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China-Iran strategic partnership —

genesis and future
Iran’s closeness to China is largely attributed to President Trump’s inimical policies
towards Iran

Talat Masood July 21, 2020

At the conclusion of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Tehran in 2016, the two
countries announced a major agreement that covered a broad canvas of bilateral
relations and regional and international issues based on “Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership”. It was meant to deepen and broaden the scope of their relationship.
President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and
impose comprehensive sanctions on it had a debilitating effect on Iran’s economy.
With Iran under severe political pressure and economic squeeze was eagerly looking to
reduce this burden by developing a close relationship with China.
It equally suited Beijing to strengthen its ties with Tehran. Apart from Iran being an
important Muslim country and a close neighbour, it is also a major oil producing
country.
In fact, the strategic agreement noted “that under the current conditions of deepening
multilaterisation of international order and globalisation of the economy, the bilateral
ties between Iran and China have gained strategic importance….” The two countries
also aimed at concluding a bilateral 25-year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement on
their agendas. Significantly, the Iranian side welcomed “the Silk Road Economic Belt
and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” and the promotion of industrial and maritime
capabilities by China.
Nevertheless, seasoned observers are of the view that there is nothing especially
threatening to the US or its allies in the document. Military and security cooperation
was already taking place and become a norm among friendly countries and allies.
Cooperation in areas of counterterrorism, trafficking, and transnational crime is now a
common phenomenon among friendly countries and is for the general good of the
region and the world.
In essence, international observers downplayed these developments. Interestingly, the
Chinese side has not tried to hype it either. This was evident from the recent foreign
ministers meeting of China and Iran where they were more focused on coronavirus and
the joint action plan.
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What needs to be kept in perspective is that China has much larger interests in the
region and has comprehensive strategic partnership agreements with Saudi Arabia and
the UAE. It would certainly like to maintain a balance in its relations with these
competing powers in the region to maximise its leverage. For China’s ambitions go
beyond regional alignments.
This is clearly evident from the fact that China has strong diplomatic and trade relations
with Arab countries. It regularly participates in the ministerial meetings with Arab
countries and values its ties with them. Incidentally, the last meeting was held only
recently. It just so happens that other international events overshadowed the event and
did not attract much publicity. As reported in press, it resulted in the signing of three
policy documents that included a Covid-19 pledge of cooperation, an execution plan for
the Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) from 2020-2022
and the Amman Declaration, which “expresses the desire of China and Arab states to
deepen relations…. And reiterates mutual support on the issues of core interests and
major concerns.”
This is not to imply that the Arab governments would not be wary of the China-Iran
ties. Unsurprisingly, as leaked media reports indicate that the China-Iran cooperation
was discussed and Chinese representative tried to assure the members that it is not
directed against them.
China has vast interests in the Middle East and is building a multifaceted relationship
with major countries of the region. For Beijing, Iran has its importance, but it is not a
zero-sum game. Chinese companies have invested heavily in the region and it would
like to further expand and consolidate these relations and will ensure that its developing
strategic partnership with Iran does not stand in any way with Arab countries.
The news that China will invest $400 billion in Iran attracted global attention, but has
been received with a high degree of skepticism by neutral observers. It seems to be a
highly exaggerated assumption considering the present state of Iran’s economy and its
ability to absorb such a huge amount of investment. Moreover, no Chinese bank would
like to stake its credibility by defying international sanctions and invest in this project.
China, maintaining a balanced approach, would make investments in energy and
infrastructure in Iran somewhat more than it has done in other BRI countries.
Apparently, Iran would sell its oil in return for investments from China.
According to international sources the draft agreement is very ambitious and includes
nearly 100 projects that include high-speed railways and 5G telecommunication
networks, free-trade zones, etcetera.
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Previously, it was the US and other Western countries that invested in the Middle East
and were also taking care of their security. With deep economic engagement in strategic
projects China is also supporting Iran’s efforts at strengthening its defence.
Iran’s closeness to China is largely attributed to President Trump’s inimical policies
towards Iran. With the US hostility toward China becoming more intense nothing suits
Iran better than to have a powerful partner as China. It equally suits China to have Iran,
a major Muslim country, strategically located and a strong US adversary as an ally.
According to press reports, China plans to develop a port at Jask that would give it a
huge advantage as much of world’s oil passes through the region. It is in close
proximity to Bahrain where the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is headquartered.
For quite some time Iran has been steadily turning toward developing closer relations
with Asian countries rather than look towards the West. It not only wants to strengthen
its relations with China but would also build bridges with South Korea, which it
admires for its rapid economic progress and self-reliance in industrialisation and energy
production.
Iran’s relations with India have received a serious setback as under US pressure it set
aside its agreement wherein it was supposed to develop the Chabahar port and
associated infrastructure. This will provide additional space to China to expand its
cooperation with Iran.
With Washington and Beijing all poised toward a potential cold war, the China-Iran
proposed strategic partnership acquires even greater significance.

China-Iran Chabahar deal

ushers in a new geopolitical
order
Syed Qamar Afzal Rizvi JULY 22, 2020
Tehran – Beijing’s current show of political sagacity via announcing a new historic deal
on the Chabahar port, a project of profound leverage, has opened a new window of
opportunity for not only the peoples of two countries but also for the populace of the
whole region. India’s apparent decision to go along with the Trump administration’s
maximum pressure campaign against Iran has rightly propelled the Iranian leadership to
look for a better alternative via an epoch-making deal on the Chabahar port
project. Needless to say, the China-Iran deal is morphing the region’s geopolitical
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tapestry in many ways, particularly China’s CPEC and Gwadar strategy and its relations
with Iran, Pakistan and other actors in the region. The US-based South Asian affairs
expert, Michael Kugelman has tweeted that the emerging China-Iran deal is a watershed
for international relations.

Iran’s visionary and resourceful decision of ousting India from the said deal (formerly
signed between Tehran and New Delhi in May-2016) has created a new strategic
environment of making a new geopolitical matrix in the region, paving the way for
Chinese expanding connectivity. Though apparently, Iran has attributed putting India’s
participation aside on account of delays in Indian funding and other aspects of project
implementation, the truth advocates that it is the dictate of geopolitics. China and Iran are
giving final shape to a colossal partnership package worth $400-billion, to be spread over
the next two decades and a half. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has
recently kept busy with diplomatic visits to neighbouring countries.

The China-Iran deal will not only give a boost to the growing Turkey-Russia-China-Iran
strategic gamut but also revitalize the Pak-Iran relations

Notably, on May 23, Javed Zarif arrived in Islamabad, his third trip to Pakistan since
Prime Minister Imran Khan took office in August 2018, and held talks with Khan, army
chief Qamar Bajwa, Speaker Asad Qaisar and his counterpart, Shah Mehmood Qureshi.
The current development has eclipsed the Indian hopes as, since 2013, India remains
involved in the construction and maintenance of Chabahar Port. China’s access to the
Gwader port and its de facto control in Februrary-2019 has been a serious concern for
India. According to reports, Beijing and Tehran are diplomatically engaged in forming an
extensive trade and military partnership. Needless to say, for Iran, such a deal could
throw the embattled country a much-needed economic lifeline. Iran is already a part of
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and in September 2019 China announced its
intent to infuse $400 billion worth of investments in Iran’s oil and gas, infrastructure and
transportation sectors.

The newly espoused partnership, firstly proposed by China’s leader, Xi Jinping, during a
visit to Iran in 2016 — was subsequently approved by President Hassan Rouhani’s
cabinet in June, Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said last week. The
current deal is part of the China-Iran 25 -year strategic partnership. According to leaked
versions of the 18-page ‘Comprehensive Plan for Cooperation between Iran and China’
being finalised by officials in Tehran and Beijing, the cooperation will extend from
investments in infrastructure, manufacturing and upgrading energy and transport
facilities, to refurbishing ports, refineries and other installations, and will commit Iranian
oil and gas supplies to China during that period.

Amidst the growing US strategy to isolate Iran, Tehran has in recent months largely
reached out to Beijing. China remains Iran’s main trading partner but trade between the
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two sides had reasonably declined due to U.S. pressure in recent years. The deal between
the two sides would be far-reaching as It would increase intelligence sharing and security
and military cooperation, including in possible missions in Syria and Iraq; It would also
enlarge Chinese companies’ footprints in Iranian railroads, ports and
telecommunications; and most importantly, securing for Beijing a steady and discounted
Iranian oil supply for the next quarter-century . According to the plan of the said deal,
China would develop free-trade zones in strategic locations in Iran, further binding the
country into Beijing’s sprawling Belt and Road global trade and development initiative.
Many Chinese companies including China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) have pinned their stakes in Iran’s oil
and gas exploration.

Nonetheless, New Delhi’s bowing to the US- imposed sanctions on Iran has intrinsically
pushed India in a corner over its relations with Tehran. In this growing geopolitical
scenario, the Washington – Beijing tussle of interests — arriving in Iran provides a big
policy dilemma for New Delhi, which has been facing the task of rebalancing its relations
with the US and Iran. Yet not surprisingly, after its reversal on Chabahar port, Tehran has
also decided to cancel the Iran-India Gas-pipeline project (a double- blow for India). Last
week, Masoud Karbasian, managing director of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC),
told reporters.

The China-Iran deal will not only give a boost to the growing Turkey-Russia-China-Iran
strategic gamut but also revitalize the Pak-Iran relations. Geopolitically, the emerging
political and economic integration of Eurasia is part of the growing partnership between
Turkey- Russia-Iran relationships—giving the Iranian leadership the confidence that they
can wait out Trump. After the US announced fresh sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank,
Russia’s foreign ministry immediately declared Moscow would ignore them. “This will
not impact our approaches to Iran”, said Zamir Kabulov, a Russian foreign ministry
official, according to RIA Novosti. “We will continue to cooperate with Iran in the
banking sphere as planned.” Today, pragmatism drives Iran’s eastward policy– the
cornerstone of Iran’s foreign policy, per se.

Ariane M. Tabatabai an expert on the Iranian affairs, argues in her book ‘No Conquest,
No Defeat: Iran’s National Security Strategy’ that Iran’s national security policy today is
largely shaped by its strategic culture, a product of the country’s historical experiences of
war and peace. As a result, Iranian strategic thinking is perhaps best characterised by its
dynamic yet resilient nature.

Undeniably, Iran’s political leadership, by reviewing its decision on the Chabahar port
project, has rightly shown the political correctness that Iran has the sovereign right to
participate in any regional integration projects that it wants to, especially those such as E-
CPEC+ which could ensure its long-term economic security amidst the U.S. ever-
tightening sanctions pressure vis-à-vis the Iran nuclear deal. One of the most growing
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impacts of the deal is that sidelining India by Iran from Chabahar port would bring peace
and maintain security on western borders of Pakistan.

China is already engaged in a trilateral peace dialogue between Beijing, Kabul, and
Islamabad. Given all that, it is a paramount need that Iran must reset its peaceful relations
with Pakistan since the issue of its proxy war in Baluchistan is highly alarming for the
future of CPEC and the Gwader port. After Iran’s interest in the CPEC, Kabul may also
be gravitated towards getting the fruits from the ongoing CPEC activity in the region-
remaking new vistas of geopolitical reorientations of peace and prosperity.