A. C. No.

7421               October 10, 2007

ELISA V. VENTEREZ, GENARO DE VERA, INOCENCIA V. RAMIREZ, PACITA V. MILLS, ANTONINA V. PALMA
and RAMON DE VERA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME, Respondent.

Thus, complainants were compelled to engage the services of a new counsel to file a Motion for Reconsideration with
the MTC who did not, however, enter his appearance as new counsel. It bears stressing that during this time,
respondent had not yet filed any notice of withdrawal as counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981.
Respondent only formally withdrew as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 981 when he filed with the MTC his
Notice17 of Retirement as Counsel on 5 May 2004, on the ground that "he was also retired as Counsel for the
[complainants] two days after he received copy of the decision rendered in this case when SALVADOR RAMIREZ, a
representative of the [complainants], withdrew all the records of the case from [respondent] to be given to his new
counsel."

We cannot accept respondent’s defense that he had already withdrawn from the case two days after his receipt of the
MTC Decision and that he had allegedly communicated this withdrawal to Salvador Ramirez, son of one of the herein
complainants, Inocencia Ramirez. It is an apparent attempt on the part of respondent to wash his hands of any
liability for failing to pursue any of the available remedies to complainants from the adverse MTC Decision.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time
with or without cause.18 The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is,
however, considerably restricted.19 Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.20 He is not at liberty to abandon it
without reasonable cause.21 A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the
client's written consent or from a good cause.22

Section 26, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the
written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without
the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he
ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the
docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.

A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in
court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer
must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether
the lawyer ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.23

What constitute good cause for the withdrawal of services by the counsel are identified under Rule 22.01, Canon 22
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE
APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01-- A lawyer may WITHDRAW his services in any of the following cases:

a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is
handling;

b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;

c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
 d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;

e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer
agreement;

f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and

g) Other similar cases.

The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds aforementioned. Neither can the circumstances of this case
be considered analogous to the grounds thus explicitly enumerated. Contrary to respondent’s contention, his
professional relations as a lawyer with his clients are not terminated by the simple turnover of the records of the case
to his clients. Respondent’s defense completely crumbles in face of the fact that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party
in Civil Case No. 981 and, hence, had no authority to withdraw the records of the said case from respondent or to
terminate the latter’s services.

Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services, he, however, cannot just do so
and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal
will be granted by the court.24 Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record
who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his clients require.25 He must still
appear before the court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-
client relations are not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record.

Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel of record for the
complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and whether he has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot
immediately do so and leave his clients without representation. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a
written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event, the attorney
should see to it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case.26 Respondent did not comply with these
obligations. Therefore, he remains the counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981 with the duty to
protect complainants’ interest. Had he made the necessary inquiries as to the status of the case, he would have
known that he was still the counsel of record as no entry of appearance was ever made by another counsel. It would
have been easily discernible on his part that there was no change in his status as complainants’ lawyer. As of that
time, their client-lawyer relationship was still subsisting. Therefore, he would have known that the Motion for
Reconsideration was denied; and a writ of execution had been issued under the circumstances.

[G. R. No. 141854.  March 30, 2005]

APOSTOL vs. CA

THIRD DIVISION

client filed in court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party. [1]  As a rule, the withdrawal in writing of a lawyer as counsel
cralaw

for a party, with the client's written conformity, does not require the approval of the court to be effective, [2]  especially if the
cralaw

withdrawal is accompanied by a formal appearance of a new counsel. The withdrawal ordinarily takes effect upon its filing in court,
insofar as the court is concerned, and upon receipt of a copy thereof by the adverse party insofar as the latter is concerned. [3]
cralaw
G.R. No. 109493 July 2, 1999

SPOUSES SERAFIN AQUINO and RUMELIA AQUINO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET. AL., respondents.

We rule that there was a proper service of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
21553 dated July 25, 1991 on the petitioners. 1âwphi1.nêt

Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states the proper procedure for the withdrawal of a lawyer as
counsel in a case. It provides:

Sec. 26 — Change of Attorneys — An attorney may retire at anytime from an action

or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also
retire at anytime from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his
client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing,
determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of
the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of
the former one, and the written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse
party . . . .

Unless the procedure prescribed in the above mentioned section is complied with, the attorney of
record is regarded as the counsel who should be served with copies of the judgments, orders and
pleadings and who should be held responsible for the case.   In cases of substitution of attorneys
17

the following requisites must be complied with:

1. Written application for substitution;

2. written consent of the client; and

3. a written consent of the attorney to be substituted.

In case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof
that notice of the motion for substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by our
rules. 
18

In the present case, petitioners admit that Atty. Barican represented them in the proceedings before
the lower court but that Atty. Mala substituted Atty. Barican when the case was elevated to the Court
of Appeals.   No proof was present by the petitioners to show compliance with the above procedural
19

requirements for the withdrawal of Atty. Barican and the substitution of Atty. Mala in his stead: no
written application for substitution or written consent of the client was filed in court. The Certification
made by Atty. Rosalino C. Barican to the effect that he was the former counsel of record of the
petitioners but that he withdrew as their counsel is not controlling in the absence of compliance with
the above procedural requirements. It is therefore irrelevant that Atty. Mala did not receive the copy
of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1991 which dismissed their appeal since he
was not the counsel of record and had never entered his appearance as counsel of the petitioners.

Accordingly, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 21533 dated July 25, 1991,
dismissing the petitioners' appeal became final and executory because their lawyer of record, Atty.
Barican, was duly served with a copy of that resolution. There was an effective service upon the
petitioners for as far as the Court of Appeals was concerned, Atty. Barican continued to be their
counsel of record.

G.R. No. 147010             July 18, 2003

PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
DE DIOS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and DE DIOS MARIKINA TRANSIT CORPORATION, respondents.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The contention of the petitioner does not persuade.

First. The notice of withdrawal of appeal filed by the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates on
September 14, 1999 with the CA was a mere scrap of paper, absent a valid substitution of counsel.
The counsel of record as of September 14, 1999 was the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office.
On the said date, the law office filed a motion with the CA to withdraw as counsel for the appellants,
while the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates filed the notice of withdrawal of appeal for the
appellants. In the case of Santana-Cruz v. Court of Appeals,30 this Court enumerated the essential
requisites of a valid substitution of counsel:

. . . No substitution of counsel of record is allowed unless the following essential requisites of

a valid substitution of counsel concur: (1) there must be a written request for substitution; (2)
it must be filed with the written consent of the client; (3) it must be with the written consent of
the attorney to be substituted; and (4) in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted
cannot be obtained, there must be at least a proof of notice that the motion for substitution
was served on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. . . .31

There was clearly no compliance to these essential requisites. It was only on September 16, 1999
when the CA granted the motion of the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office to withdraw as
counsel for the appellants that the withdrawal of the said counsel and its substitution by the Luis
Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates became effective.

Second. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:

Section 3. Withdrawal of appeal. — An appeal may be withdrawn as a matter of right at any

time before the filing of the appellee's brief. Thereafter, the withdrawal may be allowed in the
discretion of the court.

We agree with the respondents that the notice of withdrawal of appeal of the appellants in CA-G.R.
CV No. 61310 filed on September 14, 1999 was not self-executory, and did not render the trial
court's December 4, 1998 Decision final and executory. While we agree with the petitioner that under
Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal maybe withdrawn by the appellants as a matter
of right at any time before the filing of the appellees' brief; however, the rule does not apply in this
case because the notice of withdrawal of appeal filed in CA-G.R. CV No. 61310 by the Luis Q.U.
Uranza, Jr. & Associates did not bear the appellants' conformity thereto. It bears stressing that the
counsel of the appellants was a mere agent holding a special power of attorney to act for and in
behalf of the principal respecting the ordinary course of the appealed case. There was a need for the
appellants, as the principals, to execute a special power of attorney specifically authorizing the
withdrawal of a perfected appeal.32 Absent a special power of attorney expressly authorizing their
counsel to withdraw their appeal, or in lieu thereof, the written conformity of the appellants to the
withdrawal of their appeal, the notice of withdrawal of appeal by the new counsel of the appellants
was a mere scrap of paper.

G.R. No. 106153 July 14, 1997

FLORENCIO G. BERNARDO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS and JIMMY TOMAS, respondents.

Under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence, a valid substitution of counsel has
the following requirements: (1) the filing of a written application for substitution; (2) the client's written consent; (3) the
consent of the substituted lawyer if such consent can be obtained; and, in case such written consent cannot be
procured, (4) a proof of service of notice of such motion on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by
the Rules.   Where death of the previous attorney is the cause of substitution of the counsel, a verified proof of the
32

death of such attorney (usually a death certificate) must accompany the notice of appearance of the new counsel.

Clearly, petitioner failed to comply with the above requirements. His new counsel's notice of appearance   merely33

mentioned that Atty. Jose B. Puerto "recently died." A verified certificate of death was not attached thereto. It has
been held that courts may not presume that the counsel of record has been substituted by a second counsel merely
from the filing of a formal appearance by the latter.  34

In any event, mere mention of the death of Atty. Puerto was of no moment for it was the law firm of Puerto Nuñez &
Associates, — not merely Atty. Jose Puerto — which was the legal representative of petitioner. The death of said
attorney did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between the firm and Bernardo.  35

This Court is not unmindful of the belated attestation   of the former secretary   of said law office that the other
36 37

partner, Dr. Constantino Nuñez, allegedly died even before 1986; that two associates   ceased to be connected with
38

the firm since 1989; while a third associate, Atty. Jose Acejas predeceased Atty. Puerto in March 1990, thereby
leaving Atty. Puerto as the only lawyer in the office. But, obviously, it was petitioner's former counsel who misled the
trial court into believing that "Puerto Nuñez and Associates," a law firm consisting of more than one lawyer, continued
to legally represent Bernardo. Courts may presume that a law firm that represented itself as such, with at least two
name partners and more than one associate is composed of at least three lawyers.   It is not the duty of the courts to
39

inquire during the progress of a case whether the partnership continues to exist lawfully, or the partners are still alive
or its associates are still connected with the firm.

ubstitution of counsel; procedure under

Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court - G. R.
No. 187188
G. R. No. 187188

"x x x.

Substitution of Counsel
 Petitioners claim that Atty. Espinas passed away on 8 February 2008. They
further claim that he was already bedridden as early as December 2007, and thus
they “failed to get any information whether [he] was served with a copy of the [CA
Petition].”[23]
Petitioners were negligent in the conduct of their litigation. Having known
that Atty. Espinas was already bedridden as early as December 2007, they should
have already obtained new counsel who could adequately represent their interests.
The excuse that Atty. Aglipay could not enter his appearance before the CA
“because [petitioners] failed to get [their] folder from the office of Atty.
Espinas”[24] is flimsy at best.
The requirements for a valid substitution of counsel have been
jurisprudentially settled in this wise:
Under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence, a valid
substitution of counsel has the following requirements: (1) the filing of a written application for
substitution; (2) the client's written consent; (3) the consent of the substituted lawyer if such
consent can be obtained; and, in case such written consent cannot be procured, (4) a proof of
service of notice of such motion on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by the
Rules. Where death of the previous attorney is the cause of substitution of the counsel, a verified
proof of the death of such attorney (usually a death certificate) must accompany the notice of
appearance of the new counsel.[25]

x x x."

Substitution of Counsel

Petitioners claim that Atty. Espinas passed away on 8 February 2008. They further claim that he was already
bedridden as early as December 2007, and thus they "failed to get any information whether [he] was served with a
copy of the [CA Petition]."23

Petitioners were negligent in the conduct of their litigation. Having known that Atty. Espinas was already bedridden as
early as December 2007, they should have already obtained new counsel who could adequately represent their
interests. The excuse that Atty. Aglipay could not enter his appearance before the CA "because [petitioners] failed to
get [their] folder from the office of Atty. Espinas" is flimsy at best.
24 

The requirements for a valid substitution of counsel have been jurisprudentially settled in this wise:

Under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence, a valid substitution of counsel has
the following requirements: (1) the filing of a written application for substitution; (2) the client's written consent; (3) the
consent of the substituted lawyer if such consent can be obtained; and, in case such written consent cannot be
procured, (4) a proof of service of notice of such motion on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by
the Rules. Where death of the previous attorney is the cause of substitution of the counsel, a verified proof of the
death of such attorney (usually a death certificate) must accompany the notice of appearance of the new counsel. 25

The fact that petitioners were unable to obtain their folder from Atty. Espinas is immaterial. Proof of service upon the
lawyer to be substituted will suffice where the lawyer’s consent cannot be obtained. With respect to the records of the
case, these may easily be reconstituted by obtaining copies thereof from the various courts involved.