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Consider this case: Tonya plans to do Y, but Irving wants her to do X instead. Irving has tried unsuccessfully to
provide Tonya with reasons for doing X rather than Y. If Irving is unwilling to resort to coercion or force, he
might deploy any of the following tactics to try to influence Tonya’s choice. For example, Irving might …
1. Charm Tonya into wanting to please Irving by doing X.
2. Exaggerate the advantages of doing X and the disadvantages of doing Y, and/or understate the
disadvantages of doing X and the advantages of doing Y.
3. Make Tonya feel guilty for preferring to do Y.
4. Induce Tonya into an emotional state that makes doing X seem more appropriate than it really is.
5. Point out that doing Y will make Tonya seem less worthy and appealing to her friends.
6. Make Tonya feel badly about herself and portray Y as a choice that will confirm or exacerbate this
feeling, and/or portray X as a choice that will disconfirm or combat it.
7. Do a small favor for Tonya before asking her to do X, so that she feels obligated to comply.
8. Make Tonya doubt her own judgment so that she will rely on Irving’s advice to do X.
9. Make it clear to Tonya that if she does Y rather than X, Irving will withdraw his friendship, sulk, or
become irritable and generally unpleasant.
10. Focus Tonya’s attention on some aspect of doing Y that Tonya fears and ramp up that fear to get her to
change her mind about doing Y.
Each of these tactics could reasonably be called a form of manipulation. Many also have more specific,
commonplace names, such as “guilt trip” (tactic 3), “gaslighting” (tactic 8), “peer pressure” (tactic 5),
“negging” (tactic 6), and “emotional blackmail” (tactic 9). Perhaps not everyone will agree that every tactic on
this list is properly described as manipulation. And in some cases, whether the tactic seems manipulative may
depend on various details not specified in the case as described. For example, if Y is seriously immoral, then
perhaps it is not manipulative for Irving to induce Tonya to feel guilty about planning to do Y. It is also possible
that we might revise our judgments about some of these tactics in light of a fully worked out and well
supported theory of manipulation—if we had one. Nevertheless, this list should provide a reasonably good
sense of what we mean by “manipulation” in the present context. It should also serve to illustrate the wide
variety of tactics commonly described as manipulation.
Manipulation is often characterized as a form of influence that is neither coercion nor rational persuasion. But
this characterization immediately raises the question: Is every form of influence that is neither coercion nor
rational persuasion a form of manipulation? If manipulation does not occupy the entire logical space of
influences that are neither rational persuasion nor coercion, then what distinguishes it from other forms of
influence that are neither coercion nor rational persuasion?
The term “manipulation” is commonly thought to include an element of moral disapprobation: To say that
Irving manipulated Tonya is commonly taken to be a moral criticism of Irving’s behavior. Is manipulation
always immoral? Why is manipulation immoral (when it is immoral)? If manipulation is not always immoral,
then what determines when it is immoral?
1. Preliminaries
1.1 Ordinary versus Global Manipulation
1.2 Applications of a Theory of Ordinary Manipulation
1.3 Two Questions about Manipulation
2. Answering the Identification Question
2.1 Manipulation as Bypassing Reason
2.2 Manipulation as Trickery
2.3 Manipulation as Pressure
2.4 Disjunctive, Hybrid, and Other Views
3. Answering the Evaluation Question
3.1 Is Manipulation Always Wrong?
3.2 Manipulation and Harm
3.3 Manipulation and Autonomy
3.4 Manipulation and Treating Persons as Things
3.5 Other Suggestions
4. Further Issues
4.1 Manipulating Persons versus Manipulating Situations
4.2 Manipulation and Intent
4.3 Manipulation, Vulnerability, and Oppression
Bibliography
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1. Preliminaries
1.1 Ordinary versus Global Manipulation
Forms of influence like those listed above are commonplace in ordinary life. This distinguishes them from
forms of influence described as “manipulation” in the free will literature. There, the term “manipulation”
typically refers to radical programming or reprogramming of all or most of an agent’s beliefs, desires, and other
mental states. Such global manipulation (as we might call it) is also typically imagined as happening via
decidedly extra-ordinary methods, such as supernatural intervention, direct neurological engineering, or radical
programs of indoctrination and psychological conditioning. Global manipulation is typically thought to deprive
its victim of free will. This common intuition drives the “manipulation argument”, which seeks to defend
incompatibilism by claiming that living in a deterministic universe is analogous to having been the victim of
global manipulation. (For a detailed discussion of this argument, see the discussion of manipulation arguments
in the entry on arguments for incompatibilism.)
Despite the differences between ordinary manipulation and the forms of manipulation in the free will literature,
it is still worth wondering about the relationship between them. If global manipulation completely deprives its
victim of free will or autonomy, might more ordinary forms of manipulation do something similar, but on a
more limited scale? If Tonya succumbs to one of Irving’s tactics, should we regard her as being less free—and
perhaps less responsible—for doing X? So far, few people have explored the connections between ordinary
manipulation and the forms of global manipulation discussed in the free will literature. (Two exceptions are
Long 2014 and Todd 2013).
assailed by demons which instilled in him a passion sometimes for silk shirts, sometimes for kitchenware,
sometimes for chamber pots, and sometimes for orange squash. (Galbraith 1958)
Several philosophers have made similar criticisms of advertising. Often, these criticisms are limited to forms of
advertising that do not simply convey accurate factual information. As is the case with purely informational
nudges, it seems difficult to claim that advertising that does nothing more than convey accurate factual
information is manipulative. However, most advertising attempts to influence consumer behavior by means
other than or in addition to purely providing accurate information. Such non-informational advertising is the
most apt target for worries about manipulation. Tom Beauchamp and Roger Crisp have made influential
arguments that such advertising can be manipulative (Beauchamp 1984; Crisp 1987). Similar criticisms claim
that non-informational advertising can subvert autonomy or improperly tamper with consumers’ desires (e.g.,
Santilli 1983). Such critiques are either versions of or close relatives to critiques of advertising as manipulation.
On the other side, Robert Arrington argues that, as a matter of fact, advertising very seldom manipulates its
audience or undermines its audience’s autonomy (Arrington 1982). Michael Phillips has marshalled a large
body of empirical evidence to argue that while some advertising is manipulative, its critics vastly overestimate
its power to influence consumers (Phillips 1997).
manipulation, unlike coercion, does not interfere with a person’s options. Instead it perverts the way that
person reaches decisions, forms preference, or adopts goals. (Raz 1988: 377)
Treating manipulation as bypassing rational deliberation, and then characterizing “bypassing rational
deliberation” in terms of introducing non-rational influences into deliberation, would cohere nicely with the
observation that manipulation is a contrary of rational persuasion. Moreover, characterizing “bypassing rational
deliberation” in this way would lower the bar for an influence to count as manipulative.
However, now we should worry about the bar being set too low. For many forms of non-rational influence do
not seem to be manipulative. For example, graphic portrayals of the dangers of smoking or texting while
driving are not obviously manipulative even when they impart no new information to the target (Blumenthal-
Barby 2012). In addition, moral persuasion often involves non-rational influence. Appeals to the Golden Rule
invite the interlocutor to imagine how it would feel to be on the receiving end of the action under consideration.
It is difficult to believe that all such appeals are inherently manipulative, even when they appeal more to the
feelings than to facts (of which the interlocutor may already be aware). Finally, consider something as
innocuous as dressing up before going on a date or an interview. Presumably, the purpose of such “impression
management” is to convey a certain impression to the audience. Yet dressing up on a single occasion provides
little if any rational basis for conclusions about what the well-dressed person is really like day in and day out.
Thus, impression management of this sort seems to be an attempt at non-rational influence. Yet it seems odd to
count it as manipulation—especially if we treat “manipulation” as having a connotation of being immoral. Of
course, we might avoid this problem by defining “manipulation” in a morally neutral way, and then claiming
that these forms of manipulation are not immoral, while others are. But this would merely move the problem
without solving it, for now we would want to know what distinguishes immoral forms of manipulation from
those that are not immoral.
Perhaps we could address this problem by defining reason more broadly, so that appeals to emotions could
count as forms of rational persuasion. Such a move might be independently motivated by the rejection of what
some critics regard as the hyper-cognitivist radical separation of reason from emotion. However, it is not clear
that allowing emotional appeals to count as rational persuasion will get us very far in defining manipulation in
terms of bypassing reason. For while we will have avoided the implausible implication that all appeals to
emotion are ipso facto manipulative, we now face the question of which appeals to emotion are manipulative
and which are not. And that is close to the very question that the idea of bypassing reason was supposed to help
us answer.
Thus, despite the plausibility of the claim that manipulation bypasses the target’s capacities for rational
deliberation, using this claim to define manipulation faces serious challenges: If we take “bypassing” very
literally, then the account seems to miss many examples of genuine manipulation. But if we loosen our
understanding of “bypassing reason” so that it applies to any non-rational form of influence, then it seems to
count as manipulative many forms of influence that do not seem manipulative. And if we fix that problem by
adopting a conception of reason according to which appeals to the emotions are not ipso facto non-rational,
then we are left with the original problem of determining which appeals to the emotions are manipulative and
which are not. Perhaps there is a way to characterize “bypassing reason” that can undergird a plausible
definition of manipulation in terms of bypassing reason. But the most obvious ways to define “bypassing
reason” appear to be dead ends, and no other suggestions are currently on offer.
Nevertheless, even if defining manipulation in terms of bypassing reason turns out to be a dead end, it is still
possible that manipulation really does bypass reason in some sense. But it may turn out that we need an
independent definition of manipulation before we can determine in what sense manipulation bypasses reason.
Some writers, such as Cass Sunstein and Jason Hanna, seem to have such an approach in mind when they
initially characterize manipulation in terms of bypassing or subverting reason, but then go on to gloss
“bypassing or subverting” in terms of some other account of manipulation (Sunstein 2016: 82–89; Hanna
2015).
However, a recent argument by Moti Gorin raises questions for the claim that manipulation bypasses or
subverts reason—even when that claim is not being used to define what manipulation is (Gorin 2014a). Gorin
argues that manipulation can occur even when the target is offered only good reasons. His argument turns
largely on examples like this: James wishes for Jacques’s death, since this would enable James to inherit a large
fortune. James knows that Jacques believes that (1) God exists, and that (2) if God did not exist, life would be
meaningless, and he would have no reason to go on living. James provides Jacques with rational arguments
against the existence of God. These arguments fully engage Jacques’s rational faculties, and consequently
Jacques concludes that God does not exist. Jacques promptly commits suicide—just as Jack had hoped he
would. As Gorin notes, James’s activities do not appear to have bypassed, subverted, or otherwise been
detrimental to Jacques’s capacity for reason—indeed, James depended on Jacques’s ability to employ his
rational faculties to draw (what James regarded as) the correct conclusion from his arguments. If we accept
Gorin’s characterization of James’s actions as manipulative, then his example poses a significant challenge to
the claim that manipulation always bypasses the target’s capacity for rational deliberation.
manipulation occurs when there is a difference in kind between what one intends to do and what one
actually does, when that difference is traceable to another in such a way that the victim may be said to
have been misled. (Kasten 1980: 54)
Although many of Kasten’s examples of misleading involve some form of deception, he includes examples in
which manipulation involves inducing the target to have inappropriate emotions like guilt. More recently,
Robert Noggle has defended a version of this more expansive approach, writing that
There are certain norms or ideals that govern beliefs, desires, and emotions. Manipulative action is the
attempt to get someone’s beliefs, desires, or emotions to violate these norms, to fall short of these ideals.
(Noggle 1996: 44)
manipulation is directly influencing someone’s beliefs, desires, or emotions such that she falls short of
ideals for belief, desire, or emotion in ways typically not in her self-interest or likely not in her self-interest
in the present context. (Barnhill 2014: 73, emphasis original; for a similar view, see Hanna 2015)
Claudia Mills offers a theory that can be considered as either a version of, or a close relative to, the trickery
account:
We might say, then, that manipulation in some way purports to be offering good reasons, when in fact it
does not. A manipulator tries to change another’s beliefs and desires by offering her bad reasons, disguised
as good, or faulty arguments, disguised as sound—where the manipulator himself knows these to be bad
reasons and faulty arguments (Mills 1995: 100; see Benn 1967 and Gorin 2014b for somewhat similar
ideas).
This more expansive version of the trickery view retains the connection between manipulation and deception
but extends it to characterize manipulation as inducing—tricking—the target into adopting any faulty mental
state, including beliefs, but also desires, emotions, etc. This view might be further expanded by adopting
Michael Cholbi’s observation that the phenomenon of ego depletion might induce targets of manipulation to
form faulty intentions (that is, intentions that do not reflect their considered values) because their resistance to
temptation has been worn down (Cholbi 2014).
The trickery view can be motivated by appeal to various examples, one especially fruitful set of which is
Shakespeare’s Othello. It seems natural to describe Shakespeare’s character Iago as a manipulator. The
activities in virtue of which he merits this label seem to involve various forms of trickery. For example, through
insinuation, innuendo and cleverly arranging circumstances (like a strategically placed handkerchief) he tricks
Othello into suspecting—and then believing—that his new bride Desdemona has been unfaithful. He then plays
on Othello’s insecurities and other emotions to lead him into an irrational jealousy and rage that both
overshadow his love for Desdemona and cloud his judgment about how to react. The trickery view accounts for
our sense that Iago manipulates Othello by noting that Iago tricks him into adopting various faulty mental states
—false beliefs, unwarranted suspicions, irrational emotions, and so on. The fact that the trickery view explains
our sense that Iago manipulates Othello is a key consideration in its favor.
Proponents of the trickery view differ over several of details, most notably on how to define a faulty mental
state. Some proponents of the trickery view argue that manipulation occurs when the influencer attempts to
induce what the influencer regards as a faulty mental state into the target’s deliberations (Mills 1995; Noggle
1996). By contrast, Jason Hanna argues that we should define manipulation in terms of the attempt to introduce
an objectively faulty mental state into the target’s deliberations (Hanna 2015: 634; see also Sunstein 2016: 89).
Anne Barnhill defends a trickery account of manipulation, but suggests that our usage of the term
“manipulation” is inconsistent on the question of whose standards determine whether the influencer attempts to
induce the target to adopt a faulty mental state (Barnhill 2014).
Although the trickery account has considerable appeal, it faces an important challenge: It apparently fails to
count as manipulative a whole class of tactics that seem, intuitively, to be manipulative. Tactics like charm,
peer pressure, and emotional blackmail (tactics 1, 5, and 9) do not seem to involve trickery. Yet it seems quite
natural to think of such tactics as forms of manipulation.
There are many in-between cases: For example, suppose the physician has made clear that he or she will
be upset with the patient if the patient does not take the drug, and the patient is intimidated. Although the
patient is not convinced that it is the best course to take the medication, … the patient agrees to take the
drug because it appears that acceptance will foster a better relationship with the doctor… Here the patient
performs the action … under a heavy measure of control by the physician’s role, authority, and indeed
prescription. Unlike the first case, the patient does not find it overwhelmingly difficult to resist the
physician’s proposal, but, unlike the second case, it is nonetheless awkward and difficult to resist this
rather “controlling” physician. (Faden, Beauchamp, & King 1986: 258)
They claim that such “in between” cases constitute manipulation. However, they do not claim that all forms of
manipulation fall into the middle region of this continuum; they also count forms of deception, indoctrination,
and seduction as manipulative, and claim that
Nevertheless, the idea that at least some forms of manipulation involve pressure has been very influential.
Joel Feinberg offers a similar account of manipulation. He writes that many techniques for getting someone to
act in a certain way
can be placed on a spectrum of force running from compulsion proper, at one extreme, through
compulsive pressure, coercion proper, and coercive pressure, to manipulation, persuasion, enticement, and
simple requests at the other extreme. The line between forcing to act and merely getting to act is drawn
somewhere in the manipulation or persuasion part of the scale. (Feinberg 1989: 189)
The attempt to influence B’s behavior takes on a manipulative character when … A’s primary intent is no
longer to convince B, in a good faith manner, that acting as desired by A would be in keeping with B’s
rational assessments of outcome; [but rather] to procure or engineer the needed assent by bringing
pressure to bear, in a deliberate and calculated way, on what he presume to be the manipulable features of
B’s motivational system. (Kligman & Culver 1992: 186–187)
Kligman and Culver go on to distinguish this manipulative pressure from coercion by claiming that the latter,
unlike the former, involves “sufficiently strong incentives … that it would be unreasonable to expect any
rational person not to so act” (Kligman & Culver 1992: 187). More recently, Marcia Baron and Allen Wood
have also discussed forms of manipulation that seem best characterized as forms of pressure (Baron 2003;
Wood 2014).
Although we can treat the idea that manipulation consists of a form of pressure as a full-fledged theory of
manipulation, most of the authors just cited hold only that some forms of manipulation consist of pressure. In
particular, most agree with Faden, Beauchamp, and King, that other forms of manipulation are more akin to
deception. Thus, it is somewhat artificial to speak of the pressure model as a theory meant to cover all forms of
manipulation. It is more accurate to regard the pressure model as claiming that exerting non-coercive pressure
is sufficient (but perhaps not necessary) for an influence to count as manipulative.
A attempts to manipulate S iff A attempts to influence S’s behavior by means of deception or pressure or
by playing on a supposed weakness of S. (Rudinow 1978: 343)
He goes on to claim that that the use of pressure is manipulative only if the would-be manipulator directs it at
some supposed weakness in his target that will render the target unable to resist it; this leads him to finalize his
definition in terms of “deception or by playing upon a supposed weakness” of the target, with the second
disjunct meant to cover pressure-based tactics (Rudinow 1978: 346). Several other philosophers have followed
Rudinow’s disjunctive approach to defining manipulation (Tomlinson 1986; Sher 2011; Mandava & Millum
2013).
A somewhat different version of the disjunctive strategy might begin with the pressure account’s continuum
pressure of between rational persuasion and coercion, but go on to add a second dimension consisting of a
continuum between rational persuasion and outright lying. We might then define manipulation in terms of a
two-dimensional space bounded by rational persuasion, outright lying, and coercion. A strategy like this is
suggested by Sapir Handelman, although he adds a third dimension that measures the level of “control” that a
given form of influence exerts (Handelman 2009).
Disjunctive strategies that combine the trickery and pressure accounts are appealing because they seem to do a
better job than either the trickery or pressure account alone in accounting for the wide variety of tactics that
seem intuitively to count as manipulation. However, this wider coverage comes a price. If the disjunctive
approach simply puts an “or” between the trickery and pressure accounts, then it will leave unanswered the
question of what, if anything, makes all forms of manipulation manifestations of the same phenomenon. Of
course, it is possible that this question cannot be answered because, as a matter of fact, there are two irreducibly
different forms of manipulation. But this seems like a conclusion that we should accept only reluctantly, after
having made a good faith effort to determine whether there really is anything in common between pressure-
based manipulation and trickery-based manipulation.
One possible answer to this challenge might be drawn from Marcia Baron’s important paper on
“Manipulativeness”, which diagnoses the underlying moral wrong in manipulation in terms of an Aristotelian
vice. She suggests treating manipulativeness as the vice of excess with regard to “to what extent—and how and
when and to whom and for what sorts of ends—to seek to influence others’ conduct” (Baron 2003: 48). On her
view, manipulativeness is at the opposite extreme from the vice of
refraining from offering potentially helpful counsel; or refraining from trying to stop someone from doing
something very dangerous, for example, from driving home from one’s house while drunk. (Baron 2003:
48)
Perhaps, then, we can understand the underlying similarity between trickery- and pressure-based manipulation
as manifestations of a common vice, as different ways of going wrong with regard to how and how much we
should try to influence those around us.
Finally, it is worth noting two other approaches to defining manipulation. Patricia Greenspan suggests that
manipulation is a sort of hybrid between coercion and deception. She writes that
cases of manipulation seem to have a foot in both of the usual categories of intentional interference with
another agent’s autonomy, coercion and deception, but partly as a result, they do not fit squarely in either
category. (Greenspan 2003: 157)
Thus, we might characterize her view as a “conjunctive” theory of manipulation, according to which it contains
elements of both pressure and deception. It certainly seems true that manipulators often use both pressure and
deception. For example, a manipulator who employs peer pressure might also exaggerate the extent to which
the target’s peers will disapprove of her if she chooses the option that the manipulator wants her not to choose.
However, we can also point to relatively pure cases of manipulative pressure or manipulative trickery: Indeed,
all of the items on the list above can be imagined as involving either pure pressure or pure trickery. The
apparent existence of cases of manipulation that involve only deception or only pressure seems to be a problem
for Greenspan’s hybrid view.
Eric Cave defends a theory of what he calls “motive manipulation” (Cave 2007, 2014). Cave’s approach rests
on a distinction between “concerns”, which are motives that consist of the agent’s conscious pro-attitudes
toward some action or state of affairs, and “non-concern motives” which are motives that are not also concerns
(i.e., they are not also conscious pro-attitudes). This distinction in hand, Cave defines motive manipulation as
any form of influence that operates by engaging non-concern motives. This theory clearly implies that appeals
to non-conscious motives, and as well influences that operate via “quasi-hypnotic techniques” and “crude
behavioral conditioning” are manipulative (Cave 2014: 188). But it is not clear what Cave’s theory would say
about appeals to consciously-experienced emotions or pressure tactics like peer pressor or emotional blackmail.
This is because the distinction between a concern and a non-concern motive—which is a crucial part of the
theory—seems under-described. Are such things as my fear of failure or my desire to retain your friendship
concerns? Without a fuller account of the crucial distinction between concerns and non-concern motives, it is
difficult to say whether Cave’s theory provides a plausible answer to the identification question.
If we think that moral argument should proceed not merely by invoking our pro- or con- sentiments, or
appealing to our unargued intuitions, but instead by identifying objective facts about a situation that give
us good reasons for condemning or approving certain things, then we would generally do much better to
use a non-moralized sense of words like “coercion”, “manipulation”, and “exploitation”—a sense in which
these words can be used to refer to such objective facts. (Wood 2014: 19–20)
No matter how we answer the question of whether manipulation in general is absolutely immoral, prima facie
immoral, pro tanto immoral, or not even presumptively immoral, there are clearly situations in which
manipulation is immoral. Any complete answer to the evaluation question must explain why manipulation is
immoral in those cases where it is immoral. In addition, any view that holds that manipulation is only pro tanto
and/or prima facie immoral should tell us what sorts of considerations can defeat the presumption that it is
immoral and/or outweigh its pro tanto immorality. Several accounts have been offered to identify the source of
the moral wrongfulness of manipulation (when it is wrong).
a manipulator is interested in reasons not as logical justifiers but as causal levers. For the manipulator,
reasons are tools, and bad reasons can work as well as, or better than, a good one. (Mills 1995: 100–101)
The point here is that a manipulator treats his target not as a fellow rational agent, for that would require giving
good reasons for doing as the manipulator proposes. Instead, the manipulator treats his target as a being whose
behavior is to be elicited by pressing the most effective “causal levers”.
Of course, the idea that treating a person as a mere object is immoral is a prominent feature of Kant’s account
of respect for persons (see entry on respect). Thus, it would be natural to appeal to Kantian ideas to help
elaborate the idea that manipulation is wrong because of the way that it treats its target. Thus, for example,
Thomas E. Hill writes,
The idea that one should try to reason with others rather than to manipulate them by nonrational
techniques is manifest in Kant’s discussion of the duty to respect others. (Hill 1980: 96)
Although Kant’s moral philosophy (see entry) is a natural place to look for the idea that the wrongfulness of
manipulation derives from a failure to treat the target as a person, there are potential drawbacks to tying the
account too tightly to Kant. For Kant’s notion of rational agency appears to be of the hyper-cognitive, hyper-
intellectual variety. Hence, if it is unethical to fail to treat someone as that kind of rational agent, we might be
pushed toward the conclusion that the only acceptable basis for human interaction is the kind of coldly
intellectual rational persuasion that excludes any appeal to emotions. But as we saw earlier, there are good
reasons for regarding such a conclusion as implausible.
These considerations certainly do not entail that it is hopeless to look to some notion of treating persons as
things for an account of the wrongfulness of manipulation. But they do suggest that more work must be done
before the claim that manipulation is wrong because it treats a person as a mere thing can be regarded as much
more than a platitude.
4. Further Issues
In addition to answering the identification and evaluation questions, a complete theory of manipulation should
address several further issues.
If A wants to get B to do act x, there are two general strategies that A might undertake. A might change, or
propose to change, the external or objective features of B’s choice situation; or alternatively, A might try to
alter certain internal or subjective features of B’s choice situation. While some writers might call both
strategies manipulative, at least in certain circumstances, I prefer to reserve the label manipulation for a
subset of morally problematic actions falling in the second category. (Mills 1995: 97)
Although Rudinow’s case provides a clear contrast between what we might call psychological manipulation
and situational manipulation, this distinction—or at least its importance—is not always so clear. Consider tactic
9 above, where Irving threatens to withdraw his friendship if Tonya does not do as Irving wishes. Is this direct
psychological manipulation, or situational manipulation? The criterion offered by Barnhill and others counts it
as situational manipulation, since Irving changes Tonya’s choice situation so that doing Y and retaining Irving’s
friendship is no longer an option. But how is this tactic any less of a direct interference with Tonya’s decision
than if Irving had engaged in some form of deception? Why would it be more like what the malingerer does to
the police officer than what he does to the psychiatrist?
This is not to deny that there is a difference between psychological and situational manipulation. Instead, it is to
ask what that difference is, and why it might matter. Presumably, the distinction is meant to differentiate
between tactics that affect a target’s behavior by directly tampering with her psychology and those that do not.
But if this is the distinction, then it seems plausible to think that Irving’s use of emotional blackmail is at least
as direct a tampering with Tonya’s psychology as, say, Iago’s dropping of the handkerchief in a location where
it will trick Othello into becoming inappropriately suspicious. Yet criteria like those proposed by Mills and
Barnhill seem to imply that these two forms of manipulation are on opposite sides of that distinction.
Nevertheless, there does seem something importantly different between what the malingerer in Rudinow’s
example does to the police officer and what he does to the psychiatrist. But much work remains to be done to
provide a well-motivated account of that difference. Such an account should not only get the intuitively right
answers in cases of direct pressure (like emotional blackmail) and indirect deception (like Iago’s dropping the
handkerchief), but it should also explain whether and why the distinction makes a moral difference.
a combination of intent and recklessness: the aim of getting the other person do what one wants, together
with recklessness in the way that one goes about reaching that goal. (Baron 2014: 103)
She goes on to argue that the manipulator need not be aware that she has that intention (Baron 2014, 101).
Manne agrees; to support this claim, she offers the example of Joan, who gives extravagant gifts to relatives
who pay her less attention than (she thinks) they should (Manne 2014, 225). Manne tells Joan’s story in such a
way that it seems plausible to say both that Joan’s gift-giving is a manipulative attempt to make her relatives
feel guilty, and that Joan does not consciously intend to make her relatives feel guilty. If Manne’s description of
her example is correct, then it seems that Joan can manipulate her relatives into feeling guilty without having
any conscious intention of making them feel guilty. (Later, Manne [2014, 235] goes even farther, suggesting
that “people can even behave manipulatively despite consciously intending not to.”) Of course, those who hold
that manipulation requires more conscious intention than Manne allows might well balk at her description of
the case of Joan. Nevertheless, the arguments offered by Baron and Manne raise important questions about the
level of conscious intentionality required for an action to be manipulative.
The question of what sort of intention is required for an act to count as manipulative has practical implications
for assessing the behavior of children, who sometimes behave in ways that seem aptly described as
manipulative even when they are too young to have the complicated intentions that some theories of
manipulation might require. Similar worries arise for assessing the behavior of people for whom
manipulativeness has become a habit, or a part of their personalities. Indeed, certain personality disorders—
such as borderline personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder—are often characterized by
manipulativeness, as is the so-called Machiavellian personality type (Christie & Geis 1970). As professor of
psychiatric nursing Len Bowers writes,
the manipulative behaviour of some personality-disordered (PD) patients is consistent and frequent. It is
an integral part of their interpersonal style, a part of the very disorder itself. (Bowers 2003: 329; see also
Potter 2006)
In such cases, one wonders what level of intentionality lies behind behavior that we would otherwise think of
as manipulative. Even if we are inclined to regard childhood or certain personality disorders as factors that
mitigate the blameworthiness of manipulative behavior, it would seem counterintuitive for a theory of
manipulation to say that children and persons with personality disorders are incapable of acting manipulatively.
and that
manipulative strategies may be viewed as a low-key way of fighting back at a system which has deprived
the prisoner of normal freedom. (Bowers 2003: 330)
Finally, it seems likely that one reason why children often resort to manipulative tactics is that they often lack
any other (or any other equally effective) way to get what they want.
It is also worth noting that the idea that the idea that manipulation undermines autonomous choice might be
used, somewhat paradoxically, to undermine autonomous choice, especially among the non-elite. This point is
comes out forcefully in a comment by Sarah Skwire (2015, Other Internet Resources) on George Akerlof and
Robert Shiller’s book, Phishing for Phools (Akerlof & Shiller 2015). Akerlof and Shiller discuss a number of
advertising, sales, and marketing practices that they deem manipulative. The problem that Skwire notes is that
the reason for calling these practices manipulative is that consumers make choices that Akerlof and Shiller
think are sufficiently irrational that they would only be made under the influence of manipulation. Skwire
writes that this approach to detecting manipulation demonstrates “contempt for the decisions made by people
who are poorer and from a lower social class than the authors” (Skwire 2015, Other Internet Resources). In
short, she suggests that Akerlof and Shiller are too quick to suspect manipulation in cases where people make
different decisions from the ones they think best. Whether or not we agree with Skwire’s criticisms of Akerlof
and Shiller, her point serves as a cautionary one: Even if we accept that manipulation undermines autonomous
choice, we must be careful not to use that as a reason to suspect that people who make different choices from
what we think are best must therefore be victims of manipulation. It would be ironic—and unjust—to use the
idea that manipulation is a wrongful interference with autonomy as a weapon to delegitimize the autonomous
choices of people with whom we disagree or whose situations, needs, and values we do not understand.
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