operation
How the deal sourcing, due diligence,
negotiation, synergy, and exit
structure will be operationalized
Performance
It is about how to measure the
success of the CVC within the overall
innovation process of the company
Corporations target financial and strategic objectives with CVCs. However, the research9 concluded that
most CVC programs in Germany reached neither strategic nor financial goals, and 75% were planned to
discontinue at the research year. Therefore, objectives are crucial in setting, running the CVCs, and
monitoring the performance. In Exhibit 11, we demonstrate our approach toward financial and strategic
goals. All emphasized strategic objectives may not be targeted, but the critical success factor is to define a
relevant focus to strategic objectives with the correct balance of financial ones.
Exhibit 11
Circle 1 - Objectives: A corporate venture capital should identify long term objectives that will direct the
structure, operation, and performance
Corporate Venture Capital Objectives Framework
Source : Startup Intellect Analysis, Timo B.Poser (2003) Impact of Corporate Venture Capital
If corporate venturing is to endure more than the average CVC life span10, it must offer structural
advantages over independent venture capital. One difference is a longer time horizon than independent
VCs. VC funds generally have seven to eight years of life. Corporations, in contrast, have an indefinite life
span. When there is no end of fund pressure to gain liquidity for venture positions, CVCs may find an
Exhibit 12
Circle 2 - Structure: Configuration is connecting the strategy to crucial decisions of where
and how to establish the corporate venture capital
Corporate Venture Capital Configuration Framework
Portfolio Approach
Investment and Fund Type
Does the CVC portfolio look like many
How will CVC invest in the ventures,
investments to look for a few winners
indirect or direct?
or a couple of well-managed startups?
Exhibit 13
Circle 3 - Operation: Operational design is to run the program effectively and fulfill the objectives and
configuration requirements.
Corporate Venture Capital Operational Design Framework
• Manage • Screen the deal • Discuss, negotiate, • Provide value at • Monitor the
reputation funnel to identify and deal with market, progress of
• Develop promising ones contractual terms technology startups,
networking and • Assess the startups and commitments. strategy, product collaboration, and
scouting channels with parent • Develop mutual and syndication. benefits of synergy.
for referrals and collaboration benefits. • Collaborate with • Adjust activities
inbound calls. based on • Close the startups and and future
• Use outbound structured due investment create the synergy investment and
approach if diligence of strategic exit plan
necessary benefits accordingly
Team and Skills
Required skills, people to be onboarded in CVC and as contact points in business and technology units
Source : Startup Intellect Analysis
In principle, performance can be measured on a portfolio company level or directly on the CVC unit level.
We suggest four main performance monitoring aspects for CVC, financial, innovation, operation, and
corporate metrics. CVCs should apply relevant ones to objectives, structure, and operational design.
Performance metrics should provide a long-term horizon to all CVC stakeholders, but the short-term
capability to monitor the progress and take performance improvement actions.
Exhibit 14
Pillar 4 – Performance: To measure the success of the corporate venture capital, four main section KPIs
should be defined aligned with objectives, structure, and operational design
Corporate Venture Capital KPI Framework
• Change in market share • Number of patents and • Number of investments • Perceived corporate image
(relative and absolute) cross patents made as an innovator (public
• Net Profit • Number of licenses • Number of co-investments survey)
• ROI • Number of developed / lead investments • Employee satisfaction
• IRR technologies • Number of cooperation’s (survey) and employee
• Capital gains • Number of developed agreements between turnover rate
• Cross-selling values products business units and startups • Cumulated development
• Concentration level • Business unit share of time in person-years of
(investment stage, revenue of startup technology R&D of
technology, region) on • Number of received startups
total fund volume business plans with the • Cumulated venture capital
strategic fit experience of the
• Number of due diligence investment team in years
of business plans • Number of press mentions
• The standard deviation of and conference speeches
due diligence duration
from the target value
• Number of ventures in the
portfolio
Source : Philipp Dauderstadt (2013) Success Factors in Strategic Corporate Venturing, Faisst (2002) Performance Measurement in Corporate
Venturing
Deniz Kayahan
Founder and Senior Innovation Advisor
+90 532 637 78 58
deniz@startupintellect.com