Section 24—Role of Public Prosecutor and Private Counsel in Prosecution

The upshot of this analysis is that no vested right is granted to a complainant or informant or
aggrieved party to directly conduct a prosecution. So far as the Magistrate is concerned,
comparative latitude is given to him but he must always bear in mind that while the prosecution
must remain being robust and comprehensive and effective it should not abandon the need to be
free, fair and diligent.So far as the Sessions Court is concerned, it is the Public Prosecutor who
must at all times remain in control of the prosecution and a counsel of a private party can only
assist the Public Prosecutor in discharging its responsibility. The complainant or informant or
aggrieved party may, however, be heard at a crucial and critical juncture of the Trial so that his
interests in the prosecution are not prejudiced or jeopardized. It seems to us that constant or even
frequent interference in the prosecution should not be encouraged as it will have a deleterious
impact on its impartiality. If the Magistrate or Sessions Judge harbours the opinion that the
prosecution is likely to fail, prudence would prompt that the complainant or informant or
aggrieved party be given an informal hearing. Reverting to the case in hand, we are of the
opinion that the complainant or informant or aggrieved party who is himself an accomplished
criminal lawyer and who has been represented before us by the erudite Senior Counsel, was not
possessed of any vested right of being heard as it is manifestly evident that the Court has not
formed any opinion adverse to the prosecution. Whether the Accused is to be granted bail is a
matter which can adequately be argued by the State Counsel. We have, however, granted a full
hearing to Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate and have perused detailed Written
Submissions since we are alive to impact that our opinion would have on a multitude of criminal
trials. [Sundeep Kumar Bafna Versus State Of Maharashtra & Anr., (2015) 3 Scc (Cri) 558;
(2014) 16 Scc 623, Criminal Appeal No. 689 Of 2014 [Arising Out Of Slp (Crl.)No.1348 Of
2014]

Ss. 31, 427, Penal Code (45 of 1860), Ss. 53, 300 – Sentence of life imprisonment – Implies
imprisonment till end of normal life of convict – Cannot be directed to run consecutively Section
31 of the Code which deals with conviction for several offices at one trial. Section 31(1) deals
with and empowers the Court to award, subject to the provisions of Section 71 of the IPC,
several punishments prescribed for such offences and mandates that such punishments when
consisting of imprisonment shall commence one after the expiration of the other in such order as
the Court may direct unless the Court directs such punishments shall run concurrently. The
power to award suitable sentences for several offences committed by the offenders is not and
cannot be disputed. The order in which such sentences shall run can also be stipulated by the
Court awarding such sentences. So also the Court is competent in its discretion to direct that
punishment warded shall run concurrently not consecutively. Section 427 (2) carves out an
exception to the general rule recognized in Section 427 (1) that sentences awarded upon
conviction for a subsequent offence shall run consecutively. The Parliament, it manifest from the
provisions of Section 427 (2), was fully cognizant of the anomaly that would arise if a prisoner
condemned to undergo life imprisonment is directed to do so twice over. It has, therefore, carved
out an exception to the general rule to clearly recognize that in the case of life sentences for two
distinct offences separately tried and held proved the sentences cannot be directed to run
consecutively. Thus while multiple sentences for imprisonment for life can be awarded for
multiple murders or other offences punishable with imprisonment for life, can be awarded cannot
be directed to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however, be super imposed over each
other so that any remission or commutation granted by the competent authority in one does not
ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the prisoner for the other.
Muthuramalingam & Ors. V. State Rep. by Insp. of Police, 2016 Cri.L.J. 4165 (SC).